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Introduction 
Every age is an age of transition, Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed 
The Presidency at a turning point in our history--our economic system 
had broken down. He patched the system up and saved it. Eventually, 
but not until World War II, the nation was to enjoy full recovery. 
Roosevelt's words and policies indicated his transitional histori-
cal role. He partially rejected the past, and he partially accepted 
the future. In educating himself, he gave a hearing to representa-
tives of a nwri:ler of schools of thought. One of his important ad-
visers and administrative appointees was Rexford Guy Tugwell. 
Tugwell's ideas, and his experiences as a ?rofessor on the Poto-
mac, are of interest and importance in themselves. Moreover, his 
public career provides a point of entrance to the New Deal as it un-
folded, and his institutional economics furnishes a kind of yardstick 
by which to measure the New Deal with respect to the fundamental 
question of change. 
Tugwell became a 'll'hipping boy for the Administration. This role 
resulted in his being discredited with the American people. His at-
tackers impugned his motives and his loyalty; they distorted his i-
deas, academic and administrative. A study of Tugwell's service in 
washington, if it is to contribute to better relations between in-
tellectuals, especially professors in government, and the public, and 
if it is to throw some light on the age of Roosevelt, m~st attempt to 
tell what the young professor really said, and thought, and did. 
Other lDTeatisationa 
SeTeral aunired article- and chapter•length accounts 
ef Jhaaea of Rexford Guy Tugwell's career haTe seen 
put>lislled. In The Strickea Laad: Tile Story ~ 
Puerto Rico, Hev York, Dout>leday, 1947, he descrised 
ais serTice aa GoTernor of that island, 1941•1946• 
Tais 41ssertation, eased on seconiary sources, goT• 
ernment publication&, tae sut>ject 1 a ewn published 
vritin&&, releTant decu.enta in tae Franklin D. 
~CilaeTelt Liltrary at .iq'de Park, and Professor Tut;• 
vell'a personal ,.,.rs and caaaenta, is the first 
full•l8J11:th study of his actiTities as an adTiser te, 
and aJpoiatee of, RooseTelt froa March, 1932, to Janu-
ary l, 1937• 
TABLE OF CO~~NTS 
Pr~ - Ne'tr Deal 
Part I 
The I>Jan 
I. A Biographical Sketch. 1891 ~· 1931 
Part II 
His Uorda: Ecor:omic Thou.ght 
Int:!'oduotctry Note 
II. Tho Prosperity Decades The Dissenting Tugwell of the 
1920 ° a - Diae;nosia and Prognc·oie 
III. Tue;well ~ e Long-Run Appzooach: Prevention 
The tlew Dea:t 
Part III 
His l'lorde e.r:d Deeds 
From the For-mation o:r ·;;he Brain Trust through the 100 
Days: ~rall's Short-Run Approach~ Resuac1tat1on 
IV. FrO!ll the Fom.a.tion of' -the Brain Trust to the Election 
TUgwell VG:l.'SUS HOOVGr: The Lame=Duck Period 
Introduction 
v. Analysis oi' the Causes of' the Depression: t:ationalim.n 
versus Internat1o:nal1su 
VI. Business Confidence 
VII. Foreign Pol1oy 
VIII. Ent.rance into Of'f'1c1aldom and the End of' the Brain 
Trust 
The 100 Days 
IX. Emergency Approaches 
The J',dmin1s·~rs.t1on 
Xo Tugwell in Washington, 1933 - 1936 
Part IV 
The Man and the Hyth 
XI. Whipping Eoy f'or the Aclm1n1stl:-at1on 
The Controveraial TUgwelll Chaxoges and Rebuttal 
XII. The Dangerom TU!3Woll: Subverl51on 
XIII~ The Dangerou8 Ttlgt-rell: Pe:r"son,ll TX"D-i to and Conduc•t 
XIV. The !Inmlesa 'l'Ugltell 
Part V 
Conclusion 
XV. Tugwell 1 s Impact on the New Dee.l 
Intrllduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••••• • ••• • i 
Other lDYest1sationa ••• • • •••• • • • • • • • • • •• • .11 
Pre • @w Deal 
Part I 
The Man 
I. A Bio8raf&ical Sketca, 1891 • 1931 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
Part II 
Hia Woriaa Eaontaic 'l'll.oupt 
Intreiaator.r Note • • • • • • • • • 14 
II. '!'he Presper1t;y Decali.oc The DiaaoaU~ Tugwell of the 1920'• • 
Diasa-eia aDi Procaoeia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .15 
Instit•tional Laa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .15 
'l'apell·•a General Diaaatiafactioa • • • • • • • • • • • 15 
Beaaona for Inatitutioaal La1 •••• • • • • • • • • • 20 
MaaifestatioDB of Iastitat1o .. l La1 • • • • • • • • •• 28 
Cauaal Factoras A8u8e• • • • ••••••••••••• 2B 
Resultaa Malali.juat•ata • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 33 
O"tH"proli.uctioa ( 0"ftlr1aYeatMnt) • • • • • • •• • • 33 
Misuse ef Surpl•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 37 
UDierconauaption • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 42 
Conclusioaa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 47 
Procaosia • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 47 
• • • • • • • • •• 49 
III. 'l'llpell 1a Lo~-Ru .l•proe.oh a PreYeation • • • • • • • • • • 54 
Iatr .. uction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 54 
The Heei fer Plaunins • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 55 
Contusion aDi Coorli.1natioa • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 55 
Ethics • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 57 
Sociali- • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 59 
Daplementation of Planninc • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The Rationale for Plaanias • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 70 
The Lep.l Basia for PlaDDiDC • • • • • • ••• • • • • • 70 
The Concept of Conjuaeture • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 71 
Recoaciling the Esoteric and the Exoteric • • • • • • ••• 86 
ATOidance of Politica • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • 
Plannilll; ancl D111110craq •••••• • • • • • • • •• • • 
Poteatialitiea of the FUture • • • • • • • • ••• •••• 97 
The Econ~ of A~dance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 97 
Ttapell • • Lone-Run Th inltiJic • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 98 
The New Deal 
Pan III 
His Wol'lla aJicl Dee4a 
From the Formation of the Brain Truat throush the 100 
Dayal 'l'upell1a Shon-ihla Approach - ReaWicitation 
IV. Fram the Formation of the Brain Trust to the Election •• 
'l'llpell wreua Hoowr: The :UU.-Duck Period 
IatrOduction • • • • • • • • • • • 
Y. Aaalyaia of the CaWiea of the Depreaeion: NatioDalia 
106 
121 
._raua lnteraatioaali .. •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12' 
Nationaliaa ••• • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • •• 126 
Iaternatioualia: The European Interpretation • • • • • 132 
VI. Bu.iueas Confidence • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .1}6 
IDaction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 150 
Kinde of Actions Lip~na•a Theaia • • • • • • • •••• 154 
Aid at tae !OJ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 163 
Aii at the Bottaa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Reflation and the Diwraified Attack •• • • • • • •• 
175 
186 
Hoowr • a Collfidence Theaia: The D111110cra ta •· Depreaaioa • 2o6 
VII. roreiln Poli-.y • • •• • • •• •• • ••••••••••• • 282 
The Load.oa Ecoll.llmic Collf'ereaee • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 282 
Iatroductioa • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • •••• • • 282 
Natioaaliam v.raus Interaatioaalism • • • • • • • • • • 283 
Nat ioaali- • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 284 
Da.estic Measures • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 284 
All. Interaatioaal lllev Deal •• • • • • • • • • • • • 289 
IDteraatioaali.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 293 
Areas ot Coatlict • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • 
Iatercow~atal Da'llts •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The Iateraatioaalist Ca.es Ha.e •• • • • • • • • • • 300 
HooYer«a Attitu4e• • • • •••••••• • ••• • •• • 308 
Roosevelt's Failure to Cooperate • • •••• • • ••• 308 
Estiaate ot Foreicll Pertoraaace • • • • • • • • • • • 310 
Coaolusioa. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 313 
Helatioas with Japan • • • • •• • •••••••• • • •• 3~ 
VIII. Eatraace iato otticiald• aU. the Ead ot the Brain Trut • 327 
The 100 Days 
IX. ~raenc7 ApproaCh•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3a9 
:ra ... • • • • • • •• • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • 339 
The ~eaper ot the ~t.ea • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 339 
• • • • • • • • • • • 343 
SarTi~l ••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 351 
.356 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Tugwell's Awrsioa to Crackpot Do-Goocl.i- • • • • • • 361 
A Call tor a •coacert ot Iaterests• • • • • • • • • • 368 
'l'llewell•s Attituae towards Busiaess1 lillperaoaality • • 175 
' 
Meaaurea ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .,380 
Tile Nati011al Iadustrial Reco"nJry Act aDd the li'atiolll&l 
RecoTery Aiainiatration • • • • • • • • • • •••••• 380 
Tll.e Oriciu aM. Prc.~tion of the n-est ic .Ulot-nt Plan 415 
Tll.e Adaiaiatration 
x. Tu«well in Washin&ton. 1933 • 1936 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 499 
Tucwell and the Jar.er • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 499 
'l'll.e .&crinltural Adju~at Aiainiatrat1oa1 Peek and 
tlle •Ptarae• ••••• • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Ola•Line and Other AetiTities in the USDA • 
Tile Reaettl.-nt Aa.iais~ration • • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
531 
543 
Tacw•ll aDd tae ceaa~r • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5&4 
lfhe AAA aad. the NRA. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 564 
The Pure Pood.and Druce Bill •••••••••••••• 566 
Tacwell and Natural Reaouroes • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 579 
TWcvell aM. the TVG New Deale • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 597 
~~1•• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 638 
Additioaal JUactioaa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 664 
IDtroduetioa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Board Mea-.rahipa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .,66 
Erralld .lle7 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 670 
Tacwell' a Praat ice with Procressi 'nls • • • • • • • • • • 
Iiea ian • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 674 
Feieral lneerporation • ••••••••• • •• • • • 675 
Moaeta17 Viewa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 676 
The Uniiatri~ted Profits Tax • • • • • • • • • • • •• 686 
Pa-lict.t • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• ?17 
Resi.-atioa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 120 
Part IV 
'l'.llle Mall arul tlae ~h 
XI. ~ippiac Ba,r tor the ~aiatratioa • ••••• 0 • 0 0 •• 135 
• 0 0 0 0 •• •••• 0 735 
General • •• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 735 
The Pure FOG& arul Druca Bill • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 744 
!he Attack aad Ita lmpaet • • • • • 
Geaeral • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • ••••••••• 
• • •• • • • • • • • 
• •• • • • • •••• 
155 
755 
756 l'J34 • 
l'J36 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• ••• • •• 7~ 
The Beaettl ... at A4aiaiatration • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Retatatioaa •• • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • •••• • • 
Diaaenters in tlae Press • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
~ell•a a.&ctioa • •••••••••••• • • • • • • 
The Coatzooftrsial Tucwlla Chsrpa aiHi Renttal 
XII. The DaJI&Ol'OIIll 'flacwlll Sull'nlnion • • • • • • • • • • • • • 76.3 
Charpa ••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 783 
Renttal • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 803 
Tll&walle Rllaaia• allll the C~ista • • • • • • • • • • 613 
The Cliaate at Accuaatioa • • •••• • • • • • • • • 60.3 
lar.er•La8or Political Uait7 • • •• • •• • • • • • • 612 
Tve IniiTiduala • •••• o • • • • • • • • • • • • • 622 
'l'qwall Detiaea Intel'lllltio•l C~i- • • • • • • • 624 
'l'qwall •• In4ipDOIIS 'ftliakiDC • • • • • • • • • • • • 629 
TUcvell the Coaaer"nnti'nl ••••••••••••••• • 6.3.3 
BZipncies at tlae Tt.ea • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6.3.3 
Loq Bua • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 833 
~-ia~e • • • • • • ••••• • • • • • • • • • 836 
Tacwell in the Miiile • • • • • • • • • • ••••• 838 
Ecoaaaic Tho.cbt • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 839 
Political 'l'houcll.t •••• • • • • • • • • •• • • • 843 
B~lution • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • 843 
Refe:ra b .AMrioa • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • 852 
ne..eraq • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• 8.52 
The Coaatitu~ioa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 862 
~e ProcressiTe 'l'reii~ion ••••••• • •• • 898 
Specific Measures • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 896 
Ceael•aioa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 902 
XIII. 'l'lle De.aprous Tacwellc Persoul 'l're ita aDil CoDiluc~ • • • 905 
'!'he Aa•i~ioaa Tacwell • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 985 
caarae• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 905 
Ren~ul ••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • o911 
The ~nt 'l'U«Well • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • .928 
'l'llc T•~•-Ba7iaa Tacwell • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 938 
~e A••~ruse Tucwell • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 947 
XIV. The Haralese ~11 • • •• • ••• • ••••• • • • • 957 
'!'he Iapru11ioal, Dre&aill8 Tucwell • ••••••• • • • 957 
Char&•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 957 
Be-.,tal • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••• 
'l'ucWell ~he Poor A4ainistreter • • ••••••• • • • 985 
Char .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 985 
Re lnlttal • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 988 
Pan v 
Conclusion 
xv. 'l'ucWell's !JIIpact en the New Desl 
Introduction: Intellectual aDd Adainiatrati~ ContriDutiena 1000 
Short Ran: Eiueati~ Function • ••••••• • • • • • • • 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
~ll•a Iatlueace on Rooae~lt • • •• • • •• • • • • 
1001 
1001 
1001 
Tllpell•a Apparent In1'luaceo O~rest:lmationa • •••• 1001 
'l'IJ«Well' a Actual Influace • • • • • • • • • • • 
The Preai4ent and the Proteaaora • • • • • • • 
• • • 
• • • 
1013 
1013 
'l'IJ«Well and Rooae~lto Peraoml Relations • ••• • • 10,38 
Oonclu.ion • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .1045 
Rooae~lt aDd the New Deal • • •• • • • • • • • • • • lOltS 
Rooaewlt •Hia Own Maa• •••• • • • • • • • • • • •• 1046 
• • • • • • • •• • • • • 
Maaaurea Which Reoae~lt Approwd • • • • • • • • • 1048 
Meaaurea to Which Reoae~1t ReapoDdea ••••••• 1048 
Measures Whiah Rooae~lt Rejected • • •••••• • 1048 
• • • •• 18.51 
Long Ran: 'l'he •Pree;ressi~• Natve ot the New Deal • • • • el85f 
Iatro4•c•i•a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .1857 
The C•Dtliat • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The Pro\aeoniat• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
~lla Coajuncture •• • • ••••••• • • 
• • • .1858 
•••• 1058 
• • • .1058 
Braadeiat Atemisa •• • ••• • • • ••• • • • • • • lo61 
'flae Wi.Juaer: Baru.ch ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • lo65 
!he ~sRooae~lt • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • .1072 
The Reau.lta • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • •• ·1091 
The •Pro~aai~• Nstve ot the New Deal ••••••• 1091 
The •Death• ot the New Deal • • • • • • • • • • • • • uolr. 
The Dichot~ ot the New Deal • • • • • • • • • llo6 
19.38: 'l'oo Late to ReYerae the Decision • • • • • • 
Concluaiona • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • 
•• • • • • • • • 
s...ar,- •••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
General • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••• 
• 1111 
.1115 
• 1115 
Bi.l1G~t&Jh7 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1152 
A'-tract • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1196 
Biosr-Ph7 ef CaDdiiate • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1199 
REXFORD GUY TUGWELL AND THE NEW DEAL 
Pre - New Deal 
Part I 
The Man 
I, A Biographical Sketch, 1891 • 1931 
The Tugwell and Tyler families came from Surrey, England, in 
1852. Landing in New York City, they moved inland to Chautauqua County 
in the lower part of the western tip of the state. Through intermarri-
age of the Tugwells and Tylers, Rexford Guy Tugwell carries on the male 
side the blood of both strains. His grandfather on the Tugwell side 
was a cattle dealer known as a good man in a trade,1 
Tugwell was born in Sinclairville, New York, on July 10, 1891, 
to Charles Henry and Dessie (Rexford) Tugwell,2 When Tugwell, the only 
surviving child, was thirteen years old, his family moved 8eventy-five 
miles northward to Wilson, New York, near Buffalo. His father hed pur-
chased a fruit farm; he soon became a moderstely '"ell-to-do orchard 
farmer and canner.3 
Tugwell graduated from Masten Park High School in Buffalo in 
1911.4 In high school, according to a critic, Tugwell made no effort 
to hide the fact that his instructors bored him,5 The principal wrote 
Rexford's father that the boy was so unappreciative of educational advan-
tages that he might just as well be taken out of ~chool and put to work 
on the farm,6 The father, who, allegedly never understood his dreaming 
1. 
2, 
6. 
Lord, Russell, The Wallaces .Q!. ~ (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
348. 
Who's 1r/ho in America, 1952-53, Vol. 27, 
Marquis Co., 1952) 2457. 
Two Years (Chicago, A. N. 
Lord, R., The Wallaces of ~. 349. 
Who's Who in America, 2457. 
Bolles:Jil;;i"r, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 
Vol. 39, No. 153, September, 1936, 79. 
Lord, R., ~ Wallaces of ~. 349• 
American Mercury, 
2. 
son- raised •carefree and alone• on a dairy (stc) farm,7 paid suffici-
ently little heed to the principal's suggestion to see his son through 
college, Tugwell was neither mentally nor physically inactive during 
his high-school career. In his senior year he covered the police 
courts and city hAll for the Buffalo Courier ;8 his th.,l"e papers showed 
that he already desired to do something about humanity's problems,9 
While Tutwell enjoyed rural life - he raised B calf &nd won a 
prize with it, 1 t was too 1 imi ted for hl.m. 10 He left Nia@ra County to 
make his mark in Philadelphia, New York, and Washington; but he retained 
a feeling for the ~and of his childhood. Later, se Under Secretary of 
Agriculture, he returned from time to tim" to western New York to deliver 
addresses. In the course of a speech on conservation, he rr.entioned the 
regrettable erosion, in two generations, of the top-soil in the New York 
hill country where he had been born;11 he referred, in a speech in 
South Carolina, to the overproduction of apples in "my own country of 
western New York;• 12 in another speech he expressed a "genuine sense of 
homecoming,• although his loyalties were, torn between Chautauqua and 
Niagara Counties ,13 It is not easy to d.ismiGs Tut-well 1 1'1 re!llRrks on his 
7, Bolles, B., •The Sweetheart of the Ftegimenters," 79, 
8, Lord, R. , The Walla ces .£f. l!2l!!!., 34 9 • 
9, Bolles, B., "The Sweetheart of the Ftegimenters,• 79. 
10, Gillis, A, and Ketchum, R., Our America (Boston, Little, Brown, 1936) 
360, 
11. '!'u~'Well, R, C:., •conservation Redefi.ned," Address, Fiftieth Anniver-
sary of the Founding of Neu York's Forest Preserve, Albecny, Ne>r York, 
r.'f.ay 15, 1935; ~Press Release, 8, 
12. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Clemson College, S, C., August 15, 1934; 
USDA Press Release, l-2. 
13, Tugwell, R. G,, Address, Niagara County Pioneer Association, Olcott 
Beach, New York, August 8, 1934; USDA Press Release, 1-2, 
home country as oratorical ornamentation when one reads this passage in 
The Stricken Land: 
To my children the life of my boyhood in that town would 
seem incredibly simple, no doubt. We went barefoot in 
summer; the balls we played with were often wound and 
covered by ourselves; we made our own skis and sleds; and 
one of my daily duties was to go down to pasture lot and 
bring home the cow for milking •••• We had fourteen driving 
horses in the barn; I had a flock of chickens; a hutch of 
rabbits and a maple-sugar house all my own. And dogs - I 
always had one and sometimes four or five. I could relate 
the history of every one of them to this day. We spent 
every summer -or part of it - on Chautauqua Lake, where I 
could distinguish the steamboats as far away as my boys 
can now spot a Mariner or a Marauder. And I knew them by 
their whistles too,l4 
In his first two years at the University of Pennsylvania, 1911-13, 
Tugwell was very active in extra-curricular activities. He was a member 
of the social fraternity Delta Upsilon and the prom committee.15 He 
16 
served as toastmaster at the sophomore banquet. He found vehicles for 
expression of his literary inclinations as managing editor of the col-
lege newspaperl7 and as editor of a student literary magazine.18 While 
Tugwell's suavity, seriousness, and literary erudition attracted lesser 
students,l9 few classmates at Pennsylvania knew him we11.20 
At lesst two men at Pennsylvaniaappear to have influenced Tugwell 
seriously to consider man's broad and basic problems, Scott Nearing told 
14. Tugwell, R, G., The Stricken Land .(New York, Doubleday, 1947) 663. 
15. Block, M., ed,, Current Biography, 1941 (New York, H, W. Wilson Co., 
1941) 874· 
16. Lord, R., The Wallaces .Qf Iowa, 349• 
17. Current Biography, 874. 
18. Lord, R., The Wallaces .Qf ~. 349 • 
19. Bolles, B., •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 79• 
20. Lord, R., The Wallaces .Qf ~. 349· 
him his future lay in economics; Simon Nelson Patten said he was wasting 
time in frivolous college activities.21 In his junior year Tugwell 
abruptly dropped his student activities and eagerly began to study econ-
omics. He set out to acquire the tools with which to give expression to 
his desire to rectify society's errors. That mankind's ills attracted 
his attention is seen in a poem he wrote in 1915, verse which opposing 
Congressmen of the New Deal period seldom failed to cite in committee 
hearings: 
I am strong, 
I am big and well-made, 
I am muscled and lean and nervous, 
I am frank and sure and incisive • 
... 
I bend the forces untamable; 
I harness the powers irresistible -
All this I do; but shall do more • 
... 
I am sick of a nation's stenches, 
I am sick of propertized czars •••• 
I have dreamed ~ great dream of their passing, 
I have gathered~ tools and mf charts; 
MY plans are fashioned and practical; 22 I shall roll up ~ sleeves - make America over! 
From 1915 to 1917 Tugwell held an instructorship in economics at 
Pennsylvania, earning a master's degree in 1916.23 He was impressed with 
21. Bolles, B., 'The Wallaces of Iowa, 349. 
22. •Tugwell's Dream,• Newsweek, Vol. 28, No. 1, "uly 1, 1946, 28; Bolles, 
Blair, •Prose and Politics: Writers in the New Deal," Saturday Review 
of Literature, Vol. 21, No. 23, Mar<:h 30, 1940, 4• 
23. Who.• s :!hQ .i.n America, 2457. 
5. 
Nearing's experimentalist approach24 and Patten's institutionalist views.25 
When Nearing was dismissed for making seditious observations, Tugwell and 
others quit the faculty26 - not because of the attack on Nearing (Tugwell 
felt that Nearing had it coming to him27), but because of the investiga-
tion the trustees started afterward to the shame and discomfiture of eld-
erly scholars and useful scientists in the department of economics.28 
Nearing, incidentally, had once said that of all his students only two -
Rex Tugwell and Big Bill Tilden, the tennis player - would go far.29 
Tugwell was an assistant professor in economics at the University 
of Washington, 1917-1918; he served in Paris as business manager of the 
American University Union in 1918.3° A journalist stated that Tugwell's 
experience in Europe so unsettled him to the point of uncertainty as to 
what to do in life that the young economist had to return to his father's 
24. Bolles, B., •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 80; the authority is 
Gruchy, Altan G., Modern Economic Thought: The American Contribution 
(N.Y., Prentice-Hall, 1947), chapter entitled 'The Experimental Econ-
omics of Rexford Guy Tugwell.• 
25. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Fourth Power,• Planning and Civic Comment, April-
June, 1939, Part II, 14-15; Tugwell edited Patten, S. N., Essays 1a ' 
Economic Theory (New York, Knopf, 1924); he wrote •some Formative Influ-
ences in the Life of Simon Nelson Patten,' American Economic Review, 
Supplement, Vol. XIII, No. 1, March, 1923, and •Notes on the Life and 
Work of Simon Nelson Patten,• Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 31, 
No. 2, April, 1923; he compiled a "Bibliography of the Works of Simon 
Nelson Patten,• Annals £! ~ American Academy 2[ Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 107, No, 196, May, 1923; he summarized Patten's ideas in 
'The New Deal: The ProgressiTe Tradition,• Western Political 9uarterly, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, September, 1950, 403·09· 
26. Current Biography, 874• 
27. Lord, R., ~ Wallaces of l2D• 350. 
28. Bolles, B., •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 80; a complete account 
in Witmer, Lightner, The Nearing Case (New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1915). 
29. Lord, R., The Wallaces £! .l2l!§., 349· 
30. Who's :!h2 in America, 2457. 
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farm in 1919 and tramp the old roads near Wilson for more than a year 
before steepage in the aesthetic atmosphere of his boyhood cured his 
uncertainty and reawakened his interest,31 Undoubtedly, although he was 
far from the fighting front, Tugwell had seen enough of waste and cruelty 
to depress him profoundly; but his problem was primarily· a physical one -
a respiratory ailment that has bothered him all his life. His doctors 
told him to live in the country, do light work in the garden, snd write 
only a little. He built a small house on his father's farm, remaining 
there while he regained his health,32 Tugwell had helped out in his 
father's business during summer vacations from college;33 in 1919 he held 
the title of Assistant Manager of the Niagara Preserving Corporation,34 
It is unlikely that, in<.consideration of his health, he labored too 
strenuously in that position. 
In 1920 Tugwell accepted an instructorship at Columbia. He was 
promoted in 1922 - the year in which he completed Ph.D. requirements - to 
assistant professor, in 1926 to associate professor, and in 1931 to profes-
sor,35 Fellow academicians marveled at his rise,36 Tugwell appears to 
have been a favored person at Columbia. He taught a light schedule, some-
times none at all; he was always givea his head to make studies here and 
abroad and to work on his books,37 
31. Bolles, B., •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 80, 
32, Lord, R., The Walla ces .Qf Iowa , 350. 
33· Time, Vol. 23, No. 26, June 25, 1934, 10. 
34• Tugwell, R. G., ed., The Trend .2t Economics (New York, A. A, Knopf, 
1924) 493· 
35. Who's :!!lQ. in America, 2457 • 
36. •The Brain Trust,• Business~. March 22, 1933, 17, 
37, Lord, R,, The Wallaces .!2! ~. 350, 
A disapproving Washington correspondent found the reason for Tug-
well's giving little attention to actual oral teaching in the professor's 
customary lack of interest in direct dealing with people,38 In fact, 
when Tugwell lectured, his classes were popular;39 he carried a standard 
teaching load at times - as in 1924, when he gave the following courses: 
Introduction to Contemporary Civilization 
Phases of American Economic Life 
Proposals for Economic Reorganization 
Advanced Economics for Honor Students40 
When Tugwell was not teaching a standard schedule, he was writing industri-
ously, He published articles in the academic quarterlies and was a con-
tributing editor of the New Republic. During his years at Columbia he 
also wrote, edited, or contributed to several volumes.41 
It was alleged that Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia, 
gave Tugwell carte blanche to teach what he would and devote all the time 
he wished to writing out of wholehearted approval of Tugwell's theory and 
method.42 Documentary evidence indicates that Butler did not personally 
agree with Tugwell's specific economic ideas.43 Butler's attitude must 
have stemmed from a regard for Tugwell's ability and a firm belief in aca-
demic freedom. 
After Tugwell went to Washington in 1933, the opposition press ste-
38. Bolles, B., 'The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 80, 
39· Qurrent Biography, 875• 
40. Tugwell, R. G,, ed,, The Trend of Economics, notes on contributers. 
41. See below, •Bibliography of R. G, Tugwell.• 
42• Bolles, B,, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 80. 
43· Letter, N. M. Butler to F. D, Roosevelt, February 13, 1936, asking 
whether Tugwell is to return to Columbia upon the expiration of his 
leave on June 30, and criticizing the •soak the rich" tax policy; 
Roosevelt Papers; Tugwell, R. G,, 'The Fourth (continued on page 8) 
a. 
reotyped him as a typical impractical product of the ivory tower, a •frus-
trated utopian,•44 "dreamf, reform-minded,•45 the young professor who im-
pressed sophomores.46 Tugwell's activities at Columbia would appear to 
distinguish him from the academician as popularly stereotyped. He pointed 
to the •conservatism of education, the inculcation of past standards 
rather than the freeing and training of intelligence and the slowness of 
enlargement of educational programs• as barriers to increased productivity,47 
He believed that the economics being taught in colleges was not related to 
reality.48 In retrospect, Tugwell has written that the generation after 
World War I hid the true character of its fatal unrealism by calling intel-
lectually honest contemporaries, some of whom predicted disaster, •theor-
ists• and "dreamers.•49 It is reasonable to conclude that Tugwell was 
•not a typical denizen of an ivory tower,•50 that he was •no stock pedant 
with ink in his blood and the moldy dust of libraries in his eyes. On the 
contrary, he had a first-hand knowledge of affairs; his understanding of 
44· 
45. 
46. 
47· 
48. 
49. 
so. 
(Continued from page 7) Power,• Planning and Civic Conment, Part II, 
April-June, 1934, 3, condemns the superficial nature of such distinc-
tions as the one "Nicholas Murray Butler is fond of making between 
'the sphere of government and the sphere of liberty.•• 
Bolles, Blair, •Prose and Politics: Writers in the New Deal,• Satur-
daY Review of Literature, Vol. 21, No. 23, March 30, 1940, 4• 
•Territories: Rumbles in Puerto Rico,• Time, Vol. 39, No. 24, June 
15, 1942. 12. 
Ward, Paul w., "The End of Tugwell,• The Nation, Vol. 143, No, 22, 
November 28, 1936, 623. 
Tugwell, R. G., Industr:y's Coming of !;£&_(New York, Columbia UniTers-
ity Press, 1927) 211, 
•Tugwell: He Blazed a New Path in 'Dismal Science,•• Newsweek, Vol, 
1, No. 8, April 8, 1933, 16. 
Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Lend (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 441, 443• 
Rodgers, Cleveland, Robert Moses (New York, H. Holt, 1952) 129. 
practical economics was thoroughly unacademic.•5l 
In the summer of 1927 Tugwell spent two months in the Soviet Union,52 
a tour Which the anti-New Deal press never let him forget. The visiting 
group consisted of the first non-Communist delegation of American trade 
unionists to go to Russia. The unionists selected to go along with them 
economists and other trained observers - for both technical assistance and 
independent observation. The latter group included Tugwell and Stuart 
Chase, eight people from the field of education - including Paul Douglas -
a law,rer, and a labor journalist. Tugwell was joint-editor with Chase and 
Robert Dunn of Soviet Russia in the Second Decade, a JOing Survey by the 
Technical Staff of the First American Trade Union Delegation, and he con-
tributed Chapter III on "Russian Agriculture.•53 
Despite later accusations that Tugwell desired to Sovietize America 
because of what he had seen in Russia, his chapter on Russian agriculture 
was an academic attempt to evaluate what he saw. Tugwell saw no feasibi-
lity in the application of Russian solutions to the problems of American 
agriculture (our problem was overproduction, theirs quite the opposite). 
The magnitude and ambition of the Russian undertaking impressed him; in an 
academic sense he believed there was much to be learned from observing the 
Soviet development. He returned to America unsympathetic with revolution-
ary tactics54 and critical of the regimentation of opinion so essential a 
51. Gillis, A. and Ketchum, R., Our America, 362-63. 
52. Current Biography, 875. 
53· Tugwell, R. G., joint editor and contributor, Soviet Russia in the 
Second Decade (New York, JOhn Day, 1928) Introduction; Chapter III. 
54· Current Biography, 875• 
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part of the Russian system,55 
In the 1920s Tugwell mingled freely with the Socialists of the 
League for Industrial Democracy and the Civil Liberties Union, He thought 
that some of their ideas tended in the right direction; he by no means 
believed in all of their theories.56 Critics later maintained that the 
platform of the Socialist Party accurately expressed Tugwell's beliefs.57 
Actually, Tugwell's economic ideas on coordinated capitalism did not in-
elude the central tenet of doctrinaire socialism, namely government owner-
ship of the means of production, He observed in December, 1933, that the 
government had to spend when the fruitful sources of income shut down in 
order to reconstruct those forces, not to take them over a la socialism.58 
Tugwell had always been more interested in farmers than in urban 
workers; the plight of agriculture was a aubject to which he gave his 
close attention in the 1920s. In the period 1924-1930 he made intensive 
studies of agricultural problems in Europe and the United States; he wrote 
articles in the Political Science Quarterly, the Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, and the Nation. He also surveyed 
the whole agricultural situation for Alfred E. Smith in 1928, producing a 
lengthy memorandum,59 
As the depression deepenad and government action did not effect an 
improvement in the economv, Tugwell put forth both destructive and con-
structive criticism. One of his last expressions - before joining the 
Roosevelt circle - of dissatisfaction, accompanied by suggestions for reme-
55· 
56. 
Lord, R., !!!§. Wallaces of ~. 351. 
•Tugwell: He Blazed a New Path in 'Dismal Science,•• Newsweek, Vol. 1, 
No. 8, April 8, 1933, 16. (Footnotes continued on psge 11.) 
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dial action, came in a speech before the American Economic Association 
in December, 1931. He called for an economy so sufficiently planned as 
to bring about the end of laissez-faire,6o 
Tugwell belonged by birth and instinct to the American middle class, 
"Without a history of unhappy childhood which spurs many later to social 
reform, he could come to his convictions by the unemotional route of logic. 
Knowing neither great poverty nor great wealth, he had, in advance, no 
excessive hate or love for the extreme fringes of our social order.•6l 
Tugwell, himself, put it this way: 
••• the firm quality of their Lhis parents~union, based as 
it was on physical perfection and proceeding out of a commu-
nity which had accepted and unquestioned ways, had given me 
an exceptional boyhood. No one in that community expected to 
be very rich, but it was almost unthinkable that there should 
be fear of want. 
It was not until I was grown, almost, that I learned that 
Chautauqua County had a poor farm, though, of course, •over 
the hill to the poorhouse• was the tag line of a song we all 
knew, If it saddened us, however, it was with a vague pathos. 
No one I knew ever went hungry or was cold - mucb. less went 
to the poorhouse,b2 
While reactionaries deemed Tugwell a raving radical, the militant leftists 
cited his hesitancy, born of his middle-class origins, to join them as 
(Footnotes 57, 58, and 59 from page 10) 
57, Pettengill, Samuel, Smoke-screen (New York, Southern Publishers, 1940) 22. 
58, Unpublished statement, Tugwell Papers. 
59. Tugwell Papers. 
60, Tugwell, R. G,, •The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Lais-
sez-Faire,• American Economic Review, Supplement, Vol, XXII, No, l, 
March, 1932. 
61. Gillis, A. and Ketchum, R., .QJg: America, 359. 
62, Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 662-63, 
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excluding him from the ranks of sincere advocates of refonn.63 Perhaps 
Tugwell's ideas were as impersonal and unemotional in their origins as one 
can expect from a human being. He once told a conference of social workers 
that "kindness in the world in no way absolves you from your responsibili-
tiea•64 - the duty of seeking long-run solutions, as contrasted with stop-
gsp emergency relief, to society's problems. 
As a result of his background, Tugwell's approach to national prob-
lems was unemotional and yielded sweeping, unorthodox views. His origins 
and training were quite different from those of the young urban lawyers who 
lent Washington a campus-like atmosphere in 1933, provoking the opposition 
press to call them emotional do-gooders. While he had to go to the city to 
exercise his talents, his rearing was rural, 
Among the many lawyers who staffed the New Deal agencies, he was an 
economist. Among economists he was an unorthodox critic of classical con• 
cepts; he was a pupil of Simon Nelson Patten, whose broad views had as much 
impact on sociology as on economics. In the Department of Agriculture Tug-
well was neither a representative of the farm agencies nor an agricultural-
economist graduate of a land-grant college. He discussed social and econ• 
omic objectives with Socialists; he would neither join them nor accept their 
doctrinaire ideas. 
It is difficult arbitrarily to classify persons in a social sense 
63. Ward, Paul w., •wallace the Great Hesitator,"~ Nation, Vol, 140, 
No. 3644, May 8, 1935, 535· 
64. Tugwell, R. G., Address, •Relief and Reconstruction,• Kansas City, 
May 21, 1934; in The Battle for Democracy, 303. 
in a country which has exhibited more class fluidity than any other 
major modern nation. Tugwell's background was essentially middle-class. 
His father was neither a wage-worker nor an investor-capitalist on a 
large scale; he was an independent entrepreneur. In his boyhood Tugwell 
acquired no emotional attachment to any particular social, economic, or 
political group; as an adult he was not a joiner. He did not attach 
himself for any length of time to any organization representing class or 
political interests until 1932, when government inaction moved him to public 
expression of his discontent. He then joined the political organization 
which he thought most likely to take the necessary governmental action in 
the crisis of depression. 
The difficulty involved in any attempt to categcrize him indicates 
that he was an intellectual in the highest, unemotional sense. Human 
nature being what it is, it usually expresses itself in individuals through 
internal conflicts between the rational and the emotioc,al. Men like Tug-
well, who usually reasoned with cold objectivity, are few. The views of 
such a man do not require agreement; they do demand attention. 
Part II 
His Words' Economic Thought 
Introductory Note 
Chapter II presents Tugwell's analysis of the causes of the 
depression. This chapter provides background for the short-run approach 
of the New Deal, especially those measures taken to restore consumer 
purchasing power (Part III). 
Chapter III presents Tugwell's scheme for the prevention of 
depressions. A consideration of the fate of this scheme in the Roose-
velt administration provides a basis for ascertaining in perspective 
Tugwell's impact on, and the overall nature of, the New Deal (Part V). 
In chapters II and III the writer has selected citations from 
Tugwell's works so as to enable Tugwell, in effect, to present his ideas 
himself. The citing of writings post-dating the New Deal period does 
not represent a retroactive attribution to Tugwell of foresight. Selec-
tions from his later writings are those which elaborate on views he 
expressed in the 1920s. 
15. 
II. The Prosperity Decade: The Dissenting Tugwell of the 1920s • 
Diagnosis and Prognosis 
Institutional Lag 
Tugwell's General Dissatisfaction 
Amid the optimism prevailing during the prosperity decade of the 
1920s, 1 critics who identified flaws in the econo~ largely went unheard. 
In the instances in which the critic was an academician, any response he 
evoked, especially from men of the world of business, usually labeled 
him an impractical dreamer. Businessmen asserted that any professor 
would be •hopeless in government,•2 where he would have to grapple dir-
ectly with practical problems. Other observers who doubted the practical 
propensities of academicians generalized that educators actually were 
allies of business in a societal frame of reference. Tugwell, himself, 
maintained that educators could not effect needed adjustments in our 
society unless they desired to do so; but when it was suggested that 
educators make that desire their own and act on it, they cried "indoctri-
nation• • an epithet referring to any ideas that did not coincide with 
current privilege and orthodoxies; a more pleasant name covered prevail• 
ing justification and inculcation.3 
1. 
2. 
Angly, Edward, editor, Oh Yeah? (N.Y., Viking, 1932) shows that this 
optimism outlived the stock-market crash and ensuing events. 
Neilson, Francis, Control from the Top, N.Y. (G. P. Putnam's, 1933) 
39•42; Prothro, James w., The Dollar Decade: Business Ideas 1B ~ 
1920s (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1955) analyzes 
business attitudes. 
Tugwell, R. G., •After the New Deal: 'We Have Bought Ourselves Time 
to Think,'" New Republic, Vol. 99, No. 1286, July 26, 1939, 325. 
~-
Perhaps the views and activities of temporarily aroused youths 
have contributed to the belief, held in some quarters, that American 
colleges and universities are hot•beds of radicalism. There is, however, 
ample reason to consider colleges strongholds of conservatism. Tugwell 
grouped with the press, business sycophants, the orthodox, and the moral-
ists, the teachers whose "adherence ••• to the anti-social ideals of the 
'interested conservatives••4 plsced them, too, in the service of an impos-
sible, imaginary Utopia of reaction.5 Moreover, Tugwell noted, business-
men hurled no epithets at professors who publicly pronounced views in 
agreement with theirs;6 powerful and successful banks and industrial organ-
izations had combed universities' professorial ranks for years in order 
to recruit their chief economic advisers.? 
Tugwell's erudition, often a suspicious quality to men of affairs, 
sat well upon him; he represented the type of scholar who applied himself 
to the interests of the masses of men and got down to the bread and butter 
of everyday life,8 Among educators he fell neither within the category of 
the dreamers divorced from reality, nor the orthodox adherents to the 
status quo. Tugwell's belonging to the younger group of institutional 
economists, along with Hamilton, Tyson, Atkins, Slichter, and Wolfe, in 
4• Tugwell, R, G., Industry's Coming£[ Age (N.Y., Columbia University 
Press) 1927, 212, 
5· Tugwell, R. G., "After the New Deal •••• ,• 325. 
6. Tugwell, R. G., •A Fireside Symposium,• Columbia University Quarterly, 
Vol. 27, No. l, March, 1935, 31. 
7. McCall, c. H., "That Columbia Crowd," Credit and Financial Management, 
Vol, 35, No. 6, June, 1933, 17; Anderson, Sherwood, •Give Rex Tugwell 
a Chance,• clipping, magazine article, Tugwell Papers. 
8. Gillis, A. and Ketchum, R., Our America (Boston, Little, Brown, 1936) 
369. 
itself reflected dissatisfaction with aspects of the econo~. This 
group of institutionalists attributed some signif"cance to the automatic 
changing of institutions, but in its thinking it also placed great em-
phasis on the part rational man played in economic affairs9 - an anti-
determinist philosophy. Obviously, the formulation of approaches to the 
problem of change assumed the need, as well as the inevitability of, 
change; Tugwell and his colleagues were dissatisfied with existing insti-
tutions. 
Tugwell's belonging to the experimental division of the institu-
tional school of economistslO indicated, in addition to dissatisfaction, 
an. undoctrinaire, practical approach to economic problems. The pragmatic 
method of trial and error rejected intellectual and political regimenta-
tion along with the dogmas of Marx and classical liberalism.12 Regarding 
doctrinaires, Tugwell, who condemned those of both the socialist and 
capitalist varieties, wrote: 
Only the unsound theorist counts upon a static world; he 
does so, I suspect, in order that his literary generali-
ties may more accurately describe reality.l3 
He also wrote, in 1926, that in order to get all the things we wanted we 
could have neither socialism nor capitalism; we would have "simply a 
9. Neff, Frank A., Economic Doctrines (N.Y., McGraw-Hill, 1950) 406. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., editor and contributor, "Experimental Economics,• in 
The Trend 2( Economics (N.Y., Knopf, 1924). 
11. Tugwell, R. G., •Trial and Error,• in The Battle !£I Democracv (N.Y. 
Columbia University Press, 1935) 34, 38. 
12. Childs, Marquis w. and Cater, Douglass, Ethics in~ Business Society 
(N.Y., Mentor Books, New American Library, 1954) 161. 
13. Tugwell, R. G., "Design for Government,• Address, Eighth Annual Meet-
ing of the Federation of Bar Associations of Western New York, June 
24, 1933, in The Batt:J&_ For Democragy, 3. 
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series of compromise arrangements worked out from the data of experience 
rather than from any one set of premises.•l4 He was really referring to 
the mixed economw that stems from the method of trial and error that we 
like to think we follow in this country,l5 
Why does the need for institutional change arise? A differential 
in the development of two factors, technology and human nature, creates 
a physical-social gap, The institutionalists believe that human nature 
changes with imperceptible slowness if at all; •, •• though the outside of 
life changes much, the inside changes little •••• • 16 Meanwhile, technolo-
gical advance proceeds at a rapid rate, New things, devices, and instru-
ments are conceived and come into being; each begins an evolution of its 
own and simultaneously affects the concurrent evolution of every other 
existing instrument. The new totals, representing interrelationships of 
new factors, are something more than the sum of their parts. These new 
totals Tugwell labels •emergents,• their coming into being "emergence," 
Through •emergence,• civilization becomes incredibly complex as •emergents• 
pose new problems in social analysis and management. The conservative 
habit of mind often fails to recognize the significance of novelty and 
interrelated institutions; consequences are the more devastating for the 
process of •emergence• having gone unrecognized.17 "Emergents,• cities, 
14. Tugwell, R. G,, "Chameleon Words,• fiew Republic, Vol, 48, No, 612, 
August 25, 1926, 16, 
15. Childs and Cater, Ethics in~ Business Societv, 161 • 
. 16. Hamilton, Edith, The Greak Way 1Q Western Civilization (N.Y., Mentor 
Books, The New American Library) 1948, 8, 
17. Tugwell, R, G,, •The Directive,• Journal£[ Social Philosophy and 
Jurisprudence, Vol, 7, No. l, October, l94i, 22·24. 
19. 
for example, have their own behavior patterns distinct from their parts -
streets, sewers, water-pipes, schools, hospitals, and houses,18 "Emer-
gents• must be recognized, because society cannot go back and literally 
reestablish a situation from which it has once departed,l9 
While ciTilization advances technologically at a geometrically in-
creasing rate, there is ample eTidence that man has not substantially 
changed in his psychological and mental equipment for thousands of genera-
tions; at some point in prehistory he set out to go on from Where he was 
20 by modifying his environment. Thus, man has been able greatly to affect 
his environment; he has not been able adequately to control himself. 
Social-institutional techniques haTe lagged behind materialistic methode-
logy: 
Each of the emergent technological novelties ••• has contracted 
space and shortened time -that is, has reduced separateness 
and increased integration,,,, the devotion to exactitude, which 
was a general condition of this kind of inTention, has been slow 
to make any way in social, especially governmental, affairs,21 
Modern processes have been most at home in industry; there has been little 
progress in thought and morals.22 In a delicately coordinated and systema-
18, Tugwell, R, G,, "Implementing the General Interest,• Public Administra-
tion Review, Vol. 1, No, l, Autumn, 1940, 34· 
19. Tugwell, R, G., "Earthbound: The Problem of Planning and SurviTal,• 
Antioch Review, Winter, 1949-1950, 482, 
20, Tugwell, R. G,, "Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part I, Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol. 27, No. 17, August 14, 1930, 242. 
21. Tugwell, R, G., •Notes on the Uses of Exactitude in Politics,• Poli• 
tical Science Qparterly, Vol. 54, No. 1, March, 1939, 15. 
22. Tugwell, R. G., "After the New Deal •••• •, 325. 
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tized world psychologists and economists have much to learn.23 The real 
economic revolution is just beginning; social policy will have to move 
rapidly to keep pace with it.24 
Basic human drives are too strong to be channeled by police 
methods. Institutions and policies must be so shaped that undesirable 
impulses are •taken advantage of or sublimated in a program which is an 
expression of competing impulses.•25 In order to close the physical~ 
social gap, Tugwell would neither regiment nor change men; he would 
alter institutions. 
Reasons for Institutiom•l Lag 
The inertia of human nature, combined with rapid technological 
progress, has resulted, according to Tugwell, in inade~uate development 
of social institutions. Moreover, man has magnified the inertia of his 
nature by creating and perpetuating ·~ths.• He has concocted theories 
on the basis of imperfect observation of facts which have changed even 
before the completion of the process of formulation, However, in men's 
minds theories have outlived the facts from which they supposedly stemmed, 
Tugwell believed that effective social policy had to be dictated 
by contemporary resources, techni~ues, and circumstances, rather than by 
23. Tugwell, R. G., "An Economist Reads Dark Laughter,• New Republic, 
Vol, 45, No. 575, December 9, 1925, 87-88. 
24. Tugwell, R. G., "America Takes Hold of Its Destiny,• Today, April 
28, 1934, in The Battle for Democracy, 258. 
25. Tugwell, R, G., "The Progressive Tradition,• Atlantic Monthly, Vol, 
155, No, 4, April, 1935, 413; this concept certainly was not origi• 
nal with Tugwell; in his Political Treatise Spinoza advocated laws 
ao designed that man's undesirable traits would cancel out one another. 
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political expediency; it had to be tuned to the times rather than to 
an imaginary environment in some past Utopia.26 Man had failed to take 
the action necessary to eliminate any false basis in current arrange-
ments because false bases had "become encysted in s moral and aesthetic 
system which seems precious, even to those who may have no stake in its 
favors, because of its familiarity.•27 
A Dation, or an individual, living according to inapplicable 
theories - ·~ths" • runs the risk of bringing disaster upon itself. 
Tugwell did not believe that society would always avoid a disastrous 
reductio ad absurdum simply because men would cooperate when new forces 
threatened their survival. Practical considerations would not always 
prevent destructive absurdities from occurring: 
Those who believe this are evidently unaware of the tenacity 
with which old theories are clung to by those who do not 
know them for theories or prefer to believe them descriptions 
of reality. Ap~~osch to the disaster of completed paradox has 
been close •••• 
The particular sphere of American life in which Tugwell could most 
easily observe the perpetuation of ·~ths• was, of course, the academic 
world. His most detailed objections to. doctrinaire attitudes and unre-
alism naturally focused on the teaching of economics. He pointed out 
that the 'laws• of the Manchester economists were evolved by the well• 
known armchair method of •one thing at a time" and •other things being 
equal.•29 Tugwell urged a departure from classical economics and the 
26. Tugwell, R. G., •The Fourth Power,• Planning and Civic Comment, April-
June, 1939, Part II, 30. 
27. Tugwell, R. G., •The Fourth Power,• 28. 
28. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Directive,• 10, 
29. Chase, Stuart, A New Deal (N. Y., Macmillan, 1932) 40. Part II. 
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adoption of a realistic approach, He pointed out that a scandalous 
breach existed between economists• psychological assumptions and the 
work of psychologists; he indicated flaws in the efforts of the histor• 
ical economists and the descriptive statisticians; in general he de· 
plored the separation in academic economics of theory from practica.3° 
In economics the world was never understood as a complex, actu-
ally going mechanism. The aeon~ was judged by its supplying goods 
rather than by its providing a good life. Economics failed to consider 
itself a complete science in the experimental sense, evading its respon-
sibility for policy: •economics is still social economics, and most 
folk are incorrigibly interested in 'what ought to be done,•• Such mis• 
taken conceptions as that which did not consider policy formulation a 
science prevented economics from becoming an experimental science. Of 
course, Tugwell, in declaring that framing,policy involved the definition 
of problems in experimental tenns, was aware of the grave difficulties 
that this approach entailed • especially the impossibility of laboratory 
representation and the unwillingness of vested interests to give way 
even in the face of likely improvement. Yet, in avoiding policymaking 
problems by excluding all but the measurable, economists were merely 
adopting a scientific pose, because the excluded was indispensable to 
solution,31 
JO. 
Jl. 
Tugwell maintained that social science would al~s be judged by 
Tugwell, R. G., "Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part II, Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol, 27, No. 18, August 28, 1930, passim. 
Tugwell, R, G., •Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part II, passim, 
23. 
the criteria or policy. Even if the social scientist were disinterested 
in the sense that he did not care what happened - seldom the case - his 
points of departure would not be confused with results; his work would 
stand by itself. being tested and retested. In order to meet this chal-
lange of policy the social sciences had to merge, following lines of 
investigation adapted to their own natures and objectives; uncritical 
borrowing from the methodology of the physical sciences would result in 
following false fashions.32 Summarizing his views on the unrealism of 
economists in the 1920s, Tugwell observed: 
The economists might have understood the significance of 
scientific management if they thc~ght about it; but ••• 
they were still parsing the phrases of Ricardo. Mill. Mar-
shall, and Clark, Economics had retreated from the market 
place and the factory to the library and the classroom. 
D~dnouef~the~w~~~.TI 
In Tugwell's view doctrinaire theorists dominated life and thought 
beyond the confines of college campuses. In the broad area of political 
econo~ the society in general clung to ·~ths" arising out of the general 
concept of laissez-faire. Tugwell, in outlining the origins and history 
of the laissez-faire doctrine, called it a useful theory in the revolt 
against mercantilism and divine-right monarchy. Unfortunately its use• 
fulness led to its being overworked in connection with the French Revolu-
tion, The Physiocrats had influenced the future revolutionary leaders 
in France only indirectly; the latter noted mostly the political implies-
tiona of the doctrine: they exaggerated the vices of the going system 
~-33· 
Tugwell, R. c •• 'Human Nature and Social Economlf," Part II, 488-92. 
Tugwell, R. c •• "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 
Western Political Ruarterly, Vol. 5. No.2, June, 1952, 275. 
of governmental control and overemphasized the virtues of freedom from 
control.34 
Similarly, in America, support of laissez•faire arose out of 
practical rather than theoretical or constitutional considerations. 
Adam Smith had not directly influenced the members of the Constitutional 
Convention; the Constitution merely started a controversy over the defi• 
nition of government•business relations.35 There was no historical basis 
for the constitutional sanctity with whi.ch its reverent devotees clothed 
the doctrine of laissez-faire. 
In addition to the constitutional ~th it evoked, the doctrine 
itself, Tugwell believed, included elements which, perpetuated into an 
age of inapplicability, had become ~ths. Business interests which had 
always considered themselves •practical,• rather than "theoretical,• un• 
36 knowingly lived by a •ready rigamarole which passed for theory.• The 
possession of this rigamarole prevented business from recognizing its 
lack of theoretical orientation,37 Without a sound theoretical approach 
businessmen, like children, were wholly unaware of their own place in the 
scheme of things as the end-product of technological evolution,38 Adher-
ence, often unrecognized, to an outdated theory produced ·~ths• in the 
American mind. 
34· Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3. September, 1952, 484. 
35· Tugwell, R. G,' •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 485. 
36. Tugwell, R. G.' "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 486, 
37· Tugwell, R. G.' •The New Deal: The Rise of Business," Part II, 486. 
38. Tugwell, R. G., •The Directive,• 9. 
Tugwell cited among the ·~ths• of laissez-faire a misconception 
of the significance of profits. In the depths of the great depression 
neither Tugwell nor any other important New Dealer had any idea of "doing 
away with the profit system, hut it served a purpose to say we did,•39 
Tugwell asserted that abuses in the profit system, not the moderate 
rewards to management, resulted in immoderate gains used for speculation, 
over-expansion, and the building up of extravagant business structures. 
Abusive gains, ~ deflecting potential purchasing power into sterile 
pools,4° contradicted the ·~th• that profits are a measure of national 
wealth and synonymous with national welfare,41 
Other ·~hs"' that had arisen out of laissez•faire involved faulty 
concepts of individualism. Tugwell concluded that people did not believe 
in individualism as an ism like the Constitution or any institution; it 
lay at the back of thought and action as accepted, immutable, true. The 
belief in individualism wss relatively immune from influences such as 
the dependence of production on collective organization. Every day indi-
vidualism-automatism encountered more sophisticated modes of thought. 
Men found themselves, lost in inconsistencies, on both sides of issues. 
The individualist became enmesked in a nasty dilemma: orthodoxy and com-
men sense reinforced his position, but with the intrusion of reality he 
had to form policy and act.42 
39. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken l&!!S (N.Y., Doubleday, 1947) 22, 
40. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, California, October 28, 1935; Resettlement A4ministration 
Press Release, 9. 
41. Tugwell, R. G,, "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 501-02. 
42. Tugwell, R. G., "The Superpolitical,• Journal£[ Social PhilosophY, 
Vol. 5, October, 1939 • July, 1940, 107, 
All of the •myths" in laissez-faire stemmed from what Tugwell 
considered the fundamental fallacy in the doctrine, the "Smithian total"' 
or the concept that adding up the welfares of self-seeking individuals 
yields a total representing the greatest possible good for the whole 
society. Tugwell saw the whole as more than the sum of its parts; the 
parts were to be understood in relation to the whole -not vice-versa.43 
Followers of laissez-faire had assumed that the system embodied automati-
cally self-equilibrating elements which, by overruling human errors and 
frailties and enforcing ethical practices, yielded the greatest possible 
total welfare. Regarding the concept of self-stabilization, Tugwell 
commented: 
The jig is up. The cat is out of the bag. There is no 
invisible hand. There never was. 
We must now supply a real and visible guiding hand to do the 
task which that mythical, nonexistent, invisible agency was 
supposed to perform, but never did. 
Men were taught to believe that they were, paradoxically, 
advancing cooperation when they were defying it. That was 
a viciously false paradox,44 
The creation and perpetuation of 'myths" through theoretical think-
ing entirely divorced from reality characterized members of all groups in 
society. Tugwell referred to inhibiting theorists in general, not just 
those of the academic or business worlds, wren he stated in an address 
before a meeting of lawyers that 
Such theorists ••• do not merely prefer to inhabit an 
unreal, static world; they also accumulate resistance 
43. Tugwell, R. G., "Chameleon Words,• 22, 24. 
44. Tugwell, R. G., •Design for Government,• 14. 
••• to the recognition of change and the necessities for 
it. They are, therefore, always ready with criticism be-
cause they have a prepared basis for it. It is easy for 
them to attack any express plans which threaten to create 
a world which is different from their concept of it. It 
is this sort of criticism which, since it possesses pres-
tige and emotional content, is in the end most dangerous. 
••• it is the line of least resistance for most of us to 
affect the attitude of the theorist. And this is true 
whether or not the consequences appear to be promising for 
or threatening to our social and economic existence. It 
is merely a usual process of thought. Our loyalties and 
affections are apt to attach themselves to instruments 
rather than functions. In this instance we are apt to re• 
gard the form of a document more highly than the values 
such a thing produces. 
Only crisis calls in question our attributions of virtues.45 
Many professors were not among the ~th-makers. Academicians like 
Tugwell had great enthusiasm for the American experiment; at the same 
time, they engaged in unabating criticism of the course of its develop-
ment.46 They received no thanks for their warnings, for 
••• those who predicted disaster and preached avoidance 
were 'theorists', were 'academic', 'had never met a pay-
roll', and so were not 'practical'. When they were 
proven right by events, they were still accorded the same, 
or perhaps worse, treatment, still labeled with the same 
epithets, still officially distrusted.47 
A review of the events of the 1920s indicates that businessmen and poli-
ticians (the latter perform their share of ~h~king by substituting 
demagogic romancing for future reality48 in their campaign promises and 
45. Tugwell, R. G., "Design for Government,• 3, 4. 
46. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Magazine, 
Vol. 94, No. 5, November, 1933, 286. 
47. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 441. 
48. Tugwell, R. G., •The Superpolitical," 112. 
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their assertions that taking care of any emergency will enable the 
future to take care of itself49) should judge a man by his effective-
ness; they should not assume that he will fail in public affairs because 
he is a professor or will succeed despite his being a professor.49 
Manifestations of Institutional Lag 
Causal Factors: Abuses 
In his doctoral dissertation and elsewhere5° Tugwell sought to 
determine the ultimate prerogatives of government in economic affairs. 
An institutional economist would naturally wish to define government's 
ability to affect institutions. His work for the Ph.D. degree was a 
study of the common-law regulation of business. He concluded that im-
memorial usage indicated services must meet the needs of the public and 
prices must be reasonable.51 In order to insure the provision of adequate 
services at reasonable prices, government set common limitations and con-
ferred common protections - powers that should rest with the sovereign 
people and should be based not on a foundation of traditional economic 
assumption but on fact.52 Tugwell, however, did not believe in government 
for the sake of government; he considered any action by business itself 
to establish continuity, through wage and price policies insuring a full 
49· 
50. 
51. 
52. 
McCall, C. H., "That Columbia Crowd," 17. 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Economic Basis for Business Regulation,• ~­
ican Economic Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, December, 1921; The Economic 
iiBSis .9! Public Interest (Menasha, Wisconsin, George Banta Publish-
ing Co., 1922). 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1., October, 1953, 11-12. 
Tugwell, R. G., •Economics,• in Neilson, w. A., ed., Roads 1£ Know-
ledge, new and enl. ed, (N.Y., Halcyon House, 1937) passim. 
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and free flow of consumers goods, preferable to direct government inter-
vention,53 
If business cooperated on policies of low prices, high wages, 
planned use of capacity, and the foregoing of speculative profits and 
deficits, that government would not have to exercise its ultimate prerog-
atives. Business would be "its own government,•54 Business in the United 
States, under laissez-faire, had already acquired what Tugwell considered 
to be ultimately governmental prerogatives: 
Through the mechanism of incorporation, social functions of 
the most crucial sorts were appropriated to the uses of mon-
ey-making. Capital was allocated, production arranged, the 
places and terms of people's livings fixed - all with a pri-
mary v!ew to probably profits - and Government did not inter-
fere,5.J 
That business exercised powers which ultinately, and legally and constitu-
tionally, fell within the prerogatives of government was not, in itself, 
significant. What mattered was how business managed industry,56 and the 
protection of government's ultimate powers. 
In the 1920s Tugwell did not believe that business had exercised 
its powers in the general interest. Business was irresponsible in a 
social sense because those who had received governmental powers did not 
know it - nor did the people.57 According to the doctrine of laissez-faire, 
53· Tugwell, R. G., "America Takes Hold of Its Desting,• 266; •continuity,• 
a term Tugwell uses often, meant the elimination of violent cyclical 
fluctuations in the economy through the continuous presence of pur-
chasing power to dispose of goods as they came off the production line, 
54. Tugwell, R. G., "America TAkes Hold of Its Destiny,• 266. 
55. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part II 0 
Western Political Quarterlv, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 471. 
56. Tugwell uses "business• for management and "industry• for production. 
although not with unvarying consistency. 
57. Tugwell. R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 496. 
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the economy contained self-actuating forces which assured of free compe-
tition for the benefit of all. Actually American businesses, while 
inveighing against a "planned economy,• planned their own economies when-
ever they couldf when necessary they invoked government intervention 
to help them do it,58 Tugwell maintained that planning by special inter-
eats benefited only those interests by sacrificing other interests and 
•eventually, though they may not realize it, at a sacrifice to themselves.•59 
The theoretical free competition of laissez-faire was inoperative 
through interference by special groups and non-interference, in accordance 
with the role assigned to it in that doctrine, by government, The 
special interests, in formulating plans which affected economic processes, 
employed what Tugwell considered governmental powers in order to work 
against each other and against the public interest, Business men who 
abhorred dictators acted like them within their own spheres - in the name 
of democracy,60 
To have argued that publicly subscribed corporations were publicly 
accountable was not necessarily to have advocated socialism,61 Planning 
by special groups was not observable by other interest groups or by the 
public interest. But difficulties did not arise from secrecy; rather 
they stemmed from lack of coordination, If interindustry planning replaced 
58, Childs and Gater, Ethics in~ Business Society, 119, 
59, Tugwell, R, G,, •The Fourth Power,• 8, 
60, Tugwell, 'R, G., •The Future of National Planning,• New Republic, 
Vol. 89, No, 1149, December 9, 1936, 162. 
61, Lippmann, Walter, The~ Imperative (N, Y., Macmillan, 1935) 
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intraindustry planning, secrecy and • more important • chaotic conflict 
would both disappear, In that eTent neither goTernment ownership nor 
direct goTernment planning would be necessary for achieving •as much 
consistency as is required for practical purposes•62 of insuring that 
the economy would operate continuously and in the public interest. 
Private planning had gone on regardless of public policy such as 
antitrust laws. With the failure of the supposedly self-contained en• 
forcing agents of laissez•faire, planning took place in a predatory 
economy, The individualist, Tugwell commented, had net meant to conquer 
nature, but to exploit his fellows; he wanted no limitations which pro• 
tected the plundered; he had had no complaints so long as all, except 
his own children, got an equal start; any exploitation which he promoted 
had the benefit of orthodoxy.63 Under laissez-faire business, in control 
of the new techniques of industry, had been wholly speculative; it had 
eTaded control largely through the failure of the general public to dis• 
tinguish between the instruments of large-scale production and the specu-
lators who controlled them,64 
The conflict between the business u~n, who sought profits, and the 
engineers, who sought production, was one of the principal themes of Veb-
62. Tugwell, R. G., •The Future of National Planning,• 162, 
63. Tugwell, R. G,, •The Superpolitical,• 109. 
64. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 
276. 
len's work. In his writings.65 Tugwell, who was accused of falling 
•under the spell of this ribald and lawless iconoclast,.66 continually 
referred to Veblen's views on the clash between society's expectation 
that industry would produce goods and business' expectation that in-
dustry would produce profits,67 Coordination in production would elim• 
inate this conflict and its disastrous results • scarcity in the distri-
bution of goods, with violent cyclical fluctuations. 
Tugwell believed that 'the steps that had to be taken to achieve 
a minimum of order are relatively few, but ••• momentous.•68 For if 
planning did not take place in the public interest, the planners, in 
possession of governmental powers, would supersede the Government.69 
From speculative economic manipulations supported by a doctrine that 
actually excluded them and was, therefore, a mythology, would come econ-
omic ruin (if the uncoordinated planners destroyed their markets and 
each other), or economic autocracy (if the private planners became more 
powerful than the government). 
Despite some caustic comments about businessmen - •a set of ir• 
responsible and certainly self•interested people who half-manage and half• 
Tugwell, R. G., "Veblen and 'Business Enterprise,•• New Republic, Vol. 
98, No. 1269, March 29, 1939; 'Veblen,• in Cowley, Malcolm, ed., Books 
~Changed Our Minds (N. Y., Doubleday, 1939); the authoritative 
work on Veblen is by a student of Tugwell's, Dorfman, Joseph, Thorstein 
Veblen l!JlS His .America ( N. Y., Viking, 1935) • 
Flynn, John T., The Roosevelt Ml1h. (N. Y., Devin-Adair, 1948) 155• 
Tugwell, R. G., 'The Superpolitical,• 102. 
Tugwell, R. G,, "The Future of National Planning,• 162. 
Hoover, Herbert, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Vol. III, The Great 
Depression, 1929·1941 (N.Y., Macmillan, 1952) ]88. 
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neglect affairs of whose consequences they have no adequate conception, 
but from which they have no hesitation in drawing the last penny of pro-
fit•70 - Tugwell did not hold business men responsible on an ethical or 
personal basis for economic abuses. The trouble lay not in men, but in 
institutions. Each business man could be efficient in his own operation, 
but he could not see the whole scheme within which he carried on his 
business, What was needed was overall (interindustry) coordination: 
The advance in technique of control LbusinesAf has b~en 
just as great as the advance in efficiency Lindust~/. 
It is only a problem of adapting it to the public service.71 
Results: Maladjustments 
Overproduction (Overinvestment) 
Tugwell listed as the two transforming economic forces of the nine-
teenth century the •nationalizing of business• and Taylorism, the tech-
niques and processes of scientific management. These two ideas included 
the depth and breadth of business penetration,72 Tugwell attempted to 
summarize and evaluate the whole movement of Taylorism in a book published 
in 1927.73 He believed that Taylorized industry possessed a physical 
potential for production that staggered the imagination, 
In connection with the new, increased productive capacity, Tugwell 
wrote on the matters of technological unemployment and occupational obso• 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73· 
Bolles, Blair, "Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• American Mercury, 
Vol, 39, No, 153. September, 1936, 79• 
Hallgren, Mauritz, Seeds of Revolt (N, Y., Knopf, 1935) 321. 
Tugwell, R. G., 'The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 275• 
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lescenee.74 He doubted the validity of the classical assumption that 
the enlarged product resulting from scientific management, when sold, 
provided funds used to hire an increased labor force; investigation 
confirmed his doubts.75 He alae deplored the lack of attention and 
funds devoted to retraining of displaced workers,76 Most of the tech-
nological improvements 
••• displaced labor and so reduced buyers' incomes at 
the same time they increased business income by the amount 
of the saving. This income, being partly sterile, never 
had so important a stimulating effect on the econo~ as 
the offsetting paralysis from the loss of wages •••• 7 
Tugwell saw beyond the immediate problem of technological unem• 
ployment to a time when man would so far free himself from the compul• 
sions laid on him by nature that physical work would become obsolete78 -
the age, for example, of the automatic fectory,79 In wartime the nation 
had demonstrated how it could perform institutional experiments. It 
showed how much it could produce; if it could find, in peacetime, a 
moral equivalent for war,80 through the use of technological instruments 
and scientific management production would attain undreamed-of heights 
with a minimum of human effort. The reduct ion of the need for human 
74. Tugwell, R. G., "Theory of Occupational Obsolescence,• Political 
Science Quarterlv, Vol, 46, No. 2, June, 1931. 
75. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
5-6. 
76. Tugwell, R. G., "A Third Econo~,· Address, Rochester Teachers Associ• 
ation, Rochester, New York, April 9, 1935; ~Press Release, 16. 
77• Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 501, 
78, Tugwell, R. G,, Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, 3· 
79. Chase, Stuart, The Economy of Abundance (N. Y., Macmillan, 1934) 84-85. 
80, Tugwell, R. G., "America's Wartime Socialism,• Nation, April 6, 1927; 
•Paradox of Peace,• ~Republic, Vol. 54, No. 698, April 18, 1928; 
•Later Moral Equivalents,• in The Battle for Democracy, 74·77· 
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effort as the machine process mastered industry would necessitate a 
separation of work from income,81 . A society in which man had to do 
little work would have to give up its aUribution of moral importance 
to the connection between work and income in order to secure the full 
release of productive energy,82 Tugwell, elaborated on his ideas about 
•released" labor during the New Deal period in a controversial speech83 
calling for a "Third Econo~• of basic public works. The "Third Econ-
o~,· neither socialistic nor in competition with private enterprise, 
would absorb that part of the labor force that was not required for the 
production of the ordinary economic needs of society,84 
Agriculture, always a concern of Tugwell's in the 1920s,85 had 
also acquired technological capabilities for enormous production. The 
uncoordinated productive capacity of the nation's farms, accompanied by 
haphazard.capital allocation and abusive land-use practices (and the 
abuses of the 1920s were inexcusable compared with the abuses of the nine-
81. Tugwell, R. G., •The Fourth Power,• ;~3. 
82, Tugwell, R, G., "The Directive,• 10, 11; Bendiner, Robert, "The Brain 
Is Not Outmoded," New~ Times Magazine, January 23, 1955, 31, noted 
that Walter Reuther told of a visit to a new automatically operated 
Ford plant in Cleveland. Pointing to the robots, his host asked him, 
•How are you going to collect union dues from those guys?• The C.I.O, 
president, who expects good to come of automation in the long run, but 
is concerned about the transition, returned an equally pertinent question, 
'And how are you going to get them to buy Fords?• 
83. Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism, N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1936, 94-113. 
84, Tugwell, R, G., "A Third Econ~;• In 1926 the economist J, M. Keynes 
cited Jer~ Bentham's distinction between Agenda, the part of the econ-
o~ the state was expected to occupy, and Non-Agenda, the realm of private 
enterprise. Dimock, M.E., Business~ Government (N. Y,, H. Holt, 1949) 
140, In a broad sense Tugwell's proposing the "Third Econo~• was an at-
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85. See below, Chapter IX, "The Origins and Promotion of the Voluntary Dom-
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teenth century when Americans settled a vast continent in the only way 
they knew86), resulted in a staggering agricultural surplus problem. 
By the time Roosevelt had become president, his Secretary of Agriculture 
had concluded that any measures to reduce the burden on farmers of such 
fixed charges as interest and railroad rates, and of taxes, would have 
little effect on difficulties growing out of unbalanced production; in 
the emergency acreage controls before the spring planting period were 
necessary,87 Meanwhile, Tubwell estimated that there were a couple of 
million too many farmers,88 
The term •overproduction,• when used in connection with the twenti• 
eth-century technological revolution, applied in a special sense within 
the framework of the American economy, "Overproduction" did not mean the 
creation of a supply of goods in excess of the amount required for the 
total population to live at a reasonable standard-of-living level, •over-
production• was related to purchasing power, indicating the creation of 
a supply of goods which, translated into prices, exceeded the buying power 
of the people. Tugwell attributed the lagging of purchasing power behind 
production to society's failure to create social institutions to accom-
modate the new technological developments, (Inequities in the incidence 
of technological gain and the resulting inadequacy of purchasing power, 
due to institutional backwardness, are the subjects of the next two sections. 
86, Tugwell, R. G., 'Changing Acres,• Current History, Vol, 44, No. b; 
September, 1936, 
87. Letter, H.A. Wallace to F. D. Roosevelt, April 22, 1933, Roosevelt Papers. 
88, Moore, Russell, Roosevelt Riddles (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday Doren, 
1936) 25. 
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Misuse of Surplus 
The accumulation in the first place of a surplus of goods in rela-
tion to purchasing power and a surplus of corporate profits beyong the 
ordinary needs of industry was due to wheot Tugwell considered flaws in 
the distributive mechanism of the economy. On the distribution of income 
depended consumer purchasing power, on which - in turn - depended the 
widespread physical distribution of goods. Tugwell maintained that the 
lack of the institutional concomitants - assured low prices, high wages, 
and fair farm income - implied by Taylorism resulted in the failure to 
translate technological gains into the purchasing power necessary for 
continuous operation of the economy at capacity. This section deals with 
the disposition of the corporate surpluses which were deflected into 
functions other than that of purchasing power; the following section, 
'Underconsumption,• deals with the effects of that deflection. 
Tugwell believed that the use of funds obtained from the sale of 
an enlarged product for hiring an increased labor force, and their auto-
matically turning into purchasing power, depended on a process which took 
place nowhere but in economists' imaginations,89 In tracing out the dis-
position by corporation directors of net funds obtained from the disposal 
of goods, he listed several means of disposal: 
1. Retention of a cash balance or surplus reserve for 
protection against depression. 
2, Investment in the securities of other corporations. 
89. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D, Roosevelt,• 
5~-
3• Allowance of the use of funds in the open money 
market on call. 
4• Expenditure for plant expansion. 
5. Expenditure for distribution costs and •business 
luxuries• such as advertising. 
6, Lending to stock-exchange speculators. 
7• Lending abroad. 
None of these alternatives enlarged ultimate purchasing power. While 
plant expansion, accompanied by inflation of capital values, might in• 
crease industrial activity at first, as more product was provided for 
fewer purchasers, the goods would eventually flow into warehouses,90 
The gist of Tugwell's analysis was that 
••• we were heading for a good deal of trouble and 
••• the time would come when our much-praised system 
would break down because of overinvestment and under-
consumption,91 
Tugwell listed the two sources of capital for productive uses: 
the sale of securities in the general investment market and corporate 
surpluses. The latter, constituting by far the larger part of our sav• 
ings, was the most difficult to reach in the interest of any public 
policy. Investment of surplus in plant capacity for the production of 
goods which did not sell resulted eventually in a shutdown; with the 
shutdown came unemployment; with unemployment came reduced purchasing 
power; with reduced purchasing power came, to complete the vicious circle 
90. Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
6; with Cutler, A.~. and Mitchell, G. s., "Flaws in the Hoover 
Economic Plan,• Current History, Vol. 35, No. 4, January, 1932, 526. 
91. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
6. 
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additional shutdowns. 
In faulty anticipations and the overextension of business' capi-
tal commitments, the banking and credit system participated along with 
business management. A misestimation of the market, combined with an 
increase of capital charges as a relative part of total costs with Tay-
lorism or rationalization, resulted in a piling up of overhead costs, a 
reduction of general funds for investment, and a chain reaction of credit 
restriction - all contributing to a general restriction of business 
activity,92 One of the earliest advocates of revamped control of our 
money and credit system was Marriner s. Eccles,93 a banker from Ogden, 
Utah, whom Tugwell later invited to Washington,94 In 1928 Tugwell, himM 
self, called for an effective financial mechanism for the protection of 
all.95 
Tugwell referred to advertising as a •business luxury• which did 
not increase purchasing power; this view provoked advertisers and publishM 
ers to translate his views into a declaration that advertising should be 
eliminated as a total social and economic waste,96 and that the profit 
system had to go,97 Tugwell actually credited advertising with serving 
92. 
93· 
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95· 
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ber 12, 1928, 96, 
Groom, William, •Tugwell's Mischievous Ideas about Advertising,• Prin-
ter's Ink, Vol, 166, No. 9, March 1, 1934, 32, 
Time, Vol, 23, No, 19, May 7, 1934, 50. 
a worthwhile purpose in educating people as to relative values; he did 
see a tremendous waste involved in the effort through advertising to 
turn trade from one firm to another when their products were identical 
in value98 -a familiar phenomenon in industries, such as the manufac-
ture of cigarettes, subject to oligopolistic control. A spokesman for 
the advertising industry maintained that advertising increased purchas-
ing power, the ability to buy, by creating a will to purchase -many 
economists, this spokesman wrote, had determined that will preceded abi-
lity to buy,99 Tugwell would have replied that will without ability 
could not result in a purchase; will would not result in ability - a job -
on the part of the would-be purchaser unless the econo~ was supported 
by high, widespread purchasing power; a large part of the money expended 
for advertising did not go into consumer purchasing power. 
Fear during the New Deal period that Tugwell, •a name always 
enough to send shivers down the spine of any advertising man,• 100 would 
take or bring about action on his friend Stuart Chase's suggestion that 
proper control of advertising would release 400,000 of its 600,000 employees 
for •useful' work101 proved to be unwarranted. As a New Dealer Tugwell 
continued to maintain that good advertising served a function in market-
ing by assisting the consumer to make intelligent choices.102 In any 
98. Groom, w., •Tugwell's Mischievous Ideas about Advertising,• 33• 
99. Groom, w., •Tugwell's Mischievous Ideas about Advertising,• 34. 
100. •scowl at Billboards,• Business~. july 8, 1939, 30. 
101. johnson, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Saturdav Even-
ing Post, Vol. 209, No. 5. August 1, 1936. 
102, Tugwell, R. G., •Freedom from Fakes,• Today, November 17, 19331 in 
Ih£ B&ttle for Democracy, 97-104. 
41. 
event, many of Tugwell's academic pronouncements had little to do with 
his authority and duties as Assistant and Under Secretary of Agriculture; 
he had no inclination to see unemployment increased by 400,000 persons in 
the depths of a depression; above all, he profoundly respected the free• 
dom of the press.103 Nevertheless, when Tugwell sponsored a Pure Food 
and Drugs Bill, representatives of advertising interests combed a text-
book of which he was co-author,104 interpreting the passages on advertis• 
ing as a threat, in consideration of Tugwe•ll's alleged influence in the 
Roosevelt administration, to the very existence of the industry, 
Similarly, Tugwell's views on exploitative and abusively exces• 
sive profits did not constitute a desire that the profit system be abol-
ished, He evolved his basic concept of planned capitalisml05 as a means 
of eliminating the self-defeating effects of excessive profits deflected 
from purchasing power into surplus, creating in our economy sterile pools 
which ultimately caused a severe reduction in all profits, He advocated 
measures which would substitute continuous, if lower, profits for tempor• 
ary high profits and violent cyclical fluctuation, including periods of 
severe losses: 
103, 
104. 
105. 
The ~York Times, October 23, 1934, 6:3; Mussolini told Tugwell 
Roosevelt's experiments would fail. When Tugwell asked why, Mus-
solini replied, "You have to shut down the press,• Tugwell recal• 
led with glee this failure of the Italian dictator to appreciate 
the American herdtage, Interview with writer. 
Tugwell, R. G. and Hill, Howard C,, Our Economic Society and Ita 
Problems (N. Y,, Harcourt Brace, 1934). 
See below, Chapter III, •Tugwell's Long-Run Approach: Prevention.• 
Nothing but higher wages and farm incomes together with 
moderated retail prices can redress the maladjustments 
which continue to exist in the structure of our prices, 
Profits will have to follow from new efficiencies. To 
put them first is to put the cart before the horse, In 
feet the best guarantee of profits is capacity operation 
at low costs and prices; this involves the preservation 
of purchasing power, the conservation of markets. It may 
mean smaller earnings at on9e, but it ought to insure 
their steady continuance,lOb 
••• it is impossible to destroy the principle of profit, 
if by profit we mean the reward a man receives for his 
services and for his investment of time, effort and fore~ 
sight. The profits which are unee.rned, which are arrived 
at through taking unfair advantage of another's weakness, 
ignorance or necessity have never been regarded as sacred 
by either the Law or the Prophets, What we see today is 
that America can never prosper or be happy if we continue 
the practice of that economic cannibalism which regards 
man as the proper prey of man and one individual's des-
truction as an advantage to another,l07 
Under consumption 
~-
Taylorism in American industry had lowered production costs; in 
the 1920s business did not pass on this saving to the worker in the form 
of higher wages, to the stockholder in the form of larger dividends, or 
to the consumer in the form of lower prices, Business accumulated surplus 
profits -~ part of which went into plant expansion, Production outran 
purchasing power; eventually, by the spring of 1929, a glut of goods be-
gan to back up into warehouses, So read the main features of Roosevelt's 
analysis of the economic collapse in his speech accepting the Democratic 
1~. 
107. 
Tugwell, R, G,, •A Third Econo~.· 
Tugwell, R, G., Address, Niagara County Pioneers Association, Olcott 
Beach, New York, August 8, 1934; USDA Press Release, 7, 
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nomination for the presidency in Chicago on July 8, 1932,108 Roosevelt's 
analysis represented views he arrived at sometime before he first met 
Tugwell rather than an unquestioning acceptance of the Columbia economist's 
ideas. 109 Nevertheless, that pert of the acceptance speech cited here 
sounded like straight Tugwell to anyone familiar with the latter's writ-
ings during the prosperity decade. 
In the 1920s Tugwell acknowledged that real wages in the United 
States were the highest in the world; he did not consider them an ultimate 
index of the soundness of the economy, The relationship of labor's pur-
chasing power to the total production of salable goods, regardless of real 
wages, was what counted from the point ofview of maintaining economic sta-
bility, Moreover, real wages reflected the welfare of only those who were 
employed, Overall statistics showed that technological unemployment was 
offset wage increases; manufacturing industries showed a decline in the 
1920s in employment; total factory payrolls barely held their own,110 
Despite relatively high real wages, it was best for the country whenever 
labor exerted as much power as it could to raise the wage share of techno-
logical gains as high as possiblelll - for the creation of purchasing power 
adequate to absorb industrial production, 
108. 
110. 
111. 
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the consumer, relations between industry and agriculture were suck that 
the farm population's purchasing power was disproportionately low. The 
farmer, caught in an economic •scissors,• bought industrial products in 
a protected market and sold his output in a world market. Farm prices 
went up slower than industrial prices in any upward movement of the busi-
ness cycle; they dropped faster in any decline. During the great depres-
sion farm prices fell 63 per cent and production fell only 6 per cent; 
prices of agricultural implements fell only 6 per cent and production fell 
80 per cent,ll2 In the 1920s Tugwell stressed the fundamental land-use 
aspect of the farm problem, pointing out that farming of submarginal lands 
adversely affected the whole econonw.113 It is sufficient to note here 
that the farmers failed to provide an adequate market for industrial pro-
ducts. A following section will deal with the agricultural problem in 
the l920s,114 
Tugwell, since his work on his doctoral dissertation, was concerned 
with the basic problem of the economic consideration due the interests of 
the consumer. Later, as a government administrator, he continued to advo-
cate protection of the consumer interest; that protection which had not 
come, as it was supposed to have come under laissez•faire, from conflict 
among productive units; it was vital to thE! support and broadening of 
purchasing power. Tugwell's views on consumer protection for increasing 
114, Means, G, c., Industrial Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility, 
Senate Document 13, 74th Congress, lst Session, 1935. 
113, Tugwell, R. G,, "Changing Acres,• 57~8. 
114. See below, Chapter IX, "The Origins and Promotion of the Voluntary 
Domestic Allotment Plan,• 
~. 
purchasing power eventually involved him in a clash of opinions concern-
ing the functions of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. He saw 
the defeat of the administration's program if distributors increased the 
spread between the prices farmers received and the prices consumers paid 
by more then the assistance given producers and ccnsumers.115 Holding 
the line on marketing costs would leave more funds available to the con• 
sumer for expenditure on goods, in this instance farm products. 
When one arrives at a consideration of the determination and 
function of prices, one encounters what Tugwell believed to be the key 
factor in accounting for inadequate purchasing power end consequent 
economic maladjustments. In studying the opinions of the engineers who 
had rationalized American industry on the technological aide, Tugwell 
found that they had not been primarily concerned with the social implies• 
tions of their work. They only dimly recognized 'the sequence into which 
their work naturally fell" and •the risk involved in putting it to the 
sole service of business,• After 1910, when the engineers entered a period 
of justification, seeking to explain the Ineaning of their work, they were 
forced to think of its social aspects. As early as 1912 some prominent 
figures in Taylorism asserted that reduced production costs would not 
help the economf so long as the financiers and the middlemen violated the 
fundamental law of economics •that small profits make good business, ••• 
that large profits always tend to diminish business.• The engineers were 
just beginning, according to Tugwell, to recognize that prices were de• 
115. Tugwell, R. G., •consumers and the New Deal," Address, Consumers' 
League of Ohio, Cleveland, May 11, 1934; in~ Battle f£r ~­
cracy, 270, 273. 
cided upon; they did not simply happen. It followed that public price.· 
controls were needed when scientific management made its contribution to 
the work which the organizers of the trusts had begun,ll6 
Tugwell found that price behavior in the 1920s failed to follow 
classical lines. Economists had maintained that rationalization provided 
a gain for the workers; they reasoned thct increased production at lower 
costs resulted in greater demand and more employment. This sequence 
actually depended upon progressive price reductions, which Tugwell lab-
eled "the fly in the ointment,• Progressive price reductions failed to 
happen because competition failed to operate in the classical manner, 
The most efficient were supposed to capture the market; market-capturing 
was a complex process which seldom followed the classical course. 
During the several years required for raising the capital and 
achieving the increase in the labor force necessary to attain a new level 
of efficiency, prices were retained at the old rate, with profits going 
into dividends, further expansion, or mergers. Mergers then kept prices 
up for another indefinite period, The maintenance of an abnormal (not 
based on costs) price level either restricted buying or, at best, failed 
to encourage it. As plant expansion outran any increase in buying, unused 
plant resulted in increased overhead. Low-price, full-capacity profits 
were sacrificed for high-price, restricted-operation profits. In other 
words, prices did not come down fast enough to enable buyers to absorb 
the increased supply of goods which improved technique and enlarged capi-
tal commitments yielded, For some time a race took place between increas-
116. Tugwell, R. G,, "The New Deel: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 284-85. 
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ing amounts of goods and falling prices; unfortunately, not enough busi• 
ness men were converted to the low-profit, large-volume approach.ll7 It 
was belatedly that the theoretical explanation of the •stickiness• of 
oligopolistically set prices begin to emer~e •.when Edward Chamberlin 
submitted his doctoral dissertation at Ha.rvard in 1927.118 As late as 
October, 1930, President Hoover told the American Federation of Laber that 
both labor and management agreed that •the savings from these reduced 
lProduction/ costs shall be shared between labor, employer, and consumer.• 119 
Americans lived by an economic •myth.• 
Tugwell's analysis of price behavior in the 1920s pointed up his 
attribution of a fundamental economic function to purchasing power. De-
vices such as advertising, installment selling, and foreign loans for fin-
ancing export trade were inadequate for stiffening a sagging market.120 
Basic protection of the consumer's buying power, resting on proper price 
controls and wage policies, was absolutely essential as •the only thing 
which can keep industry alive. Destroy ••• or weaken it LPurchasing powei/ 
••• and you injure every part of industry.• 121 
117. 
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Conclusions 
Prognosis 
A writer who generally rejected Tugwell's views specifically asserted 
Tugwell, R. c., •HUnger, Cold, and Candidates,• 323•24; "Flaws in 
the Hoover Economic Plan,• 525-26, 
Haney, L. H,. History of Economic Thought, 4th ed. (N.Y., Macmillan, 
1949) 701. 
Tugwell, R. c., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy (N.Y., John Day, 1932) 12, 
Tugwell, R. c., etal, •Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 528. 
Editor and Publisher, February 2, 1934, 18. 
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that Tugwell's complaint about "draining the last cent of profit" was 
heard only in bad times.122 A casual examination of Tugwell's articles 
on the presidential campaign of 1928 in the New Republic reveals des• 
criptions of deficiencies in the economy and dire warnings of eventual 
collapse if remedial measures were too long delayed, Farmers did not 
share in the prosperity of the period 1922·1927; chronic difficulties 
plagued bituminous mining and textile and shoe manufacturing,l23 Tug• 
well listed exigent situations which would confront the next president: 
farm relief, labor, power, unemployment, and the assurance of continued 
prosperity,124 
Although industrial affairs appeared to be running smoothly, Tug· 
well warned, the smoothness was not real but only apparent, Difficulties 
inevitably occurred in an unmanaged system without price controls and 
direction of investment; one bad spot inevitably spread throughout the 
economy,l25 Tugwell was convinced that the American economic machine was 
inevitably destined to collapse; he saw signs everywhere exposing the 
archaic unfitness of that machine in a civilized nation. Some day it would 
fall apart, leaving the world in ruin. The appalling nature of this pros-
pect •acted like an explosive on his mind, L;hakini/ him clear out of the 
classroom into the world, .:!.:?6 
122. Neilson, Francis, Control from lli Top, 34•35· 
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The Need for Institutional Reform 
Tugwell did not call for institutional reform in order to promote 
change for the sake of change or experimentation fer the sake of experi• 
mentation. Nor did he believe that a reformation in the personal ethics 
of business men was the principal requisite for eliminating economic 
problems. Although some journalists later asserted that Tugwell contem-
plated ethics and brought to Washington an ethical-economic prescription, 
an obsession with the immorality of business,127 in Tugwell's institu-
tional approach placing ethics first would be putting the cart before the 
horse. 
Tugwell's writings, it is true, often included condemnations of 
the immoral conduct of business men. In one article he wrote that the 
rules of the game had, by the 1920s, become such that an honest business 
man could not rise,l2B However, he believed that immorality in business 
was the result of an uncoordinated, institutionally backward system, 
Business men would not be different from What they were until the system 
within which they operated changed,129 What exploitation had occurred 
was not the fault of business men alone but the responsibility of all.13° 
It was quite possible that the improved conduct that would come with 
proper institutional changes could become a self-sustaining ethical force -
127. 
128. 
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a possibility which Patten impressed on Tugwell. In any event, institu-
tional reform had to come first. 
On the question of ethics Roosevelt and Professor Adolph A, Berle, 
Jr., of Columbia, disagreed with Tugwell, Berle, with Raymond Moley and 
Tugwell, was one of Roosevelt's three academic advisors, Roosevelt did 
not believe that the depression reflected the failure of the Protestant 
ethic, but only the failure of many men to live up to it,l31 Similarly, 
Berle, the son of a Congregational minister, believed that the world would 
be a better place when the men in it were better.132 Tugwell certainly 
would not have denied Berle's thesis; the difficulty in Berle's conclusion 
involved timing; man could bring disaster upon himself before he reformed 
in his nature and ethics.133 We could not wait for man to change, We 
could enact regulations in the American Progressives' tradition of •make 
the capitalists behave• (and Tugwell favored such measures as the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act) but regulation would not be enough,l34 The solu-
tion of economic problems required institutional reforms. 
In the context of the dangers he saw in the neglect of institutional 
reforms, the course Tugwell advocated was fundamentally conservative, When-
ever the •oneness of man and nature• was violated, the penalties and pun-
ishments came sooner or later and were often savage. In order to correct 
mistakes before their damaging effects went too far, thereby avoiding cat-
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astrophe, man had to adjust to the demands of his environment. Conse• 
quently, the problem of social adjustment was an ecological one. While 
the environment did not necessarily favor any single means of maintaining 
the relationships on which man depended, man had to find some effective 
means of adjustment,l35 
Tugwell used the word "discipline• in an ecological sense with 
reference to the search for means of achieving proper relationships:l36 
the environment presented a challenge to man; man had to make himself do 
the thinking and conduct himself in the manner required for an effective 
response to the environments - the discipline of adjustment.137 Tugwell's 
opponents in the New Deal period often maintained that "democratic dis-
cipline• and •social discipline• meant a totalitarian state in which all 
would think and act alike.138 Actually, Imposed uniformity had no place 
in Tugwell's experimental-institutional approach to the challenge of the 
environment, In a radio address to the nation he stated that: 
1~. 
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••• ve are living in a democracy and we know that the American 
people have given no mandate for the final abandonment of our 
traditional business system. When the American people gave 
this administration authority ••• it vas to readjust relation-
ships, among our old institutions, to overhaul them, to repair 
them, to make them work if they could be made to work, to mod-
ify them when they failed to function and to demonstrate by 
the old method of trial and error which of those institutions 
could be readjusted to the new economic environment of the post-
war world, a world of super-power, automatic machinery, mechani-
Tugwell, R, G., "Earthbound," 477-81, 
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zation, specialization, photo-electric and chemical short-cuts, 
and all of the accelerated growth of the technology which is 
the basis for ••• abundance •••• l39 
The implications of the need for adjustment reached out to the ul-
tin>~te problem of survival, Man had to a<:cept the concomitant of his in-
ventiveness by developing foresight in its use and an accommodation to 
the constantly new environment it produced; "Otherwise it can be seen that 
what he created" - including such genuinely ultimate weapons as atom 
bombs, lethal bacteria, and radioactive mists - •is likely to destroy 
him.•l40 
Whether man would successfully meet environmental challenges through 
adjustment was a close question. Tugwell's skepticism regarding c<~temp-
crary arrangements - the Puerto Ricans, wto applied their own names to 
their United States Governors, in the 1940s were to call him todo lo huele 
(everything smells)141 did not necessarily characterize his views on future 
possibilities. Between the conclusion of Veblen that man could not close 
the gap between his nature and the machine process, and Patten's belief 
that man could,l42 Tugwell seems to have leaned in the end towards the 
optimistic attitude of his former mentor. Pedestrian concepts of optimism 
are applied to people who look at the worlc through rose-colored galsses 
and think •everything is going to be all right ,• are they really optimists 
139· 
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or are they fools? Tugwell believed everything could be all right if 
man did something about it- an anti-determinist philosophy (the depres-
sion, for example, could be explained in mechanistic rather than psycho-
logical terms and re~uired mechanistic remediesl43). He was not certain 
that man woyld do something effective to close the physical-social gap; 
this attitude was, "although things are in a terrible mess and man may 
not take the necessary steps for survival one who is interested in this 
problem must go ahead anyway and do what he can.• 144 In comparison with 
the commonplace optimistic concept that •things will work out somehow,• 
perhaps proceeding with unflagging energy in the face of known obstacles, 
by dignifying man's rational faculties, is a higher kind of optimism. 
143. Tugwell, R. G., •The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• Antioch 
Review, Winter, 1953-1954, 422. 
144. Lord, Russell, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, H. Mifflin, 1947) 346. 
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III. Tugwell's Long-Run Approach: Prevention 
Introduction 
Chapter II presented the main features of Tugwell's analysis of 
economic practices and developments in the 1920s which led, as he pre-
dicted, to disaster. This chapter (III) treats Tugwell's scheme for 
avoiding a recurrence of depression. 
Chapter II swmnarized Tugwell's comments on the • physical-social 
gap• resulting from more rapid advance in the physical sciences than in 
the social sciences. He employed the term •emergence• to describe the 
creation by science and technology of new, interrelated things and forces; 
he labeled these new sets of interrelated. factors •emergents.• "Emergence• 
was a continuous process calling for continuous acconnnodation by man. 
Tugwell suggested that man accommodate •emergents• by altering his insti-
tutions, not his nature. He recognized that there were obstacles to 
institutional adjustment, the principal one being man's inclination to 
cling to ·~ths" - ideas and institutions arising out of the conditions 
of past eras and inappropriate to the present technological age. 
Chapter II also dealt with Tugwell's views on economic developments 
of the 1920s which he deplored, attributing them to the absence of insti-
tutions applicable to modern conditions. Business had usurped, or simply 
appropriated in the midst of governmental default, powers which Tugwell 
defined as •governmental.• Lacking an institutional framework for "inter-
industry coordination,• business (managements) abused its powers. "Private 
planning" led to speculative capital investment and the conflict of inter-
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ests between profit-seeking financies and production-seeking engineers 
which Veblen emphasized, This conflict produced maladjustments between 
production and purchasing power which caused depressions. 
The Need for Planning 
Confusion and Coordination 
What did Tugwell mean when he mentioned the absence of "interin-
dustry coordination?• He referred to the fact that individual business 
men, who were efficient in their respective activities, had little know-
ledge of the whole econOJey. Lacking information about the general scheme 
within which they operated, business men in a given line tended, in an 
upsvi11g, to think of the same thing at the same time; they produced more 
of a given product than the market could absorb, allocating too much of 
a given resource to the production of a certain product.l In a capital• 
istic econ~ •allocation of resources• meant •capital investment,• When 
Tugwell wrote about a lack of •coordination,• he meant that there was no 
coordination in capital investment. 
Tugwell asserted that the individual business man did not under• 
stand his •function• and his •relationship to other business men• in an 
uncoordinated econ01ey • an aeon~ without coordinated capital investmant. 
1. Chase, Stuart,~ Economy .21: Abundance (New York, Macmillan, 1934) 
202, cited Tugwell's emphasis of the fact that in prosperous times 
each industry tended to assume an almost unlimited market, optimis-
tically making capital commitments • plant, machinery, materials • 
out of its surplus. With overexpansion the expense of unused taci• 
lities went on, adding to selling prices and making marketing more 
and more ditticult. 
It the capital inTestment of a shoe manufacturer in Boston was not coor-
dinated with the capital investment of a shoe manufacturer in St. Louis, 
the two manufacturers, going their respective ways, might both decide to 
increase production in prosperous times. They might devote their pro• 
fits to a further increase in production; eventually they might together 
produce more shoes than the population could or would buy {it being 
assumed for the purpose of discussion that there are only two manufactur-
ers of shoes). The illustration of the two shoe manufacturers shows tkat 
Tugwell meant by •function• and •relationship to other business men• the 
percentage of capital investment in the production of a given product 
which could be attributed to a given firm. 
It a firm knew what percentage of the capital investment in the 
production of a certain good ~ capital investment represented, it obvi-
ously would know the total capital investment in that line. If the two 
shoe manufacturers, used as an example here, agreed on what percentage of 
total shoe production each would account for, each would understand his 
own "function• and •relationship to other business men• - at least within 
the shoe industry, where introindustry coordination would now prevail. 
In Tugwell's opinion, intraindustry coordination would not prevent 
serious maladjustments in the econCII\Y for two general reasons. First, 
each industry would not understand its •relationship• to other industries; 
the shoe industry might overinvest in its own activity at the same time 
that investment in copper mining was needed. In other words, each in-
dustry would not know what percentage of the total capital investment of 
all industries its capital investment represented; under such conditions 
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the economy would operate inefficiently on a national basis - as in the 
shoes-copper situation mentioned here. Secondly, intraindustry coordi-
nation could lead to abusive •private planning• - manipulations of pro-
duction by virtual monopolies in order to obtain the maximum profit from 
the market for a certain product at a given time. •Private planning,• 
done without the public knowledge, could be employed to promote high-
price, low-volume sales for private purposes - counter to both the tech-
nologists' efforts for full production, and the public interest. 
TU!well considered interindustry coordination necessary to assure 
econoadc •continuity.• ay •continuity• he meant continuous production 
based on a continuous balance between production and purchasing power • 
as opposed to violent cyclical fluctuations. Interindustry coordination 
was synonymous wita •overall" coordination. •Qyerall" coordination was 
a minimal term; Tugwell's scheme applied to an enterprise only on tae 
level at whick the activities ot that enterprise were directly •related" 
to the whole economy - the •conjunctural• level to which he continually 
referred in his writings. The kind ot clothes which workers in a parti• 
cular factory wore was not important; the percentage of the total produc-
tion ot a given which a particular plant produced bore a direct •relation-
ship• to the total economy. Rationalization at the •conjunctural" level 
required central allocation of resources. 
Ethics 
•overall• coordination, like intraindustrial coordination, would 
not eliminate the possibility ot market manipulations against the public 
interest - unless there was some kind of public cognizance ot the alloca-
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tion of resources, In fact, the need for protection against unethical 
business conduct would increase as the antitrust laws were suspended, 
permitting wide coordination; combinations unlimdted in size and unre• 
gulated in conduct could dominate societ7. 
Tugwell deplored the unethical end immoral conduct of some business 
men; as en institutionalist he did not condemn suca practitioners on per-
sonal or ethical grounds. He did not approve of immorality; he believed 
that the means for its elimination lay in institutional reforms rather 
than in e reformation of !lumen nature. Business iDIIIorality steiJIIDed from 
e lack of coordination, from a system in which the individual business 
men's 'function• and •relationship• to other business men was undefined, 
causing him to fell into unethical practices in order to surTive in the 
predatory world of industry and commerce. Business immorality was not 
only an effect of the aDsence of planni~; it aroused Tu~ll's concern 
that its enti•aocial impact could cause additional confusion leading to 
the collapse of the econ~. The avoidence of eventual collapse, he 
believed, required at least a mintmwa of coordination, 
In a coordinated aeon~ there would be no detailed check on tlle 
conduct of business men; there would be no dependence on tlle laissez-faire 
concept that each individual's pursuit of his own interest inevitably con-
tributed to the general interest. Businessmen would operate within an 
institutional framework so constructed that individual operations, re~rd­
less of their ownership end management, would necessarily promote tlle cen-
eral interest.1 
1, Galbraith, :r. K., American Cepitelip: (continued on page 59) 
5'h 
Socialism 
Tugwell's ideas on 'planned capitalism• did not lend themselves 
to easy understanding by non-economists. Militant le~tists deplored tke 
inclusion o~•capitalism• in his concept. Advocates o~ laissez-~aire 
asserted that •planned• meant •regimented.• Tugwell, himsel~. conceded 
that his scheme was an institutional departure in a direction away ~ram 
laissez-~aire capitalism; on the other hand, he aelieved that his ideas 
were primarily suggestions o~ ways to make twentieth-century capitalism 
work better. With an air o~ urgency he insisted that the devising o~ 
ways to prevent periodic depressions was a matter o~ assuring the survival 
o~ the capitalistic system. 
It was understandaale that those who made only a su~ace analysis 
o~ Tugwell's ide~s. upon encountering his advocacy o~ the central alloca-
tion o~ resources, should call his scheme socialistic. Some commentators 
associate Tugwell with "'extreM socialism• down to tllte present time,l A 
close examination o~ Tugwell's works revealed that ais ideas ci~~ered 
~rom doctrinaire socialism in sicni~icant respects, He did not accept 
the central tenet o~ doctrinaire socialism - public ovnersaip o~ the means 
o~ production. He did not recommend the aaolition ~ the pro~it systea. 
(Footnote 1. continued ~rom )lap 58) llls Concept 9.t Countervailinc Poyer 
(Boston, Houghton Mi~flin, 1952) Chapter XIII, "Tke Role o~ Centralized 
Decision,• discusses government attempts to create an econoadc climate in 
which individuals' decisions are not dictated, ~t necessarily contri~te 
to the general interest. 
1. Woodbury, David 0., review o~!. Chronicle .2f. JeopardY, 1945·1955, by 
R. G. Tugwell, in Saturd!y fteyiew, August 5, 1955, 14, 
6o. 
Soae of kis critics opposed the adoption of any scheme whick 
would exclude their selfish speculations. Other critics had sincere 
lllisaivings that Tugwell's system was as undesirable as the illness it 
sou!bt to prevent; it would suastitute for haphazard allocation of re• 
sources on the part of many, allocation according to the vllillaies of a 
few • suajecting all economic activities to re8imentation. 
Tugwell met oajections to his ideas with the assertion that tae 
allocation of resources would take place under pualic co~izance whick 
would prevent vhimisicsl decisiona.2 As for regimentation, he maintained 
that a lack of overall coordination in the econ~ resulted in the adopt-
ion ay ausiness of predatory policies; predation involved a kind of regi-
mentation whick •usually did not go by that name• - the herding of work-
era into factories for eight, nine, or ten hours a day with inadequate 
wage pa;vmenta.3 Tugwell pointed out that there had al'Wilys been some 
coordination in production; •private planning• amounted to coordination 
within limited economic spkeres, which, in soinc at each other's throats, 
manipulated mechanisms such as prices for purposes of private gain. 
•()verall• coordination of laraescale production was necessary; Tuswell 
conceded tl!lat 
So long as the major task of production is subject to coordi-
nation there aust always ae a certain amount of regimentation. 
'l'be true danger lies in the fact that we may strain at tke 
gnat of the minor checks and controls required to counteract 
See aelow, Chapter III, Section, "Reconciling the Esoteric and tke 
Exoteric.• 
Tugwell, R. G., •A Fireside Symposium,• Columbia University Quarterly, 
Vol. 27, No. l, Marca, 1935, 28. 
kuaan exploitation in economic pro4uction and swallow tke 
CSIIel of llig lrusiness, whick already has gone far toward· 
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the regimentation of workers, of producers and of consumers, 
The fact tkat repressive police-measures in certain foreign 
countries which are operating under class party dictator-
ships have led to intolerallle regimentation of what we re-
&ard as fundamental h11111Bn rights and liberties would not 
llliad us in this regard. An intelligent solution of the main 
problems of production, through coordination ••• should set 
the aass of us free to develop the most important aspects of 
individualism in economic life.4 
It is important to llear in mind the differences between Tugwell's 
ideas and doctrinaire socialism in order to understand both the inaccur-
acy of the comments of many of his critics and Tugwell's own estimate of 
the New Deal. In the opinion of Herllert Hoover, for example, the New 
Deal wnt too far toward regiiiiBntation; as for Tugwell's scheme, it was 
Communistic. In Tucwell'a opinion, Roosevelt deserved credit for takinc 
elll8raency .. aaures which Hoover failed to sponsor; however, tb.e New Deal 
was no more than stop-asp in its essential impact since it did not create 
•conjunctural• institutions, 
In a llesic sense, the differences lletween Tugwell and Roosevelt 
were greater then those lletveen Roosevelt and Hoover. The two Presidents 
were lloth lillerel capitalists who really differed on the implementation 
of their pkilosopby;5 of course, on the level of implementation, in an 
emergency, the differences between Hoover and Roosevelt amounted to a dif-
ference in philosophies of governaent - the role that government was to 
Tucwell, R. G., Address, •A Third EconOIIJ,' Rochester Teachers Associ-
ation, Rochester, New York, April 9, 1935, ~ ~ Release, 10, 
Tugwell, R. G., •ne Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• ~ !!!11-
.s!!lh Reyiey, Winter, 1953-54• 442. 
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play in liberal-capitalistic economic life.6 In addition to larae-scale 
relief measures. Roosevelt undertook Progressive reforms - •make the 
capitalists ••have.• He did not go •eyond Pro~ressivism to the creation 
of the kind of •conjunctural• institutions Tucwell advocated.? 
Implementation of Plannin& 
Tucvell wrote very little about the mechanics of his institutional 
scheme to prevent depressions. In fact, one could include the specific 
content of his ideas on planning in one sentence. He called for the can-
tral allocation of resources. price controls, and federal incorporation 
of 8usinesses. Central allocation and price controls served as a two• 
edged sword; they made for a balance 8etveen production and purchasin& 
power; they acted, in effect, as a control on profits, preventing tae kind 
of misuse of surplus whica Tugwell listed as a principal cause of the 
deDacle of 1929. 
Tugwell wrote at length a-out ~gas. Wages were important in ~ild-
ing up purchasing power; moreover, the passing on to workers of cost•reduc-
tion benefits, derived from increased technological efficiency, in tae 
form of higher ~ges would also ten4 to prevent the accumulation of sur-
pluses suscepti•le of misuse. Tugwell did not write about wages specifi-
cally in connection with his institutional scheme for coordination. S~-
ilarly, he wrote a great deal about the invinci-ility of the combination 
6. See below, Chapter VI, Section, "The Democrats• Depression;• Chapter 
XV, Section, •Tae 'Progressive' Nature of the New Deal.• 
7. See below, Chapter VI, Section, "The Democrats• Depression;• Caapter 
XV, Section, •The 'Progressive' Nature of the New Deal.• 
liiOV&JIIent • SOJBetimes in articles which also referred to central alloca-
tion of resources and pries controls. However, he did not include per-
missive leaislation resarding combinations in any specific list of coor-
dinating devices.1 0-viously, his anti-antitrust position, implied in 
his advocacy of central allocation of resources, was, like high-wage 
policies, essential to his concept of the achievement of economdc balance. 
Tugwell did not mean to be evasive wken he pointed out what ke 
thought had to H done without tellin& in detail how to do it. Be was a 
proponent of experimental econoudcs, He did not believe that men could 
lay out a detailed blueprint of the future. In working out the actual 
instruments of coordination in detail, society would aeve to experiment 
continually vita various devices. The bulk of Tugwell's writings on 
planning constituted a statement of objectives end en effort to esta•lisa 
a rationale for the plannina which vas attain those objectives. 
In~ Industrial Discipline, published in the Spring of 1933,2 
Tugwell called attention to the failure in the 1920s to distribute surplus 
product. He advocated the creation of a social instrumentality to iuure 
distri~tion.3 In this book he •riefly described the kind of mechanisa 
whick ae thought would apply effectively to an econ~ of ange, uncoordi• 
nated units of production,4 Combination was assumed, society having a 
1. Tupell, R. G., The Industrial piacipline Aa4 111!. GoverDJ!Ieptal .A!::t!l 
(New York, Columbia University Prest, 1933) Chapter VIII, contained 
a very general section, •The encouragement of inteeration,• 207.08, 
2. T.IIA liD 1m Tigs, May 14, 1933, ·14a1. 
3• Carter, :r, Franklin (Unofficial o•server), ~ New Dealers (New York, 
Si.an and Schuster, 1934) 87. 
4• Tugwell, R. G., l'.!!.! Industrial Discipliae .llali 1!ll. Goyemp!!ntal .Al:a• 
Chapter VIII, •Goverament and Industry,• 187-219· 
choice between a •supertrust outside our political fol'IIS ( whicla mey 
swamp the State in the "lle.ckwash of its progress) and an assiailation to 
the State of the going systea.• Some commentators, quoting this passace, 
interpreted it as meaning government owaership of the means of production.5 
In Tucvell•s opinion, ownership was beside the point. Combination 
llaving leplly occurred, the methodological problem was one of coordinet-
ing the activities of productive units. By "Industrial Discipline• Tug-
well meant cooperation SlllOng business groups, cooperation as efficient 
and effective as that existing amonc business units within a group - inter-
industry ss well as intrainduatry coordination. He poiated out that wllile 
each of two groups could be admirably efficient, their efficiencies could 
cancel out if they worked against each other. Many practical and succes-
sful business men were evangelists of the same idea regarding eoordination. 
The National Association of Credit Men and the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, among other business orpnizations, promoted trade - association 
and trade-~up activities,6 
In Chapter VIII, entitled •Government and Industry,• of !h! Indus-
trial Discipl1pe,7 Tu@well set dovn his general sclleme for a coordinatin& 
mechaniBIIl. The first requirement we.s a federal incorporation lav.8 'l'be 
5, Mitchell, James G., •The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust,' 
and Its Many Manifestations,• ~ AppAlist, Vol. 43, No. 115, June l, 
• '1'14· 848. 
6. McCall, c. H., •That ColUIIIbia Crowd,• Credit and Fipancial Mana,.,nt• 
Vol. 35, No. 6, June, 1933, 17. 
7. Tupell, R. G., 'l'be Industrial DisciPline~ tile Goyernm,ntal Jtl!., 
187-219. 
a. Tugwell, R. G •• Ill!. Industrial Pischline and 1!!!! Governmental J.ri!., 
201-<>2. 
history of powers ot inoorporation in Aaerioa had seen competition be• 
tween states to attract industry; the result had been the delegation to, 
or usurping by, corporations of •go•eramental• powera.9 Long before the 
Mev Deal the contusion and abuses arising from state incorporation o~ 
mended government attention. President Taft presented a bill tor federal 
incorporation to Congresa in December, 1909;10 he re•ived the proposal 
in his annual message to Congress of December 5, 1911.11 
The key to Tucwell's coordinating scheme lay in his proposal for 
central allocation of resources (capital in.astment) through an adminis-
tration tor the •articulation• ot busiDesa. This administration would 
allocate production among industriea and among firms within each industr,r.12 
Federal incorporation would aid central allocation, since an industrial 
organization would receive a pe~saive certificate of convenience and 
necessity only upon the presentation ot e•idence ot the affiliation of a 
certain percentage of the productive facilities of any single industry.13 
Coordination of capital investment was the core of Tugwell's scheme because 
ae believed that haphazard investment on the basis of limited knowledce 
was the basic cause ot cyclical fluctuations. 
9. Tu€well, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government.• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 470-71; 
•The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, Septeaber, 1952, 493· 
10. Duffy, Herbert s., Willi8!J1 Howard .I§.O. {New York, Minton Balch, 1930) 
252. 
11. Speece, Glenn H •• ~ R00sevelt {New York, The Author, 1936) 191; 
see below, Chapter X, Section, •Federal Incorporation.• 
12. Tugwell, R. G., Ih! Industrial Discipline ~ & Governmeptal A!:Ji.l• 
205. 
13. Tugwell, R. G., llul !ndustrial Discipline W & Governwntal A!:Ji.!, 
212. 
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The administration of central allocation would require enormous 
facilities for ~thering and analyzing statistics. Surveys of consump-
tion and production would be undertaken in order to make estimates of 
domestic and foreign markets and needed imports. 14 A detailed classifi• 
cation of industries would also be necessary. Tugwell did not maintain 
that estimates would be perfect; he ~lieved that coordination even on 
the Basis of approximate accuracy would afford vast improvement over the 
existing course of cyclical fluctuations, 
Price controls would be essential to any coordinating scheme as 
a device to regulate profits and adjust sales values - 8oth calculated 
to insure widespread purchasing power for continuous production and con-
tinuous profits.15 Tugwell declared that any attempt at positive control 
of prices without vidation of the ideology of the anti-trust act would 
be futile,10 Both central allocation of resuurces and price controls 
were inextricaaly tied in with Tugwell's anti-antitrust vieypoint - his 
belief that the development of a rationalized industry organized in large 
14. In the 1920s an industry could conceivably find out its percentage 
of total capital investment after it made its investment calculations; 
such delayed information did not prevent investment on the basis of 
misestimates of the market with their disastrous results. Thousands 
of decisions were made with inadequate knowled£e of what consumers' 
decisions, around which the econo~ revolved, would be. Information 
was needed before investment decisions were made. Electronic •&rains,• 
in wide use in the 1950s, might effectively handle the statistical 
task in the scheme which Tugwell suggested before the perfection of 
such instruments. 
15. Tugwll, R. G., The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental .AnAo 
208-11. 
16. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
Western Political Guarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, June, 1951, 308, 
combinations was both inevitable and desirable, 
Any effective coordinatin& mechanism would have to provide for 
the protection of certain vital interests such as essential weaker busi-
neeses, farmers, workers, consumers, end techniciena,l7 If major pro-
duction was a known factor, the protection of other interests, Tu~well 
believed, could be accomplished far more readily than in an uncoordinated 
eCOnOJIIYo 
SoMe critics dismissed Tugwell's idees as totalitarian - a form 
of economic slavery. His concept of planned capitalism was not •social 
control,• "democratic process,• "Jlsnned econ~,· or •experimentation;• 
it was simply •bureaucratic dictatorship.• 18 During the New Deal period 
some observers called Tugwell's scheme socialistic on the basis of these 
oft-quoted words: 
•••• business will lo~ically be required to disappear. This 
is not en overstatement for the sake of emphasis; it is liter-
ally meant. The essence of business is its free venture for 
profits in an unregnlated econoJIIY,l9 
Those who interpreted Tugwell's call for a disappearance of business as 
socialism neglected to cite his definition of •ausiness• in the very next 
sentence. Senator Hugo Blsck, later a Supreme Court Justice, stated that 
there was nothing in Tugwell's works about doing away with private owner-
17. 
18. 
Tugwell, R, G., The Industrial Discipline A!li the GovernuiAntal Am• 
202. 
Mitchell, James G., •The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust' 
and Its Many Manifestations,• 849. 
Tugwell, R, G., •Tae Principle of Plsnnin~ and the Institution of 
Laissez-Faire,• Aperican Econgg1c fieview, Supplement, Vol, XXII, No. 
1, March, 1932, 89. 
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ship.20 The •end of business,• in the context of Tugwell's definition 
meant the end of laissez-faire; by 1932 important members of the business 
community were insisting that the preservation of capitalism required 
the abandonment of laissez-faire,21 
Another passage in the 'end of business• address which provoked 
cries of government ownership stated that 
Planning will necessarily become a function of the federal 
government; either that or the planning agency will supersede 
that government, which is why of course, such a scheme will 
eventually be assimilated to the state, rather than possess 
some of its powers without its responsibilities,22 
Again, this was another declaration that the protection of •governmental• 
perogatives was essential if planning, which went on in any event, was 
to take place in the public interest. The federal government's function 
could conceivably be limited to sponsorship of planning by business. Tug-
well stated that such self-government was preferable to direct government 
planning, although he doubted that it would be readily undertaken,23 
Tugwell's views on government ownership had nothing in common with 
the doctrinaire socialist position. He assigned to government the duty 
of performing certain tasks • even though they were unprofitable; i!:OVern• 
20. C€?ngressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 78, Part II, June 
14. 1934. 11349· 
21. Letter, M. L. Wilson to Tugwell, July 25, 1932, concerning Henry I. 
Harriman, President of the Boston Chamber of eoa.erce and later Presi• 
dent of the United States Chamber of Commerce, who aad stated taat 
more income to labor and agriculture was the alternative to taxation 
which would put business out of operation, Tugwell fapers. 
22. Tugwell, R. G,, 'The Principle of Planning and the Institute of Lais• 
sez-Paire, • 89. 
23. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• The .AD11-
~ Reviey, Wiater, 1953•54, 43ln. 
ment, howeTer, .as not a business; the more industry did, the less goT• 
ernment would have to do,24 In the struggle for the achievement of tke 
economic objectives of efficiency in production aDd wide distribution 
of benefits, Tugwell had •no feelingL;-out government ownershii/ one 
way or the other.•25 In the early New Deal period the administration 
consciously and carefully planned its relief program so as to aToid in-
terference with private enterprise (necessitating leaf-raking and inferior 
projects) and to proTide customers for business yet business was •cru-
elly satirical about a program shaped to its own criteria.•26 
With regard to planning, Tugwell considered the issue between 
private ownership and public ownership of secondary importance; industry 
and government were not opposite interests, one of which had to push the 
other out,21 Coordination was the essential element in large-scale pro-
duction; while pu8lic ownership vould apply to some utilities, for example, 
•in others we shall equally certainly have to rely on individual initi• 
ative, enterprise and ambition for salt-expression and self-satisfaction 
to supply the motiTe pover.28 For "what is important 8eyond all else is 
24. Unpublished statement, December, 1933, Tugwell Papers. 
25. Letter, Tugwell to Ickes, 1941, regarding Puerto Rico; cited is Lord, 
Russell, •GoTernor Rex of Puerto Rico,• Cormnon Sense, Vol, 11, No, 7, 
July, 1942, 
26. Tugwell, R. G., :Dis Stricken J.AG (New York, Douloleday, 1947) 56•57. 
27. Tugwell, R. G,, •The Utility of the Future in the Present,• Pu-lic 
Administration Beviey, Vol. 8, No, 1, Winter, 1948, 53-54; Tugwell's 
Tievs on public ownership render the contentions of economists such 
as von Mises and Hayek - that a ainimum of government action ineTit-
a8ly leads to total goTeroaent action with collective ownership, aDd 
that collective ownership results in a loss of personal freedoa • in• 
applicable to his •planned capitalism,• which made no reference to 
ownership. 
28, Tugwell, R, G., Address, •A Third Econ~.· Rochester Teachers Associ-
ation, Rochester, :New York, April 9, 1935, .!!§.!2! Press Release, 9· 
70. 
the achieving of pultlicly oriented direction whether of pultlicly or 
privately owaed or operated agencies.•29 
If Tugwell's unorthodox ideas made him the Brain Trust •s ·~ldest 
brain,•3° he considered the action he advocated little enough, in fact 
conservative, in the face of the challenge of modern technology. A 
writer for a business journal asserted that business had nothing to fear 
from a man who sdught to accomplish the kind of coordination whicla trade 
associations desired, without disrupting !Berican individualism and initi-
ative.31 Tugwell himself provided this useful definition of terms resard-
ing means of achievement in a much-quoted sentence in The Ipdustrial ~-
cipline: 
Liberals would like to reltuild the station while the trains 
are still running. Radicals prefer to blow up the station.32 
The Rationale for Plsnninc 
The Lesal Basis for Plsnnina 
Tugwell concluded from his study of the English common-law regula-
tion of ltusiness, summarized in Chapter II, that the public was entitled 
to adequate goods and services at reasonsltle prices. This consumers• 
right constituted the D&sis of public interest in economic affairs. It 
was the ultimate prerogative of government to take the action necessary 
to protect the public interest. With the historical prevalence of the doc-
29. Tugwell, R. G., •Tlte Directive,• Journal £!.Social PhilosoAAY W 1!&1:-
isprpdence, Vol. 7, No. 1, Octolter, 1941, 34. 
30. Butterfield, Roger, ~ rerican ~(New York, Simon and Schuster, 
1947) 417. 
31. McCall, C. H., •Tiaat Colwabia Crowd,• 17. 
32. Tugwell, R. G., !hi Industrial Discipline W .1M, Goverppntal !nJ., 229. 
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trine of laissez-faire in the United States, business had in some ways 
become govel'lllllent, developing a disregard for the pu&lic interest. Gov-
erament would not be exceeding ita prerogatives, which it now had to re-
possess, in sponsoring • without public ownership of the aeans of produc-
tion • same scheme for overall coordination of large-scale production. 
The Concept of Conjuncture 
It has Been noted that Tugwell's writings on planning were con-
cerned leas with aechanisas than with the statement of a rationale. Taia 
Utellect\181 endeavor carried Tugwell into 118117 fields, especiell;y-
ecology and Biology. He em~eaize4 the integrating impact of technolOSY 
and the economic principle of efficiency as the 8asis for his anti-anti· 
trust viewpoint. He also stressed his experimental approach, rejecting 
doctrinaire, deter.Binistic a,-st..a of political econ~. 
Plsnnin& ws necesser,-; it rested on a legal usia. At wllat level 
was it to Be executed? The construction in detail of a planning mechaDiam 
had to follow the determination of the level and area of the application 
of planning. After the determinatiGn of means and ends, •direction• 
would 8a posanle. 'l'ugwell meant ~ "direction• the definition of oBjec• 
tives US. the effort to achieve them through •planninc•1 • gbing, in 
addition to pointing out, direction. 
Tugwell called tor a giving of direction to economic affairs at the 
•conjunctural• level. His belief that the waole had a behavior pattern 
1. Tugwell, R. G., •'l'lle Fourth Power,• Plannipg and Civic C9!!!!!ept, April-
J"une, 1~39. Part II, 27. 
distinct froa that of its parts ProTided -oth a definition of •conjunc• 
ture• and the reason for the application of direction st the •conjunetural• 
level. Parts had only a derived, contributory significance in relation 
to the whole, and none when taken alone. Where a part came into relatioa-
ship with the whole lay the area of conjuncture.2 For example, the 
details of ownership and of the Pb7sical operation of a factory llad no 
direct imJSCt on the whole econ011,1. The percentage which a factory )lro-
duced of the total production of a good aore a direct relationshiJI to a 
larger area of production, aoth inttaindustrial and interindustrial, witkin 
which a factory operated; that percentage involved a public interest 
llecause if it vas aased on a gross miscalculation of the prospective ll!lr• 
ket, it could contribute to a serious .aladjustment in the total economr. 
Direction would not involve cognizance of such details as workers• 
dress or plant architecture • even though the latter detail might conceiT• 
ably De suaject to general specifications laid down by some agency of 
local goveru.ent. Direction would apply at the top; that is, it would 
adopt a synthetic, rather then aa analytical, epprosck, The planner -ld 
attempt to grasp the whole before 1le considered its parts. The planners' 
concept of the whole -ld aot be a lifeless 11echanical additive (the sua 
of the parts); it would -e an •emergent• • a unique entity to whick eacla 
part ~s necessary in suitable )lroportion. The directional mechanisa 
would represent 'this whole, this emergent, this relative and conjunctursl 
interest.•3 Only throu~ planning could there ae consideration of tile 
2. 'l'ugvell, R. G., •Implementing the General Int.erest,• Pualic J.dm1aistra-
1i.!!ll Ruiey, Vol. 1, No. l, AutWIIIl, 1940, 34• 
3• Tugwell, R, G,, •Implementing the Public Interest,• 34· 
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whole at the conjunctural level, therew, enabling protection of the 
JU'IIlic interest. 
Tugwell elaborated on his concept of the conjunctural lly pointin& 
out a parallel between the evolution of individual multicellular orsan• 
isas and that of societies.4 ln both, the complex whole had a life 
which conditioned that of all its parts and memllers. Both developed loci 
of leadership. In the higher animals localized leadership occurred 
within a framework of •pllysiologicel democracy.• All parts of the lloely 
interacted with the brain, determiainc its level of awareness, the kealth 
of nervous connections, and. suggesting necessary reactions. Similarly, 
in the best human societies, in decisions on matters affectinc all parts, 
all parts - no one of which was more important than another • were con-
sulted; laws ruled rather than men,5 
In the cases of ants and lleea cooperation had its final triumpk; 
competition and leadership disappeared as the whole society behaved like 
a single or.-niam. Giving human society a •llrain• presented, however, 
an entirely different problem from that of the llees. Men had highly devel-
oped braina; consequently, while men had engaged in apecielized activities, 
llecoming functionally interdependent, cooperation among intellectually 
individualistic humans had bean alij!ht. Yet, man ksd to face his dil-
of combining specialization, characterized by the initiative which pro-
dnced progress, with integration. He had to adjust to the new world he 
4. Tugwell, R. G., •variation on a Theme lly Cooley,• Ethics, Vol, 59. No, 
4, July. 1949; "The Utility of the FUture in the Present.• Pu&lic jdmip-
istration Review, Vol. s. No. 1, Winter, 1948, 59· 
5· Tugwell, R. G., •Variation on a Theme W, Cooley,• 236•37• 
had created in which time and space had contracted. He bad to accaa-
modate larger combinations, somett.es intent on destroying one another 
and possessing forces adequate to accomplish that aim. Involved in the 
environmental compulsion to adjust was the question of racial survival.6 
In addition to understanding the universe and using it for his 
own advantage, man had to accept the conccadtant of his inventiveness -
foresight in its use and accommodation to the constantly new environment 
it produced. He had to know everything; lle also had to a~e on every-
thing. Not only could he neither overlook nor fail to gain control of 
any important environmental element; he also had to achieve agreement as 
to its management.7 MBn certainly had ia his rich nature the contriving 
ability to foresee, control_, aad agree through •social mechanisms cap• 
s•le of containing and mastering the forces and materials to be under-
atood, controlled, and socially accepted.•8 He could ascertain and 
achieve the'directive• through new, admittedly unorthodox,9 •relational'lO 
institutions. 
Tugwell expected that some serious students of public affairs would 
consider his synthetic approach eaoteric end unorthodox in an age devoted 
to the analytical method; he asserted that his approach vas reelistic.11 
He predicted that the principal source of the •unorthodox' epithet would 
6. 'i'ugvell, R. G,' •variation on a Theme •Y Cooley,• 238-41. 
7· Tugwell, R. G., •variation on a Theme by Cooley,• 242. 
8. '!'ugllell, R. G.' •variation on a Theme by Cooley,• 243• 
9. '!.'ugvell, R. G., 'li:a rth•ound: The Problem of Planning and Survival,• 
Antioch Reyiey. Winter, 1949•50, 484. 
10. '!'ugvell, R. G., •Earth •ouad: The ProlDlem of Planning and Survival,• 
483. 
11. '!'ugvell, R. a., •Implementing the General Interest,• 34• 
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be those who hid behind orthodoxies in order to veil their speculative 
actiYities; they did not want the future laid out in clear, objectiYe, 
eYeD if tentatiYe terms, because they thriYed on uncertainty and could 
not surYiYe exactitude.12 SpeculstiYe enterprisers would not agree ay 
themselves to cooperate so long as recalcitrant minorities could ex-
tract gains from any cooperative effort,13 SpeculatiYe business men 
were still interested in ~bling - in keeping society insecure in order 
to create uncertain conditions whic~ proYided gaa8lers• rists.l4 
Politicians as well as ausiness .en feared the projection of 
exactitude into the future. Uncertainty enabled the politician to at• 
triaute all appropriate attractions to the future - campaign promises 
were notorious; politicians of tile dnagogic type also .exploited the 
popular impulse toward an UDcomplicated and undisciplined past.15 Busi• 
ness man joined in the appeal to the past W, attributing the Yast gains 
in well-being in the past two centuries to uncontrolled initiative. 
Tugwell disagreed with theas 
This period Lot great gaini/ was indeed also the one of 
least control. But the d81111nd for ausiness treed0111 fol-
lowed rather tllen preceded technical change. The de!liTe 
was to take adYantage of cumulative possiailitiea rather 
than to further them or to make certain of their benignity. 
12. Tugwell, R. G., •The Superpolitical,• Journal .2f Social PJ\ilosoU:r, 
Vol. 5, October, 1939 • July, 1940, 113. 
13. Tugwell, R. G., "lleaign tor GoYernaent,• Address, Eighth Annual Meet· 
ing of the Federation of Bar Associations of Western New York, J11.11e 
24, 1933; in Tugwell, R. G., Ill! Balitle for DemocracY (New Yorke 
Columaia UniYersity Preas. 1935) 6. 
14• Tugwell, R. G., •chameleon Words,• !few Rewalic, Vol. 48, No. 612, 
August 25, 1926, 163. 
15. Tugwell, R. G., "The Superpolitical,• 113. 
A theoretical justification of this was worked out ~ 
Adaa Smith, centering in his famous dictum taat self· 
seekinc led, as lty a hidden hand, to social advantap. 
It is by now generally recognized taat this was s Oqde• 
side justificatiof6of exploitation rather t~an a melior• ati~ philosophy, 
Yet, Tagv811 did aot charge that business En bore personal pilt for 
their speculative attitudes; we could not •expect conformity to a desicn 
which does not exist, nor to a sequential prograa vhich is not laid out,•17 
The specific content of Tugwell's aclaeme for economic coordination, 
especially central allocation of resources, caused same students of Ilia 
vritinp to state that his ideas resembled Soviet theory,l8 To this 
assertion Tugwell replied that the democratic American spirit included 
an 'invincible oltjection• to Coamaniaa and Fascism vita their suppression 
of dissent; the United States could democratically manage economic affairs 
as efficiently aa dictatorahips.19 Our most serious problem was the 
achievement of change within a desired pattern without serious departure 
from voluntarism,2° The attainment of economic security required the aid 
of the functioning managers of the economic system; all depended on their 
consent or vithholdin&: of it, plaaning beginning vhere class warfare and 
hatred ended.21 
Tucvell comeined with his firm ltelief in democracy a rejection of 
lo. Tupell, R. G., •Land of Plenty,• Current Riston, Vol, 48, No. 2, 483• 
17. 'l'ugwll, R. G., 'The Superpolitical,• 98, 
18. Mitchell, James G., 'The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust• 
and Its Ma~ Manifestations,• I!R +pp•&ist, Vol. 43, No. 115, June l, 
1934. 849· 
19. Tupell, R. G., •Chameleon Words,• lo2. 
20. Tucvell, R. G., •Land of Plenty,• 486. 
21. Tugwell, R. G., •Chameleon Words,• lo3• 
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Man: ism on a theoretical leYel. In the first place, Man: ism was doctri• 
naira. Tugwell found himself Wl8ble to discoYer the ineYitsble superi• 
ority of a doctrinaire systaa; it only seemed to operata well 8acause 
there was no criticism; there was no criticism only so long as doctrine 
fit the facts. A system constructed without deference to preconception 
would have greater survi'val value in the long run.22 Man:ism did not 
fit the facts because it llllS inapplicaltle to industry after the adYent 
of Taylorism. 23 
Moreover, Man:isa, as the Russians applied it, resulted in reason-
ing that the end justified the means: 
It is, as an instance, both gain and loss for others that 
objectives should suddenly haTe become dominant in Russia: 
gain, because sdministratiTa feaaibilities may be tested; 4 loss because so many Russian characteristics infuse them.2 
Man:ism gave first place to objectives since certain eventual. results were 
considered inevitaltle in a deteradnistic philosophy. Tugwell's basic 
philosophy was anti-deterministic. He refused to believe that panics, de-
flation, and bankruptcy were the only remedy for industrial overproductiv-
ity.25 In his flexiltla, experimental approach neither means nor ends were 
iiDDIIltably fixed. As for means, he asserted that simple conformity to pro-
cess would result in an insane world.26 As for ends, allowing dominance 
for objectiYes, without considering administrative possibilities, would 
22. Tugwell, R. G,. •Cltsmeleon Words,• 162, 
23. Tugwell. R. G., 'The Superpolitical,' 103. 
24. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Superpolitical,• 102, 
25. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's MIS!iiAe• 
Vol. 94, No. 5, November, 1933• 264, 
26. Tugwell, B. G •• "Tlte Superpolitical,• 105. 
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inTolYe endless disputes; objeetives would have to be agreed upon.27 Both 
ends and means would become indistinguishable and institutionalized in 
his scheme for enabling tentative projections into the future and agreed• 
upon modifications as necessary from time to time. Projections could 
only be tentative because of inevitable disagreements over which elements 
of the present had the most significance for the future, According to 
Tugwell, •Nothing could be less Utopian.•28 
The challenge to coordinate lay in the interdependence of the vari• 
ous factors in the econ~; a nev control was needed to conserTe their 
ability to function on a continuous basis, maintaining our economic exis• 
tence,29 In an industrial system the coordinators would hold the keys 
to power, the power Tugwell considered •goTernmental• whether or not it 
was so labeled, If that power were exercised in the public interest. tae 
future would see men drive out fears and vitholdings, releasing techniques 
which would bring victory in his long, cumulative struggle for technical 
mastery of the forces of nature - for men had faith that he could alter 
the future, pertly by reconstructing the past.30 Americana kRev their 
history end were tired of insecurity.31 Some dey taey would demand a co-
ordinating mechanism at the conjunctural level; this device would afford 
economic plenty end spirituel freedoa,32 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
Tugwell, R, G., •The SuperPolitical,• 104. 
Tugwell, R. G., •'!'he Superpoliticsl,• 110. 
Tugwell, R. G., •Design for Government,• 8. 
Ortega y Gasset obserTBd that the historical approach is valuable in en-
abling man to profit by racial experience; at the same time •life is al-
ways different from whet it ws,• ~Revolt .!?f. the Masses (Nev York, Nev 
Americsn Library, A Ment·or llook, 1950) 66. 
Tugwell, R. G,, •The Fourth Powr,• 24. 
Tugwell, R, G., "'!'be SuperPOliticsl,• ll3, 
The nature of the mechanism wbich TUgwell considered essential 
for assuring continuity in a capitalistic econ~ stemmed from his econ-
omic and social philosophy of •concentration and control,• Van Rise's 
phrase,33 as opposed to 'enforced atomism,• Raymond Maley's label for a 
philosophy he rejected.34 •concentration• implied the inevitable devel-
opment of huge production units for the most efficient application of 
new technology and scientific manageasnt. •control• meant that the tre-
mendous production units would operate in the public interest; they could 
not usurp governmental powers, the wealth they provided benefiting the 
nation as a whole. 
Tugwll's views made hilli, to ue another phrase, aft •anti-anti• 
truster.• There was no question in his mind that in any modern society 
larger c0111binations would, and should be allowed to, prevan.35 The fail-
ure to recognize the inevitability of the dominance of concentration re-
sulted in contradictory statements of public policy which urged promo-
tion of 'free cOBipetitive enterprise• along with a set of wholly opposing 
aims such as the coordination and utilization of the"plans, functions, 
and resources• of industry, agriculture, labor, and government; Tugwll 
noted, regarding such contradictions, that there could be no such coordi-
nation and utilization 
33· 
34· 
35· 
in a complete and literally free and competitive system 
Tan Hise, c. R., Concentration .All! Control (New York, Macmillan, 1912). 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,' 
Ethic1, Vol, 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 1. 
Tugwll, R. G., •Ideas behind the New Deal,• !!!lf York Tl•e Magazine, 
1uly, 16, 1933, 2. 
of enterprise. This is a contradiction of terms. Either 
we are to haTe autc:aatism and are really to restore free• 
dam, or we are to admit that we have not and cannot have 
such a system and proceed to sha:.e what ve dO have - which 
is very auch mixed privately - and - pualicly manased and 
regulated industry and commerce • more reflectively and 
systematically in the pu~lic interest.36 
80. 
In fact, Tugwell asserted, the whole antitrust movement was the 
result of the failure to recognize the governing technique of industry, 
In 1919, in an address to the American J!ar Association, Woodrow Wilson 
pointed out that tke separation of competition and democracy had to ~e 
118de if competition were not to stifle democracy. However, public 
espousal of Wilson's idea was unpopular; the antitrust laws found the 
government •pitting itself against inevitable, unconquerable industrial 
forces.•37 The antitrust laws 
meant coapelled business confusion. Cooperative impulses, 
demnded by the current econoaic trend, were thwarted and 
repulsed. They expressed themselves only indirectly and 
unkealthily, What was sound and econOlllically necessary was 
aranded as wrong lesally, 
The reason for insistence in those years on legislation to compel 
conflict was that conflict was natu~lly disappearing. Its pas-
sage was regarded as a cataatrepha.3 
Although uader the antit~st laws the new industrial structure had 
to lesd a subterranean existence, it grew as if it had been nourished care-
fully rather than considered a pariah. It preyed on its oppressors, its 
victimizations of society becoming more and more violent, until pretense 
vas no longer pose i ble. It ws out in the open ; its ns ture had to ae 
36. Tugwell, R. G., •The Utility of the Future in the Present,• 57•58. 
'Jl• Tugvall, R. G., •Design for Gover~~~~~~nto• 6, 
)8, Tugvell, R. G., •Design for Government,• 7, 
81. 
•ta.ed to the uses o~ ciTilized exiatence.•39 By the time ~ RooseTelt's 
election in 1932, a~reement with Tugwell that the alternatiTe to ~rear 
access to goods was to adopt a policy o~ limitation, to return to hand 
work and less power and to shoot engiDeers and inventors,40 was ~orthcom-
ing on all sides. William Randolph Hearst, pro-Roosevelt in 1932, 
obserTed that the trust was a labor-saTing deTice which would lowar the 
cost of production, which should be regulated and restricted, but which 
should not, and could not, be dastroyed.41 One of Tugwell's seTerest 
critics also labeled the antitrust laws undesirable restrictions.42 
In the face of irrepressible forces the antitrust laws had not pre-
vented eTBaions which defeated their purposes. Yet, the sentiment in 
their feTor had been strong enough to preTent the positiTe development ~ 
sa alterastive policy. The antitrust IIIOTement, obserTed Tugwell, had 
shova the threats which Dig Dusiness encountered in a representatiTe da.-
ocracy. Politicians preached littleness as a simple vote-getting reaction; 
really big Dusiness bad few Totes • as time passed it could not eTen count 
on the political l07alty o~ ita employees. Smaller business, of course, 
'IISS envious. •Maney alone did not mke the politlicsl mare go.•43 
41. 
42. 
43· 
Tugwell bel~eTed that the opposition to the antitrust acta aad 
~11, R. G., •Desigu for Gowr111Mnt,• 7. 
Tugwell, R. G., •.America Takes Hold of Its Destiey,• l:S!9u• April 
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Sons, 1933) 63. 
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II, Western Political Ouar!;erl.Y, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 
476. 
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adopted the correct position in opposing regressive, anti-evolutionary 
la,~s; it had gone about opposing atomism in the wrong way. Big business 
could not present an adequate defense on the basis of technological 
superiority since, not having been sensible enough to reduce prices suf-
ficiently and with timeliness, it could not appeal to contented consumers. 
All hands had opposed big business, including its own, What Tugwell would 
have considered an adequate defense was indicated in these words: •Only 
at last gasp would.any business man admit that public rights were involved 
in his enterprise,•·44 
President Hoover's statements showed that public antitrust policy 
remained confused during the period just pcceceding the New Deal. Hoover 
advocated the development of coordination throurfl the trade-association 
movement and recommended cautious revision of the antitrust laws -- gov• 
ernment would sanction combination. At tho~ same time, he spoke as the 
prophet of government withdrawal from economic affairs. Thus, in Hoover's 
mind, according to Tugwell, danger lay not in business' combining, but 
in the possibility that acts of combination would provoke government inter-
ference stifling the will to enterprise,45 Tugwell contended that combi-
nation without governmental cognizance would result in suppression of 
enterprise by large combinations in poasesaion of governmental powers. 
Apparently Hoover's brand of individualism did not call for any particular 
kind of behavior on the part of individuals -- including strict abstinence 
from cooperative business management. By "individualism• Hoover meant a 
44. 
45. 
Tugwell, 
Tugwell, 
10. 
R. G. • 
R. G,, 
"The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part II, 478. 
Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy (New York, John Day, 1932) 
"hands off" policy on the part of the government. 
Tugwell analyzed Hoover's message of December J, 1930, on revi-
sion of the antitrust laws and found it confusing. Hoover considered 
the prevention of monopolies of vital publ:lc importance, implying that 
competition was desirable; however, competition was not desirable in 
some industries, "these enterprises closely related to natural resources.• 
Regarding this speech Tuewell commented: 
Suggesting that we are assenting to wasteful and destructive 
competition by no means implies that these are the natural 
characteristics of a certain stage of the private exploitation 
of natural resources. No, indeedl the difficulty is with 
•prohibitive interpretation• of a law intended to enforce 
competition. 
Competition, one would say, is good in some instances but not 
in others. Those instances in which it is not good are those 
in which it is enforced. Where it is not enforced combinations 
exist,46 
Hoover's desire to "determine if these evils can be eliminated without 
sacrifice of the fundamental purpose of these laws• was, wrote Tugwell, 
•·a desire to have his cake and eat it too,• Faced squarely with fact and 
theory in a field in which he was a professional, Hoover left himself on 
a rack of indecision,47 Meanwhile, statistics compiled by Hoover's 
President's Research Committee on Social Troends shm.red a continuous 
growth in concentration in the period 1919-1930 -- a poor record for the 
champion of competitive individualism,48 
Tugwell, unlike the New Deal as a whole, was consi::tent in his 
anti-antitrust position; he flatly rejected the general underlying prin• 
46. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policv, 9-10. 
47. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 10. 
48. Newspaper clipping, Tugwell Papers. 
ciple of antitrust legislstion as inapplicable to twenthith-century 
production. However, and in this regard he departed from Hoover, when 
the government permitted combination, there could be no withdrawal of 
continuous governmental cognizance, In fact, concentration •<ithout con-
trol would not only mean that private interests would exercise govern-
mental powers, but that they could also conceivably arrange for perman-
ently retaining them-- taking over, in effect, areas of government. 
Tugwell doubted "whether the technical forces suitable for attack-
ing nature will not break up our society unless they are strictly regula-
ted in the general interest,.49 Government had been becoming ineffectual 
in its relationships with industry. The antitrust laws, based on an 
interpretation of an industrial life of Rnother era, failed to change 
so anything, leaving the government in a trance. Even reformers had 
feared governmental innovation; the Progressives' suggesticns had been 
in the direction of weakening industry to match a weak government. Any 
positive change in government would have been socialistic and immoral,51 
Woodrow Wilson was aware of the danger that the government could 
fall into the hands of industrial interests; Roosevelt learned of Wilson's 
ideas from Josephus Daniels, then Roosevelt's chief in the Navy Depart• 
ment, At the time of World War I Roosevelt considered Daniels unrealis-
tic; he bter saw that the older man knew wnat he Nns talking about,52 
49· Tugwell, R, c •• • Chameleon \ofords, • 9· 
so. Tugwell, R, G. • "America Takes Hold of Its Destiny, • 259. 
51. Tugwell, R, c., •Chameleon Words,• 29. 
52. Tugwell, R, C,, •The Compromising Roosevelt,• \-/estern Political 
Qy!;lrterl:£, Vol, 6, No, J, June, 1953. 528-29. 
Obviously, Roosevelt responded approvingly to Tugwell's views on the 
protection of eovernment; whether the President would go beyond agree-
ment in analysis to protection through positive action remained, in 
1932, to be seen, 
If government was to protect itself After permitting combination, 
such protection required the positive promotion, not of bureacuracy, but 
of the venerAl interest, Tugwell maintained that in the pror:,otion of 
the general interest a redistribution of income W'JS essentiR.l for the 
provision of generAl purchasing power adequate to assure business a con-
tinuous market for its increased prcduct,,53 He considered redistribution 
of income through taxation repairs following the breakdown of an origi• 
nally defective economic process,54 Redistribution at the o~;tset through 
price and profit controls55 would not only protect the institution and 
prerogatives of government, and the public; it would also prove essential 
to business welfare,56 One critic inquired: if redistribution of ;;ealth 
did not mean a profession to help the dependent by destroying the inde-
pendent, and the robbing of Peter to pay Paul, then what did it mean?57 
This question ignored Tugwell's assertion that assurance of purchasing 
power, in providing customers, constituted a protection of business, 
53· Wyand, ChArles s., The Economics of Ccnsumption (New York, Macmillan, 
1937) 67. 
54. ~ee below, Chapter III, •Tugwell's Long-Run Thinking." 
55· Time, Vol, 23, No, 26, June 25, 1934, 11. 
56. Wyand, Charles s., The Economics of Ccnsumption, 67. 
57. Young, James s., Roosevelt Revealed (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 
1936) 39· 
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Reconciling the Esoteric and Exoteric 
Avoidance of Politics 
Effective planning in the general interest could not be subject 
to the capricious fluctuations in the influence of special interests 
which politics involved. Coordination of complex forces called for the 
disinterested efforts of experts. That Tugwell considered planning an 
esoteric function is readily understandable in consideration of certain 
general comments on human nature in his writings; in one article he 
wrote that 
••• the incidence of intelligence in the race ••• seems 
to run constant. That is to say, every generation has 
some one-half-of-one per cent of gifted individuals whose 
cerebrations suggest change. The suggestions may be good 
or bad, depending on the other qualities of gifted indi-
viduals. and particularly. of course. whether they use 
their gifts for public or private purposes. This is where 
morality comes in. For creative people are often more 
practical and vocational than general in their capacities.1 
Needless to say. Tugwell was not alone among intellectuals in con-
fining creativity among humans to narrow limits. Hendrik Van Loon 
observed that 
The number of people sufficiently intelligent to think for 
themselves has always been exceeding small. It is doubtful 
whether the percentage today is very much higher than it was 
in paleolithic times. It probably is slightly lower than 
during the third century bef'ore our era in Greece and Asia 
Minor.2 
1. Tugwell. R. G •• •Earthbound• The Problem of Planning and Survival.• 
492-93· 
2. Van Loon. Handrik. The Story .2f America• New York. Dell Publishi~ 
Co •• 1954. 35· 
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Ortega 7 Cesset commented; 
Civilization becomes more complex and difficult in propor-
tion as it advances. The problems which it sets before us 
today are of the mcst intricate. The number of people whose 
minds are equal to these problems bacames increasingly small.3 
It political process ostensibly produces public officials as repre-
sentatives of the general interest, vby would those officials not be ade-
quate for the execution of general planning? Tugwell replied to this 
question that 
The Mayor, it is true, was a general officer; but, like all 
elected officials, one with a comparatively short-run and 
necessaril7 political interest. An official elected for a 
short term must be responsive in a different sense than an 
appointive officer whose term is longer. The commission was 
intended to be devoted completel7 to the long run as well as 
to generalit7, and to be removed as completely from what is 
ordinarily called politics as is humanly possible - as much, 
for instance, as is the judiciar,r.4 
Tugwell believed that the pursuit of the general interest would 
be difficult, when not impossible, within the framework of existing gov-
ernmental mechanisms as managed by existing political organizations. In 
a detailed account of the attainment and the retention of political 
power, he analyzed the "leadership system• which political organizations 
in the United States employed. 
The leadership system had connotations of unscrupulousness and the 
3• Ortega y Cesset, !!:!.!!. Revolt !2f. !Ill. Masses, 65; Lipx-nn. Walter. ,n& 
Public fhilosophx, Boston, Atlantic, Little Brown, 1954, deals with 
the problem of reconciling expertness and efficiency with democracy • 
a problem which any serious student of government inevitably encounters. 
Brooks Adams vas concerned with difficulties arising in a democratic 
govarnment in !!!!. Degrad§tion 9L .1!!.!. Democratic Do-, New York, 
Macmillan, 1919. 
4. Tugwell, R. G.. • Implementing the General Interest, • 37 • 
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seeking of responsibilities beyond an individual's power, with a view to 
personal advantage rather than to the merit of any undertaking in ques• 
tion. This system rested on a paradox found in political organizations, 
all of which engendered selfless loyalties and included men of principle. 
HoweTer, many men of principle did not judge the social purposes and 
effects of measures; their philosophy consisted simply in faith in the 
leader. Consequently, men with a genius for organization were able to 
gather power and prestige. The number and loyality of his followrs 
provided a measuring rod for the politician's greatness.5 
When his organization became too larse for him to handle personally, 
the leader ran into difficulty. Be then needed disciples who, in turn, 
also needed disciples. Disciples bad to have the leader's qualities, but 
in a lesser degree. If there was not only a group to lead but a jo- to 
do, it was a rare man indeed who could meet both challenges and at the 
same time rise to •statesmanship•· as an impartial promoter of the public 
interest. Usually his choice lay between giving sway whatever was neces• 
sary to hold his organization together and doing the job well. It be did 
not •play politics• and concentrated on the job to be done, he did so to 
the neglect of what was necessary to keep his organization intact. On the 
other hand, if he displayed the ability to keep his organization together, 
he did not necessarily possess the ability to handle the problems of 
statesmanship. 6 
The victor in politics needed the qualities of statesmanship because 
his new position involved consideration of problems outside of his political 
5• Tugwell, R. G., "The Superpolitical,• 98-99· 
6. Tugwell, R. G., •The Superpolitical," 9'h 
orsanization. Up to the moment of victory, the leaders among his sup• 
• porters constituted a comparativel7 small group held together by mutual 
aid. Now the very loyalities necessary to victory demanded that the 
whole area of administration be exploited by the group which had won 
power for the leader. Consequently, the leader, who now had general 
social responsibilities, faced a dilemma. If he became public-adnded, 
giving jobs to the efficient regardless of whether they were •leaders,• 
his organizational support would fall away.7 
Several alternatives were available to the political leader as he 
faced his dileiiiiiS. He could turn the new job over to the old gang for 
exploitation; he could abandon the old group and form a new one; he 
could attempt a compromise between old and new interests, serving the 
public as far as possible without endangering his political position. 
Nearly always, concluded Tugwell, as affairs actually worked out, the 
leader chose the way of compromise. In order to make up for his own lack 
of qualifications for aa.dnistrative tasks he had to bring in experts and 
figures commanding respect; the necessity of conciliating newly pressiD! 
interests compelled him to make some statesmanlike decisions.8 However, 
in the end, political considerations almost always limited experts' deci-
sions on matters of public interest. 
Tugwell asserted that the leadership system, with some modifica• 
tiona, also described the way in which business leaders rose to the top. 
7. Tugwell, R. G., •The Superpolitical,• 99•100. 
B. Tugwell, R. G., "The Superpolitical,• 100. 
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Accordingly, business administration was subject to the same limitations 
as, and was therefore no more effective than, public administration. 
In both fields there was a disparity between the qualities necessary to 
get ahead and those later necessary to do the job (of serving the whole 
rather than a part of it). While the aims of business and government 
were not the same, •leadership• was equally ineffective for gaining tae 
objectives professed by either. The best climber was •useless as least 
because of his climbing abilities.•9 
Tugwell reasoned that those who called for nev leaders vere really 
asking for results which could be attained only by abandoning the leader-
ship system. The leadership system, after all, rested on payments of 
various sorts at the general expense •• privileges.10 Any planning which 
would be in the general interest would have to set aside areas of public 
affairs from the leadership system, it could not be operated by elected 
officials because planners vere usually not the kind of men who could vin 
elective office.11 
Tugwell advocated a kind of planning institution to which the usual 
charge -- that •planning• would simply ~ a substitution of politics for 
business, politicians beinc worse looters than business men12 -- would not 
apply. He suggested that society attempt, through the substitution of a 
rational, equitable scheme, which would be defined and consequently not at 
the mercy of self-interested individuals or groups, to circumvent the ,rac-
titioners of both business and politica.13 
9• Tugwell, R. G., •The Superpo1itical,• 100-01. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., •The Superpolitical,• 112. 
11. Tugwell, R. G., •The Superpolitica1,• 111. 
12. Neilson, Francis, Control !IQ!llU 121!• 39· 
13. Tugwell, R. G., •The Superpolitical,• 97-98. 
Planning and Democracy 
The esoteric aspects of planning required its removal from poli-
tics. Did that removal ezclude any exoteric cognizance of the plannin« 
process? An affirmative repl7 to this question stemmed from prevalent 
popular concepts in which •plannill8" connoted •regimentation.• Tugwell 
asserted that revulsion from the idea of planniQB frequently reflected a 
failure to appreciate its processes.1 In his view the very creation of 
a planning mechanism was in itself a democratic action; that mechanism 
would function in WBTS in keeping with the democratic tradition. 
Americans were aware of a new precision•created industry in their 
midst and of the new possibilities of foresight and control that planning 
offered in technological operatioos. They did not want to recognize that 
technological developments, taken together, constituted a process compel• 
liQB concomitant changes in government in order to modify conflict and 
emphasize cooperation. The picture was one of a •democratic republic torn 
by internal struggles yet hoping to find a competence which L~ouls1 survive 
the coming challenge.• 2 
Amid institutional leg, planning by private interests went on, as 
concentration in control of production accompanied technological advance. 
Tugwell accepted concentration as a logical outgrowth of the new technology, 
which required large-scale production for its most efficient application. 
To hom •monopoly• did not simply mean concentrated control of large produc-
l. Tugwell, R. G., 
zum lconnm1 cs, 
Tugwell, R. Go, 
•A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• 
Vol. 31, No. 1, February, 1949, 31. 
•The Fourth Power,• 2. 
Jourpal g!. 
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tive units; -monoJOly• meant concentrate4· control not su-ject to any 
altimate review and reculation -.r t~e JU'IIlic interest. The longer 
society delayed action to protect t~e public interest, the greater 
would be the threat to the very existence of the econ~. for t~e tiM 
would ccme 
vaen general forces, inappropriate for monopolization, 
will yield the major share of the world's ~ode and 
services; these are of aueh a nature that they will re• 
quire few workers, and those only of highly skilled 
aorta; and they will therefore yield little income 
strictly as wages. Their fruita must ba distributed in 
some other way; for their unefits must be made avail• 
able as generally as their nature is general; if they 
are allowed to be monopolized they will drive all others 
out of competition, thus rendering the whole population 
unemployed and unable to turchase their produce.3 
Tugwell saw business in possession of powers whic~ enabled regi• 
mentation -- a term usually applied to any proposals for planning, 
Calling vould•ba pla1111ers •regimenters,• Tugwell observed, vas 
••• satisfactorily opprobrious until attention vas 
recalled to the .tac! that most of the herding and pushing 
in our econ~ L~ after all done U.V business tor its 
own JUrposes, rather than by goveru.ent in the public 
interest, •Regimenting• ud lost its value as an epithet 
by 1936·4 
The haphazard private exercise of powers which affected affairs of public 
concern represented regimentation of a kind sufficient to endanger t~e 
econOJIIY• Tugwell insisted that 
••• for [survivaii there is no issue at present so important 
as the control and distribution of general forces. Where 
these questions are settled, there governing will take place • 
whatever it may be called, Those who retain some respect for 
3. Tugwell, R. G., •The Directive,• Journal or Social PhilosophY .1!19. 
lurisprudence, 10. 
4. Tugwell, R. G., •The Fourth Powr,• 2. 
democratic procedures would prefer that representa-
tiTe public pcver rather than self-interested private 
groups functioned at these points •••• The directiTe 
actiTities arising at poiats ot conjuncture are ones 
to which intelligence bee to be applied if same other 
valuable institutions are to surTiTe. It is these 
directiTes, also, which beTa to be democratized if 
technique is to be allowed to haTe its way in the 
world without at the same time destroying it,5 
In the context of Tugwell's belief that planning was of the nature ot 
goTernment, regardless of whether it w.s so labeled or vas undertaken 
in the public interest,6 his proposals constituted a deTice to preserve 
and promote democracy. 
The creation of a planning agency would be a democratic action. 
The planning body would operate within the framework of the traditional 
democratic governmental structure -- as a •tourtb power,•7 or as an arm 
ot goTernment within the tripartite, representative, republican fonn, 
It was cooceivable tbet the federal goTernment could create a coordinat• 
ing agency without gathering in tram the states any more powers than bad 
already been delegated or appropriated with judicial consent; no more 
controls over private industry than those already ia use would necessarily 
be needed.8 
Tugwell readily admitted that planning, being a politically 
neutral technique, was susceptible of use by autarchies. In totalitarian 
states planning was dictatorial, militarist, and authoritarian. In a 
democracy scientific planning could seek through democratic procedures 
social objectiTes defined by a body representative of the majority. Such 
5• Tugwell, R. G., "The Directive.• 11. 
6. Tugwell, R. G,, "The Directive,• 3• 
7• Tugwell, R. G., •The Fourth Power,• 1. 
8. Tugwell, R, G,, •The Utility of the Future in the Present,• 52• 
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a bod:y would foster democracy. which w.s to the average citizen not a 
s:ystem but a "latent. ever-ready revolt• against oppression lying deep 
ia men•s nature natures. Democracy deaoted the beliefs that aoverument 
sought to institutionalize, as churches sought to institutionalize 
theologies. It was bece'll&e democracy had been wrongly identified with 
lsissez•faire cepitelism that critics deemed plsnning -- ot the kind 
which would affect the economic systea -- undemocratic.9 
Siace "disagre..ant conceraing the elements of the present whick 
are most significeDt for the future };...!7 ••• alw.ys preseDt,• teanicel 
proposal. public discussion. and considered adoption would precede the 
execution of any plsn. While the plBD could not easily be set aside at 
anyone's whim. it would be flexilille -- changeable by constitutional pro• 
cedure.lO Indeed. the processes of planning. Tugwell maintained. were 
necessarily more democratic 0 "that is based on substantial agre-nt,• 
than moet of the other goverameDtal processes -- a fact which was seldom 
recognized. The work of the experts who operated the machinery of plsn-
ning largely consisted in • regulerbing and making effective what is 
otherwise done but not dCDe as well as is required in society.• 11 
Tugwell cited the vell..ade budget as an example of the creative 
synthesis of an institution affecting all other institutions beneficially. 
Like series operations or time-nd-BIOtion studies, as part of the plsnning 
apparatus, the budget aided man in his contest vit!J chaos. Eltperts for..• 
9. Tugwell, R. G., "The Fourth Pewer.• 6. 
10. Tugwell, Iii. G •• •'fbe Superpoliticel,• 111-12. 
11. Tugwell, R. G., "A Plsnnar's View of A@riculture's Future.• 31• 
lated the budget; it was not deaocratic "if democracy means that with 
reference to technical matters all judgments are to be considered equal 
•••• • However, in a far higher sense, a budget was democratic because 
it helped to "make the participation of each after his fashion effective 
in govel'lllllent. •·12 
TUgwell attributed popular susceptibility to persuasion that men 
who wanted balance were •crackpots• to the failure of people to associ• 
ate fears with their source, or hopes with a program for achieving them. 
The explanation for the popular attitude lay in the elementary state of 
information about plsaoing: 
The schools do not teach, and orgeos of opinion do not 
insist, that we ~st achieve or.-oic relations among the 
elements of the econosr and provide ways of preventing 
any part of the whole froa exploiting the other parts. 
That such exploitation returns to torment even its authors, 
is a lesson which seems to have lain plainly ia the events 
of the •twenties• and •t~irties;• but there has been a kind 
of determined refuasl to draw the lesson - which agein can 
only be understood by remembering what its acceptance 
would imply. Thia, of course, is a willingness on the part 
of each to subordinate his own initiative in the function• 
i!lf> of the whole. That he would have had a pert in creat-
ing the development plan in democratic fashion and that the 
1118Chinery for operating it would be strictly impt;sonal, 
has not penetrated the public consciousness •••• 
TUgwell's opponents in the 5ew Deal period condemmed his views on 
planned or coordinated capitalism. Beactiooaries asserted that there 
could be no capitalism if there vas to be any planning, which, they 
assWDed, would regiJDent every detail of the aeon~, jSIIDiing •arbitrary 
12. Tugwell, R. G,, "The Directive,• 25-26. 
13, TUgwell, R. G,, •A Plauer's View of Agriculture's Future,• 41, 
production sckedulea down the throats ot a liberty loving people,• and 
eYen interfering •with their freedca ot consUIIIption.•l4 For his ott• 
expressed belief in evolutionary development,15 militant leftists also 
cond-o Tugwell. They declared tnt there we no time for the &r&dU• 
alist prosraa he espoused,16 maintaining that there could be no plannins 
along with capitalism. 
Some ot the critics on the right became involved in contredic• 
tiona, -,. wy ot pointins out the danprs to de1110cracy in planning, in 
their analyses ot European history. Herbert Hoover denounced planniD£ 
aa havins paved the _,. tor tae steJ-by•step development of dictator• 
ships. Raoul Desvernine, Cll.ai~a. National Lawyers CCIIIIIlittee, .American 
Liberty Leape, pointed out how, on the otaer hand, d81110crecy had sur-
Tived in countries such as Greet Britain and the Scandinavian nations. 
Ernest K. Lindley, a senerally pro-Boosevelt journalist and author, 
noted that what Desveraine denounced as "democratic despotism• in tke 
United States ws a mch lower degree ot econ0111ic manas8118nt by the gov• 
erlllll8nt than the •economic liberau-,• ot vhica Desvernine a,provede 
in the Scanoiinavian countries and Great Britain. • Sucla antasonists ot 
the •totalitarian' states as Messra. Hoover and Desvernine,• c011111ented 
Lindley, •apparently do not think that manased economies are inconsistent 
with democracy ·~~ere except in the United States• •- the only important 
nation in which witing for •natural• forces to ettect improvement in 
].4. Tu£vell, R. G,, ''l'he Fourth Power,• 2. 
15. Tu£well, R. G., ru, Industrial Diacipliu .1!14 !hi. Governpmt&l .AEiJ., 
22<). 
16. Ward, Paul w., 'Wallace the Greet Hesitator,• The Nation, Vol. 140, 
No. 36144, Febrnary 20, 1955. 535· 
economic condition~~ had 'Hen con~~itiered a fit • or even defensible• 
policy.17 As for his opposition oa the far left, Tugwell observed: 
It is strange that a worship of technique should be 
brought to the sel'Yice of Marxi•• a philosoplly 
Which antedated the modern Jbases of 1ndustrial1sa.l8 
Tuswll struck out "both at those who would not support aD7 
program short of ~iate, total c.._niaa, and those Vho considered 
coYerument intervention of aQJ kind sinful. PlaDDers rejected tke 
ideas of both aorta of extreatata aa obsolete and unrealistic. Neither 
related policy to actual working conditions. Both proceeded fr- tke 
saae "basic principlea; either, if allowed to determine policy, would 
"be equally destructiYe.19 
Potentialities of the Putura 
The Econoar of Abaadance 
Tucwell belieYed that coordination of the aeon~ at the •con• 
junctural• leYel would result in a production•consuaption relationship 
which would release the total potential of Aaerica•a productiYe ener17, 
proYi4inc a fllll an4 free flow Gf goods. 'l'he creation of such an •aeon• 
~ of abundance• on the basis of a rationalized technology in production 
would, through technological unempl0J118nt and accompaQJlng occupational 
o•solescence, necessitate the separation of wrk fraa inccae Q' aekiDg 
17, Lindley, Ernest K., Htlfwr JIU!1 Rooaeult, lllev York, Viking, l'fRo 
32·34· 
18, Tugwell, R. G., 'The Superpolitical,• 103. 
1,. Tugwell, R. G., •T)ae Fov.rtll Powr,• 3• 
anilable a ll1age force of •releaaed labor• for eiiPlo~nt in a •Third 
ECODOII;Vo0 Through the •Third ECOD01Q'0 the nation could achien a ere• 
atiYe outlet for an .-at of energy 11hich in the past had lleen stia-
lated onlT bT tke.destructiYe actiYitT of war. 
During the Jfew Deal period 'fllswll's opponents challenged Ilia to 
reconcile his desire for an •econa.r of abundance• vitk co•ern.ent 
actions, perticularlT those of tu Acrieultural Adjusaent Adllinistra• 
tion, calling for reduced production. Critics ware diYided into two 
contradictina camps& those wo deplored the •eeono1111 of allundance• aa 
a dreaa, and tkoae who deplored the failure of the goYarn.ent to achieYe 
it. s- ri4iculed 'l'a&Wll's itleas on allundance as Utopian -- •..:~at 
farsipted sck-s for the happi~~ess of us au.•1 Othera pointed out 
how far skort of proYidiag tke potential needs of the population tbe 
ecODOJIIic measurea of the Jfew :Deal fello 2 'Dae response of 'hlgwell tke 
econo.tat, as inferretl fl'OIII his writinp, was thet potential purehesin& 
power to aatisfT potential needa ud aothinc to do with •effectin d-lld·" 
The response of Tugwel~ the admiaistrator reYolYed around the matter of 
tiaing -- -rgeney measures as contrasted with plans for the attaimlent 
of long•run aspirations. 
'hlgwell's analTsia of the causes of the depression focused on a 
1. Kent, Frank R. • WithouS G1ons, Jlew York. Williaa Morrow, 19~. 273o 
289. 
2. tiM• Vol. 24, No.7, Ausuat 1.3. 19~. 11-12. reports the conclusions 
of Bobert B. Doane. Director of Research for a Hational SurYeT of 
Potential Produotin CepecitT finaneed out of WPA funds. 
deficieacy ia pu.rchasillf!; power. Be belieYe4 that the restoration of the 
ecoa~ to a healthy conditio& required imaediate meaaures tor buildiQ& 
up b1Q'ill6 powr. Coasequently, he approye4 of the speadill4! ,olicy of 
the adllinistratioa in pnera1,1 and such particular expenditures as 
those tor work relief and public vorta.2 Tugwell's long•rua coacept ot 
an •econC~~V" ot abundance• also centered on the attar of purchasillf!; 
power, ita adequacy to be insure4 b)' OYerall pultlic plannillf!;. 
Unless one considers the tt..-eontext in ~ic~ Tugwell expreased 
himeelt on a giY&D public polic;r, his writincs and stateaents appear 
contradictor)' and contusift8• Whea one dete~nes, in a giYen instance, 
whether ~e was reterrillf!; to the short-rna or the loJ14!•rnD, to borrow t~e 
econOIIlists• terainolol!)', the aeparatioa of, and essential difference 
ltetwaen, his Yiews in the two tt.e sequences bec0111e apparent. Tugwell 
ltelieYed that relief mea1111Z'8s were, in perapectin, priarily atopegap 
in their llllture, attectillf!; only s1JIP1;- while tailillf!; to get to the 
oausea vhil:h lay at the bott- of eco!Ulaie progl-.3 Short-rna reco'l'8ry4 
measurea were necessar;r, howeYer, io order to return the econCII,Y to a 
state sufficiently sound to be auaceptiltle to the protitaltle applicatioo 
of his long•rnn ideas. 
'fucwll'a Yiew in the Wew Deal period on interoational trade aDd 
1. Ecclea, Marriner s., ilecl!;oatpr lropti•rt• New York, A. A. Knopf, 1951, 
131·32· 
2. 'l'ugwell, R. G.;, .1!££ Hoonr'a lcopQ''C pglicy (New York, John Day, 1932) 
here and there. 
3• 'l'ugwell, R. G., •Huager, Col.d, aod C&ndidatea,• fu Hewblie, Vol, 54, 
No, 700, Ma)' 2, 1928, 324• 
~. It ia difficult to .. ke a text~ook delineation between relief and 
recOYer)' meaaurea. 
1oo. 
agricultural policy provided specific examples ot short-run approaches 
which coutraated vita long-run plaaa aDd objectives. He opposed a doc-
triuaire haDdling ot the problea ot interuatiOIUll trade on an unquali-
fied tree•trade basis. The United States could not participate in inter-
national COOperation unless othera didt the United States would cooper• 
ate ~en possible; it could not determine vben others would make it poa• 
aible. Rather tlaan get into unprofitable and endless q'llllrrels over 
geaeral principles, it vas bast, tor the tiae baiD&e to •ka lilllited, 
apacitic acree•ata one at a ttae.S 
Tugwll•s long•:nm vieva on ilateruatiOIUll trade, as expressed ia 
au address to the Iaternationsl Inatitute ot A«ricult~re in Bam& on 
October 24 0 1934, called tor interuatioaal JlaDDing and coordination ot 
trade.6 In this speeeh Tugwell was talking primarily as an acadeadcian 
-- in broad teras with reference to ultimate objectives. ••tore ~ll 
ude the speech., Secretary ot State lhlll 1nt01'118d the White House that he 
would aot object it Tugwell made it clear that he vas eJeaking as an 
individual aDd not otticiallyJ Roosevelt believed that such a distiuctiou 
was not possillle,7 '!'he Preaident vas correct; the Jress concluded that 
although there was no authentic iadicstion that Roosevelt stood Hhilld 
the speech, it vas assu.ed that he knew vbat Tugwell vas going to say,B 
Actually, the White Bouse vas quite waenthusiastic a'llout Tugwell's -king 
the &JBech at all,9 Such incidents resulted in an overestimation ot 
5. Tugwell, R. G,, •Iateruational lcoucaic Policy,• ia ~ J!attle tor 
Dgocraqx, 167. 
6. !U 1fu ~ '1''!11!!'• Octoller 25, 1934, 14a 2. 
7• Cattle, s. Earl-7 to Tugwell, October 12, 1934, Roosevelt Pataq. 
8, 'l't.e, Tol, 24, No. 19, NoVeaMI' 5o 1934, 16. 
9· 'MiiiiiOraudua, M. Mciatyre to BooseTelt, Oetober 20, 1934; -raDdua, s. 
Early to H. A. Wallace, Octolter 23, 1934, Roosevelt PaJ!!ra• 
101. 
Tlagvell's intluence 1 deaona~ratiq ~ba~ a fol'DIIIr professor in gonra• 
•a~, ~hough &JIIllkiq ia essentially acadellic ~el'IU, ac~ually spoka. 
in ~he popular aind, ae a public official. 
In ~he area ot ~icul~ural policy ~11 aleo dis~inguiahed 
-.~ween ... rgency and long-ran solu~ions. The crop-reduc~ion prograa 
of ~he Agricultural Adjua~ .. nt Adainietration did not appear to allov1 
in the eYea~ that it MC8M naeassa17 1 tor crop expansion. The press 
la-eled as an "about•face• TUgwell's asae~ion during the drought ot 
19.34 tllet tile AAA prograa vas not necessarily one of crop re4uction1 
and that tara policy aigh~ wall be one of crop expaasion.10 In anT 
eYent. TUswell considered ~he AAA as providing a deYice for adjus~ina 
supply to ~he •rket0 con~ractina or expanding, ot the -·~.11 He 
foresaw clearly the iaeYi'--le reac~ion asainst the original reduc~ion 
prograa; he vas eager ~o depa~ t:raa -rgancy •thoda as soon as poa .. 
sible.12 He stated tba~ ~ ot ~he AAA deYices vera frankly expedients, 
aa.e ot ~hea drastic because ot ~lie shockiq neclec~ in ~he precadina 
dozen yeare.lJ It vas necessa17 1 Ita insisted, to consider peranen~ 
plana wich would M ettec~he Myond the t1• when temporary deYices 
were discarded and torgo~ten.~ Crop control and su-aistence lla.es~eads, 
in Tugwell's opinion, did not proyide either tor conserYStion or pe:rmanent 
10. !J,at, Vol. 2J, No. 24, J'une 11, 19.34. 17; the acreage control pro• 
graa demoaatrated ita capacity tor expaDBiOn during World war II. 
ll. Nevapaper elipting. Tuf5!11ll Puera. 
12. Lindley, '&rllaat K., lfaltm .!!!a BooseYeU, lJO. 
13. Tugwell. B. G •• col- tor Ullite4 features SyDdicsie. J'aD\18.17 28. 
19~o Twn!!ll PJP'rfo 
14. TUgwell. B. G •• •J. Planner's View ot Agriculture's Fu~ure.•• 46o c-
•ats that the termers now ban a tendency to wnt eYerythiq else 
regulated in their i~aterest • 
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bettering ot termers• lives.15 A J18r.&nent solution to agriculture's 
proble11111 would have to concentrate on land use, especially the retire-
.. nt and turning to aev uses ot sub•rginal lands,l6 
While Tucvsll's long-run aia ot an •aeon~ ot abundance• would 
see all groups working together, so.e ot his utterances provoked tae 
acountion that he ws t~ntin& clan wrtare. Attar ae ade a speeca 
in Loa Angeles in October, 1935~1 the cries ot •red• reached a ores-
cando. In connection with this a4dreas Tugwell was labeled ~a potent 
influence in the President's class-bate and anti-~iness policies.•18 
and •a teacher ot the doctrine of hete,•19 Soae ot the critici .. was 
overdrawn ( •Plutocratic alld lliddle•claas heads are not to tall iD the 
basket it they abstain tram resistance to the uev order•20 was oae iater-
pretation ot Tugwell's words, •we have no right to expect that the die• 
eatablishaent ot our plutocracy will be pleasant. These hiatorieel 
changes never are, We uve, however, the duty ot avoidi~ violence•21). 
Yet, even Harold Ickes recorded in his diary that excerpts frDIIl the Loa 
Angelea speech 'did look as it he had not been altogether vise •••• I 
agree pretty generally vi til 'l'llgwll in his social outlook, but I do 
think be llipt guard himself 1110re eeretull;r in mat he says and writea.• 22 
15. lievapaper clipp1ng, Tugwll P!.Mra. 
16. Tugwell, a. G., 'A Planner'& View of Agriculture's Future,• .32•,36; 
•:ram Relief and a Pe1'1118nent Agriculture,• The Annals .2! the. Aprica!l 
Acade!llf .2! PoliUcal u4 Social Science, Vol. 142, No. 231, March, 1929· 
17. Tugwell, R. G., Address, DeiiiOcratic State Central Collmittee, Loa ~lea, 
Calif,, October 28, 19351 Be!!ttlement Ad!rlnistration fresa Beleaae, 
18, .Tohnaton, AlYa, ''l'llgwll, the Preaident•s Idea Man.• Seturd!!v l!!pig 
.f2!1, Vol. 209, No, 5, .&uguat l, 19,36, 9. 
19, Ely, .Joseph Jil,, The .-arleen Drelllll, Boston, B, HUIIIpbriea, 1944, 80-81, 
20, .Johnston, Alva, ''l'ngwell, the Prasident •a Idea Man,• 9. 
21, Tugwell, a, G,, Addreas, DeiiiOcratic state Central CODillittee, Los Angeles, 
Celit., October 28, 1935, 2. 
22. Ickes, Harold L., The Secret Diary of Harold L, Ickes: Part One: '!'be 
Firat 'l'hounnd Days, l2J3-l9J6, NevYork, Si110n and Scaut;;", 1953,473• 
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The contrast between the Tieva on group relationships which Tug• 
well expressed in the keat of political turmoil and those he held vitk 
regard to the long-run ws particularly apparent in his discussions ot 
fiscal ~~attars, which revealed his hope for the eventual elilllinatiOil ot 
friction between classes. He noted that the judicial interpretation of 
the taxation clauses of the Coastitution had enabled, in effect, the 
taxatie~n of oae class etl', UQUP tor the benefit of anotlaer - proTidill& 
the tax sad the benefit were not associated in lagislation,2.3 For 
eltlllllPle, the rsdistriwtion of iaco. througla the graduated income tax 
was an accepted principle despite quarrels over it in practice.24 Tus• 
well had cited the need tor a radiatribltion of income (not solely 
tlarougla taxation, llut also through proti t and price cOiltrols) in the 
spri~ ot 1932 in an address at Teachers College, Columbia University, 
entitled •»iscourse in Depression.• 25 
From a lons-run point of view Tugwell considered any taxation with 
class connotations essentially emergency in its nature and really a device 
tor patching up a situation in which the damsp had already been done 
through defective econcaic practices in the first place. The ~~ainteunce 
ot high prices through limiting production had simply brought about tax 
legislation to return part of the profits to cons.-ra; Tugwell preferred 
a •socially wise policy to socialistic taxation.•20 In the long-run 
socialistic taxation could have dire consequences. The general demand 
tor higher liTing standards resulted in an almost intolerable drain on 
upper- and llliddle•claaa inco.s, and 
Tugwell, R. G., 
Tugwell, R .G.! 
Tupell, R. G., 
'l'apell, R. G., 
'The New Deal: The Decline of Gonl'DIIIBnt, • Part II • 481. 
"'l'he .New Deal: The Decline ot Gon~nt,• Part n. 489. 
"The Pro«rassiTe Orthodcxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 9• 
"Aaerics ~akea Hold of ita Destiny,• 264. 
104. 
Between these pressures ~blic officials are .. de des• 
perata. Politioiana divide nicely oa issues which in-
volve a little more or less, saae favoring mora ~nefits, 
80118 striving to reduce expellditures. 'What pressure is 
yielded to at the -nt is of less importance than the 
fact ot increasing pressure and increasing resistance. 
The only relief in the long run (aside from explol!lioa) 
.. st caae troa suck an increase in benefits and suck a 
diffusion ot thea as will satisfy those who are prel§ntly 
below stalldard without reclucing everyone to llliser:r•'' 
'l'lle (!OVe~nt •t suecessive crises occurring in various parts of tile 
econaq by subsidy. 'l'he unsubaidised, who gre~ fever and tewr. were 
expected to support all the rest by payinc taxes. '!'here might come a 
time when the creditor or middle classes, Who contributed to rather 
than subtracted from public income • would •revolt at some point shan 
ot loeaing all their privileges to others whoa they regarded as inferior 
to themselves.• 28 V.scisa and Nasiisa bad arisen out of suck difficulties. 
On the spending aide ot the fiscal situation 'l'ugwell also held 
contrasting short•run and long•rnn opinions. He wholeheartedly approved 
ot gover1111111nt apendbg in the eaergency of the depression tor the protec• 
tion ot people against 29 poverty and at least the partial restoration ot 
buyiJIII powr.-3° However, gover1111111nt spending was a crude device for tle 
correction of permanent unbalence.31 The attempt in 1936 to withdraw 
27. 
28. 
29· 
Tugwll, R. G., •The Fourth Power.• 4• 
'l'ugvell. R. G., •The Fourth Powr.• 12. 
'l'ugwell, R. G., Address, De11100ratic State Central CoBmittee, Los Angeles, 
Calif., October 28. 1935, 8. 
'l'ugvell, R. G., •Your Future and Your Nation,• COIBIIencement Address, 
Unh'ersity of Hew Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, J'une 10, 1935; ~ 
J!E!u Release • 8. 
'l'ugvello R. G., "'l'he Fourth Powar,• 25. 
105. 
subsidies aDd relief axpenditurea32 was followed -., tbe recession of 
1'137. which demonstrated that s•ch a withdrawl could not bs accoa-
plished without disaster in an unarticulated econ~.33 Moreover. the 
coats of deficit financinc. which TUcvell hoped vould •continue to be 
assessed upon the protita attributable to our inereaaina mechanical 
efficienCT,.34 would continuall7 contribQte to class antasoni._..35 In 
a coordinated aeon~ the profits froa teohnological advance would be 
distributed in adequate UIOUDts to all without class friction. 'l'llllBo 
Tllgwll favored 11easures calculated to elilllinate rather than foment 
class enaities, and to bring abeut a situation which Roosevelt described 
(at Tltgwll's sucgestion36) as a •concert of interests.• 
33· 
34· 
Part III 
His Words and Deeds 
J'raa the Fol'llllltioa of the Brain Trust throup 
the 100 Da7s: Tllgwll 'a Short .. Run Approach -
ReauscUatioa 
'l'ugwll. R. G., •'!'he Compromisiag Roosevelt • Western Political 
Qy•rterlr. Vol. 6. No. 2. 1une. 1'153. 32'1-30• 
'l'ugwell. R. G •• •.&. Planner's Yiev of Agriculture's Future.• 37• 
Tugwll. R. G., Address. Democratie State Central Colllllittee, Los 
Angeles. Calif •• October 28. l'135l Resettlement !d•'pistration 
Press Release. 8. 
Tugwll 0 R. G., •'!'he Fourth Powr.• 11. 
Inteniey J!Wl writer. 
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IV, Fran the Formation of the Brain Trust to the Election 
Early in 1932 RooseYelt and his associates contemplated the 
possibility of the Goyernor's becoming a presidential candidate. 
This possibility indicated that preparations for a campaign could not 
begin too soon. The gathering ot data on national questions would be 
an essential part of such preparations; out of this informational and 
educational need emerged the Brain Trust. 
RayDOnd Moley, Professor of Public Law at Columbia, pertol'IJied 
Yarious tasks concerning legal administration for the Goyernor,l Moley 
was the key figure in the formation and functioning of the Brain Trust. 
According to Moley, Samuel Rosenman, Roosevelt's personal adviser, 
stated one eYening in the .tddle ot March that the Governor would need 
expert, professional adYice on national issues; Rosenman suggested tllat 
a group to assist Roosevelt be formad, Moley encouraging the notion 
that Rosenman was the origiDator of the idea.2 Rose!IBI8n 1 Moley, and 
Basil •Doc• O'Connor, RooseYelt 1 s lev partner, listed possible campaign 
topics; Moley suggested men who had expert knowledge on each subject • .3 
O'Connor suuested that they 118et these men one by one; Rose~n and 
Moley both suggested TUgwell first since Roosevelt wanted to em~asize 
strongly the plight of the agricultural populstion.4 
1. Moley, Raymond, Arter Seven Years (New York, Harper, 19,39) 5• 
2. Moley, Raymond, .At)er Seven Years, 8; apparent egotiSIII in ac• 
counts of the New Deal is often simply the inevitable impres• 
sion conveyed by a participant •a placing himself 1 unavoidably • 
at the center of develo]llll8nts, according to TUgwell, Inteniev 
n!Jl yrUer • 
.3• Moley, Raymond, After Sevep Years. 8. 
4• RoseDIIIBn, Sa-.el I., Worki!!flj J!U!l Roosevelt (New York, Harper, 
1952) 591 Moley, Raymond, After Snen Years, 15. 
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Moley was not a close personal friend of Tugwell; he knew him 
as a neighbor and colleague at Col1111bia. Moley was aware that Tugwell 
118de a study of agriculture for Alfred E. Smith in 1928. carrying on 
his research since then.5 Tugwell particularly impressed Moley with 
an address entitled •Discourse in Depression.•6 delivered at Teachers 
College. Columbia. early in 19.32. The address was mimeographed; MolQ" 
read it and discussed it with Tugwell.? These discussions led to sub-
sequent 118etings in which Moley •was persuaded at least that ~ views 
ware sharp. specific and practical - that. in fact. they offered a 
tenable alternative to the poliCies of the Hoover admdnistration.•S 
Moley felt that he knew Tugwell well enough to be certain that he would 
get along beautifully with RooseYSlts 
He was ignorant ot politics. But he 
was a first•rate economist who had 
pushed on beyond the frontiers of stiff 
classicism. and his original and specu-
lative turn of mind IIBde him an exhila• 
rating c0111panion. Rex was like a cock• 
tails ais conversation picked you up 
and mde your brain race along. At 
the - time thsre was a rich vein 
of melancholy iR his temperament • 
frequently finding expression in the 
doubt that say politician could or 
would take steps to relieve the pars• 
lysis creepina over our system. And 
that gave his presentation of idees 9 a certain moving. emotional quality. 
5. Moley. Raymond. Mm Seyea Years. 15. 
6. SUDISrized in H!:• Hoover'• BconO!I!ic Policy (New York. John Day. 19.32); 
quoted in part in •'l'he Progressive Orthodoxy of Frsaklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics. Vol. 64. No. 1. October. 195.3. here and there; manuscript ia 
Tv.mll Papers. 
7. Letter !.2 wri tar. 
8. lrote • Tugwell Papers. 
9. Moley. Ra:r-Dd, :!!!.!!: Seven Yeal'f• 15. 
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The day after the decision to haTe RooseTelt meet Tugwell, 
Moley brought him to RoseDDI.n •a apartment i Tugwell spoke at length on 
the tal'WI problem and the action required.10 OB Tugwell's departure, 
O'Connor, who 'IBS tar from impressionable, r81111lrked to Moley with SOlie• 
thing ot awe, •He•s a pretty profound tallow, isn't he?"' Rosenman also 
ll thought he would doi Tugwell ws to be taken to see Roosevelt. Jlloley's 
certainty that RooseTelt and Tugwell would get along well vas justified. 
The GoTernor and the young professor, on the bssis ot their economic 
Tievs, were immediately on speaking te~.12 
Moley then canTassed other academic people tor recruits tor the 
Brain Trust. There was nothing sinister in concentrating on Columbia. 
This apparent proTincialism st-d traa practical considerations. 
The aetiTities ot early April were experimentali they might not prOTe 
to be What was needed. Moley could not expect mere acquaintances to lay 
out time and money without COIIlpelUiation. The men had to be close enougla 
to each other tor daily meetings. Moley had to know them well enou9 
to detenaine whether they would attract Roosevelt's interest and adjust 
to his work habits, Moley also had to 'be familiar with their range ot 
knowledge and where each would be most usetul.13 One 'by one Maley eli-
minated most ot the professors either because they were oTerspecialized 
intellectually, or because they were unable to simplify and generalize 
their ideas tor campai&n purposes. The group quickly sillllll8red down to 
10. Rose1111111n, Samuel I., 'Workipg Jd!i, RooseTelt, 59· 
11. Melley, Raymond, After Styen Years, 15. 
12. lD!! Magzipe, Vol. 23, No. 26, J'une 25, 19.34, ll. 
13. Maley, BaTJ~~Cad, After Sena Years, 18·19· 
the key figures of Moley, 'fu«wll, and Adolf A. Berle, .Tr,,14 Profaa• 
aor of Law at Columbia and co-author ot a tortkcomiog classic stud7 ot 
the role of tke corporation in the econ~.15 
After a tew prelimillll1'7 ••tioga with .RGseDBBn ud 0 1Cormor. 
the professors BIOTed to Albu17. '!'hey would take u afternoon treill 
from New York, later ro&Eing over the field of economics vitk Mr. Roos-
evelt until past midaight.16 Roosevelt foraally acknowledged the atatt 
ot Mclay, Tucwll, Berle, Boseman, and o•cormor just before he left to 
attend a Governors' Conference in Richlllond on April 25. He ws to 
spend a aonth in lfam Sprinp 1 he told Roaelllll!ln and Moley that he hoped 
the group WDald continue to prepare material and possibly send a ...or-
end- to Wam Spriags for atud7 •17 Moley asked a bout the makeup of the 
group: •Who, specitieally, are 'YCIIl tellova'?" Rooeevelt 11811ed, Saa, 
Doc, Rex, Berle, an4 Moley,l8 iutructiog the last ll8lDIId •You put in 
whatever you want to and pu.ll the mole thiog together ao it Ekes 
sense politically, which makes you chai:n1111n, I guess •••• • 19 
'!'he day attar Roosevelt lett, the three professors att in Moley's 
otfice to lay out the work for the nen three weeks. They wre to pre-
pare meaorallda themselves, or eall in othere -- being reaponai'llle for 
accuraey ia either case. Moley was to work out a broad pkilosophic 
1.4. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19· 
Lindley, Earnest K., •war oa the BrailUI '!'rust,• Scri'llner'• Mtgzipe, 
Tol. 94, No. 5, November, 1933• 259. 
Berle, A. A., .Tr, and Meau, G, C., The MQdern Corporation .ldl!£1• 
!!!! PropertY (Nev York, Macaillan, 1933). 
Lill4ley, Ernest K., •War oa the Breiu '!'rust,• 259· 
Moley, Reyaond, M!n: S!m!P Yeara, 21; Roa-n, Samuel I., WorkiM 
.K.UI1 Roo.senU, ~ 
Moley, Raymond. At!!.£ SUeD Yeam, 21. 
MDley, Ba,.ond, After Seup Yyrl, 22. 
uo. 
statement as a preface to the memoraDda.20 The group redoubled its 
efforts, frequently meetiDg in the late afternoons and eTeninsa.21 
Tu«well worked on the tariff and an aDBlysie ot farm remedies proposed 
in the 1920s. Witlt. Henry Morgentha•• 1r., then chairan ot Roosevelt's 
agricultural advisory coadseioa, lt.e prepared some leeborate notes on 
a fal'lll progru~. 22 'l'lt.ere ws no tiM to put the •terial in speecla 
tol'lll; on welt-ends Moley and Bose-a would cut, rearranga, and aillplity 
the memoranda.2.3 Oa May 19 Bolle-n took the •terial to Wal'lll SpriDg&.24 
Wilen Rooeenlt returned froa Wal'lll SpriDgB in early 1une, tile group 
ree-d its meetiDg& in Albany, deTelopiDg from a research ~roup into 
a board ot econcmic strategy for the campaip.25 
While the Brain Trust gatherH. information, Louis How 'IIBS ell8ros-
sed in getting the n<llllinstioa,26 Soae obsernrs han concluded, on the 
8asis ot these tvo different kinds ot actiTity, that there was great 
friction batwea the professors aDd the political •aasers. Louis How, 
in particular, ws supposed to han held the Brain Trusters in sometllill8 
close to conturpt;27 there wre l'IJIIDrs that it was •How against the 
Trust.• 26 
There is no evidaace to support this picture ot conflict. Moley 
20. Mclay, Raymond, Mtu Sevea Yean• 22. 
21. RoseJUE.n, ae..ael I •• Worl!iips JdjJ1 Roosevelt • 64. 
22, Mclay, Beymcad, After Stvep Itara, 22. 
2.3. Rosenman, Seaael I., Workiy JIU)l Boosnelt, 64. 
24. Moley, Raymond, After Seup Yeva, 2.3. 
25. Lindley, Ernest K., •war oa the Brains Trust,• 259• 
26, Lindley, Ernest K., •war OJl tha Brains Trust,• 256. 
27, Ounther, 1ohn, R001eyelt i,p Retrospect (New York, Harper, 1950) 269. 
28. Looker, Earle, !U Ayrign !azs Fran!tlip RooseTelt ,a Aetiop (New 
York, 1oha Day, 19.3.3) 10. 
111. 
had a roo. in the offices of the Commission on the Administration ot 
1ustice, across the street tram Roosevelt headquarters on Madison Avenue, 
where Howe was working. Moley visited Howe frequently in February and 
March, •as indeed I had been doing tor years,• keeping Hove informed ot 
his relations with Roosevelt and continuing to do so,29. How, hillllelt, 
~roaght Moley into the Roosevelt circle in the campaisn of 1928.30 Howe 
helped to create the Brain Trust, believing that ita ideas would lie use-
ful to Roosevelt; be continued to be tspressed with its vork,31 He did 
not wish that the ideas ot Moley and the others supplant his own,32 
Howver, he watched the Brain Trust only tor ita loyalty to Roosevelt; 
he was not capable of jealousy conceraing his relative position since 
he· was a part of F,D,R,33 During May and 1une Moley saw Howe constantly 
and intonad hila of develo~nta in Albaay. Fram these talks Howe llecu. 
reasoaably familiar with the id .. s ~pressed ia ~he acceptance epee~; 
•contrary to the impression of political wis .. cres, he had no objectioa 
to thea •• 34 It does not appear that Howe, who coined the tara •Brain 
Trust,•35 did so in irony, as a tara ot ridicule,JO 
'2:9· JO. 
Jl. 
32· 
Moley, Rs)'IIDnd, After SenD Ytara, 7. 
Stiles, Lela, ~ J!!u blhind iU President: IU Stoa §! L9uis HcHepn 
1J2lll. (Cleveland and New York, World Publishing Co,, 1954) 174• 
Looker, Earle, lllJ. 4MricaP ~~ Franklin .U• RooSenlt .1a J.ctiop, 70, 
Stiles, Lela, IU, lfiUl behind !11! Pr&Sidept: !h!. Storx .2t Louia Mclie!l1'1 
li2B· 174. 
Stiles, Lela, tu. !fan behind lU. Preaidept: tu. Ston 91.. I.ouis KcHepr.r 
!!2!!· 276. 
Moley, Rsyaond, Mi!£ Snap Yeara • 29. 
Stilea, Lela, The HI!! Bthi&d lh! President: The Storx £f. Louis 14cH!an 
.H2a· 275· 
Guntller, 1ohn, Roosevelt .iP Retrospect. 269; Mrs. Howe recalled no fric-
tion 'lletwen her llusband and the Brain Trust; interview ..!!Uil writer; she 
had DO docliiiSntary evidence because her husband Du.rned or destroyed 
almost every paper he handled; in this rea)Htct Howe wa unlike .,st llew 
Dealers. 
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At the end of 1uae the Professors came into eontaet with the 
politicians when Moley. Berle, and Tugwell went with O'Connor to the 
eonYention in Chicaaa.37. 1esse Straus made a rooa anilable for 
Moley and Tuswell in the Drake; they spent most of their time in Louis 
Howe's suite at the Congresa.38 Maley and Tugwell had nothing to do 
with the political mauuevering, althon$b they responded sensitively to 
the fate of Roosevelt's prospeets. On the morning of 1uly 1. after u 
all night session of the convention, the outlook for Roosevelt 'IIIIS dill. 
Moley and Tugwell found the Congress full ot "hell and desperation;• 
they vent to the StadiWII with Ha1'17 .iepkiu. then Chail'IIIBn of the New 
York State Temporary Emergency Relief Comaittee,39 After the noaiaa• 
tion, Moley and Tugwell joined the celebration at tlae Co~ess. lernard 
Baruclt, a supporter of Alfred E. Saith, and Bugll 1ohnson, a Baruch dis• 
ciple, appeared. Moley and Tug'llllll vera both suspicious ot Baruch, 
although, in retrospect, Moely saw Baruch's appearance as •a genture of 
loyalty to the party tiolrat ••• the act of a gOOd sport.•4° Baruch, 
Herbert Bayard SWope, and 1oseph P. Kennedy liked the acceptance speech, 
as did '1'ug'llllll,4l who, with Berle and Rose!llllln, had previously seea parts 
of it.42 
yr, Roseu.l'l, Ss-el I,, Working l!!!!l. Roosevelt, 67. 
38. Maley, l'laymond, After Sevep Xgrs. 'n· 
1'· Maley. l'laJ110nd 0 Atter Seyen Yeara, 30. 
40. Maley, l'la)'IIOnd. After Seven Yesrt• 31; According to Tugwell. Maley 
continued to distrust Baruoh, but •He was not inclined to recall it 
very vividly when he vas writing After Seven Years, 'The Preparation 
of a President.• Western Political O!!orterly, Vol. 1, No. 2. 1une, 
1948. 143; Tugwell 'IIIIS astoullded at Baruch's graeti.,;: •Well, boys, 
we won.• 1Dterview JfUll yriter. 
41. Moley, l'la)'IIOnd, Attar Se'MB Years. 32•33• 
42. Maley. Ra)'IIOnd 0 Attar Sevea Teart, 26. 
Roosevelt formalized the delineation between the professors aDd 
the politicians when he told Noley, early in the morning of 1nly 3, 
that policy and the other ead wre to be separate. Howe ws to head up 
the political side, Moley was to be in charge of policy, clearing all 
drafts and proposals. Roosevelt kept his praadse •without exception,• 
Within a week Moley confirmed the division in New York with Hta Farley0 
who was interested only in votes, stating that issues were not his husi• 
ness. They asreed to keep out of each other• s affairs; botlt. kept the 
acree-nt. Howe also stated that he would send all ideas along to 
Moley; How tailed to do so just once, tor which error he later inad• 
vertently expressed resret.43 
The political ccntributors, as well as the political managers 0 
were either in general sympathy with the Brain Trust or disinterested.44 
In tact, Baruch wrote Roosevelt that it was necessary to keep the policy 
group separate from political headquarters.45 In late Augast Roosevelt 
sent a letter to prOIIlinent supporters such as Baruch, Newton D. Iaker, 
Owen D. Young, Colonel Echard M. House, and others, as wll as Senators 
Pittmn, Walah, Robinson (Arkansas). aDd lflzll, in which he requested 
that they cooperate witlt. Moley, who would act as a clearing house for 
ideas, separate from the political •nagement of the campaign.46 
ly October Pittman and Byrnes were actively working with the Brain 
Trust.47 As the campaign P1"08r&ssed local politicians, Senators, Congress• 
43· Moley, Raymond, ~ Sevep Yeera. 36·37· 
44· Moley, Raymond, Atm Seven lyra • 31· 
45· Maley, llayllond, After Seven Yeara • 39· 
46. Moley, Raymond, .a.tter §even Xyrs. 45-46. 
47· Moley, Raymond, After §eyen Tears, 61. 
188D, and state bossea eat in with Rooaeyelt and Moley es they clra!te4 
speechea,48 Me1111vhile, only Sam, Doc, and Ray or the Brain Trust actu• 
ally went on campaign tr1pa.49 ObserYers such as John Gunther5° 
appear to have contused this ,re•Washiaston situation with deYelopaents 
after the i88U8Ul'Stion, when Moley and Tugwell l»ecame part or the adllin• 
istration. Arter March 4o 1933, intimations of hostility to the colle88 
professors were soon heard on Capitol Hill,51 Politicians were report• 
edly annoyed at the methods or the •classroom cabinet;•· they resented 
the filliDE: or the Assistant Secretaryships of State (J«oley) and Agri• 
culture ( Tugwll) with non-laeelers.52 Arter the iuauguration there were 
undoubtedly some 41f!iculties between the •politically .tnded, politic• 
ally chosen, and politically seasitiYe,• and the •academic or non• 
political" members or the adllinistration,53 
Tugwell, himself, had ao fsm1liari1:y witll the tou!h realities of 
politics; he recogaized his ignorance and was unperturbed about ito He 
made no pretense ot beiRg a practical politician. Lindley sensed that 
Tugwell ·-ld prefer nenr to be known as a polit1cian.•.54 However, 
Tugwell's attitude toward the PGlitical DBnsgers of the campaign ws 
quite different from his approach to JOliticians in Washington. In his 
48. 
49· 
so. 
51. 
sa. 
53· 
54· 
Tugwell, R. a .. •The ProgressiYe OrthOdoxy or Franklin D. Roosevelt,"' 
lthics, Vol 64, No, l, October, 1953, 21. 
Tugwell, R. G., •Tile ProgressiYe OrthOdoxy of Franklin D. Rooaevelt,• 2, 
Gunther, John, !looseul\ JD Retrospect, 269. 
J!u: Outlook, Tol, 161, No. 6, March, 1933. lJ. 
•'!'he Braia Trust ,• Butiptu J!H, March 22, 1933, 16-17. 
Lawrence, llaYid, St!illlbUpg ..i!l!.2 Socialism (New York, D. Appleton• 
Ceatury, 1935) 16-17; see below, Chapter XIII, Section, "The Arrogant 
Tugwell.· 
Lindley, Eraeat K., •war on the irains Trust,• 264. 
description ot the Yictory celebration in the Biltmore, he noted that 
RooseYelt appeared on a balcony between Farley and Howe •as vas fitting 
enough~.55 Moley and Hove worked together right up to March 4, decid• 
ing on Woodin for the 'l'reasury post after it appeared tllat SeiiStor Carter 
Glass would decline. Schocl children were then making contributions to 
build a pool in the White Housel Holey and Hove cabled to RocseYelt, 
•Prefer wooden to glass root OYer avt.ming pool.•56 When Hove's fnnc• 
tion had diminished due to the sweep of eYents and his last illness, 
Tugwell and others veat out of their w.y to channel aaterials througll 
Hove tor the benefit of the dying .. n•a morele.57 
Back in New York in July, after the ConYention, the Brain Trust 
had no 1118eting place; ita work w.s scattered between Moley'a apartment, 
the offices of 'l'ugvell and Berle, and other places.58 In late July 
the Brain Trnst finally set up headquarters in the RooseYelt Hotel, 
separate from the offices of the Democratic National Co~ttee across 
the street in the Bilt1110r8,59 The origiiiSl group sought the adYice of 
Yarious people from tiJDB to tilll8. The most active addition was General 
Hagll Johnson; he JDBt Moley and Tugwell at Baruch's home and contributed 
materials whicll had been gathered for Alfred E. Snith in 1928,6° Tugwell 
55· 
56. 
51· 
sa. 
59· 6o. 
Tugwell, R. G .. •The ProgreasiYe Orthodoxy ot Franklin D. RooaeYelt,• 
21. 
Stiles, Lela, !!1!. MD behind lilt Presi!\ent: The Storx.!!!. Louis McHenry 
!!e!!. 2511.. 
!Jateniew l!i!h writer. 
Moley, Rayaond, After~ Years• 39• 
Rosenman, SemMel I., Working~ RooseYelt, 80. 
Johnson, Hugh, !11§. ~ Eade fi:!!!IL.k& 12 Ee,rth (New York, IJGubleday, 
Doran, 1935) 140-41. 
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and Berle had different view. fromJokaaon on a fundamental approac~ 
to the crisis. Johnson felt that govern.ent•s true function was to 
give reassurance to business; in JChnaon•s view ~vernment also ked 
to end the crisis. Lower expenditures and reduced taxes, Johnson be• 
lieved, would fulfill both responsibilities. Tugwell consiaered 
•seductive• a doctrine that •with one motion govern.ent could reduce 
ita importance and discharge ita aaet pressing responsibility.• 61 
In AU8Ullt 'l'ugwll 8111'tered from hay fever. Victory appeared 
certain; the need tor the kind of Eterial vhich the Brain Trust pro-
vided having diminished, Tugwell spent two weks in September in 
!lllexico}'2 In October, Moley and 'l'qwell wre back in New York; thinp 
began to move faster as election day approached.63 
Tugwell's primary ares or interest was agriculture. His chief 
contribution in this field in 1932 was his promotion or the Voluntary 
Domestic .Ulot.ant Plan with Roosevelt.64 The Governor was familiar 
with the equalization-fee and export-debenture sc~eas proposed by farm 
interests in the l92lils. Early in the year Tugwell mentioned the work 
vhic~ a group of agricultural econoaists, financed by the Laura Spelala 
Rockefeller Fund, were doing on "sOIDSthing better than the old schemes.• 
A meeting of agricultural econcaista in Chicago about ten days before 
the Democratic convention was to discuss the new plan. Tugwell went to 
Chica~ to explore the plan aad detel'lline whether it met with general 
approval. He spent an ~our on tha phone explaining the plan to Rooaevelt, 
61. Tugwell, R. c •• •The Preparation or a President,• 143• 
62. Tugwll, R. c •• •The Progressive Orthoaoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 21, 
63. Moley, RaJIIIOnd, Arter~ Yeara. 61. 
64. See below, Copter IX, Section, • • •• the Voluntary Domestic Allotment 
Plan.• 
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who called back a few miuates later, seyiag, •I don't get it yet. 
Put it in a telegrem.•·65 
Tugwell previously discussed the farm problem at length in 
early sessions of the Brain Trnst end in the memoranda to Roosevelt 
of May 19. It was in June at the Chicago meeting, sponsored by the 
Giaonini FOUDdetion for Agricultural Econcadcs, that he "discovered• 
Professor M. L. Wilson of Monteaa State College, one of the chief 
authors and promoters of the na.estic Allotment idea.66 Tugwell ar-
ranged to have Wilson visit a,de Park in August.67 Wilson came to 
New York, spending a whole dey with Tugwell end Moley explaining the 
VDAP, the extent of 1 ts support UIOag fal'lll orgsnizat ion leaders, and 
its econOIIIic and political possibilities. The Srain Trusters took 
Wilson to Albany. 6S Wilson found that T~~gWll had already "done a 
good job of selling him LRooaevel!7 the idea ;• after the visit there 
was no doubt about Roosevelt's position.69 
In the middle of August Maley asked Wilson to prepare a memoran-
dum as a basis for Roosevelt's speech oa agriculture and to go over it 
with Henry A. Wallace, the Iowa farm-journal publisher.7° Wilson 
obtaiaed WBllace•a approval of his final draft,71 ~ich Moley received 
65. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• 264. 
66. Moley, Rar-ond, After Seyen Years, 41• 
67. Fite, Gilbert c., George !!• Peek and Jihl! Fight for I!m!! ParitY 
(Nol'llllln, University of OklahOIE Preas, 19.54) 2.39, 
68. Mole;r, Rar-ond, Ali!£ Seven Years, 41. 
69. Fits, Gilbert c •• George l!• ~and the Fight for l§m ParitY, 
2,39. 
70. Moley, Raymond, After Sevep Yeaq, 41·42· 
71. Lindle;r, Ernest K,, •war on the Brains Trust,• 264. 
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on August 23.12 Moley's task was to correlate the work of Wilson, 
Wallace, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and his assistant Herltert E. Gaston, 
Hllgil Johnson, and others.73 In tura, Tugwell, Berle, Johnson, Mor-
gentbau, and Gaston went C>Ter Maley's draft in detail. Finally, it 
was sent to M. L. Wilson for his suggestions. Moley has called the 
Topeka s)eech of September l4 first•rate •substantiTely and strate-
gically. • 74 While the address vas general in nature, there 'WBS no 
doubt that Roosevelt, whose brief -ntion of surplus crops in his ac• 
ceptance speech forecast the Topeka address, referred to the domestic• 
allotment plan. Vilaon and Tugwell were overjoyed, congratulating 
one another on what they had accomplished for the farmer,75 
Attar Topeka, Tugwell, lerle, Johnson, Pittman, llyrnea, and 
Moley went over the speeches on policy to date. They decided that 
Roosevelt had yet to take a B'!OaDd on three lllljor issues: go.arnment 
finance; industry, labor, and relief; and international relations. 
In his ta111011s Pittabursh speech, which 'WBS to haunt hila in the future, 
Roosevelt promised a twenty•five per cent reduction in ~vernment ex• 
penditures. He vas, accorcling to Maley, wholly siacere; •none ot us, 
then, was a 118Dlber ot the •t.orrov and spend' school •••• •·76 The Boston 
speeell of October 31 on i!ldustry, labor, and relief occasioned the only 
major quarrel within the Brain '!'rust. 'l'he group a@reed on coverage; it 
Moley, .Raymolld, After S!•AA Yeara• 42. 
Moley, Raymond, Attar laDil Ieara• 43·44· 
Moley·, Raymond, Attar SeDp IHEI• 44• 
J'ite, Gilbert c., George !!• luk .!Ul4 the li8!!! tor .l!!.m Paritxo 
2.J<h letter, M. L. Wilson to Tugwell, September 28, 1932, T!gwell 
Papers, 
Moley, Raymond, .!!m Sevea Years, 62, 
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disagreed violently as to phrasing. Tugwell and Berle favored a de• 
tailed elaboration of the program for industry and labor; they sug• 
gested a sharp attack on those in gcrrel'lllll8nt and industry who had 
countenanced existing abuses. The others called for a general state• 
ment of the program in a moderate tenor. 'nley reasoned that since 
the public was wary of the CSJBpeip and Roosevelt was a sure winner, 
it was time for dignity and conciliation. Roosevelt followed Moley's 
tack,77 
During the campaign Roosevelt neither shaped his speeches 
around what he learned on the various trips, nor did he allow the 
Brain Trusters to serre as £host writers. Local allusions were added 
at the appropriate stops, and memoranda from the Brain Trust vare 118-
erslly used; the final decisions on ideas was Roosevelt•s.78 Tugwell 
has traced through the influence of tke Brain Trust on Roosevelt's 
statements. He saw a shift from the holistic ideas of the •Forgotten 
Man• speech ot April 7 and the proposal of experimental planning in the 
Oglethorpe University speech of May 22 and in the acceptance addresa, 
to atomistic Progressive refom in the ColWD.bus, Ohio, speech of August 
20; there were only occasional DOWII after Collllllbus, at Topeka, Sept.-
lter 14, and Ssn Francisco, September 23, to the philosophy of social 
management,79 Tugwell concluded, •Ovr Jlflilorsnda were merely the instru-
77. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 63. 
78. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 54-55; Moley claimed direct influ-
ence in the specific metter of currency manipulation, getting Roose• 
velt to play it down on the trip a8Binst the wishes of Senators 
Walsh (Montana) and Pittman; all of tbe Brain Trusters were •sound 
money• ~~en, After Snep Years, 57, 57n. 
79· Tugwell, R. G., "The ProgrsssiTe Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
lo-17. 
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menta he had used on wlliah to play a tune which tul'Ded out to be ot 
his own composing.•80 
Roosevelt's speeches between April and October clearly and 
boldly procalimed the New Deal. Yet, Moley observed, the public was 
somewhat shocked when the progr.a was translated into action attar 
March 4 because people saw ollly generalities in the speeches. Hoover 
and Ogden Mills, Secretary ot the Treasu.ry, were among the tew outside 
the Roosevelt circle vho saw the boldness and coherence ot Roosevelt's 
proposala.81 Tugwell contil'Md Moley's views on public reaction; tile 
public did not pay close attention to the details ot Roosevelt's 
addresses: 
Everywhere he went the people • • • responded more to 
his personality than to his intelleet¥&1 appeal. I 
will Bot sa;r that the work our group did 'lllls 'llllsted, 
but certainly it played little part in the success ot 
his caapaign,82 
Tugwell was satisfied that he did his best. He lett the victory 
celebration at the Biltmore aDd 
went early acme to bed with a sense ot a job oaapleted • 
and it not well done, taen done as well as posterity 
had a r18ht to expect ot a tairl;r 'badl;r trai~d, even 
it eal'll8st, stndent ot cont-porary attairs. 3 
80, Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy ot Franklin D. Roose• 
velt ,• 20-21. 
81. Moley, Rs)'IIIOnd, Attar Sevep Year•, 61. 
82. 'i'11gwell, R. G., "The Progre•sive Orthodoxy ot Franklia D. Roose• 
velt,• 20. 
83. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy ot Frsaklin Do Roose• 
velt, 1 ' 21. 
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'l'ugwell versus Hoover: tJle Lame-Du.ck Period 
Introduction 
A chpater in a recent text book in American history is entitled 
"The Hew Deal: Change in the Fhilosoplly of Govel'!llllent,• 1 Perbapa one 
of the bast ways to illustrate this change is to consider the debate 
betwen Rexf'ori Guy 'l'ugvell aad Herltert Hoover whicJl has gone on dur-
ing a period of Dearly three decades, Tugwall first expressed his dis• 
agreement with Hoover iD print in a series of articles iD the Nay 
Republic on the oaapaign of 1928, In the 1950s Hoover, in his Mm!pil'f 1 
condemned the New Deal in more detailed fashion than he had ever done; 
Tugwell, iD a review of the !'1211'8, rejected Hoover's argwaents, 
A consideratioD of the controversy between the professor-BraiD 
Truster-aa.inistrator and the eagiDeer•President involves the risk 
of conveying a false impression -- an overestimation of Tugwell's 
direct, detailed i111pact on the Nev Deal. 'l'lagwell had little or nothing 
to do with some measures on which he and Hoover disagreed 1 Tugwell often 
had no decisive influence, fro111 the point of view of ultimate causation, 
on actions which he favored. While historians hesitate to indulge in 
"llie;ht•have-beens,• 'l'ugvell himaelf would agree that without his parti• 
cipation the Nev Deal would have developed essentially along the aa.e 
lines as it did with his activity.2 
1. Uning, A. c. and Klein, P. s., .A Histou ,9! the United Statl8, 
Vol. II (New York, Soribner•s. 1951) 473• 
2. Tugwell, R. G .. •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Boose• 
velt,• Jthics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953. 7, •I si111ply call 
attention to the activities ot Adolph and _,self because, largely 
by accident, it was our aterial which (continued on page 122) 
Another general qualificatioa is necessary. The differences in 
opinions on action programs between Tucwell and Hoo~er were greater 
than such differences between l!ooseTelt and Hoonr. In practice. Tuc• 
well supported measures which fell short of his intellectual prefer• 
eJI.ces; consequeJI.UY• the Tugwell•HOOTer centro~ersy at times reTolTecl 
arOUDd -sures actually taken; at other t :l.aes Tugwell oppose4 ik:lonr 
fraa the standpoillt of a oonjuncturel program which the New Deal itaelf 
failed to adopt, Despite ca.plieatiDS factors. the personificatioo in 
these two mea of opposing Jkilosopbies of goYerument prOTides a worth• 
while subject for stncly b.r the student who atte-.ts to understand the • 
shifting ideas of the American society of the early 1930s. 
'1'118wll opened the debate ia 1928. In the 1920s he considered 
weak spots in industry. and disproportionately low farm inc01118 1 threats 
to the health of the whole aeon~. lD the electioa year of 1928 he 
directed his expressions of dissatisfaction with gOTernment inaction at 
President Hoonr. He questioned HoOTer's reputation as a practical 
man. conceding that the Preeideat was a super• adadnistrator as far as 
he went ·- but his schooling in the orthodox leasioJI.S of nineteenth• 
century laissez•faire doctrine di4 aot allow biB to go far enougk. 
Hoonr saw the iaeTita'IIUity of aiaplificstion. staadardizatioa. aDd 
associatioa; becanse ia his iadustrial philosophy gonrnment was oaly 
to assist but ia no way control illdustrial processes. be would not rec• 
ogDize the corollary aeed for natioual plaaning.3 
3• Tugwell, R. G., •Platfor. aDd Calldidates,• Jls![ Republic, Vol. 55. 
No. 704. May 30, 1928. 44• 
2, (continued from page 121) was used in Mr. Roosevelt's campaign.• See 
below, Chapter xv. for an estimate of Tugwell's impact on the New Deal. 
12.3· 
Hoo•er•s Jhilosopb)o of poliUcal econc;m,y, 'l'uswll asserted, pre-
•ented detection of sympta.s of sickness; only when disease had tully 
de'Yeloped did ita existence beca.e known. Tagwell criticized HOo-yer's 
bliadaeaa to econaadc ills ~ -.r of inquiria« whether Alfred E. Smita 
would a4opt 
••• construct he industrial control which lllight effect 
a cure, or will he offer the cheaper and easier wa7 of 
meeting problems only in crisis and refusing to see4 thea until the crisis arri'YSS -as Mr. Hoo•er •••• ? 
Tu&well's coaaent became e•ea harsher as election day neared. In 
Sept8111ber he wrote 1 
Ou is fCilrced to the conclusion that Mr. Hoo'Yer is 
either a -yery bad econolllist or that he is intellectually 
dishonest. Tkis is a 4ifficult choice for that larse 
body of intelligent people who had concei'Yed him as the 
engiaeer in poliUcs. And it seeas stranse that there 
should be so vide-spread a disposition toward apology, 
Hoover's supporters, 'l'ugwll asserted, IIIBintained that it was not the 
real Hoo'Yer who, for eltBIIIPle, a4'Yocated enlarsed foreigg c-rce 
while outdoing Coolidge in ad'Yocstia« protection; the President sav 
througb the corruption around him and only waited for a free hand to 
show his qualities, accGrding to his admirers. Tugwll respon4ed to 
thia defense of Hoonrs •It ae belie'Yea the stuff he talks, there is 
notbin& to be sained in electing him. If he does not -.lie'Ye it, ~en 
can ve trust him?"5 
4• Tugwell, R, G,, •Huager, Cold, and Candidates,• lfev Republic, Vol. 
54, No. 700, May 2, 1928, .325· 
5. 'l'ugvell, R. G., •The Liberal Choice.• Nev ilepublic, Vol, ,56, lllo. 
718, September 5, 1928, 74• 
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ty the aext presidential-election year the nation was struggliDC 
in the throes of depression. Tugwell renewed Ilia attack on Hoover with 
Yigor. He co-authored an article appearing in January in Current ~­
~ entitled, •Flaw. in the HooYer Eeonoadc Plan.• In the same montk 
he delivered a radio address entitled "Responsibility and Economic Dis• 
6 tress.• Be also gave the address, •Discourse in Depression,• in the 
first pert of the year. He then auaaarized the main lines of Ilia pre-
Yiws a~~alysea, adding c01111ent oa lloonr•s thought processes, in a 
peaplllet, HI:• Booyer'• Econ•'e Poliqy (New York, John Day, 19,32). He 
kas described his v.riting of thia last it .. , 
Atter the depression had pne on for some time, and 
it had beca.e apparent that Hoover had ao intent of 
sponsoriRg a117 sutficieat ~tlies, Jlllf indigaetion 
got the better of me and I prepared a brochure, tor 
the preparation of Whick I collected all of Hoover's 
pu\llished writings and speeehea • piled th8111 on Jlllf 
deak, classified and aulyzed their thoughts, and set 
th8111 out as clearly as I could. The revelations 
interested not only me but evidently many otkers, 
because the J18111Phlet had a large sale. It discloaed 
Hoover not only as a 4ete~aed defender of private 
business but also aa an equally deterained opponent 
of a autficiently imple .. nted public program tor the 
~ ot ills which private business had brought upon 
us. 
Among the readers of the pamphlet was Governor Roosevelt; it bad soae 
influence on his decision to take Tugwell into the Brain Trust.6 
Hoover's first docuaented condemnation of Tugwell came in a letter 
during the ~-duck period to J ... s H. Rand, Jr., of New York.9 In 
6. llational Advisory Council on Ed•cation, Economic Series, Lecture 
No. 14, delivered January 30. 1932, National Broadcasting CoapaJIY• 
7. 'l'ugwell, R. G,, •The ProgreasiYe Orthodox;r of Franklin D. Rooae-
Yelt,• 7. 
8. Note, Twn!all Papers. 
'J • See ChaJiter VI. •liluaiaess Gontideace, • Sect ion, • ••• tile Democrats' 
Deprelsion.• 
late 1~33 HooTer apparently found an indirect aTeoue of retaliatioD 
in the IlK~ Herald Tri.._. colUBDe of his friend Mark SulliTan, 
whose attacks on ~11 eagan attar tke journalist ked Tiaited the 
tol:'ller president in Palo Alto.10 ID 1~34 Hoover's personal secretaey 
purliahed his memoirs, recounting the incident involTing the letter to 
Rand.11 In the following year tvo ot Hoover's staunchest defenders 
also included the letter in their published account of the Hoover 
adDdniatration.12 In Hoover's memoirs the Rand matter came up a~in 
in the 1~50a, followed by TUgwell's aaamaey ot his rejection of HoOTer's 
theses in an article, •The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover.• 13 
The la~~e-duck period saw the actual -- as distinguished tr<llll 
the published -- clash of ideas Which highlighted the basic differences 
between the Tiewa of Hoover and those ot Tugwell. In this clash 
Roosevelt refused to accept Hoover's analysis of the causes of the 
depression and the policy tor recovery Which that analysis indicated. 
Hoover's response was the assertion that the President-elect's failure 
to •cooperate• with the outgeing adainiatration nipped in the bud a 
recovery that vas underway. An examination of the protagonists' Tieve 
on the origins ot the depression prOTidea background to the disagree• 
11111nta of the lame-duck period. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Carter, 1. Franklin ( Unotfioial Obaener), The !I!Uf Deal!ra (New 
York, SimOn and Sehuster. 1~34) 8~; the attacks and the visit 
may well haTe been coincidental. 
Joslin, Theodora G., Homr 9fL lU, Record (Garden City, New York, 
Doubleday Doran, 1~34) .363-65. 
J(yers. William s. and Newton. Walter H., Til! HoOTzr Adainistretio" 
A Do?P!I!!nted larrative (New York, Scrillner•a, 1~3 ) 3.56• 
Altioch Review, Winter. 1~53•54• 
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v. Analysis ot the Causes ot the Depression: 
Economists used the term "IIB.tionaliaa• to descrilile tlte Brain 
Trust's approach to the pro'blea ot reconry.1 Moley stated. •v. wre 
agreed that the heart of the reccmtry program 111111 and -st be dm.a• 
tie• •• ia oppositiOD to traditional internationalisa.2 He listed the 
three distinctive features ot the areia Trusters• tltougbt; 
1. They aas'BIIIed that the cauaes ot our ills 
wre da.stic. internal. and that the re• 
medias must also be internal. 
2. They belieTed that the so•ernmeat not only 
ltad to extead ita regulatory )lOver to pre• 
Tent abuses. but it also had to deTelop 
controls to stt.Rlate and staltilize econo-
mic acthity • 
.3· They rejected the treditioaal ataaistic 
Wilson-Brandeis Jhilosophy and acreed that 
the heart of our economic difficulty was 
the anarchy ot coacentreted economic power. 
AtaaizatiOD of big business would destroy 
America's greatest CODtri8ution to a higher 
standard of living -- the development of 
1. 'l'be Brain Trust's approach 1111s generally accepted by. not imposed 
on. Jlooaevelt. 
2. Moley 0 Raymond. After Senn Years (New York. Harper. 19.39) 70. 
mass production. 'lhe:r asreed on the pre• 
sel'Y!ltion ot equality ot opportunity, but 
recognized that competition, es such, ws 
not inkerentl:r virtuous.3 
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Hoover, too, otfered a nationalistic solution to economic 
problema -- aid at the top of the econom;r in order to give ~siness 
confidence would suffice for recovery. The depression, Hoover said 0 
origiaated in Europe; the percentap of the American econOIIIIY' vhicla ws 
not dependent oa European developments was sufficiently greet to 
assure recovery 011 the l:te.sia of demestic coDfidence. At the sBIM time. 
Hoover placed great importance on securing international agreements. 
The Brain Trust emphasized domestic origina; it also recognized i11ter• 
national causes of the depression. 
The differences betveea Hoover aDd the Brain Trust were relative 
rather titan absolute. Both recogaized international and national ori• 
gins of the depression (Hoover eveatually conceded that there had laaen 
har.ful speculative orgies in America). Both believed in national aad 
international solutions (the Brain Trnst believed international solu-
tions had to await stabilization of the internal situation). Differ-
ences involved matters ot emphasis, degree, and timing. Yet, differ• 
encea in emphasis, deuee, and timing amounted to a fundamental overall 
difference. 
Differences in emphasis between Hoover and the Brain Trust re• 
garding the origins of the depression reaulted in different empbasea in 
3• Mole;r, Raymond. AO;er Seven Years. 23·24• 
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their respectiYe efforts at reco.eey. The nationalis-international• 
ism conflict produced disagreements betveen Roosevelt and Hoover over 
-tters pertaining to the f'orthcoaiag London Economic Conference •• 
especially foreisn debts and ct1rreac7 questions. Concernillg the lat• 
tar. it was a nationalist view which caused Roosevelt to invoke war 
powers to control foreip a:chaage ud the hoarding of gold 1 in the 
absence of a~ international agrea.ent on currency DBtters 0 it was be-
lieved that the American cnrren07 structure required protection from 
harmful foreign influences. HooYer and Roosevelt placed different 
estinetes on the probabUt7 of' foreign cooperation. Hoover was more 
optimistic than Roosevelt. but by the beginning of March he was ready 
to invoke the Trading wit~ the Ene.r Act of 1917 in order to control 
the gold supply -- if Roosevelt would join him by publicly announcinc 
~is support. 
Within the Roosevelt Administration itself there existed funda• 
mental differences on the nationali~internationalism question vhic~ 
led to frictioa. Moley 0 seconded by TUgwell. represented the nation• 
alist point of viev1 Cordell H»ll was the leader of the international-
ist school. As early as J'eU'wlry 10 19.33• Moley told Roosevelt at 
Warm Springs that Hllll penoaified the philosophical opposition to IJiev 
Deal nationalistic policiea.4 Later in the year develo~nts in London 
at the economic confereace highlighted the opposing views of Maley and 
Hull. 
4• Moley 0 Jlaymond. Attar Seven Ieara. 108. 
~. 
Moley and Tugwell defined proalems in foreign trade in tel'lllll of 
practical possibilities rather then on any theoretical basis. Bot~ 
recognized. the potential long-run banefits st..Ung f%"(8 free trade as 
a hypothetically operetin international policy. In the short run, 
Tugwell believed, the administration had to consider the effects of any 
move in the direction of free trade on the standard of living of the 
.AIIerican vorker.5 Similarly, Moley, conceding that the theoretical 
arg~D~~~nt for frae trade was convincina;, would have agraed on the ~ 
diate elimination of tariff barriers only if one kundred years of 
history could have been wiped OQt,6 He believed that indiscriminate 
tariff reduction would 8enefit cotton growers but hurt all others liv-
ing under tariff protectioa.7 
Differences within the administration were also ones of empk&sia, 
degrae, and timing •. At the outset Roosevelt's tariff policies cont--
plated modified protectionism to protect experiments in raising wages 
8 
and prices. Moley insisted that the New Deal could not embark on a 
crusade to restore free trade end at the saae time achieve its essential 
objectives --agricultural-industrial balance, stability and security 
of liveliaood, and adequate domestic purchasing power. •It was not that 
tariff reduction vas per se incgapatible with the economics of the New 
Deal ••• bu.t there ws a crucial question of timing and method" whick 
the Hull school ignored.' 
5· Note, Tugwll Puera. 
6. Moley, RaYIIIOnd, After Senn Years, 48. 
7. Moley. RaJJDOnd. After Seyen xun. 48. 
8. Moley, RaJJIIOnd, After Seyen Years, )68. 
9· Moley, Ra,.-nd, After Sena Years, 48• 
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'1\igwell agreed with Mole;y 011 1111tters of tilllillf!:• He considered 
international coordination of couaerce a desirable long-run objective.10 
He described his advocae;y of econOIIic Dationalism as a matter of real• 
istic choice. The Dnited States coald not, b;y definition, unilaterall;y 
eater a harmonious international situation. The attainment of inter-
national harmony required the cooperation of other nations. Since suck 
cooperation ws not forthcOiling, • ••• international sentiments were 
unrealistic and ••• clouded ever,. issue; we could not count on that 
sort of relief' .• 11 Ever since the :lconOilic Conterence, Tugwell observed, 
there had been mutual distrust and increased restrictions in trade; we 
hed no choice and were forced to go our ow wy alone. It vas •non-
sense to aay that because we were forced to follow that course for the 
tillle being we ••• had becOIIB detel'lllined nationalists.•12 
~ugwell pointed out that under the circumstances nationalism was 
the only realistic choice the United States could make. He also acknow-
ledged the international aspects ot the depression: 
10. 
11. 
12. 
The current depression is a consequence of the sentiment 
of nationalism carried into inappropriate economic fielAS• 
It vas no.1 shared at t'irat bT the United States. But Lve 
could no!/ pursue a policy ~ich ran against that of the 
rest of the world. We too haYe been caught ia the uniYer• 
sal moYement toward isolation. And our eJIBrging program 
for agriculture has had to reflect it. This trend may be 
reversed b{ slow, hard stages • but that reversal has not 
yet be~. 3 
See Aboye, Chapter III, Section, ·~ll's Long•Run Thinking."' 
Tugwell, R. G., •Must We Draf't Roosevelt?• lfew Republic, Vol. 102, 
No. 1328, May 13, 1'40. 
Tugwell, R. G,,• International Economic Policy,• in The Battle W 
Democraex, 166. 
Tugwell, B. G., Address, "The Place ot Government in a National Land 
Program,• Joint Meeting, ~rican Economic Association, .American 
Statistical Association, Farm lcoa0111ic (Continued on page 131) 
131. 
In fact, Tugwell declared, the liestern world would not be set right 
until the trend toward nationalism vas reversed; readjustments tor 
recovery would be harder without international cooperation,14 
Tugwell •a primary emphasis 1111.8 on the internal aspects of tile 
depression, His ideas about recovery stemmed from his economic diag• 
nosis of' the 1920s -· production outran pvrchasing power.15 A letter 
f'raa Gardiner c. Means, his colleape at Columbia whose research in 
the govel'lllllent Tugwell encouraged, Wlderlined the importance wbicll the 
two professors placed on restoring and increasing domestic purchasing 
power. Means suggested the possibility of' a study ~ the Bureau of' 
Home Economics, USDA, of' cons\llller demand for non-agricultural products 
·- assuming that average family inccae could be raised, for example, to 
three thousand dollars. • It such a study were made, I believe that 
mach of the talk of the importance of foreign markets tor manufactured 
goods would disappear.16 
The nationalism-internationalism controversy also involved per-
sons concerned with agricultural policy, After Tugwell became Assist• 
ant Secretary of' Agriculture, his vieva on agricultural exports con• 
tlicted with those of A A Administrator George N. Peek. Both IIIBn wre 
fundamentally nationalists --Tugwell's general vieva on foreign trade 
wre nearer to Peek's than to Hull's - but there was ample room tor 
differences within the nationalist school of thougbt.17 
( Continu.ed from page 130) Association, Philadelphia, December 29, 
1933; Y§Q! Press Release, 9· 
Tugwell, R. G., •International Economic Policy,• 167. 
See above, Chapter II. 
Letter, Gardiner c. Means to Tugwell, October l, 1934, Tugwell Papers. 
Wallace, Schuyler c., The Hew Deal in Action {New York, Harper, 1934) 
Chapter 10 entitled •Nationalism vs. Internationalism,• 69•71; see 
below, Chapter X, Section, •The Agricultural AdjustiiiBnt Administration .... 
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Internationalism: ~be European Interpretation 
Opposed to the Brain ~rust's nationalism in diagnosis and cure 
of the depression was Hoover's emphasis on the European orieins of our 
economic ills. Briefly, in Tugwell's words, Hoover's contention was 
that 
••• the depression was an after-effect of the dislocations 
reiiBinins from war in Europe; that it had begun there and 
spread to America; that it was not a particularly serious 
.. tter because foreigners boufl:bt only a small pereentaee of 
American production in any case; that it would soon be over; 
and that minor preeautions would be needed •••• 1 
A spoke81118.n for the business C'-'lity, Julius H. Barnes, Chairman of 
the National Business Survey Conference, expressed Hoover's viewa in 
specific terms when be asserted that, ·~ariff walls erected too rapidly 
by European nations and the da.onitiziae of silver ~ Great Britaia 
were the tvo chief causes of the depression.• 2 
Members of the school of tboufl:ht which stressed the Europeaa 
origins of the depression became involved ia some confused lines of rea• 
sonine. If, as they Dllintained, European developments could not tnnde-
mentally affect the American aeon~, international action ought to kava 
been adequate to the achievement of recovery. Barnes proclaillled oa 
April 24, 1930, •American business ••• is achieving e restored stability 
' 
by a philosophy peculiarly its ova, and throufl:h methods probably effective 
.. 
in no other country and no other era.•3 ~hose methods were internal, as 
1. Tv.ewell, R • .G., ·~e Proeressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D, Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Tol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 8. 
2. Aag1y, Edward, ed., .Q& .!Uh? (New York, Viking, 1932) 48, fr0111 an 
address in New York City, November 7, 1930. 
3. Ang1y, Edward, ed. , .Q!I. lull?, 47 • 
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vera the Brain Traat's; since they vera based one different aaalysis 
of the causes of the depression. they involved a different emphasis. 
By the fall Of 1931 the inefficacy of internal measures to date 
led Hoover to state, "The depression has been deepened by events from 
abroad which are beyond the control either of our citizens or our ~ov­
ernment.•4 In this particular address Hoover considered the impact 
on America of E.ropean events significant; on other occasions he insis-
ted that the essentially European nature of the depression made more 
than minor measures in America unnecessary. Hoover did not undertake 
a fundamental reexamination of his internal approach; instead he shifted 
in his vie~ on the international situation. In the fall of 1932, after 
his defeat at the polls, Hoover made an attempt to •sell' his successor 
an internationalist foreign policy. Hoover's approach to the depres• 
sion then implied that '-'rica •s fate was nov in the hands of foreign 
nations. 
'l'ugvell agreed with Hoover that the depression was in many w.ys 
an international phenomenon. The war had made the United states a 
creditor-exporter; Europe had withdrawn from accepting the situation by 
closing her markets with tariffs and quotas and by impounding funds 
for exchange.5 On the other hand, the Roosevelt group 
••• had 111et this LEuropesn emphasiii by saying that 
the sins of Europe vera at least shared by the United 
States, and that the Republican policy of disposing 
of surpluses by creating purchasing power abroad 
4• Aagly, Edward, ad., .Q!lJ.!U?, 19, from a radio address, October 18, 
1931· 5· Tugwell, R. G., •International Economic Policy.• 164. 
through loans ~s distinguisha•ly among the causes 
ot the trouble. 
Attar the Boosevelt administration got underway, some critics 
of the llev Deal based their ar~nts, in part, on a European inter-
pretation of the causes of the depression. They reasoned that since 
the depression was essentially European in its origins, the actions 
taken •Y the European democracies ware not necessary in the Unite4 
States 1 they wre in fact laudably lllild in canparison vi tb. New Deal 
socialisa pointing toward totalitariaaisa. Raoul E. Desvernine7 noted 
the silllilarity betwaea the Thir4 International of Toverich Stalin, the 
Third Reich ot Herr Hitler, the Tripartite Corporationism of Signor 
Mwlsolini, and the Third EconOlii,Y Gf Dr, Tugwell. He concluded, •The 
nwaber 'three • sesaa to have a strange fasciaation, a megical charm 
and import, tor all these utopians. •6 Tugwll aped the dicta tore when 
even the devices of the European democracies were not needed in America. 
The hitch in this line of reasoning was that the •economic lib-
eralism• of Sweden and England constituted a more sweeping program of 
government intervention in economic affaire than did the Nev Deal. In 
Britaia Parliaaent had enacted income and inheritance taxes and established 
6, Tugvell, R. G., •The Preparation ot a President,• Westerp Political 
QyarterlY, Vol. l, No. 2, June, 1946• 149; perhaps this statement 
has become ironic ia view of the foreign-aid programs which both 
parties supported in the 1950s for the defense, it is true, of the 
free world, but econolllically speaking partly, in effect, subsidize• 
tiaa ot American exports, 
7. Desvernine was Chairmen of the National Lawyers Coadttee ot the 
American Liberty League. 
8, Desvernine, Raoul E., De!!l9cratic Despotism (New York, DOdd; Head, 
1936) 113·14· 
a social iiiBurance system -- all calculated to effect a redistributiOD 
of wealth. aritain had long had legislation similar to the Securities 
Act of 1933· The British agricultural .. rketing boards anticipated tae 
AAA; the British gonl'llmeat was directly involved in housing, shipbuild• 
ing, railroads, coal mioing, and the tra...tssion of electricity,9 
The caaplexities and contradictiODs revolving around the various 
analyses of the causes of the depression10 indicated that in each 
instance emphaaia was the decisive element. In Tugwell's opinion, 
Hoover's stressiDg EQropean factors was directly related to the fact 
that he •pooa•poobed the statistics of decline• and believed that pros• 
perity was •just around the corner,• 11 Not only did the EUropean inter• 
pretation result initially in iuactiODJ it also determined the kind of 
goverasent action Hoover eventually aponaored, 
• 
9, Lindley, Ernest K., Half!!IY JIUll Roosevelt (New York, Viking, 1937) 
25-28. 
10, It is interesting to note that a German author in effect reversed 
Hoover's contentions by attributiag ais nation's ills to econaaic 
ealatiOD of the United States; lkllul, Moritz J' •• ProsHritx: I!Dl 
yj llealitY J.a A!llerican EcoftC&iC 1in (London, M, Hopkinson, 1931) 
7-lo, 
11, Tugwll, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D, Roosevelt,• 
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VI. Business Confidence 
Hoover believed that public policies which gave business confidence 
would result in business activity leading to industrial-commercial recov• 
ery and, in turn, recovery of the whole econo~. This belief of the 
President led Tugwell to inquire into the nature of Hoover's personality 
and thought processes. Interaction between cause and effect rendered it 
difficult to make a simple analysis of the origins of Hoover's views; 
however, the President's intellectual end-product did not elude descrip• 
tion. 
An analysis of the origins of Hoover's views could readily lead to 
reasoning in a circle. His personal experience led Hoover to believe 
that business was the key element in the econo~ -- as an independent 
causal factor; therefore, in a time of economic decline, recovery lay in 
giving business confidence so that it might lead the aeon~ back to 
prosperity; the facts in any given esse invariably substantiated, in 
Hoover's opinion, his stress on business confidence. Tugwell suggested 
a circular aspect in Hoover's reasoning; because Hoover believed that 
business confidence was almost the only requirement for economic well-
being, he rejected all facts that contradicted this belief -- the facts 
remaining after such a rejection logically reinforcing his original con-
tention. The European interpretation of the causes of the depression 
provided a specific example of circular dialectics: (1) the American 
business system being fundamentally sound, the source of the difficulty 
had to lie elsewhere; (2) there were difficulties in Europe; they were 
lJ7. 
the source of the trouble; (3) since the trouble originated in Europe, 
the American business system was fundamentally sound; (4) since the 
American business system was fundamentally sound, there was no recogni-
tion of facts to the contrary. (Of course, dialectics can be superfi-
cial and deceptive; perhaps a similar set of propositions might be set 
up for Tugwell's reasoning, beginning with, •He believed Hoover's rea-
soning to be unsound.") 
Tugwell dealt with Hoover's failure to recognize facts in detail 
in his pamphlet ~. Hoover's Economic Policr.1 Hoover, Tugwell asserted, 
believed that he proceeded from particulars to generals, that he was an 
engineer pragmatist par excellence. Actually, Hoover clung to "fixed 
ideas inherited from a vanished past.• He had a mania for facts and an 
obsession for acting on them-- "if only they will behave.• Hoover based 
his confidence in the business system on its production of fruits in the 
past. The failure of fruits to appear after late 1929 did not cause him 
consider the possibility of basic defects and maladjustments in the econ• 
omy. •we judge by fruits,• commented Tugwell, •so long as their produc• 
tion requires no change in our customary attitudes.• In his acceptance 
speech in 1932 Hoover stated that progress proved •the fundamental cor-
rectness of our system.• Tugwell granted that it was justifiable to point 
to progress as proof of soundness -- if Hoover displayed a willingness to 
2 
show the relation between cause and effect. 
1, See below, Chapter XIV, Section, "The Impractical, Dreaming Tugwell, 
Rebuttal,• for additional comment by Tugwell or Hoover's handling of 
facts, 
2, Tugwell, R, G,, Mr. Hoover's EcOnomic Policy (New York, John Day, 1932) 
5-6. 
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When it came to causal analysis, Tugwell wrote, Hoover exhibited 
a •curious twist of mind, seeking to establish itself on fact, yet rest• 
ing solidly on received ideas.• The domination of faith over realistic 
reasoning, which emasculated American approaches to policy, disclosed 
itself in Hoover's speeches. There was no causal analysis, only cita-
tiona of simple concurrence. As an example of Hoover's treatment of 
causal relaticnships, Tugwell cited a portion of a Presidential message 
to Congress in 1929 which referred to the tariff of 1922. In associat• 
ing the retention of the tariff with economic well-being, Hoover rejec• 
ted •one thousand other reasons for prosperity.•3 Hoover's remarks on 
the tariff of 1922, Tugwell continued, described several years of history 
in terms of a single reference. If tariffs caused prosperity, they must 
also cause depressions, Tugwell asserted, for the tariff had been raised 
at the start of the last slump.4 Hoover's position on the antitrust 
laws, in his message on their revision of December 3o 1930, was similarly 
perverse.S 
In his analysis of Hoover's public statements Tugwell, admittedly 
6 in an indignant mood, pointed out the damaging psychological effects 
on Hoover of the struEgle between his ideals and reality. Hoover became 
less and less able to face reality. He gradually succumbed to the 
3• Tugwell, R. G., !:!l:• Hoover's Economic Polity, 7. 
4• Tugwell, R. G., Mt• ijpover's Economic Policy, 9· 
5. Tugwell, R. G., Mt• ijpover's Economic Policy, 9·10; see chapter 14, 
Section, "The Impractical, Dreaming Tugwell, Rebuttal.• 
6. See Above, •TugWEill versus Hoover: The Lame•Duck Period, Introduc-
tion.• 
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prestige of the presidency, tending to believe that what he said was 
true because he said it. He systematically whittled down damaging 
reality, deliberately twisting evidence reflecting on the basis of his 
policy. In the end he clung to his business-confidence thesis by 
"ballyhooing for better business and hurling invective at 'pessimdsts.••7 
Since Hoover's system of thought took into account no fundamental 
causes of the depression other than business' loss of confidence, and 
declining economic conditions he continued to reaffirm his faith in 
business and himself.8 He blasted those who rejected the possibility 
of improvement without action beyond his recommendations, and who enjoyed 
misery9 -- his implication being that certnin critics favored continued 
depression as a contradiction of his policies affording political gain. 
On one occasion Hoover remarked, •From this one LdepressioBf we shall 
gain stiffening and economic discipline;• Tugwell's paraphrase read, 
•Even a system which produces depressions may produce them for our own 
10 0 good.• F1nally, Tugwell observed, Hoover sought the "last refuge of 
the mentally troubled• -- he attributed to those who disagreed with him 
11 
a lack of balance. 
If Hoover's attributions of unbalance were valid, an alarming 
percentage of the population was verging on insanity. The doctrinal 
resource which was available to the average American was an individualism 
according to which he had only himself to blame for his plight; this 
7· Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover'§ Economic PolicY, 10. 
a. Tugwell, R. G., HI:· Hoove;t'!i Economic Policy, 12. 
9· Tugwell, R. G.,~· Hoover'§ Econgmic Policy, lJ. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., Mr• Hoover'§ Economic Policy, lJ. 
11. Tugwell, R. G., Mr• Hoover'§ Econgmic Policy, 14. 
doctrine, Hoover believed, could presumably sustain him and guide him 
out of his difficulties.12 Hoover assured Americans that the depres-
sion was a natural phenomenon which would. automatically adjust certain 
ill-defined minor imbalances of the econcmic system.13 When •natural" 
readjustment failed to take place as the result of Hoover's own pro-
gram of self-regulation seconded by government, he refused to consider 
direct government regulation of industry and agriculture. Meanwhile, 
business men and farmers begged to be savad from themselves and the 
evils of competition. Hoover once again urged that confidence was the 
key to the situation -- "the measure of his stubborn adherence to 
principle.•l4 The majority of Americans soon lost confidence in the 
confidence thesis and a doctrine of individualism which did not permdt 
their government to aid them directly in their distress. 
There was a waning of faith in old Gods and a search for new 
doctrines which would explain the causes of the depression more ade• 
quately than Hoover had done, suggesting e. less painful cure. On the 
whole, academic economists had no dogmas to offer on the causes or cure 
of the depression. Radicals advanced doctrines which ran from orthodox 
Marxism through native panaceas such as the single-tax, share-the-wealth, 
and funny money; the basic conservatism of the American people prevented 
any significant popular support for radical remedies.15 While the 
12. Rauch, Basil, The History .2! the New Deal, 1933•1938 (New York, 
Creative Age Press, 1944) 9. 
13. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933·1938, 9• 
14. Rauch, Basil, The History .2! the !a 1&Me 1933·1938, 15. 
15. Rauch, Basil, The History .2! ,W !Wit !lu!• 1933-1938, 10. 
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people found no definite approach to their problems around Which they 
could rally, by 1932 they rejected Hoover's program; even business men 
were then ready for unconventional experiments,16 
One could ac"ount for Hoover's point of view, not expecting him 
immediately to react effectively to events for which there was no place 
in his ideas on political economy. He was the inheritor of a nineteenth-
century body of thought based on economic development unaccompanied by 
governmental controls. Tugwell referred to this economic development 
by noting that the system just grew, as resourcesprovided a margin of 
tolerance, While America had had its share of a widespread low stand-
ard of living, in its uncontrolled system farmers and workers were bet-
ter off most of the time than those of other nations; we attributed our 
prosperity to a lack of controls.17 Hoover inherited a belief that the 
absence of governmental controls was a positive causal force for the 
good; he carried that faith into the changed conditions of the twentieth 
century. 
In Hoover's thought restrictions on governmental activities with 
regard to the economy did not apply to public assistance to b~siness. 
Government could aid, but it could not regulate closely; it could assist 
economic activities, but it could take little cocnizance of them after 
public service to business had been rendered. Business could be •confi-
dent• that ttere were no strings attached to government aid; it could lock 
16. Rauch, Basil, The History of ~New Th~al, 1933-1938, 10. 
17. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Ri;se of Business,• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. J, :September, 1952, 494· 
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to Washington for help withot:t fear of hamperine questioning. Certainly 
Hoover's views were well enough known to give business confidence. Tue-
well wrote in 1928 that Hoover wanted to keep government on the sidelines 
except to support business' own program as it evolved from profit-seeking 
. t. 18 1ncen 1ves. 
Tugwell's reference to profit-seeking incentives touched on that 
aspect of economic activity ~ich, Hoover believed, called for govern-
ment intervention. The President considerHd the profit-seeking incentive 
the basis of American individualism; it could, towever, result in combi-
nat ions which denied economic opportunities to otc:ers. Accord ine;ly, 
Hoover stood firmly, if not always with loeical consistency, for anti• 
trust laws. He was aware that anti-trust laws met ccnditions far differ-
ent from trcse of Adam Smith's time; such regulation, hE> stated, was 
• itself proof that we cove gone a long way to•NB.rd thE' abandonment of the 
'capitalism' of Adam Smith."l9 
Hoover was aware that he lived in the twentieth century; he was 
aware thAt conditions had changed ereatly even since 1900. He wss fami• 
liar with technological advance -- • As we build up our powers of produc-
tion through the advancing application of science we creete new forces 
d . t ,20 with which men rwy om1n2 e •••• 
His reference to technological advance indicated that in his 
18. Tugwell, R. G., "The Liberal Choice," New Republic, Vol. 56, No. 718, 
September 5, 1928, 74• 
19. Hoover, Herbert, American Individualism (Garden City, New York, 
Doubleday, Doran, 1928) 53• 
20. Hoover, Herbert, American Indi vidt:alism, 54 • 
opinion the principal task for government which the ':'aylorization of 
injustry created was the twarting of the trust movement; at the same 
t irne Hoover encouraged trade associations, Tugwell, or. the other hand, 
was consistent in hjs views on the implications of technology; he con-
sidered the anti-trust movement a futile gHsture aeainst invincible 
forces, He would not thwart combinations; he >10uld reguU!te tr.em in 
the public interest. The cUef c~.allenge of 'l'Bylorizat ion, in 'l'ugwell 's 
view, was the distribution of its enormous product. 
Hoover, too, considered wide distribution an ecc:10mic desideratum: 
"The O!'!ly road to further advance in the standard of living is by greater 
invention, greater elimination of waste, greater production and better 
distribution of commodities and services lt21 •••• Distribution, hcwever, 
did not c'!use Hocver as much concern as it caused Tugwel 1; altho,eh the 
President was an engineer, he did not rate the productive potentialities 
of Taylorized industry as highly as the professor of econo:r.ics did, 
Hoover wrcte: 
It is a certainty we are confronted with a population in 
such numbers as can only exist by pr·oduction attuned to 
a pitch in which the slightest reduction of the impulse 
to produce will 11t once create misery and want .22 
'l'ugwell similarly deplored obstacles to greater productivity; 23 he did 
not, however, doubt for a moment the physi.cal abll'ty of prcductive faci-
lities to meet the nation's needs. He doubted that the populAtion pos-
21. 
22. 
23· 
Hoover, Herbert, American Individualism, 32-33. 
Hoover, Herbert, American Individualism, 35· 
Tugwell, R. G., Industry's Coming !2f. AFe (New York, Columbia Uni• 
versity Press, 1927). 
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sessed purchasing power adequate to buy tr.e national product 
he insisted that purchasing power lagged tehind production, 
in fact, 
Tugwell pointed to the distributive mechanism as the key to the 
success of capitalism, Hoover did not consider distribution a pressing 
problem: 
To all practical souls there is little use in quarreling 
over the scare cf each of us until '"" have scrcething to 
divide, So long as we maintain our individualism we will 
have increasing quantities to share and we shall have 
time and leisure and taxes with whic" to fight out proper 
sharing of the "surplus,• The income tax returns show 
that this surplus is a minor part of our total production 
after taxes are paid,24 
The surplus which Hoover treated casually played a key role in Tugwell's 
2" analysis of developments in the 1920s which led to the depression, ~ 
Both Hoover and Tugwell declared tbat the world had c!-.anged since 
1900, How much had it changed? They had different answers to this 
question, If Hoover thought society had changed less than TuL~ll believed 
it had, his background and experiences, extending farther back into the 
nineteenth century than Tugwell's qualitatively as well as quantitatively, 
accounted for his attitudes. He was confident in the ability of business 
to lead the nation back to prosperity; he believed that business would 
provide leadership if it, in turn, was confident that public policy would 
be favorable. Hoover believed that busines" had a sense of responsibility 
equal to its key function. He attributed to business a benich spirit of 
public service on which he could call in times of distress. He would not 
concede that business men, in trying to save t~eir necks in an uncoordi· 
24. Hoover, Herbert, American Individualism, 34• 
25. See above, Chapter II. 
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nated economy, were no better and no worse than anyone else. 
Like most other men Hoover derived his ideas from his experience 
rather than from intellectual analysis of an open, academic nature -- not 
th'lt academicians cannot be dOt,'lll8tic. There would understandably be a 
lag between the appearance of unfamiliar phenomena and an adjustment in 
his thinking. He eventually took unprecedented meRsures to meet unpre• 
cedented developments, Yet, there was no adjustment in Hoover's faith, 
which remai~ed constant despite events, determining the degree and emphasis 
of his novel actions. 
In his first attempt to meet the depression he urged that confi-
dence was the key to the situation, After his own prc·crams had been 
ineffective for over two years, and he had suffered defeat at the polls, 
he restated his confidence thesis to the President-elect, Granting Hoover 
a period of time for adjustment, one could not account for an absence of 
basic change in his approach to the depression on the crounds that new 
phenomena did not present themselves or that he did not h9ve sufficient 
time to test his policies pragmatically. 
In the esrly part of 1930 Hoover first .:oved to meet the depres-
sion by calling a conference of business and labor leaders. From the 
conference came promises to maintain wages and production, The govern-
ment was to contribute a one-percent reduction in tr:e incoMe tax and an 
expansion of public works. The response of business tc these announce-
ments did not substantiate tC.e confidence tl•esis. Corporations increased 
dividend rates; new fixed-investment trust and pool managers promoted a 
partial restoration of the bull ~'rket; but production did not gain. In 
May, 1930, the stock-market crashed again; a two-year decline in prices 
26 
and production began, 
During the decline hdustry disregarded its pledge to rraintain 
wages and employment, desperately trying to cut teem faster than prices 
fell. For over a year Hoover accepted the collapse as an inevitable 
liquidation of inflated values that scould be pennitted to run its 
course,27 Wage lossPs during tris period, l9JO-l9Jl, ;rere frcm twelve 
to fifteen bill ion dollars; nevertheless, dividend payments increased 
by between two hundred and three hundred million dollArs.28 These fig-
ures sho...ed, Tug...ell observed, thst business was gambling on a sudden 
end to the depression.29 One could not contend that the decline continued 
because business lacked confidence. 
Hoover clung to his certainty that business would show the way to 
recovery, counting on public-spirited business cooperation. He appealed 
to \~all Street and the commodity exchanges to stop the s>:ort-selling 
which depressed prices to unnaturally low-levels -- appeals to the volun-
tary &:ood will of operators which appeared "timid to t'.e point of absurd-
ity• when the president of the New York Stock Exchange stated to a House 
connnittee trat stock exchanges depended on sc.ort-selling for their very 
26. Rauch, Basil, The History of~~ Deal, 1933-1938, 15. 
27. Rauch, Basil, The History of the~ Deal, 1933-1938, 15. 
28. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthoioxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953· 
29. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Ortr·odoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 
9· 
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existence.3° In the spring of 1932 Hoover blamed measures providing for 
expansion of the currency and direct federal unemployment relief, bills 
which passed the House but not the Senate, for the failure of business 
to regain confidence.31 One could have met ris concern wit:, b,csiness 
confidence at that late date by questionine; his logic; if business confi-
dence stemned from a government favorably disposed tow-drd business, 'lnd 
a confident business was the key to recovery, the events of 1930 and 1931 
should hAve tliminated the necessity of being co~cerned with business 
confidence in 1932. 
By the fall of 1932 Congressional investigations hnd reqealed 
malpractices of bankers, utility magnates, ''nd brokers >!hich, ccmbined 
with He over's failure to take counter m-=asures, caused t.he ;Jt,blic quickly 
0') 
to lose confidence in both business and the President,.J~ 1-loley cor.P:ented 
that the stcrtsic;l"tedness, selfishness, and dishonesty of sO!:le bu:::;iness 
leaders seriously d.R:r.1'1ged confidence ;33 he ~:--eferred to the confide nee of 
business men in eacr. other and public confidence in business men -- not 
confidence in terms of Hoover's thesis. Aceordinr: tc Hoo~1er's view busi• 
ness conduct in a favorable governmental cl:Lmate would be ;JUblic-s.;;irited. 
In reality a spirit of public service did not cl-arg,cterize the cunduct 
30. Rauch, Basil, The History of ~ New~. 1933-1938; "A :rHrket in 
which people rrny buy in the hope of a rise, but in ·,;hich ethers 
expecting a decline may not sell would cease to be a true m'l rket, 
Such a market would give a distorted reflection of the public's opi-
nion of values and could not function [lroperly,• Understanding the 
New York Stock Exchanoe (New York, New York Stock Exchange, 1953) 40. 
31. Rauch, Basil, The History of~ New .J.kll, 1933-1938, 21. 
32. Rauch, Basil, The History .Qf the New Deal, 19]1-1938, 21. 
J3• Maley, Raymond, ~.fter ~Years (New York, E.'l.rper, 1939) 371, 
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of a number of business men; Hoover's thesis, as it wcrked o~t in prac-
tice, me8nt th?t business was confident it could do as it ple2sed with-
out havinc to answer to the p~blic. In t'is connection the assurances 
of Roosevelt, whose electioC~ Hoover cons ide, red the cro,.mint: blow to 
business cc:nfidence, that te intended to cleanse n~d reh"bili tate tre 
econo~ic system acted as a restorative.34 
Tugwell's interpretation of the co'lfidence tr.esis was that, 'The 
business classes h.1ve alw-dys wanted government to 'ins!) ire ccnfidence • 
by being supine.•35 There was, of course, Tugwell pointed out, a the-
oretical rationale for the confidence thesis. Lord Brougham's views in 
the nineteenth century included the idea that, regrettably, nothing 
could be done for the workers directly -- a view which rested on tee 
econor.;ists' dictum tlat frighte:>ed capital would sto>J hiring labor; 
Tugwell suspected "that the '"hole wages-fund doctrine of the classical 
ecoccomists was shaped to this policy of 'avo:dance. ,,3b Andrew 14ellon, 
Coolidge's Secretary of the Treasury, restated the doctrine as the 
•trickle-down• theory: shift taxes to the poor, nnd the we.3lth of the 
relieved rich v/Ould find its way downward; (perhaps 'I'uc:well's version 
was not a:J. entirely fair statement of the tl•eory); Eueene !Ceyer, Governor 
34· ~loley, Roeymond, After Seven Years, 371. 
35· Tugwell, R, G., 'The Directive.• Journr.l £[Social Philosoph" and 
Jurisprudence, Vol. 7, No. 1, October, 1941, 21. 
36. Tugvrell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy o!' Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
8; Soule, George, Men, \~ages ~ Employment in the Modern U. S. Economy 
(New York, New American Library, A Mentor Book, 19511) 8-lJ, briefly 
summarizes wage theories fer the layman. 
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of the Federal Reserve Board reiterated Mellon's t~eory in advocating the 
creat ivn of the Reconstruct ion Finance Corporation, of , .. ,~~ ich he became 
chairman; the "trickle-down" t"eory, Tugwell noted, 
••• would crop up a little later as "business co:1fidence• 
and be presented all over again as t'oough it had not been 
refuted a hundred times in theory and practice.37 
Tugwell observed th'l.~ Roosevelt's rE,jection of the confidence 
thesis meant that business wculd not be able to do as it pleased while 
hardly accounting to anyone. Roosevelt's attitude did not involve the 
intention of persecuting business; business in'"erpreted the loss of its 
privileged position as persecution. There were 
37· 
J8. 
••• endless charges by newspaper publishers that the 
administration deliberately sought to "destroy confi-
dence.• It was true trat confidence of several sorts 
was lacking; but w'.at was meant by the newspapers was 
the confidence of business that it would be treated as 
it had been up to 1929 - that it mig' t be !'e2ssured 
concerning its "liberties.• An indictmerot of the admini-
stration which carried great weight in :niddle-class minds 
was the unwillingness of corporations to undertake new 
ventures or to expand old ones so lo~g as such indicative 
measures as the undistributed profits tax or the corpor-
ate 1:ains tax •,rere part of the New D.8al a;:>paratus. It 
was ctarged that this unwillingness proved that the profit 
system was being destroyed. 
It was never the inte:1tion of Presid•mt Roosevelt to 
destroy confidence; but if confidence depended on willing-
ness to acquiesce in all the practic"s cf business, he may 
have felt and even said, privately, that the price asked 
was too high, and such suggestions, however cautious, get 
around. In l9JJ, there had emerged no specific hint of 
tolerance and lacking t!'".at the business community juclged 
that it was to be ~rea ted with uniform intolerance .38 
Tugwell, R. G.' "The Progressive Ortroiloxy of Franklin D. Roose-
velt," 7-8. 
Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rbe of Business, • Part II, 
491; it was this judgment, according to Tugwell, which led to the 
formation of the Liberty League. 
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If business had reacted otherwise to Roosevelt's attitude, Tug-
well still would have rejected Hoover's cor.fidence thesis. Assuming 
effective (investment-inducing) business confidence fo::- purposes of dis-
cussion, Tugwell rejected the belief that "business recovery• was the 
one panacea for the depression. He saw no evidence t"9t advocates of 
business recovery weighed the basic consequences or teccnology. There 
was scant recognition of human deterioration, W: ich had increasingly 
affected the unemployed, among those who were obsessed with this "speci-
ously simple 'recovery' formula • attractiv•9 because it appears to avoid 
the necessity beth for thoucht and reform.•39 
Inaction 
Govern."llent pol icy, as determined by Eocver' s confidence t~'esis, 
fell roughly into a sequence of a period of inaction followed by action. 
The thesis not only determined the timing of govern."!lent act ion, but also 
its nature. Durine the initial period of ir.action, Tucwell became exas-
perated at Hoover's failure to take counter measures arainst steady eco-
nomic decline. While the United States remained tte only m'3.jor nation 
1 
wt ich waited for "natural" forces to bring about reccve!"J•- Tugwell worked 
out his criticism of the administration. He finally expressed his exes-
peration in print early in 1932 in an article and a pamphlet in ,,!".ich he 
39· Tugwell, R. c., Address, •Relief and Reconstruction," National 
Conference of Social Workers, Kansas City, Hissouri, J.'l.ay 21, 1934; 
in The Battle ~ Democracy, 309. 
1. Lindley, Ernest K., Halfway with Roosevelt (New York, Viking, 
1937) 32. 
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reviewed public policy in the depression up to thc;t point •2 
Tue••ell saw the reason for Hoover's failure to take relief mea-
sures at the outset of the decline in the President's belief that every-
thing was all rigrt or \vas about to be. In l9JO Hoover described the 
decline as a dislocation, an adjustment. In l9Jl he clune stubbornly to 
t"e European interpretation, althcurh he admitted t~at tl:ere had been 
wild speculation and stock promotion and loose and extrevagant business 
met rods with harmful effects; Tugwell CO!Ml<cnted, recording this admis-
sion, t"~-:at if such abuses hAd been our only disasters, recovery ,NDuld 
have occurred "months ago." Tugwell also noted tl:c,t later ir:> the same 
speech in w'• ic:C he cited business abuses, Hoover voiced a "lyric en co-
mium 11 of' business men.J 
Tugwell asserted thc1t Hoover had had. arr.ple opportunity to test his 
policies empirically. The overriding facts were trgt tre depression con-
tinued to deepen; there was a vast increase in unemployment and a syste-
matic reduction in waees. Yet Hoover stood by his policy, op;oosing all 
attempts to do anythinE more or different. In time he became sc sensi-
tive in his fenr that legislation might imply a reversal of cis doctrines 
that this phobia did a good deal to prevent action of any sort:· "He is 
afraid of action anywhere."4 
2. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy {New York, John Day, 
19J2); Tugwell, R. G., Cutler, A. T. ar1d l>litchell, G. s., "Flaws 
in the Hoover Economic Plan," Current History. Vol. 35, No. l~. Janu-
ary, 1932; Link, Arthurs., American Epoch {New York, Enopf, 1955) 
708, called ~.r. Hoover's Economic Policy a •se·,rchine criticism.• 
3· Tugwell, R. G., MJ:. Hoover's Economic Policy, 111-15. 
4• Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 11. 
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It is interesting to note that years after the heat of the crisis 
a competent commentator wee, hnving served under r'lr. Hoover in the Depert-
ment of Commerce, had enjoyed an excellent op;>ortunity to observe the 
President, confinned Tugwell's reference to Hoover's personality problem 
and its resultant inaction: 
I doubt whether the world ever understood the depth of 
Hoover's shyness th2t teen amounted to an in'ensely 
morbid fear of adverse criticism. It persistently 
blocked !::is execution of plans repeatedly evolved by 
his rare vision and power of projection, This WB.s, I 
think, the essential reason Why he never realized, for 
the lasting bettennent of his country, upon his unique 
combination of mental, spiritual, and humane qualities, 
his technolocical msteries, and his knO\·Iledce of the 
world • s 1 ife. P..n obscure defect in person.<:Jl·l t~, not in 
character, proved a rr.Bjor national nisfortune.) 
Tugwell agreed that human suffering had an intense rneani'1c for Hoover. 6 
Hoover's defects certainly '.<ere not ones of' character. His mental capa-
city was not deficient, even if the specific content of !-is tho'J[ht WAs, 
in Tug,-~ell' s view, inapplicable to a new are. Ideas cnn crance -nore 
quickly than pter-sonality in the face of ne•• data; !!cover did fcrmul.ate 
new policies. Ho,,;ever, his forrm.1lations did not result in action by the 
federal government until October, 1931, when, after twc y~ars of' industrial 
depression and finenciel strain, he "finally Rnd perhaps reluctantly took 
steps. • 7 
As for Hoover's "technoloeical masteries, '' his encm...:ral_·ement of 
5. ',vehle, Louis B., Hidden Threads of Historv: \iilson trrcugh Roosevelt 
(New York, JV'acmillan, 1953) 87. 
6. Tug,rell, H. G., ''The Protagonists: Roosevelt a"!ld Hoover," Antioch 
Review, \>linter, 1953·54, 429. 
7. Tugwell, R. G., "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 525. 
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t~e trade-as~ocjaticn :rcoverr.ent reflected J-1is ,·,WJrePess of +:l-'_e intecr3t-
in£ effects of scier~tific e-.dv:1nce. Yet, "rur~.ve::.l !:As st:.!.t:ed, Foc,vcr 
.. ,,..as, in f:.~1 e.lm.ost irr.pos~:iblf?. sense, unfi."Ware of the t::reo;":t ct:rre::t. ::-·ettine_: 
i:-1 tovmrd secial inter~'!'""'tl"on," 8 mt.. • t f"' 11' ' t · 
- L> C1 u;€ £18 0 -Uf\\"E"- .S 0C2erva.1Cn WRS 
the,t Hcover t:!lderestir:r~ted the stren£th of :f'(~rce.s for inte[_'Yation, co~1-
sequently f.gi.lin£ to realize tr:at coordin-3ticn t·nsed cr. spo:r..tn':'leCt.;.S 
busi!'less a.cticn, •nithcut q ch3n£e in the <:;fficial ccvernmer.t e.ttitude 
to1::ard co!!1bi!1atjo!1. ,.f<:-ls inadequate to the cc::_t;-(il cf intetrAtint fcrces. 
In the !'Bee cf th8 revived c.-.!Dpetiticn of tr-e pe:;~c,.. of' econo:-r:ic decline, 
coordination stern.mj_ ll£ frorr. the trade assoeiGt icr:s trek-:.- Cl c,·,·::q irr.pc.,rtant 
b1..:.s iness !'epresent~t i v·es re:;,tc_ested covernn:ent sponsc:!':'s!-~ i.p c-f' coo;erqt j ve 
efforts. 
Tue:well asserted t~?_t EooYer's cc 'ldt:ct in '*::l-·e rn'es~dent:!.el cf'fice, 
in 3dditio:-: tc its .sdve!'se effects on the eco"'r-:·my, ~:"'d sericu2 imr1licR-
tic.~:1.s for tr-e functicrlint: of rovernment. The traditiv:-1 est::b1:!..shed 
d.urinl t!:e administrations of furdin[ and Cr_olid[e vns cne cf a we2k 
£OVern.."TTent in Tflash i net C!1, w~ ich r;ave business CC·:t'f' ider:ce. 9 I!: r_ is fBi 1 ure 
to get, Hoover cerried en i:1 t.~1is tradition ~ . ;'it'-1 o:tn "aLmost ,-~uixotic intre-
pidity;" he was 
••• not eYen afr3id tc present the ,spectacle of a c~ ief 
executive "ir.o passio!"'.s.tely desires1o 1i~itat3..cn of the fur:ct l ons belone;ing to !'':is office. 
8. Tugwell, R. G., 11 The Prc[ressive Crthor.loxy of Fra~:kli!! :J. Rocsevelt,"2. 
9. '!'u£well, R. G~, "The New Deal: ~he Rise cf Business," P3rts I and II, 
'.lfestern Political 'uarterly, Volume 5, Nos, 2 a'ld J, Ju"e and September, 
1952. 
10. Tucwell, R. G., !1£. Hoover's Economic Policy, 20. 
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At the end of iJir. Hoover's administr:gtic:-1 t~_f're •.-Jas ~anrer­
cusly little left of rcvernmental pov1er as .scch, and 1,rithin 
the covernment little prestige left in the presidency _11 
Kinds of Action: Lippmann's ~hesis 
Hoover eventu?.lly drcpped e policy of inact"!c-:1 !JS the .. sh~er 
\-?eig'ht of disaster~· hAd its effect,.1 The linds of :r..,ast:.res he s:ponsored 
const:. tuted a departure from his belief t':Et gover'1merct s'oould not ercter 
the econcrr..ic sphere beyond ler:dinc: encourncement t;c bt;.Si!'less in indirect 
ways. The e.bandonme~t of lois::::ez-faire by e. rr:r':_7"l '-'r!-o, e:r.:ceptj_';l.C ~is ~d-
vocacy of :J.nti-trust measures, was a110ng the fcrP::~o~t pro~:.cnents c-f ~c·n-
inter-vention, moved 'lalter Lip~nn to exrlain the cr.3n.ge in the Presi ... 
dent's attitude. 2 In n brilliant, closely reasor:Ed essay Lippmann 
accounted for the change as the loe:ica1 re·actlon of e !'espcnsible public 
official to new fcrces which rendered adhErence to traditional doctrines 
an academic matter., 
Lcokine back frcm the year 1935, Lipp:nar!~ noted tr.ct it 'ced been 
clearly estAblished "that eovernment must hencefu!'tr: c.cld itself consci-
ot.:sly respcnsible for the maintenance of the standPrd of li~e prevailing 
amone the people.•J 'I're ability to protect the j:opular stac:dard of life 
he.d become an indispensable c<ndition of toe st:rviv31 of rolitic.el insti-
tuticns; tr.ere had been no ccnscious decis:ior~ tc 2ccept the responsibility 
-- it was forced upoP.. Ecover and Roosevelt ur:der the compt.:.lsion of the 
11. Tugwell. R. c .• "The New Deal: The Declinf' of GoYernment," Part I. 
Western Political Juarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2. June, 1951., 301. 
1. Tugwell. R. c .• Mr. Beever's Eco:Iomic Policy (New York, Jchn Dr~:,', 
1932) 14. 
2. Lippmnn, ',va1ter, ~ ~ ln:perotive (New Yc-rk, ~bcmlllan, 1935). 
J. Lippmann, Walter,~ New Imperative~ l. 
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cr1s1s. With practice preced5.ng thecry. "m!':·?.sures ·~.·ere t.3ken •"*dch 
have r..o warrant whatever in the philosoph.~, o!' those who tock t:hem."5 
After his cpenine statements, Lipprr..2nn rest~t.ed the gist of ~is 
ccnter..tion: the~ principles and functions of ;cvernment co:r.rnon to 
both Hoover and Rocsevelt ~ chanfeS due to histcrical !'crces, trans-
cending individuals and parties.6 Reasoning f'rcm t~,is thesis •rrculd, 
Lippreann 9.sserted, offset the general imp:-e~.sto:;. t~·~c!t the two adrn.infs .. 
tratio:1s were radically different, havin[ nc~.l-line i-r.-p', rtar:t 1!1. ccrrmon.7 
The brel3k "'i th the pAst o~curred in t~e fall of 1929 -- :~ct cr. r.1grch i., 
8 19JJ• Heaver did more t.han "merely seAk to cre':.~t"= 11n at~•OS?~Pre cf CC:-!-
fide:J.ce ••• he intervened Bt every point :~n t!;-? "1~i"t-~o:-:,Jl ecc <::m:;,r where 
he felt "';het so ·.ething needed to be drne." 9 Ee 8bandcmed the ;>rinciple 
of laissez•faire ·.-~ith regard to the husiness cycle, sponsorjne- "inclu-
sivP and persistent .. experimentation before r.r:arch, 1933.10 
In Lipprna.nn's view Roosevelt's pro[ram evclved frcm 5cover•s. 
amountine: to a continuity in principle. Both derived from the unprece• 
dented doctrine that governme!"lt is responsible for t'be reneral standard 
ll 
of life. \1-rh.en the acceptance of this doctrine cccurred, there was 
almost no comment -- no ct.allenre en the cround.s of il"!_tU.vidual istic 
4· Lippmann, '.Val ter, The lim! Im~rativg, 2. 
5· Lippmann. 't.ralter, Till:~ ImJlerBtive, J. 
6. Lippmann, ~:Ja 1 ter, ~New lm£erat i ve Q 10-11. 
7. Lippmann, \.ral ter, Till:~ Im;Qerat i ve ~ 11. 
8. Lippmann~ Walter, "'he New Imoera t i ve"' 12. 
9· Lippmann, ~..ralter. The New L-rnEerativ~n lJ. 
10. Lippmann, 11VA l ter, ~~ Im£era t i ve, lJ-14. 
11. Lipprrenn, 1.'fP.lt.:r. The~ Im}2erative, lh. 
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tradition or accepted limitations on federal 12 In his acceptance 
speech of AuEUst 11, 1932, on being renominAted, Hoover summ•rlzed his 
measures; the absence of criticism of eovernme:.t 3ctiYity in the econo-
mic sphere could not have been the result of any ef.forts by the <>dmi ni-
stration to ccnceal its position. Hoover fortl:ric1··tly prcclaimed his 
his "unprecendented measures to meet the unprecedented vi.elence of the 
stonn:" 
',1e mipht have done nothing. Thet would rcve been utter ruin. 
InsteRd we met the situation witr. proposAls to private business 
and Congress of the most gigantic profrmc of economic defense 
1 
~ 
and count.er-attac~ ever evolved in the history· of the republic . ..J 
Hoover explained how he had gotten the leaders of business, labor, 
and agriculture tc uphold wages until the cost of l i v"!.nr beca'Ile >idjusted. 
He cited the spreadine; of employment tr,rOllfh the adcptio~C of shorter 
hours. The President pointed out that ad11ance constructlc·n work, public 
and private, hPd cotten underway in anticipntion of future needs. Thf· 
federal povernment had expended $600,000,000 in cc'1struction and public 
works; it had loaned to the states for relief $1,500,000,000 for self-
supporting works. ("Relief.," in Hoover's Yiew. did not include direct 
federal c, id to the unemployed.) The rovernment h3d also extended crecit 
to strengthen the position of the Federal Land Banks, farmers coopera-
tives., and homeowners. The Reconstruction Finance Corpor"'dtion was set 
up with $2,000,000.000 capital. Finally, the powers and functions of 
12. Lippmann, Walter, The New ImpHative, 15. 
13. Lippmann, '•'~alter, The New Imperative, 15-16. 
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the Federal Reserve Banks were expanded tc co,ntera ct credit shrinkage 
due to feer, coardinf, and foreicn withdl~wals. For the imm~dinte 
future, Hoover hoped to retrench on no!'l!>'ll rovernmPnt expenditures while 
increasing taxes.1 ti 
Hoover's program ccnta5ned all the i".Ore specific princinles of 
Rooseve 1 t 1 s. Lippmann concluded, listing the common tl·1emes in detail. 
Hoover's fiscal policy included a reduction of normal expenditures of 
e;overnment; extraordinnr'J expenditures not covered by taxation were to 
be met by deficit financing. 15 There was an expa'lsion of :mblic works 
to create employment-- pump priming.16 Federal J:elief •~s to apply to 
situations in which loc£11 or private relief was imldeq,nte, 17 ')'J·.e; ccv-
ernrnent assumed responsibility for eorrect i ng "disparity," seeking to 
f l . 18 pee farm prices and u:rgine armers to cur·~ai .;)rc duct1on. '!'he 
encouragement of industrial cooperation in the ado1)tion of coa~non poli-
cies on waees, hours, and capital investmtmt foreshadowed the NRA, 19 
which was the equivalent of Hoover's trade-o.s~~ociati:m :r..ovemP:'lt exemrted 
from the anti-trust lar..Ts and extended to previously une>rgnni.zed 
?0 [TOt:.ps.-
Lippm:~nn dwelt ot lenrth on Hoover's monet~~r'I r·:licy, ~ s:[l1ifi-
cant m'9t•:er s~:1ce Eoove:r lo.te-r asserted th~1t nccsevelt 's !""'nilure to 
ll;. Lippmnn, ~.vn~_te:r, ~ New Im12£rat i ve, 13. 
15. l.ippr.1RrJn, 'dalter, ~ New I'1lQerat i ve, l9. 
lb. Lippmann. ·;/olter, The New Im:2erntive, ]_ 9. 
17. Lippmann, ';/alter, ~~ ImJ2:£rative, 19. 
18. Lippmann, 'tln.lter, ~New Im12crati ve, 19. 
19. Lipprnann. ~'lel ter, The New ImpP.rative, 19. 
20. l.ippmo1nn, ~.va ~ ter, ~ New Im:12erat i ve • 26. 
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assure business there would be no currency manipulation destroyed busi-
ness confidence, cutting short aa incipient movement toward recovery. 
Hoover sought to counteract deflation by a deliberate policy of inflat-
ing the base of credit.21 He was as,,eager as Roosevelt to halt the 
general deflation and to effect a reflation, "Nor did he hesitate to use 
monetary measures sometimes called 'currency tinkering.••22 Open-
market operations in the Federal Reserve System and a lowering of dis-
count rates expanded the base of credit,23 Aside from the details of 
currency management, the general principle that the regulation of the 
purchasing power of money was a function of public authority was here 
to stay.24 
Interpretation of Lippmann's thesis -- the new principles and 
functions of government common to both Hoover and Roosevelt were changes 
due to historical forces, transcending individuals and parties --yielded 
conclusions which Lippmann himself did not necessarily accept, His 
references to forces which required action in similar directions by dif-
ferent administrations did not purport to evaluate in detail the compara-
tive efficacy of the measures of Hoover and Roosevelt, Some supporters 
of Hoover deduced from Lippmann's assertion, that Roosevelt's program 
evolved from Hoover's, that full credit for the New Deal belonged to 
Hoover; this view, of course, contradicted Republican statements that 
21, Lippmann, Walter, The New !mperative, 19, 
22. Lippmann, Walter, The New Imperative, 20. 
23. Lippmann, Walter, The New Imperative, 20, 
24. Lippmann, Walter, ~New Imperative, 23. 
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the New Deal was a "wicked apostasy,•25 At the same time, giving Hoover 
credit for the New Deal contained a confusing •grain of truth," which 
disturbed Democrats who were eager to claim beneficent originality.26 
Hoover himself was inconsistent on the fundamental ~uestion of 
governmental responsibility for the popular standard of life. In a cam-
paign speech in Newark, New Jersey, in 1928, he stated: 
This recovery and this stability are no accident. It has 
not been achieved by luck Lbut through7 sound government 
policies and wise leadership •••• 27 
In his message to Congress in December, 1930, Hoover reversed his posi-
tion: 
Economic depression cannot be cured by legislative action 
or by executive pronouncement.28 
Six months later, in June, 1931, the President again asserted the gov-
ernment's responsibility for general economic welfare: 
We have assured ~i£7 the country from panic and from its 
hurricane of bankruptcy by coordinated action between the 
Treasury, The Federal Reserve system, the banks, the Farm 
Loan and the Farm Board system.29 
There is no ~uestion that Hoover shattered precedent in the area 
of government action affecting the economy. The contradictions involved 
in interpretations of his measures stemmed from overneat applications 
of logic to social developments. Human affairs seldom lend themselves 
25. Wecter, Dixon, The Age of the~ Depression, 1929-1941 (New 
York, Macmillan, 1948) 55. 
26. Wecter, Dixon, The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941, 55· 
27. Angly, Edward, ed., Oh Yeah? (New York, Viking, 1932) 10. 
28. Angly, Edward, ed., .Qh ~?, 15. 
29. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 23. 
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to rieid, locical descr~ption a!ld explanation; "La verite e~ en les 
nuGnces.rr 7l:e differences between the pr,::gra,.,s of Hoover ond Roosevelt 
were differences in timin.r:. degree, and emp~asis -- dissimiluri.ti.es 
which amounted to a diffe::-ence in kind, Hoover did "ct co:r.hine with 
his dep~rture frcr.1 precedent the creaticn cf instruments vd~=q_uate to 
the new respo:tsib:.lJt:es covernrnent as~·umed; he left !:imself in 2 dif· 
ficult :-·:olf-wa,;r position. In fairness to Hoover, cw2 must rec::..'[nize 
that it would huve been a [;reat de(ll to e:xpect, P:S historical develop-
ments go in a fundamentally evolutionary Eoc::.et:.r, th:~t h~?. beth ass,...une 
the gcvernroontal responsibilities which new forces required qnj_ ~t the 
same ti:ne create in detail effective instruments adeq:>ate tc, :~ew tasks. 
Lipprna:1n Y.~S fLlly ~ware of Hoover's diffict;lties, illustratine 
them with specific exac:1ples. With regard tc fa= policy, r'e noted that 
Hoover ad vi sed the farmers to curtail pre duct io:o, >r'1 ile Roosevelt 
'>Q 
offered pa:;/Tnents in addition to advice • ..J T:1 tr.c field of benkinc, 
Hoover's administratio~, i.n practice, assume1 tr,e rit:ht to rer.\:1-:te the 
volume of credit; it did net formally and clearly nvow t"is richt as WlS 
done in New Deal banking legislation)1 Hoover's createst diffic~lty 
was monetary mangement. There had been mooetary :oonaccm,?nt since World 
':lar I; Hoover, and Roosevelt, chanced the :onceptio:l cf' wh"t the object 
of such 1mnagement should be. Previoc,sly it \-laS held t!:st the dominant 
JO. 
Jl. 
Lippmann. 
Lipprmnn, 
'tlal ter, 
'llal ter, 
The New 
The New 
Imperative, 
Imperative, 
purpose of manege~ent s'ould be stabiloty in terms of cold, Hoover 
suplJorted the preva ling C0!1cept; !'-:owever, he ?..lsG desired tc :'~culnte 
the currency in +.erms of purchasin[ p wer.J? 
'tlhen the value of cold changed viol<>ntly b<0t.wee:1 1929 nnd l9J3, 
in terms of purcf-.3sinc po:-.rer. Roosevelt !~ba:ldG:-!ed stability in terms 
of gold in order to actieve ccntrcl cf "thn value cf ~he .'icllr>: in terms 
of purchasint:: pC\oJer33 -- a move 1-.rhich ~U£well c:..:!1sidered a necessDry 
n'3.tior~A}.jstic act:c-n. Hoover atte-:npted to rec~:l:--lte the internal ve:lue 
of tr~ dollar; Roosevelt undertook, in adC.itio:'1, rert·lr'l~io:: of t~e 
<4 
externa 1 value ...... 
Dixon ',1/ecter, in corr.ment inc on Lipp!Mnn • s beak as a sonrce for 
+.::re Brcum.<]nt that HooYer "WaS the "unackno....,rledt_:ed sire of tre New De.al," 
observed thRt "like most piquant paradoxes it icnores a number of thinc:s." 
He contrasted Hoover's reluctant caution in RdC9tir:..[: sc ·~ :r.ec.sures with 
Roosevelt's zest fer experiment and innovation. Hocver ados:.ted temporary 
expedients; Roosevelt fcrmuV1ted a pennanent blnepr) r.t for refe>rrn A.S 
well as recovery,. Hoover's basic reliance W9S on indi,rirJual self-covern-
nent; RoosE'velt resorted to leg8l compulsion. Finnlly, Hoover saw the 
campai£n as a co:ttest between two philoso~~1ies of r:o~.rerf'l.m?nt; Roosevelt 
J2. Lipp;nann, Walter, The New Imperative, 22. 
33· Lippnnnn, ~.1/8-lter, ~New Imperative, 2?. 
Jlt. Lippm3nn, '1/alter, The New Imperative, 20; whe:1 the t'nHed Stntes re-
turned to stability in terms of gold tn l9JL~. the f..l!leric9n :1rice 
level once aeain ca~:1e under the distu:::-binc ~nf1uer:ce of' the insta-
bility of cold itself, Lipprrenn, 'J!Rltt~r. The New 1:..-:p~~qtive. 2?. 
saw it as a dilemm1 betwePn two theories of pros~:cr:t.y -- tr~~,-- trickle-
down A:1d the risinc-up dcctrines.J5 
In practice, ~~~lecter noted, Roosevf•lt's v~ev.• :'1P,Jnt -t.~_8+- covern-
ment sh.ould rct-ulate wealth more firmly, taxinc ;:refits end incc~.e while 
spendinr .... ,o~e freely for the corrroon man's benefit; "~-·.ras it," ~.·Teeter 
inquired, "the business of £Cvernment to do thF>se thincs? Herein lay 
the essence of their disacreement •• 36 
read, "~-·!as it tl-te b~siness of government to do t~c t: i!1£S which imple-
men ted Roosevelt's theory of pres peri ty?" Si!lce HoC'ver initinted gov-
ernment Rction in 9ccorda!'lce with his own t'-eor~_r of prr_.'Sper:t?, the 
fundamental questio!'l C'f f:Overnme!lt action was settled -- it was now a 
m:'3.tter of kind and decree. Hoover, howevE~r, was si'1cere in ris belief 
the.~ two philoso;;hies of gcvernment, and not two t::ecri.es of :prosr-erity, 
were in co~".flict. His t~eory of prosperity placed ';1:alifj cati.o:1s on 
covern.-rnent ac-t:.ion; these t}t:.alificat)ons, r;:•_lttc:.,fh closely TP:2.2ted in 
ori£in and nature to his eco "mic thoupht, a::.r1m~nted in ris !!;.in.~i to a 
philosophy of government -- des;:li te Roosevelt's bas~ c belief', sir:::i lar to 
Hoover • s, t:!lat rovernmer..t stot.;ld sustain capi t['ll ism. 
In Tuc,.,.ell's view, Hoo"rer was not perr..itted to assien !:is econo-
mic ~nd political tr:eories to separ2te corr.pertments. Ecove!" 1s pl--_ilosophy 
of covernrne!1t initially delayed action; then it fostered P certain kind 
35· '.'lecter, Dixon, ~Age of lli Great Deprtession, 1929-19/;l, 55-56. 
36. Wecter, Dixon, The Ape of~ Great Denression, 1929-l9cl, 56. 
of ?.ction --all in consonance witl-1 a particuJ:.r sehc,cl 0f' econo.:::ic 
thcueht .. Turwell did not A~ply· his ability f'c)!' so ,l,i_stj-:;3ted re2scnin[ 
to fjne ~h:ilosophical C}.Uestions which sot~r::ht ~o ~etermi!'.P Rt w+:at l'oint 
diffe·:--e~ces in d~cre~- and tirninc beca::1e dif~ere:tc.es ; .... kir.d ... He assumed 
tf'.8t the 1uestion of fOYernment actio., WE"3 sP.ttl,...:i .. ~f~c~-rdj:;C Hocver•s 
e.ctions, he !'18:le the plnj_n, ~:raclM.t~c jude.ment +'-J:"':: "what •,m::;; C!.cne ·t~as 
toe lqte nnd too feeble •• 37 
'!'ugwell mi(r·t r-'JVe fo:..md. on close"'" exar.;.in"'lt:o:'.. !'~om r; philoso-
ph ical stendpoint, certnin fundamental sir~d l1~ri t, ies bPt'*-'ePn t;};e two 
Presidents. Roth Hoover and Roosevelt f,qY·.Jred ec:vernment ::cticn tc im~le-
:nent their respective theories cf pros9er:~ty. Tre ji_ffe!ences in these 
tl-:ecries rem1_lted in different kinds of aetion. Rccsevet.t dj:J not differ 
from Hoover in ~is philosophy of eovernmcnt in t!>•.:- ~~ 1-:>r.-le:rt.g l 'ir::.:.y the.t 
the latter thoucht re did. Eoover, limited in action, it is true, by his 
eco·1omic thourht, souc~t. to aid the peo-ple indir0ctly by cfferjn,e 1irect 
aid Bt th~ top .,._ by promotinV "confidenCE! 11 thr01.J~:·:: i!1f!Cticn nr t:.r e:ctin[" 
eovernr.tent 0 pos~tive i"1strument for brincinc :d·:~ .J.i!'"Ctly to -'111 +,!":.e 
people -- r~lief :r:c~sures C~ccnmp~nied the t:!cti_v:ty c-f the ?."H',C. Both 
were ~n tl1e capit-:dist +.r:v3iti.on, ready to hr~!"":C zcve!"nrr:e--_t tc the g_id of 
the ca~lit-1list systere • 
. ~.id ~t "the '!'op 
Tucwell %'!3s~rted tf·_;"t, Hocver's ecor·c:r:ic ;1---ilc:.--·c;~~' resu:.ter1 ir~ 
J?. Tug1.ofell, R. C., "[\·Ir. Hoc·ver• s Eco!1omic Pol icy, J_}_]., 
161;. 
deductive reasorli.ng \{/':icr-_ initially dela;red -?c"tion, and subse1uently 
determined the kind of f!cticn taken. Hoover rc:0SV!ie::.1 th.:::t s~nce our 
institutions were basically sound, there 'd3S no !leed for re\:onst.ruc-
tion -- o'!l.ly " need to restore ccnfi::ience in 0ur in::titut~cp_s .'")r.d 
l 
neutralize the effects of f'creicn i:;fl"ence. n0l:rir:::· on hi . .::: cc::tfidence 
thesis, Hoover rr:r1de the "si.nple contribution +;o t'~-.e ·i1''0le >rr.,blem of 
depression 0nd unemployrr.e::Jt in the first two y~=-,~J.!'s," ""ur·'rle11 protested, 
of callinc: toeether ce!'t3in business leAder3, p;eechi.~r ~c +hem te~m-
? 
;...rork ~rd "'= so:ld8rity of social interests.- ~ventt:·,:lly the ~;"Jeer pres-
sure of events broufht the PrPsident to act. at l~st .J 
In Turwell 1 s vie,..; Peever's r""·medial uc"tic:-n becnn t~t tl-:e "top" 
o:f the eco ..... cmy, to tte neclect of the "botton." ~-:~r!"ec.-t:lv~ -~!cticn h~d 
to apply tc beth. 'fucwell meant by "top" a:1d "bottc~~·! prod;.;cti~te 
enterprises e.nd fin.::Jnc::a.l :institutions on the c::c 'r··ar.d., and purchasinc 
po\wr on the other. Aid co:1f:ined to the ~cp reprf:t>ented to Tucv.rell 3 
one-sided approach to gn -:~dl-inclusive pr(.:.ble::-1. Eccver, ~c·.mver, CV.:"~-
sidered business the orit;in2.l source of pres peri. ty; ~_:ct ion · ... rl: =:_c!-: [?.VC' 
co!lfi_ien.ce to business wct~ld brine nbout reccYer:_.·-. Tht:.:.s ~r.e Pres~dent•s 
measures bef-)3D, and ess8ntially rew.ined, at --~ r: tCl-' cf tLe ecutcr.:y. 
Ir.. labelinb Hoover's ideas en pclit·:cal ecc::,c:-::.~-- +;.~ eclccy-like, 
Tue~nell 'lid not bcse his opinion on philosc~~hical ::_:rcur~.d[.. :r.. 1'-'T. Hoover's 
l. Tugwell, rt. G • • rJ.r. Hocver•s Economic Pol i CJ' (New vork., JG~n "Jcy 
l9J2) lb. 
'2. Tucr...re~l. n. ~ Hr. Hoover's 1<:coC!cmic Pol:cy, 11. v., 
3· Tuewell, R. G • • l-lr. Hoover's Economic Pol i c·.r, 1_5. 
Economic Policy and Flaws ln the Hoover Economic Plan,4 Tugwell pre-
sented the economic analysis on which his criticism of administration 
policy rested. He reviewed the economic developments of the period 
1921-1929, noting that as profits increased, the values of eoods, real 
estate, and securities became inflated. There was no equivalent growth 
in the purchasing power of consumers. The crash of 1929 and the con-
tinuous deflation which followed meant that values had to retreat if 
goods were to issue from the industrial process priced so that their 
purchase was possible with the available funds of consumers. Events 
required a policy of deflation of capital values, securities, retail 
prices, and industrial "excresences• such as advertising and huge re-
serves.5 
In other words, Tugwell referred to the harmful effects of the 
•stickiness" of oligopolistic industrial pr:ces. He believed that a 
drop in prices, at the outset of the depression, as purchasing power 
declined, would have enabled enough actual purchases to prevent a con-
tinuous decline, providing a base on which to build a recovery program. 
Since capital values reflected prices, a drcp in prices wculd have re-
quired a corresponding decrease in values. 
In the article in Current History Tugwell pointed out that values 
represented a capitalization of prospective earnings from industrial 
4• Tugwell, R. G., Cutler, A. T. and Mitchell, G. s., "Flaws in the 
Hoover Economic Plan," Current History, Vol. 35, No. 4, January, 1932. 
5· Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Econgmic Policy, 24. 
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and land holdings; eArnings depended on prices. Lower prices consequently 
required a decline in the values of stocks, bonds, and mortgages, Such 
a movement, Tugwell observed, hPd actually been underway since the start 
of the depression; producers and banks, however, fought the decline in 
values •step by step." Msny industrialists sacrificed volume of sales 
in order to maintain nominal prices,6 
Hoover, who was against government intervention in the economy, 
"caused such intervention to be set up as would support all these falling 
indexes.•7 Tugwell asserted that through all of Hoover's measures ran 
"the theme of 'restoring confidence.• All are intended to support 
values which have presumably declined too fecr.•8 Tugwell then sumnar-
ized the administration's views on domestic ills which accounted for the 
kind of action Hoover sponsored: fear threatened the American banking 
structure by driving down values of stocks, bonds, and mortgages held 
by banks -- values which reflected expected future income, which in turn 
depended upon prices; the decline in prices was exaggerated, warranting 
no such drop in security values as had taken place.9 
Tugwell did not agree that the decline in prices was unjustified, 
He believed that lower prices were needed to match diminished purchasing 
power, and •an accompanying decline of capital values would seem 
to be required.• 10 The whole administration program was aimed at supporting 
6. Tugwell, R. G., "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 529. 
7. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic ~. 531. 
8. Tugwell, R, G., 'Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan," 529. 
9· Tugwell, R. G., "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan," 529. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., 'Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 529. 
present values. "The whole policy is calculated to save the banks --
agricultural, commercial, and investment -- which are holding paper 
valuations representing capitalized incomes far above those obtainable 
at present price levels.• 11 
Tugwell reasoned thAt in the end no successful policy could dis-
regard the problem of restoring purchasing power. He stated that to 
support frozen assets was to wager that they would soon be salable at 
higher prices; prudent forecast would look toward revaluation on a lower 
level rather than toward a rise in prices supporting values at any former 
12 level. The confidence thesis failed to answer a key question: if 
the government's credit policy fostered confidence, and confidence re-
sulted in a resumption of production, who was going to buy the new product 
if the goods produced had to be sold at prices which would protect capi-
tal at present valuations?13 
Tugwell supported his general assertion, that Hoover's policies 
were calculated to support artificial capital values, with a detailed 
examination of the specific measures of the administration. Hoover 
announced his six-point plan for relief of the financial situation on 
October 7, 1931, after the banking situation h~d become extremely precari-
ous during the previous month. Two of the six points related to the 
Federal Reserve System, one referred to the Land Banks, and three called 
for new financial machinery -- a revival of the WAr Finance Corporation, 
11. Tugwell, R. G., "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 530. 
12. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 24. 
13. Tugwell, R. G., "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 531. 
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a new bank pool, and a National Credit Corporation, Hoover also had in 
mind two other major credit plana: one, for the rescue of railroad 
bonds, had not been announced yet; the other, announced on November 14, 
was to benefit building-and-loan and real estate operators by the estab-
lishment of twelve home-loan banks,14 
Tugwell concluded that Hoover's •specific measures were mostly 
those which would arrest a deflationary process which was largely psy-
chological,•15 He asserted that the National Credit Corporation and 
the banks which were to liquefy real-estate values were "premised on 
optimism and a dogged faith in the institutions of Coolidge prosperity.• 16 
His final criticism was that Hoover's measures amounted to an attempt 
to protect the privileged.l7 
Tugwell's analysis included more than his description of what was 
done (the protecting of the privileged) and how it was done (through Hoov-
er's specific measures). He offered an explanation of why it was done. 
Briefly his explanation was that •they Lbusiness and financial interesti7 
were Just poor sports,.l8 Behind this brief statement of the reasons 
behind the measures of the Hoover administration lay an elaborate and 
scathing criticism of certain aspects of the American political econo~. 
Tugwell contended that historically business and financial inter-
14. Tugwell, R. G. • •Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan," 528. 
15. Tugwell, R. G • • Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 16. 
16. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 24. 
17. ~ Outlook, Vol, 161, No. 6, March, 1933, 14. 
18. Interview~ writer. 
ests had been able to manipulate government in order to immunize them-
selves from the effects of the depressions which their practices had 
brought on in a large measure. In other words, the influence of busi-
ness in government had been strong enough to separate crime and punish-
ment, Those who had profited in times of speculative spr_ees, which 
ultimately proved disastrous, sought to escape sharing the burden of 
hard times with the rest of the American people. In phrases of "chil-
led steel" Tugwell derided Wall Street, which in the end19 did not 
escape the effects of the 1929 crash, for its leek of sportsmanship: 
The frantic attempts of the administration to rescue the 
financial system from the consequences it delibere.tely 
risked - not for social but for private reasons - approach 
the comic in view of the expressed horror among all these 
gentlemen of "governmental interference' with business. 
What the phrase means, evidently, is that the government 
must not interfere when business is "inning its gamble; 
interference is only legitimate when the gambling devices 
betray the manipulators.20 
The gamblers who now sought government protection, Tugwell con-
tinued, •were always ready to shift the burdens wc·ich they create onto 
the shoulders of those least able to bear them, always unwilling to pay 
the social costs of the policies they have fastened on our people •••• • 21 
He described the attitude of business as a •lamentable_ lack of sports-
manship which has characterized the reactionaries throughout the crisis.• 22 
19. New Outlook, Vol. 161, No. 6, M9.rch, 19_33. 14. 
20. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Discourse in Depression,• Tugwell Papers. 
21. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935; Q§QA Press Release, 14. 
22. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee; USDA 
Press Release, 14. 
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They displayed a "kind of sportsmanship which would rule them out of their 
favorite sports by common consent.• 23 He called the unsporting refusal 
to share, which ran all through the government's emergency action, "re-
gardless of favors of the past ••• the ugliest feature of our system." 24 
The failure of Wall Street to escape the effects of the crash did not 
necessarily refute Tugwell's charge thRt business, until 1933, control-
led government; Wall Streeters' plight may have indicated that the govern-
ment which they controlled could not help save them this time. 
One must bear in mind that in his address "Discourse in Depres-
sion" Tugwell was in a bitter, impatient frame of mind.25 He was expres-
sing discontent with the administration's inaction and one-sided action 
which had been pent up within him for two years. At the same time, one 
must recall that he based his attack, which was unusually emotional for 
him, on a carefully worked-out economic analysis of the causes of the de-
pression. He deplored the inequitable incidence of the burden of the decline: 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
It is quite true in general to say that those who are 
asked to make the greatest sacrifice are those who are 
least entrenched in our social institutions. The 
workers, having lived poorly in prosperity, ,qre asked 
to insure society as a whole by bearing the risks of 
hard times. Insurance, on principle, is only possible 
as a consequence of an accumulation cf surpluses; but 
depression finds the possessors of surplus relatively 
immune; and those who have none at all are asked to 
carry the heaviest burdens.26 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee; USDA 
Press Release, 14. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Discourse in Depression," Tugwell Pa)2ers. 
Interview with writer. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Discourse in Depression ,•• Tugwell Pa12ers. 
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He would not accept the argument that one had to .:;cce?t the 'Jnfortunate 
3Spects of the depression in order to enjoy ic f·cod t i::JPS the benefits 
of the capitalistic system. The nation :ould enjoy the ndvantaecs of 
capitalism without sufferin€ a erossly ine•1uitRble distribution of 
disadvantages: 
••• the ree:irne of laissez-faire, •;ith modifications, mif.ht 
be made to work far more justly than it does at present. 
Even if we are to have periodic stat_:naticn, t'·_at is ::o 
reascn :'or allowine the incidence of dist!'ess tc fall sc 
henv-L:Ly c:-1 tr.e workers as it does nc-,-:; ..-:::lj f'a:rGJ.ers C'J.Lht 
not to be re•lJ-..:ired tc bear the ou.traceous "bu::-J.Pn ~ht;y hRve 
so freq_uen~ly sta[gereJ under. Tl-tere i.s ;!c·t~.inL- i:-1!--:.e:-ent 
i:I laissez-fairc w·f.ich requires tt.e :'ortt.::v·te _f'clk~ of 
society. whose inccwes are sufficient fer ~heir needs .in 
any case, to rna:1ipul:~~te legislqt ic,n in :-~~..:d-: ·.-n:fs e.s ~c 
escape most of the penr1lties involved in a :-:::yste':':'l ~4Lich is 
m:dnt:~:ned tc support their functions nnd to :_;:rr.t.0c~ tl-:eir 
privilAees~ Tl-;is is poor sportsm.-:::J.s":ip.?7 
I!1 con:-;.ecticn ~ ... rttr. his theme of "peer :::;pcrtsrr~nrw· ;pn '":'ucwell :xen-
C \-.r__. .... -.e"" ?2 It \-1!1S :1nt in tfJis co:-:nection. l c :ever. t}<_at ~UD"'.\·ell fc:-:"Tned .-~.ut_ o • _ 
his idea.s on the cold st2nds.rd. He favored ~. depeY'tl;.re frc~:r. t~_c LC'ld 
stAndard if st;ch action ',</"clS necessary for t::~e prcte·.:ticu. ::L2~:-:::.;t for-
levels tc2 a:1d bottom. 
In Tugwell's opini8~ 'b11Si11ess iE":e-':'es-t;s nl.so s::i)'>'!ed po:;r spcrts-
mansl-:ip witt: regnrcl to tr.e farm program. He ~winted out tr.~t 'J-...;si-;ess 
27. Tut:;we:!.l, R. c., Address. Discot:.:!"'S8 in 'Jepressjon." Turwell Papers. 
28. Tugwell, R. G., "?rices and ~oll~rs.'1 in Tl1.!l Battle for Jerr.ocracy, 
!;8. 
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wanted to remain free of control while having its profits guaranteed. 
Business objected to controls because it was able to accomplish its 
objectives without government sponsorship. Business cooperated to 
control its production; it objected when the farmers atten:pted to do 
the same thing. Tugwell stated that the farmers' controllhg their 
production ·,·muld be no different from what business did -- except 
that the farmers would be attaining their ends under government aegis 
with its accompanying publicity.29 
Tugwell was especially critical of the lack of sportsmanship 
displayed by the banking interests, whom Hoover atteropted to protect. 
They were particularly vulnerable to the charge that they wished to 
do as they pleased in good times, and receive government assistance 
in bad times. In 1928 Tugwell protested against manipulations under 
the Federal Reserve Act in the interests of the largest banks, without 
concern for other· interests.3° He observed that the banking system 
was only theoretically above politics; it actually "reflected the cur-
rent administration notion of the government's relation to business." 
The bankers had >mnted some changes, such as the elimination of finan-
cial panics and access to government support in times of trouble. 
They thought the Federal Reserve Act called for too much change; they 
denounced it bitterly. Their fears of what might happen were unjusti-
fied. Within the new structure they were able to carry on as usual.3~ 
29. Tugwell, R. G., "A Fireside Symposium," Columbia University Quar-
terly, Vol. 27, No. 1, March, 1935, 25. 
30. Tugwell, R. G., "Bankers' Benks,• New Republic, Vol. 57, No. 732, 
December 12, 1928. 
31. Tugwell, R. G., •Bankers• Banks," 95· 
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By • good management ,• decentralization, which was to have eman-
cipated the nation from control by New York, was avoided, The big banks 
were •bigger, more powerful, more profitable, and less repressively con-
trolled than ever before.• When non-banking interests sought aid, the 
Federal Reserve System repudiated controlling powers which Tugwell refer-
red to as •easily discerned in the wording of the Act.• He pointed out 
that the System, denying the function of influencing prices, had exer-
cised that function on occasion, In the post-war slump officials of the 
Reserve system said their agency was helpless, being able to act only at 
the initiative of member banks; •the faTmers were allowed to suffer a 
blow from which they never recovered.• When the banks' own interests 
were endangered, the System exercised powers which it did not consider 
available at the time of the farmers' troubles. Tugwell noted that in 
1928, when bankers worried about the worth of the collateral on which 
their loans were made, the System manipulated rediscount rates and 
freely resorted to open-market operations,32 
Tugwell concluded that the banks had a good record as money-making, 
not social, institutions; the nation needed a centralized and managed 
financial mechanism to control other phases of the business cycle 
besides panics, for the protection of all -- not just bankers.33 The 
conduct of bankers which provoked his accusations in 1928 of selfish, 
unsportsmanlike conduct was almost in the nature of misdemeanors compared 
32. Tugwell, R. G., •Bankers' Banks," 95. 
33· Tugwell, R. G., •Bankers' Banks,• 96. 
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to the practices which Congressional investigations revealed in the 
early 1930s)4 
In a syndicated column Tugwell recounted how the speculative boom 
of 1929 was •largely financed through a system of credit loosely con-
ceived •• 35 Banks discovered the elaborate fiction of affiliations for 
speculation with depositors funds, weaving complex nets of finance 
36 through the old lawe. By the use of depositors' funds, securities 
were created and manipulated to the profit of •speculators who pretended 
37 to be bankers.• A former Comptroller-General pointed out that some 
of the worst abuses arose out of the activities of holding companies in 
banking. He stated that their stocks had speculative values far above 
values based on earnings and tangible assets; individual borrowers from 
many banks used the overvalued stock of holding companies as collateral 
security for their obligations.38 With the crash, the credit structure 
based on holding-company stocks quickly collapsed. 
Hoover's basic assumption in aiding the credit institutions was 
that they would be •good sports.• He proposed the National Credit Cor• 
poration in the hope that the strong banks would voluntarily form a 
credit pool to help the weak.39 The big banks, Tugwell noted, rebelled 
34· 
35· 
36. 
37· 
38. 
39· 
Pecora, Ferdinand, Wall Street under Oath (New York, Simon and Shus-
ter, 1939) reports the findings of the Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency. 
Tugwell, R. G., •Banking for the People,• in ru Battle f.2!: ll!!!!!2-
cracy, 30. 
Tugwell, R. G., •Banking for the People,• 30. 
Tugwell, R. G., •Banking for the People,• 30. 
0 • Connor, J. F. T., .Til§. Banking Crisis and Recovery under the Roose-
velt Administration (Chicago, Callaghan and Company, 1938) 10. 
Wecter, Dixon, The ~ of the Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York, 
Macmillan, 1948) 47 • 
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at the responsibility of supporting the small ones.4° Hoover counted 
too heavily upon the enlightened self-interest of business and finan-
cial interests; the strong showed little eagerness to aid the weak.4l 
The National Credit Corporation collapsed; the whole burden of saving 
the banking system fell upon the government. In January, 1932, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation went into operation. 
In comments on the creation of the RFC, former chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board Marriner s. Eccles pointed out the poor sports-
manship prevalent in the banking world. The credit institutions of the 
East did not agitate for the establishment of the RFC so long as the 
depression crushed the credit institutions of Eccles' West and the 
South.42 The financial capital of New York called on the political 
capital in Washington for aid only when the depression spread from Main 
Street to Wall Street. Neglect of the bottom finally affected the top. 
Aid at the Bottom 
Despite the poor sportsmanship which the financial and business 
interests displayed, Tugwell did not direct his complaints concerning 
Hoover's policies against aid at the top as such. He disapproved of aid 
at the top as the sole approach to a problem having at lease two aspects. 
In his speeches and articles of early 1932 Tugwell asserted that the 
trouble with Hoover's program was its failure to provide aid at the bottom. 
40. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 15. 
41. Wecter, Dixon, The ~ ~ the Great Depression, 1929•1941, 48. 
42. Eccles, Marriner s., Beckoning Frontiers (New York, Knopf, 1951) 
101·02; Eccles was from Ogden, Utah. 
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Tugwell did not desire to eliminate aid at the top by way of retribution 
against the unsportsmanlike financial community. He did not offer aid 
at the bottom as the single solution to economic ills, He contended 
that action at both the top and the bottom of the econo~ would afford 
mutual benefit for both levels, reviving the total econ~. He warned 
that neglect of the bottom portended disaster. 
In 1928 Tugwell complained about Hoover's failure to take action 
on unemployment. As Secretary of Commerce Hoover had sponsored some 
worthwhile research on unemployment problems; he did nothing for the 
jobless workers.1 In 1932 Tugwell described Hoover's reaction to the 
valuable information gathered by his own research groups as "character-
istic" of Hoover's dogmatic, theological-like approach to matters of 
political econ~; the President "denied or shaded" facts which did not 
fit into his concepts; he •evaded administrative responsibility,• making 
2 
only •false gestures• toward relief. 
In Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy Tugwell deplored the lack of direct 
Federal relief for the unemployed, rejecting the reasons the President 
offered in explaining that lack. Tugwell quoted this statement by 
Hoover: •I am opposed to any direct or indirect government dole. The 
breakdown and increased unemployment in Europe is due in part to such 
practices.•3 This statement by the President moved Tugwell to submit 
1. Tugwell, R. G.,'Hunger, Cold, and Candidates," New Republic, Vol. 
No, 700, May 2, 1928, 323. 
2. Tugwell, R. G.' Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy (New York, John Day, 
1932) 11. 
3· Tugwell, R. G.' Hr.,.. Hoover's Economic Policy, 17, 
54. 
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this •tempting syllogism•: 
Our troubles originated in Europe. 
Europe's troubles are due in part to the dole. 
Therefore, our troubles originate in the European dole!4 
Tugwell insisted that direct federal relief was essential because 
$800,000,000 in relief, of which public authority had provided three-
fourths and charity one-fourth, could not compensate for the $12,000,000,000 
which ten to twelve million unemployed workers had lost in wages.5 Hoover 
not only opposed federal relief; he also vetoed Senator Wagner's bill for 
6 
employment exchanges. The President accused Senators who differed with 
him on the question of government contributions to Red Cross aid to 
drought sufferers of •playing politics with misery ... ? When Senator I.aFol-
lette pointed out that Hoover urged Congressional relief for German 
children in 1924, the President replied that the situation in Germany was 
"different.• 8 In 1924 the German nation, Hoover maintained, was so dis-
organized by war that self•help was impossible,9 As for the United States, 
Hoover was apprehensive that recourse to government aid might destroy the 
people's liberty and character.10 
Tugwell believed that there was justification for relief in the 
United States, as there had been in Germany in 1924, on humanitarian grounds 
alone. In 1935 he recalled the administration's position in 1933 on relief: 
4· Tugwell, R. G.' M!:· Hoover's Economic Policy, 17. 
s. Tugwell, R, G. • Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 16. 
6. Tugwell, R. G.' Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, ll. 
1· Tugwell, R. G.' Mr. Hoover's Economic Polil!Y:, 21. 
8. Tugwell, R. G •' Mr. Hoover'§ Economic Policy, 21. 
9· Tugwell, R. G., M!:· Hoover's Economic Policy, 21. 
10. Tugwell, R, G., &· Hoover's Economic Policy, 22. 
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••• it is obviously right for the community to see that 
the unemployed and helpless are fed, clothed, and preserved 
in decency and self-respect. Even the logic of reactionar-
ies shrinks from the conclusion that it could ever be good 
business to permit potential producers and consumers of 
goods and services to perish or be destroyed for lack of the 
essentials of living. For a time, under the preceding admin-
istration, the effort was made to pretend that this was a 
matter for the individual conscience to solve by charity, but 
the social common sense of the American people revolted at so 
narrow a concept for, if such a belief were to be accepted as 
permanently true, it meant that the preservation of society 
depended on the mass of individual citizens acting deliber-
ately against their individual interest.ll 
Tugwell's reference to •good business• in a statement of the humanitarian 
grounds for relief indicated that he was concerned with the welfare of 
all sectors of the econo~; relief fer workers and consumers made custom-
ers for business. 
Tugwell did not confine his comments to general criticism of the 
failure of the federal government to take direct relief measures. In 
the article in Qurrent History of January, 1932, he listed specific needs. 
He called for further deflation of retail prices; he advocated an attempt 
to raise the income of that part of the population with a high consuming 
propensity.12 He stated that the maintenance of wage earnings was, of 
course, desirable.13 He urged the government to undertake public works 
11. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "A Third Econo~,· Rochester Teachers Asso-
ciation, Rochester, New York, April 9, 1935; USDA Press Release, 5· 
12. Tugwell, R, G,, Cutler, A, T, and Mitchell, G. s., "Flaws in the 
Hoover Economic Plan,• Current History, Vol. 35, No. 4, January, 1932, 
529; •propensity• is a common Keynesian term; Keynes' General Theory 
was not published until 1936; Tugwell was familiar with the works of 
J. A. Hobson, another British economist to whom Keynes owed much, 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. l, October, 1953, 7• 
13. Tugwell, R. G., •Flews in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 529. 
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and disburse unemployment compensation, if necessary, to spread profit 
reserves and credit among consumers.14 He protested that the unemploy-
ment relief which the President's Emergency Unemployment Relief Commit-
tee provided came partly from the wage earners themselves.15 (he expec-
ted that the bulk of relief in the winter of 1931-32 would come, as it 
had the previous winter, from municipal governments which raised funds 
by taxing the rank and file of citizens16). 
Tugwell failed to see the economic logic of drawing relief funds 
from the portion of the population with low purchasing power. The restor-
ation of purchasing power was a key factor in attaining recovery. He 
commented that the form of profit distribution in the 1920s increased 
production and inflated capital values without taking into account the 
17 distribution of goods. Relief was now necessary in order to restore 
buying power. In his address, •Discourse in Depression,• Tugwell sug-
gested an increase in income and inheritance taxes in order to shift 
purchasing power to those who lacked it;18 this shift in income would 
take place through public works and federal relief for the unemployed.19 
Tugwell believed that business did not need confidence; it needed cus-
tomers: 
14· 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
The energy and initiative we now are expending on our 
financial institutions ought to be turned toward the 
Tugwell, R. G. • •Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan," 529. 
Tugwell, R. G.' "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 530. 
Tugwell, R. G.' •Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 530. 
Tugwell, R. G.' •Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 526. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, •Discourse in Depression,• Tugwell 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, •Discourse in Depression,• Tu~ll 
PaJ2ers. 
PaJ2ers. 
repairing of a nationally damaged purchasing power --
not confidence - but actual power to .JlY:!.20 
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In stressing purchasing power, Tugwell insisted that Hoover's one-
sided policy of aid at the top was economically unsound. Aid at the top 
was based on the confidence thesis strengthening the credit behind 
industry, agriculture, railroads, and banks would relieve uncertainty, 
halt the decline in price levels, and restore opportunities for profit-
21 
able business. Tugwell insisted that dependence on aid at the top was 
a kind of wishful thinking, an attempt to •temporize, support values, 
give time for the fever to fall; we must not lose faith or pursue false 
22 gods, especially the dole.• He concluded that Hoover had not gotten 
to the bottom of the trouble: 
It is not too much to say that the whole program in this 
emergency has been framed with reference to the protec-
tion of privilege rather than any calculated analysis of 
cause and cure •••• 23 
Tugwell was not alone in deploring the •protection of privilege.• 
Marriner s. Eccles later commented that the same people who clamored for 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation operations to finance creditor insti-
tutions such as banks and insurance companies, opposed the use of govern-
ment credit for the relief of the distressed and unemployed.24 The 
Federal Home Loan Banks were another example of aid at the top; they were 
20. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Discourse in Depression,• Tugwell PaJ2ers. 
21. Tugwell, R. G.' "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 529. 
22. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policv, 17. 
2]. Tugwell, R. G., Address, •Discourse in Depression,• Tugwell PaJ2ers. 
24. Eccles, Marriner s., Beckoning Frontiers (New York, Knopf, 1951) 
101-02. 
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established in July, 1932, to make loans to building-and-loan associ-
ations, banks, and insurance companies whose credit had been strained by 
loans to home and farm owners. A historian of the New Deal observed 
that while the Home Loan Banks helped to keep some mortgage-lending 
instruments afloat, the •effect in removing the incubus of worry and 
loss from the backs of individual homeowners proved disappointingly 
small.• 25 
In retrospect Tugwell again stated that Hoover's policies amounted 
to protection of the privileged. He did not question Hoover's sincerity 
or humanitarian qualities: 
Hoover could see unemployment grow past ten millions, see 
Hoovervilles proliferate and know that human suffering 
beyond estimate was still growing - and still not be shaken 
in what he knew to be right. It was not that he was an 
indifferent or an insensitive man. Human suffering had 
for him an intense meaning •••• It was simply that there 
were resorts which were not available. The federal govern-
ment must do everything to help people gelp themselves. It 
must do nothing to help them directly.2 
Unfortunately for Hoover's personal reputation, the majority of 
the American people did not attribute his policies to his economic beliefs 
or his constitutional scruples. Hoover lent himself unhappily to the 
role of scapegoat because he did not possess Roosevelt's gifts of politi-
cal camaraderie and communicable personal warmth -- and a comprehensive 
program.27 A •smear campaign' made Hoover appear dour and taciturn and, 
25. Wecter, Dixon, The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York, 
Macmillan, 1948) 50. 
26. Tugwell, R. G., •The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• Antioch 
Review, Winter, 1953-54, 429. 
27. Wecter, Dixon, The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941, 44· 
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unfairly, callous to the people's plight.28 From the people's stand-
point, it was simple reasoning to deduce from Hoover's policies that the 
President deliberately intended to protect only the privileged. 
Hoover's agricultural policy provided a specific example of a 
Presidential program which aroused unfavorable public opinion. In 1931 
the farmers of the plains suffered a severe drought. Hoover recommended 
loans, when secured by property, to be used only for supporting property 
values. '//estern Senators complained that farmers would be unable to feed 
cattle unless they fed themselves first. The government replied that it 
could not provide direct relief as gifts to relieve human suffering; the 
federal government could go no further than providing loans to relieve 
credit stringencies in productive enterprises. Both sides in the argu-
ment knew that they were debating not just relief for some farmers, but 
the administration's policy on relief for the growing millions of unem-
ployed. Private charity was proving to be inadequate in even the richest 
districts; local and state governments were exhausting their credit. The 
people looked to Washington for relief.29 
As non-federal relief for the unemployed fell short of the people's 
needs, they began to treat the President's efforts to restore confidence 
by making optimistic statements as •comic diversions from the realities 
of life.•3° The majority of the people considered the RFC final proof 
28. Wecter, Dixon, The Age £1'. the Great Depression, 1929-1941, 44-45• 
29. Rauch, Basi.l, The HistoiJ of the New Deal, 1933-1938 (New York, 
Creative Age Press, 1944 17-18; the Mormons took care of their 
own relief needs -- an exception. 
30. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 18. 
that the administration favored bankers and business men over other 
citizens, and large corporations over small businesses3l -- the Presi-
dent vetoed the Wagner-Gamer Relief Bill to extend RFC Loans to small 
businesses and individuals.32 Meanwhile, Hoover helped creditor groups 
by establishing the Home Loan Banks and increasing the capitalization 
of the Federal Land Banks.33 The farmers who needed federal action to 
limit their production, the employed workers who needed federal action 
to halt wage-cutting, and the unemployed who needed direct federal 
relief grew bitter in the opinion that •not constitutional rectitude 
but class favoritism• accounted for the administration's failure to meet 
the needs of aay group except big business.34 
Neither the public nor Congressmen considered Hoover's ideas, 
personality, or character in detail as Tugwell did. They simply accused 
the President of class favoritism. In the Spring of 1932 the Liberal 
Democrats and the Insurgent Republicans in Congress increasingly voiced 
the opinion that Hoover was defiantly partial. These anti-administration 
Congressmen did not object to the action which the administration had 
taken in areas it had selected; they demanded similer action in all areas.35 
By the fall of 1932 the charge that Hoover's administration was interested 
only in protecting business men from the worst effects of the depression 
was to be the most potent argument in bringing about the President's defeat 
31. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1:133-1:138. 18. 
32. Rauch, Basil, The History of !hl! !il!l/! Deal, 12:33-1:138. 20. 
33· Rauch, Basil, The History of !hl! New Deal, 1:133-1:138. 20. 
34· Rauch, Basil, The History of !hl! New Deal, 1:133-1238. 20. 
35· Rauch, Basil, The History .Qf the New Deal, 1233-1238, 20-21. 
at the polls.J6 
Tugwell did not discuss Hoover's policies in terms of class inter-
ests. He stressed the economic consequences of aid at the top unaccam-
panied by aid at the bottom. He predicted in early 1932 that the present 
administration policy would have dire consequences. He did not see any 
likely possibility within the framework of Hoover's program of measures 
being taken to avoid further decline. 
Tugwell warned that Hoover's recommendation that bonds issued by 
the home-loan banks be accepted as security for government deposits was 
a proposal to push the government into the banking business. Without a 
comprehensive recovery program, the government's banking activities would 
leave it 'holding the bag - empty.•37 Hoover's program anticipated a 
reversal of the downward trend of security and commodity prices; this 
program was of •no assistance at all in increasing the incomes of 
employed and unemployed consumers.•38 
Tugwell saw Hoover in a dilemma. The present program of extended 
credits could leave the government with a 'deed of trust on an overvalued 
economic system;•39 if Hoover reversed himself, the banks would fail.4° 
No policy of aid at the top could be effective without aid at the bottom. 
If the administration artificially maintained prices, consumers could not 
purchase goods in large quantities.41 Without the stimulus of purchases, 
36. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 17. 
37· Tugwell, R. G. • 'Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 531. 
38. Tugwell, R. G. • "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan, • 529. 
39· Tugwell, R. G.' "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 531. 
40. ·rugwell, R. G.' 'Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 531. 
41. Tugwell, R. G., "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 531. 
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business activity would decrease; prices and market quotations for secur-
ities would go down still further.42 
The article, "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan," closed on a 
depressing note. Tugwell asserted that lower prices and security values, 
with wider distribution of consuming power, "cannot be fitted into the 
credit policy of the administration,.43 Tugwell did not contradict him-
self in calling for lower prices at once while warning against a policy 
which would lead to a continuous lowering of prices. An initial timely 
lowering of prices, accompanied by positive measures to restore purchas-
ing power, would provide a basis for getting the economy on a rising 
course. The initial support of falling prices, without any efforts to 
increase buying power, would end in a continuous decline. 
By late 1932 and early 1933, a year after Tugwell published his 
protests against Hoover's policies, economic decline had gone so far that 
Tugwell no longer emphasized a lowering of prices. The situation which 
the new administration faced was, as Moley described it, •superdefla-
tionary.• Tugwell shifted his emphasis to a top-and-bottom approach 
involving positive measures both to support prices and to increase pur-
chasing power. 
Tugwell was not a money-tinkerer. Inflation could have no more 
than a temporary effect as an economic measure. He believed that absolute 
prices were not important in a balanced economy. What mattered was the 
relationships between the prices of the products of the various sectors 
42. Tugwell, R. G., "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 531. 
43. Tugwell, R. G,, "Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 529. 
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of the economw. Balance relationships would enable mutual exchange. 
Agriculture, for example would be able to buy the products of industry.44 
The superdeflationary situation of late 1932 and early 1933 was 
anticipated in Tugwell's warning that declining purchasing power provided 
an insufficient stimulus to business activity. He saw no way to avoid 
unbalance and continuous decline through Hoover's program. The last 
sentence of •Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan• bemoaned the fact that 
under Hoover's policies there was no •guarantee in any event that prices, 
security values, and consumer purchasing power will be brought into a 
balanced relationship.• 45 
Reflation and the Diversified Attack 
In early 1932 Tugwell predicted that dire consequences would follow 
from Hoover's policy of aid only at the top. In neglecting aid at the 
bottom, the administration failed to provide a positive stimulus to busi-
ness activity. Tugwell saw in Hoover's program no means of halting a 
continuous decline in capital values, prices, and general economic acti-
vity. 
At first glance, Tugwell appears to have contradicted himself. He 
criticized Hoover's program because it would lead to a continuous decline 
in capital values and prices. At the same time, Tugwell insisted on a 
lowering of prices; he deplored artificial support of inflated capital 
values. The contradiction was only apparent in view of Tugwell's different 
short-run and long-run objectives. 
44. Unpublished statement, Tugwell Papers. 
45. Tugwell, R. G., •Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan," 531. 
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In the short run he eallea tor adjustments required to ottset the 
malaijuatments ot the 1920s. Technolo~ical advance in the 1920s lewere4 
production costa. iusiness did not pass on the benefits of this scienti• 
tic ~aiD to workers, far.ers, or consuaers in the fora ot higher wa~s, 
a fair share of aational income, or lewr prices, respectiTely. Procbtc• 
tion outran purchasin& power, cood.s pili~ up in warehouses. Shutd.ewns 
in production, with a turtller liecline in purchasinll power, followell. 
Tugwell insisted that a lewerilll! of prices, in combination with positive 
lleasures to restore viliespread purchasing power, would ena\lle consumers 
to move goods eut ot warehouses. Since capital values ultiaately rested 
en the price level, a loweri~ ot prices would require a comaensurate 
decline in values. 
In his address, •Discourse in Depression,• Tugwell summarized. his 
d-nd tor a rea4justment in prices and capital values, acc0111panied •y 
efforts to restore purchasing power. He noted that Hoover consillereli the 
dole a threat to the liberties ot our citizens, Meanwkile, the adaini-
stration enacted legislation tor the protection of -.nks, insurance coa• 
psnies, and railroads 
••• whose c~ tments had been made on the ••sis of values 
which had so lleclined as to leave them insolvent. This 
:Prognm could not acc011.plish JDOre than a tem:~~orary support. 
The levels of .values must ultiaately rest on a capitalized 
income fr011. property. Incame troa property depends on the 
_, prices consumers will pay tor the ge»Qds and services property 
furnishes. The prices they will pay depenll on their power to 
earn.l 
1. 'l'uf!W8ll, R. G., Aadress, 'Discourse in Depreasion,• Twl:well Papers. 
--· 
188. 
Tugwell here insisted that there was a direct relationship between capi-
tal values at the top of the econo~ and purchasing power at the bottom. 
Tugwell asserted that his proposals for adjustment in the short 
run amounted to a pro-business policy in the long run. He believed that 
a timely decline in prices and capital values, with measures to restore 
purchasing power, would prevent continuous decline in the long run. He 
called Hoover's program self-defeating, even from the point of view of 
business• 
••• the values of property are built on the income derived 
from their use and these incomes will fall as long as our 
paralysis continues. To attempt to support values for pro-
perty among an idle and impoverished people is a futile 
gesture.2 
Even the objectives which it has been hoped to attain by 
the various financial measur~s undertaken ••• r~ally 
depend on such restoration Lof purchasing powe~.3 
The Hoover administration did not adopt Tugwell's short-run poli-
cies. Events in 1932 bore out the professor's long-run prognosis. Devel-
opments in 1932 were, of course, a continuation of trends underway in 
1930 and 1931. Administration leaders initially expected •natural forces• 
to stem the tide of depression,4 For over a year after the stock-market 
crash of May, 1930, Hoover accepted the collapse as an inevitable liquida-
tion of inflated values which should be allowed to run its course.5 Ad-
ministration spokesmen referred to a necessary and healthful deflation of 
2. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Discourse in Depression,• ·rugwell Papers. 
3· Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Discourse in Depression,• Tugwell Papers. 
4• Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938 (New York, 
Creative Age Press, 1944) 9· 
5· Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 15. 
l 
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unnatural values to a level where the sound basis of the business struc-
ture would provide support for a new and more secure return to prosperity. 
The administration's comments on the deflation of values sounded 
like Tugwell's. However, the administration did not display Tugwell's 
concern with the restoration of purchasing power. Tugwell asserted that 
a decline in values and prices by way of adjustment, without efforts to 
restore purchasing power, would not bring about an eventual halt to the 
decline. His warnings were timely. Deflation did not quickly run its 
course. After the crash of May, 1930, there was a continuous decline in 
prices and production during the ra.ainder of 1930, in 1931, and in 1932.7 
As the decline continued, business believed that the necessity of finding 
a profit margin below the falling price level justified wage cuts, which 
a Hoover had at first tried to prevent. Wage cuts meant a further decline 
in purchasing power. 
By September, 1931, when Great Britain went off the gold standard, 
Hoover decided that deflation had gone far enough; he believed that a 
lack of confidence was driving the process to the point where the banking 
and currency systems were endangered. In the fall of 1931 Hoover launched 
his program to defend the last financial bulwarks of the economy. He 
first encouraged bankers to help themselves through the National Credit 
Corporation, whose formation he announced on October a. The NCC went 
into operation on November 10. Within a month Hoover decided that self-
6. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, l933-l93a, 9· 
7. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, l933-l93a, 15. 
a. Rauch, Basil, Ihl!. History of the New Deal, 1933-193a, 9· 
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help would not save the banking system. He asked Congress to set up the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Aid at the top was underway. Mean-
while, Hoover's Organization on Unemployment Relief reported that a relax-
ation of bank credit was the main solution to unemployment. Aid at the 
bottom was not forthcoming. 9 
lhe RFC undoubtedly saved many banks through its loans. It did 
not halt deflation. Within a year a new wave of bank failures occurred. 
As Tugwell feared, deflation had gone too far. By early 1933 Tugwell no 
longer emphasized the failure of prices to come down fast enough to accom-
modate diminishing purchasing power. In a superdeflationary situation 
people did not have enough high-value dollars to buy a significant amount 
of goods at even the lowest prices. 
Tugwell's suggestions in early 1932 were deflationary up to a point 
(dollars became more valuable in terms of goods with a lowering of prices 
and capital values); however, he insisted that efforts to make more dol-
10 lara available to more people also had to be part of an effective recov-
ery program. In early 1933 it was too late for Tugwell's short-run program 
to be effective. At the start of the depression he suggested that it would 
9. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933•1938, 19. 
10. More dollars in relation to goods would, of course, amount to infla-
tion; however, inflation under the circumstances would not be cam-
parable to the inflation of the post-World War II period, for example, 
when pent-up consumer demand was accompanied by an abundance of avail-
able savings and a shortage of consumer goods. Tugwell was not think-
ing in terms of inflation versus deflation but rather in terms of 
exchangeability; see below, this section. 
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be necessary to force prices down in order to cure the stifling effect 
of the disparity between costs of production and prices of gooda, 11 but 
by late 1932 
••• there was another range of fact to be considered. It 
was one which loomed larger as the campaign progressed. 
And it was more important in shaping the New Deal program 
than the analysis just cited. This was the dislocation of 
established relationships involved in the deflation of the 
depression years. This was not only a matter of debts owed 
by individuals and·groups to each other, but also a matter 
of exchangeability. It was reasoned by Roosevelt that panic 
had supervened when evidence of ownership had moved toward 
worthlessness. Debts contracted in dollars of low purchas-
ing power could not be paid off in dollars of high purchas-
ing power because debtors could not get enough of them. 
It followed from this that if the value of dollars cculd be 
returned to the levels at which debts had been contracted, 
debtors could get enough of them to satisfy their creditors. 
The incurring and discharging of debt - one of the central 
mechanisms of capitalism - could then go on freely.l2 
Tugwell now favored inflation. Through neglect of aid at the bot-
tom, the economy had declined beyond the point where management of prices 
alone could restore working exchange relationships. Direct currency 
management by the government was necessary. That Tugwell was known as 
an anti-inflationist, hard-money msn suggested a contradiction in his 
thinking. 
As late as February, 1933, Tugwell stated that in his opinion the 
Roosevelt program would include •a sound currency with no inflation. Gen-
11. Tugwell, R. G., •The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• Antioch 
Beview, Winter, 1953-54. 422-23. 
12. Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover," 423· 
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13 era! inflation will not procure the results we want •••• • Tugwell did 
not believe that absolute price levels were significant in a balanced 
economy. What mattered was exchange relationships. If prevailing prices 
at a given level enabled the farmer, for example, to exchange ten bushels 
of wheat for a pair of shoes, it was not important whether the exchange 
took place at a five-dollar or ten-dollar level. Tugwell believed that 
public price controls were necessary to maintain balance at any price 
leve1.14 He rejected inflation as a permanent policy. Balanced exchange 
relationships depended on the ratio of purchasing power to production 
(the total selling price of the national product); the maintenance of a 
proper ratio through continuing wage and price policies was far more funds-
mental in the achievement of economic balance than manipulation of the 
currency. 
Tugwell did not contradict himself when he favored inflation in 
early 1933· The econoRW was then unbalanced, verging on total collapse. 
He did not cling in doctrinaire fashion to his ideas on the maintenance 
of a balanced economy in the midst of an unbalanced econoRW• Moreover, 
he called for a particular kind of inflation -- •reflation.• In a broad 
sense ~lation is inflation. Yet reflation was a kind of inflation 
which constituted a response to a particular development in economic af-
fairs -- the increase in the value of the dollar in a deflationary period 
subsequent to the contraction of debt. If a person borrowed fifty dollars 
13. Time Magazine, Vol. 21, No. 6, February 6, 1933, 14. 
14. Tugwell, R. G., Address, •Sound Money,• Adult Education Association, 
Chicago, October 29, 1935; Y§QA Press Release, 3· 
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in 1928, his repayment of the obligation in 1932 would exceed in value 
fifty dollars as of the time he borrowed the money. Not only were the 
1932 dollars worth more than the 1928 dollars; they were also harder to 
come by. Reflation aimed at returning the value of the dollar to the 
level prevailing when debts had been contracted. Tugwell opposed infla-
tion beyond reflation; he rejected inflation as a continuing policy. 
Tugwell possessed detailed knowledge of the r6le of the cheap-
money doctrine of prosperity in American history.15 The cheap-money 
doctrine never won a national political campaign. Although debtors were 
more numerous than creditors, public attitudes proved that principles 
were more powerful than self-seeking. The appeal of the Protestant ethic, 
the "honoring• of obligations and •just• debts, had prevailed. In all 
the campaigns involving the money issue relatively little attention was 
paid to the question of public policy. Obviously, Tugwell concluded, 
periods of inflationary expansion had not come from deliberately adopted 
policies; they were accidents. They had been stopped as rapidly as pos-
sible; they were not halted because creditors opposed economic expansion 
creditors were investors in common stocks. however. creditors never were 
clear about the connection of easy money with production; they were certain 
about what any impairment of the currency involved -- a decrease in the 
value of the obligations due them. Since they were more interested in 
~. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business," Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3. September, 1952, 497-
501 is the source of this historical account, including the quota-
tion on the recurring resort to the cheapening process. 
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collecting debts than in collecting dividends, they opposed inflation-
ary expansion. 
The sudden drops which ended periods of prosperity stirred many 
people to serious thought before 1933· They began to understand that 
there was no connection between input and output, between goods produced 
and purchasing power to buy them. •The so-called capitalist system would 
not run as the capitalists were running it. It would simply slow down 
and stop.• Many people believed that with a sensible public policy the 
economy would run at capacity. Bankers' arguments could not explain away 
idle factories, idle men, and people in want. 
The ordinary man, who knew little of factory techniques and less 
about finance, made the simplest deduction from what he could see, He 
concluded that easy money created prosperity. Some distinguished anal-
ysts, citing in their scholarly, roundabout way numerous other factors, 
came to,ca •not-very-different• answer. They related plateaus of inven-
tion, for example, to periods of rapid expansion. Technological advance 
accompanied both the banknote inflation after 1812 and the enormous issues 
of paper money in the Civil War expansion period. After World War I the 
consummation of the nationalizing and rationalizing movements in industry 
accompanied new credit inventions, which were subtler but as effective as 
those following previous wars. The Federal Reserve System expanded deposit 
currency, Installment selling demonstrated what could be done with con-
sumer credit. 
All these periods of inflationary expansion ended in disaster --
in 1837, 1873, and 1929. Each collapse occurred at a significant remove 
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from war and at the end of an equally significant expansion movement. 
Observers, hesitant to generalize in this matter, could not avoid some 
comment on the cyclical aspects of economic events. They saw the •busi-
ness cycle • as only partly • cycl~ in the sense of building up and running 
down through the culmination and exhaustion of inner forces.• The •cycle• 
seemed to run partly in sequence from man-made events of which war was 
the principal prototype. Tugwell concluded that there were man-made 
events which contributed to the business •cycle• in addition to such 
cataclysmic developments as war: 
The logic of easy-money prosperity, as well as that of the 
accumulation of technical processes and devices, led straight 
to a consideration of •business• as the fundamental cause of 
instability, of periodic slowing down, of areas of stagnation. 
Easy money, cheap money, and phrases of a similar sort had a 
meaning which had not at first been evident, but Which was 
the whole reason the policy was desired and resisted. Making 
money cheaper than it had been was a writing off of debt to 
the extent of the cheapening. It meant that the business 
system had distributed goods to an amount greater than the 
amount of available income with which to pay for them; it 
meant that the slow and wearing processes of bankruptcy which 
went on continually were inadequate in crises of mounting 
debt; and that an abrupt general one-third or one-half bank-
ruptcy must be undertaken. Repeatedly, throughout the history 
of business, this cheapening process had been resorted to • 
••• ••• after a crisis and much suffering, bankruptcy had been 
forced, money had been cheapened, and the process had begun 
all over again. 
Any suggestion of inflation infuriated the creditor classes. Infla-
tion threatened immediately to decrease the value of their holdings. "If 
it had not been resorted to, however, on many historic occasions, some 
sort of violence would have resulted; but that had never protected the 
advocates of inflation from conservative wrath.• ••• • Inflation was one 
of those facilitating devices which had always sustained the business 
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system.• Tugwell pointed out that at first glance inflation did not 
appear to be a historical bulwark of business -- because business furi-
ously opposed it. Beneath the shouting was the real serviceability of 
inflation to business. 
From the standpoint of his long-run institutional views, Tugwell's 
ideas on reflation were in an ultimate sense pro-business. Reflation was 
part of a short-run readjustment, a patching-up job. Tugwell believed 
that with society's neglect of central allocation of rescurces and price 
controls, business brought about an unbalanced situation which required 
readjustment. His reaction to the crisis involved two steps: (l) emer-
gency measures to sustain creditor institutions and business; (2) insti-
tutional reforms, after business was saved from disaster, to equip the 
business system with a balancing mechanism. Tugwell did not suggest the 
socialization of business. 
In the emergency creditors could not possibly expect to collect 
their claims on the basis of prices prevailing in 1928. Purchasing power 
had diminished beyond the point where a general lowering of prices could 
revive economic activity. With superdeflation Tugwell turned to advocacy 
of a several-sided program. This program included a general stabiliza-
tion, and increases in some cases, of prices. It also contemplated creat-
ing purchasing power adequate to support a bolstered price level. Holding 
the line or increasing prices amounted, on the face of it, to a pro-busi-
ness policy. Yet business considered a price program such as Tugwell's 
anti-business, since price increases would be achieved partly through refla-
tion-- increasing the dollar value~rice~ of goods by decreasing the value 
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of the dollar. 
In a significant sense Tugwell's triple-pronged attack -- prices, 
purchasing power, and money management -- against deflation run wild was 
pro-creditor and pro-business. There was no hope that amid government 
inaction •natural" forces would salvage the situation, preventing the 
total collapse of all values and claims, The government did not wish to 
undo history, writing off all financial claims by abandoning the system 
of free enterprise. Tugwell's program was a middle course, a readjustment 
which would get for business and creditors the best return that could be 
gotten under the circumstances. Ernest K. Lindley, who excelled among 
journalists, as did Walter Lippmann, in .discussing economics for the 
layman, described the middle course as follows: 
In meeting the economic dislocations resulting from the de-
pression, the Democratic party had the broad choice between 
an inflationary and a deflationary policy. The diminished 
volume of business at a drastically lowered price level could 
not support the overhead weight of debt and taxation built up 
at a higher price level. The rigid deflationists would have 
brought the overhead of debt and taxation down to the lower 
price level, Their program assumed that the price level would 
stay where it was instead of falling lower as the overhead was 
cut down. The extreme inflationists would have pushed the 
price level up high enough to support the highest levels of 
the old debt structure. Their program ignored the fact that 
the top level was no longer a plateau but a series of peaks 
with deep valleys in between, and that full reliance on infla-
tion would cause a second dislocation to those portions of the 
economic system which already had become adjusted to lower posi-
tions. 
The platform struck a compromise, Mr. Hoover had preserved 
some of the peaks of the debt structure by using federal credit, 
through the RFC, and had done nothing effective to raise com-
modity prices. The Democratic platform proposed the corrective 
course: an orderly reduction of the peaks of debt and taxation 
and the raising of commodity prices until debts and prices were 
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again in a workable relationship to each other.l6 
Tugwell's advocacy of the middle course Lindley described made him 
the target for criticism by the inflationary and deflationary extremes. 
The Committee for the Nation, in the person of William A. Wirt, 17 showed 
the emnity which the inflationists held for Tugwell. Deflationists con-
sidered Tugwell "wild' on the money issue. Among academic economists 
18 Tugwell "lost face all around."' 
Lindley's summary, published in 1935, referred to an aspect of econ-
omic adjustment in the crisis on which Tugwell was quite explicit. Lind-
ley's reference to the defects in 'full reliance on inflation" virtually 
repeated what Tugwell said in early February, 1933: •General inflation 
... would be favorable to those groups which never adjusted themselves to 
the new price level; it would injure those who had done so •••• .19 Tugwell 
insisted throughout his period of service in Washington that an effective 
price program had to be selective; in early February, 1933, he stated: 
20 
•some prices ought to go down; some ought to go up.• As human nature 
and economic affairs go, it was easier to get cooperation in raising prices 
than in lowering them; Tugwell deplored the NRA 1 s failure to apply selecti-
21 
vity in its price-fixing program. 
16. Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase (New York, 
Viking, 1934) 18-19. 
17. See below, Chapter XII. 
18. Interview with writer. 
19. Time Magazine, Vol. 21, No. 6, February 6, 1933, 14; Lindley's refer-
ence to the adverse affects of general inflation on "those portions of 
the economic system which already had become adjusted to lower posi-
tions• closely paralleled Tugwell's statement of the differential ef-
fects of general inflation. 
20. Time Magazine, Vol. 21, No. 6, February 6, 1933, 14. 
21. ~~morandum to Roosevelt, September 8, 1934, Roosevelt Papers; see below, 
Chapter IX, Section, "The National Industrial Recovery Act.• 
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The middle course took into account conditions at both the top and 
the bottom of the econo~. Rigid deflationists might have insisted that 
reflation and debt adjustrnent22 were designed to hurt the top. Tugwell 
would have replied that price-stabilizing and price-raising devices such 
as the NRA and AAA worked to the advantage of the top. The AAA, for 
example, by increasing the farmer's income, enabled him to purchase indus-
trial products; he could also discharge his debts at a level which, while 
admittedly reduced, was the best return creditors could get after years 
of severe agricultural decline. Tugwell also favored measures such as 
pu.lic works23 and work relief for the restoration of purchasing power to 
match the price program. 
Extreme leftists could argue that Tugwell contradicted himself in 
favoring any aid at the top. Tugwell, after all, criticized Hoover's pro-
gram as an ineffective, one-sided attempt to render aid exclusively at 
the top. Actually, Tugwell did not contradict himself, He dropped his 
emphasis on a general lo>~ering of prices, a seeming sacrifice by the top, 
when the econo~ became superdeflationary; his attitudes changed as condi-
tions changed. Moreover, he had never criticized aidat the top as such. 
He insisted that aid at the bottom should accompany aid at the top in a 
two-pronged "Diversified Attack.• 24 
Despite the attacks from the extremes, Tugwell did not desire to 
22. See below, Chapter X, for Tugwell's position on debt adjustment. 
23. Public works were also intended to provide a market for heavy 
machinery. 
24. Tugwell, R. G., syndicated column, Tugwell Papers. 
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injure the top; he did not intend to abandon the bottom for exclusive 
support of the top. In no case did Tugwell or the Roosevelt administra-
tion intend to stand by while the credit institutions collapsed. As 
early as May 22, 1932, Roosevelt referred to a reflationary course in a 
way which showed concern for the creditor interest: 
••• the drastic change in the value of our monetary unit 
in terms of the commodities is a problem which we must 
meet straightforwardly. It is self-evident that we must 
either restore commodities to a level approximating their 
dollar value of several years ago or else that we must 
continue the destructive process of reducing through de-
faults, or through deliberate writing down, obligations 
assumed at a higher price level.25 
Tugwell has recalled hew the problem of saving the creditor insti-
tutions concerned the Roosevelt inner circle in 1932: 
25. 
~. 
The banks by then were in an alarming condition and the 
decline in values had jeopardized all sorts of credit 
institutions, including insurance companies. It began 
to seem like a choice between very general bankruptcy 
and such a complete reconstruction of values as could be 
accomplished by government action. Prices and values 
could be allowed to fall further until general reorgani-
zation should become necessary; or the financial institu-
tions could be bolstered by deliberate measures to raise 
prices. The latter led directly to the question whether 
the result could be accomplished through gold and cur-
rency management. There was also the alternative mach-
inery already set up by President Hoover - the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation. All this range of problems 
could not be divorced from international finance. Nothing 
could be done here without either foreign consent or ~ith­
out deliberately establishing a policy of isolation.2 
Roosevelt, F. D., Address, Oglethorpe University, cited in Tugwell, 
R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt," Ethics, 
Vol. 64, No, 1, October, 1953, 13. 
Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Pert II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 483. 
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Tugwell's reference to international finance as one of the sub3&ets 
of discussion in 1932 suggested the general situation in which he would, 
and later did, favor going off the gold standard. So long as the United 
States remained on the gold standard, foreign operations in the gold 
market prevented effective internal currency management. In the absence 
of international cooperation Tugwell favored action which would prevent 
foreign interference. Hoover contemplated such action toward the end of 
his term, as gold left the country in increasing amounts; he was unable 
to discover a means of implementation satisfactory to him. (The next 
section takes up in detail monetary matters in the lame-duck period. 
Reference is made here to the gold standard as part of the discussion of 
the general reflationary viewpoint; reflation obviously required internal 
management.) 
Roosevelt took measures relating to the gold supply almost immedi-
ately after he took office. With gold draining out of the country at a 
dangerous rate, Roosevelt's proclamation of March 6 placed an embargo on 
the export of gold until March 9. The Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 
passed in a few hours, validated the proclamation. The United States did 
not go off the gold standard officially until April 20, when Secretary of 
the Treasury Woodin, stopped the issuance of licenses for the export of 
gold. By taking possession of the basic standard of credit, the govern-
ment itself was not the ultimate security for other forms of credit. The 
departure from the gold standard began the devaluation of the dollar. 
Devaluation did not become a policy of the Congress until an act of janu-
ary, 1934· Tugwell's attitudes toward monetary measures between March 6, 
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1933, and January, 1934, illustrated his reflationary, but anti-inflation-
ary, stand. 
As inauguration day approached, Raymond Maley recorded, Roosevelt 
had an open mind on the question Whether the superdeflationary effects of 
the March crisis might require drastic action. The President oas not 
determined on inflation on March 4• He was consciously waiting after 
Me.rch 13, when the banks reopened, to see if the effort to preserve the 
monetary standard would not entail •greater sacrifice in terms of sinking 
money incomes than the American people would bear.•27 Roosevelt was also 
aware of the possibility that the political forces demanding uncontrolled 
inflation might overwhelm any effort to preserve the gold standard.28 
In the end Roosevelt was compelled to compromise with pro-infla-
tion forces in Congress. )OOley comnented in After Seven Years: "The cold 
fact is that the inflationary movement attained such formidable strength 
by April 18 that Roosevelt realized he could not block it, that he could, 
at most, try to direct it. •29 'tiel tar Lippmann foresaw in January the out-
come of the politics of inflation; he declared that the only question was 
"how inflation was to be produced and whether or not it would be managed 
and controlled.•3° Maley stated that Roosevelt's decision to compromise 
with the inflation group was the result of •counting noses in the Senate.•31 
There may have been an alternative for a theorist pointing to his charts; 
27. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years (New York, Harper, 1939) 156. 
28. Moley, Raymond, ~ ~ Years, 156. 
29. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 157. 
30. ~ ~ Herald Tribune, January 18, 1933· 
31. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 158. 
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there was none for a President of the United States.32 On April 18 a 
Senator told Moley that the most the administration could get was Congres-
sional consent to vesting inflationary power in the President.33 Roose-
velt designated Senator Byrnes to persuade Senator Thomas to agree to a 
thorough revision acceptable to the President.34 The Thomas amendment 
passed the Senate on April 28, 64-21, the House on May 3, 307-86.35 It 
was natural that the inflationists got their measure through as an amend-
ment to the farm bill; historically monetary inflation had been proposed 
as a solution to farm problems.36 
Tugwell took no part after March 4 in the decision-making in cur-
rency matters.37 The administration's monetary measures between March 6 
and April 20, when Woodin stopped the export of gold, fitted within the 
pattern of his reflationary thought. Roosevelt essentially agreed with 
Tugwell's pre-inauguration opinion that the administration might possibly, 
even probably, have to resort to reflation. As an institutionalist Tug-
well rejected inflationary measures, beyond reflation for a specific pur-
pose in the crisis, as a permanent policy. Similarly, Roosevelt did not 
contemplate general inflation in early 1933· The President abandoned the 
gold standard not to implement any monetary theory but to prevent further 
deflation; he accepted the Thomas amendment only to circumvent uncontrolled 
32. 
33· 
34· 
35· 
36. 
37· 
Moley, Raymond, After~ Years, 158. 
Moley, Raymond, After~ Yeam, 158. 
Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 158. 
Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 160, 
Rauch, Basil, The History of ~New Deal, 1933-1938, 68-69. 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 334• 
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inflation by Congress.38 Roosevelt was determined to prevent inflation 
through •printing press• money.39 
'Nhen Roosevelt, irt October, 1933, adopted the theory of Professor 
George F. Warren of Cornell that changes in the price of gold would cause 
commodity prices to vary proportionately, Tugwell stuck consistently to 
his reflationary ideas. He and Moley told the President that Warren's 
theory was nonsense.40 After the failure of the Warren scheme, devalu-
ation of the dollar in accordance with the traditional inflationist doc-
trine took place by presidential proclamation on January 31, 1934, under 
an act of Congress of that month. In Msy, 1934, Roosevelt, after trying 
to prevent the passage of any measure of its kind, sent a silver-purchase 
bill to Congress; the inflationary effects of this bill were "mild at most.•41 
A remark by Basil Rauch on monetary matters applied to Tugwell, 
indicating that the latter was not "wild" on the money question: 
•sound money• Democrats, chiefly Easterners with the credi-
tors' point of view, who had not seriously opposed the fall 
of the dollar to its •natural• level from March to August, 
were unwilling to support further devaluation by "artificial• 
measures which began in October.42 
Rauch listed some conservative Democrats who opposed the October experi-
ment with gold: Dean G. Acheson and 0. M. W. Sprague of the Treasury 
38. Moley, Raymond, ~Seven~. 161. 
39· Rauch, Basil, The History of i!!§. ~Deal, 1933-1938, 65. 
40. Interview~ writer; Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 162; see 
below, Chapter X, Section, 'Monetary Views.• 
41. Rauch, Basil, The History .Qf lli New Deal, 1933-1938, 122. 
42. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 1o6. 
Department, Bernard M. Baruch, James P. Warburg, and Alfred E. Smith.43 
Mentioning the agreement with, or the acquiescence in, a reflationary 
policy of these particular persons indirectly indicated that Tugwell's 
reflationary ideas were not anti-business. 
As an institutionalist Tugwell disagreed with these conservatives 
on long-run measures of achieving balance and continuity in business 
operations. He believed that monetary measures, in the short run, could 
raise prices and halt deflation, saving for their owners middle-class 
investments -- insurance policies, homes, and farms.44 He did not believe 
that currency manipulation could •achieve a situation in which everyone 
could buy everyone else's products because his own sold at 1parity.••45 
Tugwell believed that monetary measures could be no more than a temporary 
balm. Temporary measures could not prevent recurrence of depression: 
Fixing up a situation once would be like the early socialist 
suggestions for redistributing wealth; it would last such a 
short time as not to be worthwhile. We needed a control of 
income, not of wealth; a control of prices, and of investment. 
And if expedients were to be used, government benefits for 
the unemployed, public works, and the like were the best ones 
to try,4b 
Despite Tugwell's differences with conservative Democrats on long-
run institutional changes affecting business, his reflationary position 
43· Rauch, Basil, Ib& History Q[ 1h§ ~ ~. 1933-1938, 107; Ralph 
Robey, the financial writer, and Professor Frederic Mills of Colum-
bia whose defection was occasioned by monetary policy. 
44. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President," Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 144. 
45. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• 144• 
46. Tugwell, R. G,, "The Preparation of a President,• 144·45; Tugwell's 
reference to control of •income• rather than •wealth" indicated his 
rejection of the doctrinaire socialist position. 
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was fundamentally pro-business -- even according to the criteria of 
important business spokesmen.47 Tugwell took the top of the econo~ into 
consideration in the crisis. He advocated aid to the bottom which would 
benefit both bottom and top. His comments on Hoover's policies were not 
confined to destructive criticism. Hoover's one-sided program amounted, 
in effect, to protection of the privileged. Tugwell offered an alterna-
tive -- government action at top and bottom in a "Diversified Attack.• 
Hoover's Confidence Thesis• The Democrats' Depression 
Hoover asserted that, partly as a result of his measures, economic 
recovery was underway by the first of July, 1932. The recovery which he 
helped to start was dissipated through Roosevelt's refusal to cooperate 
with the outgoing administration during the lame-duck period. In psrticu-
lar, Roosevelt's silence about inflation of the currency led to a general 
fear of what the Democrats would do after March 4, 1933• In their uncert-
ainty, business men lost the confidence they needed if they were to keep 
on making the investments essential to continued recovery. The effects 
of Roosevelt's behavior led to renewed decline, culminating in the banking 
crisis of February, 1933• On top of the bad start which he made between 
the election and the inauguration, Roosevelt then sponsored a New Deal 
which militated against a revival of business confidence, preventing recov-
ery until the United States entered World War II. 
Hoover informed Roosevelt at their meeting in Washington on November 
47. Tugwell, of course, believed that his institutional ideas were also 
pro-business. 
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22, 1932, that recovery had begun in July of that year; since the causes 
of the American depression were foreign, international instability was 
the only threat to continued recover.1 By early 1933 Hoover shifted from 
an international to a domestic analysis. On February 17, 1933, the Presi-
dent wrote to Roosevelt, stating his lack~of-confidence theory of the 
causes of the depression; agitation for money tinkering, publication of 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans, and fear of Roosevelt's unan-
nounced policies stopped the recovery which had begun in July, 1932, con-
2 tributing to a situation in which the banking collapse was now out of hand. 
Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover's secretary, elaborated on the tr.esis 
of the Democrats' depression in Hoover off !h& Record, published in 1934.3 
According to Joslin, a business placed orders for several hundred millions 
in September and October, 1932; after the election these orders were can-
celled pending the release of information on what Roosevelt's policies 
would be.4 In general, Joslin maintained, Hoover went more than half way 
in attempts to cooperate; Roosevelt did not intend to do likewise.5 With 
Roosevelt's cooperation, the President and the President-elect could have 
solved the problem of international debts and avoided the banking crisis.6 
1. Rauch, Basil, The History of the~ Deal, 1933-1938 {New York, Cre-
ative Age Press, 1944) 49; Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years {New 
York, Harper, 1939) 72-77, is the only published account by a parti-
cipant in this meeting; Ogden Mills, Secretary of the Treasury, was 
the fourth man present. 
2. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 141. 
3· Garden City, New York, Doubleday. 
4. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover £ff !h& Record, 330. 
5· Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 332. 
6. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover £ff !h& Record, 332. 
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By November 9, Joslin wrote, •It was obvious to every thinking per-
son that the forces of experimentation, inflation, and tinkering with the 
currency had been elected, the more so because of the increasing reliance 
of the President-elect upon the brain trust .... .7 Enormous expenditures 
and deficits were "foregone conclusions.•8 The economic world and indi-
viduals struggled for protection; thousands of factory orders were can-
celled,9 With the depreciation of foreign currencies, foreign goods poured 
over the tariff walls; the dollar fled the country.10 Bank withdrawals 
increased as the people demanded gold; national concerns transferred their 
funds from interior banks to larger banks.11 Roosevelt's statements that 
he would handle international debt and currency negotiations after March 
4, rather than cooperate with Hoover, were damaging.12 The publication 
of RFC loans, forced by John N. Garner of Texas, despite assurances given 
Hoover by Democratic Senators that the law would not be construed to auth-
orize publication, hurt the econ~.l3 Depositors considered loans a sign 
of weakness on the part of the borrower; over one thousand banks collapsed 
from this cause alone.14 
Joslin cited additional developments during the lame-duck period 
which destroyed Hoover's recovery, Congress refused to cooperate on the 
7- Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover £f! ~Record, 350; the original brain 
trusters were hard-money men, see above, Chapter VI, section, 11 Reflation ••• •" 
a. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 350. 
9. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off ~ Record, 351. 
10, Joslin, Theodore G.' Hoover £f! ~ Record, 351. 
11, Joslin, Theodore G.' Hoover off the Record, 351. 
12. Joslin, Theodore G.' Hoover off~ Record, 351. 
13. Joslin, Theodore G.' Hoover £f! the Record, 351, 353· 
14. Joslin, Theodore G.' Hoover off~ Record, 351-52. 
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budget, expenditures, and the bankruptcy act. The announcement of the 
Democratic intention to make huge emergency pub~ic-works expenditures 
caused people to fear that Government credit could not stand up. The 
Democrats• call during the campaign for tariff reductions caused busi-
ness to contract. The refusal in the middle of February, 1933, of Sene-
tor Glass, a hard-money man, to accept the Secretaryship of the Treasury 
aroused fears of inflation. Rumors that certain wealthy Democrats had 
withdrawn and exported their gold contributed to misgivings about cur-
rency tinkering. Most of the fear of inflation and currency tinkering 
arose from general uncertainty about events after March 4• The whole 
country hesitated, with employers marking time.15 Out of Roosevelt's 
silence came the final crash. 
Two staunch supporters of Hoover seconded Joslin in a book pub-
lished in 1936. Williams. Myers and Walter H. Newton presented the 
Hoover thesis in The Hoover Administration• A Documented Narrative.16 
(Moley, incidentally, pointed out several inaccuracies in The Hoover 
Administration concerning matters in which he was involved either as an 
eye-witness or a participant.17) Myers and Newton stated that without 
Roosevelt's full cooperation on both foreign debts and international cur-
rency stabilization, Hoover could accomplish nothing; Roosevelt's failure 
to cooperate caused discouragement and apprehension as to the delay in 
stabilization of debts and currencies, contributing to the development of 
15. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off~ Record, 352-53· 
16. New York, Scribner, 1936. 
17. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, l40n, 142n, 146n. 
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the banking crisis.18 Neither Joslin nor MYers and Newton exaggerated 
the extent of the economic collapse in the lame-duck period. From Decem-
ber, 1932, to March, 1933, the index of production in the United States 
fell from sixty-four to fifty-six -- an ail-time low.19 
Hoover's thesis, to Which he clung in later years, stressed 
domestic developments. His initial interpretation of the cusses of the 
depression emphasized the impact on the American economy of events over-
seas. It was with regard to foreign affairs, the war-debts problem and 
preparations for the London Economic Conference, that Hoover first wished 
to see Roosevelt; by the middle of February the banking convulsion brought 
20 domestic matters directly into their discussions. Regardless of the 
immediate topics of discussion in any given instance, one cannot separate 
domestic and foreign factors in accounting for the respective attitudes 
of the President and the President-elect. The meeting of November 22, 
1932, showed that their basic approaches to the internal situation hinged, 
in part, on their estimates of European developments, and vice-versa. 
On November 22 Hoover and Mills met Roosevelt and Moley in the 
White House. There was quick agreement on certain foreign questions: 
war debts were not political but business obligations; debt negotiations 
were to be with each country separately; debts and reparations were not 
related; the United States must take account of proved inability to pay. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Moley, Raymond, After~ Years, 288. 
Rauch, Basil, The History£( the New Deal, 1933-1938, 48. 
Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase (New York, 
Viking, 1933) 44· 
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Disagreement arose when Hoover proposed that a single body of delegates 
represent the United States in debt negotiations, the Disarmament Con-
ference, and the Economic Conference. The inner purpose of Hoover's 
proposal was to facilitate "trading• -- scaling down debts in exchange 
for concessions on tariffs, monetary stabilization, and disarmament. 
The debt payments were due in December, 1932; the Economic Conference 
was to meet after March 4, 1933· If there was to be any trading, Roose-
velt had to accept Hoover's proposal at once.21 The United States had 
no guarantee that concessions in December, 1932, would be requited in 
19.33· 
Roosevelt's objections to Hoover's proposal showed the relation-
ship between domestic and foreign factors in the formulation of policy. 
Roosevelt rejected Hoover's opinion that since the sources of the Ameri-
can depression were primarily foreign, only international instability 
threatened the recovery which had begun in July, 1932. Roosevelt main-
tained that the principal causes of the depression were domestic -- pur-
chasing power failed to keep pace with production. The situation called 
for sweeping measures to raise domestic prices. The protection of 
increased prices against foreign dumping in the American market would 
require dollar devaluation and the maintenance of tariffs. International 
monetary stabilization before the devaluation of the dollar would be 
22 
unfavorable to the United States. 
Roosevelt's emphasis on domestic considerations reflected another 
21. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 48-49· 
22. Rauch, Besil, The History of~ New Deal, 1933-1938, 49· 
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aspect of his objections to Hoover's proposal. The President-elect 
rejected the internationalist foreign policy of the league-advocates, 
the prosanctionists, those who wanted a revival of foreign lending, and 
"those who would make us parties to a political and economic alliance with 
England and France -- policing the world, maintaining the international 
status quo, and seeking to enforce peace through threats of war.• 23 
The outcome of the meeting of November 22 was agreement on the 
principles on which the United States would stand in debt negotiations and 
disagreement on the means of negotiation, Roosevelt was against •trading;" 
he favored separate treatment of the debt question. With debt payments 
due in December, •trading• would require the United States to make conces-
sions before it could be sure of what concessions the debtor nations 
would grant in return at the Economic Conference. Roosevelt declined 
participation in the appointment of a Debt Commission. He suggested that 
debt negotiations be carried on through regular diplomatic channels.24 
The results of the meeting of November 22 reflected the opposing stands 
on the causes of the depression which the two major political parties took 
in their platforms and during the campaign; following Hoover's lead, the 
Republicans stressed international roots; the liberal Democrats and Roose-
velt emphasized domestic causes.25 
Tugwell, like Roosevelt, considered Hoover's proposed solutions for 
23, Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 78-79; see below, Chapter VII, 
Section, •Japan,• 
24. Moley, Raymond, ~ Seven Years, 76. 
25. Wecter, Dixon, The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York, 
Macmillan, 1948) 51. 
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the depression oversimplifications; they were based on an analysis of 
origins of the depression which failed to get to root causes. In Janu-
ary, 1932, Tugwell stated that Hoover's measures were taken in accord-
ance with •some hypotheis, however vague," concerning the causes of the 
depression. Hoover had not developed a "formal and coherent theory;" he 
had only "furnished suggestions.• Tugwell quoted from a speech by Hoover 
of October 7, 1931: 
We have met with greet difficulties not_of ~ur own making. 
It requires determination to overcome LtheBV and above all 
to restore end maintain confidence • 
••• the world is suffering more from frozen confidence than 
from frozen securities. 
Tugwell commented: 
The administration's theory of our economic difficulties 
probably runs much more in terms of European disturbances 
than American shortcomings. 
Tugwell summarized Hoover's European interpretation of the depression. 
The American economy was sound; the real blows came from abroad; politi-
cal uncertainty in Germany and Austria resulted in the withdrawal of 
short-term credits through London; an attack on the pound followed, fore-
ing London off the gold standard; uncertainty spread over Europe, ruining 
our foreign trade and debt collection.26 
Hoover's remedy for international ills was: (1) calm the debtors 
26. Tugwell, R. G, with Cutler, A. T. and Mitchell, G. s., "Flaws in 
the Hoover Economic Plan,• Current History, Vol. 35, No. 4, January, 
1932, 28-29. 
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with a moratorium; (2) scale down reparations and public debts; (3) work 
for currency stability by collaboration with France, the leading European 
gold nation.27 Hoover stated his solution for domestic difficulties in 
his letter to Roosevelt of February 17, 1933· He urged that Roosevelt 
issue a statement including these points• (1) there would be no currency 
tempering (preservation of the gold standard); ( 2) the budget would be 
balanced; (3) government credit would not be exhausted by the issuance of 
securities.28 
Having proposed his solution to the nation's economic ills, Hoover 
sought to apply it with the help of the President-elect. As the banking 
crisis deepened, he asked Roosevelt to get the Democrats in the lame-duck 
Congress to cooperate on the President's legislative program.29 Unfor-
tunately, Hoover charged, Roosevelt refused to cooperate on a program which 
would have assured recovery -- Hoover's program. Hoover's statements dur-
ing the lame-duck period revealed what he meant by •cooperation.• At the 
meeting of November 22 he asked Roosevelt to accept a European-origina-
snd-recovery-since-•uly analysis.3° In December and again in •snuary 
Hoover tried to win a commitment from Roosevelt to his (Hoover's) foreign 
policy; Roosevelt held firm against the advice of Norman Davis and the 
League Democrats.31 In his letter of February 17 Hoover again outlined 
his European-origins-recovery-since-•uly thesis, requesting that Roosevelt 
27. Tugwell, R. G., •Flaws in the Hoover Economic Plan,• 529. 
28. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 141. 
29. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 48. 
30. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 74. 
31. Rauch, Basil, The History of the~ Deal, 1933-1938, 50. 
215. 
make a statement on domestic policy; like his proposals on foreign policy, 
this letter was •mor~ than a request for cooperation.•32 His confidential 
memorandum to Senator David A, Reed showed that Hoover was thinking about 
a last-minute victory: 
I realize that if these declarations be made by the 
President-elect he will have ratified the whole major 
program of the Republican administration; that is, it 
means the abandonment of ninety per cent of the so-
called new deal.33 
Hoover sought •cooperation• down to inauguration eve. On February 21 he 
instructed Mills, who was to meet with the next Secretary of the Treasury, 
Woodin, to insist on the Hoover policies, foreign and domestic,34 On 
February 28 Hoover appealed to Roosevelt for a •declaration even now on 
the line I suggested,.35 
Moley minced no words in commenting on Hoover's letter of February 
17, which asked Roosevelt to accept Hoover's thesis on the origins of the 
depression -- a thesis which Roosevelt had •torn to shreds" during the 
campaign,36 Hoover knew his thesis had been shattered,37 The letter 
•assumed that Roosevelt would succeed -- where Hoover had repeatedly failed 
-- in hornswoggling the country with optimistic statements which everyone 
knew weren't justified.w38 
32. 
33· 
34· 
35· 
J6. 
37· 
J8. 
Rauch, Basil, ~ History .Qi. the~ Deal, 1933•1938, 50. 
MYers, WilliamS, and Newton, Walter H.,~ Hoover Administration: 
A Docmrented Narrative (New York, Scribner, 1936) 341. 
Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 53· 
Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 143· 
Moley, Raymond, After~ Years, 141. 
Moley, Raymond, After~ Years, 14ln. 
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Hoover finally followed his request of February 28 for cooperation 
on the part of Roosevelt with an offer in early March of full cooperation 
with the President-elect "in any line of sensible action."39 On the 
night of March 2 Woodin said that for the first time proposals were made 
which were worth serious consideration; representatives of the Federal 
Reserve Board end the Treasury suggested a proclamation closing the banks.40 
Yet .• to the very end, Hoover would not risk repudiation; on the afternoon 
of March 3, the day before the inauguration, Hoover asked Roosevelt to 
promise that the Democrats in the new Congress would not repudiate a 
proclamation, under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, controlling 
foreign exchange and withdrawals; when Roosevelt said he could give no 
such guarantee regarding Congress, the risk being the same whether the 
President or the President-elect invoked emergency powers, Hoover did not 
issue the proclamation.41 Ernest Lindley's comment seemed to describe 
Hoover's desire attitude from the election to his lest-minute offer of 
early March: •It developed that Mr. Hoover's desire was less to cooperate 
in putting Mr. Roosevelt's policies into effect then to persuade Mr. 
Roosevelt to support Mr. Hoover's policies.•42 
Roosevelt's position during the lame-duck period was a difficult 
one. Participation of a President-elect in responsibility for executive 
functions was •unprecedented and extra-constitutional.• 43 There was the 
39· ~loley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 143· 
40. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 144. 
41. Moley, Raymond, After~ Years, 145-46. 
42. Lindley, Ernest K., ~ Roosevelt Revolution: First Phase, 44. 
43· Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 48. 
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obvious political danger of transferring the unpopularity of the out-
going administration to its successor by becoming entangled in commit-
ments to Hoover's policies.44 Roosevelt showed that he was willing to 
cooperate on those policies of Hoover's that did not conflict with his 
own when he advised Democratic Congressmen to vote for the bankruptcy 
bill, which Hoover signed on March 1.45 
In general, cooperation in domestic affairs was impossible. 
Hoover could not recommend to Congress most of the important measures 
in Roosevelt's program "without repudiating his political principles 
and swallowing some of his most earnest campaign utterances.•46 Roose-
velt, on the other hand, did not possess the prestige and power of a 
President actually in the White House.47 It was doubtful how far he 
could have managed the lame-duck Congress even with all the presidential 
powers in his hands.48 Roosevelt could not afford to make enemies among 
men whose aid he would need later when he could more effectively demand 
it; most important, he could not afford to risk the impairment of his 
prestige in the eyes of the American people.49 
The most controversial aspect of Roosevelt's lame-duck stand was 
his refusal to make a statement on currency tinkering and the gold standard. 
44. Rauch, Basil, The History 9!. the New Deal, 1933-1938, 48. 
45. Rauch, Basil, .T.!J& History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 50. 
46. Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 44• 
47. Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 45. 
48, Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 45· 
49. Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 46; Roose-
velt's general position may have accounted for his failure to send a 
letter (to complete the record of lame-duck exchanges) which he wrote 
to Hoover on February 18; in a letter of March 1 Roosevelt apologized 
for the letter he •forgot• to send. 
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Proponents of the recovery-in-July thesis emphasized Roosevelt's silence 
on the money question as a contributing factor in the economic decline 
and banking crisis of the interregnum. Business undoubtedly lost confi-
dence for these reasons: (1) the general inflationary tendencies of 
the Democratic party, especially its powerful western wing; (2) rumors 
of specific inflationary intentions on the part of the new administra-
tion; (3) the revelation of unsound banking practices by the managers of 
the great banks before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency; 
(4) most important according to the historian Basil Rauch was the weak-
ened condition of even the most conservative banks after three years of 
falling values, bankruptcies, and forecloaures.5° These factors resulted 
in the withdrawal of deposits, domestic hoarding, and the flight of the 
dollar abroad.5l 
Roosevelt found himself in a trying position on the currency ques-
tion. If he remained silent, uncertainty about future policy would hurt 
confidence in business and financial circles. If he even hinted that 
•sound money• might require devaluation of the dollar, he might precipi-
tate an immediate panic and speculation in gold.52 If he pledged no cur-
rency tinkering, he might be forced by future developments to go back on 
his word. According to l'ioley, Hoover's letter of February 17 requested 
•a promise that could not honestly be made, for things had already gone 
so. 
51. 
52. 
Rauch, Basil, I!!§_ History 9f. ~New Deal, 1933-1938, 51-52. 
Rauch, Basil, The History of the m Deal, 1933-1938, 52. 
Rauch, Basil, The History of~ New Deal, 1913-1928, 51; Lindley, 
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so far that temporary suspension of specie payments seemed inevitable,.53 
(Moreover, Hoover's request for a statement on a balanced budget was made 
despite the fact that none of Hoover's proposed budgets balenced.54) A 
number of speculators and business men had withdrawn their gold during 
the previous year and a half out of fear or belief that the dollar sooner 
or later would be forced off gold,55 
Roosevelt's refusal to commit himself irrevokably to the gold 
standard caused Senator Carter Glass to turn down the Secretaryship of 
the Treasury. On January 28 Roosevelt instructed Moley, who was to offer 
Glass the Treasury post, •so far as inflation goes, you can say that we're 
not going to throw ideas out of the window simply because they're labeled 
inflation. If you feel that the old boy doesn't want to go along, don't 
press him •• 56 Glass' refusal to accept the cabinet position was a fortu-
nate one. His appointment was intended to have given bankers confidence 
and to have restrained capitalists from running to the banks for gold; in 
a few weeks Glass would have been forced to renounce his principles or 
split the cabinet at a critical time, for the paralysis of the banking 
system had gone so far as to frustrate the chief purpose which his appoint-
ment would have served.57 
Ernest K, Lindley made the most forthright defense of Roosevelt's 
position on the currency question: 
53· Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 141. 
54· Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 141. 
55· Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 64. 
56. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 119. 
57· Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 55· 
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The bankers looked to Mr. Roosevelt to save them, and they had 
definite ideas about the way he should do it. Their first 
plea was for a statement that would create confidence by prom-
ising that, come what might, there would never by any departure 
from the existing gold standard. Mr. Roosevelt firmly refused 
to make such a statement. The average citizen who was going 
to the bank to get currency cered nothing about the gold 
standard: he wanted money before the bank closed. The gold 
standard meant something to the financiers and corporations 
who were making large conversions into gold but most of them 
were intelligent enough to see that the suspension of specie 
payments probably would come soon, no matter what anybody might 
say. Mr. Hoover had helped to undermine his prestige by making 
optimistic statements which everybody knew were not supported 
by fact. The chances were overwhelming that the effect of a 
statement from Mr. Roosevelt would have been not to step the 
demand for currency and gold, but to injure public confidence 
in him and destroy his chances of dealing effectively with the 
situation after March 4.58 
The single factor which most impresses the historian who considers 
Hoover's thesis is time. Tacitus' account of the German barbarians in the 
time of Caesar still accurately described some tribes such as the Saxons 
eight-hundred years later, in the time of Charlemagne. Since the indus-
trial revolution the pace of historical development has quickened enorm-
ously. In the twentieth century three years are a long time -- if not to 
the geologist or the astronomer, then to the historian. A historian is 
impressed by the sheer chronological aspects of the Hoover attributed to 
Roosevelt's conduct from November, 1932, to March, 1933, a collapse which 
was the final feature of a fundamental, steady decline which began in 
October, 1929. 
The mild upsurge of July, 1932, meant little to the average citizen; 
58. Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 74-75• 
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it did not determine his vote in November.59 Within Hoover's own frame 
of reference, Roosevelt's conduct between July and November could not 
have prevented the slight rise in the business index, the July •recovery,• 
from being greater than it was: (1) if there had been •confidence" in 
Roosevelt, the July rise would have continued; (2) if there had been no 
•confidence• in Roosevelt, the voters would have rejected him at the 
polls by way of retaining a President in whom there was •confidence.• In 
fact, the people's vote in 1932 was not a vote of confidence for Roosevelt, 
but a •no confidence" vote for Hoover. Of course, according to Hoover's 
viewpoint, the •confidence" of business men was the key to recovery; 
obviously, business men had fewer votes than workers. Even business men, 
however, demonstrated, in their withdrawals of gold before 1932, their 
lack of confidence in Hoover. In asserting that the election of Roosevelt 
damaged "confidence," Hoover betrayed the basic flaw in his thesis. The 
election of Roosevelt was an effect of no confidence before it was a cause. 
The slight relative rise of July, 1932, took place far down on an 
absolute scale of economic activity. The low level at which the rise 
occurred was significant, indicating that the upturn did not reflect a real 
cure of a fundamental illness, a beginning of a continuous rise, because 
the July •recovery• took place under the same administration which had 
seen the econo~ decline to an all-time low. Given a depressed econ~, a 
rise must begin at a depressed level; however, the mild upsurge of July, 
1932, began at a low level which had been reached under the Hoover admini-
59· Wecter, Dixon, The~ of the Great Depression, 1929-1941, 51. 
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stration, If this administration was to take credit for the July rise, 
it had to accept responsibility for the previous decline. If Hoover's 
policies were efficacious in bringing about recovery in July, 1932, why 
had they not been efficacious in preventing decline and effecting recov-
ery earlier -- in 1930, 1931, and 1932? Whatever the administrationdid, 
and it did very little until October, 1931, its program did not halt con-
tinuous decline for nearly three years. There is no evidence that Hoover 
suddenly got down to root causes in July, 1932, It is true that Hoover 
may have overestimated the significance of the July rise under the influ-
ence of current business-cycle theory; there had been sufficient cause in 
the preceding three years to question prevailing cyclical analyses of the 
economy. 
It cannot be said in defense of the Hoover administration that 
there had been no warnings of an eventual crisis. Writers who attributed 
the banking crisis to Roosevelt's lama-duck conduct60 neglected to con-
aider the situation in perspective. In 1933 Hoover insisted on Roosevelt's 
cooperation on an emergency basis in a situation marked by developments 
long since foreshadowed, The depression, which started with a panic among 
traders in Wall Street, spread like a paralyzing disease for three years 
before it finally reached the heart of the economic system -- the banks.61 
Hoover did attempt to protect the bankers with government loans; he did 
little to aid the great masses of people whose plight eventually affected 
60. Sullivan, Lawrence, Prelude to Panic: The~ of~ Bank HolidaY 
(Washington, Statesman Press, 1936), 
61, Rauch, Basil, The Historv of~~ Deal, 1933-1938, 48. 
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the financial institutions of the econo~.62 
In banking, itself, developments which indicated an eventual 
crisis took place well before the depositors' panic of January, 1933· 
The increased exports of gold in February, 1933, had been far exceeded 
in the first six months of 1932.63 Hoover, himself, stated on February 
13. 1933: 
We ourselves a year ago suffered from the effects of such a 
movement. Thus a mass of gold dashing hither and yon from 
one nation to another, seeking maximum safety, has acted 
like a cannon loose on the deck of the world. 0 4 
In late January, 1933, Hoover requested a report on hoarding; he learned 
that the average daily withdrawal of currency from circulation was from 
ten to fifteen million dollara.65 Joslin remarked that these withdrawals 
were •sufficiently large to cause concern, although they were not as 
heavY as during the crisis the year before.• 66 Confidential daily Treasury 
reports on hoardings contained fieures which, Joslin wrote, •compared with 
only a few millions one way or the other for months previously.•67 
J. F. T. •Jefty• O'Connor, Roosevelt's Comptroller-General, cited 
significant figures on hoarding. He pointed out that the Comptroller's 
Annual Report to Congress for the fiscal year 1931-1932 recognized the 
importance of hoarding in banking failures. The Report stated that begin-
62. See above, Chapter VI, Sections, "Aid at the Top,• "Aid at the Bottom.• 
63. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 52. 
64. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 357; Hoover made these 
remarks before the National Republican Club, New York. 
65. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off~ Record, 354· 
66. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off~ Record, 354· 
67. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 359· 
224. 
ning in the autumn of 1930 there was a recognized trend toward demanding 
currency for hoarding purposes. It was estimated that in the middle of 
July, 1932, total hoarded currency was in excess of $1",500,000,000. 
Between 1928 and 1932 deposits declined from about fifty-six to forty-one 
billion dollars. 68 
It appears that conditions in early 1932, although they were not 
marked by the almost complete collapse of the banking system which occur-
red in early 1933, were sufficiently serious to require timely preventive 
action. A decrease in bank failures did follow the creation of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation;69 however, the number of failures 
after the RFC went into operation showed that additional measures were 
necessary. Hoover seemed always to have reasons either to reject or con-
demn action. For example, according to Joslin the Governor of I•lichigan 
"lost his head" when he closed the banks in his state on February 11, 
1933.7° The suggestion of guaranteeing deposits failed to register with 
the Hoover administration because, according to Joslin, such action would 
not stop withdrawals •considering the attitude of the people.•71 Yet, 
figures showed that from June 30, 1928 to June 30, 1933, postal-savings 
deposits increased from $150,000,000 to $l,Ooo,ooo,ooo.72 disproving 
68. O'Connor, J. F. T., The Banking Crisis gng Recovery under the Roosevelt 
Administration (Chicago, Callaghan, 1938) 9· 
69. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 202. 
70. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off~ Record, 363; the Detroit Clearing 
House and the Michigan State Bankers Association made a joint request 
to the Governor to declare a bank holiday, O'Connor, J. F. T., The 
Banking Crisis and Recovery under the Roosevelt Administration, 12; 
Joslin did not mention the bank holiday declared by the governor of 
Nevada in October, 1932. 
71. Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 365. 
72. O'Connor, J. F. T., The Banking Crisis and Recovery under the Roosevelt 
Administration, 9· 
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Joslin's assumptions about the attitude of the people toward guaranteed 
deposits, 
Joslin stated that Hoover's annual message to Congress in 1933 was 
based on the •urgent necessity of immediately passing banking reform 
acts, in view of scandals which had developed and the weakness which had 
been proved in the whole banking system.• 73 If one inquired why Hoover 
did not urgently recommend banking reforms in early 1932, his supporters, 
Myers and Newton, provided an answer. They claimed that Hoover carried 
on a vigorous campaign for bank reform for three years. Moley refuted 
the claim of Myers and Newton by quoting John T, Flynn: 
I followed that legislation carefully from beginning to end. 
And this is the first I ever heard of Hoover's lifting a 
finger for it. Professor H. Parker Willis, of Columbia, 
acted as technical adviser to the Banking Committee in pre-
paring that bill, He knows its history as well as any men, 
He has embodied it in a book - "The Banking Situation,• 
purlished in 1934 by Columbia University. Professor Willis 
says what everyone at the time knew to be true, that n£t 
only did Hoover do nothing to support the Glass bill jJIJyers _ 
and Newton implied that Hoover chose Glass to prepare a bil!/ 
but actually •retarded and prevented its passage,• to use 
Professor Willis' words.74 
Why did Hoover fail to take timely measures? He was not calloused 
to human suffering; his defects were not ones of character.75 His high 
intellectual ability was beyond question; he had the facts at hand and 
understood their implications. His understanding of the international 
gold situation, for example, was penetrating. He was aware that hoarding 
73· Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover £t[ the Record, 333• 
74• Flynn, John T., New Republic, December 4, 1935; cited in Mclay, 
Raymond, After Seven ~, 142 • 
75. See Above, Chapter VI, Section, •Inaction.• 
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threatened to paralyze the banking system; he knew that countries with 
depreciated currencies were flooding our markets, causing unemployment~ 
in the United States and hurting American farmers. 76 His address to the 
National Republican Club in New York City on February 13, 1933, included 
a thorough, even brilliant, survey of possible courses of action. He 
listed three policies: ( 1) internet ional stabilization of currencies; 
he believed that if anyone could announce at once that such action would 
be taken, price levels would rise immediately; he felt that the debtor 
nations would concede on currency stability in return for debt conces-
sions; (2) nationalism, with increased tariffs, curtailment of agricul-
tural production, and a long road of adjustments into unknown and uncertain 
fields; (3) deflation of the currency and departure from the gold standard; 
this would lead to a world economic war with certain destruction at home 
and abroad; Hoover was unalterably opposed to this third course.77 
Hoover's argument for the gold standard won supporters, Roosevelt 
backers such as Ralph Robey, a financial writer, "ames Warburg,78 and 
Lewis Douglas broke with the President on monetary policy, Douglas, Roose-
velt's Director of the Bureau of the Budget, remarked, When the United 
States went off the gold standard, •well, this is the end of Western civili-
zation,• 79 
War did eventually follow .America 1 s departure from the gold standard 
76. "oslin, Theodore G., Hoover off~ Record, 341, 346-47. 
77• "oslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 347, 355-57· 
78. Warburg, "ames P., The Money Muddle (New York, Knopf, 1934), 
79. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 160. 
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which consequently became attractive as s determining cause to historians 
attempting to explain the degeneration of international relations into 
World War II. The writer has heard a professor of history lecture: 
•watch the gold standard; that is the key factor. wben Britain, then the 
United States, go off the gold standard, chaos and war in the western 
world are inevitable.• 
Statements which implied that departure from the gold standard was 
an ultillBte causal factor in the outbreak of World \\'ar II amounted to vast 
oversimplifications containing obvious weaknesse$. The gold standard was 
a bone of contention principally between the United States, Britain, and 
France allies in l'iorld War II. Departure from the gold standard did 
not produce •certain destruction" at home; Moley stated that the average 
citizen was concerned with the soundness of his bank, not the gold stand-
80 
ard, 
The international currency stabilization which Hoover urged was 
uncontestable as a desideratum; it did not take into account the real 
attitude of the British and French, who were no angels.81 \\'hat was desir-
able and what was possible were not necessarily identical.82 In the face 
80, Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 142. 
81. Text books record that Roosevelt ruined the Economic Conference by 
refusing to cooperate on international currency stabilization in 
order to protect domestic price rises - a version containing some 
truth as far as it goes; there is another side to the story because 
the British and French drove a hard bargain, See Below, Chapter VII, 
Section, "The London Economic Conference." 
82, Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 105, "The argument that we could 
have persuaded Great Britain to return to the gold standard in the 
winter of 1932-33 or even to stabilize at that time if we made con-
cessions on debts was obviously illusory,• 
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of harsh demands by the British and French, Moley took the lead in pro-
meting the nationalist point of view regarding the gold standard and the 
Economic Conference. Tugwell acted more or less as Moley's lieutenant, 
providing intellectual aid and running errands. Tugwell's published 
writings and unpublished statements clearly revealed his position on the 
gold standard. He pointed out that gold was important only internation-
ally; domestically, people cared only about the relationship of money 
to goods as reflec;ed in prices.83 The United States on June 30, 1933, 
possessed four billion dollars in gold; currency, government obligations, 
state and municipal bonds, and urban mortgages and real estate bonds 
totaled between seventy and eighty billions of obligations in gold.84 
Under such circumstances it was possible to maintain a gold standard in 
compliance with the parity act of 1900 only so long as people did not 
ask for gold, believing they would get it if they did ask for it.85 When 
the burden of debt became unbearable due to deflation, Americans and 
foreigners demanded innnediate redemption of their claims in gold. 86 The 
liquidation movement reached a crisis in March, 1933.87 Under emergency 
powers and the Emergency Banking Bill, the President stopped banks from 
83. "Money and Gold," notes by Dr. B. E. Agger, Assistant Administrator, 
Resettlement Administration, and Professor of Economics at Rutgers 
University; forwarded by Rugwell to Roosevelt, May 28, 1936, Roose-
~ Papers. 
84. Tugwell, R. G., •Our Weight in Gold,• syndicated column, in The 
Battle for Democracy, 25. 
85. Tugwell, R. G., •our Weight in Gold," in The Battle for Democracy, 
26; under the parity act of 1900 all forms of money issued or 
coined were to be maintained equal to 25.8 grains of gold 9/10 fine. 
86. Tugwell, R. G., •Our Weight in Gold," 26. 
87. Tugwell, R. G., •our Weight in Gold," 26. 
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paying out gold coin; he ordered recent withdrawals of coin to be returned 
88 to the Treasury. All obligations, whether promising payment in gold or 
not, were treated alike; all coins and currency of the United States were 
made legal tender for all debts, public and private.89 The justification 
for these measures, Tugwell wrote, was simply that gold was no longer 
obtainable.90 
Tugwell pointed out that gold was still recognized as the orthodox 
international medium; the management of the dollar in relation to foreign 
currencies required governmental control of the gold supply in order to 
put the dollar beyond the control of foreign manipulation, thereby making 
it possible for the dollar to serve domestic purposes.91 There could be 
no rise in the commodity price level (a fall in the value of the dollar 
in relation to other commodities) if foreigners could buy and sell gold 
at will, thus determining the price, and with it the value, of dollars.92 
Tugwell favored a policy which would protect the United States 
against a development which Hoover deplored -- the inundation of the 
American market with the goods of countries with depreciated currencies. 
Hoover maintained that the best basis for trade relations was international 
stabilization of currencies; this most desirable measure was not achieved. 
Hoover finally considered government control of the gold supply when he 
88. Tugwell, R. G.' "Our Weight in Gold,• Zl· 
89. Tugwell, R, G. • •Our Weight in Gold," 27. 
90. Tugwell, R. G. • •Our Weight in Gold," 27. 
91. Unpublished statement, Tugwell Papers. 
92. Tugwell, R. G., •Prices and Dollars,• syndicated column, in The 
Battle for Democracy, 49· 
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sew that optimistic words would not cure the crisis; he surrendered a 
position to his successor's policy. Yet, Hoover would not move without 
Roosevelt's assurance that Congress would not disavow his acts. On the 
night of March 2 end on the afternoon of March 3, Hoover stated his 
belief that a proclamation closing the banks would not be necessary if 
control of withdrawals of currency end gold under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act was assumed. Roosevelt replied that he believed Hoover had 
the authority to act under the World War I statute; Roosevelt would re-
gard any invocation of emergency powers with the graatast sympathy; 
Hoover was free to proceed as he thought best. Roosevelt would not 
guarantee Congressional approval; he did not, as reported by ¥~ers and 
Newton, refuse to approve either the proclamation of a banking holiday 
or a resort to the Trading with the Enemy Act.93 
The meeting of March 3 ended at five p.m. when Roosevelt said, 
"I shall be waiting at my hotel, Mr. President, to learn what you decide.• 
Hoover telephoned Roosevelt at 11:30 p.m. that the bankers hoped to hang 
on until Roosevelt's inauguration on Saturday, after which e change in 
psychology might take place before Monday; a bank holiday was not neces-
sary; Hoover had decided to do nothing. Mlfers and Newton reported Roose-
velt's end of the conversation; Roosevelt believed the governors of the 
states would take care of the closing situation; he was opposed to any 
proclamation. Moley heard Roosevelt's end of the conversation end his 
summary of it immediately after he hung up; Moley's notes did not jibe 
93. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 144-46. 
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with the account of Newton end MYers.94 
It is interesting to note that in acting on the bankers' hope for 
a 'change in psychology• after March 4, Hoover inadvertently retracted 
his confidence thesis. His supporters could argue that no one meant to 
hold that the confidence thesis was valid as late as March 3 in the midst 
of the final crisis. If the confidence thesis had been valid earlier, 
however, there would have been no crisis in March. If Hoover would not 
take effective action in ~arch, 1933, he did not take such action in 
1930, 1931, and 1932. Why did Hoover fail to act? His intellectual abil-
ity, as seen in the metter of the international gold situation, was high; 
that is, he acquired much pertinent information, and he understood its 
implications clearly. He sympathized with a suffering people. He was 
deeply concerned with the national welfare. He was not lethargic; he 
worked "dey end night' to avert a penic.95 
Hoover did have an intellectual defect. He was aware of the facts; 
he understood them. Yet, in contemplating action, his evaluation and 
selection of date depended on his 'theology" of political economy.96 He 
had a tendency to believe in the truth of what he wanted to be true. 
According to Tugwell Hoover •systematically resorted for years to writing-
up;' relief was not necessary because everything was all right or was 
about to be.97 The institutions of his system of political economy were, 
94· Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 146-47• 
95· Joslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 354· 
96. See above, Chapter VI, Section, 'Inaction.• 
97. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy (New York, John Day, 
1932) 14. 
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he believed, sound; he rejected facts which did not fit into this system. 
Hoover believed, Tugwell stated, that "being based on correct principles, 
he must be right,•98 He •wants facts at once and he wants them favor-
able,.99 Tugwell concluded that anyone with any human feeling had to be 
impressed with the •tragic ordeal" Hoover was experiencing• 
It is as though there was a general conspiracy to confute 
the system of ideas based on his assumed facts, The 
power to analyze and to construct a policy of genuine 
relevancy could not exist in the same mind with the numer-
ous faiths and confidences that Mr. Hoover holds,lOO 
Hoover apparently was also the victim of a personality defect. 
Louis B. Wehle, on the basis of first-hand observation, mentioned Hoover's 
101 
extreme shyness and his fear of adverse opinion which led to inaction. 
Tugwell noted that Hoover was •supersensitive to criticism;• when a 
spokesman for the Navy League stated that a cut in the naval budget for 
1932 was "abysmal ignorance,• Hoover appointed a commission to judge the 
matter, stating that he would demand an apology.102 Hoover's fear of 
adverse criticism or Congressional disavowal seems to have governed him 
more than the Constitutional scruples to which he attributed, for example, 
his attitude toward the dole. 
Hoover's failure to act on March 3 without Roosevelt's assurance 
of Congressional approval was not the first example in his administration 
of an attitude toward Congress which resulted in a surrender of legitimate 
98. Tugwell, R, G., Mr. Hoover'!! E!,lonomic Policl(, 27. 
99· Tugwell, R, G., Mr. HOO!er 1§ lijconomic Policl(, 27. 
100, Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 27. 
101, See above, Chapter VI, Section, •Inaction,• 
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presidential prerogatives. At their meeting of November 22, 1932, 
Hoover described in detail to Roosevelt how Congress had come to dominate 
the debt question; if he negotiated an agreement with our debtors, Con-
gress would not approve it; his hands were tied by Congress.103 Maley 
recorded his own reply to Hoover: 
Up to that moment the debt question was very largely within 
the province of the Treasury •••• What prevented the State 
Department from taking an active hand in these questions 
over the next few months? What bar was there to exploratory 
discussion between our foreign-affairs office and European 
representatives? And then, somewhat impertinently perhaps, 
I added that what little knowledge I had of the constitu-
tional powers of the President led me to believe that there 
was no way Congress could deprive him of his power to carry 
on conversations with the representatives of foreign govern-
ments. Therefore, there was no need to ask Congress for 
permission to negotiate with foreign powers on debts.l04 
Constitutional scruples did not cause Hoover to refrain from acting 
under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Hoover's Attorney-General was 
inclined to think that the act was no longer valid.105 Roosevelt's 
Attorney General designate, Senator Walsh of Montana, stated that in an 
106 
emergency he would rule that the needed exercise of powers was valid. 
Walsh died just before the inauguration; on March 3 Roosevelt had not 
heard the opinion of Hamer Cummings, Walsh's replacement. On the grounds 
of legality, Hoover had less reason to feel free to resort to the Trading 
with the Enemy Act than Roosevelt. He had Roosevelt's assurance of sym-
pathy; he could not get •an assurance and a commitment in terms of abso-
103. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 74• 
104. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 76-77. 
105. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 145• 
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lutes" on the attitude of the next Congress.107 Fear of Congressional 
disavowal, not constitutional scruples, determined Hoover's conduct, If 
such misgivings prevented his taking action to control gold movements in 
the crisis of 1933, he could not have been expected to take effective 
measures in 1930, 1931, and 1932. 
The chronological factor continually impresses itself upon one who 
considers Hoover's lame-duck thesis. In a sense, chronology provides a 
defense for Hoover. His administration spanned the transition from pros-
parity to depression; it is more difficult for a statesman to determine 
what action to take in the midst of a sequence of events than it is in the 
final stages of that sequence; the action required in an emergency is 
often obvious, especially to an outsider without previous commitments to 
policy, leaving a leader with no choice (Republican holdovers at the 
Treasury contributed to the drafting of the bank-holiday proclamation which 
108 Roosevelt made on March 5 ), Certainly Roosevelt acted swiftly. On the 
morning of Tuesday, March 7, Woodin told Moley that currency could be 
issued under the Federal Reserve Act against the sound assets of the banks; 
Woodin's idea was the origin of the Emergency Banking Act.109 Roosevelt 
approved Woodin's suggestion in twenty minutes; Congress received Roose-
velt's message at three p.m. on Thursday, March 9; the House passed the 
measure at four p.m., the Senate at seven-thirty p.m.; Roosevelt signed 
the banking bill at nine p.m.110 Moley remarked, •capitalism was saved 
107. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 146. 
108. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 149• 
109. Moley, Raymond, After~ Years, 152. 
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in eight days •••• • 111 The historian Basil Rauch observed, "The confi-
dence for which Hoover had pleaded for three years had been restored 
within two weeks by Roosevelt.•112 
The argument, in defense of Hoover, that business men had fewer 
votes than workers assumed that business men had confidence in Hoover in 
November, 1932. The fact that business men had lost confidence by 1933 
did not necessarily shatter the thesis that the slight rise of July, 1932, 
was the beginning of a potentially continuous rise resting on business 
confidence; loss of confidence, according to Hoover, was due to Roosevelt's 
lame-duck conduct. On the other hand, there is evidence that the outlook 
of business men in 1933 represented the final stage of a confidence-
losing process which began some time before November, 1932. 
There was every reason for business men to have confidence in 
Hoover if confidence was based, as he maintained, on having an administra-
tion which looked on business with benignity. In his thinking business 
men were the key to economic well-being; their independence and courage 
were precious assets, producing the conquest of poverty and the progress 
in which all shared; government had to protect and encourage business men, 
preventing monopolistic domination and enforcing competition in order to 
protect both smaller businesses and the public from exploitation.113 
When Hoover discussed specific measures for enforcing competition, 
he inadvertently threw light on the real nature of his confidence thesis. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 155. 
Rauch, Basil, ~ History of !ill!. New Deal, 1933-1938, 64. 
Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 19, 
He championed trade associations; he also cautiously advocated revision 
of the anti-trust laws.114 His brand of individualism obviously did not 
mean that men would always be strictly non-cooperative in the management 
of our enterprises; the danger was not that business men might combine, 
but that combination might bring on governmental interference through a 
bureaucracy which would stifle the will to enterprise.115 
As an anti-antitruster, Tugwell also believed in combination. 
However, Tugwell would have provided for government regulation of enter-
prises which were granted exemptions from the anit-trust laws. Exemption 
without regulation would mean a weak government in Washington. Tugwell 
preferred a strong government in Washington -- not as an anti-"effersonian, 
but out of the conviction that in the twentieth century the interests of 
the public at large could best find protection in an active government as 
the alternative to a passive government whose passivity was determined by 
business interests. His analysis of Hoover's comments on the antitrust 
laws identified the basic element in the President's confidence thesis. 
Hoover's individualism did not really call for any particular kind of 
behavior on the part of individuals; its distinguishing feature was the 
emphasis it gave to the necessity of a hands-off policy on the part of the 
government in relation to business. 
A hands-off policy did not rule out government measures to encour-
age business without interfering with it. Hoover's emergency ects were 
intended to be confidence-givers; the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
114. Tugwell, R. G.,~· Hoover's Economic Policy, 26. 
115. Tugwell, R. G., V~. Hoover's Economic Policy, 26. 
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was the chief confidence-giving mechanism of the Hoover program.116 
Hoover had faith that, given proper encouragement, business would act in 
a public-spirited manner, leading the way to recovery, His confidence 
in business-enlightened behavior, Tugwell wrote, stemmed from "an ideal 
conception of business rather than its particular performances.• 117 
Hoover clung to a belief in the efficacy of words. Moley, like Tugwell, 
placed no stock in words: 
••• it LHoover's letter to Roosevelt of February 17, 1933/ 
wholly disregarded the fact that, while the citizen who 
was rushing to the bank to draw out his money may have 
known vaguely about the gold standard, he was primarily 
concerned about the soundness of the bank in which he had 
his money. 
This last, a transcendently important factor in the situ-
ation, was confirmed when Roosevelt asked the people to 
put their money back into banks on March 12th. They did -
not because he promised the things Hoover asked him to 
promise on February 17th, but because they had been given 
assurances that the banks that were reopened would be 
safe. This completely refutes Hoover's theory that Roose-
velt could have stemmed the bank panic by the making of a 
statement about the currency,ll8 
Hoover failed to bring about general recovery through words. Busi-
ness could not complain that Hoover was not everything a President was 
supposed to be in terms of the confidence thesis. However, business men 
too, in addition to the more numerous working people, lost confidence; 
this loss occurred well before the crisis of 1933, when business and bank-
ing interests finally suffered more than a lack of confidence -- they were 
116. 
117. 
118. 
Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 24-25. 
Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policy, 26-27. 
Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 142. 
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virtually helpless. Tugwell discussed at length the bewildered state of 
business during three years of depression. He pointed out that in order 
to understand the origins of this bewilderment, one had to understand 
how the profit-makers moved into control of social organization in the 
one hundred years before 1929. This understanding 
••• centered necessarily in variations on a technological 
theme. That theme needed its setting: its history, its 
geography. But important as these were, they were not 
the drama itself. That - or, more properly, its third 
act - took on power and velocity which, as we looked back, 
was breath-stopping but which, as it went on, was (as 
historical changes are apt to be) relatively unnoticed 
and without effect on accommodative social institutions. 
This contemporary obliviousness to basic technical change 
was why the tragic events which began in 1929 took so 
many people by surprise and why terror descended on a >mole 
people like the mid-day darkness of a hurricane,ll9 
In spite of appearances, the stability provided by re-
spectable status and by superior personnel was more seem-
ing than real. The basic contradictions in the system 
were not dissipated by academic degrees and deaconships 
in churches, by tastefully decorated offices or well-dres-
sed, university-trained juniors and customers' men. They 
were only hidden more effectively. The dangers of social 
disturbance were immensly enhanced by these developments, 
and the helplessness of the class with all the prestige, 
all the reputed wisdom, and all the anointment, was one 
of the notable features of the economic debacle,l20 
The public, Tugwell asserted, overrated the business men of the 
The abdication of responsibility, the growth of luxury 
and smoothness in business services to the exclusion of 
thought and consideration, were very significant. Tech-
nology transformed industry; but business tended funds-
119. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, June, 1952, 274. 
120. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 
278. 
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mentally to stand still. The advance to greater competence 
in the administration of industrial functions was hampered 
by an offsetting tendency to become soft and protective. In 
an age of great change this tendency was obstructive. As 
prosperity piled up, the means were available for the support 
of •yes men,• satellites who would justify rather than cri-
tize or disturb; and the resulting sloth and lethargy had, by 
1929, all but overcome the momentum furnished by technology. 
There could be no greater contrast than that which existed 
between the management engineer and the business man of that 
time - unless it might be the contrast between that business-
man and his predecessors. Whatever may have been the circum-
stances favoring enterprise, the contemporary generation was 
slew to take advantage of them; it had become toe routinized 
and too lazy, At the same time, self-esteem had expended 
enormously, and this made the tragedy of the onrushing de-
pression much more poignant than it need have been. As the 
floods rose which were to engulf them, financiers and the 
directors of big business stumbled through their city canyons 
with grey, frightened faces, mouthing rote phrases out of 
which all comfort had gone. 
This was the strange drowned end of a process which, furing 
the years of its apogee, had seemed to tend toward some-
thing quite different. Adam Smith was the first of the "yes 
men,• perhaps; but what he praised was at least an active 
managerial regime, Scotland then was freely breeding account-
ants and engineers who were to contribute mightily to the 
improvement of business administration throughout the world. 
IQg Wealth of Nations was their justification; but they were 
a different race from the financiers of the American 1920's. 
It was to become something of a fashion to contrast the older 
generation of businesssmen with the later weaklings who let 
their world crumble in upon them. In journalistic retrospect, 
nineteenth century captains of industry had taken on some-
thing of heroic stature. Hill, Harriman, Morgan, Gould, 
Fiske, Archbold, Whitney, Rockefeller, Carnegie - it was a 
roll of names in which Americans took patretic pride. It 
was, we said, at least a race of giants. Perhaps it was; but 
their times had favored speculative genius.l21 
In Tugwell's view it was logical that business found itself unable 
to comprehend events after October, 1929. A pro-business President in the 
121. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business," Pert II, 
Western Political ~1arterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, September, 1952, 486-87. 
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White House, through his attitudes alone, could net give confidence to 
post-1929 business. In early 1932 Tugwell referred to the lack of 
122 leadership in the business community, especially among bankers. Moley 
mentioned the •scandalous inability of the bankers to suggest practicable 
measures to head off the psnic.•l23 
The sector of the business community which did make concrete pro-
posals of recovery measures failed to win a response from the Hoover 
administration. The United States Chamber of Commerce led the demand for 
a coordinating mechanism such as the NRA. Hoover understood the impli-
cations of coordination, which he encouraged in the form of the trade-
association movement; he took no action to give the movement some kind of 
institutional framework, which would have required the government's psrti-
cipation -- at least as a sponsor. The mild upsurge of July, 1932, which 
Republican politicians hailed, did not convince the business men who 
continued to advocate coordination that the Hoover administration had 
achieved a fundamental cure for economic ills; they continued to publicize 
their views. In a campaign speech at San Francisco in September, Roose-
velt acknowledged that business men everywhere were asking for a • •·• 
form of organization to bring the scheme of things into balance,•l24 
1932. 
122. 
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124. 
Non-business people were also unimpressed by the recovery of July, 
"••• the average citizen, looking at his meager pay envelope, the 
Tugwell, R. G.,~· Hoover's Economic Policy, 12. 
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soup kitchens and bread lines, felt hardly better and yearned for a 
change.• 125 People in all walks of life lost confidence some time before 
the lame-duck period, Basil Rauch in effect rejected Hoover's Democrats'-
depression thesis by lending greatest importance among the factors contri-
buting to the final crisis to those which had a long background. Rauch 
conceded to Hoover that the general inflationary tendency of the Demo-
cratic party and rumors of specific inflationary tendencies had some 
influence on the withdrawal of deposits and the hoarding and exporting of 
gold. Yet, Rauch asserted, the fear of inflation was •not as important• 
in creating runs on banks and causing hoarding as the fear that the banks 
were unsound (this was indicated by the fact that only about one-sixty of 
the domestic withdrawals in February, 1933, were in gold and gold certi-
ficates); this •most important• fear was due to the •weakened condition 
of even the most conservative banks after three years of falling values, 
bankruptcies, and foreclosures.• 126 Loss of confidence did not occur as 
suddenly as Hoover said it did. 
Undoubtedly many business men retained enough confidence in Hoover 
to vote for him. Their votes did not necessarily indicate that they had 
confidence in Hoover's ability to bring about recovery. In many instances 
their votes may well have reflected, as Tugwell would have it, confidence 
that Hoover's pro-business attitude would enable them to save their own 
skins regardless of the fate of the rest of the community. Certainly 
business votes for Hoover did not reflect the kind of confidence which, in 
125. Wecter, Dixon, The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-1941, 51. 
126. Rauch, Basil, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938, 51-52. 
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the President's view, a pro-business government was supposed to instill 
--confidence which resulted in investment. (In Tugwell's opinion, busi-
ness could not be expected to invest when it had no customers,) 
If Hoover's thesis -- the existence of a government benevolent to 
business promoted business activity -- had been valid, there could have 
been no depression in the first place; prosperity stemming from business 
confidence would, in turn, have given the people confidence in Hoover, 
who in all probability would have been reelected; Roosevelt would never 
have attained a position in which his conduct could destroy business 
confidence. In other words, the very facts of the depression and Hoover's 
defeat revealed his lame-duck confidence thesis as an oversimplified, 
surface analysis by indicating that business lost confidence before Roose-
velt appeared on the scene. Tugwell commented that Roosevelt by no means 
won the confidence of the voters with his cautious, generalized campaign; 
the election of 1932 was primarily a vote of lack of confidence in Hoover.127 
By February, 1933, even those business men whose confidence in the 
Hoover administration referred only to their own desires for self-preser-
vation gave up all hope of salvaging anything from the economic wreckage 
of the nation under Hoover. In the final crisis, the most selfish busi-
ness interests at last surrendered their position, They no longer hoped 
to save their own necks by their own wits and the aid of a benevolent, 
hands-off government. They did not, of course, lose their desire for sal-
127, Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
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vation. They did lose their wits; they were quite willing to be saved 
under active government direction. In 1933, Tugwell explained, 
It was no longer a theoretical depression, a problem in 
management, of scheduling production and arranging fin-
ances. Reserves were being exhausted; and corrosion was 
~triking in toward the strong boxes of the mighty. De-
pression had become a personal matter to those whose 
raised voices counted. The immunities which went with 
superior place were giving way. And a crisis approached 
which was, at last, one which affected more than workers, 
more than the poor in their miserable homes. The wave 
of liquidation had swept up the middle-class institutions 
-- insurance, banking, investment -- and was now threat-
ening to break into the most luxurious offices of the 
tallest skyscrapers,l28 
By 1933 the expensive build-up that business had given 
itself had collapsed. It would not be a great exaggeration 
to say that businessmen and their representatives had been 
managing the nation when disaster had come to it, and 
since Hoover, their man, had been President, and Harding 
and Coolidge had also been their Presidents, they were 
without any alibi. The loss of face was complete. They 
had lost their nerve, too, and had turned to the govern-
ment, whose powers they had taken, so much trouble to 
reduce.l29 
The instrument Lthe~/ would seek then and use was the de-
spised, the bought and sold, the debauched -- the govern-
mentzl30 
In 1933 • ••• men of property L;er~ well-nigh as eager to invoke the gov-
ernment's intercession in the 'flat ~llet 1 era as tcey had been to protest 
its interference in flush times.• 131 Americans were disenchanted with the 
128. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 135. 
129. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, June, 1951, 302. 
130. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government," Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951. 
131. Wecter, Dixon, The ~of the Great Depression, 1929-1941, 44. 
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•supermen• of wealth and power who once ruled New York and Washington.132 
Several pillars of the banking community went to pieces; of those who did 
not, many came "perilously close• to it.133 
For months after the March crisis the greAt bankers seemed too 
chastened to lift the voice ot self-assertion; they were also aware that 
Roosevelt was irresistible -- at least for the time being,l34 Some observ-
ers saw repentant industrialists and financiers eagerly cooperating in the 
creation of s new era; Tugwell saw •only a lot of badly scared men who 
will return to their old habits as soon as they dare.• 135 Tugwell believed 
that business' attitude had a crisis quality; in a crisis 
••• fright overtakes privilege and reduces resistance to 
change; opportunity for creative ideas opens out when 
something is desperately enough needed,l36 
He did not expect 
Business ••• willingly Lt~ give up the status estab-
lished in so many struggles. True, it was frightened 
almost to death, and consequently ready to concede that 
the government might do unusual things in the way of 
providing benefits such as were offered by the R.F.C., 
but its lawYers would never lose sight of the permanent 
questions involved even in this,l37 
Business was in fact willing in the crisis to concede to the govern-
ment prerogatives to go beyond measures such as the creation of the R.F.C. 
132. 
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Bankers talked of all kinds of schemes, •even ••• of nationalizing the 
banking business.• 138 Under such circumstances Roosevelt, had he been a 
socialist, might have nationalized the banks and set the nation moving 
toward extreme collectivism; "he was simply an:: old-fashioned American 
with traditional views on the benefits of the system of private enter• 
prise and ownership of property, who believed the capitalist system was 
worth saving.• 139 
The Roosevelt administration did not wish to destroy business con-
fidence. On November 22, 1932, Moley told Hoover that the appointment of 
a separate debt commission would be played up dramatically by the press, 
precipitating "so much uncertainty as to the future that a stoppage 
rather than an acceleration of business activity would result." 14° Roose-
velt, however, refused to rely on words alone to restore confidence. He 
took measures to give business customers; measures to restore purchasing 
power distinguished Roosevelt's response to the crisis from that of Hoover. 
Tugwell pointed out that Roosevelt responded to the needs of all the people: 
138. 
139. 
140. 
141. 
••• Mr. and Mrs. Big stood shuddering now on their dis-
solving islands, threatened by turbulent waters. Sud-
denly they remembered government, the despised, the 
bought-and-sold, the not-quite-respectable. •come save 
us,• they clamored. Even Mr. Hoover heard that cry in 
the intervals of proclaiming tranquility and prosperity. 
He sent a rowboat out to save the Bigs; the Littles 
could get along as they always had, for all of him. But 
from the Albany house, to ears sensitized at least by an 
education in political progressiveness, the future Presi-
dent heard Littles as well as Biga.l41 
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Tugwell, himself, played a ]JArt in bringing on the banking crisis 
according to Hoover and his supporters. On February 25, 1933, Tugwell 
had lunch ~<ith J'anes H. Rand, J'r., Chairman of the Board, Remington Rand, 
Incorporated. Rand telephoned to the White House a summary of the con-
versation. Hoover confirmed Rand's message in a letter, •as I wanted it 
in the record.• 142 In 1934 Joslin referred to the letter in his book,l43 
In 1936, Lawrence Sullivan, who blamed the banking crisis on Roosevelt, 
and Myers and Ne\iton, mentioned Hoover's letter on the Rand-Tugwell con-
versation,l44 John T. Flynn included the letter in his book on Roosevelt 
in 1948.145 In 1952 Hoover cited his letter to Rand in his Memoirs.146 
Myers and Neliton gave the complete text: 
I beg to acknowledge your telephone message received through 
Mr. Joslin, as follows: 
•Professor Tugwell, adviser to Franklin D. Roosevelt, had 
lunch with me. He said they were fully aware of the bank 
situation and tr~t it would undoubtedly collapse in a few 
days, which would place the responsibility in the lap of 
President Hoover, He said, 'We should worry about anything 
except rehabilitating the country after ~Brch 4th. Then 
there would be severat moves; first an embargo on exporta-
tion of yellow chips; second, suspension of specie payments; 
third, reflation if necessary, after one and two, and after 
that arrangements would be made for the so-called business 
man's committee of 60 prominent manufacturers who have been 
igvited ~o spend half a day with Mr. Woodin on Tuesday 
LMarch 2/ in an attempt to gain support of the business in-
terests for a program.•• 
142. Hoover, Herbert, Ib& Memoirs of Herbert Hoover; Vol. III, The Great 
Depression, 1929-1941 (New York, Macmillan, 1952) 214. 
143· J'oslin, Theodore G., Hoover off the Record, 363-65. 
144• Moley, Raymond, ~Seven Years, 356; Sullivan, Lawrence, Prelude 
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145. Flynn, J'ohn T., The Roosevelt l!:1ldl! (New York, Devin-Adair, 1948) 24. 
146. Hoover, Herbert, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover; Vol. III, The Great 
Depression, 1929-1941, 214. 
I also have your suggestion that in consequence of this 
attitude I should at once demand of Congress a general 
guarantee of bank deposits. 
When I consider this statement of Professor Tugwell's in 
connection with the recommendations we have made to the 
incoming administration I can say emphatically that he 
breathes with infamous politics devoid of every atom of 
patriotism. Mr. Tugwell would project millions of people 
into hideous losses for a Roman holiday,l47 
Hoover placed the letter under the heading, •some Reasons Why 
Roosevelt Refused to Cooperate.•148 According to John T. Flynn the let-
ter confirmed Hoover's impression that he and Roosevelt were interested in 
two different things; Hoover wanted to save the banks and the people's 
savings; Roosevelt •was thinking of the political advantage of a complete 
banking disaster under Hoover.•l49 Sullivan stressed the importance of 
the effect of Tugwell's reference to the abandonment of the gold standard 
on the financial community; word of the plan which Tugwell outlined 
reached the financial district in New York on the afternoon of Saturday, 
February 25; it was this authoritative • inside infom.ation" which controlled 
events during the final week of the Hoover administration• as the financial 
community •began to brace itself for the final shock.• 15° 
In his oft-quoted memorandum to Senator Reed, Hoover implied that 
Roosevelt, like Tugwell, placed political considerations above national 
147• Myers, Williams. and Newton, Walter H., The Hoover Administration: 
A Documented Narrative, 356. 
148. Hoover,· Herbert, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover; Vol. III, The Great 
Depression, 1929-1941, 214. 
149· Flynn, John T., The Roosevelt~. 24. 
150. Sullivan, Lawrence, Prelude 1£ Panic: The .§1£r.Y of the Bank 
Holiday, 99. 
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welfare, possibly hoping for chaos out of which a new system would arise: 
But unless ~is L;bandonment of ninety per cent of the 
so-called new deal through acceptance of Hoover's pro• 
gram? is done, they run a grave danger of precipitating 
a complete financial debacle. If it is precipitated, 
the responsibility lies squarely with them for they have 
had ample warning - unless of course, such a debacle is 
part of the •new deal.•l51 
In this memorandum Hoover, who questioned Tugwell's patriotism, unwittingly 
revealed a morbid fear of failure which had become so much a part of him 
that, in effect, his concern for his own place in history outweighed his 
concern for the national welfare. He would, the memorandum showed, have 
placed Roosevelt in a position in which there were these two alternatives 
available to the President-elect: (1) adopt Hoover's policies; (2) be 
subject to the charge of playing politics, regardless of the national wel-
faire, amid the debacle that was probable if Roosevelt did not follow the 
first alternative. In short, if Roosevelt did not agree with Hoover, he 
would be unpatriotic. It did not occur to Hoover that any policies other 
then his own, which had brought the nation to the brink of disaster after 
three years of depression, could stem the banking crisis. 
Again the chronological factor must be considered. Until after the 
first of March, 1933, Hoover accepted no modification of his policy, which 
was proving ineffective after a three-year trial; even then he would not 
move without Roosevelt's public support. Tugwell made his statement to 
151. Myers, Williams. and Newton, Walter H., The Hoover Administration: 
A Documented Narrative, 341. 
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Rend, which allegedly contributed to the banking crisis, on February 25, 
1933 -- three years after the banks began to suffer a continuous weaken-
ing, and aner the final crisis of February, 1933, was underway. Sulli-
van noted that the banking community was informed, for the first of 
several times, in the November-January debt conversations that Roosevelt 
contemplated some form of currency manipulation.152 In view of the 
bankers• opinion in January, which Sullivan noted, it is not likely that 
Tugwell's statement could have shocked the financial community. 
One may grant to Sullivan that in stating his thesis (Roosevelt's 
•cooperation• could have averted the final crisis) he did not disregard 
the decline prior to November, 1932. Yet, one cannot dissociate events 
which took place before the election from Roosevelt's attitude; the 
President-elect had no disposition to accept the recommendations of a 
President whose policies had not been effective. Maley said that Hoover's 
requests for a statement on currency matters amounted to a demand for a 
promise which Roosevelt could not honestly make. The origins of the 
situation which caused Roosevelt and Maley to believe that they could not 
honestly pledge strict adherence to the gold standard dated back to a 
time earlier than the lame-duck period. It was beneficial to the nation 
for students and publicists like Sullivan to advance their interpretations 
of the banking crisis; there was no basis, especially in view of the 
previous inadequacy of Hoover's policies and the seriousness of the situ-
ation in early 1933, to question the patriotism of men who did not agree 
152. Sullivan, Lawrence, Prelude 1£ Panic: The Story .Qf. the Bank Holiday, 
99. 
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with Hoover. 
It did not occur to Hoover and his supporters that Tugwell's 
airy "We should worry •••• • could have been the result of despair -- a 
despair arising from a patriotic concern over the crisis. The Presi-
dential coterie did not consider the possibility that Tugwell said "We 
should worry ••• •" because he had concluded that it was useless to worry 
until March 4; Hoover would not modify his stand as the country plunged 
toward disaster. Marriner Eccles, who went to New York to see Tugwell 
in late February, about the time of the Rand incident, found the Pro-
feasor fer from flippant. They lunched in a drugstore booth; Eccles 
found Tugwell steeped in gloom, despairing because it •was clear that 
nothing could be or would be done to stop the final collapse.• 153 Tug-
well's attitude was roughly analogous to that of George Peek on the farm 
problem during the campaign of 1932; Beak was willing to forego any 
argument over plans since he believed nothing could be accomplished until 
Hoover was ousted.l54 Eccles reviewed the banking situation-- moratori-
ums, failures, and withdrawals -- remarking that Tugwell's attitude was 
based on events.155 
While Tugwell was gloomy, it was not his gloom which accounted 
for his saying "We should worry •••• • He later explained his remark to 
Rand: 
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I knew members of the Rand family from my home territory 
in upstate New York, James Rand knew of me for years. 
He paid little attention to me until it became known that 
I was to have something to do with policy. l'ihen Rand in-
vited me to lunch, he called me "Rex" for the first time. 
He was snooping around for information for his own specu-
lative purposes, I certainly did say •we should worry .... " 
I said it by way of evasion, I wanted to lend a light, 
airy tone to my conversation so that Rand wouldn't know 
how to take it. In other words, I wasn't going to tell 
him a damn thing. Hoover, who was understandably i~ bad 
shape in the lame-duck period, took it seriously,l5b 
Subsequent events showed that Tugwell made a tactical error; they 
also showed that he did not misjudge Rand. It would have been difficult 
to put off Rand with a simple "We should worry .... "; on the other hand, 
Tugwell should not have mentioned, even in a studied offhand manner, a 
specific three-point program. Tugwell was not fully aware of how quickly 
private statements got around; he made a similar mistake regarding what 
he thought was an off-the-record interview with a journalist earlier in 
February •157 
As for Rand's •speculative purposes,• his subsequent letters to 
Tugwell and his lobbying activities revealed his interest in inflation, 
On ~arch 14, 1933, Rand wrote to •Dear Rex,• enclosing a confidential 
analysis of the banking situation and stating, "I have nothing but praise 
for the leadership of the President •••• •; Rand suggested a deposit insur-
ance plan and favored raising the price of gold to 36 from 20.67 to help 
farmers, debtors, and creditors.158 On November 15, 1933. Rand sent to 
156. Interview lillJl writer. 
157. See below, Chapter XV. 
158. Tugwell Papers. 
Tugwell a summary of the •vicious propaganda emanating from the vicinity 
of Broad and Wall;" certain financiers, Rand warned, intended to break 
government bond prices, bringing the administration to its knees.l59 
Rand's letters to Tugwell revealed two significant facts. First, 
Rand apparently sought to cultivate the friendship of those men who 
happened to be in office -- which suggested in a general way some ulterior 
motive. Secondly, his advocating that the price of gold be raised from 
20.67 to 36 indicated his specific interest in inflation. He became a 
leader of the Committee for the Nation, which lobbied for outright infla-
tion. Rand learned that Tugwell would not bend in his opposition to the 
panacea of inflation. In 1934 it was William Wirt, of the Committee for 
the Nation, who charged, in a letter released by Rand, that Roosevelt was 
only the •Kerensky" of the New Deal revolution; Tugwell would eventually 
160 take over. There was more to Tugwell's "We should worry •••• • than 
met the eyes of Hoover, who called Rand "a responsible industrialist,• 161 
and his supporters. 
The final feature of Hoover's self-defense was his charge that the 
New Deal, as a whole, prevented recovery, which did not come until 1941, 
with America's entrance into World War II. Tugwell agreed with Hoover 
that the New Deal did not solve domestic economic problems before Pearl 
Harbor: 
159. Tugwell Papers. 
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President Roosevelt had to go on and on with an unbal-
anced budget, subsidizing the most demanding elements 
of the economy. He had to go on until W.P.A. merged 
into war production. It has to be remembered not only 
how the emergence from depression was accomplished, 
but also that there had been an almost immediate oncom-
ing of preparations for war. It is often said that it 
was easy for Hitler to boast of having cured unemploy-
ment because he had all the unemployed either in the 
army or hard at work making munitions. In a way, it was 
forced work paid for by inflation, The same thing was 
true of the Russians. And to a large extent it was ••• 
true in the United States. An attempt had been made in 
1936 to withdraw subsidies and relief spending. The re-
cession of 1937 showed that it could not be done in an 
unarticulated economy. It was never tried again; and 
the gradual rise of war preparations and then produc-
tion for war itself made it unnecessary,l62 
If Tugwell agreed with Hoover that unemployment ended only with 
war, his reference to an "unarticulated economy" indicated the area of 
his disagreement with Hoover. Tugwell believed that the capitalistic 
system could avoid periodic maladjustments through centralized allocation 
of resources (centralized control of investment) and price and profit 
controls; inflation and deficit spending, although necessary in the emer-
gency of the great depression, would have harmful effects as permanent 
policies.163 In Tugwell's view the New Deal failed because it did not go 
beyond •Progressivism,• adopting conjunctural institutions.164 In short, 
the New Deal failed because it did not do enough, not because, as Hoover 
maintained, it did too much. 
Because the depression ended with World War II, Roosevelt's detrac-
162. Tugwell, R. G., "A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• Journal 
of~ Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, February, 1949, 36-37. 
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tors made the simple deduction, which they expressed by implication, that 
he took us into war to cover up his domestic failure. John T. Flynn wrote: 
Saved now by the war from the disaster which overtook 
his administration in 1938 ••• he could now rise out 
of the ashes of a mere New Deal leader to become a 
modern St. Michael brandishing his sword against Hitler 
and all the forces of evil throughout the world,165 
Moley flatly rejected Flynn's implication: 
••• those who charge that Roosevelt threw himself into 
foreign affairs in 1938 because of a calculated desire 
to swing the attention of the country away from the 
unsolved economic problems at home do not know their 
man. Roosevelt was no cold-blooded moral opportunist. 
In fact, he felt so intensely the need to do right that 
he had to believe he did right. He was incapable of 
sustaining a planned duplicity. In this case the shift 
was the more easily made because the play of forces in 
Europe had so long been discribed in moral terms by our 
internationalists,l66 
The allegation that Roosevelt took the nation to war due to domes-
tic failure implied that he was aware of no alternative policy with which 
to replece an inadequate program, Tugwell talked with Roosevelt on several 
occasions after his resignation;167 he learned that the President, who 
had not essentially gone beyond traditional Progressivism up to that time, 
finally admitted the need for conjunctural institutions: 
It would not be until February, 1938, that President 
Roosevelt would give indisputable signs of recovery 
from Progressive orthodoxy. It would seem strange 
then, and contradictory, because it would come just 
after a new flare-up of antitrust oratory from mem-
bers of his administration. But it would be clearer 
and clearer from that time on that the President at 
165. Flynn, John T., The Roosevelt~. 182. 
166. Moley, Raymond, After Seven~. 376. 
167. The New XQtl; Times, December 29, 1937; 8:2; January 15, 1938, 1:5. 
least understood the need for social management rather 
than economic reform. It would have taken the sharp 
and costly recession of 1937 to drive the lesson home 
•••• There would be ••• a serious search for admini-
strative devices to implement the new policy •••• The 
grand objective would be a national balance to be 
achieved by the imposition of public controls at the 
points in our system where prices are decided. The 
objective would never be reached during the Roosevelt 
administration. The war would intervene, for one 
thing.l68 
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In a sense, as Tugwell indicated, the war deprived Roosevelt of 
the opportunity to attack the problem whose solution he felt would deter-
mine his place in history. In 1938 the administration lacked strong 
support in Congress due to domestic differences; bec8use of the need to 
consolidate national unity against the rise of the aggressive Axis, 
Roosevelt gave up the fight for domestic reform in return for Southern 
support on foreign policy.169 Tugwell commented: 
To meet the challenge of the Nazi~Fascist threat from 
1936 on seemed to him so overwhelmingly the most im-
portant contemporary objective that compromise of al-
most a~y s~f8• if it was really required, was worth 
the pr1ce. 
Roosevelt's greatest statesmanship was exhibited as it had never been in 
his domestic management, as he 
••• struggled with a reluctant public and with the 
recalcitrant Congress which represented it ••• he 
was imaginative, truly perceptive, with a certain and 
stubborn grasp of strategic reality. He realized the 
commitments of our position and of our power. He 
168. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business," Part I, 282. 
169. Rauch, Basil, The History of the~ Deal, 1933-1938, v111. 
170. Tugwell, R. G., •The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 322. 
would not let us rest in careless sloth while disaster 
was prepared by a smooth-spoken ene~ •••• Americans 
wanted not to be disturbed. There were not only - two 
thirds of them - living well and securely again after 
the fright of the early depression, but they were 
earnestly engaged in internal quarrels •••• They were 
also skeptical and pacifist,l71 
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In addition to the war, another factor prevented Roosevelt's sue-
cess in domestic matters -- the American people were not ready to support 
the establishment of conjunctural institutions. As a democrat, Roosevelt 
could not and would not compel acceptance. He failed where he most wanted 
to succeed: 
It is not true, as was sugges!ed Lby Eliot Janeway, 
Life Magazine, April 30, 1945/ that he did not want 
to resolve the crisis but only to keep it going so 
that he could ride it perpetually as a ship rides a 
storm, knowing that what was most fundamentally im-
portant was for him to stay ascendant, thus providing 
for American continuance, however divided. On the 
contrary, he wanted above all things to solve the 
domestic crisis: he considered that his flace in 
history would be determined by this test. 72 
Hoover, on the right, and an observer on the left like the historian 
Richard Hofstadterl73 judged Roosevelt's failure harshly --Hoover because 
Roosevelt had done too much, Hofstadter, who quoted Tugwell, because he 
had not done enough. Tugwell was not harsh in his final judgment; he 
stressed the problem of education which Roosevelt faced, concluding that 
failure as an educator could not be considered on the same basis as failure 
171. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 69. 
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Opportunist.• 
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as an economist-statesman: 
The real difficulty, the basic difficulty, with the pro-
gram was that it seemed not to be educative so that its 
elements of reciprocity could become permanent and its 
inflationary supports be dropped. None of the individu-
alists appeared to realize that his future existence as 
a functioning part of the econo~ would thereafter depend 
upon the maintenance of a calaulated relation with the 
rest of it. All in chorus talked of "getting back to 
freedom.• That kind of freedom had gone from the world 
forever if it was not to fall into a worse disaster than 
that from which it had been rescued. But some education 
was necessary to persuade democrats that this was so. 
They had demonstrated that they could not learn from ex-
perience. They would not tolerate the logical and neces-
sary extension of the institutions they had already 
accepted.l74 
If he failed, it was as an educator, as one who sought to 
bring us nearer to the acceptance of reality in national 
policy, who meant to turn as away from the past and toward 
the future. It is not fair to measure his success in any 
other way.l75 
There are, of course, degrees of failure. Tugwell asserted that 
Roosevelt's instincts and his weight coming down "constantly just a little 
on the side of humanity ••• served to save the domestic situation.• 176 
Roosevelt saved the capitalistic system from collapse; he failed to formu-
late a program which would make it function properly. What was Hoover's 
program? Hoover's supporters could derive little comfort from Tugwell's 
judgment of Roosevelt. Roosevelt failed due to his belated understanding 
of the need for social management, the demands of the war, and the unreadi-
174. Tugwell, R. G., "A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• 36. 
175• Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition,• 422. 
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ness of the American people to accept conjunctural institutions. That 
Hoover's "confidence• program could not have saved the capitalistic 
system, much less make it function properly, was, in Tugwell's view, 
a certainty. Hoover's policy had almost permitted the destruction of 
the capitalistic system; in fact, it was reasonable to assume that the 
system would not have survived much longer under Hoover's custodianship. 
Hoover's policy would have brought on the disaster which "fol-
lowed every loosening of rogue forces in such an intricately interrelated 
system as had been built up.• 177 Those who accepted Hoover's theses were 
not interested in a program for assuring long-run stability; they 
strained to return to their speculative practices, disregarding inten-
tiona they had expressed in 1933 in the midst of the debacle. Their lack 
of interest in long-run stability was obvious, because, as Tugwell noted, 
Their suggestions for recovery Lin 193~7 were the same ones 
which had proved inadequate before; but they were just as 
determined to try them again as if the failure were not of 
record. As a consequence of ••• official advice, it was to 
the •restoration of confidence• that the President addressed 
himself in his special message to the Congress on November 
15, 1937• He had been reluctant. Mr. Morgenthau had said 
to him: "What business wants to know is: Are we headed 
toward state socialism or are we going to continue on a 
capitalistic basis?• And the President had answered, wearily, 
• I have told them again and again.• But he did consent, with 178 
whatever reluctance, to reiterate once more the futile formula. 
Business would not accept any governmental approach other than a 
"confidence-giving• policy. When the worst of the economic debacle was 
over, business men returned to laissez-faire explanations of the depression 
177• Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business," Part I, 283. 
178. Tugwell, R. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 330. 
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and called for laissez-faire recovery policies. In 1934 one of Tugwell's 
critics referred to the origins of the depression, commenting that • 
••• 
for some unexplained reason, hesitation comes .... "; in 1928-1929 we 
lived beyond our means.179 Tugwell's idea that government should provide 
work in an emergency was unsound, this critic continued, because people 
could not be forced to buy goods.180 In other words, the government could 
give people jobs and wages; it could not make them spend their money. 
It is not necessary to refer to the propensity-to-consume of Keynesian 
economics -- a relief laborer with a family would spend his wages -- to 
refute the assertion of this business man. 
In the eyes of that portion of the business community (the whole 
business colllllUnity did not support the •confidence• thesis; not all of 
those who supported it believed it constituted a sound long-run policy for 
the general welfare) which longed to return to a 'confidence• basis for 
its operations 
••• Mr. Roosevelt would be a crazy fool of a reformer for 
continuing to insist, in the better times of partial re-
covery, that what had been weepingly promised in the £~~a­
repentance of a sto~ day should now be carried out. 
It might have been expected, Tugwell commented, 
179· Verity, George M., •Appraises Prof. Tugwell, Finds Lack of Appreci-
ation Problems of Business,• The l!£n Age, Vol. 134, No, 4, July 26, 
1934. 34· 
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••• that the vast expensive proof provided by the depres-
sion would have settled the matter. But the dream of 
easy, irresponsible and uncomplicated living had survived 
even that -- had survived, perhaps, because President 
Roosevelt had insisted, at the moment of crisis, on devot-
ing several (but a bere minimum) of billions of dollars, 
spread among consumers by work-relief, to thetempting out 
of warehouses of goods which had been otherwise sterile 
•••• Was this temporary salvation of the economic system 
well received? Everyone knows it was done to the accompan-
iment of wails and groans and against the most violent 
opposition of press and pundits.l82 
The logical end result of the attitude of business men who mouthed 
the •confidence• thesis was reached in the Hoover thesis -- that the New 
Deal prevented the recovery which a •confidence" policy would have 
assured. Tugwell rejected this thesis in no uncertain terms. 
••• upon the turning of the balance toward recovery, the 
lesson, instead of being taken to heart had been repudi• 
ated. There had been, then, a wide conspiracy to pretend 
that the whole cataclysm had been caused by the measures 
taken for recovery. 
••• when it was said that the minimum measures of the New 
Deal~ responsible, the ultimate hypocrisy had been 
reached; for those who said it knew that it was.Yalse. 
They said it risking the further disaster of such counsel, 
in complete cynicism, because they themselves would gain, 
they thought, from the country's loss.l83 
The latest round in the Hoover-Tugwell debate opened with the pub• 
lication in 1952 of The Memoirs £[ Herbert Hoover: The Great Depression, 
1929-1941.184 Hoover again stated that the depression was primarily a 
Democratic creation. Tugwell replied to Hoover's assertions in an article-
182. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 441. 
183. Tugwell, R. G.,~ Stricken Land, 441-42. 
184. New York, Macmillan. 
review, "The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover," 'rhe Antioch Review, 
Winter, 1953-54· 
Tugwell recalled that during the campaign of 1932 the attitude of 
the Roosevelt group toward Hoover changed from infuriation at the repre-
sentative of "the smug immovability of reaction" to pity. It became 
apparent that it had been a mistake to reason thRt "a scientific training 
implied social' realism," Hoover 
••• genuinely considered that consent to the mild mea-
sures of reform proposed by his opponent was immoral 
••• because there was almost no distinction, in his 
mind, between federal relief for the unemployed, for 
instance, and Communism. At the very least the one 
was a commitment to the other. He was to be pitied 
because he suffered,l85 
Raymond Maley reported, after the Hoover-Roosevelt meeting in the 
White House on November 22, 1932, •He LHoovei/ has the look of being done, 
but still of going on and on, driven by some damned duty,• Tugwell de-
fined Hoover's duty as the minimization of the disaster to the country 
which, Hoover believed, Roosevelt's accession involved, Hoover performed 
his duty with an impressive consistency, which "led ••• inevitably to 
tragedy," He allowed himself inadequate weapons. A partisan and hostile 
Congress harrassed him, He failed to halt a decline toward disaster as 
he prepared to turn his office over to a man he deeply distrusted.186 
In Tugwell's opinion, Hoover's clinging to ineffective policies 
demonstrated that the President was •not an engineer st all in any factual 
sense, but a man of principle,•187 Tugwell referred to Hoover's position 
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on the gold standard as a specific illustration of his theology-like ideas 
in political econ~. On February 13, 1933, Hoover proclaimed, 
Ever since the storm began in Europe the 
has held staunchly to the gold standard. 
tained one Gibraltar of stability in the 
United States 
We have Jm.in-
world.l88 
Hoover's acclamation of the gold standard seemed to Tugwell and his col-
leagues 
••• a curious view in February of that year. There was 
no Gibraltar of stability for all those unemployed and 
their families, all those farm and home owners who were 
being dispossessed, all those holders of insurance poli-
cies whose companies were insolvent; and there was none 
even for industrialists whose factories were closed. 
Presumably it was a Gibraltar for those who owned gold. 
But even the banks did not own enough. Within a month 
they would all be refusing payment to depositors.l89 
On February 17, only a few days after his "Gibraltar" speech, Hoover 
sent his famous letter to Roosevelt. The President repeated his theory 
of the depression. He listed the continual •sr,ocks" to the American eco-
n~. He wrote, •we are confronted with precisely the same phenomena we 
experienced late in 1931 and again in the spring of 1932.• 19° The chron-
ology in Hoover's comment suggested that his policies of 1930, 1931, and 
1932 had not gotten to the root of our economic ills. In his comments 
after his defeat at the polls, Hoover did not describe the final crisis 
as another phenomenon in a pattern of recurrence. He maintained that the 
crisis in 1933 was due to Roosevelt's conduct in the lame-duck period. 
Hoover insisted that a lsck of confidence was our principal prob-
188. Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists,• 420. 
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lem. In his letter of February 17 he requested that Roosevelt guarantee 
no currency tampering, a balanced budget, and the protection of govern-
ment credit through a limitation on public-security issues -- a policy 
calculated to give business the confidence essential to recovery. Hoov-
er•s written request in February ~s, Tugwell felt, 
••• about as far as a human being even went in sticking 
to his guns while the ship went down. There was the 
clear implication that the Republican policy was to be 
absolved of all blame for the depression, That holocaust 
had begun as the aftermath of war, it had continued be-
cause of •shock from abroad," and heroic efforts to over-
come it had been frustrated by irresponsible Democrats,l91 
Hoover, Tugwell noted, did not believe that dissent from his views 
~s possible; Roosevelt and his advisers, as reasoning people, must ac-
capt the President's analysis and cooperate in obvious measures for 
recovery; Tugwell attributed •such obtuseness ••• to immersion in an ide-
ology immune to events.• 192 Hoover stated his confidence thesis during 
the campaign; he elaborated it in his Memoirs twenty years later. "Few 
men in all history,• Tugwell asserted, •can have played a Premier role 
in comparable circumstances and have kept their ideas .so inviolate.• 193 
Tugwell pointed out that the writings of Hoover and his apologists 
did not suggest that there was any explanation of the depression other 
than their own.194 Actually, Roosevelt offered his analysis of the causes 
of the depression, •cautiously, but nevertheless unmistakably," beginning 
191. Tugwell, R. G., •The Protagonists,• 421. 
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with his acceptance speech.195 Roosevelt's explanation was a "mechan-
istic, not a psychological,• one, calling for mechanistic remedies such 
as price controls and reflation for the restoration of •exchangeability•; 
Hoover contended that inferences of the possibility of price controls 
and inflation under the Democrats frightened businessmen, making it im-
possible for his measures of 1932 and early 1933 to be effective "The 
Roosevelt idea of what the cure ought to be made it impossible for the 
Hoover cure to work.• 196 
Tugwell quoted from the Memoirs Hoover's summary of the cure he 
tried to apply. The first four items in Hoover's list were economic and 
social desiderata: (1) the avoidance of bank depositors' and credit 
panics; (2) the prevention of widespread bankruptcy and the losses of 
homas and productive power; (3) the giving of aid to agriculture; (4) the 
mitigation of unemployment and the relief of those in actual distress.197 
The last five items were qualifications: (1) the prevention of 
industrial conflict and social disorder; (2) the preservation of the fin-
ancial strength of the United States government, its credit and its cur-
rency, in order to keep the "dollar ringing true on every counter in the 
world"; (3) and (4) warrant direct quotation• 
(3) to advance much-needed economic and social reforms as 
fast as could be, without such drastic action as would 
intensify the illness of an already sick nation; 
(4) to sustain the courage and morale of the people in 
195· See above, Chapter II, Section, "Misuse of Surplus.• 
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order that their initiative should remain unimpaired, 
and to secure from the people themselves every effort 
for their own salvation; 
(5) rigid adherence to the Constitution and the fundamental liberties of 
the people.198 
Tugwell called attention to the fact that Hoover, making his sum-
mary in 1952, •may possibly have exaggerated to some degree the prompt-
ness and the energy with which the crisis -was met." Hoover worked hard. 
That he did everything cited when it should have been done could be 
questioned. The qualifications in the last five items on the list, in 
Tugwell's judgment, largely ruled out what Hoover suggested in the first 
part of the list.199 Tugwell's conclusion was not unreasonable. Any 
measure contemplated could raise close questions as to whether its adop-
tion would be a gain or a loss, or both, for the economy or morale. Care-
ful study and consideration of economic and morale factors was necessary; 
immediate action was also essential. 
When Hoover resumed the debate in his Memoirs, he still thought he 
had the best of it; "an impatient democracy had preferred to follow after 
a siren voice." Tugwell observed that Hoover had found it difficult to 
accept the people's decision because he "felt so virtuous about the whole 
thing. • Hoover italicised in his l'Iemoirs one of his typical affirmations 
of the campaign of 1932: 
198. Hoover, Herbert, The !olemoirs of Herbert Hoover, Volume III, The Great 
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We have not feared boldly to adopt unprecedented measures 
to meet the unprecedented violence of the storm. But be-
cause we heve kept ever before us these eternal principles 
of our nation, the American Government in its ideals is 
the same as it was when the people gave the Presidency 
into my trust •••• We have resolutely rejected the tempta-
tion, under pressure of immediate events, to resort to 
those panaceas and short cuts which, even if temporarily 
successful, would ultimately undermine and weaken what has 
slowly been built and molded by experience and effort 
throughout these hundred and fifty years.200 
Hoover appears to have emphasized form rather than function; he rejected 
variations in detail from a set structure -- variations calculated to 
preserve the essential elements of that structure. If he did not believe 
that variations were necessary, he underestimated, in the opinion of Tug-
well and the other Brain Trusters, the threat of the depression to the 
traditional American way of life,201 
Hoover was aware that his lofty moral position was not enough to 
win the election; his refusal to compromise despite this awareness was, 
to Tuewell, •a measure of his inflexibility, or, if thP.t is preferred, his 
devotion to principle.• Hoover knew that only a quick economic upturn 
would save him politically; he believed that such a rise •~s underway --
it was apparent in July. Was there enough time for recovery to demonstrate 
to the public the rightness of Hoover's policies? Unfortunately, for 
Hoover, the Memoirs recorded, the upturn was 
••• halted by the ~aine elections at the end of September 
200. Hoover, Herbert, Address, Washington, D. C., in The Memoirs of 
fterbert Hoover, Volume III, 256-57; cited in Tugwell, R. G., "The 
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which, in effect, went against us. The fears of the 
business world at Roosevelt's announced policies started 
a downward movement for the next six weeks which greatly 
nullified our hopes of mitigating the political influence 
of the depression.202 
The logic of Hoover's confidence thesis, on the basis of his own 
account, is difficult to grasp. His policies had failed to give to busi-
ness the confidence it needed to lead the way to recovery -- or he would 
have decisively won the September election in the solid Republican state 
of Maine. Roosevelt's announced policies would not have disturbed busi-
ness if a Roosevelt victory had been considered improbable. A Roosevelt 
victory would not have appeared probable if Hoover's confidence thesis 
had been valid; his •pro-business• administration had not halted a steady 
three-year decline. 
The confidence thesis was a dogmatic, surface analysis, which did 
not reach to the fundamental economic maladjustments out of which the 
depression came. Nevertheless, Hoover did not give up on the thesis that 
the depression was a Democratic creation, for, Tu,well commented, 
202. 
if Roosevelt had been right in 1932, business had brought 
on its own debacle and complete freedom of enterprise was 
no longer a tenable policy for the nation • 
••• when candidates wavered, and seemed to accept the New 
Deal, when even the platforms became equivocal on some 
doctrinal issues, the aging ex-President in the Waldorf 
Tower, growing more saturnine and even more fixed as he 
grew older, was always standing somewhere in the shadows 
to remind newcomers where their faith had to center. He 
appeared at successive conventions; he made speeches in 
each campaign; and in the interludes he made other speeches 
Hoover, Herbert, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Volume III, 269; 
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and issued statements. He was still carrying on the debate 
against Roosevelt.203 
Tugwell noted that Hoover was always convinced that he h~d not 
lost the debate. Those wbo had turned against him hod not rejected his 
ideas; they had defected for other reasons --they h~d suffered too much; 
they had chosen the •easy and wicked way out,• rejecting the "honest but 
trying struggle" he had repeatedly outlined. In 1952 Hoover, still carry-
ing on the debate, had "final proof." Victory was won through the defeat 
of Roosevelt and everything he stood for. The nation could return to the 
policies of the 1920s because they had not, as Roosevelt said they had, 
caused the depression: 
What had caused the depression - at least its later and more 
serious phases - was Democratic behavior which had resulted 
in loss of confidence. This had to be believed, a psychi-
atrist might have said, because a return to the Republican-
ism of the 120s would otherwise cause a new depression. 
Democratic responsibility not only had to be accepted, it 
was true. There was good old Herbert Hoover, whose faith 
had never wavered, still proclaiming the proof that Roose-
velt had lightly tossed aside.204 
In 1952 Hoover submitted the following facts as proof of his thesis: 
( 1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
( 4) 
The depression extended from 1929 to 1941. 
Recovery was rapid in other nations with free economies; 
New Deal devices prevented recovery in the United States 
under Roosevelt in peace-time. 
The New Deal attempt to collectivize the American system 
of life was the primary cause of the failure to recovery 
of the American economy. 205 The depression was •ultimately in name ended only by war.• 
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Hoover supported his proof with figures •collated patiently over the 
years with engineering neatness.• The figures demonstrated the truth of 
what Hoover had always insisted was fact: 
It had been a Democratic depression, and the Republicans 
had had it licked but the Democrats had interfered and 
prevented recovery until war had intervened and saved 
them. It was 3gite safe to go back to the Republicanism 
of the 1920s.2 
Tugwell pointed out that in 1952 Hoover, who at times had seemed 
to stand almost alone in proclaiming what men had to believe, now found 
his thesis accepted "in perhaps the dominant intellectual majority." 
"This would be conclusive.• Pundits had taught Hoover's thesis; courses 
in schools of business had elaborated it; radio commentators and finan-
cial writers now repeated it Quite casually. There was, Tugwell noted, 
a •certain peevishness" against a perverse minority of intellectuals who 
adhered to Roosevelt's explanation of the depression. Persistency in 
politicians was understandable; the failure of intellectuals to be set 
right was "downright dangerous - heresy might spread.• If another depres-
sion occurred, Roosevelt's contentions might find t-.lde acceptance again; 
another Roosevelt might defeat another Hoover; another New Deal might 
actually carry out the program Roosevelt "had only proclaimed but had 
never implemented" -- for 
••• the alternative to Hoover's •proof" was the horrid 
suggestion that perhaps recovery had not occurred because 
actually there had never been any New Deal as Hoover 
defined it. That is to say, prices and investment had 
not been controlled and the resort to spending had never 
206. Tugwell, R. G., •The Protagonists,• 427-28. 
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been sufficient. This would, it could be seen, account 
for the ending of the depression in 1941 end not before -
1941 brought ample spending as well as a certain regimen-
tation,207 
Tugwell asserted that it was even possible to argue that Roose-
velt did not achieve recovery because he operated within •somewhat the 
same limitations as did Hoover,• believing in the same private and public 
virtues.208 Both Presidents had a concern for national character; both 
thought liberty precious; both had a strong attachment to private enter-
prise. Whet was involved, Tugwell concluded, was "a matter of degree 
rather than of kind.• 209 
In Hoover's view there simply were •resorts that were not avail-
able.• Government had to help people to help themselves; it could not 
help them directly: 
Better suffer or even die - and certainly better suffer 
political defeat - than compromise this principle. So 
he haggled with the Democratic Congress about relief and 
about public works. The Government might make loans to 
the states but not gifts to people, Public works must be 
self-liquidating. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
might support banks; it might not supplant the entrepre-
neur,210 
Governor Roosevelt seemed to be "dangerously inflexible" on such questions. 
"It was hard to say just why," because Roosevelt's conservative statements 
on fiscal policy were sincere. In view of subsequent developments, Roose-
velt's Pittsburgh campaign speech, which attacked Hoover for his unbalanced 
207. 
208. 
209. 
210. 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists," 428. 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists,• 428. 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists,• 428-29. 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists,• 429. 
271. 
budgets, nru.st have seemed to Hoover a "blow below the belt." That speech 
would later return to torment Roosevelt; 'what is too often overlooked is 
the genuineness of the torment.• 211 
Those who worked with Roosevelt, Tugwell recalled, were always aware 
of his desire for economy, a balanced budget, and a sound dollar. He did 
reduce current government operations as promised in the Pittsburgh speech. 
For more than a year he saw eye to eye in fiscal matters with Lewis Doug-
212 las, Director of the Budget, who had a fervor for economy. Numerous 
New Deal administrators could attest that Roosevelt was reluctant to 
enter into deficit spending, resisting it at every step. ~3.300,000,000 
was appropriated in 1933 for relief and public works; if that was an 
astronomical figure to conservatives, Senators Ls Follette and Wagner, 
experts in this matter, knew that $12,000,000,000 ;10uld have been a more 
realistic sum. In Tugwell's opinion, the two Progressive Senators were 
•quite right, if what was wanted was what was professed to be wanted -
the relief of unemployment.• New Deal expenditures 
••• were never enough to relieve unemployment and conse-
quently to secure recovery. They therefore in the long 
run had to be far more than they would have had to be if 
the initial attack had been logically and courageously 
carried out. The reason it could not be, and the reason 
there was always wavering and insufficienty, was that 
President Roosevelt felt just as much convinced of sin 
when the budget was unbalanced as Hoover had been. 
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was excised in wholesale fashion from the budget with the "lame• 
excuse that universities ought to do that kind of thing, Tugwell, R. 
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Then too, much of what was appropriated was not used in 
ways calculated to give maximum effect. This again was 
for a moral reason Hoover must have approved. There were 
repeated and serious struggles within the administration, 
not always known about by outsiders, over this matter. 
There were those who contended that direct relief was 
cheaper, easier to administer, and quicker than public 
works •••• But the President was adamant. People must 
earn their livings; the government must get out of the 
relief business. It was a matter of morals.213 
Similarly, the President insisted, in discussions of the Social Security 
Act, that social insurance should be insurance --paid for by the benefi-
ciaries out of wages.214 
Tugwell concluded his description of Roosevelt's economic-moral 
orthodoxy with the observation that 
213. 
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••• if Hoover carried his principles too far, they 1-rere 
not different from the Roosevelt principles which on 
occasion were modified or attenuated. The long debate, 
Hoover versus Roosevelt, is misconceived if it is thought 
to proceed from morals or orthodoxy on the one side against 
immorality or unorthodoxy on the other. If President 
Roosevelt unbalanced the budget, devalued the dollar, and 
involved the federal government in the direction of enter-
prise, it was because these expedients were forced on him 
by depression and war. In resorting to them he was, in his 
own mind, doing wrong. And so he was sensitive to attack. 
It is probable that President Roosevelt changed in many of 
these matters. There is reason to believe that he came to 
understand the theory of the compensated budget, as he did 
not in 1933, and to see that a Federal agency, presiding 
over the function of conjuncture, was necessary, as he had 
not in 1933• 
But in those early years he was far nearer to Hoover than 
either realized. But likenesses and differences, if less 
than is usually thought, are still significant ,215 
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Tugwell reasoned that Hoover was sufficiently inflexible, within the 
li~ral capitalistic philosophy he shared with Roosevelt, to meet the 
depression effectively. The only explanation available to him -- the 
Democrats caused the depression -- simultaneously stemmed from and dis• 
regarded his inflexibility. 
In his article-review, Tugwell turned to a biographical sketch of 
Roosevelt, emphasizing the HYde Park citizen's noblesse oblige, his 
acceptance of social responsibility, his youthful humility and sincerity 
--later camouflaged but still present, his warmth and concern for his 
home, his feeling for family and friends, his regerd for the welfare of 
others -· all developing beneath a deceptive surface which led those who 
knew him as a youth to wonder how he could be different from what they 
thought he was, a "gilded youth without a thought in his head." Tugwell 
rejected the contention that Roosevelt's illness brought about a transfor-
mation; "the inner convictions which m=de Franklin Roosevelt the instru-
ment of his nation's return to health were his own," an extension of his 
own nature which experiences ripened but did not create. Roosevelt con-
cealed his ccnviction of appointment and his dedication to service. Fin-
ally, Tugwell cited Roosevelt's deep religious faith, unostentatious and 
consistent with gaiety and intellectual freedom, but nevertheless deeply 
held; it transformed itself into a "concern for human welfare which over-
rode any principle of government or any conception of business. ••• Insti-
tutions were instrumental •••• • 216 
216. Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists,• 432·34· 
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Tugwell next analyzed Hoover's Memoirs, noting the comparative 
verve of Volume I, Years of Adventure, Hoover had two decades of rare 
adventure. He was successful; he effected creative chan[es, imposing 
order on chaos through his integrity, his single-mindedness, and his 
administrative genius, He was always in demand, never asking for a job 
or seeking a client after he was twenty-one, He accumulated a fortune 
217 in these years, years which fixed his mind and character, 
From 1917 until 1933 Hoover was in public service. Out of his 
experience he had "generated an impatience and a xenophobia which would 
never leave him•; he disliked and scorned politicians, bureaucrats, and 
"foreigners.• He tended to trust American eneineers and "almost no one 
else," He was impatient with lawyers and diplomats.· He believed other 
peoples to be inferior to Americans, arriving at this belief despite his 
world-wide contacts and success, Success, Tugwell concluded, was the 
key to Hoover's career up to 1929: 
There was, indeed, never a backwerd step, a check, a humili-
ation or disappointment in his whole life until he came to 
the Presidency and fate played him the lowest trick she could 
reserve tor a successful man. She had in store for him the 
revelation that the system in which he operated with such 
unvarying success and which had raised him to its most power-
ful position was fatally defective. It failed in his hands 
at the crucial moment of his career. He could not believe 
that it was true; and he would not be.ieve it until the day 
of his death. Huch of the rest of his life would be spent 
in tortuous processes of ratiocination intended to show - and 
to convince others - that the obvious was not feet. 
Hoover's attitude toward his successor underlined his inability to con-
sider any interpretaticn of events other than his 011n; he distrusted 
217. Tug;rell, R, G., •The Protagonists,• 434-36. 
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Roosevelt "as profoundly as it is possible for one man to distrust 
anot~er," 218 
Tugwell described the Memoirs, after the first volume, as "one 
long argument against President Roosevelt, centerine in the CRuses of and 
the cures for the Great Depression." The argument is still going on. In 
1952 there were no great differences on foreign policy; there was about 
ninety percent agreement on domestic policy. Differences revolved around 
the question not 
••• whether free enterprise should be encouraged, but 
whether it should operate within a framework; not whether 
money should be "sound," but whether soundness meant 
anchoraee to gold; not whether the budget should be bal-
anced, but when it should be balanced. In 1932 Governor 
Roosevelt promised to be sounder, more economical and 
more reformist than Hoover. In 1952 General Eisenhower 
promised the same things if he were chosen over Governor 
Stevenson, The electorate, havint; two candidates to 
choose from, neither of whom offended their sense of 
principle, chose that one who promised to find ways in 
which principle could be made to comport with the solu-
tion of the outstandin~ issue - in 1932 the depression, 
in 1952 the cold wsr,2 9 
The electorate did not, Tugwell asserted, choose either the ninety-
six percent or the eighty-six percent free enterprise theory of sustained 
prosperity (the Republicans would leave only four percent leeway, having 
the government save business from disaster; the Democrats would heve in 
addition to an RFC a Relief Administration), Neither pRrty advocated 
government responsibility for conjucture, which Roosevelt abandoned in 
1935 at the dictum of the Supreme Court and never again suggested. 
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Hoover went on assertine that Roosevelt's position never shifted; the 
Democrats attributed to the Republicans a complete lack of sympathy with 
labor, consumers, and common people. "The truth is that both have given 
away by some four percent. To that extent the debate has become unreal-
istic, beside the point.• 220 
Yet, there were still grounds for a debate, Tuewell noted, despite 
concessions by both sides; neither Roosevelt nor Hoover gave up-- they 
only gave way. Roosevelt hoped to transform the Democratic party into 
a progressive one; meanwhile, the pressure of orthodox progressivism 
perverted the administration of NRA and compelled resort to inflation 
through devaluation and spending. The greater inflation of the pre-war 
and war periods concealed the failure to achieve recovery. Truman did 
not have to face the problem of creating conjunctural institutions be-
cause inflation again occurred with renewed preparations for war.221 
Hoover, 1'ugwell noted, was never reconciled to Republican conces-
sions as his party gave way, absorbing social security and other "social 
minima.• Republicans gave no ground on the enterprise front, choosing 
to interpret their victory of 1952 as a businessman's victory. The 
Roosevelt-Hoover debate continued. Tugwell quoted a passage from an 
article entitled "New Dealers Still Blame Hoover," appearing on the fin-
ancial pege of the Chicago Daily News on February 9, 1953: 
••• the induced deflation to Roosevelt caused by his unwill-
ingness to cooperate with Hoover and his bank holiday was 
220. Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists," 438. 
221. Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists," 438-39· 
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Ill9.ny times more severe than anything that happened under 
Hoover •••• Billions were unnecessarily sacrificed in 
bank assets in order that FDR could have his fun. 
But the man in the street never got that picture. The 
present generation of New Deal writers probably never 
heard of it, 222 
It is interesting to note that the differences between Tugwell and 
Roosevelt, on an intellectual level (Tuewell was willing, on a practical 
level, to serve in the emergency), were greater than the differences 
between Hoover and Roosevelt, Tuv-1ell defined the struggle between the 
two Presidents in •somewhat narrower terms than are sometimes used": 
Neither the protagonists nor the majority of these they 
represented were so separate as capitalism or socialism, 
for instance, as is sometimes said or implied. They both 
regarded themselves as liberal capitalists, even if the 
Roosevelt definition would have included planning and dir-
ection. 'fhey differed on a CJ.Uestion of instrumentalism -
·•hat was end and what was means and what could therefore 
be properly manipulated and what had to be regarded as 
untouchable. If this seems narro''' ground for so epic a 
struggle it is nevertheless the ground on which it is 
taking place,223 
From the standpoint of 'I'ugwell's institutional economics, Roosevelt 
did very little -- although he 
222. 
223. 
224. 
••• reluctantly came to see (even if the conviction was 
implemented so poorly), that an intelligent anddemocratic 
collectivism is the sine ~ ~ of individualism and 
liberty, that it became so because of technology, that 
there is no return to the good old days without abolishing 
technology, and that failure to develop the instruments of 
collectivity will result in dreadful penalties - e,s they 
did in 1929.224 
Cited in 'I'ugwell, •The Protagonists," 439. 
Tugwell, R. G,, •The Protagonists,• 442. 
Tuewell, R. G., •The Protagonists," 437. 
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There was no comfort for Hoover's supporters in Tugwell's judgment of the 
New Deal. If Roosevelt did little, Hoover did next to nothing, Diagra-
matically, differences would be represented roughly as follows: 
institutionalism 
--------- Tugwell 
--------- Roosevelt 
--------- Hoover 
laissez-faire 
Hoover's success within a certain system shaped his ideas, His 
intellectual orientation appears to have been accompanied by a personality 
problem-- a morbid fear of adverse criticism. This phobia, as well as 
his thought on political economy, prevented him from moving in certain 
directions decisively and with timeliness. Like General McClellan, al-
though for different causes, Hoover could find reasons not to move or 
qualifications which vitiated the efficacy of action; the last bayonet was 
not fixed, or the last button was not polished, One error dtes not call 
for another; mistakes can be compounded at the eleventh hour. Yet, on a 
chronological basis alone, it is difficult to accept Hoover's thesis that 
the Democrats were responsible for creating and prolonging a depression 
which had its origins in technological developments dating back to the 
turn of the century and careening out of control in 1929. llis emphasis on 
events of late 1932 and early 1933 seems to write off developments of the 
previous three years as a mild, surface maladjustment. He did not call 
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those three years •prolongation.• 
In economic terms, Hoover represented the school of thought which 
at the present writing finds expression through the National Association 
of Manufacturers. That group asserts that the health of the American 
economy depends on a steady flow of investment ca;oital out of individual 
savings, incentives to invest capital through the removal of certain taxes 
on investments, freedom from •undue" government control, and an atmosphere 
that encourages confidence in the future. The purchasing power school, 
of which Walter Reuther of the c.r.o. is a leading spokesman, states that 
so long as purchasing power is strong, investment will follow as a matter 
of course; this school believes that wages and consumer income must keep 
rising in order to absorb our production; if other means fail, government 
spending must enter the economy. 
It appears that neither school has a monopoly on economic truth. 
Each has the medicine for a different kind of ill, In a period of infla-
tion, when there is too much money and too few goods available, there is 
a need to encouraee investment. When a surplus of goods piles up as in 
a depression, increased purchasing po>Ter is necessary. Hoover clung to 
the classical, •trickle-do>~n" thesis that investment in production will 
create sufficient purchasing po·,;er to absorb that production --Say's Law. 
The purchasing-poHer school worships st the economic shrine of Lord Keynes, 
>ThO demonstrated flaws in Say's Law. 
For ideological reasons Hoover espoused the wrong economic approach 
at the wrong time. For reasons of ideology ~nd personality he was inade-
quately responsive, in speed and in degree, ·to chanfed conditions -- under-
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standably enough. Unfortunately, due to the same personality traits, 
Hoover has remained unwilling to concede that those 11':-.o disagree ~lith 
him are not addle-pated, or un-American -- an attitude which has led to 
one of the most persistent, elaborate attempts to fix one's place in 
history that history records, 
Hoover's effort at self-justification and his condemnation of dis-
senters have a futile, ElVen tragic, aspect. Neither Eisenho·-,rer' s victory 
at the polls, ,;hich Hoover considered his o"m• nor Eisenhower's policies 
after his election, provided justification for Hoover's judgment on the 
1952 contest. Eisenho•,rer's fiscal officials, conservative by inclination, 
have given every indication that they would be willing to use the pur-
chasing-po•,rer policy if necessary in a deflationary period; Eisenhower's 
administration hes discussed such un-Hoover-like measures as decreasing 
tax "write-offs" in order to "dampen" a boom, Tugwell's fear that Hoover's 
thesis prevails in intellectual circles may well be overly pessimistic 
from Tufwell's standpoint -- at least with reference to academicians; 
college professors wr.o Here edults in the l9J0s ususlly have longer 
memories than businessmen, politicians, or the public. For example, Walton 
P~milton, Southmayd Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale Law School, in 1951 
rejected Hoover's claims concerning recovery. Hamilton asserted thet 
Hoover realistically saw the possibilities for abundance; he did not con-
trive ways and means of realizing them. He used government to aid business 
in an emergency; it did not occur to him to use government "to bend busi-
ness to do the job that it is here to do, • He indulged in the "comfortable 
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and treacherous" trickle-down philosophy, to be implemented by an R. F. c. 
which defeated itself in its execution, being staffed by commercial bank-
ers when its success "demanded a scheme of velues transcending the limita-
tions of private finance." Hamilton concluded his comnents on Hoover by 
noting that 
It has been argued valiantly by Vrr. Hoover that, when 
in November, 1932, he was voted out of office, he had 
•the depression licked." But, if he did, the returns 
did not come in.225 
Hoover has stressed •Americanism• in his public statements. His 
condemnation of all who disagree with him is not in the American tradition 
of disagreement without disagreeableness. Thil.c; histcrian Arthur Link has 
observed that in his Memoirs Hoover •claims much and concedes nothing.• 226 
A book review included this incidental reference tci the gemoirs: 
It may be preferable (as the recent memoirs of Herbert 
Hoover would suggest) that embittered men whose lives 
have come to be identified with great national catas-
trophe should follow a policy of taciturnity if the 
only alternative is published recrimination.227 
The personality defects which contributed to Hoover's ineffectiveness 
after 1929 have, in part, motivated his lengthy, labored defense in later 
years; they have also accounted for serious weaknesses in his thesis. 
225. 
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VII, Foreign Policy 
The Loadon Economic Confereace 
IntroducUon 
Raymond Moley '111111 in cllarse of American preparationa for the 
international economic conference held in London in June and J~ly, 1933• 
Tugwell agreed with Moley on every taportant aspect of American policy 
with reprd to the conference, lending hilll intellectual and moral suP-
port, 'l'ugwall also sened MQley as an errand•lloy and messenaer; one 
of his activities was recruiting specialists in certain areas of inter-
national econOIIice. !i!!ll Macazille, in its iss~e of June 19, 1933, er-
roneously listed TUawsll aa a deleeate to the conference; he did not go 
to London. 
The American officials and experta concerned with the conference 
were divided into two main groupsa the nationalists and the interaa• 
tionaliata. The nationslists instated that intergovernmental debts ._ 
considered separately froa other economic questions and disarmameat; 
the internationalists hoped to trade off debt reductions for concesaiona 
on other .. tters. The nationalists wished to put off the conference in 
order to pin tiM for ( l) the dollar, divorced from gold, to sink to 
its •natural• level with relation to the povnd and the franc, which laad 
attained an advantage through detachment fran gold some time previously; 
(2) domestic price-raising 1118ssures, dependent in part on monetary 
factora, to take effect. The internationalists wanted the confereace 
to begin in April. 
The nationalists believed that domestic recovery aeasurea were 
fundamental ·- within each coaatr.r; only an •international New Deal' 
of price-lifting policies and public works would get to the bottom of 
economic difficulties. The iaternationalists believed that a loosening 
of restrictions on trade and the achieTeaent of interaational currency 
stabilization were not secondary 111atters; they were fundamental and 
first in any effort to briag about recOTery. 
Nationaltlm Yeraua Internationalism 
The leader of the nationalists was Assistant Secretary of State 
Moley, The leader of the internationalists was Secretary of State 
Hnll, vbo found himself in an ..aarrasaing situation; lrlis subordinate 
was closer to the Presi4ent on some i.portant foreign-policy matters, 
especially foreign debts, than was the Secretary of State himself. 
Hllll 118S mora interested in the economic conference than in any other 
eTent of 19331 Moley 118S in full charge of the preJBration of data for 
that meeting. Hllll must have knowa that the President intended to be 
his own Secretary of State. In tolerating this situation as long as 
lle did, Hllll shoved, according to Eraest K. Lindley, •extreme patience 
and personal loyalty to the Presicent.•1 
Tile Moley•Hnll relationship personified the division and confu-
aion of tile ._.rican deleg$tion in LondGDo The Presideut employed 
Mole;y to proaote mationalist policies; Roosevelt occasionally placated 
Hull in order to retain his internationalist but politically U.portant 
1. Lindley, Ernest K,, 'llu on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Jfepziy, 
Vol. 94, No. 5. November, 1933, 261. 
Secretary ot State. Moley and Hull, th!'OUf!h the exercise of unusual 
tact and forbearance on ~oth sides, aigbt have been able to get along 
with each other, Lindley concluded, 'if their fundamental viewe had 
not been irreconcila~le.• 2 
Qo.estic Measures 
Lindley asserted that Moley, as the leader of the nationalists, 
was a realist; Moley saw that 
••• economic self•contaiament was the order of the day 
and that the domestic expert.ents of the new regime 
would require more, rather than less, insulation of the 
American aeon~ from the rest of the world.l 
When irreconcilable domestic and foreign economic policies produced a 
crisis at London, the President decided the issue is favor of the do.ea• 
tic policy. Roosevelt's decision did not surprise those .no understood 
the basic: nature of early New Deal •asures, 
The AAA aDd the NIRA wre intended to raise prices in the Allleri• 
can market. These acts also per.itted the raisin« of tariffs is case 
American prices rose raster than world prices, inviting an avalanche or 
imports 1 the American price level was to be protected from outside influ-
ences. Raising tariffs, of course, could reduce foreign purchases is 
the United States -- purchases important to American recovery. The 
2. Lindley, Ernest K., •war oa the Brains Trust,• 262. 
1. Lindley, Ernest K., •war oa the Brains Trust," 262. 
protection of domestic prices without discouraging foreign purchases 
could be acbieYed through reducing the gold content of the dollar. 
After the dollar was diYorced from the sold standard in March, 1933, it 
fell in gold nlue on foreign exchanges; the desired effects were 
realized to some extent. Acceptance of international currency stabi• 
lization would not be justified unless the dollar tell far enoush in 
relation to foreign currencies to eliminate the coiiiD8rcial adYantages 
accruing to the sterling and gold -lacs when they earlier reduced tae 
sold content ot their units.2 
llooaeYelt, according to Maley, was •in no hurry to stabilize 
until be was sure he was going to get the best bargain there was to be 
got.• The international decline of the dollar in May, 1933, was accaa• 
panied by a sensational rise in American stock, bond, and commodity 
prices. The President thought, "in priYBte, of course, that the dollar 
might sink to lows that tha experts hadn't conceiTed of;• this creation 
of purchasing powr and recoYery 0 11W1t laot be stopJ18d •• J 
Lower tariffs, as well as currency stabilization, were generally 
considered a leading object of the conference. RooseYelt stated that 
it 1111s important to lower trade barriers; be emphasized, howeYer, that 
domestic recovery was the first concern of Americans (the United states 
did agree to a tariff tr¥ce before the conference as s gesture of good 
2. Rauch, llasil, The History .2t ,1M Jlu 11!!!• l9:U•l938 (New York, 
Creatiye Age Press, 1934) 85-86, 
3· Maley, Raymond, After SeYea Years (Iiew York, Harper, 1939) 215; 
Tugwell suggested Moley's book as containing a complete account 
of his (Tugwell's) Yiews and actiYities with regard to the con• 
terence. 
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will). The President apparently ceased to think of lower tariffs, and 
monetary stabilization, as the leading objectives of the London confer• 
ence.k Hull favored multilateral reductions of tariffs; the former 
!rain Trusters, except Charles Taussig, President of the American Molas• 
sea CampeDT and a Presidential adviser on Caribbean matters, favored 
reciprocal trade agreements on the British model,5 While leanin« toward 
the ex-Brain Trusters' views, Roosevelt decided by the tilE of the con• 
terence to hold beck on a bill for reciprocal trade agreements; be 
also decided to postpone monetary stabilization. 
Roosevelt's views on lower tariffs and currency stabilization 
were based on longer-range premises than the domestic price rise in the 
spring of 1933• He believed that it ~s imperative to return internal 
prices and debts to a workable relationship with each other. While he 
possessed currency-nipulating powrs, none of the experts in London 
vas • ••• qualified by knowledge or disposition to discuss the place of 
currency management in the mainteD&Dce of a stable internal price level 
or the relationship of that problea to the maintenance of an international 
standard.•' Currency management ~• •ot only complicated; it also fell 
short of providing a f\llldullntal reRtdy for economic ills at how.7 -
or abroad, since international recovery depended on recovery within each 
nation. Similarly, in the nationalists' OJinion, lower tariffs did not 
4· Rauch, Basil, The Hiatorx .2! 1!!.f. !u 1!H!• l933•l<JJ8, 87-88. 
5· Lindley, :Srnest K., !!!!. Roosevelt Revolution, Firat Phase (New 
York, Viking, 1933) 185. 
6. Lindley, Ernest K., 'l'he Roosevelt Revolution, l.iLU Phase, 186. 
7• See below, Chapter X, Section, •MOnetary Views.• 
get at the root causes of the depression. 
Moley summarized the nationalist position in After Seven Years, 
whick included one of the most Taluable accounts of the economic con-
ference.8 He called free trade and the gold standard the •twin deities 
of an unshakable orthodoxy,• which everyone swallowed except the major-
ity of Americans, He condemned the internationalist policy of lending 
Europe aoney to biJ7 our goode. He asserted that the heart of the 
recovery program •was and DDlat be domestic,• In agreement with Maley's 
opposition to traditional internationalism were men upon whom •I could 
lean heavily•: Adolf Berle, Ralph Rebey~ and Rex Tugwll.9 
Moley hailed Reosevelt 1a rejection of HooTer's proposal, at the 
White House meeting of November 22, 1933, of a revival of the Debt Cam-
mission, The President-elect called for continuing debt negotiations 
through regular diplOIIIIltic channels. Apart from the debt question, this 
was the first step Roosevelt took to 
••• differentiate his foreign policy from that of the 
internationalists. It served notice on the League advo-
cates, the pro-sanctionista, and those who desired a 
reviTal of foreign lending that Roosevelt was likely to 
be no Herbert Hoover or Henry stimson on foreign affairs, 
It was a 1o19.rning that the New Deal rejected the point of 
view of those who would make us parties to a political 
sad economic alliance with England and France - policing 
the world, maintaining the international status quo, and 
seeking to enforce peace throusb threats of war,lO 
Moley was aware that there would be a bitter struggle with those wko 
wished to turn Roosevelt's attention away from domestic matters.11 He 
8. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years , Chapter VII, 196-269. 
9· Moley, Raymond, After Seyen Years, 70-71. 
10. Moley, Raymond, After §even Jears. 78·79· 
11. Maley, Raymond, After Sevep Years, 79. 
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vas aot prepared for Rooaevelt'a entente vitll Stimson on Far Fastern 
policy;12 he vas to be disappointed at the internationalists• influ• 
ence on the timing of the London conference. 
Holey was •perhaps in a better spot to see the confluence of 
foreign and domestic policies than most of the others in the adadnis• 
tration;• he was certain that HDll failed to recognize what Roosevelt's 
decision would be in any actual conflict between the domestic prograa 
and a prograa of international economics.13 The obvious self-interest 
of Britain and France, and strong opposition at home to Europeaa 
entanglements, would have •crushed a man of less militant faitll than 
Secretary HD11.• 14 
lefors Maley left for the conference, which had been in session 
for some time, he confirllllld his emphasis on the do111estic program lly 
obtaining the views of the AAA sad the NRA. On June 19 a spokesman 
for the USDA voiced the same opinion which Hugh Johnson, peppr.ry'ie&d 
of NRA, gave Moley later the same day. Moley asked Johnson, •u head 
of NRA, what is your feeling aiout a possible agreement to stsDilize?• 
Johnson replied, "An agreement to stabilize now ••• would bust to hell 
and gone the prices we're sweating to raise •••• I'a for a return to 
gold at the earliest possible moment, but that moment isa•t now,• 15 In 
12, See below, Chapter VII, Section, 'Relations with Japan.• 
13. Moley, Raymond, After Snen Years, 207. 
14. Moley, Rayaond, After .§ug IHEI• 215. 
15. llloley, Raymond, ~ Seven Teare, 234; the goverDJDent preserved 
the gold reserve backing for our currency in the event of a return 
to gold DY taking title to the metal in exchange for certificates. 
effect, Maley carried Johnson's Dl8ssage, couched in more formal phrase-
ology, to the conference. 
An International New Deal 
Maley, Berle, Taussig, and 'l'ugwell agreed that the economic 
structure of the world had broken down because it was inherently faulty; 
it would not be patched up by such expedients as suddenly declaring 
that the various currencies would henceforth stand in a certain fixed 
relation to one another.1 RooseTelt's youthful advisers believed that 
the causes and remedies for the depression lay primarily wit~in each 
nation; tile real need was for each nation to take action toward rsisillf!; 
2 the world price leTel. Tugwell. in particular, emphasized the import-
ance of internal recOTery programs. The domestic bent of the national-
ists. applied to other nations. amounted to an "international New Deal.• 
RooseTelt adopted the nationalist position in early 1933· He 
asked the American repreaentatiTes at the preliminary meetings prepare-
tory to the conference to request that the agenda be made more inclusiTe. 
He wanted the tariff and the regularizing of the production of such 
basic commodities as wheat, cotton, copper, and silver added to the 
agenda. This broadening of the agenda was •recognition that the col• 
lapse of the international gold standard was only a symptom of more 
profound disturbance.•3 
On May 16 Roosevelt issued his •Appeal to the Nations• with respect 
1. Hinton, Harold B., Cordell Im!l (London, Hurst and Blackett, 194.1) 158. 
2. Lindley. Ernest K., •War on the ilrsins Trust.• 262. 
3• Lindley, Ernest K,, The RooseTelt ReJOlution. First fhase, 174• 
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to the forthcomdng conference. The President added to his own list 
of the objects of the conference "international action to raise 
prices.• Such action would have made unnecessary protection by dol-
lar devaluation and tariffs of the increases in prices which the AAA 
and the NRA sought to achieve.4 
Maley pointed out that Roosevelt did not consider foreign debts. 
as well as tariff reductions and currency stabilization, a stumbling 
block to peace and recovery. Roosevelt's philosophy rested on the 
fliUidamental belief that 
••• the success of concerted international action toward 
recovery presupposed the beginnings of recovery at home. 
H8 did not believe that our depression could be conquered 
by international measures. He certainly did not believe 
that reduction of debts or even the partial opening of 
international trade channels would rout it.5 
The maintenance of the debts as living obligations, Moley declared, 
would actually prevent the repetition of mistakes made in the 1920s; 
in the prosperity decade we relied on an unreal foreign purchasins 
power, neglecting inadequate domestic purcllasing power.6 European 
nations, depending on loans trc:a the United States, had alao neglected 
their internal economics. The •beginnings of recovery at home• applied 
to all nations. 
Maley observed that initial American proposals stemmed largely 
from Roosevelt's desire to see international action to raise the world 
price level; in April Moley thought a de facto stabilization of the dol-
4• Rauch, Basil, The History gt the New Deal, 1933·1938, 88, 
5. Moley, Baymond, At'br Seven Years, 88. 
6. Maley, Raymond • .lfter Seven Years , 105 • 
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lar and cooperative price•raiaing measures were in prospect,7 It 
quickly became obvious that the reluctant attitude of both the United 
States and the European nations on stabilization vas to rule out any 
•streamlined• gold standard, Ia his famous "bombshell• message of 
July 3, l933t Roosevelt reasserted his view that stabilization was a 
secondary problem. He stated that the conference should not 
••• in advance of any efforts to consider these broader 
problems, allow itself to be diverted by the proposal 
of a purely artificial and temporary experiment affegt• 
ing the monetary exchange of a few nations only •••• 
"These broader problems• referred to domestic programs to raise the 
international price level -- an "international New Deal." 
In retrospect Roosevelt said his message vas a "bombshell" 
because it vas realistic at a time when the sold-bloc countries sought 
a strictly limited objective-stabilization; they were unwilling to go 
to the root of national and international problems,9 On the question 
of stabilization blame lay on both sides; Roosevelt contended that 
stabilization should not have been iaportant enough in the first place 
to cause the collapse of the conference. Lindley referred to Maley's 
emphasis. in a radio address on the eve of the conference, on coopera• 
tive action toward raising the world price level as •unquestionably ••• 
the authentic expression of the economic philosophy of Mr. Roosevelt's 
oalllpsign ••• and the American experU.nt.•10 
• 
7. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 203-04. 
8, Roosevelt, F, D., The Public Papers w Addresses .2f. Franklin R• 
Booseyelt, ed. by Samuel I. Roseuman, Vol. II, (New York, RandOlll 
House, 1938) 264. 
9. Rauch, Basil, The Histoq of the New Deal, 193)·1938, 91. 
10, Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• 262. 
'l'u.gwll supported the President in his syndicated collllllll. He 
stressed the need for internal recovery measures in every nation, de• 
ploring the unwillingness of the European countries to •enter on an 
economic program which would genuinely relieve unemployment or would 
raise prices so that the buraen of debt ~well did not refer here to 
1ntergoTel'DIII8ntal debtii would be relieved.• If,· Tugwell continued 1 
••• at the London Conference, Europe had shown a dis-
position to enter on policies similar to ours - to 
engage in public works, to raise prices, and relieve 
debtors - a genuine turn toward internationalism might 
have come then. But there vas no such disposition. 
And that was the real failure at London; the responsi-
bility did not rest, I should say, with the United 
States.ll 
Moley referred to the gold-standard as the orthodox ideal of the 
IIISjority of our economists, nearly every graduate of every Eastern col• 
lege Who had had a course in foreign relations or economics, and the 
international hankers 1 their ponderous arguments in academic and •pre-
sumably intellectual• circles made other viewa •unrespectabls.•12 Tug• 
well's c0111118nts on the Lond011 conrerence implied that those Who were 
primarily concerned with currency matters and the gold standard were 
not really interested in basic measures for the economic relief and re-
covery ot all the people within each nation. In the absence of an 
•international New Deal," the United States was determined to carry out 
ita own New Deal.13 
11. Tugwell, R. G., "International Economic Policy,• syndicated column, 
in The Battle tor D81110CraCX• 166. 
12. Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 69. 
13. Tugwell, R. G •• "International Economic Policy,• 166. 
Internationalism 
Secretary of State HUll, the leader ot the internationalists, 
was •one ot the vanishing breed of Democrats• who favored a low tariff. 
Hull's views on the tariff were, to him, a dogma and a faith. The 
professors in govar11111ent were often called doctrinaire dreamers 1 HUll 
"hugged low tariffs tighter than any professor in the government 
hugged any doctrine.• In Ernest Lindley's opinion, Hull and Maley 
presented an interesting contrast; the professor was the realist; the 
politician was the visionary.1 
Hull believed that the restoration of international commerce 
and monetary stabilization had to precede business recovery. Accord• 
ing to Hull's biographer, the Secretary agreed with Roosevelt's general 
thesis that currency stabilization ot itself would accomplisa no mir-
acles; Hull, however, might have been willing to concede that it would 
do no hara •provided it were accompanied by action to restore the flow 
ot international trade in ever-increasing volume.• 2 Hull did not agree 
with Roosevelt's younger advisers that a radically new approach was 
needed. He believed, •as a result ot his long years ot study and experi-
ence,• that it vas not the world econaadc machine which vas at fault but 
its operators. The world's productive and distributive capacity could 
go tar under its own momentum to correct abuses "if only it were given 
a reasonably tree chance to function.•3 
1. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• 262. 
2. Hinton, Harold B., Cordell !b!U• 156. 
3· HintoD, Harold B •• Cor!l.ell llllll• 156. 
ObTiouslT Hall's views differed fundamentally fraa Tugwell's. 
Tugwell believed that aoth the world econoadc machine and ita opera• 
tors were at fault; as an institutioaalist he insisted that changes in 
the .. chine had to precede changes in men's economic practices,4 On 
the level of immediate policy, both Tugwell and Moley considered an 
unqualified free-trade program desirabla in the long run but unreal-
istic for the time being.5 It is interesting to note that vhile 
Tugwell was charged with threatening to undermdne American institutioae, 
Hull, as Professor SchUTler W&llace pointed out, would have clung to 
his flat free•trade doctrine regardless of its impact on the American 
aeon~ -- including the displacement of whole industries.6 
Hull placed tariff reductions and currency stabilization first; 
he opened the conference with a protest against high tariffs and depre-
ciated currency values.7 Hall's program vas the opposite of the Presi• 
dent's. The American delegation at London became divided between two 
scll.ools of thought and demoralized. In the latter part of June Roose-
velt sent Moley to the conference to remind the American delegates ot 
his emphasis on the domestic programa the President desired the confer• 
4. See above, Chapter III, ~ction, 'lthics.• 
5. See above, Chapter V, Section, 'Nationalism'; Tugwell was awre of 
Hull's view through direct exposure; after February 21, 1933, whea 
Roosevelt aDDounced Hull's appointment, Hall conferred witll. Sti .. on, 
Normn Davis, SircRonald Lindsay, Paul Claudel, and Tugwell, Hinton, 
Harold B., Cordell !iJall, 145. 
6. Wallace, SchUTler c., !A!t ~ ~ J.n J.ction (Nev York, Harper, 19.34) 
Chapter X, •Nationalism versus Internationalism.• 
7. Rauch, iasil, The History .2t the Nev .!l!.!l• 1911·1.938, 89. 
ence to turn froa discussions of stabilization and the tariff to the 
consideration of "long-range• objectiTes. In order to allay the 
European gold bloc's fears of unilateral American action, Moley iswed 
a general declaration suggesting that steps would be taken to end 
speculation, with all countries prCIIIising eTent\18lly to return to the 
gold staDdari. The President rejeeted Moley's deelaration, stating 
that the United States had to be free to raise domestic prices re65ri· 
less of foreign exchange rates. RooseTelt's "bombshell" message of 
July 3 finally undid Moley's frantic, last-ditch efforts to saTe tae 
conference with non-committal statements that included no specific 
proaises of stabilization.8 
Moley came hClllle said goasip and the taw:~ts of conservati ns and 
foes. Yet, Ernsst Lindley explained, "PUblicly he was deflated far 
more than he was in fact.• In trallSmitting the gold resolutioa to the 
President, Moley stated that it was necessar.r to saTe the conference; 
ae also stated that its effect on the Aaerican price lenl should be 
the first consideration. When Maley receiTed the President's rejection, 
he cabled that he vas quite relieTed.9 The historian laail Rauch con-
eluded that Roosenlt w.s only carrying to an ext~ the faith of 
10 Mole;r, who seemed to be repudiated, in econoaie nstionaliSIIlo In a 
8. Moley, Raymond, After Sewn Years, 246-60; J. M. Ke;rnea and Walter 
Lippaann helped Moley on these statements. 
9. Lindley, Ernest K., •war 011 the llrains T:ntst,• 262. 
10. Bauch, Basil, l'ht. Histoq 9L ~ J!!lf ~. 193]•19'}8, 90. 
ahowow between do.estic and foreign progl'81118 &11 could not haTe ex-
pected to win. 
Nationalism prevailed thrOUf!b 1933; Tujgwell reTiewed the ,-ear's 
straggles: 
One could IIIBke 1110re ot this struggle with the inter-
nationalists than is wrrented bT the issues. Mr. :ftooaa-
Telt humiliated us a good deal in the course of it; and 
eTen after the electioa he would ner...ewrackiugly delay 
coming to policies which wre decishe. He 11011ld cut 
the United States loose fr0111 tile international excllange 
speculators, resist stabilization on French or British terms, 
retusa to let the Economic Conference concern itself wit~ 
a!Q'thiug but gemaine long-l'W1 issues, and put the reciprocal 
trade treaties under way in 1934• B•t the internationalists 
VO\lld baTS their Tictories too - notabl,- in preaer't'ing the 
•1110st faTored nation• policy and in the actual, eTft if only 
nominal, forsiTing of the intersoTera.ental debts. 
1&811 Rauch obserYed that stabilization of the dollar in Janu• 
aey, 1934, the creation of two Export-!JIIIort banks in February and 
March, 1934, and the Reciprocity 'l'rade .tsreements Act ot June, 1934, 
marked the end ot economic nationalism in foreign policy - with the 
exception of the SilTer Furchaea Act of Juae, 1934.12 It will be 
noticed that 'l'uswll. ualike Rauch, did not include the reciprocal trade 
treaties among the internationalists' Tictories. 'l'here was no conflict 
between 1;he s1;a1;aments ot 'i'uswll and Rauch, since the fora.r labelea 
•preser...ins 1;be •most favored nation' policy• an internationalist Tic-
tory. Reciprocal trade a,gre-nts, as such, vera not controTersial; 
they could haTe been made with a cQPditional most-favorea•natioa caluse, 
11. 'I'qwll, R. G., "'l'he Preparation ot a President,• Western Political 
9parterlx, Vol. l, No. 2, June, 1948, 149· 
12. Rauch, .Basil, nt Histo17 9t !U Ill! .!!ulo 1933-193§, lll, 114• 
eich the uationalists desired. 'rhe i».cluaion of an upconditional 
most-favored-nation provision was a triumph for Hull. These principles 
aaYe been described as follows: 
Unconditional most-favored-nation treatment simply means 
that if the United States mekes a trade agreement with 
c011atry A lowering the ratea on certain imports, it extends 
the same privileges to all other countries; that is, if the 
other natiGDal &iYe Uaited States exporta most-favored-
Dation treat~~ent. This type of agree11ent is designed to 
encouraca equality of treat.ent and to lower commercial Bar• 
riers oa a world vide 8asia. 
ConGlitional moat-favored-nation treatment -ns that t)\e 
Uaited Statea will grant tariff concessione to country A 
but will not extend them to country ll unless country II 
agrees to give concessione squal to those granted by A, 
This policy would necessitate baraaining nation by nation 
and teads to guard against a general reduction of American 
tariff barriers.lJ 
The aband-nt of a natioualistic arrency policy was directly 
related to the lowering ot trade Barriers. '!'he policy of dollar denl•• 
ation and gold purchases Wider tlae Warren plan created foreip p!lrehas• 
iq power. After the value ot the 4ollar ws fixed in J"anuary, l934o 
the creation of foreign porckasing power througb monetary measures de-
creased drastically -- tb.ere vera still so• Aaerican purchases of sur• 
plus sappliea of newly mined foreip sol4. Roosevelt decided to provide 
for foreip purchasing powr D;r allowing aa increaae in our imports 
through tariff reductions. Ia oppoeing the adoption of an unconditioaal 
.ost-favored-aation policy, Tugwell sided with his foe ia the AAl, 
George N. Peek, aaainst Iilll (Tugwell differecl with Peek on the subaidi• 
zation of foreign purchaaes of American goo4al4 -· there were divisions 
14· 
Fite, Gilbert c., george I• .fUk U!llli limt !2t l!u:m ParUy 
(llol'IIISn, Uaiversity of Oklah- Press, 19.54) 271. 
See below, Claapter X, Sectioa, "The Agricultural Adjust1118nt Admin-
istration, ••• • 
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within the nationalist and iaternationaliat schools of thought). In 
1932 and early 1933 the internatioualists• triWIIJ)ul vere yet to come. 
'l'uelftlll and Mole;r wre isleraed in the struggle over policy on foreip 
debts and the economic conference, 
Areas of Conflict 
Intergovernaental Debt. 
Hoover favored tradiq off ooncessiona on the debts in return 
for ooncessions ia other econaaic -tters. Debt pa:v-nts were due oa 
Dsceaber 15, 1'32· Concessions ~ the United States would have to come 
before the London conference. Moley and 'l'ugwell felt that Roosevelt, 
possibly possession iaadequate knowledMB of Hoover's previous negoti• 
ations with the BritiSh and French, should not enter into debt nego. 
tiations until after March 4, 1'33.1 They strongly disagreed with 
Hoover, who did not believe that •the two subjects L'debts and currency 
stabilizatiOJlf could be handled separately, as concessions on the debts 
mnat be made to secure other purposes.• 2 They considered it an unreal• 
istic f!8mble to Dllke concessione without haviRg any assurance of 11hat 
they would receive in retura. FiDSlly, •trading• did not appeal to tile 
two professors because they believed, as Tlagvell put it, that "'!'he 
Britiall and the rreach, particularly, were determined not to pay, We 
believed, all of us, that they not only should but could,•3 
1. Moley, RaJ'Mnd, Atter Seven Iura. 70·72. 
2. J'oslin, 'l'heodore G., Hoover !Ill. !ht Record (Garden City, Donbleday, 
Doran, 1934) 3112· 
3· Tugwell, R. G,, •Tile Preparation of a President ,• 148; the proi'es• 
sora' attitude on the debts 'IIBS probably unrealistic with vorl4 
economic conditions such as they were. 
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Hoover and Roosevelt •t on !lovllllber 22, 19.32. and January 20, 
19331 they also exchanged several meanses during the 1111118-duck period. 
After tbe first meeting, Roosevelt rejected Hoover's suggestion of a 
revival of the Debt Ca.sission, iasisting that continRing nsgotiatioas 
be carried on through regular dipl-.tie chaDnels,4 In reply to 
Hoover's telegralll of December 17, which reasserted that debts eould not 
be disessoeiated fraa disaraa.ent and the eeonomic eonferenee, Roosevelt 
asein insisted on separate treatment; he deelined to join with Hoover 
in selecting a delegation to negotiate oa the debts and give •coordi• 
aate consideration• to disarmament and the London conference.5 
On December 20 Hoover wired that he did not wish to eammit Roose• 
velt to his vieva; assuming that Roosevelt favored coordination of the 
three probleiiB, Hoover only desired to set up •chinery for negotiations. 
Roosevelt replied that he did not desire to lll!lke cOJIIIIitments on policy •-
even through conversations between his representatives and Hoover's 
which foreign nations would interpret as policy-determining. •In brief,• 
Moley commented, "Roosevelt flatly refused once asain to lie cCDIIittecl. to 
LBoarer•i/ foreign policies •••• •6 Roosevelt maintained his position 
through l!.is meeting with Hoover on January 20, 1933• Tile President-elect 
assured Moley tkat there would be no debt negotiations before Marela 4 
and there would be no linking of the debts to the London conference.7 
4• Moley, ila,.ond, After Seven Years. 78. 
5. Moley, ilaYJDDDd, Attar S!yen Years. 97-88. 
6. Moley, Raymond, After Seyen Yyra, 88-89. 
7. Moley, Raymond. A.fter Seven Ieara • 97. 
JOO. 
This brief summary of Roosevelt's aceeptance of Moley's position 
conveys the impression that the nationalists won their point with little 
difficulty or opposition. When the British paid on December 15 and 
France defaulted on her debt paJ18Bnt, some people, Moley recalled, -.y 
have assumed that the debt issue .as on ice; to make such an ass~ion 
ws to •uderestilllate the opposition.•8 The debt question became pert 
of a •violent skirmish" between the outgoine: and the incOIIIing administre-
tiona; the internationalists were to kava their say, associating the 
debts •subtly, swiftly. skillfully• with other questions of fore~ 
policy.9 In this skirmish Tugwell served Moley continuously with argu• 
menta and errands. They aought to keep debt discussions separate fraa 
disarmament negotiations and the econoadc conference; they tried to 
push back the opening of the conference as far as possible beyond 
April in order to give domestic experiments tillla to gat goine: before 
fol'IIISl international econanic negotiations began. Aa in the case of the 
determiaation of Far Eastern policy, the two professors sometimes foun4 
Roosevelt's conduct contradictory and ~stifying. 
The Internationalist Comes Haas 
Moley and Tugwell met foraddable opposition when the American 
delegatee to the disarmament conference and the preliminary meeting of 
the London econOIIIic conference returned to the United States fraa GeneYBo 
lfol'IIISn DaYia, Aaerican representetiYe at the d1sal'lll!llll8nt conference, 
8. Moley, Raymoud, After Snen Yeap, 84-85. 
9. Moley, Raymond, After Snp .II!U:ao 84-85. 
JOl. 
returned to the United States on December 22, 1932. Dr. E. E. Day ot 
the Rockefeller Foundation and Professor J"ohn Yillialllll ot Harvard, who 
attended the preliminary JDeeting ot the economic conference in October, 
returned before DeTis; Moley saw their • internationalist• report to tile 
state Depart~~~ent in the llliddle of December.1 While Maley vas alan.d 
at the report, OaTis vas to be a more redoubtable and implacable OJI-
ponent than Day or Williams, 
Moley referred to IlaTis as a Delllocrat who vas the "darling of 
the iaternationalists in both partiea,•2 TUgwell llad more to say about 
DaTi& and the internationaliata: 
Those Americans whose Jmericanisa is always faintly 
tinged with Anglophile or Francophile bias - especi-
ally those who represent the nationals of those 
countries here --set themselTes to change our tune. 
They did not aucceed until their best representatiTe 
came home from conferring abroad: Mr. Nol'lll8n DaTis, 
'Whose long efforts, aa Mr. Hoonr•s delegate, to 
achieTe clisal'IIIIID8nt, were no doubt nliant, hoveTer 
"Useless they IIBY haTe seeJDed, He ws one of those 
Democrats who were to most ccamon folk indistinguish-
able from Republicans. .And it has to be recorded that 
he ••• prOTed a better educator than we professionals, 
eTen with the long start we had in this subject matter. 
Mr. RooseTelt, of course, knew what he vas doing, He 
DeTer reTersed himself on the debt question. His 
acceptance of Mr. OaTis, howeTer, ws the beginning of 
foreign adTentures which see .. d to me of doubtful wis-
dom - a doubt which rose to a about in ~ mind, when, 
later on, Mr. HooTer's Secretary ot State, Mr. Stimson, 
vas made a confidant , 'l'hese were known paths to Mr, 
RooseTelt. His NaV3" years had familiarized him with 
the ways of diplomacy, He had a wide acquaintance --
eTen friendships - among diplODBts who during his stay 
in Washington had been secretaries and attaches at the 
esbaasies but who had now risen to senior rank. Mr. 
Davia and Mr. Stimson meTed easily in these circles, 
1. Moley, Raymond, After §!I!B Iu.!:lo 86, 
2, Maley, Rayaond, After Snen Years, 90. 
Mr. ila't'is's adnntures in Cuba could be matched b)' 
~· Stj,JIIson's in Phili:Ppius; and. although Adolph 
.D.erl§/ bad ser't'ed with the peace delegation in 
Paris allll bad a polish all his own. Ray. Charles 
./:rausis/ and I wre celj;ainly C.RUJltry b~ins in _ 
such society. And Saa }_Ro,.e-.IJ/ and Doc Lo•cormo£.1 
wre SiiiiP17 nowhere .3 
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Moley ws alal'D8d at the report to the State Department by Day 
and Williams on the acti't'iUes of the Preparatory COIIIIIIission of Experts· 
in Genen. The report illdicated that out of the ~~~eating of experts 
would come an "internationalists•• agenda --an international gold 
standard• debt reductions, and measures for international cooperation 
"Wholly incompatible" with the Rev Deal's domestic progra..4 Ernest 
Lindley wrote about an •international be.nkers •• ageada which centered 
about the return to an international gold standard -- the pre't'ailing 
cry of the international bankers aDd classic econaaists.5 Moley 
thought that Day and Williams should bs iaformed of the aims of the 
new administration before the agenda '1111& put into fiDBl forra.6 
On December 16 Moley and Tugwell rode with Roose't'elt on the train 
frOID Poughkeepsie to New York City. Moley expressed his fears and 
recei't'ed 'l'ugwll 1s support. At Moley 1a suggestion. Roose't'elt agreed to 
see Day and Williams as sooa as possible; he told Tugwell te discuss 
Ia is {Roose't'elt 's) progra~~~. at length with the two men and to arrange for 
their meeting with the Governor. '1\Jgwll conferred with Day; on December 
18 las 't'isited Roose't'elt with Day and Williams. Roosnelt told DaJ' to 
3• Tut;wll. R. G., •The Pre:PBration of a Preeident.• 148-49• 
4. Moley. ~d, After Senn Years. 86. 
5. Lindley, Ernest K., The !!ooJnelt fle't'olution, Firsl Phsae• 173• 
6. Moley, Ra)'IIIOnd • After .§.!DD Yeara, 86. 
delay the economic conference as long as possible so that domestic recov-
ery measures could take hold. Moley doubted that Day agreed with Roose• 
velt 1 s reasoning 1 regardless of his personal judgments, Dayw.s a • good 
soldier,• He went to Washington to try to have his and Williass 1 trip 
to the next meeting of the Preparatory CODDiaaion of Experts postponed, 7 
At this point Davia, Delegate to the Disarmament ConfereDce and a 
member of the Organizing Commission of the World Economic Conference, 
entered the picture, He landed in New York on December 22, announcing 
to the press that the final meeting of the Preparatory Coaaiaaion would 
take place in J"enuary, and that the conference in London would open in 
April. He telephoned Roosevelt, an acquaintance since Wilson days, re-
questing an appointment for Mond.ay, December 26. Then DaYis met with 
Day and Stimeon ia Washington, Dey pleaded for cooperation with Roose• 
nlt in delaying the conference 1 Davis ws a~nt. Dey and Tugwell 
were greatly upset by Davia's attitude. Day could not understand DeYis'a 
announcing a time schedule without consultation end his inaistence on 
that schedule. Tugwell •teared that there was more to IJayis's tactics 
than mat the eya.•S 
Moley want to CleYeland for the Christmas holidays to join his 
family and recuperate tram a brief illness, He requested that Tugwell 
handle the Dey•IlaYia situation, On Christ-a day Tugwell called Rooanelt, 
who S\JM&&ted that Tngwell escort Day and Williass to Albany on the 27th. 
The Governor said be would haTe IlaYie stay O't'ernigbt 1 a conference bet,.en 
7• Moley, Raymond, .After Senn lum• 86, 9o-c)l, 
8, Moley, Raymond, .After Styg Years• 90-91. 
Roosevelt, Tugwll, Davia, Dey, aDd Williem& might settle e•eeythiq. 
On the 26tlt. Davia persuaded Day aDd WilliUIII not to go to Al baay; Tug• 
well went on alone. 9 
Tugwll encountered a baffling situation in Albaay. On the even-
ing of the 26th Roosevelt and Davia were in conference; a aecretar:r 
told Tugwell to c~ back in the aoming. When Tugwll returned to the 
Executin Mansion, he foulld Davia in :Rooaenlt'a bedroom. The Govel'IIOro 
Mole7 recorded, 
••• apologized for not haYing included Tugwell in the 
conference of the nipt bafore. He wanted to Dlllke up 
his Dlilld about the merits of ~t DaYia had to say, he 
said, lly seeing him alone. Aad then, in Davis• presence, 
he told Rex that he had changed his plans and bed decided 
not to see Day and Williama &@Bin. Instead, Davia and 
Tugwell were to go to liev Yorll: and see the~~. The tvo men 
were thea, in affect • d isaiased. Rex vas gi Yen no op,or-
tunit7 to reaonstrete, to rellind F. D, R. of what he had 
told Day - aDd why • or to ask for enlightenment about 
this slldd.en change of front. Davis seemed to have the 
upper hand at the moment.lO 
The discussion in liev York which followed produced a campromiae 
between the positions ot TUgwell and Davia. Davis prevailed on the 
meeting of the experts; Day aad WilliaBIII were to sail on December 28. 
'l'ugvell •succeeded in upsetting the idea of having the Conference itself 
in April.• Moley considered the situation unsatisfactory. Dey and Wil-
liams did not have a ~11 understanding of the timing raquirementa aeces-
sitated by the domestic eaphaaia Roosevelt's policies. Foreign diplomats 
still labored under the iwpreasion that the United States favored an 
9• Mole:r, ilaymc>Dd, After Seyep Yean, 91-92. 
10. Moley , Ra.ymond , An.ti .§!!:U. Years • 92 • 
early confel'ence. •Jut in the light ot all the curious circumstances,• 
Maley concluded, •it was the best Tugwell could do.•ll 
Maley agreed with 'l'lagwll that there ws •1110re to IlaTis 1s tactics 
than met the eye.• Be offel'ed a word on DaTia's .oti'Yiltion. Possibly• 
Da'Yis, haTing agreed with other diplomate on a 1anuary-April schedule, 
wa trying to saTe fees. More probellly, Maley thought, DaTia wa ".o'YIId 
-,. a purpose tar leas trivial.• He .. Y well have offered concessions 
with reference to the econCIIIIic conf'ereacs ia order to contribute to tlae 
success of his pet project, diA~nt. 'At aey rate, he succeeded 
s011111how, ill IIIOditying RooseTelt 's plana,• 12 
When Moley returned to Hew York tro111 CleTaland. he was disturbed 
at the early departure ot Day and Willi811181 he was also upset by renewed 
efforts to involTe Roosevelt ia the debt question.13 He aav no point 
ill another meeting, on 1anuary 20, with Hoover; he belie'Yed that it was, 
in part, a result of an atteapt by the British to establish the theory 
that no agreement on econoadc questions was possible without a debt eat-
tla.ent. A second meetiDS would inTolTe the broader question whether 
!looseTelt was to be ••jockeyed i11to a policy of trading off the debts for 
aoae unrelated consideration which adgbt or adght not ba of Talue.•14 
In connection with the meeting of 1anuary 20, Tugwell firllly sup. 
ported Moley, A@ain, Roosevelt's at'Utudes towrd DaTis beffled the two 
professors. Moley iaBdiataly had adqiTinga when DaTis went with the 
11. Moley , Ray1110nd, .After Styen Yeaq, 91. 
12. Moley, Ra,.ond, Attar Stun Yeal'l!o 91. 92. 
13. Moley, Ra~, .Mter §enp Yean. 92. 
14. Moley, l'laJIIIOnd, After SeTQ Years• 96• 
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De1110craUc group to WashiBgtOD.. lilooaevelt 1a atat-llt to the press 
that Davis would DOt attend the actual conference failed to calm 
Moley. On the morning of the 20th differeaces which "had beea smolder-
- -ing between DaYia, Rex, and IIIJ'Self ./}4glez/ burst into flaae.• Tugwell 
JISt Davia ia the letter's hotel rocaa they •t~eatedl;r disagreed" on the 
linkiDg of debt coa..-eraations to diecuasions of other matters. Davia 
thea asked Roosevelt directly if he (DaYia) was to attend the White 
House conference. To Moley'e diiiiMTo Roosevelt said that Davis c011.ld 
COliS if he wanted to.15 
At the meeting RooseYelt listeaed to arguments between Moley, on 
one side, and Hoover, Mills, Stimson, and Davia, who, •there by Boose-
Yelt'a grace, lacked the sensibility to keep from cht.dng in• with the 
others. Roosevelt stood fira oa the tvo main points of the debate: 
(l) there would be no discussion of the debts wita the British ulltil 
after March 41 (2) discussions of debts and of other matters would be 
16 
separate. 
Roosevelt authorized Moley to join with stimeon in preparing a 
statement to the British concerniDg conferences after March 4• On the 
afternoon of the 20th ~11 wnt with Mole;r to the State Depart.nt. 
Stt.on aad with hila Harvey H. Buudy 0 Assistant Secretary of State, and 
Her\lert Feis, his Ec011oaic AdYiser. Tugwell and stimson argued over 
the question of separate discussiODs. stimson contended that he knew 
15. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Yean, 98. 
16. Moley, RsJJIOnd, After Seven Xe•rt• 98. 
Roosevelt's views on the 1111tter. Fiully, Stimson accepted e stat-nt 
which clearly set down the principle ot separate discussione,l7 
Stimson found, earlier ia Janwu,., that there were broad areas 
ot agreeMnt beheen him and Roosevelt on Far Eastern policy , 18 He 
apparently assumed that Roosevelt also agreed with him on immediate 
debt discussions with the British and the lumping together ot the debts 
with other econ01111e problems - Hoover's policy. Meanwhile, Stilllson dif• 
fared with Hoover on certain 1111ttere aucla as demandiog debt pe.,.ents 
frOIII the French;19 Hoover iDSisted on a firm reminder. On January 23, 
Stimson told reporters, ott the record, •I am Roosevelt's acting Secre-
20 
tary of State,• Stilllson, in effect, •s attempting to pertora a dif• 
ticult feat -· simultaneously serving as Secretary of State tor two admin-
istrationa. 
On the day after the .. eting, rqDDrs in the press suggested taat 
Democratic leaders desired to have Davis replace Moley in all contacts 
With the State Depertmeat. Moley telephoned Roosevelt, offering to with-
draw it Davia was to handle foreign affairs until March 4• Roosevelt 
laughed. saying 
I am through with Norman Davis. The incident is closed 
so far as I am concerned. When he got off the train we 
said good•by and no mention ot a future appointment was 
made, In the matter of debts you are ~ sole representa• 
tive •• •• I also wnt you to go ahead and get Rex and two 
or three others to lfegin preparing the stuff I'll Deed tor 
the preliminary econOIIIic discussions with the foreign rep. 
resentatives after March 4ta.21 
17. Moley. Raymond. Afhr Sevep Yaara. ')8-')9. 
18. See below, Chapter VII, Section, •Relations with Japan.• 
19. Current, Richard H •• Secretary StiPIBon (New Bruawick, Rutgers Uni-
versity Preas, 1954) 124. 
20, C.rreat, Richard H. • Secretary St1lllflop, 124. 
21. Moley, RaJ180Jid, Atter suea Iura. 101-02. 
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On Juwu•y 26 Moley, vho had re\urned to Nev York Vitlt Tugwll 
af\er \he JlleetiDf! of the 20th, vent to Wasb.iDf!\on. He joined Stiluon 
in prepariDf! notes \o the debtor nat ions. He explained Roosevelt •s 
position on the debts to Sens\ors Joseph Robinson, Pitt.n, and HUll 0 
who were satisfied vith whet had been done.22 Deapite Moley•s assign-
Jllent to handle foreign affaire, he and Tagwll could no\ have ccoaiti• 
ereti Davis'• defeat to be more than a Pyrrhic victory tor the oational• 
ista, who &uttered an additional setback in April, It was with a 
"sinking heart• that Moley learned on April 26 of Roosevelt's agreemea\ 
vith MacDonald of Jritain and Herriot of France to have the London con-
terence llegin on June 121 \bet thia agre-nt ws entered into 11y the 
aame Roosevelt who had told Day on December 18 to delay \he conference 
as long as possiBle was to Moley 'incretiible.•23 
Hoover1a Atti\ndea 
Roosevelt's Failure to Coopera\e 
After the mee\ing of November 22, 1932, according to the White 
House ueber, the President ~rked, 'He LP.ooaevel!7 did no\ get it at 
all;' as tor Moley, • ••• BBgazine articles seemed to be hia principal 
source of knovledge,•l On December 22 Hoover llanded the whole correa• 
pondence between him and l'!oosevelt \o the press, mking a atateMnt whioll 
shoved \hat be wa furious at Roosevelt's refusal to 'knuckle under&' lte 
22, Moley, Raymond, After Seven Ieara, 102, 
23. Moley, RaJIDOnd, !t1!J: Seven Yeap, 205-o6. 
1. Hoover, Irvin, Fo;rtz•TJS! Years .ill ll!!. White Ho!lse (iloston, Hoagllton 
Mifflin, 1934) 223, 
said that Roosevelt was unwilliag to cooperate, while the President-
elect said he waa willillg to cooperate, haviag proposed to that ead a 
method consistent with the policies of the new adminiatrat1on.2 
When Hoover reco.aenaed the appointment of a special ca.mission 
to handle the debts, he rejected Roosevelt's proposal for diplomatic 
exchange because it vould !lave takes months.3 Roosevelt, Moley, and 
Tugwell saw no reason to rash debt aegotiationa, especially siace they 
opposed •tradiag• tactios. Hoover bad placed himself ia the poaitiOD 
of declariag that the President was unable to negotiate on debt adjust• 
-nts without express authorization fl'OIIl Congress. Af'ter the meeUq 
of November 22, Roosevelt said that CODgress could not conatitutioaally 
limit diploaatic convereations with foreign governments -- •there was 
nothing new in this1 such Jrocedure had been established fran the 
founding of the ReJ111blie until the Hardillg-Goolidge•Hoover administra• 
tion bad obscured the tradition.•4 
Hoover's personal secretary indicated what Hoover meant by •co-
operatioa•: 
The hope was that the efforts would result in the President-
elect seeing the problem in sa.sthing approximating the light 
that the President did.5 
Roosevelt defined •cooperation• in similar te1'111B. It appears that tile 
right of .ay, short of official action, belonged to the President-elect. 
who had his eye on the future. 
2. MR:>ley 0 Ray.ond, .After Seven .Iuno 89~0. 
3· Joslin, Theodore G., H9over RfL .1h!. Record, 
4. Wehle, Louis B., Hiddep Threads .2t. Histocy: 
(New York, Macmillan, 1953) 120. 
5. Joslin. Theodore G., Hoover m:!. !i.l l!eeord, 
333· 
Wil1on through Boouult 
343· 
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Estimate of Poreiaa Performance 
HoOYer's eaphasis on a •trading• policy assuaed a cooperatiTe 
attitude oa the part of the European oat ions. Moley and Tugwell be• 
lieTea that the Uaite4 States could not count on foreign cooperation, 
They judged that the debtor oationa wre deteraine4 to IIBneunr the 
Vnite4 States into Pllrchaaiq, thrOUgh debt reductiou, economic aDd 
financial arraJ1881118nts. 'l'he •tradiq• policy, Moley stated, "loollie4 
to us like asking a man to pay admission to a 8Babling caaino.•l 
BooseTSlt info~ the British Aabaasador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, at Wa~ 
Sprinsa on Jauuar.r 28, 1933, of the '-Bricen position oa the debta.2 
Whea the debtor nations learned that they could not expect a 
•deal" on the debts, they •aela out for another kind of bonae - cur-
rency stabilizatioa.•3 Greet Britaia, for example, went off the gold 
standard a year and half lief ore tbe Uaited States, pining an adTantage 
oTer ua ia international trade. Early stabilization would baTe pre• 
serTed the British adTaatage. After no stabilization agreement was 
reached ia London and the dollar ws returned to gold (set at a fixed 
metallic weight) in Januar,r, 1934, the Britisll rejected any suggestion 
that they return to gold; there wre no coaplainta fr<S British fiaanci-
ers and illdustrialists,4 Tile British apparently were interested ia eta-
bilization only vbea it would prove adTantageous to thea, professing 
concern with the gold standard as a principle pri .. rily to pro.ote tbeir 
1. Moley. iQJDoad, After Seyep Year•• 87 • 
2. Moley, Ra1J110nd, AttiE §tftn Teart• 104. 
3. Maley, RayDIODd, After StJ!p leap • 88 • 
4• Lindley, Eraeat K., H!llf•v J1Ui, lpoqnU (Nev York, Viking, 19.37) 
25. 
own interests. The iooeeTelt crouP also entertained doubts concerning 
European atat-nis on the debtas •we wre prof011ndly certaia that 
foreign protestations of inallili ty to PB7 were in larse part: utrue.•5 
Mole;r aoted that •w had to •lte th- see w knew what was up and re• 
fused to be outtraded.•·6 
Pre)l&rations tor the econoaic coofereaoe besan in February 1 the;r 
wre suspended during the first two weka of Roosenlt'a administration. 
In the middle of March work wa re-d. Herbert Feia, .Tames Warbur,;, 
and Willialll :Jullitt, among others, joiaed Mole;r, Tugwell, and 'l'aussig,7 
On April 21 a parade into ¥aahington of dipla.ata fraa fifty-three 
8 
nations besan. Bothiag happened during the pre-conference meetinse at 
the White House and ia the state Depertllent to change the opinion ot 
Mole;r and Tugwll on prospects for foreign cooperation. Mole;r obaerTed 
that the British and the Freacll 
••• wre inclined to poola-peoll the idea that we'd been 
forced off gold b;r domestic conditione and to iaaist 
that we'd abandoned ,;old deliTeratel;r to get into a 
better barsaining position on international monetar;r 
queationa.'1 
Maley concluded that the pre-conference talks illuminated the •palpallle 
self-interest of the British and French which their talk of international 
5· Mole;r, Ra)'JIQnd, .Af'ter Senn Years, 70. 
6. Maley, Bal'JII)nd, After Seup Xg[f, 88; in the agenda the British insis-
ted on the qualification that each nation would determiae when and at 
what lenl it would return to gold, Lindley, Ernest K., !Ill Rooenelt 
Rnol!ltioa, Firat !!li.Ut.• 73• 
7• Lindle;r, Ernest x., •War oa the Brains Trust,• 260. 
8o Moley. Ba:ymond. Arter Seup Years, 198o 
9. Moley • lla;rSad, Af\er §I.Dil Ieart. 201. 
•cooperation• had aeYer quite eoacealea.•10 Liadley commented that 
American adhereace to nationalisa ws based oa a "1'l'llnlc interpretation 
o1' the result o1' the preliminary talks with other goYeruaents.• 11 
At the conference itself the British and French resorted to 
•irritating tactics•; a plea for temporary stabilization on May 26 
became a demaad for tm.ediate and definite stabilization an 1une 10.12 
Daladier of Fl'llnce stated that ending the currency war and achieYiJIC 
stabilization were necessary first steps. French and British delegates 
negotiated a •taaporery• stabilization agreement vith anti-deYaluation 
American delegatee; RooseYelt rejected the agreement.13 The American 
delegation had been told.that it was tree to present proposals for are-
Yised gold atandard; as tor atabilizstion, "it was to shun the subject 
as the plague.•14 Roosa..:elt·ocabled that any stabilization proposal bad 
to be suaaittad to Woodin and himselt.15 RooseYelt's policy waa nation-
alistic; it did not represent nationalism for its ova sake, French and 
British conduct before and during the conference justified neither 
unqualified internetionalisa oa the part of the United States, nor Hoover's 
optiaistic estimate of European willingness to adopt a policy of interne• 
tional cooperation. 
10. Moley, Rayaond, After Senn Yean, 215. 
11, Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• 262. 
12. Moley, Raymond, After Snen Ye•ra• 228. 
13. Rauch, hail, nt Hiatoey .2t lU .II.J!!u!• 19JJ•l9J8, 89. 
14. Moley, iiayaond, Attar Se'!!n Xearao 216. 
15. 'Holey, Ra:yaond, After SaY8Jllua• 228. 
Concluions 
Moley and Tugwell did not expect the conference to accomplish much. 
'l'hey thought the prelilllinary tallal might create a friendly atiiiOsphere. 
As a contribution to amity Tugwell wrote an article in the New York Heral4 
Tribune, April 12, 1933, entitled, "What the World Economic Conference Can 
Do.• His published expectations far exceeded his private estimate of how 
mach the conference would accomplish. Neither he nor Moley placed much 
' stock in the conference or international remedies, except as a supplement 
1 to the domestic pro~. Moley concluded that the public had been 
misled into thinkiDg that the •main line of recovery was shifting from 
Washington to London.• 2 Htall had baeD proclaimiq that the aation and 
the world would rise or fall vitb the results of the conference; Moley, 
reasoning that the as~re4 failure of the conference to fulfill HUll's 
claims would embarrass the administration, IIISde a radio speech to warn the 
Alllerican people not to expect too much) 
History texts often record that Roosevelt torpedoed the London 
conference ill order to protect a rise in domestic prices -- an incomplete 
c011111ent. There wra two sides to the story. Historians Dixon Wecter and 
Basil Rauch listed the two main reasons for the failure of the conference: 
(1) the insistence of the gold bloc that the United States give up further 
devaluation of the dollar before any other nation aade concessions; (2) the 
refusal of the United States to abandoa at the outset a useful adjullct 
1. Lindley, Ernest K., !Ill. Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 174• 
2. Moley, Re:J'IIIDnd, After Seven~· 207. 
3• LiDdley, Ernest K., •war OD tile llraina Trust,• 262. 
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ot the recoftry program it bad just adopted,4 Most c-ntators wrote 
the conference off as a total loss; Eraest Lindley believed that the 
conference was not without beaeticial effects: 
It brought the internationalist tendencies in the 
Administration up against the hard realities of world 
politics with enough force to bring most of the day• 
dreamers to their senses. It was desirable to have had 
this happen as soon as possible. It was desirable for 
the world sad the nation to know that the United States 
had a Pregident whose first regard was the national 
interest.) · 
It there vera two sides to the story, there certainly vera no altruistic 
angela on either side. The conference essentially shoved that it was 
impossible at the time tor the large nations to cooperate on tkeir econo• 
mic policies. Under the circu.atances, the nationalistic program whick 
Roosevelt sponsored, with the determined support of Moley and Tugwell, 
was perhaps the moat realistic course open to the United States. 
Relations with J"apen 
On J"anury 17 • 1933, Roosevelt 11ade a statement to the press on 
foreign policy. Newpepers, State DepertJDent otficials,.and Roosevelt's 
advisers interpreted the President-elect's com.ent as an endorsement of 
the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition of the Japanese penetration of 
Chine. Moley, Tugwell, and all others outside of the Hooftr adainistra• 
4• Rauch, Basil. !U History ,2! !!l! !Wf .!2!!!• 1911·1918, 88·89, ')2; Wecter, 
Dixon, Ill!.!£! ,2! !!l! Q1:!n Depressiop, 1929•1941 (New York, MacmillaD, 
1948) 68. 
5. Lindley, Ernest K., Tke Booaevelt ReVolution, Firat ?hase, 217•18. 
tion supposed that there~· only one doctrine of non-recognition.1 
In reality there w.s a struggle between Hoover and Stimson during 
1932 to aame and define the doctrine. Non-recognition came to mean dif• 
ferent·'•things to the President end to the Secretary of State. Hoover 
desired no recognition of treaties which resulted from the use of force. 
Stimson •always w.nted to go in for withdrawal of diplaaats or an econ• 
omic embargo, either or both of which 888Sures would almost inevitably 
2 lead to .... r.• 
When Stimson went to Europe in April, 1932, Hoover and Under-
secretary of State William R. Castle took a stand quite different from 
StiB&on•s. In two addresses Castle assured the American people that 
their government "did not contemplate the use of economic pressure or 
military force.•3 Hoover favored disarmament rather than economic war• 
fare as a means of implementing a pact of peace. Stimson called disaraa• 
ment •just a proposition from Alice in Wonderland,•4 
Hoover desired to set the record straight for history, .He w.nted 
documentary evidence that ~ first proposed the doctrine of non-recogni• 
tion -- as againat sanctions or other aggressive action; he requested 
written statements from Secretary of War Patrick :r. Hllrley and Secretary 
of the Interior Bay L. Wilbur,5 In November, 1932, after his defeat at 
1. Current, Richard 111 .. §ecretarx Stfpop (New Brunswick, New :Jersey, Rut-
gers University Press, 1954) 123; Professor Current had access to St~ 
son's diary which is on microfilm in the Yale University Library aDd to 
the diary of undersecretary of State William R. Castle. 
2. Current, Riche~ H., Secretary ~t1m•on, 104. 
3• Current, Richard N., Secretary St1•on, 1o6. 
4• Current • Richard N., Secretary St1pon, 107 • 
5. Current, Richard N., Secntarr Stimsop, 123. 
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the polls, Hoover spoke to Castle about the latter's writing a book on 
the foreign policy of the ea.inistration. The President did not ~at 
Stimson to write the book, placing hillaelf at ita canter, because "he 
sould have had us at ~r with 1epan before this if he had bad his way.• 6 
A student of Stt.son•a govera.ent career defined the difference 
between the doctrines of the Secretary of State end those of the Preai• 
dent: 
The question ~s whether Roosevelt would continue the 
policy of non•recognition. Or, 1110re precisely, whether 
he would support the HOover or the Stimson version of it. 
Non-recognition itself could be called ·tae Hoover.Sttmsoa 
Doctrine, since Hoover A&d suggested and Stimson bad for• 
mulatad it. It could be conaiO.ered as a final and suf-
ficient ~asure, a substitute for economic pressure or 
military force, a policy looking to~rd conciliation and 
peace alld relying on the moral power of public opinion 
for ita affect. That vas the Hoover Doctrine. Or non• 
recognition could be viewed not as an alternative but as 
a preliminary to economic and ailitary sanctions, a way 
of drawing sharp the issue between the United States 
(alonl!: with the League of Nations) and 1apan, a means of 
layiq down the ideoloj!;ieal basis for eventual ~r. That 
was the Stimson Doctrine. 
Where would Roosevelt stand'7 
Stimson desired to find out where the President-elect would staad. 
The Secretary of State intended to persuade Roosevelt, if necessary. to 
stand on the Stimson version of the doctrine of non•recognition. Liaison 
between outgoing aDd incCBdng administrations is often a delicate aatter. 
Hoover was not enthusiastic about a ~ting between Stimson and Roosevelt. 
6. Castle diary, Nov.-bar ~8, 1932, cited in Current, Richard N., 
Secretar;r Stil!!!!op, 109. 
7 • Current, Richard N., Secretar;r Stiwop, 113. 
On January 3, 1933, Stimson told Hoover that he was •a.tficiently inter-
ested in his LHoover•ii policy to wnt to do anything I could to per-
a petuate it.• Hoover agreed to a ... ting on the condition that Roosevelt 
put the request to hU.,9 On the other side ot the political fence, 
Nol'lll!ln Davia, DSIIIOcretic •mber of the JmericaD delegation to the World 
Disarmament Conference, urged the meeting. Davis returned to the United 
States in Deceaber, 1932; he JSr&uaded Roosevelt to meet Stiuoa on 
January 9, 1933.1° Felix Frsnld"urter, an old friend ot stimson's and 
an adviser of Roosevelt, served as go.betwen; before Christmas, 1932, 
he told Stimsoa that Roosevelt voald like to see htm,11 The final invi-
tation came om January 6,12 
Stimson wnt fr<a Coolidge's funeral at Northampton, Massachusetts, 
to li7de Park, 'Where he 111tt Roosevelt tor the first time on January 9. 
1933• The tvo men talked all aftel'l!l.oon with no one else present. sua-
son found his ideas were closer to Roosevelt's than to Hoover's, except 
on disarmament. stiuon cautioned Roosevelt •not to be too hasty• on 
disarmament; Japan would probably object to the naval portions of Hoover's 
plaa. The Secretary of State took up the 111ttter ot PhiliJOpine iDdepend• 
enca, the possible t.a!Dence of war, and naval strategy in the event of 
var. Stimeon fouDd it easier to discuss these subjects with Roosevelt thall 
with Hoover.13 
a. 
9· 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13· 
C.rrent, Richard N., Seere:t;arx Stlpop, 116. 
Current, Richard N., Secretan St1pon, 116. 
Maley, Ra)'IIODd, M:m SeveR Ytara (New York, Harper, 1939) 931 Salitll, 
Denys, A!!lerica ~ ~ Miap !AI (London, JoiiSthan Cape, 1942) 59n. 
Current, Richard Ill., Secretarr Stlpon, 116, 
Maley, Raymond, Attar.§!!!!~ lHn• 93· 
C.rrant, Richard 11., SecretarY Stipon, 117. 
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Tke heart of the converaation wae the Stimson Doctrine, On Jaau-
ary 10 Stimson told Castle •that he had a good talk with Hooeevelt, that 
if you could take at 100% all that he aid, the future looked very hope-
ful as to foreign relations,•14 On January 11 Hooftr sent to Congreas a 
.. morandum by Stimson on the reviaiea of ar.-elllbart;o legislation in order 
to extend ita application beyond the watern hemisphere; Roosevelt endor-
aed Stt.aon•a suggestion enthuaiaaticallJ,l5 On January 16 Stt.aon inforaed 
the European foreign offices and the Le~e of Nations of hie poaition on 
Manchurian recognition; he "indicated broadly that there would be no dis• 
position on the part of the nev adaiaietration to change it.•l6 On Janu-
ary 17, Roosevelt issued a public atat .. ntc •Aaerican foreign policy 
.ust uphold the aanctity of international treaties.• The statement was a 
.. sningless platitude to the .. n in tbe street; it vas not meeniaglesa to 
state Department people or to Moley and 'l'llgwll.17 
Moley and 'l'llgwll were certain before January 17 that stimsoa had 
won Roosevelt's support. They conferred with Roosevelt after the Stimson-
Roosevelt meeting of January 91 they were convinced after this meeting 
that Roosevelt actually cammitted himself to Stimson's version of the non• 
recognition doctrine ia hie talk vith the Secretary of State.18 Roosevelt's 
endorsement on January ll of Hoover'• request to Congress tor power to 
].4. Stimsoa diary; Caatle diary! both cited in Current, Richard lll., ~-
B!Z §t1•on, 118. 
15. Current, Richerd lll., Secretsn st1•op, 11'-20. 
16. Moley, Ra)'IIIDnd, ~ Sevu Yeal'f, 94 • 
17. current, Richard N., Secretan St1••op, 121-22. 
18. •esrd, Charles A., "-ricap ll'oreiBJl ~ .1!l !H Making, 1932·1940 
(New Haven, Yale Univereity Preas, l~b)l38• 
Jl9. 
join with other nations in ~rgoiag the shipment of arss confirmed 
Moley and Tugwell's aisgi'rings about the Meting of Januacy 9• Stiaaoa's 
statement of the siXteenth further confirmed their suspicions. 
In the midst of develo~nts in Far Eastern policy, other events 
caused Moley and Tugwell concern about foreign policy. Roosevelt agreed 
to meet Hoover on the war-debts question once again.19 Professor Wil• 
liams informed the Preparatory Coaadssion at Geneva that he believed a 
debt settlement was the chief contribution the United States could make 
to the London Ji:conOIIIic Conference; Williams also hinted that Roosevelt •s 
administration would offer a more liberal tariff policy.20 
Moley and Tugwell were not optimistic about international econo-
mic cooperation. They vera not inflexible nationalists; they did not 
want the United States to play its cards before the European nations 
showed their hands in the fora of a disposition to cooperate and caapro-
mise, They feared that Roosevelt was being pushed into an impossible 
21 position, running the risk of making contradictory commitments. Roose-
velt's announca.ent of January 17 was the climactic warning. Maley con• 
aidered Roosevelt's position on the seventeenth ·~olehearted acquiescence 
in the Hoover.Stimeon rejection of the traditional A .. ricsn concept of 
neutrality, of disinterestedness, iJipartiality, and nonparticipation in 
foreign quarrels, Finally, it endorsed a policy ~ieh invited a major war 
22 in the Far East •••• • 
19• Moley, Raymond, After Seven l!!.m• 94· 
20. Moley, Raymond, After Sevea .IB.m• 95· 
21. Moley, ReJ'DIOad, After Seven Years, 95· 
22. Moley, Reymo~~d, Attar SenD Yesr1, 95· 
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Maley aad Tugwll wre deeply upset. Charles A. lleard has sq• 
seated that "JBrbapa Mr. Maley and Mr. Tugwll were not as deeply entren-
ched in Mr. Roosevelt's confideace as they had imagined.• 23 Moley's 
recollectiou indicate that the tw Brain Trusters had no illuaiou about 
their influence on Roosevelt; rather they were puzzled and dismayed at 
the turn of events: 
'l'o say that I vas sick at heart over what vas heppeni1J4!: 
would be the epitome of uaderetatement. I vas also ccm-
pletel:r beffled. Vas Roosevelt really ignorant ot the 
iaplications of what be ws doinc? Or vas he ill process 
of achieving one of those •c0111proaiaes• betwea what he 
had led me to beline he th0118ht aacl. what he thought the 
DaYises and Hulls of the party voulcl. like hill te think'l 
Or vas this sblply te prove to 1118 - who, GGd knew, re• 
quired no such proof - that he was dependent on no one 
kind of advice, on DG adviser at all, in fact? Or vas it 
sa.ething of all three? 
Rex !llld I tried to tiacl. the answr.24 
On ~auuary 18 Moley and Tugwell spent hours with Roosevelt at his 
65th street house ia New York City. They began with an attempt to show 
that the underwriting ot the Hoover-Stimaon policy in the Far East vas a 
tragic mistake. Maley reported that Tuswll carried the burden of U.e 
debate& 
Rex, always more fluent and excUable 
the ar...-at ~ith all the clarity and 
vas capeble,2' 
than I, elaborated 
passion of which he 
Maley listened, trying to determine fraa Booaevelt'a reaction what had 
motivated him. '!'be discussion ended saddenly: 
23o •eard, Cllarles A., Ayriyp loreip Poliey ill W MakiM, 1932•1940, 
l421h 
24. Moley, Raymolld, After Snep Xeara, 95· 
25. Moley, Raymond, Attar Sng Yean, 95· 
We llight as well have saved. our bredh. Roosevelt pt 
an end to the discu .. ion by lookiag up and recalli~ 
that Ilia ancestor& used to trade vi th Chine. • I have 
always bad the deepeat .,.;atky tor the Chineae,• he ssid. 
•Hov cOilld you expect • not to go along vith Stiuon oa 
.Japan?• 
That was all. It waa eo aimple, eo iacredible, there 
could be no anawr. 0118 could pack up and go h011e or 
atoP cryiq over ~ilt ailk aad try to prevent the apil-
1 1118 ot aDY JBOre. 
Tugwll did not pretend to be an expert 011. the Far East. He 
requested intormation traa Natha11.iel Peffer, his colleague at Coluabia.27 
He baaed. hie view, as preaented to Roosevelt, primarily on his trainias 
aa an econcaist. Japan wa the only iadustrial nation in the Far East. 
Her neturel econOJIIic relationship for •rltets and source& of rav •teri• 
ala vas vith the Asiatic mainland. Some old•tashioned economic taperi• 
alism was preferable to military iaperialiam; it vould create conditioaa 
favorable to .Japaneae liberals, enabLi~ eventual regulerizi~ and tonilll& 
dovn of Cbiao.Japanese relations througa negotiation. .Japaneae econcaic 
iateresta would be the only effecti~ check to Russian iaparialiam in tke 
Far Kastl It ,Japan lacked her natlll'lll econOIIic outlet, the militarists 
vould gain control of the nation, •kill& wr inevitable.28 
TUcwell reviewed hie thoaghta on relations vith .Japan in The Strickep 
~. Moley, Rays>Dd, Atter sevu Yean. 95. 
27• Letter, .Januery 7. 193.3, T!!cwll Papert. 
28. ~nteryiey JG!k writer; it is intereati~ to aote that in 1955 Senator 
George, Claai~a ot the C~ttea on Foreign Relations, stated that 
.Japan IIBlSt be allowed to trade vith the JIISinlend or contine to receive 
Aaerican subsidization; it Tugwell's ideas vera inapplicable in tae 
193011, they became pertinent to diacussions ot relatiollll vitb JaJ8n in 
the 1950a. 
322. 
Years before LPearl Harboi/ I had noted the steaty deteri• 
oratioD ill our relatiou with .TapeD. I had baeD opposed to 
the Stimaoa-Hoonr policy back ill 1930; and had thought the 
»ritieh were right, e•ea tboush their policy had an out'IIBnl 
look of cowardice; aDd that w wre wrong because only by 
force could our •iew be t.plemeated. Oar policy led to vara 
that vas always plaia - ualess we should withdraw before we 
were utterly c011111itted. Wtiea Mr. iloose•elt supported Mr, 
Stiuoa's policy aDCl begaa, enn before his inauguretioa 0 to 
shape a stmdlar coarse with respect to .TaJBD and Chiaa, I 
s,oll:e out •igoroual)<. It see•d quib possible thd Cbiaa 
could take care of her ova interests as agaiast .Tape.n, as 
she had always taken care ot aabitious co11querora; and I 
felt that the .Tepe.neae Pa4itic eac1e4 thouaeada of miles west 
ot Pearl Harbor, I saw ao 11.eoeasary conflict then. This 
led to diaappro•al of defell.lle works at Guaa a11.d to the opiD.• 
ion that we ought to witbdraw frca the PbilippiDea • in a 
military way • at once. EYeD. the e•idences of .Tape.nese de•o-
tion to .. dienl idees, the rise of the militarists, and the 
decliDe of ci•il control ae ... d to be largely the result of 
Western pro•ocat ion. We. refused thea face. 'l'ovard tb- our 
liberalba vas not ena preteaaea w ga•e them illlplacaltle 
hostility, supercilious superiority; and no encourage•nt 
tor tllose among tb- who aigllt ha•e been our friemls. 
~ lli@!t .II!.D. bauenej J.t., :S..U .!liD Aw: Ml•chuko &dnature 
U4 btcyp.- Ad takfp A different attitude there .JiU tlWYI 
!11 !!"•tistactoty specvlatioa, .ll JU h lU1 .R.x !W .ll.J!II 
alraa4l .122 .!!.a• Perhaps Celiforaia aad her fear ot c-peti• 
tin had already beea allowed to shape such a policy of illiiUlt 
and exclusioa that subsequent e•enta were unaboidable. Per• 
haps the strong liberal elements in .Tapan had already lost their 
influence and the totalitarians had gained the strategic hold 
in aohool, in home, in gonrnaent which they needed for their 
purpose. ~ notes allow that I did act think so dow to the aid• 
dle thirties. '!'hey also show that Mr. Rooae•elt did thtak ao, 
When I bepa to change they 4o act re•aal exacUy; but it we 
somewhere about the time I lett the gonl'llllllnt ia 1936. Duri~~g 
the aext year I .. de exteDdei stays ia Califoraia aDd Hawaii. 
I had changed by thea aJUl llad ceased to lGOk backward at what 
aight he•e beeao I aatioipeted· that .Tapanese low standards 
would t'urlliah our higb•pe.:r workers and our hip .. profit •81d'ac• 
turera a COIIJI8titioa 'tihioh voul4 result in vide fear and hatred. 
Mo trade arreaa-at to a•oid this ae ... d aDY longer possible. 
At the 8UI8 tillla, inoOBaiateatly but actually, our general atti• 
tilde of superiority •-' to atreagthen, 'l'o talk a'bout 'clna• 
in& out the aonkeya• ae..a4 not to be fantastic ia •DY ca.paJIY, 
certaial)< not aaoag those who wre inatructed by the press. 
Mr. Williaa Herridge icanadian Minister in Washington ana one ot 
Tugwell's closest friend.! and I, back in 1933•193£, used 
to talk about this at great lugth. It may have beea he llbo 
helped to persuade • that thiDgS had gone too far for rever-
sal. We agreed finally, at SillY rete, that conflict vas inevi• 
tall1e and that our aide • Mantas Canada and the United States 
• vas ia great danger f~ overcCGfidence and underpreparatioa, 
We also agreed that Japane .. trade agression and her grOvill8 
iaperiali- had ~ aow gone too far to be checked in aay way 
except by terce. 
Tlacwell, like Moley, was unfair to Hoover in referrill8 to the 
Hoover-stiluoa Doctriae. This inaceuracy vas not intentional; it arose 
froa a lack of knowledge, shared by practically all outsiders, of the 
distinct schools of thought within tile Hoover administration, (Moley 
agreed with Hoovar.tllat there might have been war in the Far East ia tile 
early 1930s if England had not refused to go along with Stiaaoa,3°) The 
sentences italicized ilere susgest that Tucwell chose to present all of 
his thoughts rather than reserve for hiase1f, by not telling the vbole 
story, the opportunity to go dow ia the record as one who could jutifi• 
ably say • • I told :you so.• He did not Delieve that an;y claim to perfect 
foresight on his part llll& jutitiallle. He contended in 193.3 that adher-
eace to the StiiiiSoa Doctrine -at wr, and war came; :yet, the mere state-
ment of these two facts is a distorting oversiaplificstion. Tugwell 
declined to speculate on llhat "might have been,• The crucial factor was 
t'illliqo He readily coaceded in 1'47 tllat it may well have beea too late 
ia 1933 tor the iaplementatioa or his ideas to have been effective ia 
preventing war. 
29. '!Ugwll, R, G., IJa. Strickeq ~ (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 1Tl•7"Jo 
italics added. 
30. Moley, Raymond, After Se~eP Iu!:l• 95· 
AccordiDS to Tugwell his notes did not reveal "When I began to 
change exactly; but it wa sOMvbere about the time I lett the !0\'ern-
ment in 1936.• His writings, which he could not be expected to check 
tor dates ever.r time he added to thea, disclose that ke abandoned tae 
policy ot noa-internntion aCllllelolhat earlier than he reoalled in 1947 lolhen 
he wrote The Stricken I..!Jlg. Ill :D!f. Atlaatic MpnthlT, Vol- 155, llwaber 
4, April, 1935, paee 418, Tugwell's article, 'The Progressive Tradition,• 
included this paragraphs 
The cliDBx and than the oatastrophe came, as all will 
remember, in October, 1929, vlaen the stock •rket 
crashed. Then bankruptcies -.ltiplied, banks tailed• 
the liaes ot the ·~la,red grew longer and longer, 
until in the winter ot 1932 they numbered over 14,000,000 
able-bodied wage earners tor llb.ca no work could be provided 
by the business ayatea as it was then in ruin. Tae utter 
irrelevance ot Prohibition as either a moral or an econ• 
caie retora had bean coa.platel:r de1110natratad 1 and the 
rise ot dictatorial govern.eats tbrougaout the world dem-
onstrated with equal clarit::r that our participation in 
the World ¥ar bad not succeeded in establishing political 
de110crac:r on a solid basis. And when the Lea1;11e ot Nations 
tailed ettectinl:r to restrain the Japanese aggressions 
ia Manckuria, and vben the system ot treaties tor the set-
tlelllllnt of the Paoitic and the J'ar East prond equally 
impotent to control a nation which found the status quo 
intolerable, the end was clearl:r in sight. 
Jy 1936 Tuf!well waa certain that ti was •too late.• His COIIIII!nts 
attar 1936 on the Japanese situation also involved the crucial question 
ot ti.aing. Now he ws not concerned with the timiue; ot measures tor the 
prevention ot wr1 the lEtter ot tilling now revolTed around providiDS 
tor entrance iato the eventual conflict at a tilllll as favorable as poaaiale 
to the United states: 
29 November. ( 1941) Washington& Talking with Henr.r Wallace 
to4ay we weat back o.,ar the Japanese pro'lllam. I urged consid• 
aration in the present situation of a way to save face. JWruau 
is here for fi1111l parley ud the Gel'llllna are backil18 hill 
UJ with a savage drive on Moscow. Also there is a llif! 
battle in Lillya. I said it looked to me as if we had not 
given the Japanese any way to el:lllD clown. In a technical 
sense, we were tw years too early tor war and a way -•t 
ba found to postpone actual hostilities just as long as 
possible, 
l December. Washington: Interesting visit Friday witla 
Harry_Hopkins in ,1he NaTal &lapital •••• Hov DBcpiticeptly 
.!!U Lthe !!ussian.JI fipt tor !!. deep belief. l wnder -
can't JWJt yondering - .it J11. .HD a!lYthiM .llU. 1llAl. ill .21U: 
de110cracy. .It .Ql!ll terrilllv diYided nov; ~ perh4ps .!II. 
&llall ~ !!. uurpose W l!.l wld!d !2 J.1 .!2!m• For nov the 
whole nation is breathlessly awaiting the answer to what 
must haTe bean an ultimatua the other day. Hov badly they 
aisUDderstand us. '!'hey haYs sought to 'ttack up Knru8u with 
bluster and vith vast moveaents of troops in Indo-China. 
ht I do not think the President will allow the Eltll'llll Road 
to ba cut. That 'IIOUld end Chins's resistance and open 
ftuaaia •a flank. E!ents b!I!. .I!U. .9.m!f .Ap,ricans togther .u 
!Ia .IJill-de•ocrats lmu l!:UA but }y!!. strong natiogalism 
rather !!mil totalitariaPiMo 0n the other hand ve are not 
'tta1118 realistic iP our t:llliJ18. We are puttil18 on Jressure 
while we are ynready and leaviJ18 the Japanese notlaing tor 
face-saYing.3 
'!'he seatences italicized here are Yery similar to 'l'ugwell's references to 
the challenge of the Russian aeon~, as a result of which he was accused 
of an affinity for Communiaa. Asain, he took the stand that the chal• 
lange to Aaerica 'IIIla to .. tch aay possible adYantages that came out of 
daYelopmsnta ia Hussia while aYOiding aDy undemocratic disadvantages. Be 
clearly placed the llu.ssians among the anti-democrats. 
TUgwell recorded in his diary the events that rendered any further 
discussion of Japanese relations academic: 
7 Dec81RDer. En route Washington-Miami: Able to catch late 
morning plana by cuttiDf! short saYaral negotiations but felt 
I Rlllt get back to Jq post. The aewa today is that the Presi• 
dent has sent a personal nota to the Emperor. This must be 
31, Tugwell, R. G., fu Stricken ~. l7'J-80, italics added. 
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tll.e last IIIOYe in the game. The Japanese are nov movillf!: 
ll.uge convoys to the south. Whether there will De s •llecla• 
ration• is not clear. It does not seem to be the cont-
porsry •thod. 
Dinner last night at LeCoon'a •••• After a two hour exchange 
of experiences vi th Congress ••• and talk of contusion and 
infiltration of business iaterests into the executive 
agencies I suddenly realized with horror that we might have 
been talkiag about France of a year ago. Congressmen black• 
mail executive agencies for favors; each asency struggles 
aore for place a(!lliaat others than to do ita job; there is 
ao discipline; no unity; no purpose. I vas assailed by an 
allysEl depression. I em at least glad to get away from 
Washington but fearful as I aever vas before for lilY country's 
safety. 
Later, .... day1 Late in the afteraoon ve landed at Jackson-
ville. I stepped out for a drink end to feel tll.e Florida 
1111rmth • glad to see the JIB~ &(!!lin. There vas a stir of 
excite•nt. Solie stranger told • the Japanese were llombing 
the Philippines; another shouted that Pearl Harbor vas beias 
shelled - "'l'he bastard&,• lae said, •are coaaitting suicidet•32 
32, 'l'ugvell 1 R, G,, ~ StrickeR 1!ui41 180-81. 
TIII. Entrance into 01'fioiald011l and 
the End of the Jrain Trust 
All inauguration day approached in 1933, Tugwell llad to think 
about hie personal future, He could return to ColWBbia, He could re• 
ll!lin in the RooseYelt camp, IIOYiug on to Washington in an adlllinistrathe 
post. It aams of Tugwell's critics were correct,1 the decision ~san 
easy one. After yeara of vritiug, here ws Tugwell's opportunity for 
authoritatiYe action •• curbing, leading, regimenting, dominating, 
According to anti-Tugwell journalist&, he was eager to go to Washington 
in an executive capacity; after he arrived in the capital, he enjoyed 
every Rdnnte in which he exercised hie authority. 
Actually, tile decision to go to Washington was not so simple for 
Tugwell. He was reluctant to go into the government in the first place. 
After lie arriYed there -· his correapondence with Columbia, with his 
realtors, and with the President revealed -- his original intention was 
to remain in Wasb.iugtoa a llhort u ... 2 Tugwell ws aware that govel'llllllnt 
service vas quite different froa academic life. His experience was tllat 
of an • idea man,• not an administrator, He lmew almost nothing about 
politics. When be a11.d Henry Morgenthau, ~r., lobbied for agricultural 
legislation in the lame-duck Congress, his first contact with politicians 
was diataateful. He se.-d determined to return to his classes as soon 
aa the inauguration was oyer) 
1. See below, Chapter XIII, Section, •The .Ambitious Tugwell.• 
2. See below, Chapter XIII, Section, "The Ambitious Tugwell.• 
3. Jolles, Jlair, •Sweetlleart of the liegimenters,• American MerCJU'Y, 
Vol. 39, No. 153, September, 1936, 82. 
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!Ugwell undoubtedly could have obtained for the asking any one 
ot several positions other than the one he accepted, He did not ask for 
the Assistant Secretaryship of Agrioulture, Tugwell agreed to accept 
the position only after considerable ~rging by Henry WBllace and Roose-
velt, It seemed logical that Tugwell should go into Agriculture if lae 
vaat to Washington at all. ~eginning in the 1920s he was a serious stu• 
dent of agricultural problem.. He was also an amateur conserTstionist; 
lae wighed, 111110ng other considerations, the possibility of working vitll 
the Forest SerTioe against reasons tor remaining at Coluabia.4 As an 
institutional economist, he would naturally be interested in a social 
device such as the AAA. In the end, however, it vas not TUgwell's desire 
to pursue his interest ia agriculture within the government that led to 
his appointment, 
Many accounts of developaanta leading to Tugwell's appointment 
vera inaccurate ia their oversU.plification, A typical version wee quite 
clear; Tugwell •sold" wallace to Roosevelt as top choice for Secretary 
of Agriculture, WBllace reciprocating by naming Tugwell Assistant Seers• 
tary.5 This accouat implied that Tugwell desired the position, scheaing 
to obtain it. George N, Peek, first AA Administrator and a toe of Tus-
vell, alleged that Tugwell secured the appointment of Wallace for his 
Jiugwell• ii purposes /• It was true that !Ugwll urged the selection of 
4• Tugwell, :a. G., ~ Stricken 1.!!:19. (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 24•25• 
5, Phillips, Cabal, •The New Dealera - Where Are They Nov,• New I2Eis 
T'•• Ma.saziae, September 2<J, 1946, 52. 
6. Peek, George N. and Sa11111el Crowther, l!!z 9.lUl. Qui .QD (New York, D. Van 
Nostrand, 1936) 22. 
Wallace. Wallace strongly urged the appointment of Tugwell. Yet, there 
was no •corrupt bargain• inTolved. 
Raymond Moley recalled that "it was largely Rex Tugwell ~o per• 
suaded Roosevelt to appoint Wallace.• 7 Tugwell cOJRpletely •sold" Wallace 
to Moley lly the end of the sumaer ot 1932; Moley joined Tugwell in ur~ing 
the a•pointment.8 In Holey's opinion Roosevelt would have chosen Wallace 
anyway; Roosevelt liked Wallace, who vas a distinguished man in the Corn 
hlt, a Republican for RooseTBlt, and a chaapion of New Deal farm policies.9 
There vas another candidate tor the Agriculture poet. Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr., wanted the job1 he had the support of an important col-
lector ot part;r funds, He!ll'Y Morganthau, sr.10 Morganthau studied farm 
1111D8gelllent at Cornall under Professor George F • Warren; in 1914 he bouglat 
a 1,400-acra fal"'ll in Dutchess Count:r, fifteen llliles frOJR Hyde Park.ll He 
12 llecame an expert orchard and dairy fal'ller. In 1922 he llought ~ •eertsap 
A«riculturaliat, a Poughkeepsie fal'lll journsl.13 During RoosaTelt 's first 
term as governor, Morgenthau organbed and served as chai:rman of an Agri• 
cultural Advisory C~ssion.14 Dlaring Boosavel t 0 s second term. Morgan-
tkau served as Ccmaiasioner of Coaservation,15 
7. Mole;r, Raymond, ~Masters of Politics (New York, Funk and Wagnalls, 
1949) 80. 
8, Moley, Ra;rmond, Wtt Seven Yeal"f (lllew York, lilrper, 1')39) l23n• 
'). Mole;r, Raymond, Attar Sevep Yean, 123n. 
10. Mole;r, Raymond, gz, .Maatera.!!! PolitiC!, 80. 
11. Carter, ;r. Franklin {UDofficial Obaerver), The Ney Dealera (lllew York, 
S:t.on and Schuatar, 1934) 107. 
12. Carter, 1. Franklin (Unofficial Ollaerver), Tbe New Dealers, 107. 
13. Carter, 1. Frankliu (Unofficial Observer), The New Dealers, 108. 
14. Carter, :r. Franklin {Unofficial Ollaerver), !h!. .I!J.!f Dealers, 108. 
15. Carter, :r. Franklin {UDofticial Observer), The New Dealers, 108. 
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A journalist in Washington reported that Roosevelt considered 
Morgenthau for the Agriculture post, rejecting him as •too Eastern and 
too Judaic.•10 Tugwell recalled that Roosevelt never considered Mor-
gentheu seriously for the farm job in the cabinet.17 Morgenthau•s poli• 
tical claU. to the office was less than that of Henry WBllace;18 Wallace 
represented the Republican farmers Who crossed party linea to support 
Rooaevelt. Moley reported that Morgenthau•a candidacy was •at least one 
case Where a Cabinet office was sought,• 19 Apparently Roosevelt and 
Howe SOOil mde it clear that the appoint•nt of Morgenthsu ws •out of 
the question.•20 
'l'ugwll offered no support to Morgenthau, with vhOIII he worked on 
the farm problem. Tugwell and Profeaaor M. L. Wilson worked on a crop-
21 
reduction plan, while Morgenthsu lined up the support of the farm leaders. 
During the la•-duck seasion of Congreaa, Roosevelt sent Morgentltau and 
Tugwell to lobby tor a farm bill. Apparently when Roosevelt assigned 
Morgenthau to work with a group on a problem, liaison between Morgenthau 
and the others was loose. Morgenthau seemed to desire independent pur-
suit of a problem for his own purposes. In his diary Harold Ickes illustra-
ted Morgenthau's attitude, which hampered cooperative achieve11111nt. At 
16, Ward, Paul w., "Henry Morgellthau and His Friends,• lll!. N!tiop, Vol, 
141, No. J658, August 14, 1935, 83, 
17. lllterview J!ill writer. 
18. Carter, 1., Jraaklin (Unofficial Observer), The !i!lf Dealel'fo 108. 
19. Moley, Raymond, After S!Yep Yean, 124. 
20. Moley, Raymond, After Suep Yeal'f, 124. 
21. Carter, J. Franklin (Unofficial Observer}, The New Dealers, 108. 
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Wal'lll Springs in December, 1934. Rooserelt, Tugwell, Harry Hopkins, and 
Ickes diacuased the public works prograa for the following year, Mor-
@:entheu, Ickea recorded, 
••• is always raising some childisa objections •••• I 
find it difficult to hold rq t .. per vitll Morgenthau. 
When I told i'ugwll the difficulty w wre haYing in 
getting anywhere with Morgenthau sitti~ in at the con• 
ferencea, Tugwell said, 'That's Henry.• 2 
George Peek was info1'1118d in February, 19330 that Morgenthau and 
Tugwell did not • jibe at au,•23 'l'bis infol'IIIStion was accurate, although 
there was no open conflict. In addition to any differences between taea 
arising out of their contact in conaection with the farm program, there 
ware undoubtedly iaportant intellectual differences between Morgenthau 
and Tugwell. Morgenthau•s •econoaic -·''was his teacher, George F. 
Warren of Cornello24 Tugwell did not think much of the aonetary the• 
aries of Warren, '••• ~o. curiously enough, became a President's adYi• 
ser, not on his progeasionsl subject but on his aYocation of currency 
rafora,• 25 In May, 1933. Roosarelt found a place for Morgenthau as 
head of the Fara Credit Adainistration, ~ica vas to combine nina agri• 
cultural credit agencies into one organization; the Fara Credit Adaini• 
stratton was to adainiater a $2,300.ooo.ooo fsra mortgage relief 
26 prograa. 
22, Ickes, Harold L., The Secret .IU&!:z .2f. Harold 1• Icke!s !10. .Qu., 
The First Tl!ousapd ~. l233=12J{o (New York, SimOn and Schuster, 
1953) 239-40, ullder data of Friday, December 7 • 1934. 
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Tugwell, R, G,, "The Utility of the Future in the Present,• Public 
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Prognosticators kept guessing viae of the ~~~ark on the· new USDA 
secretariat, naming Morgenthau, Wilson, and Tugwell as poasibilitiesa 
no one thought Wallace ~ld be Secretary.27 In the middle of February 
KipliP£er't ~Letter fraa ~abington aemed Cully Cobb of Georgia as 
the next Secretary of Agriculture,28 
The appointaent was really deter.dned in December of 19}2. 
Before RooseTelt vent to Warm Springs ia that month, ha wrote to ~llace 
ia Dee Moinea.29 Moley kept in touch with Wallace by telephone until 
he and Hove were able to wire RooseTelt, •Corn ielt in the leg.•3° 
I 
Later in Dec-bar Wallace and 'lugwll Tisited the President in Wara 
Springa.3l Mo direct offers vera made then,32 although it vas essenti• 
ally uaderstood that Wallace would be the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Wallace receiTed a written request to become Secretary on February 12, 
At this late date Tugwell had aot decided to join the goTeraaent. 
He freely remarked that the legislatiTe performance he saw as a lobby• 
ist aade the thought of his going to Washington repulsive.34 Now Wal• 
lace mond to bring Tugwell into .Ae;riculture. Wallace Tirtually refused 
to consider becoming Secretary UJiless Tugwell served with him.35 When 
27. Lord. Russell, The liallaces ~ l2l!!. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1147) 
323· 
28. Lord, Russell,~ Wallacea ~ l2B• 324• 
29o Moley, Ra,.and, ~ ~ IHl:ao 124n. 
30. Moley, Ra)'IIOnd 0 After~ Iu.Do 124no 
3lo Lord. Russell 0 !U 'Wallactt Rt l2B• 324. 
32. Lord, Russell, !a! Yallaeet J!t .12lao 324. 
33• Lord, Russell, ~ 'Wallac!l .5!f. .lmao 324J Moley, Raymond, :?:/.. Maste[! 
gt Politics, 80, 
}4. Lord, Russell, !11!. Wal1aclf gt 12lll• 323. 
35• Bolles, Blair, •sweetheart of the Ragimenters.• 8}. 
Wallace asked Tugwell to beco• Assistant Secretary, he said that ae 
•s reluctant to Mke the suggestions •:ror 0 Rex, I really ou~t to be 
workinf: llDder you.•,36 It vas only two weeks before the iaauguration 
when Tugwell agreed to go to Washington as Wallace's assistant, On 
February 22, 1933, Wallace wrote to the President that he ws •pleased 
to aa~e the loan of Rex for Assistant Secretary of Agriculture,•37 Tuc-
well was not the first professor to se~a in Agriculture, His appoint• 
ment was unique, hove~ar, ia breaking the tradition of professors and 
extension directors froa state agricultural institutions.38 
In late 1936 a commentary of his resignation asserted that Til!• 
well 'ne~er considered himself a farmer and did not want the Department 
of Agriculture post which he got,•39 Raymond Moley indicated that 
Tugwell was far from eager either to go to Washington or to reDISin theres 
, • • Wallace , •• asked hia LTui!,wl!i to come vi th Ilia as 
Assistant Secretary, Rex had entertained doubts similar 
to mine on the subject of public office. Wallace's con• 
fidence in h1a, his own liking for Wallace, the ~18 chance 
of helping set up the new tara program, and his concern 
about the interaational aspects of the program von froa 
hia a qualified decision. Ha decided to take the post for 
three months and thea so to Europe on a tour of study and 
obae~ation. Deati~ filed different orders, howe~er; tae 
three mont~z lengthened to more than three-and•one-half 
yeara •••• 
Moley, Ra,YIIIOnd, ?:1. Mastera .Qt Politics, 81; Frank Kent was incorrect 
when he wrote in his column in the Baltimore §sa on February 9, 1935. 
that Roose~elt compelled Wallace to take Tugwell into Agriculture, 
Without Gr;zse: Political l!ehnior 1934•19'36 (lfew Yorke William 
Morrow, 19 ) 82. 
Tymll Papers. 
MacMahon, Arthur w. and Millett, J'ohn D,, Federal Administrators (New 
York, Colu.bia Uni~er.ity Preas, 1939) 215. 
•Exit Brain Trust,• ru Literary Digest, November 28, 1936, 
Moley, Raymond, Aft ex: SaTeR Jeart, 124n. 
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Tugwell's entrance into the @PVeruaent was part of the dissolu• 
tion of the Brain Trust. After March 4, 1933, journalists continued 
to use the term with r•terence to presidential advisers. In 1934 David 
Lawrence charged that the lira in Trusters ccntrolled the making of laws 1 
•they were inno.atora without standards and principles,•41 The »rain 
Trusters, Lawrence continued, were taken into the administration be• 
cause they championed the central thought that •economic attitudes .ay 
be translated into law if you believe law and new economic facts can 
be blended under the daring leadership of a politically elected custo• 
dian of executiYB power,•'42 In 1935 Lawrence wrote that nevapeper.en 
named the academicians in the aclainistration the •brain trust;• there 
was really no such cohesive corps ot presidential advisers.43 In his 
statements of 1934 and 1935 Lawrence did not contradict himself because 
lie declared that the Brain Trusters did not have to assemble to plot 
strategy; 'their hearts beat as one,• attuned to revolutionary doctrines 
of worship of the atate,44 
Lawrence was correct in stating thet the lrain Trust did not con• 
tinue as a cohesive group in Washington, An old Washington correspondent 
stated that the lrain Trust was a newapaperman•s fabrication,45 Indivi• 
Lawrence, David, !eyond !W!, Key .llH! (New York, Whittlesey House, 
1934) 205. 
Lawrence, David, Beyond the Ney .!l!l!.!o 2o6. 
Lawrence, David, St!llllbling !R12 SocialiSIII (New York, D., Appleton• 
Century, 1935) 16, 
Lawrence, David, Beyo!ld lli J:!m! ]H!, 206. 
Rosten, Leo, c., The Washington Correspondents (New York, Harcourt 
lrace, 1937) 268. 
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dual members of the Brain Trust and a few of the later recruits did 
ha•e access to the President; however, there was no longer a definite 
body after March 4 which could be labeled the Brain Trust.46 There 
were various suasidiary Brain Trusts; there were also scattered indi• 
viduals working at their own particular tasks.47 Correspondents could 
not agree on bow many ilrain Trusters there were; at least thirty men 
possessed at least one of the proper credentials -- a degree or a thesis.48 
A passage in the diary of Will111111 E. Dodd, Ambassador to Gel'IDBny, indi• 
cated the loose usage of the term •Jrain Trust• in the press: 
October 'Zlo Saturday. At Konstanz today, I met Rexford 
G, Gugwell, so-called •braia•truster.• ••• He had been 
definitely instructed not to •isit me in Berlin. I guess 
this bad been to avoid publicity of a conference between 
two •brain•trusters,• as I have at tt.es been associated 
with Warren and Tugwell, although this is not really true 
in any sense.49 
The appearance together in Dodd's diary of the names of Tugwell 
and Warren suggested an error in Lawrence's analysis of the Brain Trust. 
Lawrence attributed intellectual hal'IIIOny to the Brain Trusters. Warren 
and Tugwell disagreed completely on monetary measures. The so-called 
Brain Trusters as a whole disagreed violently among themselves on many 
fundamental points.5° They represented at least nina different schools 
46. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's M&eazine, 
Vol. 94, No. 5, November, 1933, 260. 
47. Lindley, Earnest K., •War on the Brains Trust,• 260. 
48. •EXit Brain Trust,• 6, 
49• Dodd, William E., Amb&ssador Dodd's Diary, 1933•38, ed. by w. E. 
Dodd, J'r. • and Martha Dodd (New York, Harcourt • 1941) 181, 
50. Editorial, •Tugwell to the Wolves?•, ~Republic, Vol, 85, No. 1099, 
December 25, 1935. 186. 
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ot economic thought; they did not agree on either means or ends.51 The 
absence of unanimity of opinion among the academicians in government 
simply reflected the diaagreemant prevailing among intellectuals and pro-
fessors in general throughout the country.52 Despite popular beliefs, 
most professors did not support Roosevelt; among those vho did, there 
were sharp divisions of opinion.53 For example, George F. Warren of 
Cornell and 1ames H. Rogers of Yale, to whom Roosevelt's gold policy vas 
popularly attributed, were far froa being in complete agreement on tae 
gold-buying experiment of October, 1934.54 Under such circumstances a 
well•knit plot was not possible.55 
The accounts of the original irain Trusters supported Ernest K. 
Lindley's observation in 1933 that "by the time the brains trust received 
wide publicity, it had ceased to exist as an institution.•Sb Samuel 
Rosenman disclosed Roosevelt's appreciation of the Brain Trust's valu• 
able services in the campaign. The President wrote to Rosenman on Marca 
9, 1933, "••• your contribution of Ray and Rex was probably the best· 
that anyone made during the whole eampaign.•57 After the election Roose• 
velt pondered what to do with the advisers vho had proved valuable to him. 
51. Lerner, Max, It Is Later than l$1 Think (New York, Viking Preas. 
1939) 156-58. 
52. Soule, George, Tbe Coaing American Revolution (New York, Macmillan, 
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53· Soule, George, The Coaiy AMricop Rsvolution, 208. 
54• Soule, George, The Coaing Wricap Revolution, 208. 
55. Soule, George, The Coming Aaerican .!ltiolution, 208. 
56. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Braina Trust,• 258. 
57• Rosenmen, SaiiiWll, WorkiM lfllh Roosevelt (New York, Harper, 1952) 
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He aeard Rosenman's suggestion that the Brain Trust be retained as it 
was; he rejected Rosenman's advice: 
- -I suggested that it Lthe Brain Trus!/ should be kept intact 
for the purpose for vhich it had been organized and for that 
purpose only - as a staff to gather materiels tor study and 
for speeches, as a group vith vhaa the President could, as 
formerly, "bat around• ideas among themselves. 
I said that it would be particularly unfortunate if membera 
ot the Brain Trust were to be given administrative jobs in 
Washington to vhich each would have to devote his major time 
and attention, No matter hov large the particular job might 
be, it would be only a s .. ll part of the individual picture 
vith vhicb the President vould have to deal, and these men 
could be more helpful in advice and discussion vitbin that 
larger framework. It they vera to be genuinely useful, it 
was important, I tel t, that they have no personal or depart• 
mental axes to grind. In administrative posts, inevitably 
they would each become the spokeBDBn tor one small segment ot 
federal interest. They vould start worrying about the trees 
vhen their job should be to help the President in his concern 
about the forest. 
The President did not agree.58 
Roosevelt, in rejecting Rosenman's viev, acted in accordance vita 
Moley's ideas on the Brain Trust. Moley referred to the Brain Truat as 
••• simply a group of informed people doing, jointly, What a 
group of informed people ought to do under such circumstances. 
Ita job was obviously over. I was quite clear about that. 
There could be no place in a tree government for en integrated 
group of people possessed ot power and devoid of official ec• 
countability. The traditions of our government provided for 
presidential advisers vith appropriate official status. No 
doubt the men vith vhom I worked vould, if they chose, be 
enlisted in the service of the government. That was a bridge 
to be crossed leter.59 
The recollections ot Rosenman and Moley shoved hov absurd were the charges 
of a conspiratorial Brain Trust. Both the President and the Number One 
58. Rosenmsn, Samuel, Working vi th llooeevel t, 87-88, 
59· Moley, Raymond, After Seveg fears, 65-66. 
Brain Truster rejected the idea of a coordinated group of unofficial 
adTisers. 
Tugwell noted that the Brain Trust "dispersed into officialdom• 
after March 4. 1933.60 Moley placed the date of dissolution earlier: 
•,,, as I determined it should on election aTe, the 'brains trust• ceased 
to exist after November 8,• 61 Maley, Tugwell, Johnson, and Berle never 
62 
met as a group "from that day on.• They met individually many times, 
•but their contributions no longer became part of a unified product -
a draft speech or a rec~ndation on policy offered as a group aug• 
gestion.~63 The original grouJ did continue to help on speeches - the 
only function of the original Brain Trust which continued after 1933; 
howeTer, they never assisted in speech•writing as a team,64 
~eferences to the •Jrain Trust• after March 4, 1933 were neces-
sarily loose and inaccurate since there was then no such group like the 
Brain Trust of pre-inauguration days. Soon after the RooseTelt admini-
stratton began, anyone not in the goTernment upon whom hoosevelt called 
for adTice, as well as officials who saw the President often on general 
problems, became in the press, a member of the Brain Trust.65 Tugwell 
simply insisted on the deletion of a misleading and inaccurate term when 
he wired Donald Geddes of the Columbia University Preas on June 19, 1933, 
regarding a book about aeTenteen American educators; the telegrsa read: 
STRONGLY DISAPPROVE USE OF THE REAL BRAIN TRUST, 66 
6o. Note on "Discourse in Depression.• Twl:!!!!ll ~l!ers. 
61. Moley, Raymond, ~ ~ Years, 83. 
62, Maley, Raymond, After ~ ~. 83. 
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64. Roseamsn, Samuel, Working~ Roosevelt, 88, 
65. RoseiiiDSn, Samuel, Working~ Roosevelt, 88-89. 
66, Tue;well Pe;eer•. 
'!'he 100 Daya 
ftoee 'ldlo .-at oa e.,..ta aa . tlle,r llappea ottea tail to ooDaUer 
a teator wlliob awn bt..toriau aea strive 1a "Nia to re-oreate -- the 
•t 1 ur ot the. tS...• .&ai .. rna tile cUttioulUu WI 1Gb llt.atorteu 
taM, the ae•ra1 Jll,&bl1e baa a alaoR 1 11, quiokly torptt1111 bow 1t 
felt au aota4 ia a peat fl'll. Yd, it 1a not poaaillla hU¥ to u4er-
a-.. the ..,..ta ot Me.rell-l~~~~e, 1933• wttiiCIIlt atte~~pUaa to ai'ra 4ua 
Aa •rq aa the tall ot 1931 there 1IU e •teiat ot paaio• 1a tbe 
alr u a 111es' re• ~ took plaoe at the White .llousea •re aDd ~ 
PIOPle tiiO'tat't that tba eaptte,liatlo at1'U\\II'S •a eollepe1JI&.1 It 1IU 
1a as a"'-8_... ot •••*'1111 .._ ,._. fllpell c; ntet on the oent-
JOJ'U7' a..... la 19~ bia oppaaaaH 00114-'. hill tw 'llbet he wrote 1a 
1931• Ia tile oapt.tol, Saaator 'llaa:ler - to 'tuawU 'a 4etenae, 4eelar• 
1118 tllat • ..., 1a tilt. .....- VOII4e1'M Wsdber ov ao~at '11!*14 av-
rtw ia 1931. ,... .,.._U V1'0h the WGI'I1a Ua or1Uoa wre c1UD&.2 
Dr Mrq 1932. 1ll'l8ll be }ld11alla4JII:a. BQent'• &wnm1e bu.,J au 
4el1....- two 1144rNaea, •Dieecurae 1a bepnaat.oa• aD4 •ReapODaillilUV 
814 .....,is Dtnnaa,• fllawll wa Ullapereta4 at Jfoower'a tailU'& to 
1, ~. R. o •.• IE• 1n s't ••sr'• Jal'a (Jrev twk, .rob Da7. 1,32) 15· •. . .. ... . .. . 
2. ·~~~ Collp"Na, 2 Seuioa, VOl. 78, Pan 11. 
3· .... . 
I 
..ate4 OD his attitude at that t~t 
It n .J.":Disowraa ill IleJreset-=.7 llOV ·- • little 
taUter, a little o~t, lt 18 to ha rsro=hre4 
bow far our eeoaoar ha4 th81l suak into letharcr an4 
how -lc alld laetreoUve wen the Ma8U1'88 with wbicb 
Mr. Hoover hope( to 4efMt .. Feasion.4 
Ia IE· .!!pour' a 'IFDP'a fplig TuaveU "-ned the tact that the capt• 
tal1at1c vorlll wa prostrate; onl:r Farace ena the Vn1te4 States continued 
to pq torsip oblt.ptiou - ana contt.ilence in us wa unaenallled.5 
'fu&well ws ill a s1111larl¥ IaUter t1'81D8 of m1na when he ws taken 
into the BraiD Tl'Wit in March, 1932• 
It we aoo:t.deatal that the furious rsaantiDent which wa 
eatin& me ill tllat thlr4 4eFeas1011 aprtnc should, tor an 
1Detan11 • have appeale4 11o the 41uat1at ill Ra:r Mola;r, ana 
11ha11 111 sbal4 have 11\U'YlJ!Ml to aoi'UtinJ' at Maaare. 
Reali ll aDil 0 10oaaoro 1' WB equall)r 8 •tter at ChaliCe 
that the a-mer ahoulcl ~ve t4111114 the enerceta uaahl 
which 11bat rsaeaU.u ...-l'iiM4. llba118Yar the probaMll· 
tiea, h-ver, the taot 1a that tt 4i4 tum illto a aniiOD 
at ill1181l8ive vorlc, eclucaUG118l ·ta l;he e&tual rdher thu 
the ••d.s.c aaaae. J'or the Jl! .. auraa vera intans1t:r1DC 
Tiaihq fHa -k tCI "!IMk H taMapl01JIIIIlt lf8Wt and 88 de• 
tlatioa bora 4eWD her4er. The old policy we 110ft and aore 
d1aored1te4 all4 a new Cilia 001'1'8f110114lJICl¥ D884e4. AOU'f'i ty 
tbi'OUflhou.t the whole eoei!OIIf' ..,_a to proceed with proteat-
iiiC aotaea. 'l'ben we llall4 ill tbe par llax • • • • llllt bi&b 
above theae aCIUIIIla. tllera bali beau# to riaa frishtene4 ""tile 
tr«D the aalt-appaillte4 ohteta at tinftnoe ana induatr:r. 
11 the fall at 19.32 a feali~~t~ of panic vas in full sw;y. Tuawll 
reoalle4.t 
341· 
n is pan ot ths ktacSMss ot -" tiM the.\ w are Ullllllle 
to rt•r•ller ths 'WOI"at ot aw llantUQI terror~~. 'l'lllel'e ••• 
u tall .._ or& la 19)2, a ll1114 ot Ol'lhld1QI bJ'a\al'la lA the 
aU' • • • IIICI oae o011l4 eseaps • • • ita awful pNYalenoa. 1 
Aft411' the eleotlft, ~, lii'Ota, the allaN 111 CoasrM• 414 not 11811• to 
..,..., the ooatw11011 ud 4eapa1r ot the 4epraN1on-raolla4 eoutJ71 the 
11011\ awte eOG'a:•io oria1a 1la ths aeuoa•s hiato17 •• ocad.QI to a haad1 
thouMIIlla ot lenan JQU1'84 la1t0 RooaiMU'a beaclquartara - •desperate 
le"an tl'la 11~17 aslt...,eliut people.•8 MarriiiM' :Keel• latar 
Chal~n ot the l'adenl lleMr'N lklaJ'Cl, acrea4 with MDley•a eatillate ot 
the eooaude •U•Uoa. Ia a •JIIMIOh Wo" the U\ah l!l4uollt10111l1 Aaaool-
a\loa oa Oetoller 'i:f, 193.3, he atate4 that the 4epr•aioa •• not ot the 
01'111M17 cyo.Uoal aot:111 it •• the ead IUH ot u aooncaio aDd poUUoa1 
o..._.aU011 ona ~-aD4•tlft1JeaJ"e ol4 the wrl4 OYer.' 
Ia Jlartllo 19.33• the .-.non people w:re ready 11114 aqer tor aew 
4Qarturaa f,a ......,......1 aetiOII. 'l'b., 
oould aot ...,...._ ••• a atn .... a Ol'8Zfo a tripklliQI 
world 1illloll bad bean upoaat llf ttm eoonoaaio eartbquaQ ot 
1929, 8114 wlO had~ oa lato 193.3· IIOtbiDI _.as 
it. W .... ,i to be. J 1 1:::::-- llliob bad llea11 OOWNI 
with \he Hl't toliap ot · . aoturecl Jllbliolty, 8114 u,t 
...._.,.. tay \he ...,.Uaiouot ,.. .. oeru .,.,, wra ntdnlr 
1:lurllll4 'llan. lllat had as I hoaeat •• sean to lie Hoe it 1 
llllat hat ...... •J'tain •• .... to be 81'0\1114e4 ill llothiq 
-.. aol.f.t tball wlabaa. 'l'be t-vol'lt ot earth - the rooks 
aa4 soU - the nila alllil w1• ot h .. ._, the powr 8114 o~ 
la\q ot aatura - all 'he nalltiea ot the eoon.to qat•, 
lU· 
the •terlau, the toreN aad tlut -..ba~&uu, 1lllft 41800'4'• 
eftl4 toM quite Uttereat tball tho8e vhioh wn deaer11M4 
b the tQtvllorlra. Wild.._, lathe palplta, '-1111tooe4 
la 'libe ...,.pen. Au~ ball U'fed too loea ia a 4reea 
vosou. hn tho8e V1o bat>U.tell it ba4 torpt that u •• 
all a tab7 atol'f". 'IU :wlu tor linaa 1a the ~nv-~~e..­
l.a114 hall bMa tJ'Wit~ ti'Uifern4 to 'liha nal Wl'l4. 
'fU7 wn irnHftllt• allll tile eooncalo .,at• •nlJ llllll villi 
..U. aQil thea e\e4 UJ thi'OI&&h the ~~heel~' tl'iotloa ol hap. 
hasanlJ ttQOelaa aa4 uaooat..ued toroee,lO 
WUJa u.,ooo,ooo people wu n;l rf"( AM:rioau avoa tl'GII their 
v ... er CMJa~ ot the l920. Wl'lih a Yl ••ace· Our 11111tttuttou, 'lUfwll 
..... ftatl la a ... _.,011-'o lllflei'Pl'ftatioa ol bla1ior7, bad •attJ'CIII'Iied 
h ... 4S..1tr••U !he people ha4 aa •tavlao.ible 4eterm1natioa' to an 
tl•taae nnichtuell _., aei'liher -JIIllloe tor vea\ed propeJ't7 rieltta 
aor a plM tor OGIU!le...., la 4aella& 14th eaOMIIlo 1Dat1tutioaa dater• 
n4 the JNpla'a 411 114 tor aa11Yo,12 toll' 
• •• w aa 1ihe k1114 ot JIIOpla Vbo alla-« poliOF to ba •4a 
"'19J!Ntlldlat1 ..... 1lbO hall ao •114a11eJ ara4 avaa telented 
the ~ to lutft •113' JDl.SaiF at all ulua thd ...., "' 
811Meolf eauad u ,..,__.. .. 81' Mtrttioa, who ve 
~II' - aealU\ u, .. ••ter .. , 1lba oma.aequaaoaa 
•••• 13 . . 
~l· • rta4 ttaat .... Ob.HrYOra, ill lookina 'baok to 1933• 
te~~Qd to 'ldalllln the 41acn4111 1at0 *iob 11he 87at• had thea tallaa 
aa4 the nacllDON ot a peral,Jzed peoJU 110 aooept dranio aoluUoaa 
otten4 b7 a tl'U'Iia6 lealler.•U. ~111 414 DGt take a4nataae ot t!te 
10. 
11. 
-.-u. a. G., •!he .. v Dral• 'ftla Ri•• ot Jhu1araa,• Pan II, J,'l;: 81\l1 M& Qn•dtrko 'frJlua 5, llo, 3, Sept.aehr, 19.52, 
.,.._u, Jt. G,, tOfte ,lYe .. 'b'dlU.oa,• AUepUt IJRP'h1I 0 
VDl. 155, Jo, 4, Aprll. l: , ~1 • 
.,.._n, ll. o.,•fhe ~-.TN41ttoa,• UJ•U· 
tlt&•ll• R. G., .... "''IF -.,.(hv York, Dolllilleda7o l<J47) ~. 
-.u. fl. G., •1'Jlit 1: &z..Uifr& JlooaeYelt,• .Qtnl MU1al Q.-a"-4'• VOl, &, .o. 2, 1Waa, l'J.5,, ,.... 
4_.-ata•toa tlaat a d IICJ'IItlio "'"' nt ean ut dea1aiw1J without 
Mi81 Ucf.Y1U.H4 hie ooaU'UiuUOD t4l waten e1Y1lillatioa.l5 Perluapa 
..., t'lltwa htatortau vJ.U .,.. with the IJasliahaa'• ralaiq their 
ent••• ~ a...eYalt'• -•nwu .. iD the lisht or the paaio 1Uoll 
prenUell. 1a 19.33• 
fba Pn-ttoa ot fln'oluUon 
fbe JU10 ot 1932 8114 19.33 JNdbq CODtaiaed the pctaat1a1 tor 
riJYOlutiGih ea wtllraalr ot Yioluoe ot a •411lUu4e vhioh the nat1011 had 
aM ~~a- au• 1865. 'fll&vall uolarad that •ao-u had 1ftber1tad 
11A1at •• -rl¥ a OtYU. Vllr teo ti'Oa the 1Dtrau4&Ut Mr. J1Dcmtr1 ra41-
1 
oale. 8114 ~C\1Qallrtaa- .. ..,. to be at each other's tbroa.te,• Mole7 
••••• allll ..._.I'OWII" \.be •U• anded a apeoitio Procraa vtth vhioh to 
appl.J the J)liloaol!la7 ot Pro.,.ui..-..-.a Ia the aarlJ pert or 19:32 'fu£-
wl1 W1'!llt4 that the pol10f ot aiel at tu top •• 
••• ._.. thaa poor.,_. .. ._.,,. U ia ahortaishtad· Slleh 
ntlllaaa eQ1.01\4lt1oa, neh IIIIPftiJJ'OU! craepiq. _, t1aa1l.J 
equdar r.--'10MI? atUW4N .... 3 · 
11ir h:~ 1, 19.3.3• 111 wa ontou.a that 1UUe wa to o~ ot the 
lnldvek Cwsr••a the 4-.Rle - •• lllau. 4 It we at about thia 
3114· 
tlae tbat .,.._ll. we etUnc 'lit tDOaollildiiiC Jllll!l...-a ot J:U W4uU£1el 
Netl\lJMo 1a Wb:l.ah ht 418-tll tba prt ... UOII ot reYOlutioat 
• • • I oaa ... tbet • be'M batla -etouall' orMUIIC a 
auaau-. ta Wbiola t~at· lftOluUo•rr taeuo aieltt lie :rt• 
aoru4 to -.-..a~. OOII!llUGDa 4o aot •• .. S.tatora 
••• W.t Mlltlt10118 al• SC!taton a ahaHt tor plaulltt• 
lliJ• Val•• w &iTt QUI" ttollaiquea 1101'1 l1H:I't7o ul .. a, 
that :La, w 4t'f1" W78 to hae their pottatiaU.Uea, the 
_,_, llet- at w tl't .... , w ~debt lie will 
lo4e& 1Mtlt _.. t11'111l.J 1a tn17 •rur•a ld.ad. Vt poe • 
.... 8'1U'7 ate4hl •twtal tw UMtlia, aa4 Bttl'l7 t'fti'J• 
... .... it I it 18 t quite 811i1Plt -clUtiCIIl 1D IIIOI!It lllf.a4.a 
that oootnl oupt to M tallla out of the hoU48 of JtoplAt 
1iiiKI IIUIIOt pt'Oil'lOt U ~ -. aoelleat •tartala at their 
41apo~~tl. 'fllu ar1 nrtt oaaa~tt lit 4talaH4 Ill' JOlAU.ac to 
Uft10111Uea, llaoaun then art al~ those who haTt alter• 
DIU.,. a._..t1CIIl8 tw _,tlq th- 41rt1ov1Ut8o 
Op ~ 1t to lt.lltratt ttaha11l1lt 1»7 aoocJ. ... ,....,. 
~ ollotce 18 -" 1ilhethtt~ t ... i4M ahall bt &iTtD 1U 
~tl7 tor ..n~, llllt oaq ia whet wy tbat opportu• 
DltJ' *•11 1M p:wpaft4 tor • 
••• w oaa expen.u11 aow. aA4 w oupt to do it bttOl"e it 
t.a too lau. Otharvt .. , • an nrtl7 ~t..a to l'e'tOlu· 
tt•..S . 
tht ,.,..... ot JIIOplt ~ who IICIIIIht to improve oorul1Uou '117 
•l'IIIUOtlfld uperlaat vl\hla tilt r-work ot the a:iaUaa soo1al qata.• 
lallurt woul4 JII!Mil• liepea 111'84leW, a atr:I.CIUII praJIIIliot apiut :rtUOIII.l 
oha..,, ltsYtas •orthCI4Gilr¥ aD4 ~lt&Uoa to ficllt :l.t Ol&t.•6 
,31U. 
WI!¥ wre IIOClial ao1eat1au COAOQiled with tile pu81bUity et re~­
luUoa 1a the Great Reptllllct Vu tllel'll a~Q" llaaia ia fact tor auch .u-
&l'f1.,.t 'lhe tint aipe tilet •OO-'c cetUUona bed lleOOM uabearallle 
aueal'll4 in the apriq fit 1932 111 tile l'iohNt aectioa ot the -.riMa 
tara Mlt f.D tha tona ot a propu'f ovat~ra• ftl'fOlt. 'l'he f!U'MJ' ot low 
41apl~ hta ap1rit ot :nage4 ia4id.llul1811. ReUber the law raor the 
U.r1Ma apt .. preteote4 bia h- alii\ tara. Ire olecided to proteat him-
aelt •vt\h rifle, abot8Wl, alii\ ...... la the true frontier aa~~~~ar pori• 
tle4 la tM Aaerteaa tracltU••• ..._. Ma4e4 toptber to. belt the 
lepl JI'G ataeea ot t.x aelea aDd tonololltll'lla. TheF 111UIII14ate4 '-nk 
\lo tu ...,...luUOIIIBZJ taoUo ot 41not aotlOA Wl'll aufiONatul. '!.'he •• 
ot ajp.taUoo 8114 eorJUhlca ap:read •P141J - weatwl'd to the Paoit1o, 
eaatwal'd \to the Delawl'lt 111~. 8114 u tar 80ioltll aa JlH\IUolq IUI4 Olllab-. 
Ill tile-rot 1932 \he low,._., led b;v the lld.lUant Milo Roo, 
-.p.lep4 an aMlUCIMl taoUo- Slla . .vu..7 
1lu1as \the l&M-4uk pert.ot U~~Net ia tile t'ana !Mlt 1aQI'INIM4. 
fke tal'llltra b14 1a ~ tor a tev eeata or a taw dollars.. raatc»'ia& 
U to the r....- IMIMl'll• .lt Daablar,· Cillo, a abt ot $400 wa aaUle4 
tw M·l5• at I.ocaao low, fa~.• Bltlidst' toreaa pra'fOD.W the aela 
Ifill' ...,.., __ ot tuN ot a~t tWO thauaalll\ pleaaa of propart1o S l'ana-
)46. 
ere anhe4 to cOIU'1o IIOUMa u4 into the capUc;la at V1acou1a, )lelmtna, 
lo1e aJMl other nataa1 1a .Jaa~~~~~oey, 1933, a tam-lieU &Oftl"'lor appeaW 
\o ...,..... holden to v1U.hol4 torec"-n procH4l-.a util the lea1a· 
lahn uW.4 aot 1 llt..ml O'Jieal, l'rH1 .. nt Cit the Allllriua laftl lhlnau 
hidaUn, ...., 1'8JZ'Qell\e4 tha OIIM81'98U'IW flll'llltra of the ocma belt, 
llllraa4 tbe Saa&u ~tue Oil 'PUill._.e 1a1a!NB!'J', 19.3.3, •U.U.ae 
t!OaPhh& 1a 4CIIIe for the .-.~toea tar.r, w•ll have revoluUoa 1a the 
o0Uilt.17&14e la lua nea twlw llllll\lwt.•' 
At*' a.o,e.,..u took otfloa, IUU'Ut in the Cora Belt ron to Dlt1l 
bailfl.ta *lle ~ llelta1ia4 the .pi~ltural bill. Oil April 1:7 a1i 
Lelfara, Iow, fuaN'a •loatad a ,_.. llllo retuae4 to pl'OIIiae tbat ba 
wwl4 aqa ao ..-. foraol0ftl'a8. SO. a1iatu paaaad ~-- .,...tori• 
tU, ,.._JQaa4 the atriU llllaJl.BIIroert'aU requeatell tbat they 4Jive the DIIV 
lq1al8Ucm a ....... to onete ~ "' orllerl¥ -~Gila. At1iu a 
•J&alal ...... no. the ~, Ccacn•• Ullft4a4 the ta:na \111 to 
~ tor rettaaaeine ot faJ'lll tiOI'tfll ... "' the a~n at 1ov later· 
N1l nua. Whea the Preallleat aipM tba llill on MaJ 12, the eo~ 
.n the t•-•• 4 •• ot the~ t1t1IJJeara• protec\icm qalaat 
t:b.- NIIDS ett .. t GO prlou ol J~qQlU proRetlon, lntlaW f&ll'Z'MOI to 
.,..., ._._ hu !h._.._.._.,), allil ohHp ..o.u.10 
'l'be attit\14N aa4 OCQUct ot tu fal'!llllrs ia 19.32 ad early 1933 
11ea4ed t9 jUtU'J' • ata'-t 'fucwU •a Oil Jult 31. 19.34. ia a radio 
a4U.U oa tana JOliq. II aa14a 
'l'bia tua4 ot IIIIUJ' ,6llo-.at ptiJ'Mrlti/. ot Nl'YiON • ot 
nUet • ot awU't, tl•t.t.1e aoo1al uoa oOatloa to eGOI!Mic 
all' 1 taDON 414 Dot •1•11 batoN the lfew Deal. W1th01lt 
111 11111 aould faoe tllliSiw 8114 J01111f.oal raY01uUOft 1a tile 
fana a11atea aD4 foal riota la the cltlea.ll 
Aa AaaiaQat aa4 Uacler S....Ul'J ot A&ftcna.Uure fuavell we ooaU•-
oulJ' tclllMrM4 with ,,_ l8e4 tw.,., t q1, loaa•nap dnelo,..ata 
la laa4 .... til replan a hiiJOftl7 de..rioe aullh u the .&A.A.. Be wa aware 
ot tar.ra • aeeda au neo111ou. tla4N1rable eYaate of the put • be 
fearell. 001&14 be repea11e4a 
Pel'bapa the really daQIM!IU :a41oa1 1a the pereoa who 
1aa1ata tlla11 aoth1aa _., M 40118 about the ala4Jut.at 
fit JOJill&Uoa to neou...-. It he baa b1a .,.. the .--
J~MUoa ot our JOpulaUoa W.14 .... ei4Jfi1f10111ltl7 aa4 
t• the _.... the cauect•..... tw dell0ore07 • tor eGGD• 
calo IIMUJ'i'J', tor the '"" •U• of o1..ril ltbertiee, I 
leaw to J'OIU' ~ttoa.lZ 
Attel' 1933 1ben wa 'nrtuallJ' ao poeaibillty of rnolutioa la the 
U'alW statea. 21len wn •• ata le4 11J Htl.e7 Loaa. htur Cou&hlia. 
aad Dr. ~ whlllh 111U111'ate4 the 1rreapoaailtil11i7 ot the 41aJMNI• 
aeaaet, 'lllho caw their polUital aupport to thoa.e pGIIialaa aecnarity 
thJIOIIC)I aoheMa Maria& no relaUoa \o the eoaaflllio oapeol'J' of the aatioa 
at the ,,_.13 'Ill ..... ,..ate -..ew a poaai'ble lltBans of expreasloa 
Dul'iaa hla at., 1a V.aMIII'oa, T\apell re1'arre4 in hie epeeohaa 
alllli U'tioJ.a to the aftr11f.Dg ot n't'Ol11UOD la 19.33 alld tbe nae4 to eU-
IIPate the JOH1lt11UJ ot a I'Mid'l'eD .. ot auah a aituaUca. Be 4ellare4 
la _.u, 1934, tbat 'llbe •v Deal .. e1taol11teq laertteltla aiaoa no 
ollf.erlJ aa4 1 .. 1. Ia l't32. he ooaUIIIUie4, the people P'" the Pru1441at 
a peaeet111 aDdate to t17 to tSPiM • _.tar .... of 41Mr1\Nt1ca ot 
aaUeaal iaODIIII. Be o'IIN:ne4 that lllbl.l. the obJeot wa a111Ple, the 
aoluUOJl .. umpJ.ea. lt cae tOUII4 apeaitio !lev Deal aoth'iUea vlo b 
ftl:'latJ aa4 aaraS•alJ' OOiltft41otQI\Y', ODe ehou14 rellliDd _ .. lt ot the 
84111aietraUoa'a pural 111MaUou.l4 
Ill llllr• 1934, 1'qvell iatol'lllll4 a .. uaa ot aoolal workara tbat 
,.. CIOfltiiMlCiaeq taoa4 the c~wu..,. ot aalar11111 the oapaoity ot our 
aooial aa4 eomwr•e a,.t• to a'lleolrlt 701111& l)ttOple •without politieal 
TlolHoa. -1a1 clello:raliutioa, or e-caio Ohaoe.•1.5 Ill CGD~~~H~tiOil 
!Jibe 014 Ounl, ta their oppoetttoa to aobian'ble ratora 
1111.1le it ie poeanle, are, 111r.e the lour'bona, the real 
tr1edtl ot 'fiolet reYOlut4i:la• . ht tortunatelt • ba'fe 
u4er our Oeut1._1oc ••toftl1ahe4 •ohaalalU of pol1t1· 
olll '-HftOJ ao *'• W;eae'fer the ajorUJ are autti• 
ote111~ arouea4 a!MI an ....Uoed that aeona.to Aa~~&tt1t• Uit~, the)' ... atft.llo10WilJ aq ao - wUh ~ ... 
Ia a &JII8oll ill J.prU, 193.5, .,._11 llfttioned the ezploai'fa i.Qli-
MUOINI of ~at t~ lxlth ._..Uo all4 foraip effatret 
•.. ulaN w reeha)IIJ our eooiet)' ao aa to lllle the 11'8811 
laua.a reaQ&l'oea raov aal'lloaloell.r :rapreaeatet br wa pl•· 
..... tlaaae •l'INIOVOINI vu1 ..... expreaaioa aD4 $hat 
apre•t• viU iaYVlaiiJ.r talre tile fOJ'II whiall hiatOI'J 
now ia cdlaftoter!Ato fll ~1at1H 11hich laolr: the illte1• 
Upllee to qtieipete ft'f4~1d1oQ br retona all4 Ulper1all-
-.r ra.....,..J.T 
Ia aa artlo1a ta Aprt1, 193.5, ~ wrne4 that sraetar crl- alllll 2101'8 
4.1HeWou e.Pl'8Jialou woul4. oulaluw 1a •political re'foluUon or rao1al 
vUh4:raw1,• altanatiqa 1111.1oh tha Mev Deal •aapirea to olrt'1ate.•18 
Oa Oat*r 28, 193.5, W• the Delloo:ratic State Ceatral CCllltllittoe 
111 * Aapl .. , fucwll •e. l!.ia -.t ecatronraial apaa.ob. Ia thia 
atuua ke 41allll8aa4 taoUu all4 atfttag for the oOIIIiJic 118111p&.ip of 
193'. apaak111(! at U•• ia IISlitarr DJ'III. It wa the onl.7 'ballise1'8Rt 
apeMh be •o u a llav DM141'1 be qob traukl.7 aa a political partiaan. 
18. 
t"'11 ..... . 1
--110 Bt Q,, 1 J. 'l'hir4 looaclllro' .&44:raea, RoohNtar Teaohara• 
J.aaootauoo, lt9ohaater, llev Yoa, April 9, 19l5a !IDA I'D'' 8'1S'U• 
141 tM .. , Deal feila4 to aol'fe the uaplOJIIMIDt probl-. aQil 
J.arl• Wilt to wrt JBt• OlllJ a.lkldrloaire Mllrxiat IMKll4 a~laia 
tile Val11a4 3ta11U' et:raaee iato 11orl4 War ll la teJ'IIIt ot ~a~M~r1• 
aliall. lt 1a tru that w dMlt with reaoUonar1ea auoh •• tlerlea 
tor IISlituy rea-•. lfa 414 she the Philipplaea their 1ndopell4• 
eoa and •tob4 tl:ae 44Nolllti4m ot the Br1Uah, Freoh. all4 .lllatoh 
881Pil'H vl\h ....,.t.,.,, 1t SlOt 8PPJ'O'f81. 
'flacwl.l, R. o., •'!be Jtrcacraaai.,. T:ra41Uoa,• us. 
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A oel'Uta u ..... tor llell1&eNDtr aa4 b7pert10la 1e uauell.J sreated to 
a .,..ur at a poliUMl rellJ'J ~. hovel'ar, should han kaowa tbat 
u a P~M"t otficial he OOilld aot n:pect, 1a an ap ot 4eta1l84 JOl1· 
tteal aonrege bJr the preu, that lala 1"UUlrks would r•eh on11 his ~ 
41ata a\ldienoe. A Mill~ or jwl1o1ouaNa in his choloe of vord.a would 
ba..,. Mea appropriate. Os tba eultJeet or the prenntion or rnolutioa 
he 4eolere4 la thie •..-ob• 
lt 1a the teak et the ~ail'N to lead the '1117 toverd. 5'tlti/ ,_tun aa4 to pre:at ali.Oti!K tumiD& baokver4 \overt 
tu put. Aaother •rt1R&• aacrt.ber Clool14ee, aaoflbar Hoower 
Qtwatad v1:ttt lea4enll1» aov ..U Ht ua 'baek u auF 
4eoa4N aa w vera Ht lllaU; l11h1e - aa4 at tba aDd of U 
tHre al&llt not 'ba annll.er 8Aiu to a....n a ronol•Uon,lt 
oa the UlpUed thftlllt that a '"''- tor the oppoe1Uon wa a YOta for ra'IO• 
luuea -- al'M t~ - .....,._ ot tu opposition '101oe4 a a1111lar 
It 'l'UcWll .,.uMehed hS.S.U vUh reaard. to tba :roar 19,36, he 
we ut u ..... ru.r Mlo4ruaUe ta h:&a a ate on con41 tiona 1a 193.3• 
J:a nt:&'CIII,.ot he llailllll tlla PWA, 11Rlo and WPA aa •noble 1natitutiou - . 
a11 l.uat ca. tlalt ot a pr08ftlll 'llbich ..... the nat1o11 fi'OII nYolution.•20 
lliltet AMriae.na an "t1af1114 DO\ to U.•• bad tba opportw1t:r to -
19. ~11. R. o., A4d.reea, JlllocreUo Stiata Caatrel ec-t.naa, Loa 
Astpl.M, Cal.ltonia, OotoMr 28, l.9151 B!MUltmS ftd'dp1atpt1• 
biU ltlMII• 2. 
20. 'l'laiWUo Jl, G., Dl. §!ritkM J.IIIA• 39• 
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,..._11 ilUilatllll nat \he -'1al ~ui11111111nb ot the depreaaioa 
ahoi&U aot 8D4 tblllkiDC Sa loJI&-rua te11111. Boon0111c collapse celled for 
.-41et.e -.una to .. ,. tha capltaUaUo syat... J:tforta to pre...at 
revol•ttoa HI aaaure pneenation l.a VIe short rua 811Phaai.Sed the Deed 
to 0911814er MeDII ot avo14Sac perio41a 4eprHa1ona in the future. '!.\&a-
well WI'Me ellwt 1lult1tuttcmal a4Juatum and •dtaoiplina" in broad, loac-
rua aoolo&iul te11111.1 Yet, then •• 80IMI ursan07 111 his •-nta OD 
Then are •ttere 11h14Jh lla,. to do ld.th inaUtuticmal 
wop. 'Ilia ,.._uon vHtller nOll a ohttnce ~ ba bl'OU&ht 
aMilt v&»elkl .u. dJH elp"k ta ou vhtch is as 
1ft ....,.net. It UluU.taa tlbat ia perhaps the worst 
Wnt ot ..._.,raq. lor ttaa 411 JaftUo prooaas depiii!U 
• 'llllat we ull Mv.ut.toa. -sac pei'INIIsion, aDd thta is 
tun 4tlpen4a, to aa astilll4 wh1th. ta appall1na, em the en-
castna ot aa t.menat wh111b baa beea allla to· ao,.._tate 
-ltlh •114 ao oarrr em aa ex,...t.,. propapn4a. The tact 
" ba taotl4 hen ie tbet 110 sa .. reat 11bich baa -- ao 
fa~ will desire to taet1tat1onalize d1reot1,. aot1•1· 
u ... 
'f\lsWU t!llrf:lou.ala cUd not expect that there woulcl he a lluddaa, 
wicleapreatl CIQI!IOenJ with 1011&•1'\ID 11U111U.ut1cmal ohanaea eDit. loac-rwa objec-
1. Bee a-..., etuapter II, 5eot1Gil, •the Beall for IIUititutioaal Re· 
fQI!at' - helov, Chapter XI%, SeotiDil, 'llltlpllo:t.n of the 'l':llllea, 
t.oq..,.. •• 
2. ~11. 1'1. G., Ofhe J'o\u'th Power,• lltMJM ul CiVic P. mt, 
A»J,"il-.hea, 1939, fart II, 22 ltalica a4484. ' 
\twa. Ia a441Uoa to the lld'NW• lileft•I'Wl •levpoiata ot 111110111 
..._... JOP&l,ar OOGMJ'e ot IIOftlJ.., ill. poliUoel IOOIIOIIIF aote4 aa 
-~ to a4,..._.t tor aaniYal. Be nterra4. tor exaaple, to 
tile lllnl n•aetn that tbOH tlbo 4o aot work alloul4 aot •tt llbile -... 
••• &11'111.6 flOOila al1eaplJ' to lllltlticlere vhiob an 4e!Ue4 to 
..... _.... Sll41"f14ule. A _.. eotltlllle4 ntnt111 ti'Ca •nllt 
--..1....,.. aoUoa It ie 4Utloalt to '-1;11111 w• n ie 11bu 
na\14 ~tluUF. a.t \tlat• 11t ._..... ie ooa ot taa ._,... 
u .. • that lllftl •ttuil Moltl4 aot be,., ia 1.oc1oa1 tona.3 
Ia 411MUJei .. tke ._.._., ot .... bel• to all7 •WJ' traa lo&ioal 
•pluaUooa ot 11H1r behaYior. -.....u ntel'l'a4, ia atteot. to the 41t· 
t.na• betwn lldlat aMlolO&iete oall the •nel• neeou (pn.e llllt\IUI) 
aa4 tile "CCMiil" reeeou ( tllOII wieh JMple &1Ye) tor talt:laa aetloat 
irru,...1W.e aetioa -u ..,.1 liUtUwUooal ohlape 
••• u .... u u 111•11¥ .,,..u .. reuoa tor ehaa&tD& -. 
-.. toua4 aoupta'lll•• . %1 lll1l be ..... ot OOI&l"Ho that tbe 
1'1&1 ....,... ..U 'be bltolenltle. '!'hat 1e aot t.aportaat, 
,...._,.. •MPt to' Jld'eaoplaera llllt anrone oaa 4u1re 
...... 8VYlYel ••• ·" 
Parillcl. the llw Deal perSOI\ 'lu&wll we prS..rU,y 4JOQoerH4 Vi tb 
the beeie thlii'Ut to 1\D'rl.,.l 1a.ct1Ye4 1a llutruoU•• laad- praeti .... 
Be OOH14ere4 the .&AA a '-POII'U'f' ""''•• • pe~nt aartoultual poli., 
.uU baYe to 1te ltaeell oa t'udr Jll'hll s.a-uaauoa ot lan4-· Acr1· 
oul'tu. •t'tl4q II I 11 nnte« tlut •suaan ot -~· - 'llbst Da~4 Llll• 
eatbal ot ·'l"fA .. 11.114 tlut •nn•·• 111 -'•"' After hie ilsparttmt tna 
WQiai..-oa. tvpsll NsiWiile4 out la Ill• nartoultval atu41ea, tUllll up 
...-nl vodra ta soolCIIJ - tlut est .... 4sslt~~& vlth the uattr ot •• 
u4 ••~~n. 6 Ia Ilia later Wli'HiiiCI he JH-te« eooloctad probl- ta 
•- ot a 4Na aUll ta PJOCIINIU - •he ooatllst llet-a -·• -uw 
d4..,._.Uw sliUUt•• 
1111atUw - ..- to ...... tsU bs.nslt relnts4 IIOr? ... .,lJ 
tiiUl .. 4eee aow to ..-,, na, ?Jill •t•r• sll4 ,._. tlutN 
wu sa·~ .--... • bta - 'llbte ... ._, nroaa ta 
•nata bUY~ • tiMrt hla nlsUOUIIip hail s 110r? putsat 
pllue thea -. lui 11M t.... '!'bat. ~ ..... 1 .. tor 
dJuWat. t1ut ..... ot ...... slao the _, ot rsau .... 
..... ot flo JU.,...toa. 1Diita ... u., 1a apolra ot, it 111 
JIIIU1\le to "lte\llt that 'llbst in _.., 111 the sUalllllill8 ot 
lla •• ...., ....... ta .. NlstiOIIIIhip ot - .. '" ....... 
... ... t-... ot 111ai4b lin b ..... 
••• 
'l'las ftft~'IUt ......... ill .U ........ J?rhsJio 1a tl:tet ... _. 
at._ tu JOWl' to tln..,. tllU stjut!aat. n ... Its .... . 
ot OOIII'Ho that tllia ....... a1tt _. s twasUoa ot hie 
-u•n••• oan ts "" ot the other. Tst it •• s mit 
whte. tf .. .._ ••· wtth .., other apedea, that apeat• 
_... 1b .ata•nuoa ... 'llldlJ u to sllldaats lUelt _,_. 
\las ttM -. wbtoll .our lqariflllp nu. It 1a -...tlJ sa ~ 
a ooualoulf lroals tli'Utell' hail est the rsos &OlliS _,.rl• 
•otalll' u ea U.lileat to 4ueou?riJII lllasther enstt'fft?es 
1st tO a1orr oir the 11'?"• tHa tiU"Il?4 ••r attl the teD 
sh01114 Its told. It ln 11011 ~ pt • Reeeat SIIDWrlsn he" 
-.. s nea -.. ... llrftattGI\ 984 tutnsttc. htors thsto PI•••• to.J« ........ , ..... to haw ou.t•t&hecl 4ss-n1lfts 
t,_ tt. .._ bet tauna411 ta ..-..rs .rslnU" to ...._. aal• 
-'-· ................. ldn aou •• -·DOt •laourlebeil. 
111 _. ..... lilt tu l...,..n Ia a h:n -.24UJMII"'tll1 •• p'es 
sa4 t).eau•• an u. Mllft psOJ)ls per sGI'? ta'Ml.YII4 s 110r0 btea• 
alYe ..,..,cl._. 111btah Ia •• ~ .Ut 1.1* 1 ra~ 
4Qti'Oplr. -. .o).f.-bcilu't ,.... 8Ptha;at ta otU••• a1111 
,_.,_, ...,Jt, ~ ,P ..-u, OU'Iie4. uapotltll tU. 
lllltah ...,... ... to -- ...,,....... .Al:\4 _1_._ ....... 
aaAe4 to ....... _. ... , , ....... ;,.ua.. .-~Jloc&oal 
···-· 
••• 
8o tar u tbe heel• of ...,. ..... hie powr to '--1 .. 
laRIIe tor laS..it .-1 &elll~\7 to wlk QI'Scllt. that 1.1 a 
.fill ' WI ml. eellt.• . at i4u\1t1e4 with bie tar 4eet1!v • 
It laaa al-.,. liMa !'•11•117• ho-...r, to ZOMoptae tllat tt 
llu ltattatf.slall. ftie.•JIOWI' to au .. te DO\ &lftll wUh tile 
,..,...~a , ... , CllllaOII.UC woaa ..,. • a.oa. vttJtoat ,...1v. 
JIJia'• tna1• .... ~a .. Ia oHHW poq or t1ae SftYe be•••· 
........... , .... ft .. -.be ....... - .... ,11& alur· It tile 
ftM ta to tlil.l'riYe vttll h u I• tt _.t !left at leut e •J· 
flll'tlp ol .. llllo WUI wra llllta ~114 to 8\U.'Yiftlt U vUl 
at111 ....,. tile PJ'Hlea of ..... 111bo eiiOOM otheMM u4 
...... • aUt •ll to 1CIIIS_.. JOlley .. who. tllenton. an 
.......... " 
Oou144mlUoa ot thNe t.aRN ~ 'ft1'1 ctUielrlJ' to other 
tllu loi1Yttul ,.-~, ... too. Oloee1Yet.l¥ a aa aq tlhooM 
to~ l'=aa\t vt.._t Yaat zuial o~..aoee. How 
4VflwH&t It Sa, h!NeiUo -.. • --. for e tarU't, a •'-
aU,, e IDIOt&. WiHII •laiiii'Sebu e atlUoa or a llUII1nd 111.1• 
U... __... ...., ol ..._ 1aiiQI.tuU of the Wen 11141• 
•tn t.a obi'Oil1o atal'fttloa tor Mlah ne.aoae. .._170M ooa• 
...... vtth tlle ..rae ,., • tha pollq 1a'f0lft1 ·...u '-ll 
,.. that ba ..... , .... bf al....... Oa ........ ,,. ~ 
,...U tva eat to M olfllllll' ..._oW with bta pooatlloolc Olr 
Jau 110Uttoal f1duft •••• 
••• 
• • • the •• aq ba ~ b;r •leatrltton, bf eo11 Uballll• 
uoa. OJ' .., wr. All1 U IUTi..U I.e to ba -cs. at ·all aa:rtata 
ita OQDttttou haYe ... to ha aet ta teraa vhitlh 4o not nl'er 
\0 s.Ml..UU.l .-tu.,.. ur.-.. than tiler 4o to pr11111t1.,. 
a4ju ...... 
lllllltf 1Rat tw .-..q ~tl01t be Ol' bin 4ftoea"llt7 haft 
.n.• ,...u~. an. ...__ ..... 1IU'e ht44M or w.r-
.,.. '*' • .,... toq~._ 0.. 111t141at .. . 
!Ut a4JUftaat .._ ..-~11111 4et1alUOil 1n happiMN 
h to 118 ,..... oa1t la 41Hoftrtac H4 ntorolq tlla et.tl&tu 
.t •"'"• JllJOPc what..., Jrit~t b ....... 17, n11aoe ¥ cleft• 
atU• it_., 118 ,._ tiMla tu louee fi'OII..,_.jufttOil. All 
tllte .u xrM\ aov to ., -.. liMit, 1JJ ial~ tu -.rt-
...._ • • .,.. .u Jur ....... ;; ail1F • cos.aa ,._n. Hl'ftal 
... tMIIIilll98loal ..-- aftelo aaotber, l'Hallhs an be 1J0U 
hia or18la an wll u Ilia .._.1111J'• 1JJ pluataa, pluat~a~, 
-....u.. Jlaa te ..nllMIIM. eo1lllwa4, nM'I'mtwla wt nOt 
_,. 1CII8N' a es.p~.e _,..eta alii' lA4l•t4ul _,. c~e-.-. 
Mlitlehlt'• a. lilnn to' • lift •114 an 11tt11 """· 1t 1a 
tS. he lea.._. to 4e lt Ul .alia a 'firtu. ot the leanlllc.7 
~l'n ,. ... ,. ota the . .- ot ftl"tl'fll 41eoloa..S • ntNDS 
MlaDOboUo nnta la tate .-...,. XII. hta oonoan wUb the ~m11alu" 
...._ ..... Oftlltlft awl 4entn .. tft PI'OI*W1t1" he ehoee tor 11-.lt 
thank ot .-.uaa out .....,rove.,... aloq tha nu ahea4. Slaoe 
,.ople onea ......,. l:lJOil .......... ,) ..... , th1Ja111, h,swll han -- ooa-
...... bMaun hb telae aMut t1t.e nu 4o aot eo4 111tll aannrl1_, 1ll 
the .... " ot • llltl~ tua. that all tu ellanetan ,.., '••tt•lilla' 
u.,. -.ur...,. .,__.,8 Tat, s.a a Nal .. .,., Tqwl.l in •• ottt111lata 
he ooau.,....q V8N Mil to WF tOftiUahln ohftaolan aad ••• hoU ot 
hte4eat1111J'• 
]56 • 
.tat1·De1ltllldala 
fllawll'• U.&ahc ta IIQIIIJIS.Utal, tuUtuUoaal eooaoldoa 
tMIIII Mil to n,Jen the ..., ......... ot lloth Mat'Xbta IUl4 lal .... ..ram 
upltaUata. Mmlieil Jhf.loar..,,. reate& Oil tiM tatalSaUo aa••PUCitl 
tllat taa. W.na ot aapStalla wn allcmt ilia w1U ot - to attm '"-· 
~ iato tNt IMaU ot tll.a Masua.. a.uanoe oa a\\toat~a ntnora• 
tiCitl ot • ....,... halu• oOIIU ....- 4U&atrouaa Man:teta tllr1Y84 011 
..... Nllo 
'hpltll SuSaHcl tluat 4eMiar .. ll01I a •tkr ot 1anttalti1111J• 
lMat ot •otaa. '!'he ll!llllM ot a \Wild .. e410DCl111o •ta'lltlitJ' aa4 pl.tla'F 
u~ ....._., ..._n.oau OCIU.l4 oouotoual.J' ereeta u att .. un 
baUt\aUGMl atrae\uft wiillia tbe111' Va41Uonal 4••oon1ilo ayata. .,..._ 
wll n,Jefta4 the 0011tnt1oa that ,_.iol.io a.,......iou wra •out'bJ'aaks 
ot W t.Mk.•l .11 ftJMWlJ' .uu_,.t the ..._rioall people to ta11a holt 
ot the&# 4Htlli1•2 Mea DIMI4 no\. • ,._ ot tuowta'ble toneat tha,r 
ooul4 ••kr thoae toreM. Oral¥ ·- ill a while l"-.i/ a01111tlliaa raallJ 
a. ....... uw ... iajanet 1Q'to tile atlta ot h-a attain- althou&b 
..-,. ut onea.•-' -.rtoau 414 aot lla'ft to tan traaadJ ~1 .. 4owas 
tht!¥ ~ •••...,. t~ 111Wl.\ltac1J, vhloh •• •rtsbt .. our purpc~~~e 
b u4 a1.,. luul Meat Ht to_. ua ol~Uoa.•• 
WOI'h1111toq, 1ft~·· optatoa. Mericaaa 414 not_.,. apiaat 
41Mn• uUl 1t vaa upoa tUa. Ia lta8 Jw WJ'Mil that w ratuH4 to 
t.UOW a tciiUI\I'IlOU,_ OOUJ'M "' Nt&leGUq to oontrol eftnte ~ tbe ll'ft\• 
aat Jlllllllo elptttaaaoe• ou pua~a ot M~Cial vtU nwlte4 ta a tau .. 
\1ft to..- t.aaURUcmal a4.Su1s Ua Whioh wre DeCIOINI&I7 f.a orclc' to 
,....,... aua'h1al ool.laPH • .S 11 ... AMrf.oau 1lllft Pl'OM to take u t.atar-
aat ill t.uu-.uoaal ohanp 01117 la tlaaa ot 4iat.,..., .._11 preaaa4 
tt.oaalW he ••• 1 r f tllat ... lal U'lllll'aa•• ata, !Mtf.q ... ade, ewl4 •• 
' ..... vUbla tM ~ at 4laJNill, 111 GOftf-aoa with aa ob,Sadlw.• 
Ia •• ........_ ill -..at-. 19~. at Olss oa eou.,., 'Puswll 
reaaallkllf tMt 
1M 81u.tb llaa ahO'IIIl ••• that U 1a ll"•ible. thl'O'Ialh 4..., 
entia Jll'Uiau, aa4 11r "- ... ot tha PeiSN'al ao•• -At, 
to ... eta~' UDII:OIIiO ~·tiP' ....... tao 1111etho:r th ... 
ll:blal b4l oanet IUJtc. Cfttlill, tlile Oo14 8tdllal'.t. PltJICl' Ia41-
Yltualbrr, • a Prfteettw !antr.T 
Ia a a 1111111 at a4tnu ia ,.... 1935o 'flt,sviiU • .._.., .. to tho &J'8(\118tal 
Ttlll oaa baW a ~--- ot S..U&Uou *lob la ao ~ 
aa taM eoDeJ.'ttW u4 ftNI. - our a:r&1teotun. •• tleslbla 
alllll etttot.-t •• tlbe ••'- or teeto17 ...,., ;at a a114 
tbtiF ... tHI ..._. t.o tha uea ot l.ttH~n,, Ce11001'8411e 
ell4 aoo4 U-rias eteh ara· the t:Ne 0111011a ot -.. t.l'dt-
UOih lid ~ tlilaaot. llrN .... t.hf.ap "' detatal.. Y011 
wiU .,_.,. \0 _. ... ~ • ha'ttltc Oftllt.ecl --., JOII 
...u ...... " Meat ..., ,. '""" ... llll1'M t.h- ... 
~ w ,..,...._ -. ... 001141Uou o~taasa ... u alllll 
..... 
"'-awll'• """~"~••• to ooat~ -....lae ooll4lUou ntleote4 hla 
_,..acnata.l. w.u, whloh to .... leJ'toa 011t a r1a14 ttloprlrn ot t.ha 
t\aluft, luUbUoaal e4JutMa$ - a ooattaaou, aYOluU"'I'J' JII'IOSaa. 
~~· ata~ta ot Ida atl.,...ralniaUo pt&UoaoPIII'o 111blob 
ha hOJFCI WINl4 tlllill aa:p:t I PalOD la 1-l\1lUODJl. ohaap, Mtl vi~ obJeO• 
Ut~~ta. 'l'tlawl.l alla.f hta ,.,_... ..... , 01 the oppoeiUoa'a atttt\llle 1a a 
.,.,... iawl•tac hla finl«<al tK!IIJU ha""PJ''l a..a ut hla vita, 
aD4 Prof__. 0~--· ~ Jfr_. Di.._,.. 'hpeU qpreaaM the 'fln. 
pot.at; ot * opoalUee __.. ••ltNl¥ uA ettanl,.lr thaa lata oppo~M~ak 
tlh_l,., ._. able to ataw -tlieH' Jib~. •Dlelanl ••• took ott oa 
a ~tuuc&e • .....WP tllpt 1111 aat tM lla D4nlaa ot tM Bev Deal• 
•1 ~iU ,_._aU • aba1 l aq. •tcuolae4 ... add Dlelfanl. 
"Y• PJIJl• .._ to tllt.k _. , ..... rapPel I'JOt •nlr 
the "-" of aJ»lr alllll •••., 'Nt aiM arlta.Hk u4 U.. 
Mtan. _I kaOw ,_ ........ Jl.•-• lllle • •• ol4-taalou4 
*""""'_. •• llal!l1r••ftticl rae.o*loaartN. TOll thf.ak 
,..,... ~t tat 1 J' ..... ,. jlult .. - w 4oa•t 
JliW ,.uuu·Ylth u. All 1 ... u, the--. ..... ,.. 
kn t. tnallle aa the .,.,._ .f~J" .-n. It •a al_,.a lloaa 
" dllvlU al_,. lla ae. • tt•a 11M •kia&. Uaalt 111aar-
""· 
able OYer •• ..-... 1t ..-. lt"lt llllltapJ1 OYer nliclGa 
01' .. R Ulf\lal&& elM .... Ia tbe anaiftt .,..aUM 
._..., tlutf ..-4 to baft Jl'*M kUlN OYer bone ,._ 
Ia thtt HiPJI II • You _.,, Obaap that et:nu ot plallt 
••••••• la PHN arat ,_ ... ,to ._,...taaat~out u . 
...._ at •••• 101111 oa .-.. • peat noble .... ru.ata in 
... ,._u ... Wlat 411-... -.t.'t BMnt pollee, •t:L., 
..,._.., • ..,._.,. tor .._1"148 all4 tllftuiiiAa lilt people 
Ia the- lilt Ulllftt'Uoal" 
•Toll ou•t .U. peoJJ.- coo4 ut PIINt bt law aa, -" thea 
J'lllll .-14 •• \Ilea atoP 4n._ bt l.av. 'l'bare v111 al_,. 
M ftftfS I' 011 ''"Iiiii' JIOIJla aa4 tiM vaa.lcer v111 al.wye ao 
to the .u. '!llu 4.,_.111,. t)let rou aot: ae thcu.ch fOil ha4 
fJato .. ra4 all '117 ,..._1.,.... 1a oalr a ataor • a ft%7 ldaor • 
lUHaat lit 'th laiiW~r ot tile ..._. naa. It vlll all 
.. ,...._ l...U ... _. t1l •-• • to"' ;run tt voa•t 
.....,. u.., _.. ,,_. • Wft7 •'-' tlae Ctrtl War to4q.• 
••••• *' I tlabk all tlala pe\\J •,.U.atat1M, aU n ... 
alJtslawll-.1, ••..,.uauo, hli'-JI'lMtpled, 1-a-nct. 
••• -'• ll0oial1atta t4al &a.l'lla are •w aouanaa. or 
OOill'M 1'4 ltllil JMJle to M flll• ot OINJ'H I CIOft't wat tbiNa 
•• wftlw· 1 ,.., .....,oae • -. • w11 aat um ua ,..,.._ 
ou 11l.,..1»Miq es.u.... x• la tnor ot all rou at*1e uplJ'Ioo 
dlOU• -. U.'" .. , I -~-~ that the WT to ... 
... ... ~. toll ........ , ..... ~ .. J~· Let .. tell 
,ou that ...... • law •• .,_, .-.. s. . IJ80P1a • •• llr 
that 1- .... ana• ~ .... that - all -uwta -
villflll\ 11*1 alit ._... with all tllaaa li$Ue ....,-en ... aD4 
Satan'eneoee allll ncS••••tt•.• .. • r.ctple oaa etell4 oel;r a 
U\tla ot that ..not t!!lltc ... tba •r all41'.1ollPilUM }ll'O'tllcl • 
tbali tur•u \ld'OW,... .......... c:rop, ... IJO baolr to o14 
tosualsu ... • 
•AJ14,• Jlr. Dlelllll'4 al4el _,,..,.:&v. •I •1DIJ1T hate to .tklak ot 
t1ae ... we•u .... to elMa ., -.. • iaHrU :rour ubt aa4 
,_r ,_ ••• , •• 1f11 tfte ........ lt vlU M a ltU\er 4a;r 
-.. J~~Ut• ..... tllllt Jill .a •t *' arUbMUo •••• • 
••• 
~ ...... Mba a ..... ,.,. .. Milo felt 4Jfl1IQ1 to aa, lata:!.• 
 ..... s... •leu.t liN& to lta ban M~Mta,• he •14 bui• 
taatlLJ, "YYOP' ~la le t1ult tile llttvlleal att:roate lluMD aatllft 
" ttl ua a •s.. tha' ''- ......_1• for ezietaaaa •a H 1111tl1tlt4 
w law, tile\ it :Le a .....,,... ebal,...... to ov aaUOIIIll 48aln 
,&o. 
Dot to 1Mt ~n4. lm4 U 1a a •lolattoa ot fllll4amellft1 
••••• ad tlMIIClul tntlla. • I rtabtt• 
'lbe lkiM:rallla JIJ'. DU&.td netle4. •Ill • mat-a.u.• he 
...... ~, 
a...urpM hoM thea pza•••ed to Q.~aeaUon the 'fiiUcUty ot Mr. 
l>l.,..I'C'• ta..au t1.r peiDUq out~ that tile •\'oriaa he4 Ilona ao• 4:raat1c 
l.,Ulattaa vf.th nt ..... oe to ta.. etnale tor edatence. • Be ered.f.te4 
llY&aa Co!UIUtutlOAal eaaoUtJ to their •ow peOI.Iliar theo17 ot propert7 
rt.Pta.• B04IM uaene4 tbat the llliiPlOIMa' ot MD¥ hiatl•PI'ioe4 corpor-
aUGil la'!l'el'a ,... DOt a 11......, vltll the lleU.af that tile atnu:le tor 
RUMMe ..W.4 DOt -. ..S1tie4 11J lav. Jloou alao thqht that Nzo. Dill• 
Jla¥t 111D4 Ilia tl'iallda woul4 not llllw MlrM the ti'Oilble to lll'lbe allll lNUy 
leaul.atvea for law wlllCih ,.... irnlewat to tllair Jllloli'PO ... • Ft.U,, 
.._. ealced Mr. 1)1.6n llb7 lie llh'11'-,4ar to the_.. ot wr people tha 
.... rlpta tor a»nial lecialiaUOD *iCih he ha4 al~~Q"a clal!lllt4.1° 
fllcwll OOiloe4e4 that lt wa •Pftbapa Ulo&leal• to auppou that 
a ..., •Oe wrlA ooul4 a.. • ....,. 11J •• with "Mlerallla etrioienq.• 
Yet tile peealble OOIIIIeqlilft ... ot Oepntenee on auta.Uo balanoins toreu 
ooul4, be \1811 .... , M tatallr 4alllqf.DSJ 1t •• •-atial to Mke a11 
at'-f' to •• •tllat tile l.osto ot onauoa allll ot •nace-nt ah«a14 nua 
wltllta tlla ... lf.~Gta.• :tt OM .. , ot ..., oorli•i-11¥ enated prob,.._, 
aD4 ....... 1' "' bed to ta" thew ._, ...... , •the aituaUoa M7 ...U 
... -· ot lla.4.•11 
a.r1Q8u, ,.._U iu1atied., wre •peble ot iiMPtlia potenUallF 
4Htnott" toi'OM uallel' .-tnl., JllkifiC thea HFN rather thea dhl'II.Pt 
... la*J'. He IleA ao tattla ta ~ eHr~Oido lava he belilmMt thet 
Allen .... 414 ~ •111Pl.F heft to cna aa4 beer per1C11Uo eooacaic 8beclea 
- ,_, awl4 Ofttnl vllat tHr bed ._ted. 
~1'• ••no•teo to Cnekpot Do-Gc!G41aa 
Ia 1933 a tloo4 ot ~ 14alta'lc ••• • •Jority ot thea hnial 
\U't!u -~. poue4 lata !luht.DifiOJI, lendlDa the o1t7 aa a-.pben 
ailttlar ta - •1• to thet ot • eollap caapu. Mlllif ot theH 70U.thtul 
•v 11a1atw lieU..,. thet quo 4ooUlllalra OtU"U tor tile 4apra .. 1oa wn 
udoatl'ia11'a PI'CIIftll ¥Melt -u ... taD atfact ill. hV17o The P"•-
ia the a- nt ot the" two 'Jpaa fill •• oraatad, aocor4111C to Mola7o 
• • • 'DI.o e-.nal pMlaa ot wus.-. into • worlraa.la .eola 
thO aliU.1Uu an4 _..,.. ••• ot •• ••• .eo nJNN-t 
tlt.a two cnat tmu • .... _til 11111u, • ..,. 11aw1ea *~" 
Ia !Ita PPiftiiP .It Ill• 'l'Udq •tralcht to hea•n• aD4 
.-1 II' ,.lob ...,_ It• ._.._., 1a the aoU, aa ldael 
flUb ucl a pratthlll ,_..l '~nth lib a vlld ._n and 
'l'ntll uu • taltW'vl ace. • 
1. MDla7. Rllflllnll, M'3N l!tm ...... l)O•)lt tuawll R01:tlll thd the lVlll 
ellald lad A~~~tri_. ~1•t• 11p to 19001 the b.iatonc cb'he tu 
po4 our .,.._ 1 at ps'Odu.OI4 ito l .... ro. JIOt all the llew llealara la 
1933 laa4 a citJ' baelrpoaD4 t apteultanl reltet I'Oq\llnd the oemcoo 
ot llaU. .. , .UtAil, Bella, liiDient!IMI, Mqer•• Paok, all4 llena • .....,_ 
iaelq, •llf JIIDh -- h'Clllurllea -~ all4 t1Ut 1012& ttaht qatut 
_.101JIIIl OOIWPUOIU 16ku, Jlopld.aa, Mclay, Parldu, Frank, ,..._rtek 
DalaMt CIUII'lq lleft'lall. Lolita il'o1elov, Leourd Wbtta, Preclarlak Bow, 
IIIDnl• GooD ••• llaarJ .... .,....u, a. o •• ''fh Souroea ot .., Deal 
RltOIId-.' l»lM,. VCilo 64, IICI. ~. lulJ', 1954, 250-51, 27,..7/t• 
The prua Jlaoe4 tup,ll .aoq tiM •wild ••u.• It is true that 
Jae ba4 ta I' 'A with the Dlilitaat t4eal1ata the youth wb10h, G. B. Sbav 
.... "-ae4• ia ••M4 OD 1011111 people. Ia a llUIIIIber or 1lllportant •T• 
he •• ualUr.e •• ot the arUilt Mtomt:n. Hia baokgoua4 •• l'll1'8lt 
hia tratatna •• ill aoollCialoa ftthw than law. a !II 414 Dot pt eutatio 
Plaallllft wt ot 4otac h1a WCift 1n Vaahtactoaa he raatDINl aa aoa4talotu 
Oil 1 .. " ot abaa.oe.3 Ill OGDal4ered •• pro'blaaa ot rHOYery all4 -tillll• 
tac ataltUtty tntallaotual, ntber tilaa 81110t1onal, _,.. Ha bel1aYe4 tbat 
u ett"*t• eoeac:lllio IIJ'OCftll ba4 to lte nallatio aa4, aaide t:rom emer-
~ -•raa, no1uttonur.4 
Mo,_.,, b 1-lt, dill aot p1aoe tuc-11 ia tbe oetaso17 ot • wild 
awu.• He aurt'IMIW to tile P"tNaor ot eOOilCIItoa three all4 a belt 
pan ot ·~ aa4 intallipAt th1aktas" in Vaahtn&toa.5 'l'lapell 
JaJaealt or1ttotae4 •all or noth111C" t4MUata vho refused to tolente 
eitlher a vtllt"'M•• to o 'DJjil'Gillae or u uavill1Jl61leae to Job. clootrU.tre 
••n eta.6 Ba oauUODe4 ai&lut •auua1 fi'GPOMle to tb: thtnp up duriac 
a. See .-..... Clllaptar I. 
3· a.a below, Clhaptar xru. s.ns.ea, ••• Allbt.ttou !'tl&w11. Rewttalt' 
hpe111a attiftte brtaca to ala4 a paaa•a• hell 1- Bn!Mh OahU •a 
lJtmpt •J'or in point ot tnth 1011 an •• !lapP)' as 8DJ'Ol'lft ia ,.,.,._ 
tell to be in tlaia lite, -., Yl~• ot the Yei'IJ taot tbet you are 10Wla•" 
4• See below, ObaJter :a: .... ,s.., "tile Btop.Ge.p llatura ot ReU.ett• 
Cllaptel' xn, .-s.oa, •awoluU•t• Cbapter XI'f, IIHttoa, "'l'he -..,. .. 
u .. 1. ~ .. .,.,.u. aa.-.1.• 
5o
0 
Jfo,.,, ........ AQn .II.DJa JMao J.24ao 
6 .,.._u, R .• G., •.._liOBViiNft.• Ju RtJINia• Vol. 48. lfo. 612 • 
._..,as. 1926, &. 
t!M au:t ooueaiot w.k-ea4.•7 Durtac tbe ~- pertCIIl he llOH4 thet 
iaw --.. .... u .._...nan !lOlL..._ bWrecla rA naeatlou ti'OII •11· 
....... people - um. tara''•• wla1011 tbeir authore tllouaht "vlll oohe 
the worW•a 4ltt1cu1Uaa.•8 
flllc'IIIIU 414 an rule e11ftloa aut Gil ma-n 110\haUon. a. .._eat..s 
the\ ..ntoe -.14 M nlt....,..atlac 11 lt Nlllll'-4 la a aaaleot ot the 
••• •tn•dac requu.4 to eol:al..,. _.1 ... 111 4ea1N4 aade. Be a-.w 
..,..,. a ..ntac ot aoolal worllua that 
••• vorlllmt tor tbe ..., Dial ••• are too otto& OUaaea4 vltb 
... aort ot thin,....,,...._ tor aoldac e"Hr,thlaa vltb-
o.t the ...... u,. ., ·~·· fU prolll- - llotb ...,., .. 1 
U4 ~..,_ - wUOII w tan are teo torlddable to w •• 
_,...,,... ... , 
MDM:r'• ""- •re aildlar to tb- Gil 'l'upall. a. belle•e4 tbd 
O"Hl'll ..n1Gaal appnaOIIae to 41ftlftlt praot1eal probl- would hut 
*'-'1•1 ettona 11r al'OIUiltl& 1a tile ,..'IIllo 
••• the OOPict:loa llhat PI'4WIJSUl•l• le DO .,re then a 
.....- ... .aow ' 11dee to •• aool• ./ialt.tftl!il 1oM aen 
.rt'OI't H aela bafttd'o 
••• 
OV future eu be ut • cbooee to aa lt, 1t w oaa 
-~at t!M JOWft of &Oft~ vl'h a -- ot flM 
tlatM1ac •• ...U aa ot purau hpillH.lO 
1• fucW,U, 11. o., "ll&Uoul iltpltloaHe rA R!taut 'huU 1a J'ana 
llDJ daUoa, • ~. . 
a. s..t""• 1. o •• 'fllpNl " 1aau o•o.eaor, Au,.ut '· 1932, •nan 
,. 
10. 
t:=fi. a. o., •a.uet an4 Reooutnaotion,• 311. 
MIW!ro .,._.., CltT Sega 'f•D• flOOo 
'fllswll •• apa-.le at tS.a fit oolwinc the preaeotatioa f1t hla 
eoa•1•tteu with a oenaia emotloaal .. ltt;y. Cenerall;y, hia worda alld 
aotiv1t1aa 11\4lata4 that be 414 DOt urt .. at hla ooavloUone la aa 
eii!OtlOilal _,.. %a coat ran to tba )IOI'tft7al f1t 'f'uswll 1a the pre.. u 
aa eiiiDUflllal Vtop&aa, tba raal GefJ8 ap,..ra to haft baaa that crackPOt 
aooaO!al•• the aH4 to 1a1Uat. .. ,_~to calOillatM to srr-.. nt dosrr-a-
alona la the i'Ut\11'!11. Bla thillld.JIC took Jlaee ta two tima oontcta. the 
flaawll'a lteaa OD 4atialt a1!8114111c. aarioultural a4,tuttanti. aad 
lat-Uenal t:rs«e vve apaoltto lU..traUone f1t hb eontreatiq ehon-
na aa4 loJI&-rua Ylaw. a. bel189114 that 4ati111t apand1B4h aeoeaaa17 tor 
-rpaq ~··,.. iM44tfl'UII'k u a pa..-uot 1 n!IJ' tor aooncalo 
ullialaaoet U '1101114. IIQnHiftl'• r-at olaaa trioUoa.1 He aalota!Hd "-' 
tne tn4a •• a daolrable obJeoU.,. to ba aO!Isbt in the i'UtuNt tor the 
tble belJIC• • baA to 8I\IP _.1t1atloaa fit tba tarltt aocor&iaa to the 
oeoparativa 1ul1•Uoaa ot other aauone. pa;ylllc oloaa at\eoUon to the 
wlhra ot OUl' o'tlll 11111l'Ura.2 
VUb npnt to the tara pmlea, 'l'uawll couideret the AM a 
t.apon17 deTice.l Ia 19~ he •t4s 
• • • dilaatar •a aot o011t1u4 to 1114uatJ7 aa we uauallf 
deacZ'tba tt. It _...._. to nn1 -.rtoa too. With 
Qet probl .. I ha .. bMD 1D oloMI' touch than with u,y 
...._, the" JUt ,..rat an4 I kll!'lv ••• the autt•r!D.I which 
baa \lata ,.,... .. oa fal'Mn • • • 1D a pita ot all Cw oould 
4o 1D the ~. ot relief • • • • • • • tha di .. ater GaM 1 aD4 
ita ocalftc ... -~ ba l'" .. a.te4 ht Jut U41DS hila 
ftftl' tor a wbtla. Rual lite Me4a raooutructioa aloac 
with taau.trial lit•·' 
ffa alao o1te4 the IIM4 tor loac-l'IIIIP Jl'OS1'UIIJ to deal with the pllpt ot 
the .. u.r. llOD ... taple tal'MI'a •• tid.ut beuttt traa the AAA• 
.. aureat • ••• w haft had, all ot u to accept oon41tiou aa they wro 
aD4 4o tirat thlap tiNt.• Be lu1ate6 that nooutruot:ton alao had to 
be OOM14eftl\. Reliat -ave• a00Qipliaha4 -rsenq JU1'110t18•1 tha1 
• ha~ touch.a 011 the real problea. • 'l'be oe m tty we too l1 tUa 1ll• 
cl11le4 to aUataate the ll8l4 tor char1*J nthar than to lllaiatar to 1t 1 
not BllOh had beaa doDe la tba 'lllt7 ot auhatituUna rohabilitatlOD tor 
ohal'U7o lltbl1o opf.Dloa ball I\Ot aaewrapd £01118 ftl7 tar beyond relief 
1D 4eal1nc vtth tha •tuaaaMDtal eoeoo~~So and aoo1olog1oal probleM "' u 
3• 8ae belovo ChaP'er Xll, .. ouoa. 1 '1be Alllb1Uoua 'l'qwll, Rebuttal.• 
It• .,.._11. B. o •• •a.tltat aD4 llaaoaatruouoa.• ,306 • 
.S· ~11. B. o., •Bau.t aD4 ._tru.euoa,• 313·14· 
'"· 
by the~ ot tM OU OI'Mr.•6 
Ia 'hawll'• rtev Hllet VIUI -rtl.7 an 1Detfto1ant ~ 
iDCI tt •• a411f.nteten4 watv tlw •a,nil ot atUIII,pt tos to 4o 11 a ll\U'q 
vbat ah01114 bna Hall tlone toJ"V T .. n aao" - aatat.Uab aetNritiF ap.1nat 
the ftrt- delta of aoctaty auoh •• Ulnan. ol4 qe, and WMIIIIPlo:raent.7 
Efta eft1otantl.7 eMCNtetl nU.t ... ~. 1a4ioat.a 10118-l"Wl national 
f.Utftoi...,.t 
• • • aoo4 ,..._ are 11101'8 iJIIpQrtant thea apand.etl prlaoae • 
•• • a aoual. iDil\JMII'ial and u· .· reial lite ta better than 
••• .ttiet•t alld at.tute ~ •••• a 
S.Cih ....._..tea •• IAI44 .. ~apreall taoreaHa la -
Jlo:r-nt eallaOt 1lle .n after _.,. M'tl artaea1 aall the 
•441fl•OI ot tnan•nGU eupt not toM Ju4&14 b)' tbe 
~ oriHI are ••· bat :rattler., -. ~n~J~Mr then are.9 
liNt II"Ple volll4 • .,. ......a -.uh '1\lpaU thea en 011noe ot pre-
.....-ntoae tor •Jlltrtantal, nol\ltiOIIIlQ' ohancee la 011r inati tutione -· 
h1a 1Maa oa • pleaae4 eaplWta.• Bit balatetl that he 414 not v1eh to 
ahalllfSa aa, their liftlo or tlwir 4H11'Ma be hoped to - the oreatton ot 
u taeUt•U-1 tnMwOZ'k vi\bia vb141h aoonomlo anterprtaee -14 opt:rde 
tor the beaef1t ot the __,. •p=rf)epe .It sutr N!tro1•1° •• hle aabea 
6. ,.....u. a. o •• •Relief. and Reeoutnot ioa,• .302-llll· 
7• .._u, a. •·· •a.u.t •• a...-tnouoa,• .311· 
a. 'f\lawello •• o .• ·~u .. tlae One:ral Jntete.t.• ,.,. 
,. ~u •. a. o •• "ttle ~ Powr,• z,. 
10. ~1. a. o •• •a.U•t alllll Jlu:annouoa.• Jl9t: ~tal lee a44etl. 
SutU11Uoraal •oh- ¥111114 proYU. lllltttoteat ooorcuneuon in ovr ....... 
to ,.....,_. ,_rlG41o hJNUiou vlth their relief requl.l'eiMNltes 
lUber w llH to llulft an GJell qn- or a cloae4 one. 
11\her w an to ctw JIOIIl,e ..... to lllo0111e which th., 
llaft eanaect u a rich'• or w an to atw thea plUaHH 
u oHrttr. ltthw wan to,.._, tll4uatry to ... ,. 
lt.t atfatra ao tbet 1101lcela all4 fal'llltl'll niter eontill\lal 
.. u 41...,..,..,.. IUIIl ,.rtotto peat -·• or w •~'~~ aot.nc 
te ... to U that 1114utq Ia ao •aace4 aa to prOY14e ooo-
t111'M'14 ~t tor all ud to 4tet:r1tnate purohaalaa 
JOIIU vhloh wiU. -ltla the .-t.ue to lNJ' ita .,.u.u-
Ja 'fqwU•a oplatOil, uuoortt.Jaate4 enterprt .. a not onll' llrouaht oa 
ort-a tldT alee 4tota,W the W7 Ia whim ertaea wre •t. preftftUn& 
iutUUUoaal ohu&Q ~inNl tOll tllul pnerel wltare.12 'l'he l'tljeattOil 
ot ,._well•• .,.Gitto _.auou tu tnaUtv.Uoaal ohall88 did not rl4 
thaea 1llful 41aasr"M4 vlth hill ot the nepoutlllllt1 ot attempUac •to sol• 
Jl'OblaM 'llf pl&llaiac aot to hne tMa.•13 '1\iaWll wnaecl• 
1'111l oeuot fOI'Imtl" co on Jl'ftlllq anutatuee to the 
SUe at &.._ rat .,.... • 'llate vll.l &eYer be -1'11 thaD 
'AN.le._ aof 111 vlll ,~the thillf! J,Hlt-4#raloP'WdJ 
wan tryhe to to.ter.l4 
Sia• etfeaU'I& tutttuUoul ~ -14 require ea:pertrrantaUOD ..,.r a 
perio4 ot U• •• the HODOIV •ana ... lta ova fox.. end aooial ooii41Uou,•1S 
u. 
J.Z. 1,. 
14· 
l.S· 
'tqwU, il. G., 'Relief aa4 RaiODStruaUODo 0 .313• 
'l'ucwll, R. o., 'Hitllet ud Hlt.,..truotlODo" 305. 
fltawU, a. o., ''l'MI Pourtll :ro.tr,• 24a. 
~. B. O., "Rellet aDA ~otlOD,• 320. 
fwawU, a. o., •~~an~ Relief aD4 a Pe~t Agriaultiure,• lM. ftP"la 
,£!!','the American Agadem.y 9!. Political and Social Science, Vol. 142, No. 
231, March, 1929, 65. 
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4 Call tot: a •c.o.n ot lntereata• 
~l•a cnuoa aoou.M4 111111 ot r-nuna ola .. •:rtare.1 Yet, 
hla Ylew on detiolt apeadiDC in perti.U.J! allll the aconfllll" in PIIQ'al 
ati1'98H4 the atake whtoh eaoh .....,., ot aoetetr heel in the welfare ot 
aU .._..ioeu. ilocNII'ftlt N:JI%11104 thia ooACept ot IIUtuality in the 
pllnn •concert ot intereat.;• 'fuaw11 ola111114 r .. pou1tl1l1ty tw the 
iaalutoa ot the' Pln.'ll" in the ruu• N ot tl:e Demoora\io -'14ate aD4 
J'Naldat.3 flaawll'• 1na1ataaae on the aae4 tor oooperattoa betwu 
oluaaa u4 pou,pe at d. tro. Ua tra1n1na in eoonOIIloa. He re,jeate4 
tu aslca ot NSaa lild.th that ua-ooopenuon. with 01oh 1n41Y1dua1 011' 
8J'OLIP 1a hot au Uballpere4 PQnult. ot eolt-tntoreat, voul4 result in 
the eraateat poeaibla welfare tw al.l. Ia 1930 'fucwell declare4 that the 
ou-thinc .. t ... u. ftaaoni~~& ot tile olaaa1oal eoonOIIiata wa inadequate 
to the •tw~J ot an 040ll019 wboee pane wre all 1nter•related,4 In 1932 
he a:prNHd 4inpproval ot Jlooorer'a pol1oiea beoeun they faile4 to -11: 
the aohie,....nt ot a llalanoed relaU01111111p betwen prioaa. conau..r JIU.'-
ollaai~~& ,powr, allll aeil1d'ity valv.u • .S 
While be nr'ftcl 1a the llepartMot ot Agrioultun, 'l'ua-11 omUnue4 
to cite the uceaaUJ' tw balaau4 nlationahipa tlet-n pro4ucer aftd cOD• 
II\UII8r ( pn- an4 PQrohaaiDC powr) eftd bet- pro4u..r aftd Pl'041loer 
1. S.e wlow, Chaper XII, aeo\toa, •tile Duaeroua 'l'qwel.l.• 
2. .... • .,. ••• ChaP*ar nt .... uoa, .,..,.u •• tone-a.. Tbtllkina·· 
3·. wm&wlfla wnv. 
lo fus-J.lo R, G., •a-a Nature allll Sooial leon(SIJ' 1 1 l9vel .it ft"a-
.... Vol. 27, Bo. 17o Aquet J4, 19JOo 4,54. 
s. fu&•U• J'l. o., with Cutler, A. '·• IUI4 1Utohe11, a. s •• •nawa ta 
tha ...,.r looacato Plaa,• Cwaqt HiQ9n, Vol. 3.5, No.4. J8.1lllai'J'o 
19J2o Sllo 
"'· 
(labor all4 ••.,..•'• l.nllu1;:r, aJl4 qrieuUve). He aner1:e4 that the 
ln'Oa4 pr1no1ple 11!PCID which we could tilllt our 001110n around ead a1Ait our 
41~ vee the~~~ tQpaeioue~ ot joint tntereat; injury to 
one in the tor111 ot Pl>ftrt7 or u~nt we the concern ot all, etaee 
eooncaio parel)teu 1n ozae pan ot the HOIIOIIY apreed repidly thl"OUBhout 
tbe whole ayet•• The 1no1dence ot })Oftrt)' and Ul:leiiiiPlOflllltnt 414 aot 
de,... oa the tauUa or •rUe ot 1ad1Yt4uelaa no one vaa t-••• trGII 
•~ac waaapl.,.._t •• the .- worker, tor 'IP"!Ple, aJ1f more thaa the 
' poor ..... 
the 881"1ou1tun1 pzo'bl.ea uuaUF Mrre4 •• the etutiR& point tv 
.,__11'• upoa1Uozaa ot hSa eonoept ot Mlaooa. SolaU•• he retal'ft4 
•PMlfl•ll' to the S.aduatrial •otor ot the eoonaq ( la 1933 ha Vl'Ote 
tbat 110 OM ot the three pantea 111 Sr&41aatl'J •• the c=ev•r, labor, aa4 
the ••,....t-owaer ~P - llb.cllll4 be 1a e poe1t1on to 4Cla1nete another7). 
!be "81'1 netv.n ot b1a theaie, that aU eeotcre ot the eCIOtlOIIt' vera later• 
relate4, tn..,ltaW-7 le4 him to rater 1a cm!l'llll tel'llll tG relatione hetweo 
aart.ev.Uun aad ln4v.etl'J. .t eeU.Uoa t1011 a epeeob be a4e on land-
}li'Ort4ae aD n:eJQle ot hie p~~eral etat11111!81lta Oil eet!Qoa!Sc beleDce• 
• • • aUalalD& a~aoh an a4equate COUIMIPt iOil ot toed by all our 
oUtaua 4apeada upon • ,...,_. tuot1onf.ac ot our whole ••-
ate .,.-.. We_., tlad .... to orpnf.ae our aothU1 .. ao 
ttaet INleb pe~ oe.a uae hie d£1U1ea 1a the killlt ot work tor 
11h1ob he te lint tnaUe4, tekiD& aeo'*Dt ot the Mad tor ... 
produot, ao thet the p1'041leUoa ct INlCh :I.e 1n proportion to the 
PS'04Uot1.n ot other thf.ap, aad ao that .. oh WOrker baa tnd'tl• 
oi~ ln.- t.o punbaae hla ta1r abare ct all ve pro«uoe. a.ab 
6. 'l'W;u!IU. ll. o., A441'Ma, DeiiiOoraUo Stele Central oo.alttae. toa AD&el• 
... c.uro:mia, Ootobar aa. 1915. 1. 
1· tlniHt htttvea Wi•••· ~I' 26, 19.33· 'Dwell. "••· 
370· 
• JJ'OporUon be\wen P%'G41lctlon and oo~ton, au 
.. ,...,.. pro4llcUoa au tluFiaa power,._., not be at• 
MiMd ta a at.lllo unee, vUh an akenoe ot procreu, 
lnat 811811 be •1ntaiu4 while CJOIItiaual ~at in 
~Ode ct JIOduettoa aud ta quality at••• eaob worker , 
a eo,taatq beUer atallllard ot lt.tna end IP'&IItar la1-
nn. 
•'1'ak:lDS ao001111t ot the taeacl tor eaell pro4uot• euueate4 the o.atral allo-
oat:lon of NaQUru& which Taswell 00ftll48~ aa aaaantial inatitullioaal 
&tap tor \he aahie.....,t ot llala._. 
'fuawell H)l81'te4 fl'Oal the tra<ltUonellJ parochial •tawpotat ot the 
UBI». ~uata tn hia approach to tM tam pro\llem. Sinoe the tamara • 
wellan r.quirecl that their product M u.4 aa4 lll'1D& in a fair ntura, 
aartoultiU"e, fu&well 4eolal'e4, vu liala4 up to the whole aoon<aio &Jret-.9 
•rkat 11bloh tea484 to upaet the deUoata llalaace of price aDd inoc:ae Nle-
·Uoubtpaa a aurplua lowel'ed the nllina prloa of tal'IR produota, ra4uo1q; 
tba a\11ltt:r ot tha tamara to llu;f •llllfaotured aoc'•• taotortea then 
ra4un4 their •rkinc toroa, lea'rlq; a ll\lllllar of uneraplcyed workera unable 
to _,. either tn4utrlal or aartouUural 13'04uota1 the HOnOIIIV went into a 
d~J"'I aplral.10 
~11 atn .. ed the tntartependenca of rural and urben populeti0110. 
He po1ate4 out 11hat raia:lq; the purohaaiD& power of farmer& lllisht oftaa 
8. 7ucwllo R. G., •'fba Place ot Goftaa.nt in a Hattooal Land Proc;raa.• 
.wdre .. , lola\ Mnttac, "-rl- loonGIIla AaaootaUOD, -.rleaa 8\a• 
Uafllea1 Aaaoo1attoo. all4 Pam Jooac:oto AaeooiatiOIIo Pbtlao1Jhiao 
l'e., Daaapr 29. 19331 - P:N• iill~'M• 12. 
9• fqwll. a. G., •eo. to krtll?§Mrnes Bit$m, Vel. 44, No. 4, 
hlr· ~"· '51· 10. ......11. a. o •• •Conw•ra aiUl the Hew Deal,• A4dreaao CoiUIUII8ra1 
L.._ ot Ohio. Cle~d, o. o ..., u. 19341 in ·Du! IAUl.l t/11. .Dia-
•••• 275· 
:NM&lt in hiper prioea to thtt oo~rJ howe•ar, the ccmuuni\,1 aa a 
whole voul4 benefit fi'Cia aa ilrl»rrYIIIIIJnt ot the term lllllrket tO!:' urbaa 
aOCIU wl.ch cr•tadiiiOra urllao ,1obe.11 At the saM tt•• Tugwell 
M.uU.ollad, a praolpitoue aot~lilla up ct •&l"ioultural prtcaa would in a0111 
iNtanoes disrupt cona111118r-JI"'4ucar reletionsb1pa, reduc1na oonauaption 
to aa extent that would bu'tl aarioultural pro4ucara.12 The key to 'l'ua-
.. 11'• conoept of aatual u._np, or llalalloe, we ecoa0111icall,1 re.aGD• 
ule nld10Nh1P& betliiMin prt .. a and punhaaina power. 
!hs•U beline4 that the oraaUoa ot balanee requil"e4 1111tional 
aolaUona to national p:robl.... It wa eaaential that the Preatdallt aae 
••• a lllllD ot •oh 1Dfo~t1on. Paotat*Qok to bia mind 
llka fllea to Ol4•faahi0Mt flniaper• We we&"8 not Often 
••la to tall hba •• 1n that '1117• But he wa wak on 
nlauou. Gil the 10ajvaot11n1, tile JoiaJ.na tosethar or 
foroea and proeaaaea, eape1oall,11D tht_nat1onal eoonolllf. 
A Ooftl'nOJ" 4oea not UH eueblmowle4ca.~ 
!he oaJq~alp ecbloatad Booeawlt 1 bJ the t11118 he b....,. Pruidant he wu not 
•oae ot thou who :repr« the torwa.. ot the nation aa the simple ,_ ot 
the tonuaea ot ita aroupaa• he ha4 learMd the leaaon that •• the •rtnt 
4oor 111b1ch opana Cllltwr« townS geav.lae national polioJ•"~ 
Jlurlna hla ada1niatrat1011 Rooaewlt learned that a president who 
aoa&bt llalenea faoe4 a tol'llldable teak. A.a a pol1t1o1aD be had to OOD'NJ 
11. 'l'llawell. R. G., •c:oa.eu..rs alld the lrew Deal,• 283• 
u. 'l'llaw11 1 R. <h • •Cou\lllllnl aDd the )few Deal,• 276. 
1,3. -r.,wu. R. o •• •!he PrefaraUoa ot a Prea14ut,• 1.37. 
~. ~1. 11. o •• •'!'he Pre,.rauoa or a Prea1clent,• ~o. 
ll• ba4 to etnglAI apiut the ~ troa .. ob whioh ataU uPtet the 
•a.oeeea17 'b&laa• •IIIODC thlm aUt• hi bloa• tn.ol•ed 1a a 10111 atna&la 
tor a polio,r viti oil • lhlillll4 include ID4 .eull4voe• all tbeee torcee. hllr~~aa-
• •• anat11t eft one • • • aa preaW.nt 1o1011l4 be 1nteD4e4 aot 
fiHI' the nU.et ot olueea _. P'fi\\Ja or 1n4h'14uala • but 
wul4 M ontH"e4 l'ltller ia oae polic;r wll1oh 1o10111d be Da• 
t10118l an4 to vhioll all ettU'la would be coatri'buto17r liRA. 
AU. ~ aD4 'llu4cet _.i.uoa. the 41etr1but1on ot 
rellet ae4 the liJ'lrl& ot tuea. !hat he woul4 ban a 11at1on 
to all vU1h wllb -u lie ~ laea aopb1aticate4 in auch 
mttera than he btme.U wa.-" 
ftrw&bout the 1111Uon each poup all4 :ntaiOII expeotl4 tnore. baing v.arillinc 
to _..l'llte ite MlallU •efta tor the ..- ot aoh1e•ing balance.•16 
Sa ret;oo~JIIt 'l"qwll ,1allae4 that Jf- U.al -•urea 414 no more 
thea •iJilllr the ooaoept ot a -.lane& vbollt.17 There 'IIIII waon to .. ., 
.... ,.., tor -mpla. OIU'l'IDOT .. tpulaUoa throuah ohaDCina the price ot 
sol4 had the •tueina.Uoa ot all altlpla aoluuona tor dlttiouU pro'DU. 
•••• •
18 
'!'ben wa no qutu. ea17' alteftllltha to real aolutioaa1 
l.S· 16. 
17. 
Ul. 
19. 
flae eatehllshwat ot balaace 1114 1te •:l.nt4tllanoe th1'0\16h 
a aariea ot 1ut1tuUou lillla w. 111111oh atteoted. pr1011 
t1v oaatl'Ollta& tlaeil' eka1ate and 111111ob 1a•olve4 the ooa-
oerte4 aattoa which wa lat., ialle4 •:rea.._auuon. • w.a 
ODe '11111 - tile her& '11111 - to ••tift a elt\laUon 1a vh1oh 
IYIJ'IOM could bur ,,....,._ eliJI'e pc'04tlate 'Deoauaa hie 
owa eolcl at "Jarit¥.•19 
'hcwl1'• liNt 4ete1W N.,...peo\11111 •-••• retoZ'Nd, ot CIOIU'INio 
to tho -.rlftl\ural ~ AtilT lllponaot pbaH of the prosram •• tho 
NooaoU1aUon ot the lateneta ot tamar au oonet~Mr. It wa tnMt thot 
a hll Uet aa4 t\all tal'll PI'OdllatlOQ each -.14 eo • a loac _, towrt ..._ 
111& the other paeatl:lle - blat not the 'llhole WJ't" the ul'bllo co~r•a 
iaeGIIe OUI8 fi'Clll .-r .. aacl ia4uni'J'o the other hdt of the OOOII.CIQ' aa4 
the •teapatr ot ecrtftltu.l plaoura.•ao Acr1ouUu.ral-1ndutr1al rela• 
Uou tie1n e the prU.r.r coaoe:ra ot ~ a4Juet-t adaiw'iraton. 
for_....,.., IIVJ4'11ao tho _.bora of the A.U, TU&wll aot.4, reall¥ 
ooa .. tWI4 the •OOIIOIIt' aa a 41ebotGIIIt'. Th.,. 41Y14ed all lao- lato •crt· 
oulfti'Ol aa4 1a4u'ir1al, attallpt111C to reduce 89"ioultural prociuottoo 1a 
ONeil to l:lr1D8 ita prtoee lldlo •,.rUJ'' with the pricea of :f.Muatrld pro-
4.,..•• 21 'fh., ~' tG oee.te a buta tor tho u:ollaaaa ot the two k11148 
ot aoou aildlar to tht 'llhioh u4 halA ia pr:oa~roua u... Oaoa dta1oe4. 
the llala .... theJ ~:~o»M,, Jdtht • ._ •• ~1'11 --at. the raartiovlaW 
eoo~ ,.. aoill8 tor-1'4 aa a w~~o~e • .,.._U ottwef. thie a1111luat1oo ot 4e .. l-
o...-e whloh rollout the t•oepUoa ot tho .U.s 
The oaratlalJ.J coooelftlll P"4PUl• .. ia ao otte11. tnMto taU 
tato llaraetatll8 IIIIOilC eooaOIIio group, 11h1'011,11h e COJI&NU 
vbloll ut 11<1 oO!Wlaioo ta 11he paenl •tter u4 110 e11aa4-
ut 1:1J t~biob to JM ... ut tlbioh reapoada4 to the a\ronaeat 
an4 .,., s-.lk11e pnalllll't no •tter 'lbat 1ta loac-rwa 
eft .. \. llhet reaul\ell we .-tblag tar troll wll oa.lov.-
lat«l w aehf.frfe tho ott.... But 1t wa -th1D8• 'l'o-
20. 'IQcwU, R. G., "A lllaoaer'e Ylev of Acr1oulture•a Futll1"8,• 3.5• 
21. 'fqw;U aev ll'Oqr la bwll11eM' ObJenloao to the .u.. atatatalag 
tllat tareenra Ul learaad trca lftllW~ti'J' the teohn&que ot pr1oe 
•ta\ella... thJ'GUilh e~~&ttills noita•U•• 
&ether with Preaident Jlocee\lalt'a reluotut aUiultaneoua 
4eftlue.Uoaa ot tM uaU at CIUZ'reiUIJ"o andlloth f8l._l'l, 
u.cl OOIIIURII'I 1 8U111Ji4iee • 1il1 ftl'iOU8 4e.,icu, 1Qolu41DC 
Wl'lc reuet. a •-fl'1" ~·-. all4 eft1\ d.uiiiP1DC abi"'Old 
• a tolerable aUutlC~a ... aoiiS.Yid.22 
AlthoutJl the con41Uona ot tarMra illlpro.,ad, eas-otalq w1 th the 
w.r. '1\l&w.U aaw ao nuoa to diQP the quest tor belenoa.23 Jfe po1atad 
out thai: duriA& till w.r aa aa11Ue4 •r.ket w.a tlnaDOad •aot ao .aob liT 
Ul.ai:lM •wal Rehaqe .... pi'Oftura aa by intlat1on,•24 'l'here W.l 
&111878 tbe aeed. tor aaaurir.~& the ~ma'kl 80\lDdnaaa ot aptculturao 
lrl aa:r deollne tbe ,...lulr tnteraata 1n the eoon01117 autfere4 tint aD4 
aoat aer1oua}¥a tbe l'U\llt. ot thia aafterina an-4, brtngi!IC oa genanl 
I 
panqataa 'fllcw.ll aaw ao na- to • ._ that apiculture lllf.sht aot 
a .. ia \!a tba -keat 1Dtenet.25 On the other hand, ha ac!IIIOiliabad taJ:Mra, 
tbe proteetioa at aartoultue ehoW.d n.- reeult 1n a n-.lect ot the aen• 
eral 1nteren. Be or1Ueiae4 the tendeaOJ ot tarMra to w.nt eftl'1th1q 
alea replated. ta tbatr 1atereet.26 '1111 tai'RI1'1 1 real hopa, ha pra41cte4, 
VC>Ill4 Ue 1n 44mllo»in& a O'-oept ot tha pllll'lll 1ntereat, in 'li8J'tectln8 
•lh1nerr tu •tateiaJ.as the sa-.lt, fill aU tbe parta ot a belenOid 
wole•• •partty1 • ha oouolwle4, 'iRpUad a ooa4it10D ot w.ll being tor 
othen thaa tai'IIH'ao .21 
'fuaw.ll, R. G., '4 l'lanner•a View ot .l&J'ioult\lre 1a l'utue,• )6, 
.,..._11 peteft'141 •lali1aaoa• to 'JIIII'ity,• the ott1e1al wori tor _...1• 
JII'Oii\J'o 
\'u&w.l11 R, G., •A Plalmer'a View ot Acrioultue1a J'\1ture,• 17• 
'fuswll, R. o., 'A Plaaner1a Vtaw ot AaHoultue'a future,• 112· 
'l\lawllo R. o., •• Pla-.r'il View ot Aarioulture•a r.•ure,• 46. 
'lllawJ,l, R. o., •4 Plalmer'• Vl•w ot J.gricul.t\lre•• J'\1ture,•. 40. 
Tuawll'• 4tUtw town Buatuu 
JJIIperaonalU~ 
Twcwll uecl 80118 llllrah wrda ill e-.ttDC oa buaineaa •wu:alt..,, 
laa 4l4 Nt al"lUoille butneaa 1la pttniOIIAl or etbical te:r.a. B. attr1b!atll4 
tnlitJ 1a bu1Uaa to the tutUuUODal trunork within wlch..,. 
Mrotal aa4 laduetnal enterpriaee operated. Buatuaa • exproprtdtoa ot 
•aove.--.a\al• powera &114 ita .,.oulau.,., pntatory preeti- vera 1.Dw1· 
table 1a aa "uacoor4lute4• eoGilGalo .,., ... 1 
'1'lae tuUtlPtoaal obaopa which faewll a4vooa\e4 did not coo~ta 
the elSaluUoa ot prtute owarahtp or the profit aJatu.2 He bel1ew4 
that • oool'lltutt•• ( oeatzal auooauoa ot reaounea) liOI.Ild onate en 
n.ppOaed to haft dorae Uder lal .... •tatre. 
TwcwU ocateadH tlult u4er laluea•fat:re 1nd1Tidual aaterpriHra 
l.a...._•ta1:re 1a ao 4taonartte4. and .. u .. a and etten• 
thi"'Matou.t the qatea era ao apparantq IIDI'alated, that 
••s•••' ot attaira vitllelllt Nta:raraoa to the •atate at 
tlaa 1134ut1'1al lll'ta•. 1a paea1'"· ot couraa it 1a not. 
41l4 the Pllft8ltiaa are alWT• patcl. altlaouah they •1 not 
be pa14 "t tha ptopl.e who an n~apoaa1ble tor thea, nor 
v1th1a .., atton p!Wtod ot ••·' 
1. Sea aboft, Gbaptar UI, aeotloa, •fha llae4 tor Plallalq.• 
2. Sea abQ<M, Cllaptar Ill, •oUoca. •soataUaa.• 
3• ~~ B. O,, 'the J'CGWtll Pow&",• 29•.30• 
trrea;oa.lb1litFt 
for all tbia I 1IWl.d not haw you tbillk that I liiiPilte 
\loa to UJODe• IIIOthlq ia tuther troa ..- parJOea. 
Ba' I W!ol14 haft JOlt oonel .. r tlllfther in •lev ot 1ibat 
hapJIIIae4 peat obnr ara not aeoeaaaJ7 in the ayataa 
11bioh IMkaa u \lebaw tn th ... ,.ya,lt 
fuawl,l .... ne4 that '0111' -saa an not tndl\'iduala ao •ch u 
tha7 an lnatlt.v.Uoaa ••••• .5 ID41•t4ula, ot ooorae, wppone4 laat.lt.v.-
tlou. Ja 1932 'hlcwll oalle4 thoee wo ha4 bonetite4 traa inatituUou 
wtel wn tJaea cm.~~u .. •,oor a»>rta• ••ua the)' 80\18bt onq to aaw 
tholr 011111 aeoka.& fat, aOOCII"41nc te ~11. thoae eo ha4 tbr1ve4 Wlll.r 
o14 lUUt.1aUCIIIIAI were aot •Uo1Qqa in aa ulllbate aeua1 in nonal h\laR 
taab.tOll t.her auppone4 the ORl7 tut1tv.t.1one they llaev about tl.rat•baD4 ·-
t•Uwt1ou _... 'lbtoh the)' ha4 tal'M well. They a .... d that a retllft 
to the pnnou attut1011, at._ - ~atal adjv.at.aante, voul4 
M the noral owna ot ~. 'l'he)' ..,.., Tuawell wrote, 
• • • tha al ... ft 4P'OJlP ot v1U1111 llanettolariea ot the 014 
on.r, 11bo- la tha 1IOZ'U ot a atfte4 Bia&Uaball • aat 
•wtuac tor \!Ia t11JM11lath oentlll\r to blow ow:r,•7 
'-"'swell a•evrai thd tha aotlntlN ot the Old Or!lar would ooatllloUe, in a 
nW.S.te4 rona, 1a a aew tnetttdleaal aatunc. He .-.uoalq oppoae4 
olaaa wrtare,8 OOIMltlac oa the aatwa ot tlw nev iaaUtv.ti-1 •7•teP &'ft• 
4ualq to 1114uae a apanva trca pnnoua aott-aoeial aooaCIIIto praotloae 
4• ,..._11, R. G., •Relief aD4 Re...-ruot.loa,• .305. 
s.. ~11. a. o., '"- ProsrtoN1Y8 '1':radtttoa,• us. 
l. lee a\low, ebapto Ylo aaottoa '.l14 at tho Top.• 
1. ,..._11, R. o., • .._r1oa 'l."allaa ile14 or Ita Daati~, • 2.5&. 
8, 8u aNfto CMpter %11, aaotioa, ''f~Wwll'a Lone.._ llb1akill6•' 
OD the pan ot 1114trt4ualtl •• panlf thl'OII8h the o:reaUoa ot a Mv 
ethteal at ... phere, parnr throqh the «**IUlaion ot an MOnOIIQI' 11h1oh 
'l'laawll oh1de4 blatoriana tor their "oon4 ... Uoa ot Dheteqtb 
oeotuJ.7 1n4utrta11ata ••• oa h-attartan rather than. eoonCIIIio IJ'OWid•··' 
Ia the aad, 1t waa the •aeture ot ooa\eJIIliGl'ar.v tnatitutiOIUI" which •toreed 
Oil the qcoJheDta aad apoloctata tbq auppone4 eo seoeroual,y • • • the 
naiae ot pt.req, ot alaerUaeae, allCl ot owmt:nc.•10 The loctoal OOftol•-
aiOG \0 'l'llpell 1a lapereonal 1nat1tuUoaal dew waa t!Mt aaaartton \hat 
aootety aa a Whole waa to blaae tor lta 41tt1oult1aaa •aooiety aa a whole• 
1101&14, ot oourae, include tUMn, llut !Upell tailed apeo1t1oelly to 
lllaM tanaen tor t!Mt1r 8bare 1a alluainc the aoil• 
!be.,..,. •••ml to be a aoQMa. It had shea Amertoena 
the htcbaet !41Yel ot ll•tac 1111 the world, they told th-
aehae, aa4 tut waa ;IUtUioaUoa eaouah. It ud oo1111n'ed 
to IIGII8 ot th• thaD • • 't'U'7 t.ev ot them, at 141an • that 
\lle1r hs.,b livtll8 ateadallla had beeR WD ta aptte ot, rather 
than tieoaUM Of, tha .,.._ ot lai .... -taira vhioh thQ" 80 
atronclJ appl'Oftd. 
Yolllall had wrtttn hia lloolla,IID4 there had bull a taw er1U• 
oal onakJ:!Ota, 'bat other 40Qlnera had been rev, allCl what 
thu'lt wra had liMa hovW d011D. There had coaa a 'Mw an• 
-.. aueh thtaaa • tnore41lll.r ..-u.• • ... ..,... thOUCh 
thq wra - hllll llaacD aooeJte4a oapttaltaa had \INa t'I•"Qb-ot. 
Tlaa built-OYer foz'eat lallde, the ... ......, pra1rlae, all had 
bW thtelrl.t lato OaH ol41ar ati'MIII8a a Dat1oa.l• rtohoa ba4 
waate« 1ato the ... while 8J8oulatora had .tllod ill the 
••....-. and ~ had loolal4 oa hopiD& that a o~ or 
two tr. t:he 1' ... , atabt tall tull' ~. Cert:ainlJ the 01'17 
bad leea at l4laat "a4oiUI4. Vliet hall baea a1YeD to 'bu*lDHa 
'IIJ ..,...,...., had liMe takn: .on or leaa o,_., aD4 aora 
'· 'f'tlawll, a. o •• •t~ae Din~CU,.,• 7. 
10. '1\acWU. a. o., •!be !'ftaraaal'N Ortho4oQ' ot rrallkl1a D. RooaaYelt,• 
10. 
:J78. 
or 1 ... wUh s ... nl coullltt. the oaapleint ot tutve 
.... nuou .. u aot lu ... 11Wtt • ., apaotal pwp b 
the pJMnUoa ot the 19l'll· \'lae Otwel"'laMt all4 the 
laa4 btl4 liMa lett aPNIIIa 11111at; ba4 baPPttiiM w th-
at tba hdU ot aplot-. had 11eeta tu l'Upouib11111J' ot 
.u.n 
the 1lllo1a aoeietJ'. betaa raepeulble tCII' eoonom.lo ooUapae, bad to OOOP-
ente la the onauoa ot aaw tuUtlltl808. Pei'II1U1111 OOIIbiMtiou tn 
u •JJaop;1ete iuUtliUoul r-110&'Jl -14 belletlt ella •tro~a tbe polllt 
Of Yiev ot the puJJlia tha ol4 •ats-t; ot fMr ot )f.a bwi1MN J:"-147 
, ............ M17•"u 
Ia 0C1UC111aJUM wUh .,.._U•a bft11naUonel 14aaa, he parooneU¥ 
eD.tblMt aal'thar tear nor ani a 1U7 1a bia oontaota with hu.aineN ._, 
naaMleae ot tbalr )llli'UOillar •taw • it ha thOIJCb.t the;v wn ainoei'HJ' 
18..,..... 1a aolYiac "'• uuee•a prob,_, %a MIC\Itlt• 193a. Allie s. 
rr.M, • hu.aiiiM ..... \ol4 ~ tut ha ha1re4 to hew - JJev DMlen 
come to Mllllo lllf-1 41uen witll uti..,._ Deal bwtlnM ..... who -u 
be able M ... 'lllbethft' the 'hOme •Dill beote Jlev Dealen repute4)¥ von wre 
41e....,ble at ahon rarace.•1' Mo~ thoupt J'ree4'• ...aeauoa ae 4 • 
uel'lll, tbmsb 1JIIite4, W7 ot llOIUite1111n1111 •the .,...,.. ot the aalfl¥ 
tonle4 """" 1.-.u to~ lluailll•• an that the;v -.t •tf.abt tu 
'111141oalU.1 ot the •• Delll.•14 \'be 41aaere took place 9'9ft'J' tbrae or 
tov ,...a thi'O!olP tha .. .._, Docal4 Jltohlleqh Daa1el Roper, Bex 'fuawll 
u4 ethan attnhct 1aton.ll,v.15 
It ia ptl'tlMat, 111 eoaaUUOR with a ooneide:ratlion ot .,.,._ll'a 
attUue tow:Ns buineaa, to tiMe tbe aUUude of Ilia 110at fth-t 
oppoaent witbia tJie afiUaiatnUOR. h f.netitutiODal terM the Pl'oare .. 
lift iaaa ot 'I'Oil Oononla - a tlSaoSple ot feliX Frallld'l:lrter, who ••• 
to tlacwll'• new. Coroona, J~er, aad Bna4eie tOOk the anti• 
truet ,..UlOR, "Yiewbla ~·• role aa that of poli-ll, nther 
thaD IOOl'tinetora• tlltlv wn opJ1CN1414 to the MA all4 the IGIA,16 '!qwell 
OOUideM hie uti-Utnat poaitioa, au iDtearal pe.rt of hia 1utitu-
d14 Dot loolc uPOR ~l aa a trSOQI.. h 8117 Dent, bu1- dtaoka 
... ,..,. Jlolllfl'Olt 1MNU~~4 ill lateut'J after tile J'rootnaalYa Corcona, 
wlao deepiaad 'llqjwll. at-1Da4 a._tua aa a White lfolaae adviser and tvc-
wll had left the aom Dt. Peftape llu1118aa' attaoke wra partlr a 
raaJOilH to tile attttde ot c:onor.a. 11bo told Moley 1D 1934, "fi&hti.._ 
with a bulDNaaD ie lUte f18btlas vUb a Polaok. YOtl 0111\ 81ft DO qur• 
tar.•17 
'l'ti&Wll oooaas-u, rataned to tlltl 1'881-taUcm which 'l:luat .... 
t..;oaecl em 011r eooaCIIIlo .,., •• 18 SO.. at hi• or1t1oa replied that lut 
eii!Pll' deelnd to replaoa one ldl\4 ot rBj!iiiiiDtaticm with anotlutr, a40pt• 
s.._ an aaU•lllaeiMN attitude 1a Ol'der to ~ta hie CIV!1 interest •• 
leader ot the liOUlcl lie ra&laatera..l9 Ap1Do there Vll8 DO Juat1f1oat10A 
,380. 
tu 41MUetlls '-"'8wll'• S.a ia l*I'IIOIIIll tara •• either anU--.1· 
- 01' P"-'l'U&Wll• 
'to all tilf.a JJ,a~*'•iri/ a Jl'ltaU''N dlnoUODal eyat• 
atu4tl ta OOII,p\eM ooatnn. n ..-. ot 1R4utr1al aool• 
et7 a W''~ la 111tloh III'VIIO a1l4 atfM11o era ol•rll' 
nlatell ad Wbiola paulU. ant traoall 41nnl)- to Yi• 
olaUODII• la thio- .. 41J'efth'e 111••• oaa lie aaid 
to lie e ,..._Mal OM. the nct-taUoa 1e, howYOI'o 
SII&INa4 IJ7 •tva ellll 1J7 the ~ ot tbe 1lllhlatr1al arb, 
Dot )J eiiJ 11'14iYidual fW IJ'GilP• 
'!'he •ttoaal lla4wttrial Ree.,eq Aot 
ell4 the Jfattoaal IIIIIINJ'J' ...,_iatnttoa 
'l'hnqb ttaa 1M Oftl' ,., t&tiD4l'all llllhlatrf.aa vorkall out eodea ot 
•talr ...,.uu ... • 'llllllb plaoad a oeiltas a IIU:iaua boura ot la\>01' al'l4 
a floor Wlilal' -.._ ._.... 41'f.aia8 wt ot oolleeUYO illpulHa whloh 
_,.. la eooel'lt vltll 'l'llpell•a liCIODGMo tbOIICbt, the liRA oneaalbl)- we 
tU liRA, ill ,.....11•a OWD epiutoa, ldlltatM aaaiaat M o:paatiq MOilOIIII' 
- ttaa aelain ... at ot llllleh, ia llfA atDA, .. the naaoa tor 1natuuuoul 
..... 
._.ftiUYO ocrapatittoo. PlotiUII~ bad 11ttle to do with the or1g1aa 
ot u.e IRA, •k1aa eel¥ -11 oaatl'lttd10DII at the vr1til'l6 auae ot ita 
20. ~ •. R. G., • .,._ J'oal'th Powr,• ,o. 
4nelOJIII8at. Aa ia the oaee of a~t every •Jor act of CoQcreu, 
tboee 'Who aotuall¥ wrote the lesialetion bad little to do with ita 
orisla ill a real naaea their uatt ..-al7 eave expreuion to a v1de• 
apread ._..,..., diapolitioa to cooperate tor aurvhal and to aa 
aoe"''P"DJ1Jia U.lld tor leslalaUCIIl to IIIP~t auch cooperation. 
hrilapa the INaiDHa o m&ty, upoa Nina Nacu.d t'l'llla total 
collapee, IOOD :ra10rted to prhatal7 eothated perveraion of' the mu. 
beoaun it laoke4 a thfiCI:ratioal :rationale tor ita '-ada duriaa tile 
ort.ale. Protaaue like 'l'vpeU wn 41. . ppo1Dted, althouah aOII uo-
... arl.l7 IJ\Il'Pl'iae4, at the pen.raioa of the NRA Deolluae they, Oil tile 
other ball4, poeaeue4 a theorMioal aptiZ'Oilch vhich they Delieved uver 
'l'llcWll alld lfolay wre expoHDb ot the aooncmte philoao~ ot 
•ecaoaotnUon alld coat:rolo" the title ot a book by Vaa Hiae publiahad 
in 1912. 'rhl.a aoltool ot thoupt reeopbad 
••• the aooialq aJl4 oooaQil. oall7 watatul eff&At• o: __ A., 
lD'C .... OQIIIIetiUoa in labor ara4 1B4wltr.YJ U .£al:lud....., 
the theclly tbd the ocmpetUtve .. lUtt,p ot WUaca alld 
llrara4ele 1\f.d woru4 or •• workable 1 .Lit oallecl tor ea:per• 
S u••••llal vttb .....,..., oonrol over ccaoeat:rate4 
eoooaalo power 1D the ia..,..ta ot the wge aaraer, the 
Hla1'7 earur, tile~. alld the asaplo,.r.l 
Aa earl¥ aa 1921 fUcwll publielled u article which atatad the uti-
)82. 
ecallf.latlou 1D the illteren ot .ooiet7 ae a vhc1e. 'l'upell arpe4 that 
ae •rah lie .... ot social OODOU'Il theJ oalle4 tor social OOD111'01.2 
%D 1928 'h&well ~tte4 a -ran4ua to Altre4 B. Smith OD apl• 
GU.ltural probl8118. Be 1D01u4e4 1n tills stUdy a nota on prtoa controls, 
vh1oll he oou14arat the key ruaoUOD or 8Jl,Y apnq Cftata4 tor the aoe1a1 
OODtrol ot larp OCIIIbbaU0118. II bal1aft4, 'alone with •AT oonatitu• 
Uonal aathor1Uaa,• that paeral prtoa controls were within the 1att81' 
aa4 aptrU ot the Constitution, but he j\Ml&a4 that opla1on thea appeared 
to be aptut prioa oontrela •• the pQ11c '118s DOt 7st read)' for tbea.3 
Jr 1932 the JNbliC 1D asnaral, and bwllDSU ln perticular, W8 lli01'8 than 
raaq tor expal'illeatatlon la JNh11cl7 apauore4 pr1oa•t1lthg -- attitudes 
of lllllo.b the Rooaeftll olrele waa ••ra. The pbllosophy of •oonaantra-
UOD aa4 OOntl'Olt' Mcle7 raaalla4, was 
• • • an4l ... l¥ 41souan4 tna •Tel'f ancJ.a durin& braiD 
tJ'Ut 4al'•• ••• ita chlat ot.J•!!Uft •s the ln1Uat1on 
fill prallllillal'1 8'Mpa 11081'11 a Mlaaaad aa4 d)'tlalllo 
aooaCIIIle .,., •• • 
%D 1933 the Jlooaaftltl •alalatlrattoa passed. .,_. ll&re 41a011881on ot 
aCIOilCIIIlo prohl-1 1t raoa4 the task ot oraaU116 u lut:rv.nt for laaal• 
lain& aatl ooatroll1D& tuqrata4 lndwltrial eatat.llahanta -- Imp taotor-
iiiiPOM4 tlunoial OOBtrola •• eo that theJ lllaltt become 1nati'IIIII8Jlts tor 
2. 'fllawU, R. o., •'I'M J£oonomio Baals tor B\laineaa Reaulation,• •=ri• 
tuB Rllill''l Rglex, Vol. Xl, Mo. 4, J:leeamber, 1921. 
3· Mealonatlwa 01.1 eplotiture tor Altfad. B. Blllitb, Tumll fiJJ!ra• 
4• Mola7, Ra7110atlo 60tr Sew JMD• :1.84. 
The liRA p'f'e expreaaioa to 'f'lll'iOWI propoaala for industrial OOOP-
ention to elilll11111te 4eatnot1.,. CIOrJIII&\lUon. Walter Lippmann noted 
tllat tlla prtaoipla ot orpnlzi~~~J 1114u.et17 v:l.tb 11 Y:l.av to adopt:l.~~g ~~-
polio1ea in napeet to wae•• hCNno priGe8e and oapiul in'f'llatmlnt wu 
pan ot HDcmtr•a prOSftiii.S Boo'f'llr ta:l.le4 to ilapl-llt the proe;nm he 
tnat law •• a etep 'Which JloOial' llec}aate4. and extea4a4 to the prni• 
ouaq UOl'flllllitlad. 6 Boo'f'llr we aot oouiatent 011 prioe•flx:l.aaa be aaid 
that he lt:l.ttel'q oppoae4 u. •llllt thia Ji,he J'arm. Boa.r4 •a tempora17 Jaa• 
&ill& ot pr1Ge8 by entartaa tba •rkat dlnotly aDd b\iriaa 'Whaai/ wll 
prioa-ttains with a ~ •• 7 
Well ltetore the eDcl ot Jklo'f'er'a .A48lll1atrat1on. in 1931. Gerar4 
s.pe, preai4aat ot Oenenl Blaotrte C0111pea;r. preeantad a plan for 
1114uatrial ataltil1MtiCllll he ....-ated the nlaxation ot anti•tru.et law 
with nteraue to •paoitlo tn ....... ooiation •sra-uta apPJ'O'f'lld by the 
:Fadaftl Trella caa.laaiona the &O'f'llttrnt WOilld aaa that the trade aaaod• 
8 
ationa eutoroa4 their O¥R aar- rrDt• retPlllt:l.ng CJampetitiY& praCJt1011a. 
Duriaa the oapaiJa ot 1932 Rooenlitlt 1ati011ta4 hie awreDeBa ot thillkill& 
.384· 
la tbe buioeu vorld iA hie S.. haaauoo apeeoh ot SeptiiiiHr 23• 
We do aot th1Dit lleoa1111e 118 Uonal Ooven.eat hacl HOOIII8 a 
threat ill tbe 18th .... \11'1 that tharetore .... oould alMul4oa 
'he priaoiple ot aaUoaal Oofel r at. Ner tocla7 llheul4 w 
allalldoa the priaoiple ot ati'Olt& aaOilOIIio unite Olllled oor• 
porat1011e, •nl7 lleoaun their powar ia BU~~oapU'ble ot 
.. ., abun. In otbar tt..a w 4ol1; wUll. the probl- ot an 
Ull4111.7 aMitiOUII oa11tftl &Off?M'Ilt: 1ly .odityiD& 1t: 81'84\l• 
all7 into a ooutituUOflal claloo•tto GoYens.at. So 
tocla1 w are .odityiD& aDd ooatrolliq our economic wita 
•••• We kllov, now, that: tile" eeoDOIIIlo unite oaaaot ex1et 
unl.41aa proaparity ill uaitoa, tbat la, ualen purchadna 
powar 1a wll 41atrUKI.tecl throqllout evel')' aroup ia the 
aatioa. 'rblt ia wby evea the -t aeltiah of oorporatiou 
tor tta owa :t.ataraat would 'be &lad to ... wee• raetored 
and UIUIIIPlcr-nt eadecl aDd to llr:f.na the Weatel'll tez.r 
llaok to hie aooutOMCI level ot proeperity • • • • 'rblt 1a 
wby sCM enll&htallecl ill4\letriea tll-elYea eadovor to 
Uld.t the t:reedGII ot aetlon ot •oh an aad bueill8U crouP 
withia the iadutl')' iA the o-. interest ot allJ wll,y 
lluaiaeaa - evel')'lllaere an eakiDc a form. of orpDiaation 
vhioll will 111'1%18 the ••~ ot thSIIp into balance. aftD 
"*'&h it my ia aCM -ave quality the treeclGII ot aoUOil 
fit 11141v14ual wlte w1th1a 'he buetae ... 9 
.,. tha •Prill& fit 1933 a llllllller 1//t 1D41viduala aDd fil'OUP wre 
4ntt1D& plau tor reooftl')'& Seutora La Follette. Coatigan, C.ttiq, 
llllvid I. Walah • aDd Vqner 1 Ccmareaama 1 ecOlloaiah, eapeciall,y tb-
ot the Brooki.,_ Inatitutioa in 'lrUIIlD&toaa bUIIine-a, vhoae aaeooi• 
atiou urpcl liberal JllC loans, vh1la 'ha National Aeaoc1eUoa ot MaB\l• 
taoturera elld the Chulber ot o-ne wone4 oa 1110b1lisat1on plane 1 a 
you'bhl •teniaeye 'llra1a ti'Witl eA4 orpaized la'llor, which aupponed 
'ha Black thlny•hour bill thl'O\IBh tbe An..lO D1atreaae4 11141v14ual 
9· Citecl 1• 'l'upell, R. o •• •'lbe Proareaet.ve Orthodo.~~T ot Franklia D. 
JlcloaeVeU 1 • l!btqt, Vol. 64, !lo. 1, Ootober, 1953, 17. 
10. Riohbeq, Doaald, Dla Rlip)oy (Gardea City, Doubleday, 1936) lo61 
Lilldll~Jt lnleat 1t. t %Jll Bpazn!l! IJI!ul.uUop, ltret Ph'U• 1!)6. 
bulDHII •• all4 labor lea4ere Joiaet -t ot the sroupa. SOh-• wre 
,...._, .. tor «<WW11111Uoa by the publio aa4 the Roosevelt MalllutreUon 
Hlall'f S. IliltaaiaOilo Beary I. lfan1.an1 1- H. Rall4, :Jr., H. 8. R1T1t& 1 
loi!.A R. onet. aacl .Touph X.pp. U Doileu ot -rceaq plana wre public 
propeft7 J they 1laclwt.e4 •vuuUou tor 1114u.11rial IIIObilizaUolh the 
1'8.-piion ot profluouon vi\11 ao•• ll1l 8Uftllt888 qaiut l08888o 10"· 
e,._D11 ~t41JiaUon ot Bpea41tt.ll'88 on plant; l~Q&'ov-at all4 Bpauton, 
and larce •peadituru on public wol'lr.t.12 
Ill Wuhii!CIIon the fonulaUon ot an 1a4u.tr1al•reooYery plan cra-
Tna1ie4 town two •Jor 8J'O\lP8• 'l'he 18841118 f'isuru ta thea• groupe 
"'" snator Wqaer all4 Oeaen.l a&8h s. .TOiuleollo Senator La 'Pollett& 
aJIOIIHN4 a pleD vhloh 41ftel'84 froa -..t other propoaalaa the latter 
oaUed tor 1a4uetr1al aelt•resul&Uon uu.r flOTSrMent euparv:latoa. La· 
follette favoftll u lcoeoalo CowloU. worldDC fl'CIIIII the sovermMnt 4ow 
rather thea troa 1a4uatry up.l3 La ~ollet1ia 1 a activities were aot as 
~t u tboae ot h:la oollaape 1a t;he Senate, Robert Wasaer, aDd ot 
.Tohaacm. The 1GhuOD sroup to-.t af'ter Moley aaaipa4 lanoh 'a 
aaa:lataat in the War IDcluetriH lloar4 fit WorU War I the task ot 41pat• 
1111 the veriou plane wbloh ba4 baea JIOilrilla ill on the Adllliniatn.Uon. 
11. 
J86. 
':Mre •• ao strict llue or 41Yia1oa betweu the Waaaer and 
1olmaoa &l'OUP8. Moler, tor aample, ha4 cCift tact a with both. Tuawl1 
participatecl in the aot1YiUea at tw 1111JDP8 -- directl.T, or indi.rectlf' 
tbroual1 the reo~ll4aUon or pereon~~e1. Roo-1t t11181lf' took acUOD 
to pt the Waaaer and J"obneon &J'OUPI topther tor the vritlDfl of aa 
actual 1>111. 
on apaoitio -.urea .tlan Ilia aacrMaJ:7, s._ Ritk:l.nd, illformed him ot 
a plu. beilt6 wcrlcecl out llr W.yer 1acol:lateia ot the Brookiasa IDatitu-
Uoa.lll ID March, 19.33• at Rooeewltl's request, Waper called a sroup 
topther to 0011814ar paera1 lqllllat1ve poliq tor recOYarr tor 1D4uatrr 
and lal>ora Wa&Mr'a srouP at\141 .. tha 14aa ot selt-resulat1on throucb 
tra4e a .. ooiaUoaa.l.S Mola:r talllia4 to Vaper al>cut iaoorporatine; a 
..-:~.uuuoa Itlen in the pul:IU.c•wrt. P1'0£1'811l on wiob Senator Wapar 
ba4 been wcrkine vith SenaUra I.a J'ollatta an4 CO.St1pn.l.6 
The Wapar iJ'OIIP 1nclu4a4 \lwf1118N •n, lavyere tor trade aaaoci-
ationa, pveraaat otticiala lit. .Toba Diokiaaon ot CclalHroe, an4 youac 
hv Deale's lib Leon ltqNrlin& and .Te:rea Frank.l7 'l"'lpall aa1ata1ae4 
ooatact with tba lfaper arouP thi'Cl\llb Ilia Qonaorahlp ot .Tarome Frank,l8 
16. 
17. 
18. 
hrkiu, hue ... 1'11.1 Rpcttw» lllu (lllev York, Vik1na. 1947) 198. 
larutain, ll'YS.II&• .t1a1 Jlp .11111 Col.leptiu hm1pty Poli• (Bar• 
llitla;r, Vaiwrsf.tJ' ot Cel1toi'a1a PreN, 19.50) 3.3• 
Lin41ay1 :&nleat Jt,, lU, Bnol»UOA, ltpt &81e, 1,56. 
SOblaat~~&er, Arthur M., , J'lrat HuQ4re4 Da;ra at tha New Deal,• 
1n La:l.4rJlton, IN 'bel, e4., lU. Mursa -.. uu-1941 (New York. stmoa 
and Schuter, 1949) 289. 
Lent, ilwlsal1 1 Da& !tllew st. lta• 340. 
who vol'kll4 with D1olc1naoa.l9 Otller 1nd1v1duala 1daat111ed as parU.oi-
the AJ'L, S.oratary Perktua, all4 DoDal4 Riahbera. o0Wl8el to the ra1lW7 
t.ro\hertaoo4,a.ao ~11 bad llotb oocaatoaal 41raot all4 continuous tn-
dll'Mt ecmtaota with the W.Siler &I'OUPI he alao worked with .1olulaGD. 
Sta1larl.y, Dcmal4 Rtahbers bat ao-'hilll to do with both the Weper all4 
1ehuoa ~· MadaM Perktu later haa4a4 a oa'binat o-.dttee created 
to t.rtac the varicua toraulatora tosather. 
'the .1Ghuon poup tozw4 4ue to the ettorta ot Moley. He rece1Ye4 
•Utanll,y 4CIHllll0 ot plana for 1114uatrtal rehabilitation between MaroiJ, 
1932, ad Maroll. 1933· On Maroh 9, 1933• Mlllq liSt .1ohnaon 011 a train 
to ••hiqtoa. 1cbuoa tol4 Milley that o illcreaae 1n the coat ot taxa 
pro4llota without a parallel nilmlatlon ot iD4uatrial aotivity would ba 
tatal.21 Millay did not aaa loh- aaaill for about a1x wake a he kepi 
hla ia ldll4 aa a a.n with exJWtnoa tD 1D4u.atrtal ooordine.t1on. Baton 
-tiaa 1ohaaon, Molay hall tuned O'feJ' the plau he received to .Tames P. 
Wartlu'4h who wu halp1na bill with pnparationa tor the London Eoonoalo 
COntarancet W.r!Nrc talllia4 te Prot8MOr H. G. Moultoa ot the Brooktnaa 
IutUuUon, J're4 lent, o4 ... olpb c. Millar, preaenttDa a -l'llll4aa t.o 
Mtlay ill aHut a 111011.t.h.22 Aa late aa AJril 4 Mole7 ad Rooarrelt aareed 
20. 
21. 
22. 
that thillld.Di ia 'buailleaa and pve11'1181nt oirolfta bad not yet oryatal• 
liaM ll\lt1'1c1en11ly to juatit')' •n¥ tunhar -• at the tm..23 
DenloJIIIInta in COI181"888 aooa atlrreil the executive branch to 
hour billa the Mainiatreuoa. ooncant:ratiAf! on the banking oriaio, 
paid little attention to the thirty•hour bill u.~til it passed the Senate 
oa April 6a Rooaavelt tho aalred Mademe Perkins to prepare an alterative 
to the Black bill.24 Molay oona14ere4 the Black bill •utterl,y 11DpreoU-
oa1.•2S The ftbatitute bill wh1Cil:l ,....._ Perkins• cabinet oo.tttee 
'IOrJIM out waa alllloat aa sreat a ahoek to employers aa the Black billa 
buaineaa leaden proteate4 qainat her auaseat1c1111 to the Senate Labor 
COIIIIiiltoe tor llliDJ8D 1111&08 and t'ederel cootrol ot procluoticna both Sec-
retary Perkina and the President wre a&baat at tho ~ion her taaU-
IIIHIJ cewaad.26 On 'l'uoa4q, April U, Roosevelt told Mo~ to oontaot 
dirootl.}' tho varioua aroupa in Yeahiqton known to 1:te working on plana 
tor 'buaineaa-aovel'llll&nt cooperation, the President apeoit'icelly mentioned 
the 8rooktllCII In.titution and the Chamber ot c-rce.27 
Jlt April 25 it we Olrfioua to Molo7 that he oculd not • pt Oil top 
ot tbia Job• teat enough to atave ott the IIIIDIIoa ot the Black or Perkine 
a.s. 
26. 
,389. 
~tUu aad the etillal 1111111o11oa of u illtlat1oo•u7 price rise without a!IJ 
attampt to ra:Laa purohaain& power in the wp-aod•nla:ey-earn1ne cla ... a. 28 
Mole;r IMt .7obUOD 1a a Waah1Q6t:OA hOtel lobby on April 25, peraua4111C tba 
O.aeftl to 1'81118in in tba capUal.29 lohnaOA locked hhl&elt in a hotel 
ro01111 tor tWDt)'•fovr atftigbt hO\Il'a ot work, -ra1116 with a two-pace 
draft of a bill attar got111 tbi'Wflb aU ot the principal plane • .30 J"ohD-
aoa oalle4 oa 'l'uawll and Donalcl Riobbeq tor belp}1 Ricb~rs ws a 
lQS1oal obolce to draft a ata~t on collective barea1n1qs. 
Wb1le the .7ohnson SJ'OUP labored on a racove:ey plan, the Challl~r 
ot c-rae prepared tor its May -tins, at which it vould preurat e 
plan u bed ~era workiiiC on ainca 1931· Meanwhile, consresa was debat1ns 
the Black 'bill. .7olmson and Tugwell at:rove to beat the Black bill to 
the win 1 at the ...- Ume tbq attempte4 to reconcile the Cballber of 
C...area plaa tor a aational oounoil ot buainese men •• operattna throu&h 
tracla aasooiaUone to control pro4uoUon, raiae prioea, and stabilize 
,.,. .. - with the principle ot tll4eral occtrol. When tbe Chamber ot a-
.. .._ lilt 1a llaahu.toa GD J1a7 J, 1'.3.3• 1t expraaaa4 a de111Bnd tor so-rera-
••t oooparat1oa 1a the 1'8SIIlatioa ot olillllp8111t1on that Ernest Lindley 
tOWid. "literally UtO\IIId.liJ&.•.12 At the aallla t11118, Mclay en4 .7ohuOD 
praaaatad a mn ot a blll *lob, deapl.ta - conceaeiona to labor, •• 
28. Moley, l'a)'IIOM, After Smp YUrt• 188 • 
.3
29o·.· LMot187l' Ra!~,· Pia!':. 'te' ...... lBBl. ... ...... _ 1'"' ad. •7• .,..,.,... ··- ~~ •JO ut'OD• £1Eft ces••• JW• 
.31· Soblaa1D6181', Artb\1%' JC., 1:r., • P1rat Hlm4rad llaJ• ot the New 
Deal,• 2&) • 
.32. Lindla:Y • Wraaat Jt. • XIII. Jreemlt l!t'!!?luUAA• f1rf1i. Phag, 158 • 
390. 
IliOn eooe»U'bl.e to bua1uaa thu the Black or Perkina plana .:33 
Aa the etratesio tillle for the Unel forll8llat1on ot a bill draw 
cloaer. the YariOila Cl'OUPII reoosnised nat the Prea14ent had created a 
oollf\uliq eituation 1t7 avthoriz1D& a aumber ot people to do the ••• 
Job. · Mallaaae Perltiu cleiM<l a lte:r role in brlneins the two principal 
arovpe toaether. Sbe had been wrkill$ with a calliut o_,_nee on a 
eu.betituta for the Bleck llill when abe leal'Ded ot the work beill6 d01l8 1t7 
Wqner all4 'bf lohnaoa ell4 'l'llaWll• She wut to the President aD4 eaid1 
• .,..,_11 u4 IMllllaone alee ere 4olnc thia, au I wcvl4 like 
to lmOv 1lb7 no oell:l.net Maller ie 1D on it.• The Pree14ent 
aeeu.red • that he lmew ao IIIDre ell011t it than I 414, but 
while I •• there he called 'IUawll eo4 ee14 that if •11.7 
IIOVP we at work on u rntrall plu or bill, he VOill4 like 
to haft • eit 1D on the aut -una. 
I Wilt to en ottloe oa en upper floor ot the t'reea\11'7 Depart-
••t bu114iua where 'l'qwll eD4 lohlleon had been worltinc for 
WMU vader • mtud p1edp ot eaoreoy. 'fv&wll and Zohlaeon 
wn aDJ"hiq but pleeaed to eee •. I '111'18 the ODl7 callir»t 
ottieer who ba4 been there. Sia" the Prea14ellt lmev aoth· 
iDa abolit their Pl'OJI'IIIIo I iae1ete4 u.pon aetttac e0118 lntor.-
un. 'l'laq trle4 to throw • ott vi th lerse talk and I sot 
onl:r the be.nat ouUlae. 1'he • .._ ee.-4 to have a soo4 
•liT aOUII4 eleaata • ancl I fe:l,t that it aisht •rit oonaider-
atlon it the Black llill o01114 aot lie .-11484. 
Later, 'llbea 'l'qwll 08D8 to lit' office, I aakad hllrl, •Hna yCN 
89ft' talked with •IIFliGdr at the lrooldnp Inatitutioa?• •o.zo-
tef.Dl:r aot,• he nplle4. •'l'lae Prea14ant asked • to explore 
the whole euliJeot .• 'fl.lawll tOOic that ae author:l.zatiOil to flO 
ahead. Tbe Preeidellt t~t he we •rel:r lllv .. Uaatin& •-
14eaa. At the earliest 01111 •uau:r I reported to the Preal• 
4ellt that ho falrl;r oaapl.eta plana were lle1nc EPped out -
oae b;y Wecur ad laCIObateS.. the other 1t7 T\lc'lllll aad J'ohlleoa. 
That' 'both rntft 011 the l4ea ot auptll4f.D& the efteet of aQU• 
UWtt laW f.D NtUl'll fOr .... tal'J' &.pi81?'1Dt tl,r 1D4uetr1ea for 
33· Liak, Arthur s •• •rrtue lptgh, ~1. 
fair lllllllfeUUoa, ~- wae le.,.la, and .xtaa hO\U'II. 
I \014 him tha1i 1ihe plau wn on Yery clittennt and \loth 
he4 appa~tlr sottea aroua4 eenatltutional 4itticult1ea. 
The Prea14ft11 aake4 Bau7 Vlall.&oe and • to aet the two 
jp'Wlla_Joetther. That ,.. allftap4 an4 1ihe OOQtenea Mt 
4a11¥·34 
Maclule Parklna UDAOilbtedly helped to proaota ooopentioa 'bet-• 
11ha Wasur an4 1oluuloa P'OilJII• ...,_..heleu, the e.,.nte 'Which naultect 
in the final ctrafUns 1'oll.ow4 a JlllUera auttiolantl.y t'lllllilur to Rooe· 
a Fl r t.r or people to tha - tau, endi.D6 the initial contuaf.on by 
iaetruotlns the .,.rioue aut.sneea to set tQsether an4 came up vith a 
bUl.JS Ia the oaaa ot the .IRA, the ·-1 OCliiiPl'OIIIiae aaasion at the 
lihUe Houe• ,.. aaUecta tba Prea14aat oftll:rect thoaa pnaant to look 
'"mall.,.. b a :rooa and - wt with a btu.36 
MoblNtrso lolt11801il, lfacAar, Dielduon, 'Jiuawell, Maclule li'erld.na, and 
Diraotor ot the 8ladpt Levi8 Dcuala• Mt b the latter•• ot't1ee. lobUOD 
and *par, the Senator ltelllfl aeo0DIIe4 by Df.oltinaon, arpad O'rar tha 118r• 
Ua ot their nepeaUYe 1111U..3? W.per and sat ot 1ihe Acllll1nlatraUon 
crouP felt tbet 1ndue11ry ahou14 ~para ita ~ occtea, diaoiplinillfl recal• 
citftllta itaelt1 1oluulon stOOd tor &Ofti'IIIISDt oo4H acoOIIQilllniecl by a 
34· Parkiu, Fran ... , 211& Br:er=U l.IIU• 199· 
lS• Sohleatnser, Al'lltnu' M., 7r., oe±sat on adclreaa by Proteaaor Frank 
1814111, ADDUal MlleUIIflo .AMI'loaa Hiatorioal AaaoelatiOD, llev Yorlt 
CUJo DeowbeT, 1954, felt that the avkwrctnua ot tbla method wa 
Cltfnt by the quality ot the· ,..educt which -rpcl fi'Cllll a OGmpeti• 
Uoa I.D JAeaa, 
:;6. Mol4W 1 Ra7111DD4, At!g SUM Jvg, 18<). 
3?· Mole)' • .,...,...., Wtr sa- !eep,18,S. 
.392· 
Uccm'IU lloeuiac JOWl' • a 11111 v111b tMth ia 1t tor tbe w1n diad· 
pl.illiR& ot ~Uw ldaorutu.38 ,....,. iuiaUd. oa protaaUCIIl tor 
MUeaUw llllrpiaiR&• Aa JIAM clelepUoa appoalo4 to RGooevalt to 
I'M1M the lallor HOUOil 4raaUoalll' 1 he rotaft'Od tha to the clraftlDC 
_,_, .. , 'llbioh 'QIIcler Vapor'• iatluoaoa, retuao4 to •lat the requeato4 
ou ..... 39 1ob11801l w.a apperaatq 1114lttarent to tba aubjeot ot aollecUw 
llar .. illill&· 40 
Initial aza ata 4i4 DOt 4ela7 the tiaal dratt1ac ot a bill. lob&-
.. raoeUo4a 
Wltbout 41ttioultr • or at loeat .uab 4itt1oultr • albeit 
... allabt ldna4erataii41R811 at the wtMt, which vera 
I'NOlw4 -, Ita 'l'llawllo w - wt in a_ tav 481• vUh a 
411 at Clll 'llhto!l w. eoul4 all ..,.. .... .U 
Attel' hia CC~Dtributloa to·~ at the early aaadona, 'rucwll, aloR& 
v1 th MIU. l'erlctna aD4 Dioktnaoa, 4roppe4 out due to tbe d-114• ot tbair 
adllilliatreUw poaUiout Wapar, 1o11u011., !tio!lbera. all4 n...•slaa did the 
•ia Job ot vrltlaco Jlaualaa lceaptac the Prea1deat ioto1'1184 ot their pro-
sra••·li2 
In ita tiDal tora tbe lllJIA, vh1cb w.a preaaato4 to Cc:~a.~rre•• • MaT 
1.3, w.a a ..rpr ot tho ZohuCIIl all4 -....r-D1oktnaoa plana.43 Ita oliJeoUwa 
won -k all4 a li¥111& ,... tor ~tlor. CoUll aovamlD& pro41actioa, 
pr1ou, &114 ,.... wre t. 'be draa "P 11r .-t.Ueea repnaauU»e ...... 
••t. ~Mr aD4 the publte. s.cu .. .,. auamated labor'. rtpt to 
orpwa aa4 barpia eol~et1ftl.J', lui~~eaa, labor, a114 the a4ainiatn• 
_,,on pre-ted a aol14 troat kf• 0011cnu in auppOrt ot the bill. Oa 
1WM ll•• 1933, the h'NS.a.JR atcu4 the .. tioaal lnd.utrial l'&OO....l7 Aet 
(Cbp. ,., ~ .... 19,5). 
'fS.Ua II ot tba liD An a,_op&"iated S3o300oOOO,OOO tor public 
'lf!DI'IIa. .Anlnlr Llllk ntarn« to '1'i111a II aa a ·~at ainta• alldS.UOI\,44 
Ja 01\0 rn. ot ratar.aoe Link •• 001'1111Ct 1 the 1nolW110D of a publ1o-
VOI'ka Netlon wa ia part a taotiaal .unnr, concei'N4 prlr.r1l7 b:r 
Mol.,, to ueun paaaqa ot the 11111. L1nk'a oOI\oluaion did not taka 
oeopanUOI\ a114 public WJ'ka Wlioh -lev Dealara, eapeciall7 1ohu01\ 
all4 '1'tlpell, ~. Ia tbtl allll, the allllbiatntift atn&eture enatecl 
t. •1'1'7 out tM JJD Aet a1Utate4 apiaat an attaetin tuaotlonal re~­
Uonahlp. 
Seonta1'7 hrkiu naalla4 tbat at tint ~~either tha 1ohnaoa nor 
the Waper pogpa illollll1a4 HJ P11""'1•1• tor public vor.U, W!1oh th., both 
f&Yoi'H, 1a their JDU. pleaaa 
In the ....,_11-Johaaoa plan, then wa a Uaitad ratenaca to 
the .UJ&ft. 'fbtlir 14aa .. to ua ~ltlie worlca aa a •tho4 
ot 4elitleretal¥ at1allatina a partlouhr pbaae ot 1114uatrial 
44• Llnko Al'tlnlr 8., trriep ... :;91. 
aoUYi\7 at a PIII'Uoular u... It the adsliniatrdore wra 
pei'II1Ue4 to allooate a oeNin _, ot pu'blio-worka 
.. ..,. ho coul4 araato «-114 tor tho pro4uat ot a aonaia 
lauiaa lodw11117 or lift _,lo,.nt in a apeoitio looalit;r. 
It ,.. a raatriate4 •:r•t• vhitll, •• Tucvell all4 Johuon 
aplatne4, voul.4 pt'OMbl¥ Dllftl' tie uee4 or uee4 oo ..... rl:r 
aa to •• ao raal 4eMD4a u.poa p&IIUc upen4Uurao. 'l'hio 
'ftl'7 lilllite4 uoe ot public worlla attracted Doucla• to thia 
Pl'OiftiD• With the Prea14etd •a lllNains I ata1'11e4 to traaa-
tom the uopr publ1o worlal JII'OCftll in tho 'l'upell•Jobaaon 
plan lato a raal publia 1110%'b. PJ'OSI'IIII• I\ we DO\ 4ittiou1t 
to aoll the i4oa to thea, ,...tor ..,.._r ha4 no ob,jeouoa.4S 
Madllle hl'lclu' nteroaco to the talluro ot Johnaon aa4 TuawJ,1 to 
obJeat to an ozpall4e4 publie•wol'k8 ,..._. 1114toete4 that; the 1imiW 
aeturo ot the Jllblio•WOI'ka proYitlilllll in theil' initial 4J:'atta wa t;he ronlt 
Ott a opeoitio rather than a pDOnl o...-rn. Johuon cou14el'e4 ,publio-
worka *' auaaUal pan of the .......... PS'08ftlll apeoitia applioaUoaa ot 
J11'blio•wol'k8 ha4e would roYift oap.1ta1-coou 1nduatriee.46 In addition 
to aQfOI"tlll(l Jobaoon'a 14ea, ~11 hat ul'pil the Proa14ent atnoe 1932 
to OOM out tor a seneral publlo•llltr'ka JII'08ftll with an appt'Opr1atton ot 
$,5,000,GCIO,OOO. 47 Secratarr Jlerklu naturally eno0Wltere4 no objeotl-
bJ' 'l'\a~Wll to an upended publio-woztca Pl'OiftiDo 
The inoluoion ot public wol'k8 .. a tactical IIIOY8 appeere to heft 
M8ll tbe roault ct Molar'• o_.el. X. earl;r March, 1933· ill hie role aa 
Ua1aoa betwea the Wbite Houe aJIIl Cona'ea•, he dilled with Senatore La 
follette and Ooat:lpa and 'l'ucwllo 'the two S.natora taYOI'e4 public vorka 
ae all illtesral pen ct raliet politlf'• Hanna tailed to set a publio•vol'k8 
~: Jlerkiaa, Fruoea. na Be"mlt .1.1111· 271. Sohlealnpr, Artbv M., lr., -tile liM :lt.ID4ra4 Deye of the Hew Deal,• 
292. 
Molar, i!ar11Dn4• mer st.ua Xgg, 17311· 
liUl thl"WWh the '••4ok CloAaaN, 'her WGildere4 whethu aad hov RooM· 
'Mlt o01ll4 be peNllda4 11o back noh a bill. They lalew 11ha11 the Pnai4ea 
,.. l":ry ot the arau-nta tor publio wru. MoleJ N14 there 111&ht be 
lepalaUoa 011 1114uatr1al ralat1ou in the aPrilll• Rooanelt lli&ht acne 
to Ua the two topthar. The Saaaton 4eo14ad to adopt the courn whioh 
Mole1 ..,. ...... .\& 
BloaaveU, tillo had rapeat..U, ah1a4 avq fi'OIII Tuawll'a proponl 
tor a $,5,ooo,ooo.ooo Jlllblio-worka 11111, 414 not then aubaortbe to the 
,...prill1111 theory. MoleJ, who, vlth Ralph Robey, oauUoned the Prea14eat 
apiaat JIIIIIP-pl"iat.lll, kept 111 tov.Gh with La J'ollatta, while relllin41111 
Jlooaaftlt that aothina apecitio bad liMa done on public worka. Rooae'nllt 
qraa4 to 81ltlaa ;publ1o worka, 111 hie ••-•• oa. relief to Coa.areu 011. 
Jlanll 21. Ult1111teq, •• Molay hell ....-11 tora...a, public worlut (about 
1111118 JlooHvel\ •• 1n41ffft'81ltl at haan) aa4 the 1n4uetrial WOOftl"J' 
plea (about! which aca laa4111i a:peoeota 1a the Seaate ot public woru, 
aa4 aaUti'Ut Suaton, wre aot aatbuiaatlc) wre oomblnad allcl carried 
eaob other throap. Mo:t.J reaeoDad that the $3,JOO,OOO,OOO approprlatloa 
ot MaJ, 1933, rapraaeatad e ~· ilet,...n the $900,000,000 vhioh 
Hooftr oov.l4 fill4 111 ueah1 projeota aa4 the $5,,500,000,000 auap•* by 
'l'lapell al!.d othera, "' 
.TohlUIOil aaaulll4 that pubUo. worlra, which could reviYe oapltal-:eood• 
)'J6. 
ta4uatrlea, ea4 OOilea Cit fair ooapeUUon, vh1ob would CIOiltrol the pl'Oibao-
tion ell4 41etr1but1oa ot CICI-..n • .-., -ld &loth be 1a hia obarae. 
Be 414 an pt hie vtah. A hiatcl'laa l'llferncl to 1ohUoa aa e • atn~~&e, 
Yid4, u4 ernaUJI& ff.aun• vboae "4r1Yl1J8 peNoaal1t7 had roused ala-
ciYtap.•SO n •• later 1'8YMle4 .that 1<lhaaoa•e 4l':lllld~~& habits •1ebft 
hMYi~ ia Roea..,.u•a deo1a1oa to 41Y14e .lll'll elld pubU.o worn betwaea 
1ob8oa aa4 Harold Iokea.Sl J'ohll&OA we 41-784 that the two pba- ot 
the aD Aot '110Ul4 aot be a4a1a1atax.4 11D4or the P8l'BOilal waioa vhiob he 
oeaa1~1'84 eaaeatial to o001"41•Uoa. Seonte17 Perltiaa ia on41te4 vttb 
haYlJI& pel'8Wl4e4 1ohll&Oil Dot to reatp.52 It 1• aot oartain that J'ohuoa, 
ea head ot both tile IIIU. all4 pullllo worlta, 00\114 haYO effeotiYO~ illple-
•ne4 the Use Cit ats.latlq oa,pltel-coocta 11l4uatr1.. in apeoitlo oaaea · 
tlll'ollab allooaUoaa of publlo-wrlta tuMa. It 414 tum out that Ioltaa, 
who we ooanne4 vtth pntYentu.l .-ft end oOl'l'Uptioa, &Pftt t\IJI4a too 
alcNl.r for ilh• 110 heft u s-tlate atfeot on reOOYel7 or to proy14e the 
ooo1'41aation vttb IIIU. whioh 1ob118011 llad t.atea4e4.S3 
Wh• 'fupeU be- the 1dllpplac•H7 for the RooeeYelt Hlltaiatn• 
uon, hia datnoton e11tl'1bu.W Ilia a liolatar, decieiYO role in the f-.a-
,50. Sohleat.apr, Arllhur M., J'r., •tbe rtnt a.a4ft4 Daya Cit the Mev 0..1,• 
29l-f2. 
51. Perkiu, JnMN, A44reea, a-1 Meettns, Alllerioll Htatorioal aaoot-
aua, lfev TOrk Clt7, llellrUIZ'o 19,54. 
,52. Soblealqer, Arllbur M., 1r., "'fbe Fint. Hundre4 Daya ot the .. v ne.l,• 
292· 
53• Sobleaia,pr, Arthur M., 1r., "!he h.nt llmdre4 Da:ra of the Jlev Deal,• 
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the J"Naldeat 1 Jraat ooaall4e4 that a ,roup VI'Ote the blll, •wt it hail to 
be 1a the b .. 4 ot ou aa• -- .,.,..u . .S4 Blair Bolles t.mplieil that 'l'ua-
wll ba4 tiael autboritJa • ••• the W.tional Induetrt.el Reooveey Act 
ws act sent to Ccmanes UDtil Batcl\l OIIJ 'l'uavell had ada his crf.Uoal 
-aiadladlone ot the text.•55 
'l'be dete.ila ot the authOI'shf.p ot the NIRA 414 not JuetitJ tha 
.... ruona ot leat and Bol1H. Tlaen is no ooatra41ction in the coaelu-
1._ ... and M41ator, yet •• not neponaf.llle tor the •••ure in-. 
'l'he liRA plea repneenteil U.O.t ent1rel7 the influence all4 
14ee1 ot 1tq -.lues •a. '!!Ia shan ot the Braf.a '1'1'\1811 
t.a lts pate:raltJ we lllaoaoopf.Oa the ahara ot the Che'lhar 
fit 0GIIIe1'418 and 011bar -.t.aaes 111lena1rs we praftll!lt•nt.S6 
It, •• lint •1ntalu4, 1mA fitW la with icl.aaa in Tuavell'a wrUinae, 
the ooino14eaoe we the neult ot ~111a atrikina 1 responaf.Ye cbol\l 
The taf.lun ot the IRA to1le.a4 a taailiar pattern in the biator,r 
ot &OYe:nlaOilt r.aulat017 apnof. .. ia the Unite~~ States -- • aeotor ot tile 
naulateil coatrelle4 tile ft&\llatina a4alaietrat1on. Tho portion ot the 
bueinese ooa.mlty, prillllrUy ._11 1tue1MBII, 'Which 414 a011 enj07 repr.-
aeatatt.oo 1n the •wtu• &rOUP potaeted apt.aet •obiutiona within the 
~. 
.55· 
.56· 
X.t, Pnak R., Yi!hftt cu!l'fM. (New York, WUliaa Morrow, 1934) 4J-4li.• 
JoUee, Blair, ....... tMIIn ct the ~t.anten,• .U•P "'ESMI'Y• Vol • 
39 .... 15:3. tlitptelllbar, 1936. e, . 
J'lJU, 1olla '1'., 'WhOM Cbil4 Is JIJ!At,• Htrpu•p llnpd!!f• Septeallar, 
1934, J94, of.W f.n Pal'IIOlHo Mllurioe, bnwll U loytr1l (N- Yerk, 
John wu.,, 1935) 28'-• 
)98. 
liRA \17 the ..-u ot lup OGI!J&aUou. Later, 'IIbera lila buatDeN bepra 
to 1oee oonJ'Ol ,._the 1u14e. it ~ to )11lbl1o oppoet.ttoa to the 
liRA. 
'1M Jll4 fi.N4 tbe t01'11Ha~e tut ot nooao11U& 0CIIItl1ne besides 
theee lletwea tbe U ••fatnUoa u4 -~ llutDeN all4 betweea lar&e cor-
pozaUGU u4 .. u llat. .... 'IU ftllaflioaeh1p lletweea the rete ot in-
onue ot llllllutnal prt. ... (liRA) u4 the nte ot iaa'eeae ot qrt.cultural 
Pl'l ... (AAA) ,.. a aoune ot tn.Uoa. Atttiii»U to ~lraete l!UU. policies 
with the )11lli11.-WI'Ial Jll'l41ft18 iln'Olw& a o1uh betweea two ot Roon'I'Olt •a 
.. t .. l.cJ:rhlallll tCI&"'ettal. dlda1a11•W2w• Bl8h .JohDIIoa aD4 Harol4 Ickes. 
The ,..t.uou •t.oh '1\aaWU ••• a ia tbe .. nti'Oftftliea aria1116 out ot 
liRA poltar n4 afn••setaUoa Wutntet his oou1at .. t adheftDce to 
oenat.a aaoll4lllio 1..... Attaob 1111 te penou.UUea 01' qeaot.ea 414 aot 
U.end.ae hil optUou. Tlle 7"'116WlaMil 414 aot e'llue theiJ' atateste 
JOIJltla ia tU 11M '-llilteq. At tiftto _, bu1DI88 &I'OU,. wa aut• 
t1et.eatq IIIMMII \Jr the 4epz aut.OD te &eYote their atteatlOD to aett1116 
the u• 1'9 pf.Ds apia Oil.., Ull1e'MIIllla buis. Aa the 4eoUae bal11e4, 
llu118aa telt 41011t14at ellOUIIa to l'ftura to the 111-Uoa ot epecSal 
t.atltl'8ltte thi'DU&Il a JUWc .... .., oaoh u the lOU.. S1aoe adllt.rliatftUOil 
ot the liRA NHiltS.lq tGCik the tOftl ot bwliaeae Hlt-&OYera1811to the 
Mehnls mot the~ 1l8lll4 WI'Jt oa11 10 loDe •• • HllM ot _r....., 
pve the JU1111e t.atereat a ehaaN te vt.a Ollt O't'er epaeSal 1ntereate.57 
Aa OGII4t.Uou lllplo•l4• ~ bwlhetwn who atatfecl tu IUIA tn4114 aat\11"-
•UJ' to rMOlYa &oulltll 1a taft~' ot bui'llfletl the tralle ..... oet.auon tht!Ort 
plqlt4 lrato ~ lilallU ot tu l.ar• otWJ!01&UOil8, vh1ah, u4er ezeapUon 
tna the nU•tnat l.aw, pulllt.aS, lllllvlp4. to thell' OVA a4ftllltqe, in 
the oua ...,., fl&ftiou ot Jl"iae4ix1ac aDd. the a .. s, at ot p1'04Uot1on 
quotae.SS 
AltiNI' s. l.iak ._l'tn4 tile -....ft.ta the liRA attorta4 l'lwl1ne"' 
Pl'i• ... -.ututt.oa (tile .,. Via4 t.a .,.t.a to claeoura .. Olltrt.Pt pnee 
• 
tixUi)e pro4\lot1ola Olllltl'Ol.ao the Olltl.aWI'J' ot au.tp4l,y Wltdr or 11UUoc, 
•• a Uoa. tRia tu eaUtnat l.aw, au tbe riaht ot aelt..,oN:t sat tiU'OIItib 
4I04u a411lraS.tas'a4 br eelle autllo&'lU• oGIIQ!Oaecl ot 11a4a .. aaoet.aUoc ottl• 
elala ftJI&IRUIIC l.aqe oorpoaUOIIIo Bi& Wal'llflet app1'0Ya4 ot "lt• 
ft&lllatlca eo 1caa u l\ hl4 • tn1e llad.. When lalla..,. orpnize4 hie OVA 
aWt ot ezpu11a lif' tlla e:prJ.aa ot 19~· he tOliM. 11hlt the oo4ea 11llll'tlda-
ata4 aaat.ut -u JJI'I*lean. 'ftser o ehlDa4 bUterlJ' apiaat bl&-.,.,_ 
eo11e11 u Jebll..,. .... w ¢1111 Vi til the tnlle ... aoet.aUca • iatUtaton' ot 
hie .... .,)9 
"*••• elao becMI etllllroU.a4 la a 4iaqnessnt With ha oU hlul 
aD4 nether knoll U..tple, Oelir81 M. Peek, adldatatra'\or ot the AAA· 
Pei'IOIIIIel ot the USDA. all4 the AA4 auerte4 11bat the pr1eea ot in4\latrlal 
~·· - ot vhloh t.-n Jllliii'CibUe4, '"'" rietna teeter thaa tana 
Sl• Sft)Aaiaael't ArthV M., 1r., •ttae Fin11 Hwa4re4 De7a ot the Jrev Dealt" 
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,. s.su. Al"hlll' s •• tss'1MP D , ... .391-93• 
111'1.... WI:IUe lobaloa auol'fM J'eek. llallaoe, and TqwU ot u,y :rupon-
albUitt tOI' ~ allec~Da \bat tH liRA ~ ,.. preJu41oial to 
aarteultue. he •lata1M4 that the iMI'HH ia the prl- or ti~aiabad 
&oo4a will u o.enU. ..0. eot\oA 810ft~~ ,.. laqelJ' Cb&e to fal'lll-relief 
.. Mli'M all4 aot to the IIIA-aJV 711114 laonaH8 ot •4iqnoet\J.ll.y loV" 
....... 60 
.Jobuoa Melle the poaiUGDo " tile 1114418 ot 193.3• that the rate ot 
IUNaH ot lll4t&atrial prloea ~a akpplDa4f 1a OJ'4er that lD4\ls• 
tl'ial pri ... llf.P\ tatleh Q vith tara lll'iHao tlhiob, a\ the OUtHt or the 
Bew llealo 1'0H tutar tUa tllou or •• otber 8l"'OIP• :Peele and Tqwel.l1 
ftlltiiiiiU poalUoa ot tara pri ... -.utia4 their 1altial •purt, 4eel1a-
iltc to p •lea& 1114atlaltell' Wltll .u.t JIII'Uaau, i'Mk all4 'fuewll u14, 
11¥ .U 8114 ot 1933• that atual ntoa ot laoi'HH -u nov l:!e fair -
eteaMo•a -'' oall7 a01d14. 61 
l't!• oa noaUecl tH.t lilt ,.. aUqe4 to ba'ft W f1sbte 1ft 1933 vlth 
...,. JM!Oflat Olllalnp. Morpatllft, Roper, x..vta Do01al••• Vallaoe, &114 Tuc• 
wllJ he JIDte4 that 'up to tile .,.17 eM AO uakind WQ3 Wl8 8'fel' l*Bae4o•6l 
Ill 0' llU88 08 Ilia eoatroftnlN o .J-... epeaitlaalll' :r.fanwcl to \ha 
VSDAI • ... elthCIUIJa ifllll7 VeJJ.aea aD4 B4lll '!\iplll prollalJlJ' 414 pot qne 
vlth v oa ... quaaUoaa ot JI011417• u ,.. ...,.r the wlt.JNt ot q\IIU'ftl. 
60. z ....... ..... JU. .... "'" ~ Jalll ... ,... 291. 
61. S.. below, CbaJ!Uir X, SeoUaa, •ttae .tar1Qltu:ral M.Juat.nt AdallliatN• 
tloa •••• • · 
62. zevoa • ._. D& JU.ta •ca• n.Jalll EArth, 367. 
401 • 
.reen"l•a rallletuoe to a1111e to the MJIU,'aUoa ot the 11:14uetrial 
u4 pabllo•WWka tut\lftl ot the JID An •'-' f~ hla dea1re to ooor-
4laate tU two ant.nUea. Bt t.Dt..._ to plaee or4era tor hMV •ebilleey 
tor pablle VOI'ka atraW~loellr • ~tarllla la4Witrial operatloaa 'Which 
Uea owW oaq be a •ttel' ot .-aJ. P&Mo DOt epeo1t1o allOGatloaa • 
.,Mel JlcllaJ'o Wile -'nlaa hi.IIHlt tor tala talli.IN to •• ..rtalD ehort-
1 1,.. S.a tile HIR AAI1\o eoul4 aav that be taa4 \Ieee eoneet 1a 4iaapeellll 
with REI.IIftlt'e eUV111f111oa that loiiM aiMI lolmaoa ouuld work th11118 CMt. 
•VIIIlt bapJUado• MD14W o JaW, •t.a that 1Citleeoa *"'M al\ea4 al.._..hel' 
Uo tNt ,.. IUee ...- at a ...u.•a •••'61. 
-., espr1eeet rearM at Ilia talltara to ... an4 pi'Oteat the "71 :• 
ld ........ ot Ifill Dot ul lODe na po11o1u iD the IIllA. 65 MDJ,ey 11M 
lllasl.SIIII al:loat e aitueUoa vhiala al.ao 41atw:olle4 'l'Upall. haa the at&IMI• 
pot.at ot 'lu&WU•• ......te • ....,.,. tile liRA •• uderteklaa uw tllaetieaa 
wlthGilt ailatWita lu111Wt1oaa1 • ...,.-.. re171111 1n the -rcUOf oa llael• 
..., Hlt•pfft et witW ear eoataiDllll trulevork tor tbe ~en1• 
ot tbe JU.IIl1o t.atanat. Aa14a tn. a nienue to a •npn01111atlft llolaft,• 
fllcWll 414 aot ele...,.te oa tlle·4aalft4 lutltuUoaal eattilllo whlolae 1t 
402. 
Ia ur•Jio ~ haft l"!!qllil'll4 the •PHial tn1ai.q. oatalde ot tbe 
appotaUft Halla. ot pel'IO&IIIel t 'ad With a bt.p - of tile p~~enl 
llateaat ae lllltll u a th0l"0118b ao'U'J dp ot llu1aau. 1olmaoa tOWIII\ him-
wltan. 
U the Nhlt flit hill Ole penruliflr'o .f ... aaOD apJiiMftl UMGDeOlowal¥ to 
bllft -..4 towrde 4iotdonhlp. Be ._., Wider OOYentp aa4 atrt!lter 
...... at tUoaeh OOHOiOD at a ilt.. ·- ntYiYi.q bu1M .. d =tat 
dQIIIIf MM}4MI 8WJ!t 1ollMoa'a e4lilldlliatfttlft p.roblna Me- iatolu• 
able. Jus- 11-t•Uilll ot tJae liRA ln• 11 UlDI •tile halfw,: boue to 
tl&e .. ,,.... .. natoa• .. the othltl' haa4o 1t JIRA. 4eo1a1ou -t aptut 
llulMMt a pollUoal atOl'll -a aUbu •O'fel"tbl'ow IGIA or oauae the rJII"• 
~Doeeftlt appo1Dt4MI Cla~ ~·•• •• bed ot a lfat1011al Reecqq 
RlmAw 1eut tdlllb •• '«:! atal,y .._ polloi .. aliA probleM ot the JIRl. Danow 
11auet a npan la tdllcth l&e p11lorUcl the JIIA tor ita 41awllliaatory 'la-
buiaeel ...... 1oblteOD, who W lien ti&hU.._ tile abuaea J:llar:NV 4epl.OI'84, 
no~. A lfatlollal latuatrlal Rlll!lmiJF llea'l'll, 1nolu&1.._ npn .. BtaUwa 
ot •••1 et, lebor, ellll the plltlle pwpanll to O'lerbaul the liN. oo4u; 
...... c:oess-.t.oael aPJC""el, Nq\llnll keeue the t-7Ml' tel'll ot the 
liD Aet - e1MN11 to apln, OGDl4 \Ia obte1M4, the 81Qtl'RRI OOIIl't d.eelared 
... JRA WatlOUUtutioeel - Jfq 25, 19JS•67 'fM OOU't'e UReDi!IIDile cleei• 
elea nls....4 t!MI edat.atetnUon ot aa UPI'Ofttellle buclea. 
Ill hia role ee JU.lllioiet TucwU OOGee1oael11 o-.tecl on the 
liN.. DU'lD& tu lllv J)al pel'locl !ae U.O prl'Ntelr voioecl oplRiORe on the 
IIQe a UtUe too ta'I'Ol'ftlllea• tiM! .. .._., 111 queeUon eetuaUV polatecl 
otat thet t!ae trut.U'tll IDNiM ot the RHbe.U. tor eoeial eoatrol W.f.oh 
tile 11M Jl'ft14414 tesntecl • the 14ee1e ot lte dlalRiatnton68 - eapeot.• 
llllr Sa nev ot the a\leeaee ot illeti .. Uoaelbecl P!'Oteotion ot tile .,..l'a). ia....... fo 'I."U8Wll- -tiOR of .... JIRA c114 DOt felJWMD11 all aee p 
U 't(~l t 1a ltMltl JIRA PII ... IA p ')ztttu tor the aohiel at of 
.... wlo \laleRMo He acloptd e l'ftftlieUe l'P11her thea ea opUmiatie ani-
_.. tow1't tu liRA ... he po1Uec1 on thet eohie' ,., wul4 ..,, ... 
tbi'O\Iih IQPI'ialatatloaa 
'Ala aew lqlelatloa to \IN1I 441aville4 ta ·- aucb tft1'lll 
u tiiJ.a - u a llbe'ltMr fflr' IIQel'iMat ar&4 reaftU'tlh, for 
, ......... eac1 leaataa-'f 
'flllwll'• ••••au 41.1elanll aa ••r••••• ot the pittella lDto 11111oh 
liMa lllkiDC vitb tbe 141e ot tin4SII& a deTiea with lllhloh to exploit the 
)illlblio. Sptoulatl..,. pro4wlere WN14 attapt to uae the oo4aa aa a 1118ana 
ot CMtlaviDa the Jc1D4 ot oom,.'UUOD lllhleh tatertenf. with the priaoiple 
ot l.iat.tiq PI'04\I.OUGD - a priaoiplA wt&ich 'l'qwU 4eplore4.70 Ill 'l'Us• 
We baft aot 00. to the •114 ot a Jl:riod ot Pl'Op'IU 111bi0h 
oalllt tot: Ntl'lla......, • ••• lllbiDCo ell4 boal'41q our ptu 
qdMt I ,..,.......tl'ia.. ~. 'le a&llt 41YCU OllrellTaa 
M M'llliaiac ... •J&IliU., l'llaour ... an4 eaJ&liiUiUtt• A.._.,. .. a se1a .... ._Sa t4•• all4 taau-.uou.n 
TII&WJ.1 aav ill the liRA the ,...UI111t7 ot OftlltiJIC •a bula tor 
the IIIM£11 It ot panlluiq powzo, JII'M'UlCil ot which can release the 
pottMJ.alltiea ot ftat ]ll'CI41K11'1& &QV.1JIIIIIIt••72 Ha a4hen4 in the taaa ot 
tile lltA to llu 011181neat ..,.. •• s. oa JUI'Chadll& powr. Ha illaietlll thet 
pntentoa ot the ulUate lFTFU'• vlao ,.. •eaaaattaU, det-1118" 
vt\hollt tiMI aart'laaa ot acmtnmnt, ba4 to aco..,.ftJ' the laplizlll eltllll• 
Mtloo bf lluailleaa ot cieataotlve ._.uuoa. Protect:tcm ot the coDIIUmll'o 
TII&WU 4eolaN4o wa "" JuM tozo tM ocaa sr•a •*• BWttalnlll purobaaiq 
powr wa •-tiel to the bea1,th ot tlu111N8.7.3 
'l'he U, to OONIUMJ' PI'OU&tiMao fllcwll 1111ateill84, waa rtpl'OWI17 
l.cNINf prt .... 74 He 'be1141ft4 tbat ..,..i• eoonoaso ~~~t ~4 an 
reeult hall the ti'II41Uoael eapite11at-latloa' praoUoe of wae illareaHa 
70• ~U, R. G., •.-.rtea '1'akea Ha14 ot Ita DeaU-.r,• 2~..0,3. 
71• TqweU, R. O., •qerloa '!'aDa BDl4 ot Da DeniDTo" 2,58. 
72• TII&WUo R. o •• •A~Jtrs.ea Tlllrea JioU ot Ita· Daatlll.r.• 2,59-&o. 
73• '1'\1pll11, 11. o., •-.noa 1'ek68 Ho14 ot Ita Daatlll.r,• 26.3-'l· 
74• 'hpell, R. o., •-.rt• '!'aUa Bold 'ot Ita Daatlll.ro" 262. 
••en •••SeA lJf prtoe t...,......TJ Be 1WJeaH4 ... -.17 --• u a 
•N1U11te twa eou4 prf.oe PI'¥•' 
A ....... llliiiiiDinary W.U haa Ita place la the new 
HliD'll w are tZ01hl& to .,_._, lntt u canaot tan 
the plaae ot ho~~Nt _.jutrreat thl'OU(!h the • ....., 
-· ot )lri.Gell • ..,. 
'fiiBw1l lllaiate4 that ill oou14eri.D& ....._17 poUq, ODe hacl to consider 
IM,..thl& etf1oleur &a prGibaoUCIIlt tettmolo&ioal plae had to be trana-
laMA lato larpr laocaN ffW t..-n aa4 wol"'rera aa4 a proareaalve lower-
ill& ot tile prtoe leftl.T7 II «eplen4 the paratoz 'IIIIich hat preYalle4 in 
the ,..,. AlOIIfl with 1owr oona I'Ualtilli tl'CIII aototttle •••srmnt 
wat the 4e'f'laia& ot 0111Dn pe1'fMt W7• ot ooatroU1D& aa4 ~~~aintalalD& 
pr~. ... , ......... ~~- tor a llf.PU .~ ot li'f'i~~& •• ottan 
lJf tll.a ••zr~pUoa ot tha ptu tv a •.-11 IJ.'OIIP la ta•oret OOiltrollhl& 
poatt1-··"' 
fllpiU oateaf.et tllat the Pl'l.....,bf.aa poaail.ttliUu ot the liRA 
eCIIUU M realiae4 thi'CUP ... uwucual -... Be expreeN4 hie •iew 
oa eCICUitttutt.CIMl OQU14ent1- to a COI!puaioaal ....stt .. 1a IOIIIleett.• 
vittl lila PI' UOil 1a 19)4 to Vl4n' SHft'-17• 
78. 
hlte OODt:rol, lt.a eflT cnw tom ot reaulattoa. 1a uaooa-
auwu ... l alF tt u 1a d'Mti'UJ', 4leG'lataat0&7o or ... 
---~ tnelftaat to the ,.u.., the leaialatun 1a tne 
Caner, z. r. (v.ottlelal <*uuw) :at JIB Rr'm (Jfav York, Silloll 
u4 Se1Na11ar, 19)4) 19· 
.,....u, R. o .. •$0wal .....,,. *"-• Adult 'HtaeaUoa Anoolatioa, 
Oh1QUO• o.toMr 29, 19!J3, lllll " ?' We•• l• 
'l'\1p~U, B. o., •Prt... all4 Dlllare,• qa41cata4 ooluaD, ill :at wue 
tor D ... ., • .so. · 
--Ut Jlo Clot "TCIU .. "" ... 1'CIU Jfatf,oa,• c-a~t AMnut 
vat.wmt~ ot .., .._.. .. , A11R uu-. '• .na.. 10,, 1935, Bill :ann 
., .•. '· . 
,...U alao ottaNil bla opla1oa that tile •4M-procua• olaun ra4e 110 
.... ullll ot, aa4 414 aot •Pill¥ ••• pnoa OODt!"'la.ao Ia tile ••· the MIA 
414 aot ._..,.. itaelt witb JUftll1ll& pzioa poliaiaa tor the protactioa 
ot tba 00111 r. lt nTl-..4 tile ol4 pae ot aaarepUq ptu. lor a 
·-u II'G'lP ta ta-.oNil .. ..,.utac poet.UIIIll.• 
It WIIQl4 be 41ttleult to 4ata ....... 'fu&wll • 1 14aaa oa tile liRA by 
oouU.tac OAl7 tile aU.pUODII Wbloll hie oritiu ••• about hie vieva 
• tllat •I"OT• rn. ~ rt.Pt ...- tiMI obu'ae that ho fa'fONil O"'IP'll· 
aloa 1.11 tile JIRA, 4lqv.lllDI bil ,....,...... with the ue ot tho tal'lll 
·~·liD· .... "JU1;Denl:llp with , .... ,,. •• 81 .... ho ocaplatna4 
tllat tHIN. 414 acrt PJ."41rt4e ._ ... pntootloa tor the ao111ue:r, pn-
..._, lat ... ata bttnle4 that bo ._.._ -.s. ... a to be naaa witbOI&t PI'Ottta. 82 
~. latralt • JOlate4 Ollt that tho altal'QIUva to lo-pri .. , hlcll• 
m.. ~~lee WI \uaU .. to MUla Jar\ ot the p!"'tita to OOIIHMftJ IMI 
Phfe:rre4 a •oot~tallJ' wiN pollq to, aootalinla taatloa.•8.3 rn. tba 
len .... th4t •rae that ,.,..u, u aa apolost.n tor tM BRA, MJiadae4 
.......... GOIUIQIIfptiOD 'beoeliH he .. ree.U, OODHft141C\ with 1 11erketl tO 
a'INion the C*tp&t ot llllluetry anil luu.re .. pltal1at p!"'tUa.•84 Oaoe apt.a 
sut ..... t; tor baariac oa p~loa tna Alailtant secretary to UD4er 
SM~~t~tary, Sellftta c-lttee oa Acrt.oulture. 1uaa 11, 193lla Tuml.l 
ltatm• 
Stet&IQIIJilt for bear~ on pz-GI80t10!1o T!well Paptrt. 
Deevaraioe, llaoal E., Qg ague "'112!'"8 (IIJv Tfli'k, Dod4, Med, 1936) 98· 
Carter, 1. 1. ('U'Doffioial Obaenel' JU 1iu PrMn• 90. 
'l'uaWlla R. o., •.u.rt.oa 'falrM Hol4 ot Ua DHUI9'•" 264. 
COI'q1 Lewia 1 Jlalll!toltp RJ. '5ri•p QepUaltp (Nn York, ecmol• 
J'ri.S., 19.34) 19.S· 
'fu&wll ,.. the tarse• ot viU.t.a t~ both exv.... 
!upltll'• prl•te eatllllataa ot tile aeeorapliabMDt.a, actual an4 
potential, ot the HM atruae4 ahoniOIIIi~~&a rather than tha poaaUtUitlea 
tor athiefl at vhloll he -14 aaturaU, point to aa a Jlllblioiat tor the 
A4111nietfttloa. Ill 1934 Ilia ftMVCih aaaiatut wrote 1 
lt wa Ra 'fllpell vhe- that the lllllla0pol1ea admitted. 
llll4er the IIIlA aact tha qa a ,. nt an to aall below tha ooat 
ot ~loa veW.4 SUI& the JOSitioa ot the eoft8UMJI' 1IIOJ'U 
innea4 ot ""•• vhU. the Sactutl'ial qat• wa troua 
l7r the ~loa ta pntlta afte:nled to the leaat eooamSo ~ ..... as 
... ,.. oPJGa&il to the liRA u lt wa 4fttte4 aa4 workall out. 
rna the ck,y the Blu lafle "111U8t ape PILiat ,.. launoha4, 
lle •• .maa that the _tllele .,entue 'llllll G'88tl11411 an eooao-
lde an4 pol1Uoal -·"' 
II 1 1nta17 ... ,..... toftHol:aW Lb141q'a repon. Ill a 11111mraa4lu?a to tu 
Prel?l-t ot Sept='a:r a. 1934t hpall aaaena4 that the mu ... af=t•t.• 
t81'84a liU taafotMte fOil.' fldJia prl ... 1D 8D 80GG '' of par1111' J'la14 Qll 
Jr ... w Oflll14 (1) JJ"aail ...._ utUnat law qaiaat 
ua•hol'1ae4 Pl'l• fixed ... (2) haft a 8U'lu ot atlthOI'l• 
uu ... tw ao•• mat ooaUOl ot -..u. .. ( llualneaa .. 
vhloh •• •Jaltla fill tiziiiC thall' ftD pr1 ... ). w Uou14 
• oa the npt tholE. 
,408. 
1'• ... .,- liRA •• laet...._ Cllal,r oa prtce-tixllll IUI4 oe 
ataf _,.. IUI4 aaxfaa hCM'II !lee J.lacJNa..,. rtc141Uee 
ta the •••• wlthOilt owi!Ntllll the •la4~u ._.,.... 
tile rf.eS4 ea4 tile tlallWI •sob 1e the heart fit GU tl'OUbla 
aov. .&a pd ... ··- rl.c14o 11heF heln to be .U,ten to 
Ma14e .. u.l. 
It wU1 be DO"" thelt 'l'u&wU aAel'M to the priaolple fit • ...., 
...U.Uoa a4 ocatl'Ol• Ia Nil Mtq au11horlH4 JI."U..fixlfli tor b\1111 
PIDAv.nloa ..Uta • .--.1• fit tkllll pr1 ... wf.thwt ooU.uioa. He wa 
._.1e11.a wUJa hill JNYiou ate._,. oa 1'Mbaoloc1•1 41mtloJIIDa11 in 
•••ni"' a .. ~_., .. Pl!'1• Jl'li u • .&a lla .. , u, 1lhD liRA 414 aot pn-
..U. autflol.e*t eoolal eonl'Ol fit ei._ ••opoJ.lae or DOil.....aaapolilll tor 
alttw<'M pro1i4Httloa fit tba ...,_.., Jlrl.oa ea4,... polloi .. wblob taU.e4 
to JI'O\Mt tbe ttW' • .._ 8hon ... , .. ,_. oapitaliiJt•laMI' cte.s ... whioll 
·! 
w,tr.-1• & the u, to ••• 11o ...U..beilll - liUI'Oba•SDc JIOVU• '1'tlcwl1 
-..a tllat tbe liRA I DUel oawaafse4 ......_loa la the eben l'U 8114 
Ia 'l'llawU'• aniolee ........... attar Mq, 193.So 1dlell the 8llplae 
COIU'1I 4eolanl tba JIU. 111100DD11ltutloulo he natfilw4 h1a Yi- CID thelt 
aentl'• Bla latar o,talou 1ltft ._.1etan with hie •rller ... ,_.. •• 
811 oaaUIAI84 to laeiet thelt watiMlOQ' NJI4ant4 the aaUtrwtt pODitloa 
obMlltta aliA NC&Uln« a .-talallll iiiRUuUoaal h'aaewol'k vhl.o11o tbi'CIUiitl 
Prioa ••a Jato Wll14 pnor14e fw OCIU I' JI."'11e0111CID aliA aqauloe fit 
1lha aua o • 'l'ha IRA, wbOH JIUDp\1.,... .,.aul lat81'Mta alluae4, wa 
87. "m.,. • .._, ~uta ._.. .. u .. SQ\..._. e. 193fh ppqnJJ.t 
l'1273• 
oa ... ,..,. Ia oc rata Gil the...,._ c.n, TucweU atete4 that ita 
4eeia1oa 414 aot :NII081\11Mo aa4 t~ntore 414 DOt nat •• 4aftlo~ta 
'fllpsU oited t1fpi:Na oa thr ti'Ut IIIIW411T?Dt tor tho porl04 1919• 
1930 h'Ca a npon 11r HM••:r•a c..t.ttee oa flMeat Soola1 TJ."'Ot4e 1 thoae 
natt.nl•• 
... a JOOI' :reul'll tor tba outatall41aa ohulploa ot .,_,.uuw 
1oUrt4ul1-. ••• 1I0M tll.e JS"Oblea 'llbS.oh 11'.\ trie4 to aolw. 
It taUed to Jt'w tt. It 4None4 to taU. Blat the pro'bloa 
-- .... 
'l'bo ii1Mlo&1ea1 OODI' ttut ot .U •ohlu pn••• •• opo:re-
tieul •e&•••••• 'llaat ._. tiiAt oricJ.aal -lllDc ot RRA.'-
othW _..,.. 6atuftlft lawi/ Wft JUn4< ftJift8a1w.V7 
Ill 1~ 'IW.e 1 n ...,...,... to iM~ u 'bolas uaa-n that tbeJ' wn 
tblt .... Pill"~ ot ..... 1 ... a1 owl.-.UGDo•90 lll19,52 he DOte4 that tha 
•lttauea ot 'buiaua .. a Uqptte1octpl nthar thaa a -.nl •tta:r.•'1 
~·· 'baelo tllOuellt • tll.e •••ha ot t•vaolow tw peUUeal oun ; 
heW. to tlla - 'baeto 11DT tor ...., tU. 4Ma4u. 
88. 
a,. 
,.. 
tuawU ooaat4on4 Pl'1M ••• Ill tho ka7 tuantoa ot .., ._..., . 
uo. 
eMaltliaUil to aaav. ooatlJMou • wide 4is11ribuUoa ot teehDolosleal 
aaiu• ~pe:r p:rtee oeat:rola ....U JII!'011eo11 the oo_:r, "'*' lihoH 
••• '• weJ.l NlDa aattonal IOCIOcato health 4epnde4. Ia ea arUele 
. pUliahed ta 1951 he .. plo~W 'Mi efteota ot pri .,.,. pr1 .... tixill6 bf 
•ffi*• •~Dto~N!e4 oc:a,patUS.OD• had ta1W by 1933 to 40 1lha ~~~ u 
eiaee 1lha ........ ,. ot CIOU'""• wf.oll lq eo cteap ta lbcliah o a 
lave had llaaa &!'IIlii up toea Qatt.'U,. all'-tiaa.'2 A·~· 414 
*" .-..1auae "•"" epee1alia1141ftne exploited tho IGIA'a aueeplf.• 
Mllt1 .. ,..._. ..... 
-.u dt4 not """'" the a4Yantaaa ot the paeaqe ot :reen to 
U.UIJ alNau Ia tho liRA. Pri'fttel,J, aa Ilea lleea ..... ti'Gil 11he be&ia• 
alac 1le ~ aut aauf.R•Uva paotioaa wlioh ctetated the Jllll'POH8 
ot tile BRA. Ia 1'lS• the 7Ml' ot 1lhe wu.•a 4..U., he 8JOU aut Pllllllol¥ 
Oil 1lha aW8e ot IRA .... , 
M 11001a •• 01&1' 11141&8111ial 1..._., atur 11he ooapl.eta 4e r:r-
alhaUoa ot 11)2!1 1 ,... ~~to pia aCIIIIIIthf.Dc ot thei:r 
1oe11 ..,..le, 11H7 ••• ....,.. . ,_a 4ateNI.ne4 eello1lqtl ot 
eftorta w ~ tlleb' .· tlelta ot b4\latJ7. l'lleh 1Ne1· 
.... IIOUPt ... tqr ttelllf uthia the atnotue ot liRA, 
,tut •• ee8h w r-..17 ..._, •• s.a tu UDupaiae4 .... 
Plltttl,. 87H-. 'hl1e1.. ot ftiOrinlon en4 prtYate ooa\1'01 
Ul. 
ot pl'l ... wn eoqlat. t.o 1te aet. v.p whioh -' tar t.ow:rt 
... t.nlialala the ftl• ot oqanhaUCift.93 
A .-Pil attw the Sllprae c:aun•a 4Hia1on •• aaN~Uoe4, Tv.&wll at.ate4, 
t.nte4 Clft the JlatnUCift ot liiiJIIml,..,, att..,..,.Na t.\arnina ita att.ent.ioa 
to the l"H4jv.atMDtl ot pn.... '!'Ilia Ulq or •enor• •• parUall,y oor-
nfted b,r the UA, wbtGil 1110'1114 t.c nat.on lturinc power to the tuwr, aDd 
the JIM, wh1Gil Pftf\llll..._ tlho lNr4ft ot .. PNUiCA trca talliq oa the 
wl'lllml wboae •t~~a powr •• 1114Sa,....llle to J.'MO'fVT • •thGM&h it /.ilt.. 
DiJ •• aot uee4 to OU'IIHt U...t.rtal priee 111eqv.1Uu 4lnot.q ..... 94 
'l'llpeU .-..- Sa 19" tlaat. alluu nr Sere4 tile liRA s.tt .. u. 
aa a llaaia tor prioe -•••n Sa tile Jllltllio iate""' •• .-thine t.hd 
wa ..,... nalJ.7 teate4t 
•• l'lftlte4, at the ...t, Sa aa 1nt.ana111na aaohaaiaa -
............. u. boal'f .... tile Sa ltaelt ot ... ,.,_ 
aal a'I'OhUon. d4 JINHUtlta the pou.t.ltUitJ ot eao1• 
OUIJ' .... he t.l&a fl'lfti ... ot I.JI4ut.J7o llat. wfliela Mftl' 
pt. • ctn• to opanw aal to PI'O'N 1taelt 1n anioa.95 
Ia 1947 Jae ntunt to the penvaloa ot the IIIlA ill qv.aniwti• tana• 
IJa the fWIIItoaat.ll ... ._, tJaen hell Mea ....rou azplolta• 
tift novatoa., t.ha llaldut. ot 81ela pasobapa, ha4 Ilea the 
att.t~Qt., aeea11M tor a 'tlbt.lft to turn cmt:r to Pl'iftte 
412· 
Ia ..... ~ tuaeuon flit .... unc 111le 11AtlOD1e ~· 
l..- t1le •lnfOia' ot 1fl.Oo4ta *- I lla4 'INin a etuAeat, 
11llat lla4 W lSJDe U 'M Nlloa to ead all aurenS.ona, 
ou .... -.uauw t rftltty •• .,.17 WllSJDelv ..,.r 
to M •tebe4. It I t1088el01U1l7 tbclu&tlt tbat t itl we a 
•NJ.eea reelrOUac. ror tu ... , reaul.etOI'J _....,._ ot 
t1le Jfew Deal ottend. I Jltl.ti'N dftllkpe ...ve4 per.. 
llape 1a the "tus. ... u .-,.m w 111111... ill • ., other 
,..,.. n ,.. tile f ...... etl'UUle tor a4ftl'l11&p ... IIIRl, 
~:&¥ .-..uaa: tu tataalet purpoua, vhtoh led to 
ita alloUUoa.96 
Uoe la Jatiolal opll\loa llblob 11w NeteeUn tor 0011rn n beo:•• with 
the..,......... to •a.,.tlUYI aut .. tt-.• '"'"'S.OD for w.s...u. Banaa 
.w&W .. ,._,. PJ'OI;eotiaa ill tM JltPieb :; na law tor IIS.e 4Mtonl 
ttue:rtauoe, Ill ooaolaM& tllat J1III&U bat ooatue4 W.luea with .,..._.. 
-..-.. atthll oleee to a r .. rptUon ot pvblio iataeat iD prlON, 
..ne eat eeoDGIIS.ete lla4 ehf.et on tl'al ita illpl1ca111out the7 aftlW 
loekhs etra1cb11 at 'till OCllala,u••• ot priftte prtoe-tixllll•9'7 
With e,..Uto Nteraoe w \he.,.._. Collrt'• 4eetetn oa tu RIIA.a 
Tupltll 414 aot ttepuw 'the Oollrt•a tleaJPZotal ot till apa07 u an llultn• 
•n11 rlte wl'll allul"' praoUoee. Bt wulla hOWI"'er, llaft 41eSMte4 Al'1lln1r 
LS.Dk'• 1111Pltcauoa tbat pl..-fixUc nroua~~. a pvbUo •s411U1.7 ....... rs.:a, 
4t.aoova&e4 tull PJ'04unlola:.98 u aa s.aauwuoaauet 4ieolpla ot as-
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'ftllwU 4lc1 aot· aUnww lev Deal 81\Utrun actiYliiea at1Nq to t.M 
Cll!lft'• 4MU101h '1'ke .A411io1atraU~m coul4 ao11, 1D a aeue. IIIUe up tw 
llillll. ,_,,,._ aootl'Ol. ot pri .. ntuin4 Ylolatloa of the aaUti'Uat 
itrlcert lloear.,.lt elullc to Nth, aaUtrut aD4 •GC~~eeat:rattoa aa4 ooa-
u.3.,• Oll'e&Uaa ocatuatoa 1D llt4\lat&"tal poUq.102 
Bloaa"lt'• ooa11ll"41cU-. Wlln a' •••atatt••• at leut thtr 414 
.- nflaet 81\ _.IIIU'OUU flit t•lll}.,_leal ebaJ1ce auch aa 'l't&cWU attn• 
....... to \M """"' 
... ••laviac • liRA SU.Uatell •• 4upJ' flit a le·-
...... .....,.., .... aD4 ........ .......... !he oovt 
.. pt.:: d ltJ 1fllu Wlch - laaolc efta MJOOil the 
11·1twdas flit lMt,~ati'SaUa aD4 l\a act,.. aJP1r1t ... '19 
IIIAutlialt.ta whoo t~lwe. • • • wee the ..a-pn4uet 
fll tlltnl-.&tal tmll_.,_. -..two atnaae alUea 
tiiiiH raactlca ia lla..., 'Ill a MM tbe 01\e a laW la tu 
lav Wildch •lW fu Jftfeot __. u4 ...,.. ai4 __.. 
\Ilea •••' 8114 \be otlHtr Ia _,..ttl" acU•i'r Vblth ba4 
__, illrn to .. ex.-pt • few ~ ....... 'l'Jaea ,.. 
• ocmtU.ot ........ tU. 11e41a~ tl:ler ••*' occupf.e4 the 
- ana n.J.taau et,r aD4 ,,..,,.. aeltl:lal' ,.. oeaeclou 
Ill a pla• ia 1Rllt\1l'al tai.atoJ7. 'ftle aUaf&otloo ot nac-
tS..•l• at the lilA 4tltiaf.OD aNN fi'Ca the appanat 
a~ lt .... to .-or aaJdq b7 a prl'ftiM &1'0\lP• 'WheNU 
the ....n ... , to 11a.&lla ,........., for nocpisf.Dc that 
.., Me4 ata•ea tu \he o..UtaUoa at goup coatU""• • 
... co.n .... ...... ............ 4f.aaUov the 'h•f.a that aou..,. W pa•ee4 oat Ill tbe la41Tl4ual aiMl eateNCl the 
poup • .._. at tlaUttoatac, ._ the tnth ,.. that .,... 
tllat atop ha4 'IIMD 1att 1Dehble103 
'lllawll .. awn aa euq •• 1721 tbat 1Diltiwtional oha ....... 
111ov1J 1a the Uld.te4 etatea. Ira 414 aot apeot a<liiiMl 1utiwli.U ...,.,.... 
~11, R. G., ''JIM .. ., lllelt '!'be llMllae ot 0o'ft¥Cil'II-D''• • '-rt I, 
~u. a. o.. '!he Otn•ttw,• ,..10. 
aU•tf.flu ahoiWl 'be the llut.e tor lluiDeU npl&Uoa, vhieh aboul4 'be 
J'la_.t aa4 eQer~ - - lleM4 011 _rp..,..l04 Molly a1•UUlr 
~ th4l wiai\Ca ot l .. ktpl \0 iJip) I t 1 J.oD&-l'Wl .... 1a aa 
-
... a -.nalc!. to.-.., tlila ph. U.oaepbr L•eoaoeat:raUoa 
aa4 ~ 'lll a pSnl ot';lqidaUOD priarl.l)' ........ 
to -1~'- tn s..&late .U..u ot the .s.ple .. ioa 11poa 
liUI1M....._ aDl tllllatr1al WOI'II;tft. ... wbUe the laaaau 
the dldnbt:rato• ot IRA •• Jaild'Ull1 leanle4 vtll 'be 
iamllualll.e to the mt...-. fill the t\1ture, the ll!tt effect 
ot tk oont\laot, tuo -. .. a•l·,.,.,.....t ._. to 4laol'*lit .-
4ela7 a 4e'Nl01WIDt vhielto ••• opttaloa, 111 iaWitabla.lOS 
~ 1ooke4 baok oa tha ·PA ae a» abortive effort - •Mr. lcolaa ,... 
Qllllot to .mu.. t.bl.la ~ ~. P8albtia thu those wbo eQMte4 ko 
..aa fill. it.•106 Y"• be did nol 1.,. aatliulaaa l» h1a atuq ot the 
polaa ot iuUtutioul aoc...sat1on ot tMim«~loa14111 ad'nmce. 
'l'lla 011alM uA Pr ruoa It the ~err 
· ~t.e~.Plaa 
, •• 14)20la AMrtllll t ...... tcuM. tba .. lvea 'l;ftppM 'bet-· 
the alcel.. "la(M ot aa aOGI\ •o •• ....,..... 'l'beJ pu:rohaHd 11111Utaot\U!I4 
8oo4a wboea prto11 ,.... an 1B a taJ!Uf,.JIII'O'aotot •rket allll aol4 their 
JI'Oilute at ~1011 detaa1aad ia a WS!'14 aruts th17 pdli hllb prioea tor 
vha'l; ~ Hqht ... :raaa1ft4 lov wtoaa· tor what thq aol4. 1'be JOe'WI' 
416. 
884 ~ialeU'N lJl'Opoaale, l'am lo11bf1ata ott.n 11Ui&tl8h4 ahorl•Nil 
aoluUoaa from the parUoular polat ot view ot the aar1CJUltun1 o ••1t71 
aca atutenta ot agioultw:al aoc>-'.oa, with a oOIII}!BretiveJ.T p~U~rel 
v1avpo1at, aCIII&ht penanent polioiae '114111114 on the prallli.- that the fa!'!ll 
probl-., involvillfl rural-urban aoonGIIIic ralationahipa, pertained to the 
wU'ara ot the naUon aa a lllllol.eo 
'!'he aharpaat 4U'fereaoa a111011g lJl'Oponellte ot the tal"'llltra' aauae 
developed not over aD4e •• •pant,.,• e fair az:ohanse of agricultural 11114 
la4Witr1al products -· bllt over ... u. The 41tferance over ... u reTOl..S 
al'OWIId the ~~~eohanl- for 1n4uc1D& 114justment of suppJ.T to d811111U. -- aa 
114.-.t~~~~mt llbieh eoo:r41aate4 1n4uatriel1ata etfe41te4 w!th an 1DIIIe41aq 
au ettioieiiOy ~ to fan.n, who -·· their production ocad...Ua 
Sa e uaofl01'41nate4 llllllnner wll in advance ot the l!llrkdillfl aeaaoa. the 
et•U.aat1oa-t" aD4 ex~tun plana, .wo41e4 111 the f81110Ua 
Mdu7•fta\16'Bn and other billa, _,. aaaent1ally arhtiJI& aob .... llllliob 
WOil14 have atfe41te4 eu1eulturel prod».ot1on 1ndireotlr. The belated 
raepcnae by the iO'Nl'llllll!lat to the taaera• aee4a, Hoover's .AarS.oulturel 
Mui!IIUD& Act with ita Federal J'ana S.:r4, was obviously prf.mar1l:r a ~-
111& 4ev1oa. Mvooetea ot 'ftrioua 4<Dibt1o-allotment plana, 11l0lu41D& 
'fUcwU, ta'IOre4 a 111ort1 direct apJIII'eaob u the detarllli~~&t1on ot pl'OiluoUca, 
atreaatns, ia ooaa14areUon ot a f.ftatically clecreeae4 toraign llllrket, 
a4JuaUent ot ..,J.t to a-nte 0..1111. 
Ia 1928 'l'upell ...-... tbat our whole eccnOIII' ,... "f'Ulaereble to 
a -klwaa 1a •liT oae ot ita 0011aUW.11.t pana. Bit noted tllat tha proe• 
)erit7 ol tlile pe:rlfll\ 1922•1.927 414 aot iacluU 'bituat.aoua llliaiD& all4 the 
417· 
IIUIItutun of text UN 8114 shOH 1 lie poiated out that tarara 414 not 
1 
neeiw • proporUOJIIlte abare ot Da'UO!IIll inCQ!It. 'l'ltpell'e ••l¥ais 
illlpUed that dire genN'IIl raaulb would tollov trom a oontrection ot the 
l'lll"'ll arlret tor the pred.Ueta ot the citiea. In 1933 he o-.teds 
'£'hat the fa:n.ro proTide an lmiOrtant 111.rkot tor indus-
trial procluota b •"-"" ltJ tile role vhiah 'fUll nuet• 
plafed 1n the polit1ca ot.the l920•a.2 
Statistioe indicate the toroe with vhioh the depression ttaally 
atn~ok dow the tanner. H1ator1oal.17. farm priose have risen IICift lllovll' 
than 1XJ4ustrial priOOS in iocd ti•a allll. haYe fallen •re rapidly ill ba4 
times, when acrioulturel pro4uct1on has not decreased with a~~Jthins appnlllah• 
iDC the :rapidity and extent vh11h hne aarke4 the curtailDll\t ot 1ndutriel 
cut Jilt. A few fi&\lres indicate the reletlYO poaition ot the tannera 1JI 
1'32• Their economic situation "'!8 not only disad'ftlntageous. it - 41•· 
WI'I'I!AS, DlllUS'fRIAL%Sl'S, 
Clt!D!i'Ol'IS 
!eat§ (a'ftlftge weelcl¥ eerntna• ot 
worlten) 
1929• $28.00 -
1932• 17 .OOb'JS deolt. 
f1'GIII 192ft 
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'hawU, W!eae e~:OGOIIlo thOIJiht empbasae4 a:ohan&e relationahtpe, cited 
theea fi&UM• 
'fupeU GOHlcleretl the l920 1a all an ill llbieh ~ha •• old the-
oriN rae lllll&fl' appllaallla to ..., tana •• JIM'ftlile4. He Doted. that 
aettllu the ....... , oor the OYHIIHlalac •Jority ot the populatior&, 
v-. allll ft&'al, I'Note4 to the eoCG.to feota ot life la the paoeaperltJ 
U.cle. Ia the ....-At the 1IIDA an4 the U8DI fa1le4 to faoe the fU'II 
pzoobJ.. tor tttt•• yaal'8 attar WOrlcl Vv x. n ,.. tl'll* that thue hacl 
..._ ao aartcul.tval ~uoa Wore the aoatU.n; the •n4clea 
reftl'Ml ot wr toea aot a:CN.M a clelQ' ot fttt .. n ,..n ill a43Utaeat .• 
'l'brolaahflll\l the poatwr perto4 
~. ov lall4 apaelH larpl,r tollowct the 4inotloa a1...a 
th• llf' their iaUtal oJ"aaUea. 'file Reolaatioe Sent• 
OODUIIU4 to dllftlop..., projee\a without oonat4eriac the 
taUU. ot J1WfS.OWJ 111'*.1Mt• to ,., their ...,. , or the quea• 
UOM)le d..U tor* outllld ot the aew lallll. '!he IHiaa 
,. Raub, llaa:ll, J:U HiQm Jilt lila 1fq iiiJ., 1933·1938 (lev TOI'k, 
e~naure ... '""' 1m> a. · 
•• '1\t&Wll, a. o ••• ...._n ...... Jew Peal,• Ac14reN, CoD•~· 
taaau ot. Ohto, Cl.eftlaal., MaT U, 19,31t, s.a At hUlt .tiE Pnr-
•n••·27·· 
auz..u ooaUI!Ue4 'llo lee.M aev 'llnota ot land 'llo aeUlen • 
• • • !'he J'enat ~- n4 the Park Se"toe COtltimuld to 
4e\'elop tutr aev JII'OJeek and to aoqu.lre landa, but vtth 
a new to their ova 4lltGilal.,. eD4a and DOt to thoae ot 
tu oown., aa a wbola. a.. aM ti!are, lt ia trua, State 
an4 J'e4Airal .,.. at ..-otu •4• oereM 8VftJ'I ot 
tha ao11val oCIDIUUCIDa ....._ f8ftllra 11a Yartoua reatou an4 
ot tu nooua aM failura ot H'lltlera 1lll4er Yarioue OOA• 
4ltlou. '!he Dinet.Oil ot IaK leoni:llloa ot the DePill"bbnt 
ot A&rtcultun -... • .._ the llaalo aoonOIIio problallla 
OOilOeraed with lall4• aD4 to IWfelop llroa4 iotOftllaUOil OD 
tha • .,.,._, M a !lbole, bowYar, there w.a ao a1Da).a Ja4· 
aral apaq 11e ~~&14e Mtt~t and 110 create polict .. .S 
Ill ,...1'81, 'l'qwll o late4, t.a tha 19201a the people ot the 
tal'll Mlt faiW, lib the lallA 81!81l01H iD \hair so.,.naent, \0 ... the 
cnuall ptotva vldoh tontol4 'IIMU' 4o.. '!'he Wen w.a Ml ot hopeful 
-11 •PUaliata whoae oheaHa ot nal1zila& their hopea ware di•PPftl'• 
l1l(! \J7 1'29' thi\OIJ&II 4ealer --~•• •I'Chan41ae chaiDa ellA mamatao· 
tunre iaftcla4 traua and oowpaUona 4aal1Ja& vtth clothlD&o 8J'OHI'iaa, 
pnpart1ea ao ••il¥ -"PaM that 1t 81110Ulltad to the - thilleo 
Jll&t theaa V..tern 1n41•W,.l1ata •:re ao aon d1at1J18Ulahad 
than the :rea\ ot the ..... '-tor \hair raaocaiUoa ot facta. 
'l'lle nalt.t:r ot inde,....._ eHaJe( thea, tNt the;r clWIC to 
Ua a,.._aoe aa loaa u thOf 001114 • • • • MHt praaen'ad, 
01at ot all reaaoa, a baa~ oont14anoa in ther a\IU• 
ttr to rtu apia by ptti., tM llut ot one another. 
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Then w.a ao oentn41a1oe lletwen Tvcw.U '• reterenoe to the 
ahort-.1&hte4aeae ot ta~l'l in the 1.920'• an4 the aaitaUon tor fa:na 
nU.et 1a that 4eoa4e. 'l'he 48IIIIJIII tv leatelaUon ca. frca arUeulate 
ta:na CIJ'Piliaetion leallera an4 frca pol1Uo1ane. It llliaht be nl4 that 
the eleoUoe ot 1928 the tana atetea -were ill the co~ ot Bocmtr, who 
he4 fttoe4 tana bllla. 101' wa tlaere a eoatra41ction bet-n 'l'uS"Well'• 
protaeaon, rolly 'lll'Ote the aartoultura.l bill 1n 1933· By 1932. attar 
the filiAl ahoek ot the depnae1on 0 tha •n of fal'llllre 4-n4•4 national 
lechletion. J'uwra reallaed. tbat 
• • • DeY tara •011111017' ...,... .. a ft'fOluUon ia ll&l':l.oulture 
11h10h Ohdaed. 1t trca a ·~ ot 11te• to an :l.n4WitJ'111lOh 
l1u &117 otllar.? 
fh417 414 aot, ta 1932. 1111A1at that the 1n4h'S.dvallat:l.o qualttiea ot qri-
oulture pnelu4H ted.eral aoUQG. Jleople S.a aenenl felt a 118114 fu 
national adS.Oil "' aattoaal proW.e• -- aartou1tural •• -well •• 1114utr1ala 
• • • ao lOIIPI' Nfllrll 1en4 •• 1an4 alone 1 J.thfil racar4 tt 
.. one ot the J"'ral aD4 o01ltre1l1aa el-ata 1a 01&1' 
111hole eon II • 
Ia 1932 t tu.ra t 1n the • aow••·. expnaae4 at the polla their llee1re 
tor nln" fl'Qil their Jn41 ..... 11, 
The hnr11 01 'l'qveU'a d:l.aeeat ill 11he 1920'• rrca the popular 'belief 
7. fuawll, R. o., •• -.v Ileal• The 111M ot Buineaa,• Peril 11. ,SOO. 
8. Tuawel1o a. G., ... Pleee ot ~t ia a llatiOIIal Lan4 l'ro&fta,' 
s. 
Sa ~ pz"Mpertt:r •• h1a ooaoera vlth the tall.un ot puron•llli 
,.._. to kee» paoe vlth procluoUe. Be •• particularl:r 1n\ereate4 1a 
1ae-. 'l'here •• DO Mala 111 tap for the ~nt that 'f\lcwel.l •~a~ow& 
little ot acrtou.ltu-..•9 llt1i lt •• aa •••rauon. 1aaotar aa uolv.• 
atw cleYotion •• illtl1e4, to atata that he ••de the HOilCllliu of 
a&riftltun a 11fe at..,. •10 
~ •a iatarat ta the ooat_...oe on the fal'll problea whloh 
Pnatdeat Jfal'ttaa oalW 1a 1922 AOwe4 that hia aarlcu atuq of asri• 
ot~1W:N bapa abolat the tiM he toak v.p hta teaollill& dut1ea at Oo1\1111111a 
1a 11)20. BU prtao1pa1 pv.bltalla4 'IIOI'D on aarlculture 'Written baton he 
•the Prob1• ot .&ar1•ultun,• loliUp1 Scitnlce S!1f£5trlr, 
Deualter, 19a. 
•Vllat WIU .. .._ of tile J'a:-r? 0 • IQ1!5• 1v.ae 1.5, 1927. 
•au..tu .Ail"totlltve,• ta Jilr.&t1. . Bu•&a J.a .lht S!!!9J!!l Qtnaa•. 
84. ""~CliMe,..._. llula aD4 B. 0. fapall, 
llev York, leba DIJ, i.f28, 
•aetleeUou Cll'l J'a:Ja Rt1Ht. • JR.litie~ Ss'Utt ?n£5arlr, 
Dla ear, 1928. -
•J'a:• Rt11et aDI. a ~t .-1eultUN,• Da •pas1• st iat 
••• .- •uM•l a Ita&•& w··· MaHb, 
'l'he _,, lllportaat ot ""-'•U •a JNII1J.Ae4 worka vaa the arUole 
lD lila 'Md•· Bla -· alpttl•at 11111,PU.ltl1ahe4 stu~~T of aar1oultv.n ... 
a R ft .... 111illth ha pnparM. ta 1927 for .Ufre4 llo Blllth 1D OOIIMOUOil 
w. 1., 
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vtth $H J..ttu•a quaat tor the pnatderl.,. Both •ram Relief IUI4 a 
Jlem'Mnt Acrteu.ltun• allll the~ tor &11th U.lt with the 
eauee ot the taftl prebl-. 8 probltlll 1olhioh fu6wel.l ICI!Illibnd. • ... tel 
lie a-. the .. , iatereeuaa aD4 tuMaMeatal ot the day.•11 In the 
aJNta ot popU.le IIOlv.Uou, the tw1e article went HyOild the fon.ula-
Uoa ot tm diate polioy. poiatilll& Cllilt pathe to loaa-:ru adjutMnt. 
the S.tth ~a~~~Cn~Dda &IIIPIIaeised the _...UOD. at OD.oe ot 8 liJOft~ntal 
IIM'loe to rea- 'the ta:r.r tros lila preeent pliaht. '1\tcwll aul"f'eyed 
tor IIIith the qr1oue 110atrhan ... 1olh1eh had been :pro;poeed to put the 
t.,_r Gil all equal tootiD£ with t.rttt-:proteeted 1n4uetr:vJ a~a tor 
tile rellet ct all'iiNltul'a appealed to 'l'v&wll. the institutional eOODCIIIl-
let • .a •u.plea ot aoeial 1a.,.auon.•12 Tuawll elao preaented to 
S.Uh hia o• plan. vhtoh. t.a reJeeUnc the equal1zetion-tee aDd a::port• 
lleNimmt deYtoea. elaal'lT tere.Utlowt hie leter araYlt.tioa towri 
$H 81111111 ot the dcaeatte .. l~~~ent a4YOOetea. 
'1'he 1Hu ot l'U tw~· ill lldl1oh 'flacwll'a arUole 8ppeare« alee 
1aclu4ed 110Mr1bu:t1ona by l.oule a. leoo SU.ior 4aricultva1 EcoaCidat. 
Vtm4t B. a. hiiM"• Jlutln ot ,._,eti'J aDd So1la. 081».1 v. :. S:pt.u.a, 
l'riaelpal "&1'10\lltUNl ,..,..... •• ,. IBD4t t. 1. Taber. NaUonal Maatttl'. 
a.UCIIIal Gn..-a Suuel a. ft818,P8(111 .• l'rea14eat • .AIIIr1081l Fa:ra Jhlren fed• 
ereUua HNtr:v A. Va!J..oe. V1oe-Proa14erlt ot the Vallaoe MUahlaa 
1 .. at Htn..r«' Snaton .AI'thu Capper ot Jranaaa and Oher:U. L. Molla17 
at ~. Chat.r.ra ot the Senete c-tn .. on Aericulture and J'o1'0t171 
... S.Oreta17 ot .A&rtoultue v. M • .Janina. Rilpreante4 in the QliijlOiiium 
wre the esenU• and lesUlatlft bl'Uehea ot the sovena.nt, the fel'lll 
Ol'IIUlbaticm., 'OSDA oareer ._, the couen..ttonlata (JierlDett), the 
ana•tea ot Melfii17..S..II8ftl- (J1aMa17 hilllaelt), the aupportera ot the 
U.at1a-.UotMzlt appreaeh (Sp1lt.n and Black), the •breacl ba8ket• at 
the M14•Vut (Wallaae), alll4 the vaherei111ea (BlaCk aa4 'l'u&wll). The 
JJn'S.taticm to .,....,.u to pla .. h1a ween..tiona bea14e thoae ot the 
d.U ot acrlftltun • 
.,.._11 atate4 at the beitut.Dc ot hla arttale that •atate help 
jut abort ot OU1'1'i8bt 8UNt.q• W!lll4 11M b1'1JII relief to 1netfioiant 
)II'CIIbiMre. It •• tntt~ that tal'llilla ha4 autfera4 ... .,. and il'Dve ua-
a4ftDtapa all4 41aarUd.DaUOD81' notifiDation did aot maea that the 
1118tioa ahoul4 npport qr1aultue ta41ee1'111d.Datalr -- d"pite the de •Cia 
ot tan.n, •a pol1t1talq fOI'IIi4ellltl poup,• that their •ooaupauoa/Jil 
-.4e pntf.qble ee 111 ia .• • 13 
'fuawll fea1'84 that the Jlll,ltioal powr at farmera •48 it 1 \lll• 
liD~ that there will be 1110h eq~lalloatioa ot eaueea or of mora daainbla 
'fllaWU, a. o. , 
t !r .. . 
Tel.~ ... . 
•J'ua Jleliet a..a a PeZ'allent Aar1oultue,• l:lal. 
Jt bi'l&el .114 Sste1el §g'"M• 
m . . 
... ta to other• ill the o01111Wlit1•" A 'lleU:w.:rd aa:rtOW.tu:re ow14 Mt 
auOMd ie the loaa•na. Mlu.Dtibile, pOlio policy OQ8ht not to OOOIIZ"-
aae tewloa1 ............ .&p1.UWI'a1 pract1oaa ba4 to be •euite4 to 
our 110U., olU.te, au the IIM4a ot OIJS' people •• 14 
'fla&well ._r1 .. 4 the •'-&•• le the noluuon ot as:rlcmlture u 
a aa111oul art by 'lll7 ot neldiiC tll1411noe tor the fonulation ot pol1q 
ill $he Oalte4 Sfttn. Be Uate4 thne atape • 
1. Crops are cro- epa..etoally on land which f.a then 
aMII40M4 qaill ttl aatun for aa lDClattaite pario4. 
a. Settla4 01'011 SJ'O'Willa f.a Joi;Md to a ..... l huabaDdq, 
which pro'ri4n oeah incOile. Crop rotation, terttlity 
JrOt.Uioa, aa4 culthaU• an nu41e4. CaNale, 
roots. au sn•... are the tJ'pioel c:ropa. 
3· No. 2 1a int.uitied. C.reala Gd roota are :re4uce4 
la a.,....., the n1eHI« areaa be in& 4note4 to 1 .. a •, 
teobnical cropa. al4 pauaa. The 1ac01111!1 tram aalal 
pro4UCIW 1a inoruaet.. At the tiul point ot de'ft1op. 
IIIIJlt, the whOle OPIII"ll11101l o..tera on aaU.1 1Walilu4r1 --
( 1) ...,. u4 avtlutl (a) .-1U7 aftd ah"P• with IMIM 
teohaioal o:rope aa4 n.uta 'betas a:rova tor oaah pu"JOaaa.lS 
It •• 41tficult to f- a farm Pl'OSl'U' aatiaf71114il all 4eMD4a 
aD4 111Mtt11i18 aU ...U ia the "'"" Btatea ~-ua• thie Ration exhnUect 
8'ftJ.7 ataaa -- 111111re ao thea alliiiDn .., other ooutrr. Dlae to 4utana-
t1a.le ill eftluUOil tu•ra thelue1'Me wre -'Dle to aSJ'M oa a fii'Oiftao 
Jaalal4 al4 De....-k did aet -.tffw ...-ra"1e di:riaion J while tbOee 
OC!Wltnu exh1"1te4 a n:rieflr ot ..U•• cl•t••• an4 ou1tiU'U, tbetr 
llo • 'l'\1cWello R, G,, •his Jlellaf •• •., • 271• 
15• 'Z'IaawU, R, G., •his Reliet •••••" 271•'72• 
.,.u.l._. en NllF .n the W.te ot st.p 3• iateu:Lw aas-l oultufto 
........ ,. ot ..,...1 crope. ud ea biUMN 1a tod4en. Iateu:LtioaUoa 
Ott BMp 3 wul4 baft &OM hnher tt theN hacl aot bMil PI"''MUoa ot 
gope troa G~Ra:Lcle ...,..U:Lca --tor ....,..wo, vlleat 1a Praaoe.l6 
'1M VaiW Btiateat fllptll ..Wo ha4 Jet to ater Step 31 it loU 
at:LU *"':Lite towl'!l the HliWl-:NftoUoa ud &ft88•:LiloNOM atepo .U a 
attoa a4ftHII4 1a ap:Leult\11'9, the Vld.t ..... ._ WillA """e 1Ma leJI4 
lelt With ita 4ee)0 uv IIO:Lle looaW be'W81l the IIIOWltllill J.'lllllfNJ ot the 
WMt aacl the •rllna ot thtl Xaat • 'fll&wU 888UIICl that the Ua:LW Statea 
Wl&l4 tU'Il to .upar:Lor tYPN Ott fP'UM8 aa4 1e..-a • eapeoSallJ' 'fiU':laUaa 
ot al.taltao llhiob loP ltnlt •l'!l J'884U,J' thala OOJ:Il to ettteieaq :La 
haJI4l:Lac.1T 
'fltawl1 ea4e4 hta 4:LHuu:L• Ott 'h OYOlut:Loa ot •SI"loultural pno-
u. ... 1J,F :r.liiUDS stqe .3 to h:La vlti.-ta ooeoen - OGUU"f'8tlOD. 'l'he 
oll:Lat WU ot a M.all...,... DDII,aat 8.11'f.eul"'"• ha ocaol.u4e4, WC111l4 be 
a aoe:Lal oae •• the pra-uoo ot ero.toa.18 a. oGIU14are4 ooDMn-aUoa 
ot the tepeoU a eootal. pzo\llea ot •Ual 001188nl to the whole uute. SiMa 
oaa .-.nuca aal40m Md'fwa4 tha 1\aU puaU.J' tOll' aoll ~~Uh:Lac. ooeaar• 
ftUoa ,.. ~ all t I:Latle aa4 eoutut 08ll'e ta 0\\lUftUoa. Beoavae flit 
the tSalfl& tanoa' aJI4 the tzae •'-Pl'lM ., • ._ ot lell4 -nhtp, --
16. -..u. a. e •• •ra:rm Rlll:Let ..... • 2?2·7.3· 
17. 'fuav811,. R. O. • •J'a:rm Ballet •• •••' 1'13· 
18. t~tcwau. a. o ••• ,._ a.uer ••••• • 273. 
wW.. wu a soolal problta .....,. 1\uthlalt -. Hlw.19 Yett aoU uoeioo 
WU 11he'_..t41d •tacle ....... W t!ut .,.._ Stat .. ta lta ulti•M ooa• 
tv••• .•20 na,. .3 hel4 hope t• .......-..tf.oat ace• J Q'biB praoUou 
11biela our hlU., tUI'IIt.a alll4 1\el.,. raWal.l ~~~a4e aeceseel'J wre contour 
hlU'ftU•• illpi'GM onlaar4 tealull.-a, retol'Utatt• OD at .. p sloJH 
u4 JCMII' •Ua• aa4 a4Ju'-At to* use or •ch1Ma.21 '1\t,swll'• later-
... Ia ....,..uoa Wlllll4 lat• tlft4 .,...loa 1a hla npport ot the SoU 
Couenatl• s.rtce aad. la hla tUent• ot the ileaettl..aeat A411d.Jl1atn.• 
'1'81 Ill ..n ''"* up the PI'Hl• or hud.aa ua aatt• JrOIP'IIII tw 
.-n ... qaolculwn 1a its,...._. 8MM. Is we a-.ra ot the basic 4la• 
........... wtliclll acli.Utue 8\ltf..,... a. vp4 aeucm to l'UOU the tu.so 
r... bla -.ttlH ----· JMlUoa. Is 414 not rea n rll4 ~· aNUUaa 
ot tba IJ1'1•te ovurehip ot laa4, -.n he 414 "''f&'IM ~at ·-... of 
aoua& ..._...,* pnnlou - a eoann to the 11bola aauoa -- hal\ to '-
11u1lt lDto &IIJ ,....... to aid aclicultve. It wa rtaht that the •tt• 
ualat ca ei'08Uila Gellt:ol la re-- tor aaslstuace l'Hilare4. All apat or 
the JNtllio ahf1Ul4 ha'ft - •••••••• ot thr use ot pl'l'fttal7 o-a laa4. 
taotha •tlllftl l'UOIU'OMt 11ut c__,.lq- ot laa4 voul4 alao be aa 
llltecNl teatve ot • ., etreotl'" l.oapfta ..... tor tile li"CMtlca ot tlle 
19. 'I'II&WUo R. G., •J'u'a Rtltet • •. ••' 21,_14• 
ao. flllwU, •· o ••• ,. .. a.u.et •••••• 21•· 
21. -.u. lh o .•. ,. .. a.1.w ...... 21•· 
42'1· 
fucwll oUe4 ~ •JMt•ttt• 41R4wakae in •SS'loultural anterprU.. 
ot •aeu ~en.-, nlattq tllat butea to 1all4 utilization. Be llOte4 
tat 
lt b8a on. Mea raal'llll4 *' 110 o11har ui- ooul4 
•1'17 .U Ml'rifto. ~ fll ~ ooat ;per uatt ot 
JZ'OIIen llbloh u. ob8ancuue ot t•l'lllDC·u 
llaoll et the .,. .. la llaru ,.. ••'-4 a cooc1 pan ot th4t year• •thtua 
weft on. ua4 OD liiiU.J' a fw acmtl u4 tor a total ot ei&bt or tea a.,. 
t.a th4t JMl'• Aa lMrMM f.a the aU. ot taJ.'IIirl8 opeatiou, 'l'uptll eve• 
'"'"• OGial4 etten • N4HUon ta OWftle4 cute. BttlottDt lall4'""" 
~a rertatoa t.a the etu ot lloUlap aa4 the eontbtac ot field 
opuwtlone to liiDl'l taYOftltla tenat.aa. A nbo\lon 1a tH peroenta&41 ot 
ttel4 orope OJ1 -t tal'a la tnlaal lllxe4-tamlll& ana• aaat ot the IU.a• 
Uou&bt a'*tt without eoae utmor flatli'Ol Ol' 4l:reot1on lt la 41ttiwlt 
to ..... 23 
.,.._u oouilleNd •._lor 4lno\10D Moeauq blloauaa b tal'llllta · 
what ,.. pntUatll.e t:rca the bil.-14ual pout ot Ylev atpt aot be ooaiaU, 
'btllletulal. PrNaill'u oo the tar.r were too a:reat to peratt oOIIfoNaMe 
to lOili*IU 1lftD4I all4 the n•ltut a4opt1oa · ot eoctalq 4HlnW.e p:reo-
u... Ia •P"loalt\IJ'tl 'NODO'Iio fOftJU 414 ~ qt-Uoelq pn Sue the 
Met rualu ·- the beat oro;pe all4 the beolt p:reotlON. T JIUate ,.... .... , 
....... t.a a ._._...,.. .. ,...,.. W•tM poteatiall.J soo4 -ua. A 
,.__....,._ .. tellallt lltcht wll....,. tile naul.te ot his llisuae ot the 
l& ... t ,.t the 18114 owl4 be N1_. 1a a paemtioa. Mien while, retore• 
naUoa, an .n'aottw pnwaUw ot 411'08108 aa4 a 1188118 ot floo4 coatrol, 
ntU1HC1 pn.pl&aAlq •• U.a took fortJ ,_n to aatun. 
fvcwll. did aot n..-114 ,..._.t plauJ.Qa tor oouenatioe aa4 
tH ~t ot holda.. to a lftlttbble al.ae ailllpl.J for the aake ot 
UIIF IOI!lttiQil&M4 lftl\Uo aHlODI 
tile queats.GG U 11h-'her the NIIU].ta in the OODMn'llUGG ot 
ftiiOUI'eN all4 1a t.h• nbaltU11e~ ot our 4eolla1111 nn1 
lite an ntflotatl.J illportaU ...a wtfioieatlf oenatn te 
JuUf¥ ,...~w laterte...-. Jlo OM oaa a PNJaM 
te .., fd'f-IIIUI4, tbouiht tt Sa ..... te ortuoue talte 
JUtll 01.1r ,._eat •••· fU •ll.J 41•"'"1111 thialle 
tllat tiUa wbolAt ...._ ot OOD814enUODB JWNr eatara •• 
a~a ... tou ot PUfOial.a tor nll81.24 
'l'qwU aav ltUla PI'Qt.Uioe fJt the loo&•nm public tnteraet ta 
a14t.as qJ"ioultue vUh ao quaU• aakeA atlout the uaa ot the nauoa•a 
IIIDitt vital naov.roa. Aa tor: the ta~'• tntanat, abwliYe traatllent ot 
the aoU wW.4 alao a4ftll'Nl¥ atteot ~ eoonomtc poaitiOD- aft& ta tha 
alloft•:rt~e• '1/ha aett:ntiaa rJI •• apnq Moll ea the .u.t, 'l'USWU bellewd, 
botll lletore aa4 after 193.3· 001.114 01111' lie ot an ... 1'881101 utun. !be 
fa~ ot n-.rpad l8IU ha4 110 tta4 aa 8CMIII u poaailll8. alllH av.'llal41• 
Hl'ftflllll1 thi'O\IIh IICNIII4 lull.,.. 6114 •011114 qJ:"ioultw:al Hoii.CIIlea. had. to 
·~· 
'l\laWll eQHt414 11.0 Oftl'ai&bt toa.laUon ot a pe:rteot Plalh lit 
elated that tha du1N4 ahaDPa 'IIOti4 take plaoe iA a h\ID4N4 1Mn with• . 
oat iAte:rt'e:reaoe, • • • • but w •11 be •• poorer then lt w tr1414 to 
rn. a w11 clet1U4, aYU 1t a flGOila poUoy.•2.5 Rt po1at414 out that 
Mlllllt oouana'Uoa _.auree oould lie tallea at onoe • oltlq the hiaW17 ot 
eon uoeioa 1a the hat iA OJ'del' to 18114 urseno:r to the )l'Oblea. lit 
ll8QI'H4 tba.t W felled to reelS. .. , ef. ... II04enl a&l"iOUltUI'II vaa ba.J'IllT a 
oeDWI'J' ol4, how faet va dapla\84 the aoilt J'et adheranoe to the doct1'S.ae 
flit laU..-taire .ant that tbat cu ba4 to ... tw prospaoti...a ohanpe Oftr 
a pel'iod ot tS'Gil flttJ' to lln'dtJ'-ti...a J'Ml'lt• So tar there had llaen no 
uahanttle aocial pe~~alUee ia OW.' aploitatlon 1111 the lead. In the ellll, 
tile .... thla,s 001114 happen to tbe ._...l..oa'OPPilll MU.•Weat ee OOC1UT84 ia 
'ba el'a4414 ta:na areea ot MuaaOhUatw alliS Tf.raiAia, llhoea qJI'ioultw:al 
hieto17 '1'11peU 011UIM4. lit poaa4 tha IPIII!ftioa• 'Should w aupport \if' 
h4enl aid a 11:1114 1111 84P1'1aul wr. silh vUl :ruu tba laet aoo4 laad w 
lutwt• ..ltMr all, it ,.. the Veet, with tte 'IIID8t profitable bitt laut 
a4'ftiUIH" &ll'10Ult'111'8, llhloh nppon.t the Molla17•illliPil plaa.26 
hlltloal oou14aftltlGU, .,.._11 obeal'ft4, had prewilsd OWl' aCNIIIS 
apioulftftll HOaOI'loe 6114 OOIIUzotaUca ia other ooaatl'1ee. lraaCih vbeat 
2,5. 'fu&wU, R. G .. 'J't:na IIIIU.at • •. •, • 276. 
26, .,..u, R. c., •l'leftl Relief •••• ,• 2'71•18. 
...,..... alli'l llrlti.lb -..r-'-' euJPDJ."'e ven 1111ataua t:roa the •aea.wal, 
mbel' thaa the aaUCIIIalt.Ue,• polat ot new. The 11nlte4 Statea, be-
•- ot ita VU. ana all4 ftl'iety fit aotla all4 eU1111tea, wa ia all e:uel-
left poeUlGil flo lnltiatle a PI'Oiftll ot eouenaUon a114 wtaa oulthatioa. 
•Blat w 11141bt ftllftt to politicallll.WIIU ot Euope.• Tugwell ~Ded 
11u tan 11bat pollttca te114M 110 oNMIJ'e tha tuii4••Ual upeota ot tha 
taN~. Ia 414 aot .... to •u.tl¥ s-tiata. 4naUc Clbeneeea• u 
waMt to pola11 ou11 that la 4ieouaitu ot tara relief e "whole ranee ot 
pzootll-. ia kial overlGObll• ·- ..,..ieU.r tha 4eolllllt1oa ot aolla thftalh 
tu ealthaUoa ot htllat.4H. 11ha IIIQOli8N ot oroluml. aoila, tlla iulhlqUtle 
p).aat1Jli ot alfalfa, the faUUl'e to Ia..,.... all4 1nteuity uS.l hUba11417o 
allll 11Jae Uanpl't ot tu DH4 fOl' wP ntorutaUoa. rt 
'1\acWll reJeotecl the fa~llet plan vhioh aUnete4 the 1110et ,.u,. 
tioal a'QPPIIII't, 11he ,...17-Jiaupn •Cib n • oa the fP'CIUilCl• that it •• to..-
aartoultuN profitable ail }lllblio expeaae, "UilOriticalq with ao •"_,. 11o 
8MIIe the future or to pe!llal1aa lMtttoieaOf' Ol' anU•aooial taahatqv.u.• 
a. 0011alu4e4 hie arUele 'ItT 4ea01'11t1Jic tiM plf.cht ot •ll'ioulture, •t.alo 
e1l4 atli'UU4 with our _, pnoiaut aa4 periabaltle nteouroe, • vhlC!b calle4 
tor t-.llef, Ia thCII&Pt tbat 11111'8 &OUNtt at ooatrol tban the llalra17•Havcea 
rt, 'l'a,svell, R. G., •JOaaa 11-.U.et .. •., • 2'78-791 allll0811 thil'tf yean attes' 
TltptU IC"'11e u the Mulf, ql'loultual. upv1la atreeae4 the Me4 
to u..n ..-. la114 to uinala alnM hca a1x to "'"" tillea •• lll4lh 
1&114 1a MIW to pa'O&uea a ,s..,.. h1.t ot too4 aalOl'lea 1a the tom 
ot ... ,, ._., 1111Jc, all4 4e1Jif pnftlta u to procltloa then in the 
tom ot 1ihaet, f'lilll'o .,.._atlle tau, potakea, an4 'bMnao Dl& !edU 
n ""· ~~~~·~ n. .. a, 1,.55, .56. 
tiUla Pl'OYi4e4 tor lllpt 'be DMMHJ')', 28 
The Jliaht ot a&l'ioult~m~, fllcwl1 noted, in.ol'f84 diaad'ftlntapa 
with ~ to 01'84111, taxat101l, rau.,- ratea, ana taritta. Ita baokwrd-
.... •• a •tna oa the whole aiODOIIdc qatea.• It vaa cloubttul that 
aariealtun•a attaliWI& .__,_. health throuah •tntqratiOil to the point 
ot plaatlJI& ana •rket GODtrol• wa poaaible axoept tllroulh the Federal 
&0"..-at. The proballle -d tor pwen-nt aot1011 oallad tor a prapatio 
appNaollt it •• DtHM~aaar:r to 
••• ..Une &Ofti'Mellt ooa.t:rol tllapaaai-taly ana without 
preooaoept101l to - 'llll.etllar the ... aaarr thiqa oan actu• 
alq lie &eCCIIPllehed thi'OIIII)l 1 t • 
~did not upeet that 4la]luai01leta 41eeuaa101l would ree.dUy pra'ftlil; 
There an taw PQtlllo authorltlea u the world who dare to 
oet up and ntone ..,.n opialoa in oppoaitiOil to 1'\ll.e.-ot• 
til-' praoUoea ana Dti•aOCiel acta t ana the l1aite4 hatea 
ia aot ODe ot ~-. It _, 'Ilia act do.a, in taet, aa the 
M8t nluotant ot all. 
He d14 think that the t1alac ..,.., 'be rtabt tor ·- intar'ftlnt1oa in aars-
oulwn. Hlatorioalq, our greataat aol10itwla had been tor ripta and tor 
individuala ou.taida ot aariouUura. We ba4 doM lUtla tor the tar.r, who 
wa DOW aald.ns Cost,pus tor nllat. A •o•Junotun ot attUudaa _, juat 
poeaillq at•• the •pert his ohanoe.• We oould otter the ta~r aaa1ataaoe 
a the ocm4U1oa ot £004 baba•ior •• the oropa ana methode whioh aooial. 
pzu4uoe raqu1n4. The our snateat 4101l11ribut1on to aarloultun. aoientltio 
adftnoe, would he'ftl a obaaca to nal.at81'. 29 
28. 'flaawll, B. G., •J'aJ'II Jlelf.et ••••• • 280-81. 
29· 'fuswl1, B. a., •J'ata Jlellet •••• ,• 281-82, 
Ill hu artlcle ot 1929, •rua.a.uet and a PelW&ant Asrioulture,• 
~ll a4YOade4 poliof.ea vllioh clearly 1D4ioa11ed that be cou14en4 tile 
u.A aa _....., operaUGA. Jllw\IV, he 414 act 8b\lll the atl\llif ot pro-
JOMla tor 11.-poraq, I'MOUii'VAitl.,. ~tea -· tar fi"CCI 1t. '1'be ~ 
ot the acrioultural problea vllioh he nllld.tMI\ to Altnt 1. 8111th in 19il 
.-tla1814 llla auapt~\1011.8 tor t Cute a~loa aa the tara front. 
~l'a report. ot 1928 ha4 u lapOI'tlanea u a \Iaale tor acilal 
polioJ• Jrot 01\lJ 414 SID1th loae the eleot1oat he 4ewte4 '"Ji7 llttle It 
afll t• to U'4'-t•i.oc ':lapall'a reP4K"'. Aa Bl.air llollea l)llt it, • ... 
wa .....- ue4.•30 'IQ&wll'a aoth'1iJ s.a SID1th'a bahalt 1a 1928 4l4 ut 
.wit the taa4Uate•a fa11\u'e to reapaa4 to the proteaaor•a au.rr.,. Jl'OIII 
11117 I tlli'Ouah Sap\JJ Mr 5. 'fuptll wote fl'n artlclea oa the CdiPlicD fflr 
tbe J11x Rep)!lle, au.ppcll'tllllllllli" 1a a biahlT lau4d01'J '"11h lit reteft'M 
to tba ..a4ltat. u a •aea•SM Jlu acnt• who pvraue4 the pJWral 1Dtesoeat,31 
iaeli llr aD ut1•11i'JIC .,.,.tb.T with .--. aap1reUGAa.•3'1 Slllith, 'l'\acllell 
utto4, bala.....4 that ... ~ ,... 
32· 
••• OIW acu ... t.ut,...at .._. Oihera tor aohlanq ~a 
JNI'»>IUUI• n la u lHt WMl4 •• • Nr 1t .,... that 1t 
coal4 Ulltl'lwt.e. IllS.. lkMNI aot - ... hlll& s-.41atelJ 
ft'f01\R1oae17• but 1t 4oee t.ft90lft :reepou1b111t;r tor 
:U.4enh1p IUl4 ooatrel ia atpot dtudi0fte,.33 
a aipat dtut1oa oertaillll' alated in aarioultve. :repr4111C 
whioh • prtaoiple tor :relitlf utnt4 • .34 'l'qwel.l reepoa484 eqerl;r to a 
requat tna Mra. Jelle Moeoovtts IUl4 ·hllae 1-pb M. Proekauer ot Blllith 11 
_, that ke mte • report tor~ ~enor. a. ba4 previoualy 'IUider-
telrea wok a project tor Ocmlraor Louin f¥1 Illiaoia. When Bllitll so; to 
ilouatoa tor the ooav•UOft, tb41 •ji01t-4e'Matve boye, 'hawll u:plaiae4, 
SO' a bol4 ot hf.lllt oertela that S111Uh aewr ::rea4 hia 11181110l'aDilwao Tuawll 
told Jlln. Moeoowlts all4 luqa P:re.lra1MI' that 1t we ueeleo tor hia to 
• ..,. U'CWIIl.lS 
fte etpttt .. oe of 'fuawll'• ~wa we ita 41eoloeve ot tM 
thioJdiiC ot a awl\an ot qr1caltua 'IIIIo we to 'Mo- la lt,32, ona ot 
the IIINt ill,ponaDt proJC~~~eata la \h 8oN8ftlt oirola ot tha 4-etlt• 
allotment plea. '1'he 1928 N,POI:t IIIIMe 1t appa:reat that ita author wwl4 
react ta'I'OI'abl;r to the prepoaale ot the 84-t;ea ot t;b41 allotmnt plalh 
Stwlftt;e of tke h1at01'J of the ...... lOJIIIII'Dt of S&J'iOUl t;vel polioy 1D the 
Va1ta4 st&11e1 will 'M 1at;e:reata4 ia tu _,_..., ot thia uap.~bl18ha4 4oeu-
-t 1 a 4ipat•autl:lu • bent oa a OOJF ot tba IIV.l"f'8J' taol\1484 ill 'h&Wll'e 
paraoael papan, tollowas 
33· 
.34· 
'l'ufWll, :R. G,, •fila LiMI'al Clloioa•' 75• 
'laawell1 a. G. 1 •PlaUorM H4 Cu41 .. taa,• .lfD hP»»it, Vol. 5.So 
No. 704. MaJ 30· 1928. 44· . 
IUtnt.•v .&a wr&tv. 
Colltlaubs aat Stl'ft&tha1ac the Work ot the DQ&l"tlllat ot ~1-
ftl.tun 
l'uounc-at ot tar .. Serle O)eftt101\a 
litl"eel,,tbeaill& ot Cooperatl-
'l'axeUOil aDd .&crloultun, 1nelud1D& 16 papa ot tables alld ehel'U 
Ol'e4U aa4 A&riouUun, lll.ol.\141:111 tipres Oil railroad boca. ud 
rates 
The lam Bloo, lll.cludl:lll a lll'let blstoey ot ita OJ'igill. at a 1118etlag 
oalled 11r S.1111tor JrHroa 011. Mat 9, 1921, and s llst ot ita 
lealalaUve nooeaaea. tauuna. and btaUons, and oonoludi:lll 
vl\h thla • Ill• 
•The oppoauts ot thla orpniaatioa haft attaolred U 
aa the srouD4 that it ia fiUM'eralve ot the pan, 
qat•• that U tailed to telta aooCWI.t ot tbe ~~atioaal 
w1tu., that it tllaoUOII.Sd onlr in the iatueata ot 
oars olass. aDd that ita 4ootrines wn 1ra4ioa1.• Ill 
nav ot Ua etteou ........ all ot tbeae ar.-nta -
H8iu the pot.at. It ena..So npraaauauon .. ts the 
tamers 'llbat tha;r Wilt, DO appeal to aaoh paaralitf.es 
will prevent it.• 
Piaa4ftMa ... ot .&crioultun 
Taritta ta'fOJ'iiiC ...utaotviaa: illduatriaa 
Restr1ota4 ore41t tae111t1 .. 
Vatair Wr4eu ot taxauoa, ••• .. -nta baiaa: lilasa4 oa apaR• 
leUw laa4 ftlua :rather than in- ;rlalda 
franaportat1oa ratea, vhieb are aot teo hich JdaiD& by rail-
road protna • llut a ob.aap to oharglaa by '18lve rather 
than llulk OJ' wlpt la no~ad 
Baokwrd teflbalqUS ad the loaa fll ettloienq aad •CIOACIIIIY la 
.. u-aoala tU'IdacJ an inoraaaa in the alae ot the awr-
... taJ!'III and the ue ot IIIOdern mohinery le reo~adad 
UAeftn a4ftll.oaa 1D ettlot.ea.,, crop oare deftlopiac taster than 
animl care 
141- ot lend eight ... the a year in oae-crop araaa 
Diaad'lllntapa ta barpintDg, 1nolu41D~: the greater power ot the 
lla;rer arad an t•'llility to bold cropa due to the laolt ot 
o.a41t taoilitles 
HiP ratio ot cwarhoad to oparat1D~: oo.ta, cauaiD~: loeaaa 1a a 
prt.oe tall to be sraater than satu in a price rise 
SlowAeu ot tunOftl', 1D ooauaat to d1atr1wUoa aD4 ••-
fanuri~~o~, ta wbioh ea old atook oan be sottaa Gilt aD4 
a uv au pilton la to take a4'ftlltaaa ot a Mw pr1H 
1-1 
IM1aaUo 4_. tw ataplea, oauaiuc abao:r-1 1nroa4a t.a 
pri ... •• au~ea &I'll prodvMd 
LeJtctb ot U• r84\&1Ne tor ell\llpaent to Jll1 tor Unlt 
euoato ll1d'Plu 4ue to tile orpalllaUoa ot aartoultura oa aa 
aport lluia t• aalea at pr1Ha tbtu 1a a world •rUt 
latlexU1Utty ot nptlJ ba tha abort na, ao that bat\er 
priMa tllia year _.. aore prod\&oUoa Mitt year 
"'-17 ot h'opoat.l.a tor A&ftftltu.nl Relief 
ta1a ... -ta1rtu •ifll•llaD4a IIIO'N 1D alld Gilt ot pl'OiluoUoa, 
QaatUaa the arketiaa aitu.Uoa 
a...,......t acaaq to '*' all4 Mll fal'll pro4uote ta ordar to 
lraell aartoultllral Jl'i ... ia Una with other o08111041Uaa 
OutriSht ~~ •pon claltaaturea to draw ott the aurpl\18 
rr. 4CIIIIaat1o arketa1 thia ta aot a awftd loaa•na 
poUq 
Belptaa tile tamer to hdp hS.alts ooopanatina, atatiatloal 
tatoratioa ..a aenloa, aa4 taohaioal lato:r.tloa oa pro· 
4\&oUoa 
.AP1at1D& eoopanat1.,.., they help ta •rketiD&t th.,. haft aot 
.n .. t.a •••aiqua fit pre4uouoa to da\et thq era an 
Ill& 0011111 tw tu JII'Olllea 
Molilll'y...,Jittapea it ailla to eoatrol nrplua aDd prioea, but it 
doao aot ooatl'Ol 11\&JPlrl tt clapando oa 4\IIIIPiD& aUoei1 1t 
1a eaaooiate& with hich tarUtat 1t iDorea ... prioea to 
~auo ao.:.-mmr•~ fflr tho llallet1t ot oal.J oartat.a oluaoa 
ot tanera ~ takaa llP the Jlellai'J'•Hauaaa propoaala 
'below• atnat.aa oautUuUoaal ooaai4artat101la. lf01la that 
hta 4llataaal ot all prenG\18 propoaala •• 1~~aclaqua\e 1a 
llaae4 oa tha llaltat that alllf aoh_. wbioh eloaa aot a•t 
41reet1J' at aupplJ 1a .... ....,. to look the llara anar tha 
bOl'M baa \!ala ato~ 
l£1eaeata ot a J':rctl• 
IrlTAsata aubjeet to lqla1at1YO 1'\llat taxation, tarltte, O'a41t, 
trtaaa}IOrtaUoa 
liao~at ot lar .. •aaala openaUoaa• thia la a baaio alaaent 
~tot ICIOJN&tt.,..a •But there la little \ella.._ 
liJ the taclartll cower at ea14a troa letalbiaa thea aa4 
ai'l'ia& 11aohaital ... l.taaoa tbreuah the USDA.• 
Xllprov-at ot pro41aotl.,. teohaiquaea 11hta ia ftuada"8Dtal, alate 
•Jie4v.M4 aoda par walt will lllll1ke -•urea to na1aa pr1oea 
u ... •••rr·• 
C.Cik oa av.ppl.J all4 .,... ot'4erlJ •rkeUD&• otbervtee, there 
wUl be u lao~' ..... IIU'P1ua ot •Jor orope and 110re 
trou.ble 
the Protllea aa4 a Propa 
Colln1tllt1oaal OOD814tJMUOIUII 0 • • • It la not oertaia but tbet 
AUon.ttJ.OU.ral •rpat wa correct ia hie toreo .. t ot 
tu Melfa17-ase•• P"JOMla• It thia _,. be taka ae oor-
reot, thia 4U'tlelalt:r _,. aa wll be a'f01cle4 1a tuture 
propoaala, a114 PJ'iM rel1et •OU8ht ll;r a-u to cioh 
all ..... , •••• ,• ..- •• the ooopereU'fa IIID'f-nt. •l(r 
o.a prater .... • 'IIOaU lie tor • IIQl'e clireot attaok.• The 
preaent adala:letrat!oa la vllllDc to nppon oooperathea 
1a •M111DC 110 1111 hlaber pr1oea, but U 1• umdlliDC 110 
adept • prop'llll ot ao•u nt lntel'l'ereaoe with •rtetiDC 
to cet the - realt. Mlrll:eta Gall be ooatroU.all. Priee 
ooatrola ot qrtoult~aral P1"04U\\ta alou would be 1aa4e-
qutea a pura1 fii'Ocna :la Mried. Prloe -trole, ae 
-. ooMU111111lOllal atatlloriUee will apee, are ~11111• 
Uonal, but Jlllbllo opialoa nov 1'11118 ap:lnet 111. Ia the 
ea4 people will ... 111 aa the cal;r reel eolut:lon, 
Mlrctul ae:Na, )9,000,000, •• U tapoedble to oontrol pro• 
4\loUoaa llia:lac u4 lNaluea, which Ilea a thlr4 110re pro-
4\loU'fe 811lui,..at ....... ia ... r uaall to Pl'o4•ce COOl\•• lul'N 
1aarna4 laov to hall!lla -~ul tao111Uea. 
!be .l4ftaoe Batie Prill Plea J.'facWll '• eoh.,.-, 
•Dettaltioaa 'to •tst•ia a rauo ot •- OOD8taaq bet-a 
the 1114• ot ll&l'loultaral nicea and that ot other 
prlou, with the idea ot atab:l.liziD& the relaUOD8hlJI 
ot aartnUve ,.urallJ with iadwttr;r. The auul 
Mpu.t ot aartftltual o~iUea oueht to exoha.,. 
tw the aaaual atpat ot 1Dduatr1al ccmaod1Uea 1a a 
coaataat ratio. It acrtoulture talla below induatr;r, 
aa 111 ClharaetHleUaU:r 4ou ia aa era ot talltac Pl'i-• lt- the tara outP'lt le uadAinalllall ta 
t.,. ot the btluvtal OU.tJIIlt. The total ....,. rala• 
Uouhlp ..,. raala ooaataat, but aUll ooaCNl aa 
ua481"t'aluUoa fit aartculture.l aoode• 'l'hia le beoa\MB 
ot a laqer IIU'Plua proble• in qri.altve tbala 1a 
l.a4uatli'J'• •• • 1U 'PM"lp• RB•M'• hglt M .IAI heed 
6/t .llll 4Uil!!!!UZ• 'l'h• Mli'JilU 1a exeeae p&'Oductf.ea ••• 
O'NJ' Wlat Ml.4 be taken b;r eon ..... .,. at a ural 
ntee, whl• 1• a pr1oe ••tine oo•• ot pro4uotl.oa 
aDd al1owf.ac a ..,t0111ar;r ~~a:rpa.• ,4Ual1o• au.t, 11141• 
•ttJtC tbe point to bear 1a at.114 wen oonatdertac 'tq-
well'• 4tttereaeee with 118a auah ea Georae If. PeelE, 
.... IIIII .... pertalaed In'S..rllt ,. •EI!Pt'P' mohall• 
1-, aetttac rl4 ot the av.rplu. attar 1t has beaa pro-
4aoe4, ratber thaa prpAu.atiqp oontrol.a1 
Soluti11111s ot the lllll'Plu probl• 
Aa.lu t.• ~~U•tiou ot practicality, allovlJII e-aJ:! 
falaan to so ballknpt to cut procluauoa vouU 
be laeffeot lYe so loq as llllll'&iMl lall4a lUIIIif lll 
8Jl4 out ot pro4uotioa 
ho4uaUOil, u wl.l as arkettna aD<l. atorap, cooper-
ati.aa are a possibility ia the ~t fifty years, 
lNt tiler would aot be etteotiYe as blal41ate 
-IIUftl· Jle4udq prolluatioa costa ie inadequate tor the -ra-
enay, eaptOially ia view of the 1nelaatia1ty ot 
,_,..,, repnleu ot prices, tor staples 
Coatrollill& tle pleat ill& ot ai'Opa eo as to ... t the 
nor.al delaa4 ellaiDStea the surplus aD4 atabil• 
izea prl- vl~out price-tixiq ./.ills heart of 
Tucwell•a soh~ 
Maollalli- ot the 44.,._ Ratio Price PleD 
• ••• eat.ltliah a ntio price Dee a boTe, "Defill1t1~ 
a JMr ia actflmea, aiiD.OUilee that onlr tbe pro4uce 
ot a eenaia aornae - estiiDted to ... t aonal 
ll4l84a • ,.-l4 M llouPt, and rat1011 out the aon• 
.,. 011 a ooatraot 'llaaia. • 
Ratioabc ot -...... would be aoh19Y84 b7 coatraota oa 
'" 'llaaia ot the pra'lious fi'n-,.ar a'ftftp 
na a4wnea pri.. wou14 be 4at81'111M4 by a statist ioal 
DW+eJ ot ONtsa the IliON ett1o1ot voul4 pia 
lftlltl¥, ftftltill& ia larpr opentiou for the 
beat gi'OWft 
Mllrke11111C 
A Pftl'UHt marltetiq board or an ageaq approvod 
by the &O'ft~t, with a JIIOIIOpoly ot apioul• 
tural tra4e, would be the market111C apnt tor 
ta-raa it would bo in4epeD4ot ot ~·USDA 
Leuea voal4 lHt borne out ot a fund created tor the 
purpose, s- profits would be JMt lllto the 
tun4 to insure apiut turther loasea1 uosss 
prot1ta 1IOUl4 be rsturaed to pro4uoen who 
'111014 to the ageaay • pro-nte4 
Salea to .pr011ason and distributors would be at 
prieea 4ate~ae4 ia local aarkata by aseata 
ot the oorporauon, or - wheZ'IITir JOUUile • 
1D auottoa arkats aa is aov 4ou by larser 
oorponUoas 
Ia onar to ... t obJections to 41sorimtDator,r rail• 
na4 rates, the corporation 1IOUl4 pay the 
••- ratio price at the ahlppt.a& pout, 
... till& the raapoaa1b1lit1 tor ahi,..nt at 
that poiat 
All aariouUun.l pro4ucte could be included 1a the 
••-· ... pt those whose :ratio-price h1at0l'J' 
•• htchar tban the sueral 11114fx ot pri ... a 
the .n nooeutul larpr •l'keUna ooo,.n-
tifta 11141bt aot .at to 1Mt 1aolu4M. - tor ex• 
aple, the C.l1tol'll1a oraap aad pz"'aM powra 
the Cal1ton1au are a ra&J.OIIIIl iJ."'U.PI ~ 41t• 
fltlllltJ 1a •tataiutnc oooperaUfta whew the 
P'516Jbloal aprea4 18 &l'ht 1llOl'MIU ~- DU4 
t• oaatralbt4 ooortiuUoa 
Coatni'U vtth OU'I'iera ant atorap people ooul4 be 
_.. oa alaqe aoale 
Re&uleUoa ot ..nata MOGD4ei'J 1B4utr1ae all'aellr 
reo•t••• ae eublaot to ooaat1t1lt1oual npla-
tloa - ...--•· tnuportaUoa, lMlalc.l -
vill be lftOlftll 
Ondit 
01'14111 probU. vwl4 be aJapl1t1e4 
The oozopordloa itult llipt t1~~~~t~ce the aroviDS ot 
the .top tor vh1eh it oontraote, tuotar •• ev.oh 
ands.t i.e ••IIHJ thie voul4 ••t objeoUeu 
that ta~"aftl ueuall7 have to 'borrow oa 111114 
'llllue n-- thea oa orop proepeota - a eltll• 
auoa ulUia that in bu1oeae 
'lor OI'OPI lllla Wr.r aa4 _, pro4uota, oontraota tor 
lOillll' PR'illilll than a currant aeaaon ooul4 'M 
.. ,. •utte eatalf vtth the atat1at1oal ..-lpa~nt 
aov anU.aW.e 
Surplue 
'~bile it vou14 atill be a problem, it voul4 be 
Olrt 4owa to a .. ..-llle abe 
lMtal'llhat!Oil ot a.....-a ROI'IIId 4011118t10 4-acl 
plu awrap ...,ort pro4uot 1 avenp y1al4 
pu .... x -"~' ot aorae uedecl to 11al4 
~ ...-.r ot aoree oofttnota4 tor 
A ,..r•a tam-oftl' voul4 be OGDa14end in allot-
Uac a aev aeuoa•a aonap 
SVplu ....-. be wholly 1'81110'rt4 1 thera vtll M 
Q w a t•UJ"-t1ve per oeat variati.Oil trGa 
Dlltul'al •uaeat aurpl.ua 41aposalt export 01' 
...... 
hnlp traC. 
'laritta ooul4 Ill uet or no'li uaet, 4apea41q oa 
111latbor 1t 18 'lihouaht 4ee1rablo to ael.l IIIII'• 
p~a abroa4 at laaa than 4aa.a'li1o prioaa, 
• ••• aa.nh1aa vhiah voul4 aal40ll M a4via· 
able oa acfOUDt a.r the lacttt.ato -"lfettoaa 
that WIIUl4 ea.. tr. •-•Uo cODII'*ra.• 
~vi.,.•' ol1Jaot1oaa to •U&88•U- tor 
auoh nlea ot aurplua butter to Iron 
Curt4tll c0\llltr1ea 111 19~ 11luatrate4 
,.._11, • point.i7 
The COI'JOfttiOII could prnent all 1111portat1ou 
-..pt thoae oou1pe4 to it by ooatraet, 
leltnq the tarltt 1uua out - the beat 
J011q 
A4111111atraticm 
A4mintatrat1ve 4itf11Ult1aa would be the leaat 
at the prctbleu to lie taoed 
It WOill4 H 41ft1oult to adainiater, but len 
eo tbaa the other propoaala 
CoutUuUoul QaeaUou 
!hera wt;\l M no 1os1oal or oo~~&Ututional 
vali41t.r 1a obJeot1ona wh1Gh will uadoubt-
e«q H ft1ae4 to •tajeot1111 11he cown-
llllllllt 1ato buailleaa• 
!he Coun 1118ht reject 1t 1 it eo, it vlll alao 
rejeat the Molfai'J'•Jraucen propcaala 
!hera 'IIU1 M two alin 41tf1oult1ea' (1) abri48-
_., et the riabt ot ooatraota (2) litth 
Aaft4111at 
It tiM <lout rejeota it, VOilld 111 reoe1ve eJIO\I&h 
JCIJI&lar aupport to work on a volwatart 
Mala~ 
It tiM <lout aeoepta it, the ease ot eatoree-
_, Will at 111 4epea4 on popular RJport. 
fucveU ooaoeded that hu a~ ,.. a • • • • variant ot Mclai'J'-
Jilupo allli open to 11011111 ot the objeetiOIUI asa1nst the latter.• In pert1• 
plan. Ll.ke other proponent• or tedNal action in the t18l4 ot asrioulture, 
'i'q'tltll 411Qbaa1Se4 the ooaoept or •per1t7" -- the •a4vaaoa ratio ntoa• 
atnas4 41ree1lly trca asrtwltval-1a4utr1al prioa ralattonahipa. !he 
a1ca1f1oaat 41ttareaoa in 'l'UaveU •a •Gh- trom Mclai'J'-Jilusalli• wa the 
41reet eontrol or nppq, the laek ot vUoh, in hie opinioa, aade other 
pnpoaala aalt-utaatilll• n •• not true, u Rvanll Lord reported, tbat 
~o. 
'fllcwll 0 •• • ooaebe4 Sllith Oil MolfuT•Haupat• • •• ,o!J6 'l'ugweU 'a 
a4'f0Gaq ot 41nct eontrol ot •NlJ W.Utie4 hill with a aohool ot 
thouaht 'llhioh - into bitter ooatllot with the a4hareata ot Oaorca 11. 
Peek, tile lea41DC Melfa17•HIIIl&ealte. 
TuawaU'a continual ratareooea to tba unaettl1na attect oa 1iha 
•rket ot the 8111117 into, u4 vltb4ra•l trom, pro4uot1oa ot •rslaal 
1aa4a ill4loate4 hia ooatinuilta interaat 1D a" •pe-Milt• aolutiGD, aa14e 
trca h!a ia.ol-at in the tolWU.aUoa ell4 proJ!OtiGD ot ••rseoq poli• 
ciao, Batora tha eatallliah-t ot 1ihe l'laaettl-n1i AdlliaiatraUOJl in the 
19.34· After he be- RA Mlliaiat.l'&tor, he vro1ie a Jltlll)aer ot articlaa 
'lillie ai&ht act q\lalii'J aa puelf aolaaUtic aince theJ related. to the 
aoU'I'iti .. ot a 101DC &PIUIJ'• ktnl ao, ••uonal Sipitioanee ot Reoaat 
'h'•••• lD lull PopW.aUoa,• SpeW rmu. 'fol. 14o No. 1, OotolMtr, 1935. 
•• 11011 41raotl.J ,.lata4 to ourra~ policy. In ..av ot hia • poli07" uti-
olea aa4 apaaotau fvcvall rawale4 hia aeholarl.7 1ntaraa1i in .a&rioul~ 
lly ratarriD& 1io INU •ttera aa raaauah ia the tiSDA and the asricuUural 
hiato17 ot lcJpt aa4 Muopotaa1a,37 After his rasipat1on, he vro1ie 
artiolea ot both the •poU.q" aa4 achOlarly types, oombinillfl the ho iD 
)6. 
37· 
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fit Aartaultun•e 7t.mare,• lqyrpel Jitlalilllflon!?!da. Vol. Jl, .No. 1, Feb• 
.....,.. 1'4'• l'Hk'a 4acluaUoa that '1'\apell !mew nothillc about ~1CUl• 
tue ftal.q aroee h«a tho tan that what 'l.'upell taYOred ill the Vll1' ot 
poUq ooatUoW with J'eek'a 14eaa. 
~111e stu41oua reao111oa to tho tara.ra• plicht baYillS -.ea ooa• 
ai.Can4, it 1.8 a~iata to lflGII at the o~r ajor polioy propoeale ot 
the 19201e, ill the tolal.&Uoa ot *ioh Ooorp )1, l'Hk plalw4 a alco1t1• 
oallt nla. l'llek, ill loe41as the tlaht tor tam parity, illa4veneat.l.J 
et..wata4 t.h1UillS al.oas lillee 1ib.1oh GIUIII iato coatliet with hie ova pol• 
101 pmere..... Pe:rhaPfl H. L. Mltllba'e role in tho t.atolleotual hiat017 
ot the ltaO•a, aa 4aear1\le4 bJ hS.. trt ... an4 prot .. e liUIIIa T. farrell, 
•e aulqau u l'llek1e pan 1a the 4nolopllent of tara polloy, Then ,.., 
. . . 1"-' in the role Mlllokea has »leJo4 ill A!ariaan lite. 
1 •• Qeekt.JIC with a .ateraa W.ablJIItoa correapoa48ot, a 
..a wo •• a tt.ra Jfev Dialer aB4 'IIlio baa written hS.. OWil 
,.._ot.oua auaoka on .. ., hau4e ot the 4aJ. DS..ouaet.as 
Maaokeo1e role, thla jouraaltat re..rkocl.a •.lie wee one ot 
tha •• 'IIlio prepare4 the &l'OWid tor the Kow Deal.• Mltaokaa 
hSIIHlt woul4 not acoo,t thia jud,peat nor wuld he be 
pleaM4 to tht.ak that 1M oontr1llllte4 to aGIMthill& that he 
cleac~Waoecl and aeonee. Yet llo1t.en the obaenatt.on ia 
jultt. MltaokeD' a attaua on lalll11t17, oa polt. ts.ot.au like 
Cclol.1.4&e all4 &rit.DC• on W.luaa, all4 Oil the eraYeDDUa 
ot ..., uwapapen, all ooatrlwtt14 to alertt.oa a aenera-
tioa flit writan, HJel'tera allll collep etudeats who later 
,..t t.ato pu,lllt.o Ute. • • • 1114h14UU.ea, whioh JfuokeD 
eo eriutl;J ...,,eel!., •• HrioualJ alldaapred lly eo..-t.o 
lllnl'l• Mltalkea taf.lo4 w ... the slpU'ioaaoo ot the Bew 
Deal ···-" 
t.1ke Muoaa, Peek proteate« that the ettorta to aan 1D4id411al1• 
an1111U, 4eni'OT84 u. IUa cr1tiu replied., 1a effect. that Peelt'a poU-
ol .. 1101114 aue nothlDc. 'fu6wU, eapeolall;r, retuted the oonteauoa that 
oelJ..tdi'fll aouon aaoeaaari}¥ 4utnp4 11141Y14uel1•• Ha inaiated that 
tile ulU•te wt ill oocaadoe, tor nuq or aaYillfh wa the 11141Ytdual.39 
Like Meaoketl, Peek heli!M to aot :1.11 ution intolleetuel torcea 
*icll OTlllltuall;r upreaaod th-alYU ill Wfe he did llot apprcn. Boat Mil& 
1la 1922, 1111ea he aad l*lah lobJMOJl ~ a torty-elJht pap peaphl.t, leJJt'• 
J.U JB tsrtrulStzq, he publloi&e4 the OCllloept ot parity. Be a114 3'ohllaoa 
took the led. ill traulat1'18 th1e idea into a atatiatioal iDdex. Their 
Jlllllllhlatoarlq helped to brlq alM:Iut atP" 1 1 lilt ,_t_a tho 'OSI)A aad fa~ 
orpalutiou laadora on parit1. 40 
Ia }lllltl1ois1q pari\,, vUoh all th.o achoola ot thouaht oa a&riou.l-
tural poU07 appln4o4, Paolc uavitUII&l¥ eaoourapd plau which l:le a114 tho 
Melfal7••Jiaaaoattoa dtMMl with 8\Uipieioa aa4 alreptie181D. Ill the yeara 
1924·1928, he lllllootriaaUA farMra with the 14u ot OOIIIPillaory oooperatiora 
aal!l a:t'OUP aotiGD, -ko11lq their nliawo on tra41tionel 1a41Yi41lal181D 
a114 bolptq to Ulher 1a aa ora ot oolla0111YO acttoa 111 acrtculture. '1'U 
14ea ot toraod oooparatiGD aot a p:rooa4oat tor tho M Act • wbioh appl1a4 
eooperat1011 to araaa that tho Mlla17•Binaaea1toa did not touoh. Whoa M. L. 
Wllaoa, P:rotuaor ot Acrioult\lt'lll Booaomloa at Moa11aaa State Colleco. aa4 
~hH' 4a..Uo-aUotMat propoaenta ahit~ the emphaaie trcs ~~arket1Dfl 
to procluoUOilo proYOJd:ac Peek'• "bittd' oppoeitiOil. th87 were ettecUDS a 
ehaJISe which • ••• hie tam relitlf efforts hat ctone aoh to eDOOIU'II68•" 
tam p&'i... • • •• helpect to sUalate OOII.IIilien.Uoa ot a creep eat pro-
4uotioa ooa11rols aa pert ot ~ Datioaal .. r1oul11ural pol1oy.•41 
'l'he 4Utel'llaoea on- 11he ho •Jor aohoola ot 1ihouaht oa asz'i• 
oulbral poltoy .... the Mcllal'J'•lilllll•ltea eat the da.suo-allotii&Dt adw-
eatea - nen'lualJ.7 l'llaulte4 ia aa OIJIID ooarlto'l. FI'QII 'lhe 111144le ot 
1932, JOJ oa all aid". arialaa trca tha Nliet that tha eleotiOil ot a 
President W.o 'IIOilld aip s •Jor •ll'i~~~&ltual "bill ws certain, 1'1N111lte4 
1n llbat .-uated to a tnaoe. Wben Peek beee• the first .Adllliaiatn.tor ot 
the Alt. Act. llh1ollo ea aa caaih& MdUS'IIo pel'lllitted the adoption ot oaa 
or IIIOJ'e ot aeftzal polio1ea, the olaeh oe• ou11 into the open,42 
the buio 41ttereaoea--iat In&;..,... ~-. te1.qull*H4.:.ft•tva 
- ..,.,l¥'.aM.,..,..u. or 1n other, '--• p&'Oduot1on controls and the 
tunouoa ot toraip ~~arkfta. Peek oppue4 p&'OduGtiOil controls. expeoUq 
o'"za•s ~~arkets to a"baorb 111U"Plu. Hie oppoaents counted ftl'J lUtle oa 
toreip ~~arketa. 1aa1a1iiaa that aa ettedift policy had to beaia vt.th 
lilllitiaa pro4uotioa ill the 41reet1oa ot ._stio 4-D4. Det1n1Uoaa ot 
the Molfal')'•lfilluaeD ( equalisatiOil•f") an4 4CIIIIIIetio-allot~~aDt soh-• 1n41· 
oate the two approeOhea to the aollie..-at ot parity I 
41. nte. Gilbert c •• gegra I· .flli-* rapt m .11m P,ritr (llol'll&n. 
Ve.lftl'llitT ot Oklaheaa Preaa, 19.54) 222. 232. 
42, see 'belwo Chapter x, S.ottoa, . •The AU. .... • 
444· 
Colapt&'- "oh year the fair etlllaDp nlue ot each pr1ac1pal 
uop oa the 4-auo •rlret, Prvtaot th1a nluo v1th a '-r• 
Ut hicb eo.oup to aep tonlp c ,Uti" fi'OII 001111118 iato 
thia count~?• ro- a ...,.~, oerporaUoa to •tntain thia 
nlu bF IMIJ'i.JIS at \hat 1 ... 1 the J&rt ot the OI'Opa vh1ch 
etlllb 4-.tie ...U, OJ' I.e 11\U'Plu, an4 sell it oa the 
tON!p .rket at 11bateftl' prt .. it vlll oriliC• Make Q the 
W.ea hee theM expme • ~1118 a price par buahel at 
thll tS. ta~re •ll their pniluota .43 
••• lt 1aTOlve4 rata1116 the prioe the tanaara voul4 reoei" 
oa the 4-aUoal.ll' oo.....a pwtioa ot their exPOJ>t OI'Opa 
bf lilltUq aalea ot auela aropa in the daaa.Uo •rket. The 
part ot the OI'OJ vbioh Ule taxwra ooul4 aell 1:11 the .daaa.Uo 
8U'lliet 'IIU oallecl the .,._..ie .. Uota.nt, la ONr to IIIOYe a 
e Uty tuo 40MaUe oua ptioa, fi'O"MOl'B had to oo .. r 
the quantitiM ottere4 tor aale with oert1t1catea purohaaw4 
troll t.-re. The 1ao:raaaa4 reWl'D oa eaoh taJ'II8r1a 4-tio 
allota.at wa to reeuU fi'OII the taot that he reoeiftd Dot 
8lllJ' the wrl4 prioo, Wt alae the proooedo ti'OII the aale 
fit Ilia oertltiaatea. • oertitiaaua wre ianacl em pl'Oduo-
Uaa ia ..... ot the llCillleaUo ·~•nt, ellll oa thia ~at1t;r 
the talWl'O reaai•all ODl7 tha ....-utaa vorl4 prt ... ,144 
fte njecti"f8 ot the two plau •• "141q the pri" to 4o.aUc GOA• 
43. MoOUa, Vaale;r, JlullUa J.Yra, 17. 
44. J:laYla, Cheater c., •the lle"f8loJ118111i ot J.cr1oultural Polley einoe the 
IDAl ot the WOrl4 Var,• T•rJeaM 1111. &SJ'lAA»m, 1940, citall 1:11 :rue, 
GU11ert c., Qt..,. I· .fiiU ••••• 229a nu, oubert c •• 9tot• I· liU 
••••• 160-61, pa'OY!4u u eaoellent brief 4et1n1t1oa ot the export-
4ebenttll'8 aeh_, wll.ioh orJ.aSaated vUb Proteaeor Chorlea L. stewrt 
ot the t!Di"f8n1t¥ ot XlUaoiar the plea wa, in effect, an export 
llouat;r, oert1t1caM8 or lleMuurea ot a 'flllue repreeentiliC the cUtter• 
eaoe Mtveea the coat ot ~loa ia the 11aite4 S.aha 111\4 ab1'0114 to 
M ai"a to exporters who ooalt pq .-.,. worl4 prioeo tor exportable 
nrplUM& to \he axteat ot the talleattll'88. whioh vera \o be DOCO'lable 
all4 could lie uaa4 \o pq s.,ort •utt... The 4aa118tlo allotMat au 
Molla~?•Jfauaea plaaa are nreuef here 'beoauee by 19.32 the;r _wre the 
lea41Jis l1au ot \hOI,IIJht 11110118 tal"lll partt.aaaa. 
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the •tentt etreou ..... • Later u....-.<t .. ot the allotment plaa tell4ed to 
ell,llbaaiae •pal'itJ"' prloea. loth II'CUP6 unci. both tel'IU, •tarf.tt ettectift' 
d4 •par1t7• 'llbieh were elicbtl¥ 41ttereat _,. ot upreasiug elf.ahtl.J 41t-
tereat 14eaa. ID atl'iet '-· the tree-trade prioe plu the tariff 1101114 
aot .. !1111&1'117 1le the eq;ahaleat ot a 0 pa1'1t7" prioe u1Rlate4 on the 
.....,._,Ult.r ot all'inlt\\ral tor 1a4ut1'1al po4a 1a a h1etor1oalllaae 
,.not. ., 1932, Peek U1111ll;r UH4 'JUitT' 1a the ae .. ral saue ot 
•'"••• eqv~all\J' tor tantra, to 1le obtdu4 'bJ lllllldac the •tal'itt etreo-
"'"•" 'lhe allo-.at pnpn•t• t_.. to ue •parit7" 1Jl the a;t~eo1t1o 
aeue ot aa 1114• prtn. uoi41nc thAt 41(epl1cate4 sn4 -••• CGDtraf.io .. 
tor:r tariff pellet .. 11b1eh tile Molfillt'•.._aiiea toz.lated. 
the tva aehooll • oootllotinc •leva oa production oontrola, toret.aa 
lllllrUta, an4 taritta re....ela4 the -.t.o 41ttereaoes whieh produoed s 
oppoeiug •1-. aecautr¢ 1a the 1920'•• doWD to and beyond the paaaace ot 
the Alt. .wt. Staoe tbet law pe-.tw the uae ot either or both ot two 
•J• ••-•• l'eek'a •rkftta& a.cree-nh aacl the alletant plea, a 
tlpt •• taen table. 
5o siaale 4etiaitloa would nriotl;r aJilJ to all lllllrkaUIIC ecree-
•1l11•· 'lbe eaa'blf.IIC prmaioa ill tile .u Aot w.a brief an4 ceDeNl, per-
llittf. .. t!MI aaptiatlon ot r.a¥e•••ata 11b1ah alilliaated praetto .. hn4111C 
~ Weat the purpoaee ot \he .ut. A epeo1tio arkeUDS acre-at ailbt 
iaelv4e proYiaioaa per\a11llll8 to 811J maber ot the tolloviDS• { 1) prioea 
*lell \he prooeaaor pd4 to the protuoera (2) arkeUJIS praoUoeaa (.3) 
lallala aliA a\8114el'Ua (4) prl_. wbloll \he coullll8r 11814 at! re\a1l. 
Prlee-tuiDS u_ll., molve4 88\UJII ldai.,. all4 .axs- char•• rather 
\ball apeo1t1o aauata. I'Mk we pri-.1'11¥ 1ratareata4 ill (1), the prioe 
wllleh the farMr reoetve4. 'l'uawell we ooraoenl84 with the relaUoraahlp 
llat- ( 1) all4 (4) •• aa ill..,.... ia lloth lllisht •an hi@her 11l4uatrta1 
11q88 8ll4 prl"•• JUttliiS the fal'M1' back where he etarta4. If a~ 
ot .uoketliiS 811J umallta vit~t prod.uUoa CCllltrola left a eurplua, the 
A"Maiatrator CIOII14, ea PMll: wa to do, -11: 41apoaal 0'18raaaa UDder n'll-
aaoUea 12\1, whiah pai'IIUW the u" ot SA ... trcal prooaaaliiS toea tor 
the aulNii41&aUon ot apona ira the Mlllla17..a.us1111 •MIN'• 
!'aell'a amphaaia oa •rkeUJI& ••-•, alii\ the all.ot.IDIAt p).aa, 
locioall.J f'ellow4 tna ocatraatliiS 14eu oa tha crucial MUar ot aon-
aaa reatrin1ou. rz. I'Mk'• OJPPIIIIIDU' atan4po1.Dt, lla -.4e a virtue ot 
a ..... alty. Stopplq Juat abon ot the lea\ atap, pndv.ouon 0011\rol.a, 
he overeatS.ta4 the ettloaor ot MI'Ut:iDC 4av1oea alii\ the allaorbetlt a\IU.-
1Uea ot f'oraip Mrkata. Gi'Nil their \lal:lat that d1raot control ot 
av.ppl.J we eaaeatta1 tour vorkallla Jn8rall• they had to •- up with 
•-thlq lilril the allotmant plea. A JII'88&Dtat1a Of' the oeateatlq 
14aaa oa pro4uot10D ooatzoola an4 •pon 11111rketa w111 provide a clarlf'J'liiS 
prataoe to a conalderatioa of' the tormalatioa and pramotion ot the allot• 
Jllant plea, vhieh, aa a lata ..... r ( iuotar aa obtainiDS vida pubUcit:y 
an4 aupport wa oonoeraad), - equal atatua in the AA Act with the pro-
4118. 
JIMill• tit Pwk. aa aoUft ....,.rt...,.....Ue a.tace 1922. 
,_tile 'Mclaataa to tile elliS ot Peek'• oane:r •• a tl&hte:r to:r 
tena padtr. he .__. ]II'OilueUce ocatro1e. Vhile tile MGifa:r:Y-Iiali8M 
plea, '11111011 he lllq)li0Ji'te4 'hrou&h tile 1920'•• nqu1:re4 a hl&hl7 cea11ftl-
lae4 ...,.:ratift or .,.,.,._ta1 a:rkettaa etceBCI1• u cll4 ~ taM1ft 
eithu a pb.Ua.ollbJ' or a aehaal• tor ooatro1 tit p:ro4uUoa,49 L1lle the 
.....,.,..JJa .... tlllla, HooNS 1a A&J'ioultwa1 Ma:rkeUD& Aeto acbWalah:ra4 tt, 
the Pe4enll'azalee:rt, ••• •• ita- lll41oatecl, -uauv a MrkM• 
ill& ... _,..,so '1M lllllfteeUw•u ot the l'a1'll lloal'll'• ope:raUOilO 414 
aot oh4tQjll ftiU:'• U..e. Ilm-111&. the ,.r1e4 ot the Para lolm! 1e ta11ure, 
lae oau.a talk ataout eoatrollin& Jl"'ketioa •• , ... 17 daqe:rou.•Sl 
1Mr1Jt1 the OllllJIIls.a ot 19)2. hek ea11e4 to:r a •-Pill& PI'OCJIUl 
tor taza neon17 - withe.t 4eo1a1w -. .. na tor crop re4uouoa.52 Be 
414 ooal81ee la a letta:r to WlUiua llaa4o1pll Heal'llt ia the -:r ot 19)2. 
that tol'atp a:rkete wre aot wllat tlael' Wl84 to bel 4eapita hie~­
Uoa fit ohanpe 1a tba woru, he ooatiall4 to 00114- p:ro4uouoa ooauo1a.53 
OUbert C. lite, Peak'• o'll,1aot1-.. 'lllCICRlthe:r, ._ateclt 
.so. 
51· 
52· 
1!01' tea Jaa:re Peak ba4 telke4 allo!at alvin& aSI'iouUure the 
- lWI4 ot Satlueae. aa4 ooati'Ol o-..:r p:rlce whioh tint 
liluiaa .. , an4 thea lalilor ha4 -. able to aoh18'M ia the 
lliOIIH'Il 1.114utl'ial atate. Yet, he •• uawillln& ,. tollov 
llfo\l:ree, 14w1a o., IIU'I!UIV ,., pp pte uMer 1ll& MA (Vaahiqta, 
Jrooldap %uUt11t1Gr&, 193.5) t .. 
nta. Oi.llltll't c •• Qnnrt I• a.· ..... 225 • 
nte, ou~~wt o •• prr 11 I· 11:1* ..... m. 
JClUOil, Geo1at r., J.1ta Ia .It -U·tk1 fMr (Joatea, t.ltUe, 
........ 1'") a6o. 
rite, Gll'-"' c., S1rmn I• llll ..... 2,34. 
tlile pollo:l.es ot 'buineaa and restl'iot outpu.' •••• 
1'41ek1a poattioa la the 1910'• ehaal4 haYs los:l.oellJ 
1M hia to auppon n4ueel prtlllu.tioa to a:l.ntabl 
prtoa. \lut hla a..,_...te4 aataacmla to a ~
ot 4M011Cillle aoa:rott7 tor ag:l.eulture -ld not pel'• 
11U hill to talce th:l.a lut locloal atep • .54 
!Mit:, lite oonttaae4. beUend that the baokbooa ot tha oapUal1st1o 
apha wa the lndepea4eat laa4-ow1118 fazour. whose d.a!H would f'uada-
11111tell¥ alter our aoaletr to the deti'SIIftt or au.SS •In •111 nent,• 
lite OODC1Ude4o •tt wa tb:l.a bellat whioh IIOtlvated Peelt:1a whole fal'lll-
nl.let H.lli*'- an4 toroecl hill to oppoae any PJ'Ot!l'Ul ot raatrtoted pro-
duotiOIL\•1,56 
lluiDt tha lalla-duok period and into the aaw A4ain18tratlou. Peek 
a\oM t11'11l. Ia tile heotto wiater ot 1932•1933• !Mk, 1n Weah:I.DftOIL\, .-.-
twred 4&111 with iDMnlatecl parties • a tU'IIl proa:-. Dlaagae:I.Df IIJW'iloo-
11 with IMIIf ot hla ol4 trieade, be vaa 41-Jed at the emphaaia lllh:l.lh 
JiHI'f Wllllaee, Ill. L. wu.oa, llloi'Utai JIUklel, and othen plaeed oa pro-
duetioa OOIL\ti'Ola. Be add that • ••• the tal'll leadera were bel~~£ let ott 
111 eeon-.eta.• He wa ~leta~ to fitalt acreaae raatrtoUou u hari 
•• be oould.S7 
J4, 193~h a84 the s-t• co.t.ttea oa Acrtoalture Oil March 24, 1933· At 
the l'elQ/uJ.7 beeriDf be etreeeed the Saportooe ot prOY141Ae tor •rket-
,54. rue. ou~~en c., Gttlflt I· ~ ....... 235. 
55· rue, Gilbert c., 0t9rg I· Jlll ...... 235. 
,56. nte, ou"-rt c., QtFe J· .bU ..... 2,36. 
Sl• lite, Gilbert c .. 9M •I· 11M .... , 2114. 
450. 
1Jic apeweata -a dpiti•nt 41111baaia, ainoe, ae M .Adainiatrator, be 
later 1Ulate4 on ha..Uf.Ds the surplus problOI through this -u. He 
-u reem to a prooua1Jic tu:, he atate4, it it waa aee4e4 to .a up 
the tutenaoe betWMa the •rlcet price all4 parlty (it ia a?'lllwhat :t.rontc 
As a laet l'Hon, in a craat _ ... .,. Peek VOI&ld ape to the IO'"ft-
... t•a re4uo1nc the aiiOUftt aotoa to IBl'lcet b7 an9atiaa the • ••• ha:M'eat• 
1J1c ot a part ot ur •c 'l:ltJ bJ' J811DC the ta1"!1111r the local arket 
trioe, len the coat ot pl'04v.ot1oa. • He 1'80011111811484 a4111niatrat1Cill oa 
the atate leftl ot 8111 l'HtrioUoa proriaf.oa • .SS 
At tu Mal'oh heariaa 'tieton •cot:toa 14• &aith'a co.tttn oa A&rl• 
oulture, Peek apia aaaertet that arkeUas •6"-•ta, not produoUOA 
eontrola, woul4 be the IIIIIIJt 1JQOrtaat part ot a tal'BI bill. SeMtor &11th 
apreaae4 hia uDderetandf.Ds that the pul'POae ot the blll voul4 be to bold 
production dowa to daaeatio GOnaUIIPUoa. Peek 41aa81'"4 vith the ec-tt-
tae Cbairan, ateUoa that the IIU'J08• ot the lesialatf.on •• to raf.H 
tr1oea to a • ••• talr le'Hl v1tlh1a the Vn1te4 states and uet world .-
petition without hav1D8 the prioe 'bnak dova vf.thln the Ula1te4 Statu J.fl 
.,.us.iJ the power ot gOYarnMat 'beh1D4 the farmers and the prooeaeora 
ot fal'll pzoo4v.cta .... • He aoaolll84 that - pro'fiaion for aorMce ...,. 
trola ehoul4 be iD the bill. He Wlll4 4eatroy poovtn& eropa 1t a tlf.tbt 
proportio• ot the maturtna crop thrMt....S to destroy the whole 1ndutl'J --
.sa. rue, Ollben c., itom I· l'IU ..... 249-50. 
•tttat :l.a mat Jallppena with unreplatt14, unoontroll414 npplJ' ••• • .59 
Ia ~11'• op:l.a:l.oa, a plan wb1oh 414 aot provide tor rt4uat:I.OD 
ot orope )!!(m, rather than atWr, planttna. would result in "1UUi'8jJU).IIW, 
u..nrol.le4 npPlJ'.• Ia 1928, u hia ...oralldum tor Altred 1. Satth, it 
vUl b4l ,...11414, he otted aa a ohkt detect of the Mdar,y·Hausen pleD 
ita·~ w rataa p.r:l.- vi'llhtlllt oo.trolliaa auppq. Be DOted thllt 
the 1Delaat1a d ... D4 for staplee an4 the ehort•run 1ntlea1b111t7 ot their 
aup)lr ol"Mt414 par1e41o nrJlUMa •• all4 the aurplua wa the •h•n ot the 
4&ft1eult7. • ~1 oca.ol\14ed that om~roUed pl.an11iac vaa aaaeattal to 
ur •••"' 11h1oh '1101114 aot W•t t.taelt. 60 
lll hS. 1m aniola, 'l'aaleliet an4 a Pe-unt AaricllUun,• ~­
'111111 Jl'e8Mt414 a lenctbT 1ll4in.at or tile Malllar,y·HaUgefl plaD, atattna 
w • ....., •Ill' ;th:I.Uable edllta:l.nraU.- ·~·· He aaaerte4 that the 
llola1'7•uceaitaa ,coatra41n.l th-lTea in ol1Jeot1118 to orop ooatrola 
because ot their uavillfnpe .. to 4epan fl"CCl la:l.aaea-talre. 'lihUe they 
tall414 ter aaoh .,.er.-atal aotivttr. th., \IWld not IIICT8 to tha h•rt 
ot the problaa. •LUeral interpretatloa ot aootrina,• 'fuavall protaated, 
and hJ'Itterioal t•ra flit all0'111lt4 the •-1 • a 110ae to set 
wa4er the teat, lw .. Ml'W to bl'lll& doctrine into diaputa. 
J'rM enhi'Pl'lae aa a uaeh1 .,.._ rill be .ore queat1oaed 
thlln it llf.aht M it it ..,. iateJ"Pratad .ore tle&llll.J ••• 
•• PnfltUOZ' Jlattea uae4 to ..., , mat 1a auentlal llliaht 
be MOJ'lt1otllfl mat·- illportaat. 
AU -.am StlilutriNo .,.. tha .,., protitallle and att:l.oiant, 'fupaU 
OGDel. .... , ba4 aurpl.uaea, or • ••• vbat UIO\IIIted to the - thllllo the 
41Cl1l1..-t vi:Lieb, 1t operate& to •paeu,., would produa. thea.• A ar-ter 
IIU'P1U prob1• ia .,.rioultan 1rlllkatle4 the need tor 1110re pleDDilll a1l4 
eoatrol thU 1a other I.Uutri ... 61 
hell:'• oppoaeata, tuaweU, Val.laoe, aDd Wllaon, wn no\, ot 
O'NZ'Ho public ottiolala 4urtaa the 1920'•• HowltTer, oppoeition to l'Mk'a 
1deu 414 llOt deftlop ool7 ._taide ot otftalalclCIII. Wtth1a the atla1atatra• 
tiouot JlarllJ.Da, Cooli4Ca, aDd Hooftr there ws a groviJII attill1t7 tor 
1deU vi:Lioll JOillta4 to'lll81"48 pro4u.oUoa ooatrola. The report ot the 
lfa:Uoaal Aartoult1U'81 Coatareaoe ot 1922, oallad 'bJ" Preaidant Hardillle 
DDtill& the quick a4JutmeAt ot prod\lotiOD 'bJ" aDUtaoturera duriJ:I& price 
reeeuiou, a4't'1ae4 tal'lll orpatut,t.Clll.ll to look to wrl4 auppl1;-e.ll4-d8118D4 
tao\Oft ao t;bat tile)' could a4Ylea their -bare aA4 • • • • propoee -•~ 
urea tor proJat' lJ.IIitatioa ot aonqe ill particular crope.•62 Ill 1'30 
Secretal'J" ot A&r1cultlure Arthur M. _.., in a .atlat8Mnt later quote4 '-' 
'J.'uawll, 4aolare4s 
Oaa UJH' ot the tua ~ ·OYeraluulowa all othera. 
Pl'o4\ult1on 1a CNt ot balaailt with the •rket, an4 INI'• 
plu.au pile up coaUINOIIalf ...... 0111' 41ttioult7 is aot 
a ttalldea -1'81110,fo lNt a I lit\t•l'N qTe:r•produoUft .... 
I 'lllllJlt to • 11 ado tlha .-.4 ,_, K~&i'kblo, illtellta-nt, 
.,.._u., aa4 oolleou.,. "!.l;,., toLlli-iJtC aupplJ' tato 
batter ralatiouh1p vttll t ~.:,.~,_u•3 
'JIIlCWll, R. o., •Jal'lll Jlellet •••• ,• 219-&la Tqwl1 llke4 to - the 
,u. .. orecUte4 to his teacher, l"dt4ta. 
MoCuae • .,..ley, :u llmAl!l· 17. 
Q.ota4 1a J1aa hUla .QIE p MDV• 228. 
Tile Coaterence report ot 1922 and. lf¥4e's report ot 19.30 cUd not, 
it u tru.e, neoe• .. ril¥ call tor direct aoreeae restriction eotorced by 
repol'tl, tal.ke4 a sreat deal about ntuud production, wt the Agrioult\11'111 
Marketin& Act oontained no ettenht provision tor curbiJI& surplu out-
Pitt. W. '1'111 J'Meral J'al'lll Board 'fi&Oroualr urpd voluntscy reduction on 
tal'llllra, who tailed to reapoll4J ll\ tact, they defied the aua&eation. 65 
After ita di .. atroua CJC:perienet, the :rem Board :f'illall;r recQD8ndtld 
• ••• reaulatina acreaae or qiiADtitita aold or botb,•66 The Hoover adlliA• 
tetration took no action on aucb rsc-lldationa. 
Mu;r dOIIIeatio-allotunt advooatea, includina Wilson and Wallace, 
414 not start out aa proponents ot &CJ'M&e restriction. Like the otti-
cisla ot the Republican a41111niatrationa, they evant~J.ll' conclul.ed that 
an etteouve proaraa hed to illolu4e direct control o:f' III.IP.PlJ. WUaon, 
tor •ample, orialnall¥ supported Peu'• aohlal8 tor surplus oontrol1 be 
aradWt.~ oonclu4e4 that scae kind ot obeclk on production was neceaa.rr. 6T 
Ill 1929, W.Uace, a RepubUoea, thOII&ht that the Molllar;y-Jia.Ue:en pl.M, 
which be aupporttld, would reault in verr little inerua" ia ac%'hp.68 
lfallace, too, chansed Ilia vitVII. In Marob 25, 19.33• he told the SeDate 
••• 65. 
66. 
J'ite, Gilbert C., Otprtt .1• - .... , 225, 
J'lte, 011\IN't c •• -- •· .. ••••• 227. lautel, M. and Been, L. H., •J!ooncldc Baaia tor the Aarioul.tura1 
U.Jwltlllent Aot,• 1a 'l'aylor, aor.oe, et al., .u, CoJ»:'!I!!!QJ'J£1 lr!m-
laa Ja .sM. Jl'Ut4 .:patea (lfew Tort, :aarcoul'tl, 193.5) 390. 
rue, Gilbert c •• 9•1• I• Zltk .... • 230. 
Wallaee, H. A., •au,llltlSM't• ot J'am Prlcee and the Mclla.cy•Hauata 
till. • A& tple at .SU. 'M£1W •gOer at :f!l1Ugl .llll Spt'fl 
3Ate•o To1. llao Jlo, 2,1, lfaftlh, 1929, 402.05. 
4,Slo 
a-&ttee oa A&rlt~~o~lt\ll'e that lle oorad4enct acnaae controls all4 tile 
ft181llat1oa ot procluoUoa ilae ooi'IIU'IIto~~e ot tho a411iniatretlon'e blll,69 
ll&n tile 4q before PMk ba4 tol4 the Seaaton that •rket1DC agre-nta 
were 111•• ke7 dArttea. 
The t~t wnt oa. A8 oloao to the paeaeae ot the A.A. Aot {MaJ 12, 
1933) u Allrtl 2, 1933, at a -uq ot l'Nko Wall.aea, -.u, all4 "here 
la Walb.._oa, Peek aJMl W.Uaea ba4 a hot ar..-at a\!Wt tho bf.U. Peek 
o'bjeete4 to •kf.Jia MaefU .., .... ._ eoaUq!IAt on aoraap I'!IAtal or pn-
b,J ll'eetriot1118 protunioa- aa at'-J' 111lloh he -u oppoae with all 
llla llipt. Wall.aee fillall.J ooaee4e4 tlllat Peek'• vtew wuld prevail, 
Wrailll; JleU:o ~l't that 0 • o o 1a Ue acllllDietratf.OD the bf.ll llil5ht 
M un.I'JI'Otll4 aoool't1118 ta llla J,f.u. .. •i/ poiat ot view.• 70 
lfallaM'• ooao1114111C ~k at tbe .. uac ot Aprll 2 provoll PJ"O-
Jbetlo. 'I'M .A4 Act 1MlwiM 'both PeQ•e tuae aDd aoreap-reetl'f.otloa 
proviaioaa. 'rba llattle O'MI' nl.aUw OIIQIII&eia _, oa with111 the AAI.o 
'1'ba •l'ldllfi out ot po.s1U.ae tor tho oo.illC tray •• appareat 1a a 1 rr-
.,._ Wallaoo 8IIJl1l to the P&uf.4nt oa April 22, lCJ3.3• '!'he SeoretaQ' 
~ that W£1le aa,y pouf.ble iatletloa llicht help the farmer -' 
fiu4 ohaiWHo it ¥1111&14 aot oMiate the ..... for pZ'IleluoUoa oontrole.7l 
halt, for hie part, W14ont0414 hf.e oppoaeate• poe1t10D. He raoaUII4 that 
theN 1a no cloullt that thq had. 111 their 111114a tile reatrioUon of pro4uo-
u •• .'12 
tile OODtlioUq eaUmdea 11h1eh I'Mk and h1a opliOJI,Itnta made ot the 
alliliV• anal aD4 potenUal, ot toret.cn •rlr.eta to absorb the surpl.ws 
produotiOD ot AMI'ieaa &£l'iculture Wllre corollaries ot their JIQ81t1ona 
parltv pr1oea at h- all4 •a-how- t1114 arlr.eta tor the aurplua. He 
410118lden4 the prolll• not oae ot OOAtrolUQC pro4uot1on wt ot 41eJ108lac 
ot the AJPlr ett.r 1 t had. IIMrA 1'ft4tlc .... 73 
Wore the seaate Fbaaoe -e-tttw on huuaq14, 1933, Peek 
teet1t1e4 that the • • • • ftOUlla tftflW 111 the 1101'14 1a aartcultual •r-
lr.et IW Clllr vitblft•l • • • 1a MSac fUle« "¥ other uPI)I'tlDC CK~Utrl .. 
••••" &a at.tel\ that tile ~·• JI!OII'UI ahoul4 pia peritT JPI'lOU 
tor fal'liU'a all4 rMtore tcretaa •rlr.eta •• not recluoe pro4v.cUOI:I. &a 
..,...... the opeaSac ot noJW.l •port •rir.eu th1"0\15h taternaUonal trade 
acsaaaata, :reetprooal tariffs. 8Jfll•UCIIl ot foretp d.eb11 to JNl1111811t ta 
wol41 or 111 part tor our exports, 8114 ateliUbet:I.CIIl of 111temat1onal 0111'• 
reae~ ... 7-
"'*• o.orce •• •· - i1&l.1 - ... 93· 
,, .. , GUllert c. •• as 1 • I· - ..... 245. 
lfOilne, 14111a o.2/.*''M a•llzannu .... , lJa rtte, OUllert c., 
r., •I· liM• • 
wen atea4N to allow we:p productloa tor cl.o.atic ....u, • ... plu 
lMt aa S.tenti.GDal wltlbcl.nwl. AU.l~, -.rt11811 tamere, cl.eapUe their 
pz'Oiblclll,g at tlW 1o'1111811 PJ'ieu, ba4 •alnaq loat• 1M117 ot their owr• 
-· •rlr.etl. 7.S 
'fuawell, who, a hta nport to AltrN 1. iiiiUh ill l<J28, attributell 
the aurplu pro-lea to the orpaiutioa ot acr1cultun oa all export 
lleas.,76 coaal4arN FMk'• '11ewe • apol't arketa urealist1c. He ••· 
aal'tH t.a liJ28 that the Jtelllar,--Ha\J&Oil 1ch4111 • • • • cl.epellCla oa 411ap11lc 
altNat.•77 At the ..... tiM, be ...,uu.~ njeote4 ._.idea of with• 
drawl fl'al foni&ll •rata. He atatH ia 1933 tbat agricultural aci.Jut· 
_, WOUlcl 'be • • • • •cb eaaier 1t our pocla ewlcl. moYe to foniflll •r· 
Irina. • 78 He lbta4 tbe 1•• ot export DBI'Ptl aa oae ot the oauaa of 
the 4apnuloa. n 'l'hia lou ba4 001.118 qui.eJtl¥, Tllpell 'bel1e'ft4, 'becaua 
ov foni&ll •rata natell oa falae prope. Our • ole,..r' 'IIIII' of expaa411lc 
tonip •rata ha4 ..._. to 18114 Ml1' on41tere the 11QDe1 with which to IRq 
our .,oeu, 8114 • • .. we loaud thla tal/ Mre thall wa wrraata b7 tbalr 
'79· 
oapuatty to ,.,.•80 n.~. 1'qwU, u a aatioDal.bt, vould aot ha'AI 
aooapttlll tile 1ateraat1oaaliata' Weaa aa a aolutton to the aariiiUltur.l 
proW... 'l'be epell.tJis 1&11 ot toreip •n.ta VOI.lld not, ia the aaUooaliata • 
optatOD, aol'AI tho pro\lea ot OYel'pi'OduatiCIIII without produetiCIII oootrola, 
it 'lllllllld, ill. taot, aaraftto .tho proltloa ot the aurplua.81 
Aa aUittoDal., eurtoua idoo vhioll l'eok held duarYM atteatioo ill. 
8 OOUideftti.Oil of hla dew OD aport •rk4!ta • He retuaod tO ll&J'N "' 
a nduftiOG ot apol"'la\lo crope "Dlaaa tha SO"UUIIIellt ooapollod bu.aiaeaa 
to rehoo ita aalao O'I'OI'MU. IDdwltlq aDd aartculturo, J'ite oe• •lilted, 
414 ut 40IIIfiW tor cporta to tu ctont that Peek aa14 th., 414. Rodv.e· 
lite h4uatrial ezJII)na woul4 haw ....._.... total tal'll Hl.oa becauao ot a 
aUiaJra&re ill ._.tla 41 ... Peek'• ..._ tor 1Jalano1aa induetrial end 
qrieultw:-.1 apol"'la, rue OOD01'114od. llat •••• no particular •rtt.•82 
.. lllll'l&eU .. · ~ IIIIJ aa4 hla .oppoaeah oa tarltta wn 
alae oorollarloa of their poeitiou Oil acne_. coatrola. 'l'arifta holt a 
oaatnl ple.. ill tho tbinklAI of tile IIColliiu7-Ifaa&an1tu. 'l'he a4weat.. ot 
tu allot..at plea,..,. fi:rat ooulteratioa to orop netrioUona. While 
llotb aohoola \apa ~ iaaiaUDC lMt e tal'll PI'OIJ'UIIII111i •ke the "1ieritt 
otteettw• tor apieul11ur.l p:roduna, -., 19)2 the all.ot•nt group atl'NII04 
;parUr ia the a»eottio .. .,.. of •aUO" prtoea. 
so. 
81. 
ea. 
4.58. 
'l'ho lletlu7•Haucott .. propoae4 to protect 11 fair price tor tU'III 
1004• at h- with 11 teritt, their eta beiJis that aarioulture ehGUld 
reeelft 11ho - proteoUon that iatuetrr ha4 hietoricell¥ enJore4. 'l'llq 
wwl4 than ee11 11he eurplu at llhat it 'lfOI.\14 brills on 11he worl4 art.t, 
-.kills up lceMa with n eqaalbaUOil-fM t'WI4. The a1lo11118nt aohool. nw 
eoatft4iotirlae in thia aeh-. 'I'M pria17 pu'P08a ot 1a4uetr1a1 tarUte 
dacMt .A.lexeaur Halll11tOII'e tlllll W INiea to preeene the hCIM •rltet tor 
AMri88ll Jllllmtaetunre. 'rile Mo!lel'f-Iflnl&enltea, too, WAte4 Pl'llHI'ftUOil 
ot the hCIM IDilrltet, 'fu&wll illlfome4 Slllllth, 'but without upeettlfiC the 
Ol'pllbaUon ot acrteultun oa •• apon lilllate -- lll other worde, there 
voW.4 be ao oaatro1 ot pro4uet1oa. A atu4.eat ot tara probl- oonolu4ed 
that tile 1 ohtot tallaOJ" ot tbo --.17-Ba\ll:ell plaa ley in tta tarUt pro-
rtdoaa. Be tuote4 Ch"ter c. Dllrte, hek1e auoceaaor ae .u Admlaiatra-
tor, 111t1o 00111111tnM« tbat a aaUoa ouaot expect to aeU exporta 1t it 4oae 
ut allow iJiporU. 83 
The allotMII.t plaa, it la tne, also eou&ht to pneene the 4_.... 
Ue •rt.t tor M8r1tea e¢CNltun. I\ tlf.ttend tna the Mollar,v·lillmpn 
plaa beteuae, •• 'fUawell- poiaM oat la hie report to SIUth, it 414 aot 
4epn4 oa 4\lllplas a~J:Aa4. Dlilpllll 41""'" toreiaa ;pw:oheeiq paver to 
the ...,._ 16 Aari88ll IM4• Mllta.J d a PJ"ioe vhieh loare4 the • ..,..... 
per-vat\ take tor aU ot aarieultv. t 1t 1aoeue4 toreip pron._.. 11114 
aowranul aad, ae '-""U ~ to SIUth, it al'OI&Hil reeen11118at oa 
tho part ot ....-ioea houewiwa, who 414 aot reliah ... las their toref.lll 
4.59· 
OCIUDUJ11&rb purobaae Aarioaa prod\&na at prices wll below the 111.rket 
FiM preqilf.Da 1n the tlllited states, 
!1M allotll8nt people desired to concentrate on the adjuatmeDt ot 
pro4m10D to dOMatic 4emanda. ha11411at; tbe problem ot exports on a 
apeoitic, U.41ate baaia. It for&1611 111.rkets opened up through reo1-
pnoal-trade assonants al\1! other 4e"ri_, they WOilld revise production 
up~ert1 accor41Dal¥• PMk, too, faYOl'ed the use ot nr1cu 4evioea to 
apaa4 o,en .. a outlets, but hi.B oppoattioa to aoreace controls -.at 
that he WDUl4 ha.,. on hand a aurplu tar 1ih1oh markets had to be !011114, 
vhather or an int.rae.Ucmal aann••uta were poaaible. It he d~ aur-
plu.a1 tub dnote4 to 4\llll,p84 S00411 oltYiCJUl.T wuld not be uae4 te pur-
ohaaa ae:riau aoe4e 'ltlich 414 not, 1lhrouch eu\JIIidizatioa, sell at aa 
unprofitable pries. 
Beth lfOilPB• lt has beea noted, eelled for a prot.oted pri" 1a 
the bc:ae •rket. '!'he ditferellt impacts Wlich thdr ple118 W0\114 ha.,. Oil 
intemational tra4e hlll6ed• 1a the eDd,. oa their attitudell towr4a acre• 
ace coatrola. 'l'upell llllliated that the lccteal meana ot protection ot 
the llc:ae lllllrkllt wa orpaizatioa al0116 dcaeeUc linea •• tbe 11.S.ta1;10D 
ot pro4uct1oa towrda da.atic 4.-114. ID4ee4, ia his report to Smith he 
~R~B&Ntad that lea"ti118 to au aartcultural ~~~arket1116 corporation arrance-
_,. tor lnt-Uo~~al tra4e oa a 0011.tn.ot bu1e would ll,nlaaa the tarut 
proW.. 
The •tter ot the tarut not onlJ' ra1ae4. the queaUon ot 1a11anlll• 
Uoaal tra4es it also pertained to tha oaleulatlon ot fair pri- tor 
AliiH'ieaa tan }111'04u•ta. halt -ttnnall¥ etreased the •tanrr atraeu ... • 
••••»'. 'fhe 4-.atio all.ot.at aahoel araduall¥ tu1'11811 to a dll'Mt 
•nue• oa1wlat1w, reJqtf.nc the adclition ot the worl4 prioe 6114 the 
MrUr •• a ...,. ot arrh·llla a\ aa aoevate pe1'1t7 tiallre. 84 t'llpell, 1a 
ll1a report to l:llllith, lill:e all a4<fooate• f/1/t the taJ'IIIIIftl• cauae, ACted tut 
taritt '*'" in4ua\l'J' aa a4.,.atap over IIF'icuUure. The tarUt c:ertalllll' 
4i4 aot aooouat tor all ot induatl7'• a4'fUtqe. Oae onl¥ ha4 to con-
814ft' la4UIR17'• o\wlOUBl¥ auperior abilltJ to a4ju11 81lJPlr to a.-11.4 to 
... that the tarltt 414 aot pnw14e a tull n:plallatioa of the 41tfereatlal. 
Blat Peek atuok to hla &UU• Oa Aprtl 30, 1932. he wrot. to Roo~ 
wlt, urs!IIB tM OoYemor to oaae wt ia feTOr at au. •ohanla which 
-u alee tile •te.rt.tt etteottw• oa aurpl.ua orope. Durins the cempast:a 
lle we plee.Hil whea tbe Delaoontio oall414ate emphasized nw.ltins the •tarut 
tua apaech at Toppa f.a Stpt.._,, 1'32· He wrote to the Preaidellt-te-lle, 
Oflftll'lltulatf.nc hSII aDd 4eolarf.n8 that the • ••• prinoiple at •kla& the 
tarf.tt etteotlw ahellld M atrea .... •I.S 
Mtenllhtle, M. I.. Wf.leoa, the lea41zlc pt'OIDD\ar ot the allotJDeat 
plaa, with whGII T\1pllll kept in oloee ~. OOm"f.noed that the tarU't 
we not a perUoularlr .,.114 -.aia tor deta~f.lll a fair price, au,:pote4 
sUoklal to tile •tariff etfeMlW" 14M tor the tiM beinc. Jfe reuou( 
thet people bacl Mia eo 14utate4 to "thia terf.tf ettecti'YI bllaiDIU" that 
it bad toM ltue4 to the a~ plea. JAtar, Wf.leoa 8UUOotMo tbeJ 
84· ftte, oubal't c •• g.prn •· .blk ..... ~a. 
as. n••· ou:~~~an o •.• !IIP!al· 11M ..... 237, ao. 
cou14 • ••• IDOTe 11111re iletinJ.tely tow!'d proiluction control J;D4 the 
nUo..prtoe concept ot per1tz7.•86 !he title ot '1'\lpell'e plan 1n hie 
to Wilaon•a view. By the U• the .u. Aet vaa written, •partv,• tor 
whtch Peek, to hie laeUaa emit, tO\IBbt tor a decade, w.e •7JlOIIliiiOU 
With ita ntto-prtce rather than ita ~-ettacttYe veraion. The 
d.QIIIIettc-ellot~~eat srouP not 011.l,r liiU able to put ita 14Ma tato the ll 
Acta lt alao natul1y 4etaate4 PMit. WbUa the MA:ry-&upnf.tea ade 
the tnlat pasee 4ur1R£ the 1920'•• the 4Cl1111Jetie-ellotlallllt IIIOVe~;~ent BTOl'A14 
,ulatly ~t e1CD1f1oeatly. 
The ,so ... r t~ator or aoae ot the princl,W.a ot the domestic 
allotMr&t plan w.s w. :r. SpU.lau ot the T.1SllA. fS7 Spf.lliiiEln • a 1181118, '!\Is• 
well wrote, • • • • will tor.Yer be aaeootate4 vnh the arovth ot rural 
aoclal ut1011. ia .AIIerioa.• !arly 1JI the .cant1U7 Spill.Mn llepn to lay 
the tO\lQ4atloa in raaeerch aD4 pre-pl.autrac tor the later ilevelopa~nt ot 
aarioulturv.l adjutment. He d*"loPB4 the ot'tice of Farm MauplllfJiat, ~ 
1918, into the •reoocnlzable pre<leoeeaor" to the Bureau ot Agriculturv.1 
Jcoaaaloa. & publlah~ oost-or-pr-.tt.on ttsur•• which fiiiiNrrtsaed 
Seoretaey Houston, llh.o toroM Spilt.aa to reaip.88 
86. 
fiT· 88. 
~ 'IIOrlt Splllmla etafted Vlllt oa. IA the early 1920'•• the OBnl 
Flte, Otlbert c., 9'?™ l• Jllll .... , 2:31·.32· 
J'tte. Gll.Mn c., ..,.: •· .l':llll ••••• 229. 
fucwll, Jl, o., '4 Pk t:l''•~ .r ~cul~'• r.tv.,• lOMIJ!Il 
.It .lu:III"R'U• Vol. 31, lfo. 1, 7elmle.ry, 19/l9, 338· 
\!epa to lleftlop aarioultural..outlook ataUatioa and land-use plauille• 89 
for the bu1141ag ot Ua aouoa )J'OCJ'UIIJ the !few Deal 1aher1te4 a t11'lll 
tOUII4aUon, whioh oou1ate4, 'l'a&wll o\laeM'ell, • •• , not Olll7 ill aoCNDt• 
latef. relewat laulvla ... , but alao ia a cotral atatt and a tar-reaohill8 
t1e14 report1118 ar-ta oapa11le ot t11141ns out enJ\hinc poU.oy makers 
aaaW to 1au1v .... • 90 OUt ot the &Oftl'llllleDt, Spillman hilllaelt oonti!Wed 
ht••t llep1pgblt r_,ttigp• sf. llP"M• .D& Gaz'M• .lilA 3"""'14 !EZ?d .. 
Jll, Rev Tork, Oftace lu44 Pu\lliahina llr IIMlf• 1927· 
leal'Qlq !luml, head ot the Rookatellar J'Gwadation, a114 Proteaaor 
lohD D. Blaok ot Jilrftft ,... alae pi-era in the 4nelop118Dt ot the 
U.atic al.lotJDea.t plaa. At !luml'• napation, Black incorporated a ,,... 
o1tio .-rr ot the aoh ... ( Ch4pter 'ha) 1n *'riqultual Rttgm Ja at 
gene stttu, Rev Torll:, MoGJ'av•H1U, 1929. Black coined the phreN 
1 4--..tio allotmnt.• Ill lfaroh. 1919, 1M~ preHDte4 hie Ueaa to the 
Saute a-tttee on Aaricultl&ret the c-tttee pu11118he4 his di1cuaa1oa 
1D Ue Mlrtap. A tev IIOdha lato WaUu R. MoCartbf ot the Capitol 
Bl.ewtor Call*~ ot Duluth 41atrillllte4 5000 :reprints ot Chapter 'l'ea 1D 
Blaok'a 11ook. 'l'he laa41ag thillken ill ajp'ioulture 11eoame flllliliar with 
Black'• 14eaa.91 
90. 
91. 
~11. R. G .. ''l'he future ot •u-1 PlaDniDC," Jllx Rew)!lif, 
'fol. 89, IJQ,. 1149, Dea•Mr 9, 1936• 1~. 
'l'\lcWflll, R. G., •.A ~r•a Tlev ot Aariculture•a Puture,• 33a· 
rua, GU11art c .• Gt!!llfl• llll ..... 230. 
'llle ·•• who •na117 1" the tJ.aht• tor the dOIIINUo allot.tat 
Pl'iiUitple ,.. ProteHer NU!ava Ltaool.a VtlaOD ot Montua state Coll.eae. 
lr 19,30 Jae ba4 lleotu.t tbat. \he anot.ht idH we superior to the equalt-
aaUea-t• ut _,on.,.lle&ltve plaaea 1a tbat Jeer, he wrote Blaelt tbat 
i' ,.. tU. to evttoll. VilaOil OCil'-otel hie aoadelllio tritmda aad won the 
MIJPOI't If/It _,. ••• tamua. Thi'Otl8b latter-vritiiiC alld propaptldis• 
f.as, he noni'M to hie oaee J11ira17 VaUaoe, Senator Peter 110~ (Rep., 
s. D.). ea4 JJeuoy I. ~. ,_l4eat ot the Boetee ctuuuer ot c.-
..... who !Ull4 larp agiwltval iatenata i.D Mon'-•• 92 
......_ ~ aD tatereatlal oaee ... td¥ tt aa •eal1pteue4• 
1'8Platlaa to 4utl'llothe ...-uuoa. Jill 0CIIIlt.ude4 that a tana-mtet 
JI'Oifta wl'""t lilll'-titlll ot Fod.ueUGD WCilld be tuUI.e. 93 lit IIMv 
ll.aelt ta lonoa aa4 Vileoa 1a IlDia'--· Jill eel'ft4 ae a lie1eon betwo 
Jut aa4 Wen aa4 bet,... 1114UtJ'I' aa4 acr1~Nl\un.'4 Harrilaa late 
Mea• htla14eu ot the v. s. Cba=her ot Oo roe, a p0e1t1oa vhioll he 
loat ta 19", attar bueiueae ,..,.taed .._ ooat14enoe, due to h1a seaeral 
new tbllt *" ,.. aa.th1 .. 1004 ia the lfev l)eal.95 
VU,aOD. aleo attftoted the atteUloa ot a student ot aar1Cit.lltura1 
~. 1931, a Colltareue Oft ~• Pol10f tor •rioaa .&cr1oultue 
.n at the Vllt.Tere1t;r ot Ohioqo. WUeOil broalcaet a _.,. ot the 
Wll.oa atre...t the aaao.nt ot a '-Nt1o aUotmnt plea tor .._.iate 
relief, allll. plaaailla tor pn:~per la.._...., iiiOlwtiliC the retireaat ot 
1Nlai'81Ml lall4a, tor loac•nm rellet. '1.\tpell, a -•r ot the bcal'i 
wtab aJ01180"4 VU.aoo•• llroalaaet aD4 JIIIQiblat, ha4 oewr •t WilaOD. 
Ht vnta tba MoaUJia prot-r ttlat ha like« hie line ot raaaOililla·" 
Vf.l.oll 'IIGIIl4 bear tl"CCII '1\lcWll epta. 
l:lu1.111 tha •Prilll ot 1932. ,..,_11 aD4 Hafll7 MDraenthau., Jr., 
._.,.lope« a •ar.ta 'l'l'Wit• tor tile ta:na pn:~lllell wioh tnolll4ed protaNora, 
aoON'elata, aD4 ta~nbat1aa laat•n t1"CCII all parte ot the aeuoa,97 
Mor.-theu lr:laaw --.... u 1Gac baton fUawU 414 • ha ha4 aai"'NCl four 
;raan Oil the Gcwel'IIIOI''• aarioulftl'lll a4Tiaory ~ttae. .l 11'0\lJ ot 
Oonttll prot....-. lrept ill tOMb with ...,...,.u thrOI!Ih Moqeathau. Oat 
ot tha raaaou JIDlq, wo 414 DOt ltlre the JlllD8\aJ7 "11...,. ot tba Co:natU 
~~. _t.,. 'l'IIIWJ.l to Joia the Gcmtnoll''e a4Tiaera •• to ~nt the 
aut••• at ot tara reltat t~ •tur~r .,..,. •• 98 MolOf' had 11.0 tl'OIIlble 
ncmat.u.,. .,.._11, who oou14aral the qrioultural pl'Obl .. the 1 11108t 
111\araatilla u4 tulllla•1•Dtel• ot the •·" 
"· ,.,. 98. ,,. 
Ia MIHb., 19.32, the IIOllth ta. wblcll Moley bea&D to organ be the 
Bnta 'l'ruat, lfal'rt.ll &'QG4Mted that the domestic allot1118at advooatee 
_, te 4taouss the sttuatloe. al'l.4 frame 11 bill. 'l.'hey held 11 conterenoe 
1a ChtQI&O 1D April, appoiatia.& I prCIIID'tion coad.UH 00111$10184 ot Vel• 
lau, Yllaoa., Louia s. Clarke, aa Olalla ta.ftetmat broker, R. R. Rosere, 
aa -OUtlY8 ot 'the Prudential Life Iaeuraaoe Co:rape.~q, al'l.4 w. R. Ro111ld, 
e4Uor of the MU41beU, s. D., iDp&y l!epnbliyp.l.OO 
Wuhf.laatOII •• also the BcttDII ot the allotMnt a4Tooetea • aoti• 
Titiaa in the first halt ot 19.32• Ia April al'l.4 May Mordeoai Esektel., aa. 
aarteultural eooa.ca1at ot \he tJ8llA uetpeA to the federal :re:na Boa1"4, 
preeeated HTeral _,.... to 1. c. B\0118, Cbai~a ot the BeaM, lll'&illa 
serious ooutderattoe. ot the allet-t plaa. '1'he loaM and seeratal"J' 
a,4e rejeete4 Enktel•e propual.l01 It we ill the aprias ot 19,32, ill 
the upUal, that 'fllawll al'l.4 Wilaoa .n tor the first tiM, beiDa tatro-
4uoe4 "" lea1"411eJ lUll. a aceor41ns to Ruaeell Lo:rll the tw protaaaol'll • ••• 
took to Mah other at oaee ••••• 102 
WUaoa. we 1a Waahillc'oe. apill tovarde the end of the last full 
H&aioa ot a Hocmlr COII&ftN 1a ol'ller ta publieise the allotMnt plan, 
which aow rapreaeate4 a ratiDed Yereioa ot hie 14M&, Black's, ed flulll'•• 
&I preeea.W tile plaa to the Jfowle o-lttee oa. A&riculture al'l.4 to a SJ.'OilP 
ot Seutore al'l.4 JiepreHDtatlwa 11h1cb senator Norbaok oalle4 toaether. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
otfl.tale ot the tara Gqallbd1GU 1 it ee111d po1ntaee to puah 1t at 
that .... 10ih .Jut betore act,touna11t, tor the eke ot publ1o!ty, the 
~ bille, wr111tft '117 wu.._, Blleklel, aad llaok, were :l.ntro• 
4¥Mt.l03 
'I'M •one ot aoUon aut ahittM 11aak to Cbioaao. when 1ohe allo1o• 
_.t 1f0UP held a lllt8t:l.na ia the JQMla ot 1\ule, lue tlwa two VHD 
betcmt the DIMeratio CQa'ntllUOih 111:1oh llesaa on 1\&M 27. s- acr10\Jl• 
tval eCIOIIIDII.tata, tiaanolld bf a craat traa the Laura Spelman flooketeUu' 
J'OimdaUa, ucl 'beea world-s oa the aUot•nt plaa. Hear1DS that thef 
were to gather la Oh10810o TuawJ.l -t1eae4 it at a -tiq or the Brain 
'l'ruat. He wat to the Chi.._. .. tt.-. to a.plore the plea and .. tel'll:l.nll 
wheth4Ja,' lt at with &eDeftl approval. He v1n4 abetld to Wilaoa ill Moatallll, 
raq\1Ut1118 that \11• ..n printelfc .tUr the seaaral -1oa ia Ch~...-. 
hrlllll t.U1r Uaouulea, .,.._11 noalle4, be bed to atrugl.e to keeJ wu. 
•• oo the IIU'I'OW Rll,1eet ill whleh the Goftl'llOl' wee apeo1t1•ll7 lntuu• 
w. ~11 thea telepb.OII84 Rneawlt, .,.eld!lll to h1a tor about aa how. 
l'IMaewlt eallll! baek a tev llllllltea later, HT:I.na• •I 4oa't Wlderetand 1t 
pta ptt it 111 a 11elqrala.•lD4 
'lhe allot•at at-rooatee aov bA4 ... a oontaot v1 th the next heel• 
A8 a •Uw ot etriet taot, It' attell4anee at a poUt1oal 
OOAftatioa •• the 11F'"f1'041lot of a nf'illU& Tanture. ror 
I bad been aat Weat to 4leeG"Nr what I cov.14 about the 
lataat plea for the nU.et ot tal'lllltre. A.ad to abow bow 
oloae a arala • VOJ'W. oa, I ~ reoall that what I 
leal'll84 tao. Ml'. Ill. :r.. Wllaoa ••• , llll'. He1U7 Wallace, Mr. 
lilleklel, hie a4T1"r• 11114 ""ral otbera wa only pthere4 
tosathw 1a the PH04141a& -k. It wat to Albe11,1 b7 win1 
aa4 it oaa llaok to CJaloqo 1J7 .Jlaae - incorporated in Mr. 
ROOMTaU'e aooeptenca e,_oll J1'v.l:t J7,105 
The ""'J!!ip •• ~. The Baiza 'l'X'Wit ·wu eepeoiaU, OOQ• 
oerae4, in the ana ot apl!Nltve, with the pnpantion ot an a44naa 
on the tara Pl'Oilltlll ecbedule4 tor 4allftl'f b:r their oaDilidAlte at Topeka 
1a 1114~. WUeon aD4 Walleoe Jtept ia tOilCb with the GoftrllOX' 
throuah ~.1116 8Gcla 1t 1IGQl4 be tiM for RooeeftU to ... t the 
laa4tas allotaeat a4~taa face to raoe. 
Wlleoa WI'Ota to ,..._U oa 1ulr 25, 19,32. an4 apia on Aqt.\at 7. 
Ja the fun lntar WUIIOIA 1Jitozw4 'l'vcwll that a tua4 tor publietztaa 
tile llcMatia aUot•at plea •• beill8 alae4; the prlneipal OODtrlbutora 
...,.. iaeunaee OCIIII,IIIIanl ... weetera n.Uroa4e, Sean Rcalluok, Montscmei'J 
Warct, aD4 blpleaat •.racmuo.n. the pdlliaity group plaaaed to ... , 
in Chleqo in the lllidcUe ot Auaut. O..n.l WOOd ot Seue Roewok, two 
or tU'oe nilroe4 pne14oata, aDd Harriaa wen expected to atteod. wu-
aoa thea wrote u utail about Harriaa, tollf.Ds Tupell about the Boatoai-
46e. 
aJI4 Jl'lblio util1t1ee llea14aa hie tara lan4a in Montana). He w.a • 
iattatel¥ aoq,uainte4 v1th Ccloli4aa•" Harriaan, Wilson eontinUell, 
• • • tol4 11111 that he hae the teal in& 11hat the HooTer 
adlll.u:lft:raUora 18 fP'OW1ll8 wone. 8!14 vorae troa 4q to tar 
arl4 that aa attempt aboul4 lie ada ~ aet up a k1rl4 ot 
4HlOIIC*1a OCNilGll or a DatiOBal o-itt.. 111Uperl4en11 ot 
the &OYel'IIMilt which '11Qll4 •.. try to inJect a ccnetruc• 
111.- eurreat into the preaea$ aituat1on. 
••• 
Wllaoa DOW that !la.rriaa •• thtakt•a a\out &h'1116 a 41mler in lfev York 
ia lata Aa&Ut or early ~r tor ._ lea.S.ra or 1A4ustry. labor, 
•• acrloulture. •x- ham,• vu- coaclu4ed, •to a•t your note that 
arra~~&8111111lta are be1116 11110 tor ,eurnlt u4 •- ot the tr1ea4a ot the 
GoYel'DOJ' to_, Mr. Harrtaaa.•1'" 
Ja WUaora'a latter ot A~a&Ut 7. he iato:r~~~~~cl Tugwell that he •• 
oa hie vq to WaahiaPOil to 1117, aa tile npreaentattve ot the Clovernor ot 
Moateaa. to pt help fra the RJ'G tor clroqht-atrickea tumera.108 rroa 
Waahi116'01t WU.oa _, to lfev YOI'II: te ... Tqwll., who took hill to tha 
aov.n.. Wllaoa tourl4 11hat 'l'llpell hacl 4ou a pod, S.t DOt OOIIlllete, 
Job ot PJ'IIUUJII the allotlllllnt plan d .U'IIellf ancl H,r4e Parkt whea he U• 
;artecl, he we aun ot JlooHftlt'a poaitloa.109 Wilson, who we to cl:raf' 
the 'l'Qptlr;a apeeoh, wat vith '1'qwU 11o lfev York, where they •t W&llaoa, 
who •• ora hla .., 11o ... Rooan•U. 110 Wallace 1111111 the Ooftrnor tor 11ba 
tint 11t.. oa A\l&Wit 13, 1932. 1llbeD he 111Uhecl vlth the oancl1clate all4 
len'· 
108. 
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it the 11144le of Aupet the ~pelta addreaa, a month ava;r, be-
,._ .U. OOQOen& of no asrtoul\unl 4hleion of the Braia Truat. On 
.Aqut 16 '1\tpell wrcte to lllloqelltlla•, llbo oODoeatrate4 4ur1Af.! tbe Clalll-
.-t&a on lllabtalaiaa; oontaet with "le tam orpaiuUona , 112 that la, 
vu ... • all4 W.llaee ha4 vorke4 ., .. terdq• oa a ram ~~~emol'IIJid• tor the 
O.•.w-....-a WUaoD aa4 Wallaoe wn '- --' apia ia Ilea Molllal to pnpn. .. 
a tlaal 4fttt, a .., ot llbleb ,....,..tbala 'WNl.4 reoet.,..113 The TopNa 
a44reaa •• a t;rploal pn4\1n .t ...._lt•a .,..ch•wrltiaa; lllllold.~~e, at 
l.4lan twDQ'•tlTe 111eD taktq JOrt la ita OJ'HtlODo m VlliOD appeant to 
bave-.. the dqle .oat lllptl'hat eoatr1Mitor.U5 
•JMOb• Be 00tlt1De4 hlllleelt to s-ralltiea ancl phUoeopbf, w1rm1Dc t• 
npport ot ta~ without stnaa ur'*- voters, edltora, alii\ Jouraaliau, 
whO protlalll.J woul4 ha.,. objeote4 to outrlcht eadw-t of eUher the 
aUn.at pla.a or the JWilai?•Haupll • ...._, anrthiaa; apeo1t1o ·~ to 
lUll onr. 116 Then wa aotllill& ftpe about the a:f"ch 1Ja the .,.. of tb 
aUotJDeDt po~~p, llbo nv la !11 aa outllae of their plaa. W11aon wrote to 
u&. 
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... u. 
I llaw ,Jut ••• etfend a tballkqlYtlls to the Go4a tor you 
Sa re..,UUOA ot llhat ,_ INIYe 40De throuah the P. D. R. 
OUIP to pat \he YoluatQ( _l)tiiNUo AUo11aast P1u on the 
•P• It 1a aU 4u to,_ •••• ••• w are 4eeplJ' appreoi• 
at1Ya au wat you to •••P' \18 aa tallow ia the ,.....u • 
... .-, tallovallip. ~!,At. fOJOA apaollliJ WI pertaot polS· 
Uoal nra.._, • 'l'lla itltpa\llSooa po1Uie1au Wltl'll ~latal7 
JllU'PI'lM4. 'l'ha atory •• IU'J'll1lt that the llaUoaal a.pib· 
Uooa c-&uee W1114 haw .-. CIQ tO'It the Tolntal'J Allot-
.,., Plea ia three 0'1t tCIIII" llqa bo4 lt 110\ tHin tor the 
•'"* at 'ftiJJUa• • •• a.. ot \he tam pollUotau are 
4Jilll haMo lNt the tu.ra are llCit ao •Ill onoei'M4 with 
..,. ot the p1ua u th!f are sn cettt.ac a PI'Nlclut iza •• 
._,. u.w oeatsua ... ur 
DNp1._ wu ... •a aceolacla. TvawU wa a1 tl'lltht\al aa be waa IIOclaat wbANl 
._ • ......... orecllt where ore41t WI au. - to •· .L;; Wt.laOQ.•ua 
Ute~' tho alaotlDD. Molar ooataft'll4 wltb the .Prui4nt-to-lle lD 
Wua .spru.a. Tho Jfo. 1 Jrala 'l'Juter til• ·~ a ••ttac ot Wal· 
laoe. Wllaoa. Jiloqallthau. u4 TqwU la Waahiaaton to 4etemiu atra-
tOIJ tor JllltUac a taa blll til,.... tho abO'Itt or lue-clu.ek aaulOD ot 
Coacrau 1 whloll wa to opea 01a D11 stU' }.U9 'l'be RohOYal11 poou.p 
HllaYa4 11hat u waa ....... zy to aa11 prloe-ralaiac 1ea1alaUoa 1a opu-
aUoa Wore •PI'lac plaaUac 1a cmlel' to preraat a oollapao ot the whole 
oreclU a11z.&oture ot a¢4N.U1lft. UO 
the allol•at ll'OUP aeecl.. tlle 1Ufl101'1l ot the fal'81 o:rpaiseUoaa 
to aa11 a blll ,. ... ,. Lltukra ot the tara orpabet1ou al&4 the ooopeJ'a-
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u.,.. lla4 tt•lly wal'Md up to flbtl allotment plan at two -unca wh1oh 
flh• hell. 1a Ootober, 19.32· 'l'hetr 1aflerea11 1noreaae4 d'ter the eleoUoa. 
Oa Dean,.... 12 au 13 the •• tara orpa1uUone .. , 1a Wa8h1upoa, 
appNriQI the ••- ot 'beaatU M••••• 4ari'fe4 trca a prooeaaiq to, 
ia mua tor aoreaaa l'eduott•• ll¥ai4·Deoember rePI'eNn~ti.,.. ot 
the •Jor tara Ol'pllbatiou wn antYtir oollelloraUns wUh VUaoa. 
fucwll, lllakiel, ll'ederiolt P. Lleo a Vull~Dctoa aUoraer •per1enoe4 
ia dratt1116 tea billa ainoa Jlolle~ dqa, and oflbtlre 1n to~11· 
lll8 • 'btu.121 
'fhe IOIIH 8111 (a.JI. Mama loaea, Dam., Tex.) 1nc.orporafled the 
l4aaa ot flu allo11MD11 plaa Rppo1'11an. .4a U -rpd hoa the !Joua oa 
IOIIIU'1 u, 111 ... I4DlAI7 n•Ue4, a ., .. .....,... ot Bourrelt'a plaa 
u4 "hopelaulr ba4aqvata.• Mel., .... ,duM to oppoatUoa ot •eotfloa 
u• Slllth a •Jor ollafleola ia tile ,..._ ot the 'bill. Jfe alao rea..-
11Mt • protuioa ot IIIDI'tpp•relial ltilla Maat that no taa 'bUl WOIIl4 
,. ... w 
P'"• u4 panecl the 1-• BtU,......_., Ul the ophtora ot two atw4aata 
ot aartoulturel hlato2:f, pro'be"lJ -u haft 'f8toe4 tt.123 The uon• 
.... toa tiaaoo .. .,. 'fa&wll • Uataate tor polittoa a114 aerrtoe ta Vaah• 
121. 
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llll'oa wbioh Rcloee'Mlt all4 Vallaoe owl.4 !lOt O"Mroome until a week 1M-
tone lrlaqpnUOihl24 
.,.._11 u4 Wlleol:l oornapoDd.ell durl%18 the la•-4\\ok period, -oth 
ttetn. U4 atter their wrk ill Vllllhl.,._ ta oGDJ~eoUoa vUh the J'oaee 
8Ul. Ca Onober 8, 1932, Wllaola w:rote ~1 a loDC letter, expraa• 
•lac hla a1q1YiiiP that the acrtll11._,.1 pol1Uolau oppGHd the allot-
•" plaa elthv lbae to ooanoU• •• attaebMnt to the other aohallle •• 
or polt:uu. 'W11aOR aotad that Peak, vho •• not aa acr1oul.tura1 poll• 
Uo1aa, •• • ••• a sood tellov OR .-..hl priao1ple, la open lllld tndlk, 
• • • tlaa Ocmmlor ehoul4 aot ..,. aDJ 11111ra a bout the tamtt 
thaD he uid at 8louz C1t7 W.t ,. .. hard OR the OOMtntO• 
U'M aide ot hla Pft&ftll• 'lnl87 an aolae to 'tOte tv 
l'teoae'Mlt aot beoauae Jlooae'MU llaa dltt'araat tar&« 1deu 
lnat 1Moaue thaT thlllk he wlll 11•• thala a .., deal • 
. Vllaoa 1Mnaed. that the • ••• tam tallow are solD& to keep pruelD& tv 
iatl.aUoa aad the cheaper tollar.• Be aoted that lf41Mnl 0 1Jfaal, Prell· 
dut ot the Aaarioaa l'am lllu'aa• ,......_UOR1 1MDta4 to talk with HalTSIIan 
attar the eleoUOR - aD 8110CIIlraallll deftlepmant. Vllaon enoloaad. a 
brlet ~ 1u4p Halbvt ot 1lha Jam Ieard OD the ooaeU 11\1Uoaallt7 ot 
the allot.nt plea U4 a oow ot a aPIMh he ( 'ifilaoa) ada baton the 
Mortpp hDkara ANooiaUoa ot .a.rtoa at lftqara J'alle oa Ootobar 12. 
lD the a44l'Ha V1laoa ·brlatl7 n-.18VIIl the other aoh-•, expeD41111 ill 
d.etaU oa the allouaat plan. He to14 th«t bultere he oppoaa4 4UIIIJlD& 
124• Lill41q, JrDNt Jt., •War oa the lftiu 'l'ruat,• 264; aee abo'Mo 
Cllaptel' YIU. 
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He Wl4 ~l tbat the tal'lllera 414 aet ua4eratan4 all the •Jor poiab 
ot tho fo,.U apeeoll. S.. ot tho taml.-4ora • ••• 4oa1t lmov beoauH 
tuwtl'll, wu.. nport-.4, bad lla4 llt\le .noauoa la pl'Oituotloll ooatl'Ol; 
thaJ • ••• thlllk prlaea aaa be ra18M liJ -.to without 81Q" effort liJ 
fll'la 8114 vlll taM 8DJ' plaa Ill .• prOJIDio' 101111 ss.;ecm, Pl'aaidnt ot 
\he latlatloalet lu.n UalGOt tor --»le, Wle Pin& arwo4 ..,1118 
tlaat JllR tol4 hill \han vaul4 1le tl'•o ltl.llloa dollan lD pr1Dte4 __,..116 
Ia hla letter ot tho tear 'J-tOIIfth alao Wll1011 lhow4 whore he 
nco~ oa Jli'Qlllnloll ooatJ'Ola. He afta4 _,, aeUher the RllUJ'-lllor'llelk 
Bill ( 1Dtro4'11114 Jut Wore the BQe KorlMiok llll aad aa\11!4Jbc hN' a 
SAeu) _. the oooaluiODa ot a aenlq et the thrae 'ta tam orpuiu-
tlou (tho ram Bveau. le4erat1GO, raaera llaioa, an4 the Gruce) ia 
Chteqo GO Ootobar U •aUOIM polaftloa I!OOtrola. 1M ta1111 oraaala• 
UODa atnaH4 auapnaloa ot toreoloau.raa, -.s..at ot no .Aarioultual 
lfarD11lo& Aot, an4 eDtorarnat till law oa tn4lo& la ta1111 ea.oilltJ' 
tlltu.na. Wllaoa waned, ·•It JllR wUl atan4 t111111 he eaa pt what lla •ataJ 
t.t aot, thaw viU 'be 110 proaouoa ooatnl -- the llaart ot tha pro~ltlla 
to JOU. aa4 •·•127 
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I.lke 'fl&pltU, WU.aoa •• aptu" 11\tlaUoa. He proponc\ to au 
ta,..n DOt 'r &bias ta111 twaDJ ...., with 11111111D to Pf¥¥ thtl1r clekta, '*' 
"r n41le1q their 4ell1ie throqll 4ekt-a4Jut~~~eat ee.aitteee o011ponc\ ot 
ta• a!MlliiOI'tpp UlMnete. •Ya a!Ml 1,• he wrote, ~-14 l1u to ... 
a lot ot 1\etJt vipe4 011t1 iuu.l"'lllH ""''P"DT repneentaU-.ee •- to thiak 
~1• ia 11111at 'rill llappea.• He DOW t~t 4all1i-a4Jut~~~eat aOJaiNioae 
wre workiltc wll 1a tu p:alria ~ .... or Caaa4e •128 
WU.eea eonoluded bu latter ot Gototler 24 with a tr11N.te to Ha:tri• 
laD, a •Gftlek hero,• who ata7ft with ttae aUot.nt plan 4eepi1ie a •pea-
a1a8' tna Oeaeral MUla all4 tM Chteaco OraiD Bxohanp. He eaoloea4 a 
W1at ltl'aliogap!q oa priee•aupport IIIMallfta tor tara pro41&ote ill otbJ' 
OCIIllltriee • Npeolally lriilala, aa4 a aote 011 the lepl opla1oa ot • oaa 
ot the Mat laVJen la Waahlqtea• ea tile allotMat plaa, aooor41a& to 
whillll the pnoeaail\11 tax wa tGUUttatioaal.129 
Ala aollal\118 ot latten Ht-a 'l.'upell alld Vilaoa ill .llo-...ller 
reueeried their oonoera with prca4v.oUoa -trole. Oa the th1r4 'l'u&Wll 
wrote Vilaoa that the ta&Wra • ••• vUl tl'f to pt llhat the;r wnt 0\lt 
ot itae allot•at plaD vUhout liYiJl& all,fth1DC 111 re11Ul'll 11\ the w;r ot 
raatr1ete4 pndutloa,• Tlapell oltMl'Wil that aiDoe J'Dil hacl eottn taw 
ttae •utMat t1_.a.• OD Jlorewbel' 28 VUeoa nplle4 that he wa • ... 
ooaY1aoec1 tllat the aUot.at plaa without produotiea coatrol Will eiaPlr 
128. M. L. Wilaon to TV£'111111, October 24o 1932, 'l'ul!lll fapera, 
129. M. L •. Vlleoa to Tlapell, OotoMI' ~. 1932, '1'wg!ll Pnera. 
ats.l&te J*OluoUoa.• He euted hie pretaren .. for ebta quotae, .,_, 
IIMinla4 tbat they 414 net appear poaa1b1e. V1la011 alao reponed that 
liiiTiMa -tea to ... JDR oa a • • • • bnad Jll'OCftDI oa vMoh ap"ioul-
-... llui .... aDd laboJ' ...... u •.• 1.'31 
Dulllc DHTrhr the tw prateeaob, aa •aUODed a'bO'I'e, were 0011-
"""" vUb the PliiOUoa ot tile loau 1111 1a the lalle-4uolt ~· 
VUaoa tAt_. 'l'llpell tbat 14 O'lllal thouebt the bill •• \00 .-,11-
eate4J be (Wllaoa) .,aot .. that the • ••• bl& Jolt of MUUtlOD v1U 
lao la the BIJwle ~ttee.•131 '!be a11o._.t lo""'leu bad no tiM te 
h'd whea the 1CIIIM 8U1 taile4 to via pee..... 'ftiQ' woald eoaa h .. a a 
MY CoJtcnn to work viti!&. 0a llUIUI'J 151 19.3.3, Wllaoa VJ'ote '!'U8wll 
that be bet wld w. 11. Roaald, tile SO.th IIIJto'- pu.bllaber, to eall Tuc-
vell Sa .., York al'CIWII\ the tint ot hU.l'J'.1.32 01!. :relll'Wll'J' 1, WUIIOil 
wrote tbat lae bepe4 to ... ~l.l la lfev Twit 011. the teath.13.3 (t&tel' 
la the ,..1' 'hpall 1114 Wllaoo. WQlld be pu.b11o etflola1e 111 WaehiBctoo., 
the :&attn Pille to tbe oap1ul la S.ptallar ae l>ll'aotor of Subelal\a-
u-eteau la llltar1or.1311.) 
Ill IIU'Q, 1933, the a11oUant a4'ftoataa ooR•nllrated on v1Dillac 
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tal'll -.abet ton baoktlli tor aa .fo4111alnrat1on b1ll. vhioh they tho 
W to praaent to CCman••· S.Cfttal'f 1illallaoa bqaa conferrlnc wUh 
tara leaden Oil Milreh 6 •115 Oa the neaa. ot Maroh e. in reapoue to 
the ,_t4eat1a 1'8Cl'llUt that ha oall the tara l.eaura -.titer •• 
tlld they oal4 l"k 11heuelTN ta a ro~a au -out wUh a 111111, 
lllllaoa not out wtrea aeron the GOU.tl'Jo1-" Oa Maroh 10. Wallace, 
with Jteek. 11111t a l&J>p az'OUP of' tara lea4ara in hie oft1oe.117 Oa 
' 
'l'llurJM~aT. Marob lii. Roeae'ftlt not the 11111 to Consre••• ur&ill8 ,. ..... 
1a tiM te reatrtot 8PI'ill8 plaaUq od «eolarlD&• 
I tall J'OU traaltq that 1t ta a aaw and uati'Od 1*1111. but 
:t tell 10il with equal fftall:aaN that aa uapraoa4eate4 
CODIIiUoa oalla toP tba htal ot .., -u to re•OWt 
apiaulture. It a fair .aialatraU'ft 11r1111 ot 111 ie 
•• and lt toea IIO't ,........ 11ha hope(-tor rolnllta • I 
ahall INt na tint to ·~ 111 allll at:fiae tou•l38 
'l'llo followill& wok Tupell uplalned. the tara bill tn a radio .,_..,1J9 
allll 111111a• 11eatttie4 Mtore the S..ak a-ttw oa AcriouUua.14° 'l'lla 
r.... 'l'b.-a "-•«•u •• .Ue4 oa April 19. Oa J1a3t 12 tho Acrloulftl'81 
.A4j\ultMat Aet ba•• a law.lU 
Wilen •• hek all4 what we he tolna •• the allo1111111at fll'OUP a11a;p-
pe4 up 1ta oupaip ia 1931. 1932. all4 earl¥ 193.3' Durlna 1110et ot what 
rue oalle4 •!be lana leud latorlll4o.• Pnk Z'elllllind 1llont out of 
1111J11'h1 tor: the a41Ua1atratora ot a r.tile law. J'i~~all;r • oa lloveabe:r 
u. 1931. he 'llrolta bia loDg a1lence, a44l'Neina the War IliCluat:riu 
Boalll Aaaooiat1o11 ill .lfev Yor:k all4 ld'CI.II&: the aMition to the AM A.et et 
the aqul1zatioa-tM aU... Aa earl7 aa 1930 he bad DB4e the defeat 
ot BNYa:r hia tt.:rat OOIIMI'Ilo a, 1931 he hacl :l.nd1oatecl private!¥ that 
Ilia tirat ohoioa tor p:rui4ent ,.. Rooaevelt.142 
Oa April .JO, 1932, JIMk wrota to Roollovelt, l'OQ.1Uiatina the\ the 
O.....raor .U. a atat-nt ia tav:or: ot aaaa plaa to make. the tarttt 
atfaative Oil IRil')llua crops. lloeae'tlllt •a aoa-.-tttal reJl¥ 1nvite4 
r..k to appcN~r ill lhv Tol'll: in para011 a117 u... Ill earl7 1wae, 1932, Jrarl 
8111th ot the lam S.re.u roqua'te4 'that I'Mk oa. to Chioago to 41110U88 
all -rceur tam-raliat bill tor PftMatation to the laat full nasion 
ot a liocmlr Coacraaa. 'l'he llaiM7 ~~~~~Wok Bill, Oil vhioh the Howle cUd 
not vote llut vhioh the Seaate paalle4, only to recall it two dqa 'llatora 
eonaraaa adJGarae4, •bo4ie4 Peak'• i ... a ot equaliaatin J87118Bta rw 
d<aeat1oall;r uoe4 eropa, agraulve markatins abroad, and no production 
ooatrola,l43 
to help the fa:t'lllllr. Ill •D¥ a,..t, 1a a letter to Haarat, •atiOMd • ....,.., 
he 111111oata4 bia reooca1tion at oluulsN in the 1110rlcl an4 l:tia aw:reaMa 
that ••ra «natie• ~1 .. thea tho Malla17-Haucen ao~ a:Lcht be 1a 
J'lte. Oil'llert c., CtOfM .1• liiJi .... , 227-28, 2yr, 
rue. Oilben o •• tsnru l· ZIU .... , 2'*'-YT• Baueh, Baau. lbl 
Ht.atwr; Jit lJal Jla lll&lt »n•l.flft 1,6-67, 
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tJ'Olac. wu.oa aft4 tbe 4-auo allot-t croup cone14ere4 Peelt•a n»-
port 't'itel. '1'h41F nlun hie poUUoal lntluaoe mora hiiShlT than hie 
fa-relief plane. Pel"bepe, 1'1 te •IP•tn, thq thouaht the:r 00\lld 
ooaftn billl te~ • ...._. reatricU• - •It ae~, tllq did not lmclw Oeorp 
J~Mtlt.• ln the 111441e ot A\18118t• 1932, wbeA He1117 Wallaoe Mt Rooee-
w1t, lae reaarlred oa Peelt1a iJ,'eet 1at1aeaoe in the Mldwat. Morp~Ubau 
thea requeete4 Peelt'a auueaUeu t01t Rooee't'elt 1a Topelte apeeob the 
to11Ciw1Da •ath. halt reo-114e4 a 4eelarettoa tor hl&her "-•tic 
prioea alld a4't'lu4 aYOidanee ot oe.t-.nt to •Ill' apecitlo pl.aa. Peek, 
aa aote« atlcwe, ooasntu1ate4 ...._...elt oa the Topelte apeeOh,. telliJI& 
him to at ~"eN tu prineiple ot •ltlaa the teritt etfeouw .144 
Oa Sapt=bu• 22, 1932, liMit p&'841oW that Rooa8't'elt ~14 awep 
the 00111lt17• Ia earl;r Ootokr 1a Olllaqo, Peak, with a CJ:'OII.P of fllftl 
1ea4era. tiPAU, •• the preaideatlal tlln414ata. He ,.. oon'f'inoH tut 
Raoa8't'elt ,.. aOIID4 oa tal'll relief. Ji'IMtlt •• pleaud durinc tbe oempaip 
with RDGae't'elt'a aten4 on altlftC the taritt etteeU't'e. Meanwblle 0 he 
414 8't'el7thlnc he could to w1a thlt M14veat for the Deuorata. He 414 
not t17 to aell Jloeae'Mlt the Mclla17•Haaaea plea. He oonceatratd oa 
elecUaa a preaideat wo, be ltel1e't'84. wwl4 treat q;riculture tairq. 
He joiaed alld eontrUruted to the rw ... a-'U•e of the Il11noia Dl't'i-
aioa ot the Dl lcnt1c Nat10PA1 c-tttea. He M- a lllllllllMr of the 
NatiCPAl Procreaei't'e IAaaue tor Rooll..,.lt an4 Garner, hede4 by Harold 
144• J't.te, 01lkrt c., QeOJA I· liB ..... 232·34· 235, 240. 
L. Ioll:ea. Ia Octo!Mtr he •u a IIUIUar ot apeechea in the M14-t. It 
•• hat llho led uarlJ all ot the oU MGBar;yooHau,;ea &rOUP out ot the 
QOp, RooaaTelt'a trtuaph we alao Peek'a createat Tictor;y ainoe he kpn 
hilt tipt tor ta:'lll p~~:rity 1a 1,22.14.5 
Ia ear1f De..-.r, 19,32, Peek W41111t ta Waah.lacton to participate 
ill th4l prtllllltion ot lacialattoa 1a the lae-4V.ct Coa&reaa· Duriac tlle 
,lert04 Deoe8er 1932•J'allruai'J, 193.3, be teat part 1a 4etly oonte1'81lMa 
on a tara \t1U.l46 Be 414 not aUea4 the tara ladera' .. uac in the 
oap1tal ot Dee 'ar l2 ant 1.3. Vblle MNputhau, 'fucwll, lllletial, and 
Wlleoa oaataata« the tort7...U tarm la...,.. 41reot1f, Peek orr Jat oated 
wt\h the ClftfeNU lJ7 telaplt ... trca bla hotel 1'04a.l47 He bqaa to pt 
the teeliJic that the a~nt croup, llh .. plan the tar.re approve4 at 
the Dee.._ .. uac. wa atartiac to get the iaaida track. oa Deo-.r 
16 be want to aae lal'l Sldth, ill ill hie hotel ~~ in the oourac ot a 
nrs.ou diawuion, Slattll aa14 be tboupt 'fucwll repreaeatcd R-CTelt.l48 
Ia ftSZONpaot, Peek aotedt 
P:rotuaor 'fucwll appaant to 1Mt the reprcaontaUTe ot the 
Praa.14eat-e1Mt t 1 callllft arq that be repraaeatcd bilaaalt 
aa apaaklaa tor Coftrnor ......... u. 1 can M7 that be 4.14 
aothlaa to taetrG¥ tbe s.,raaa101l tbet he wa.149 
the tara lq4era at a _..iDC 1a Wuhinctoa .O.e. 12..J.j] 
48Q. 
with w.u. .. , 'l\lcWlle amt Mhara tu1'M4 over ~ whole 
jcllt •• • \o M .. an. Walla .. and. Tucwll. Thaae etm\1-a 
.... ,... the NfftUiltUttr vttla alacrUiy. Tqvall lmew 
*-' be wate4.~ 
Attar the tdlure ot the J'ODM Bill, Peek ~1ne4 in W.ehinctoa 
to cpreu hie iteaa with reprd \o the aaw Mmin1atrat10D1a bill. oa. 
J'eltrual'f ).4, 19.33o he t.at1t1e4 Mtore ~ SODate :rt.na ... Colla1ttee, 
..,'lrablllc the •rk:etinc eiu ot the tal'll problea.151 At the beeiaa1Jia 
ot Marell, PMk we baok la Mol&aet at Wallaee'a requeat he returoecl to 
Waahla&'OD 1a cmler to at1:n4 a ... uaa fit tara leaclera whlcla ~ seare-
urr •lle4 tor the tenth.1.52 Oa Maroh l,.5 Peek toU Wallaae ot hie 
wftiltc to the ••••••• that the)' ..._ throu&h 'P1111118' the taNerJ 
'l'upell teU hek to preaeat thia kiail ot talk to the PreeU.eat ,1.5.3 
011. Mlrtlh 18 hek all4 Bn1 Slllth eoatern4 with Wallaoe all4 Tuc• 
wll. Walla• tel4 'l'apell that the PrwU.eat wnted a ••1n114Wa oa 
the IIIOZ'Ililt& ot the t-Ueth oa 'WIIllaee'• plana tor 114111aiatrat1oa ot a 
tara law. 'l'llpell eeld th.,- -a haft to pt bllq. PHk lnterpoaecl, 
•I oaa tell you la titt)' '1101\18 how to proaeed,• auU1ah& a plan by 
which A4T1aorr COaaolla IUI4 repn,.....Uft8 ot prl)ducera and PJ!'OIMIII80I'8 
an write the Npl.aUou.• PMk replied, •rau ~mow noth1118 ot the 
llwlf.JINa ot 41ttereat lnduaU•lea •• l.lt 
481. 
Or& lfllroll ~ Peek tuUf1e4 Ni'llre tu s.aato c..1u .. on A&l'lOUl• 
tve, npeaUIIC hie teaUIIIOQ ot fob:wa17 14 an4 callil'l& tor a flexible 
b:lU with the ..,U.ela OD •Jw'Uq ......-a11a .15.5 ( Wdlaoe, 111 vt.U be 
l'Malle4, teaUtt.e4 tJM u:n 48¥, atN&alnc pro4uot1on OOiltrola.) 
IMI£'• no ntaUon ot a fles:lble bill nfleo11e4 a OODftreeUoa be lla4 
eUatu11e the Wallace FO'Q'a 14Ma tna the bill, 1u1atll'l& 11hat i1: 
••'-111 llotb approaehea .1.56 
(Ia Aprll l I'Mk to14 WallaM 0 • • •. tho - Mil who bat Maae4 
'Q laaialat:loa laat Dt08111Der /J. ·•., '1'\I&Wll, laekiol, all4 othari/ .._.. 
4011'1& fta AM th:lap &pill with tb:la uw b1U.•l57 011 April 2 Peak .t 
v111h Yallaoe, ~11 alit othan, -...11111 in an arsu-at with Wallaoa, 
o:ltet atloft, ewer aonace natr1oUoo.1.58 hek aotet, in hia 41al'1• 
uater tho 4ato ot AprU 6, that the tobaooo •• tol4 hia 11hay ware t81U'-
M ot tho 70WIC Ma in tho UIIDA, .. paoinll)l' '1\lsWll an4 Baoklolt Ohoatar 
c. Dana alu aa14 ba w.a •aoe:rN• ot the "11haorat1oal• 'f\lavell.l59 l"ettk 
ot Aleta:lnntor oa M17 3• aiae 4111'• Wore tu u A.o11 •.- law. 
I'Nk ldor obar,et that tu PI'O'Nlanoe ot PI'04uo111on oon11rolo owr 
482. 
OOUJinq oa tha part et a haDUul ot aaonoaiste an4 protaasora, 1114 by 
'J\IcWll, ap1nst "-e ta-• an4 "-e .-r1oan peOJle. 'l'hrae facta retu-
te4 Peek's allapt10111 (1) 'l'ha allotmeat soh_, vb1ch we certainly not 
'lln114 .. , la 19.32• ha4 v14a auo-tt a IIOIII}IaraUvalt taw •n vrote this 
,..... of the tiU.l onlt iD an u.Miata ..... , (2) the bill we aa -1\Ju.a 
._. il:lolucU.na Peek's ideu, as wll as tha allotmaat approach -- this 
4aapitla the eolipae of the arltettna....-nt idea, vbioh the earlier 
tua -ills hall oontaine4, aner l929Jl6o (3) leek took the Job ot AA 
Adalwtn.tor, aaaua1a&, ot MUrse, that hie ideas would prnail -- on:tr 
to be 4ataatu, as he JUt u, DJ a Mllapin.q 'lh1oh pers1st8d trco the 
l'Mk belieftll that onlt his ideas wzoe richt • an4 that hie oppcmeots wre 
Scnon.nt or inail:lure or \loth. 
A phase ot the caattaaUon et 'fl&awll, aa the wh1pp1ns-'lto7 tor 
the '4atntatrat1on, wa the taaiataiiOS "--'.• with 1Jipl1cU4' 4eatruc1:1.,. 
totaat. he wa prtartlr reapou1W.e tor the ll Act. In 1934 aa aau-
Maifl1atrat10D tract oharpd that the tana PI'OCl'UI wa in • • • • conatcl• 
erabla ... sure the ~laaDt ot Ilia 14 .. a.•161 Ifl 1935 a DamQcratic 
oalle4 tor Hank 10, 1933• he allll '1\lcWell 1nsart8d the pro-•111& tu 
n4 the pl.ow-u4er in tile tana bUl wtthwt the tarara' lmwleilp.w 
162. 
Ia 19.3& ll.at.r Bclllea, 'l'u&wll'a toe, iiQlt.ed that \'QaWll •aolcl• the 
...._tie allota.at plan tcRcclt7elt.li3 In the aa.e year, in a...-
... ot tn tour llu4red laWiere t.a ~ aav the bill \letore it ,.. 
1atl'll4uaetll tbat the printer'• OOJII' •bi~ted oopt.eu.a arlal ia n4 
peaoU, • ••• all4 it 1a lalo1e that Prot ... or 'l'upell ia a44iote4 to a 
rec ,..u .• l64 
fto olS.eUo obarae t.a 1936 •• Peek'• ta liiZ 9.1U Jau: .Qa• He 
l'HIIllHt 
'ftae ltUl ,.. the oa..p•U• ot a nrtety ot ideaa ocatriw-
te4 117 'l'qwll, Moraeatlaa• 1 llleklel, Jl. L. Wllacn, •-
otlaar prct .. aora •114 t'OODOIIIina aJ:K perhaps Hea17 'Wallace. 
It ,.. not the taswn' _..,...165 
Peat•a notu ct Jebl'Wlq 1, 1933, reoorde4 a aoaveraat1QII with Fred tee 
1a vhioh Peek ortUobe4 Morpathau tor • ••• loUiftl tba tana J410ple 
an th-1- iate a PH1t1on ot sot• •lena with 'l'llpell apinet $hell' 
Jwll"""''•".l60 Put rete:nM to 'fllawll, ltsoku1, aa4 Mcrtsenthau aa a 
•aew pwp• ot ·- who hall u...- beaD aotift ia our tana f1ahtl" th.,. 
appeare4, be reoalle4, 41ar1aa tlaa lde-4uok ,.rtod all4 later apoaaore4 
the HeNao 11111 • ••• aett1aa •P the Seoreta17 ot Af!Tioultura aa the -r 
165.• 
166. 
> 
ot r.--. .. 167 Ia the mi4dle ot Marolt, 1933. Peek llOted that "'l'lacwll 
eppeare4 to be qui'te utiafied that lie wa ptt1ng vbataTa;f be wa 
atter.•168 1'1aallJ', Peek stated that l.ee and Jra•kiel wre the ohiet 
vrUera ot the tana billa tb• tam orp!11U.t10DB bed Tal')' little to do 
with tta it iDYOlfttl • ••• acae aev prinoiploa whiob they icMv nothin& 
aMu.t a• thOf wre •vtUin& to lluJ alq'tbinl" ill an ... rpn.,..169 
Peek's attribution ot the tllJ.'III till to the laat-aimate ettorta ot 
...,.rettTa upatarta llqleote4 to OCIIUI14er a baolt&J'Oull4 in aar1cul\lural 
history vith vhioh bo •• thoroutlhl»' tea111ar. Duriq the l<J20 1e --
lien ot both )llll"tioa prof0004 ~ which pointed 1a the direetiOA ot 
ao,..... 1'118trioUaa aad a prooeaaiiiC tax. Mllacwh1le, the OOP adla11l1etra-
t1aae ntoe4 theao nopoula. fhia coatreat between wol'lla and deed& 
fhe tam ... i'JU.IIi'l' 8epc wll Mto:n 193.3, ah"i~~& the f'anare 
sutt1o1eat tiaa to oaaei4or nriou plaaa. Peek illaulte4 the tam lee4• 
ore• iatelltaeoeo '111 illplJ"illa that tlle7 lll4 aot uilentan4 what W11Ha, 
who ha4 bHa JN\11oii.1JIC hie. 11\na ala• 19)1, wnteil -- 1t they •a.v 
DMbil:lc allout• the allotmeat priaoiplea, it •• beeauae they oould !let 
U4aralull thea an4 aot beoaue they he4 an heal'll of' th•• Wilaoc, 
'l'laaWllo Jaekiel, Morcenthau, all4 Yall.ue, except tor their n011-pert1-
otpaU .. 1a the lobllyiac for the JlotlarY-Jfllusen b1lb {"Which abaenoe 
tn.. "-- fl.rina Uae Peek etreesed), were by no 1118ana newc01111tre in 1933 
to \he ru.re • oauae. Ae for ~u, in the case of any leg1elat10ih 
oaq a rev ...-.re are r8111U.ar with it in detail; did Peek and Barry 
.... that the iubili\;r ot Chat~ ·~ton 1:4• Sllith and Marvin J'oua 
to explain the &let of the allo-.at plan to their oolleagu.ee ella'bled 
were •villtaa to t17 anythina·• '!be Oon&ftea of the HI&Ddre4 Da;ra retleo-
te4 the , ...... ot the tiaee whell U puaed billa in a hurry. Yet, no 
r~ ha4 )la4 .-. tS. to oou14er action and to w:rk up a tieroe 
4.-.4 rol' lt. Aa ear~ ae 1922 the NeUoul Ap"iO\lltural COnterenoe, 
oelled "' .lile.rd11tfl, reporte4 that •proper liaitation• ot acreage 111 s..a 
crope •• nee4e4.170 'l'be Jena Jloe.l'll ot ~r•a a4111n1atntion 'QJ'884 
fal'Mra to re4uoe pro4uot1on.171 l1l 1930 Seoreta1'1 ~·· ae noted a~. 
ur,.d •oolleotive aouoa• to aorreot the euppq-4-nd relat1088h1p.1'72 
'l'be · third aliA t111al report ot the lara Jloe.rl! a coopted some phase a of tlae 
d0111eet1o aUot1181l11 plaa.173 Acoo%'1\11\e to Yalter LiPPIIIlllllt HooTer's ram 
170. 
171. 
172· 
173· 
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a14 in acht.e•S.DC pa:rS.ty prioea, ereutuuon to curtaU p:ro4ucttoa, aDd 
ocouna-Dt of the vUh4nw1 fill •rc1Da1 laue ,174 It 1a trwt that 
Hoo'ftl' uee4 Jllblic f'ull4ll to replate appq at the •rklltiDC atega. As 
fer tala wrta11Mnt ot pl'GibletiCIIh he handtf out ai\Yioe, but, unlike 
DlepUa the 1alplS.oeUaea of their 81&\lo:rl\inat .. • repone, au 
the taUva ot •rt.Urac 48"1'1 ... , CM11._ and Hooftr wul.4 not take the 
laat lect.oal atep. Coelf.4&e ut0114 the Mdal'J'-Bauceu pleD tvtoe.l?!i 
Hwtet noeeHhll7 o,_tf aa qpo:rt-cte'Matura ril\er to the Acricultval 
JfukatliiC .let 1a 1Wie, 1929.1'16 llcnh Hecwer aD4 H74e 4f.a1 ... d the allet-
lllllt plaa ea v.awrlra\tle.177 Ia the -•r ot 1932, attar the Sell&ta 
,...., the liaiMf....,.llleek 1111. these..., with Hoo'ftl''a appron1, 
ahel..,.. tt. 
t1011 of the Pa:ra Boe:rll tf.Hce, oa the other, aUalated atu4euta to t--
lata •• plane and tas.ra to 4...a aett.ora 1110re lollllly than eYer. A1l4 
\he taza:ra mow4 towl'U au,.n at the production controla vbich •AJ 
)Nilit7 pla.Jlll&ra a4YOcded. 1t ••, attar all, a abort etap t.- the 
tqWilS...Uoa-t .. to tha p:ro•ut.DC tax,178 ladae4, a 1eaai~~& plall vbloll 
174• LS.p,_.., \!falter, .DIIII r gUp (Baw York, Mlllllf.llea, 19.35) 
19, as. 
17!1· McCwaa. W.ala.y. Dla lim ... 18. 
17ft. nte, Gf.llllert c., SleeM I·· .!IU .... •• 224. 
177, .T•Ua, 'l'htiCI!ora G., p 'MI!I4- !''?d (Oel'llaa City, OO.blMaf, 
~lena, 19,.) .3481 SalllllU.t 'f. alii Hf.eke, 1. D., •ptgy1tural JU.a• 
1900 .. 19)9. 4~. 
178. ~c~itsm: •· .11M ••••• 223. 
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~· p:ropoee4 allll Hocmtr loolr44 eta fuonlt1y p:roY14ecl tor an exeiae ux 
llfl1oh tuuha4011N14 the proaessU, tax.l79 The last Mollary-Haqen bill 
w1thll.el4 proapeotiw Hui'ib tfta those llbo 1anol'ecl a4Yioe on produo-
tlea.180 •a, 1728, • rue aaaeftM., 'the 14ea of OOII\PU1&ory oooperaUoa, 
the parlt7 eoaoept, alld tba prilloiple ot aorease restriction had all 
eatere4 the thillldac of aaricnaltval peliq akera.•181 Certailll¥ 1 \If 
19301 the lara lear«'• eaperieaoa ahowd that CNrtail.JDent of productiOil 
we .... nua1 to an etteeUn prt.oe-aupport PJ'Oflftll•l82 By 19:3:3 • ••• 
... Roll aa M. L. WUaon, OHrp PMk, Rex 'fu&wll an4 Henry ifa1laoe ./i.a4 
hal,.. te prOYtfii three ,ears ot taa.t -t 1nteu1Ye eOODOIIIio ecluoaUoa 
the .-nou peopla enr noe1Ye4 .... •18' WJaile Peek op}lOMCl the aore• 
ap .. atrel ••- ot hie tallow e41loa~ra, he hall iu4nrtently ooa-
triwted \0 a ltb1tt \If tsran in that 4irHUon.184 IF 193.3 1ea41DC 
tam oquiHUOU were ct..n41DC • • • • Jut euoh a soh- as wa atoptecl 
ia the Ap':l.ou1tunl AAJutMilt Aot •• 185 
Maq aooowta ot tba farare• atUtuu tn late 1932 an4 earl¥ 193:3 
4o aot Jibe with Peek'•· In paera1, bf 1932, the fers.ra, alokellri bf 
pnerty, watecl mea ia ifaahliJCtOil wo WOW.tl • ••• do •-th:I.IJC, all4 tha 
'bolder the better,• any ot n- wat ... eCIIIQliU1slon in •DT tam progra~~.l86 
184· 
185. 
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lll. •• hr and De..-.r, 1932. the leading tara orpnlaatiou 1ft41aW 
to RMHftU tllell' nppert ot the allownt plaa.l87 By the IIIW41e ot 
Dnn Jber, 1932. aner the .. unc ot the t-.ltth and thineeath, the 
•.to» tan Ol'pllisaUou, u IIIKM atloft, npponH the alloU.nt plea. 
It the profauel'a h004villolre4 the ta,..ra at the 11114•Deoaaber ptherlac• 
thq 414 ao ia aps.te ot tb.a •P•it01'1 powera ot Peek, 1iho •• ln 0011• 
ataat tweh lJ,v telepheae vitb the tara lea4era at the .. tial•188 
FNk'a oharp that the taz.ra lmev nothina alaout what wot iato 
tohe u. Aot ooa'rotllonte4, llf iJIIliaaUoa, Rlohar4 llel'l'J''• alleptiea thet 
the tara leaara 414 aot pt the taota at their aaoon4 iJI.portaat aeaeral 
.. una ill Wuh1Qitoa --the - 1a lfllllla•'• ottioe ot March 10-11. 193:3· 
'f'ba .. ,lac •• aalle4 beoetaae tha Praaitnt, attar oG~D~~Ultat1on vith 
W.lleoe .... hcwll uatt.l 1114atcbt ot Mania 8. 4ae14a4 that ccacraaa 
o01114 ,. •• a tara act 1D tha -.rpac17 aaaaion aat tor tha alath lt the 
tara leadore 001114 leek tbaualfta ill a "- all4 asraa 011 a b1ll. AIMiu.t 
tl.t111 tara laacera anifttl oa tba taath, u4 tha -unc went oa tor tha 
aa:t thinJ'•aix hO\U'e. "-a thoea )lftaeat •• Oeorp R. hak.l89 
lftlaa tb.a tana -111 vaat to Ooacna• • Muah 16. it aaJo,M tho 
ua1ta4 auppon ot • ..,... ot the lea41Jic ta• orpaizauoaa.19° It 414 an 
beoo• a law util Mq 12. D ia a 41ttillllt to aooept PMk aD4 Bal'l'J''• 
4&). 
obaJWM ~t Hither the tarmen DOZ' COIICftiU k:Dev aaythina about the 
ltU.l vbaa •cottoa u.• s.tth ant MarYia J'oaea, ..mo 414 llot like it, aa4 
PMk, had aearl)' tvo --.tha to explaa thatr obJeouona. All tor the 
S.eretary•a l:leeCIIIf.ll&, u l'Mk alleceC, tiM •ou.re of a¢culture, the 
ten orpaisattcma 4ee1re4, attar tu ~-4uok farce, to remove the 
U111ata·tz•at101l ot the l!Ul aa tar u peaaillle f:rca the halld8 of coasnaa.19l 
obarp that tlae fal'lll orpaiaatiou hat little to do vith the A.A Aot aust 
u teli:ita • • • • ia the lllll'l'VV eenae of eotual partioipaticm. a lta vru-
Uic •••• •191 SWlarlr, it •• true tbat 'l'll8voll praeen'ted Wileen'• 
14Na to ~t.193 He •• l"ll't~ a ..... qar • .,..,ue tor vhiab 
lle ~~~at be a1ven oredi'* -- alth8U&h it 1a reaaonable to u- tbat 
wu.n • • plu VOIIl4 haw &fttn to the Gontrnor 1t 'l'uavell had AOt Joillll4 
tlae ••• 'fnat. 
'l'ha ve1ah1i ot Dallen la tlut pJ."GmUon ot the allotment plea tn4e4 
or tift-• Joll. Lilil4le1 llate4 ill tiM ap1.oultural brein truat YU.aea, 
lukiel, Wllllaa 1. ,...ra of Corull, -.z.a Ollpluust ot J'Ohu Hopldu, 
C.U.SI.Mr c. Meena ot COlllllb1a, Louie H. llttaa of the Buraau of Asrioulturel 
191. 
192. 
193· 
seatlla•,l74 Melley, aa nete4 abO'fe, atatecl that at leaat twnty-t'1Te 
lila, inolud1q Peek an4 Huc1l lohnaon, oontr1bute4 to the fepeka ad4:reN. 
A -.s.--joul'Ul writer ottel'ecl •.rtieial proot• that at least t'itteea 
_. w:re in oonatant oontenaee vUla tha Pnteident duriq the fnaill& fill 
tlla billl sa-tore, 001lC" ..... t and fa:ra leadere aleo IIWt with the 
Pneideat 4\lriac thia ts...l9S 
fte aotual wrltiaa: 1nYohe4 fewer ••· Wallace 1118Atioaed. hSa-
Nlt, J2'e4 LH, 1•- h'aak, the firat Otlleral Cowlael ot the JJ.J., 
lllekiel 1 and fucvall t1"011 the VSf.IA, and P.ak, Chaster Dade, and Char lea 
l:rand - the latter tvo taYO:r1D& P.ak'a •iava.196 Lea and J'rank 1 
lfallaoa JI4Re4, 414 the latpll. ;lo-. aa'f8ral oonaraa._D ~~~a4e iiQOrtant 11\1&• 
v1ahea ot the tara laadara' OODfaraii.MI" it wa ia •DT rN,.ota a • ... 
lo81oal uyetallluUon ot the 1oaa atl'UfBl• tor adequate ta:ra leclala• 
uoa.•1" 'l"'llwll raoallad tut ha, learbl87 Bwltl, WilHD, wallaoe, 
aa4 lllekiel l$rkM on the draft ,198 Ptlek liated ely tee eM. Ezekiel aa 
uatten ot the oriciaal aot.199 'lila --.rot •n Hate( appa:rentlf 
depallded on vbat ataae ot the vork, eltlae:r betora or attar the or1clll8l 
Ulldler • lneat Jt. , •War WI the lftiaa 'l'ruat, • 257, 266. 
ac.o.u, c. H. • •'l'taat Cel111U1a c:rovt,• p:redit A14. li""sifl .,,._.. 
aal• Vol. 35, Jlo. 6, 1\me, 1933• 17 • 
Wiallaoe, HeN7 A •• IU rm,ssm. :L6Ju Davie auocee4e4 Peak aa 
.w.tniatrator (See below, Cliai'ar Xh lralld had. lileen ohiat ot tile 
BurMu ot Nuketa, tiSDA. aDd •• Yioe•prea1daat ot a fl'llit ell4 
vecota'ble 41Aitributf.na OOJIP8DJ• 
lfallaaa, HeiiU1 .A., Jlu lroJUe;g, 1~. 
'l'laplll, R, G., JU Qtif p J.11A (llev York, Double487• 1947) 23. 
Peek, GMrp ••• * i1l1t SIB: •• ,. 
\ 
491. 
'1.t • ., Allarioan 'beu. .... ~t the New Deal asriwltural 
J.eaUlaUoa we tile pre4uct or 4..._ra, loac•haira4 PJ'O· 
fMaora, aDil qeata t1'oll lfosoov, he la a prattJ aoocl 
•. -1' &S..lt. It ,.. ·tala pJ'Oiluot prt.ril.J' or looal 
tazwn CI71JIC to 1»e 4ell.,.ra4 trca their o011tpeUtion.200 
nte etlllfllliU4c 
It oan ha~lf 1»e CTa1'fllllph .. he4 • • • that the New Deal 
,......,. ,.. aot the Wl'k ot wtU-va4 ft41eala, Matem 
a.lbaa prot ... ora, or lllfl'aotioal 14aaliata. n real-
, .. tJ"Oa ~ wol'll: et bart..Wtte preoUU.onera, llll.lQ' ot 
•• 1MU4 town\ polltl•l .-nau •. ao1 
Prctepw .Jolla x. Oelbn1tb 41alaae4 C-.miat 1ntluaace on the AA Aetc 
Then ws a 1'8TCI1ut:t.on la .._:rf.eaa aa:r1cultu:ral polic:r in 
19.33· 'I'Haoetonll the tarar wa te lie n-taatlaUJ' 
pJ'fteote4 trca tbe \'laS,Hf.tWa ot the tree arket. The 
'-ieee tor aetG~M~UalltDC tbta - atilt.. prtcae al'l4 pro-
Uot101l al'l4 •rket111£ 41011tzole - wre to lie.- eo t11'1111 
'a44ell that llet avail Jan ._,. Beue could think coa-
teatfldq allout Junk111C th•• ht tbere 1a ae f.l'l4ieat1e 
that the J'OWIC Reb ha4 ·~~~~~ to 4e with tbia reyalu-
uw, either pre or coa,. or avail ae4 • ., blpgrtant thouahta 
oa U .. .. 'ftle J'OUIIC C alate pollebe4 tile le&al laA• 
...ae, 41eeuaee4 the 4Hper ara4 aere tn.Mamntel taeuaa, 
aud ••t aloaa ,_.....tor a utn~t.202 
tuc-U 4NN"f'N ora4U fGI' hie a1acar1tJ' and -I'CJ' ill f:laht111C 
for the taftlltl'o Bid\ ~ eta-..ll\11 la ..... lea41JIC newpapere thd ae 
praoUoalq Vl'Ota the .U Act •11lala-"""'t41J', that it ,.. ·~·· 
ata~t 1tre1A tbl14,• wn •• tar trca the tnth aa one eoul4 pt. 1'et 
aoo, 
201. 
202. 
ol'ltiee aUribvte4 'llbat tiler tollll14ent ebjeotioneble feeturea of the 
IIU1 to hill. 'Wllr' lleeaUH he hea lltNm a prot'eaaort llecauae he 1a 
..e ot the 1llr.la truatt••2°' 
'l'ha protlelou of the Alt. Aot 414 DOt retlaot the work ot a11 ut1-
Jie0 GOllllpi:raq, at laaat iuofar •• tU, iul\\41!14 Paek'a ta.... 'l'he 
.AaliaiatreUoa ••ua;a lav qv.ioklr •• Wore aprina plaa:tina if poe-
elbla -- u4 it _. not OC;. kiD 'llllioh approaoh ve.ald be bast tor 'llll1oll 
oropa.201l The AalaJ.at:raUoa ~ to pu.t all of Ue acga 1n QQI!I 
H8kat. 'ftut roult • ....,_11 reoal.W. _. 
... a011atb1QI of aa OMi• lllll llaoeua ot the Jlllrtban 
"""" for Yarioua altanata 801JIIIo Ia 1t the conaraaa 
·~ Qleptet to the·,._ ...... , all4 the Secretary the 
JOWl' to obOHe 'llllatl!l'\'81' aoheM ••• t lteat allll put 1t 
tate aouoa.aos 
liNk, 'IIIlO o'b,Jao111!14 ia 1936 to tile Saol'atel7'• lteoadDC tha •cur• ot 
qrlwlture, hatl \cll4 tile saaate c..tnea oaa qrieulture ia 1933 that 
tha J.otiolatioa bat to 1te fleaUile, p't'iq lii'Gacl a4min1atret1't'e powra 
to tha s.oreta17•2o6 llhn aa av.thor p'\'8 eqiHil orel.lt f(IJ' the Alt. A.c'lo 
to keap Peak allll 'l'lapeU, !Ia 1aclioata4 that Peak•a pet ach-• ware 
I 
auilallla, a1oq v1 til tile allet-at appl'CIIloll, tor appl1eat:Lo11 ia tha 
... rpa.,. am 
49 .:l· 
oaU1M4 tour •in plau ot prOH4una ( 1) llenetit Pll)'lllenta 011 the 
da!IHticdlJ cons~ porUon ot the crop; (2) the leaaina ot land trca 
1nd1v14ual tar.ra to take it out ot prot\U.ction or to put it into the 
prGiuotion of non-aurplua crops1 (J) Seaetor E4 Salith 1e cotton opUon 
plaa, which pve a fanDir all optioc on Cftton held by the old Farm 
lolu'd in return tor acreaae radWitioaa {4) Mrketin& a.ar-nta,208 A 
Uon ot arketinc agre ... nta, pamittell the uee ot in- frCIIII prooee-
sinc taxea to pe,y tor loaaea on exJIQl"ta209 -- an opportuait;y for Peek 
to reYiT8 the a:port•lnl'HiAJ feat"" of Mallary•HauaeDU.. Another 
iiQQrtant subaection fill'" the SRretery licenaina powere which per-
The wide ranee ot poaai\1111 :policiea 1a the AA Act -nt thet the eon• 
troT8niea OYer 1ta aU1n1stret1011 1110111.4 hinae not ao IICUOh on eliJilut-
1D& alterneUTaa aa on the M>tter ol eaph .. u, 
Peek purportec\ to raPJ'It88nt the fa1'1118re. His ideas appearll4 1D 
the AA Act. Yet, he aa14 the fax.en 'lcaev noilh1QC' ot the 'bill. 
Apparently the inclusion of ldeaa in a4dit10D to his own .aa due, tD 
af.'bly neoeaaary n•eaue ot action. Be ..aa abo ••re thet the ooupln• 
tor11• would be ln tile nev adlll1a1strat1on. Yet, he took the jo\ ot AA 
208. Lindley, Erneat K., IU, §gvml\ Rntlllt19Jh Fint l'MI!o ,8, 
209. f1te, Gilbert c., Otfl'M l• IIU .... , 2,52. 
210. llolu"Q, 14m o .. Markttiy '*' a!• !Dder lU. Ml• 16. 
Alllllain:rator •• atte:r eaUafyiac hS..U that throuch dlreot aooeu to 
the Pna14ea.,, 'llhioh Rooe..,.lt unre4 him, he eould -phaaiae the poU.-
"''''le difterenoee wre 111erel7 trautern4 to the adlliniBtratora llho con-
211 
t1maa4 to differ.• 
At early aa NoveiUer 17, 11),32, Wallaee wrote the Preaident-elect 
ru 11141DC Peek tor the Secreteryllhip. Rooae•elt raeYer aav the letter • 
.SO.. naei'Yera awspeata4 that How 1deroepte4 it. Fite did not th1Dlt 
that lilooHYelt -14 haYe appoiate4 Peek in •DT &1'ent becauae the Brain 
'l'ruat 414 not wat a mn ot Peek'• "tlaiiiMoe, peraiatenoe, an4 fixed 
14eaa.•212 After Wallace be- Secretary, he offered the Job ct AA 
Uldaiatntcr to Peek on March 12, 19.3~h Peek 4eel1ne4.21.3 On Marob 14, 
Wallace a ad '1'\lpell rtait ... Peek, who ..... tad llantch tor the job J 
Tqwll, prok"lJ' 1a part ""-ue he 414 not wnt that to happen, 1oe1a-
W that lal'I&Oll -14 act take the poat.214 On Maroll 18, Wallace called 
lal'l&ob, ottarinc hia the poet J ~1, Peek nota4, • • • • obYioual.J we 
not ple .. a4 at the trell4 ot atta1ra.•21S Vallaoe, then aelted J>ee.k 1f he 
216 
waaU aerq nan A41'iao:ry Cov11cil, aDd Peek said he wuld. 
On Merola 25 halt d1aouaae4 the jolt-otter with Senatore .!farriaen 
211, Tu&wll, R. G., •A Plallft8r1a 'fiev ct Ac:rioulture•a future,• 35· 
212, Pita, OUH:rt C., OttraJ • .flU ••••• 241-42. 
21.3. l'ite, Gilbert c .. Qtorg J • .lltd ..... 2491 Peek, Otorge N,, !U: 
iaU..!Eid• 81. 
m. Pe&Jt. Oterp •·· * i\LU. s •· n. 
a1,5. halt, Oeorp •·· Dz iiU. .Qiu:.s. 8,3. 
aa. halt, o.o:raa •·. ar i!i1l· s .baa 84. 
(Pat, Dla., Mlaa.) and Stewu (alo) (aJIIBrentl.v Hubert D. Stephau, Dea •• 
Mlaa.) an4 All' StOlle, a tiU'II parUaa. Peek Aid to StOlle, • ••• no 
•• wltll a., aeua wou.ld taka tba ada1niatratlve job an4 baTe such ~~en 
•• fl.lcwll eel Ezekiel in a )1081Uoa to l'WI cirolea al'OUIId h111l.• 217 Leaa 
than t110 welal later, on April 14. Peak wo wee atill toyillfl with tba 
ltea ot takiq the Joll, raoei'fet a eall traa hi& ol4 bose, BaNeh• 
hNoll telcl Peek to tell the Prea14et tbat he IIUIIt ( l) know what the 
11111 we k Ml (2) lie 111 a peeltioa to oc.e 41rectl7 to h111l; (.3) t.IIIUr-
atut hie authorttJ -- •'l'J~Qe thillCB MiD& olaarl;r Wlderatood, I -ld 
218 takl8 tha •Uer UD4er H'fia-nt • • llerueh we eepaoiall;r oonoei'M4 
.._..he atlll taTorat the equalisation taa.219 On April 6 Peek t.U 
Cheater Da'Yla he wou.lcl not tate the Jolt • • • • ulaea I owlll asrea on 
,.u., ... :uo 
ID early AJ.ril a reaewt ottu 08lle tZ'Cial the PreaWent h1•elt 1 
Peak wute4 time to plll a • .-plete 'UIIlaretan41DC" •• to policy. He 
finally aooeptell the posltioa at a Will .. HOWle •ettua Qt the •••nilta ot 
May 3· Vallaoa, Roper, MDI. Parktu, Woocl1n, 0118a1np, J'erle,y. Douala•• 
Mftopatbau, Jibley, Tla&wll. an4 othare •re pre .. ~at. Peek reD&llell that 
tba -tllll we neither qUiet aor bal'IIOII&OI.Ia • • ••• tor everyone aeuell 
that tt the tal'll 'bill -t wronc the AUda1atra.tion wou.ld 'be 8\Ulk.• t'b.e 
217. Peek, Oeorp If. • .81: .illlS .ba• 85. 
218. Peek, Geol'81 ••• * .ill&l.l:llll •• 90. 
219 • Pita • Ollllart C. • hOW A- liM .. • • • 237 • 
220• Peak. Qtorp •·. & iiiU Sill: S• 91. 
h•U• ull:t14 Peek ud lilallaoe to atay attar the ott hera lett. He 
Ofllltlilltl4 the oreaa1zat1011al cham whioh Wallaoa and Peak had au'-i.Ut14. 
'ftl.e Pru14aat'a re•taed oban •t all at Peek'a obJections. He acoap-
11414 th poa1Un at .U. Mainiat:ntMr• On May 12 1 when the fal'lll bill 
lleCIIIM a law. Peele wrote a letter to Wallace, ind.icatiq hill understand-
inc tbat the Malaiat:nator would act tor the Secretary, ditfereacea 
preaeat jullohre.• Peale COilel\lde4, • ••• to atete • .,.. br~~~dly the 
u ••• • ••• rtl4uotion ot acreace Ill' redvotion of produotion aa tha aaaa 
,.221 
•••• 
tal'lll bill 110 11ha lal$wla4ae \hat Wallaoe an4 Tucwll would eurciaa tta. 
Seoreileq'a breall powera only .-.. u,., ao11~.~a1 adllln1a1lJ.'a11ion rutinc 
ill the ha* at • .,...,_ with •tun u:parteaoa• -- Georp Peek.222 Dlt 
the Mala1et:nation, 1t17 aooePtiiiC Pea'a aanioea but not h1a polio1ea. 
tnai .... bill tor poltt1•l purpoaaa' Vn4out.\a41y tha senate 4P'iouUUJ.'al 
C...Sttee'a ua4erataa41na that he woald be the adlllniatrator tac111tata4 
,. ...... 223 At 11he .... tille, the allOUient advooatea •- aincerely to 
118'18 bella.,.., aa illliliaated ia W1laoa1a letters to 'l'ugwell. that Peak 
-14 acoept theil' 14oea it the:r appeel'tl4 re .. oublr appropriate to a 
&iftll attuattoa. Peell:•a retereaee oa Ma7 12 to •raduotion ot aoreep 
or l'eCNcUoa or pro4uouoa• ••t haft etilll&lete4 thie belief. Waa Peek, 
Peek •• 110t deoepUTe, he •• like Herbert HooTer. His idees 
41tterel. fna the allotaoDt croup'•. He place4 11111rketill4il aSJ'H11anta 
an4 an aai1'8H1ft export pro,ram firft• Production control& ven aooept-
able ODll' aa a laat HBOrto Oclot:U.et •• 1neT1talale. Like HooTer, PMII: 
loat to thoH who held Uftennt u.... Like HooTer, he queat1oae4 the 
a1noer1t:r aa4 1ntell1senoe ot hia Tletorioua opponeuta -- .._D thOUSh• 
like lfooftr, his OWta 14eea preYed 1aetteotifto224 tlftl1ke Hoo....r, Peek 
414 not ba<re aD Ulpreaahe intelleet. Hoover eaw CIQIIPlex1tiea, but 
001114 DOt aet for reeaODe or attaohlllllllt to 4011118 and of peraou.l1t:r. 
Peek oould aot, but he ooul4 110t lee ocap1n:1t1e•. He •• s1111PlT solD& 
• .. , to try llke hell to :raiN tara prt-.•225 Tu&well, who poiatat 
by h1per prieea to the eons-r -u lead to inore .. at industrial 
,.... an4 pr1- and the return of' the ta,_r to his preT10WI dieadftak-
pGIUI poalUOD relatiWI to 1n4uatr:r, wa, te Peek, ipo:rant and, insincere, 
Like Hooftr, Peek overindalae4 1D aelt-Juatitication. 22& Ia the 
224.. See 'below, Chapter X. 
22.5. Jite, IUl'bert C., CJeorqJ. ~ .... , 253· 
226. Ja1J.ey, '!'beau A., fila. t=rta• Pe u (loatloa, D. c. Heath, 19$6) 
s:;oa, labale Hecmlr'• M pm ••Jrret 117 n:oeaeiTa aalt-Juat1t1oa-
t1oa.• 
Jl'OMH he •4e aGOUMUOU that cl14 DOt boll up. Por example, be oal-
l.M tbe allo-.nt dYOoate• • ·~D4ere4" fo:reian arkete, 1ntena-
t10Dal18te.221 "- l:reia f~ ie .-aerally oooaidered nat1anal1et1c. 
Valiut fiebter for tbe faz.r tbat he we, faelt wa no 11111re &iuerelr 
1Jne:reete4 $a the far.er• e welfare 11bea the )'OUII8 1utructor at CelUIIlilia 
wllo pa14 hie ,.,. to Hard1Jic•e aar181ll11ual oefe:renoe in 1922. Oood 
tllbt4Jn via mere raepe.at when tbeJ are alao aoo& lours. 
'l'qvell and tba fa1'111el' 
'l'he A&rioultural A4Jutlllltn11 Mainutratiozu Peek and the 
•P~~rae• 
wre eYldent dvins the drattine and Pl'O.Otion ot the AA Act carried 
owr into ita adldniatraUOD. It wa Peak wo 1na1ste4 that the tana 
bill incllnde Pl'OTiaiona tor lllllldreUDC 11(11'8-nta and nbai4izat1GD et 
l 
•porta. And it we Peak who. ea AA Adllinietrator. intended to 4ia-
poae ot tara produota at a parity pnce throue;h llllllrlcetine asra1 "'ta • 
nba14izatloa ot uporta. and aoreap reatr1c111oa •• 111 that order. 
ua1ns tha latter onq aa a lest reaon. 2 
H1a relationship to Wallaoe •• r...,..ly alllllOCOUa to that ot Moley to 
Jllll. la both tnatancaa ott1cW. orsanizat101111ll7 subordinate to a 
oalltDet otticar aoueh11 to opeate thzoouah direct contact vi th the 
Pruident. In both aaaaa a lhowlewD saw the oa'b1net officer stay encl. 
the aubordinata so. 
Attar be lett the Adlliniatnuoa. Peak declerecl. that be had lleen 
1. Carter • .Tohn r. (vaott1o1el O'bael'YBl'). l'.lll.lu Paalera (Nev York. 
ss.on and Sehus11er. 1934) ].46. 
2. Nourao. lf4v1a G •• Jlar)rptiy AMI ppRe Pnd•r lilA 4AA (Waahinstono 
'l'he Brooldll88 InatUutiaa. 1"5) '!1· 
soo. 
1IU ao l'MHil tor bia to haft liMa nrprised. Wallace an4 Rcloaeftlt 
•de their Yiaw olear to bia Mtcmt he took the jolt. The day the 
.U An Ita- law Wallace told Peek that aor.aae relluotioo ia cOl'D 
and cottoa _. ...... 17. ID4ee4, 011Mrt Fite ca..ated, the VOJ:7 
tact that Plek i .. late« oa 41reot aooeee to the Praeideat batore he 
apwed to aooapt the poaiUon 11141•\84 hie belief that he 'WOUld haft 
tva4aM'Iltal 41tteruaea with Wallaoe.3 
Vallaoe, tor hie part, W'Oie to the 1'11'Nideat oo May 15. three 
ilqa attar tbe .u Aot lta .... law, atatlnc hie view on hia adllliaiatre• 
It ia 'beoomtnc alillm4antl;v clear to • tlld Mr. Peek'• 
Ulaiatenee oa ulna Jft u aa ,.,lre 'bet-n hia all4 
.,..11 vill lavelve you unnlllslal'ill ia a•••alat~­
Uft 4na1l an4 wlU prove to 1M a hnda ... ntal haa4loap 
to waitiall a4111alatn111on ot the r.:na A4,fuuent Aot. 
wallaoe raqua\84 a r-1 re•wl ot Pft'Pioua verilel aaauranoa that; 
be vaa '-k'a ehlet. While he bact,. he vrote, hlsh J'88lll'(l t011' Peak'• 
al»llitr aa4 desire to ra1ae tam pl'icea, ha •de the requaat aa a •t• 
tar ot a4m*niatont1ve neoe .. 1ty.4 
1116 to proctuction oontrola tor "'-• llheat, cora, aa4 hop in the 
$01. 
a~ plet414. Oil 1Ul7 ).4, 1933• '-It atated in a radio bl'C&doaat 
~t .-n-a than tiYe adllion c:ntoa srowen bell aipad eontraota to 
take over aiDe million aoraa cut ot pro4uot1ona "What baa tranapir.a,• 
he U.lar414, • ••• arka an apooh S.a .Amarioan hiatoq.•5 
Peek reoall414 hie poeit1cm aa et 1933 in .liL1c 9aU .2H£ .fbau. 
I ha4 no part in ahapi!IIJ the prosna. It wa pn~aeata4 
to • 'by the Hop and Con s..tiona at the AAA ae the 
eonaetMWI at oplnicm 111M11!4r both Pl'CIIIuoel'IJ and. proaaaaora • 
aa4 u aueh then ••• 4 notblaa to a.g but fP aloq vi th 
1 t in Yiaw ot the atauna -II'SftCIF. 
'l'ha Nal'lt 'by aa- who aav ~ in 1114·1933 that he wnt •white Wl4er 
the sill•• _. probably at leut fi&\lrat1Ye11 true.7 Peak hall not 
al..n ap his baalo ob.Jeotlona to aonep oontrola. 
WhaD lt appear.« to Plek that, in anticipation ot the 1934 plant• 
lac ...... hie opponeata lntan4e4. to 4rop the •rketiac-acraemant and 
toraip4ra4e teatuna ot the AA .lot a1111 conontrate on limitiaa produo• 
t1oa, he llac14a4 on a ahowdova. Hie narka· to Wallace 1lluatrate4 the 
a~loua a4ldaiatrat1'9'8 aat..up in the AAA. He told Wallace that 
••• acool'diDC to filii or1a1na1 at1pulation with the Praai• 
dent , I abOII.ld have to dieOOYft' rrca the Praa14ent 1n 
per&QA aaotll' how be wnt414 the .lot a41Uniatuecl. II be 
wanted it the Wallace way, I uoul4 ba.,. to lena. U ba 
wanta4 it ., way, thea Mr. Wallaee'a oouraa wa to ooopar-
ata. 
.502· 
Pnaldellt eeat tor h1111 8114 otteft4 him a new Job. 8 
'1'he oolltllct ot aOftap oontl'Ola venus marketina alfteMnta 
ollvioual,y would aot have Ofta11e4 aD administrative problelll 1nvolvtna 
Wallace and Peek 1t the Seon'llal'f and the A41111n1strator, both having 
41rec11 acceaa to the President, bad been oa the - aide ot the fence. 
In uy eventl, that eontliot, its a4111aiatrative aspects aside, •• in 
ttaelt autttoient ceUM for an open break in the AAA. In additioa, 
there •• a contliet over the adlliniatratioa ot marketiD& &ll%eelll8nta, 
which un40\\bte4l,y WO\\lcl have ooourre4 even it thera had been a general 
UD4eratan41ne oa the place ot arketing a&ree1118nts in AAA policy. In 
taet, Cheater c. Daru, Chief ot Produotion and Peek's aucceaaor as 
Mat.ntatrator, aareec\ with W'allaoe oa &llllbaatzina production CODtl'Ola, 
'but, like Peak, he got into a ttpt over the a4111n111trat1on ot •rket• 
1111 811%81P nta 11D1oh 'bl'Oqht a'bO\\t another ah0111down in the AAA in 193.5· 
'l'bera waN two schools ot thausht 1n the AAA on the obJecitivaa 
to be aou&ht throu&h Mrket1D& aare-nta. Peek coasidared thtllll a 
davlca tor d-atio dlapoeal ot tara proilucta at e parity price. His 
oppoaanta 4epen4e4 oa ecree.p Natrietioa to anura d1apoael, coM14er-
1n& aarket1ns acreemants a 4evlea tor resulating distributive practices 
1n cmler to proteo'l: the 001111-r. They also believed that it llliddlaMD 
added 'l:he ta~ra• pia to retail prices, the AA Ac'll woulcl tail 'l:o 
achieve :t.ta purpose ot ialprovina the t111'1118rs• poaitioa relative to the 
reet at the eOGMIIII'• It 1a cl .. r that arkeilina agree11111nta went into 
eftect with •rather 41ttereat Tiew ee 11o their -•1119•"9 
The pha .. "re4\loe the epnq• denoted the objeotin at tho .. 
•that wet, uncharted rqioa bftW811 the eix oente a pound the tarar 
aeta tor *I oettle, all4 the tittHa to .. .,...ty cents a poua4 the 
oona._.:li' J117• tor it ••• •re ot that fifteen to seTeat1 oenta oucht 
to pt llaok to the ter.:r •••• •10 'lu&Wll'a point at view ohenoter-
ized the poup in the AAA 'Whlu took a bne4 view at the agriculturel 
problea ea oppoae4 to the ~ as-eialtaed •tara leaur• Yiewe ot a 
~ at 11111n 'both w1th1D ell4 without the ti8DA.11 The broad Tiew took 
into aOOCWlt the reletlonahi» ot a¢oulture to the rest at the 
eeotlCIIIIf'e 111111at11na that btcher tea prioee accQIIJIIlnied by hia:ber retail 
p:rioea voul4 be tnadated into -.. iaareases and higher illduetrial 
prieea -- JU.ttiaa the tal'IIBr bHk where be started. At the 8811111 tilllll, 
rrs ••al ot su:rpl\18 tara produda we eaeentlal since the tal'IIIBre' pur-
uaaiq power we an 1apa:rtaat el.allat in the health ot IIIBDIIf'eeturiJI& 
iftlluatrise. T\agwll 881ilhe•1M4 the o oa intereete ot tsl'IIBrs all4 con-
8UIIer8 S.a an intricate all4 delicate balenae ot prioe sncl inCCJM :rela• 
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taa4-srant ooll ... craduates aa4 ta~orsanization leadera 
•••Phd Peek's liad.ted obJective ot 111711141 "like hell to raise tam 
prioea.• lA oonoeatratiaa on this at.Dala objectlft, Peek did not 
praotioe 'What he had praaohed ia the 1920's an4 4\ll'iftl the earl¥ part 
fit Ilia teaure aa A41111aiatrator. lA 1933 ha a.-d vital~ conoe:med 
vUh 1aoraaa1aa tke percentaae ot the oonau.r•s dollar which the 
tan.r rece1ved.13 lA a pnaa ..-leaae ot Sep\elllber 1, 193.3• he de• 
plore4 wate ia 41atr1\lut1on d the cou-r•a expell88.14 Yet. lite 
oonelu484, • ••• .nen it - to 1JI&)l ... nune hie proarem. Peek we 
8\ll'priaiallr charitable with tha prooeeaora and haa4lera ot tood IJN-
4uota.•1S Peek ipon4 the problell fit what happeaed to the fa~r 
attar Saoreeaeli pricea b%'0Uih11 him the ooet ot production and a arpa. 
He left lt to 'l.'v.&Wll en4 othen to deVi.M W)'a of brin&11141 fa1'111 pricea 
into line vith tans ooeta, thn 0\lfted thea out aa •aooiallata• tor 
ret\la11141 to •tall tor the ol4 'llualt' that hiaher prioea. and not the 
coat of llvine, are the teat ot aa .tteotive farm pro&ftlll.l6 
The tOl'lllllation of •rltettaa e&J'88111Rta, which brcucht the two 
aokcola fit thouaht 111 tha AU. into bead-on collision, wa 41ft1cult 
enough in 1 tsalt. The evolut1oa of an agreement was a COIIIPlex and 
tecl10\18 process involving public notice, intOl'llllll discusaiona. toral 
baarinp, review bJ the appropriate c:Cl810ditJ section to ascerta1D 
producer ln-. review 'bJ the eoa.-1'11• Colmael 1:o detel'lllina con-
sumer bul'deDIIo a cODterenoe with l)I'OOasaors an4 handlers. applioa• 
tion for a tol'lllll.l hearing on the revised draft, and, aaain, public 
not1oea ot the t111111l acre-nt. .Ul interested parties wrs heard. 
COGtliots cleYeloped. betwen fi%'0Wl'a an4 asricultural trades, 'bet-11 
srowl'll, betwen aartcultural tra ... , between larp tin. and small 
ti:., bet wen t:ncla associations aacl "indepanden'ts, • bat.wen oha1n 
•tore• and 1adepen4anb, 'bet-n ohaina sad woleNlers, bat-n ol4 
atl4 nav 4iatr1'butors, bet-a reciOU (California and Florida citl'WI 
srowra), and batwen natiODII ( supr). . It 'Willa putting it mildly to 
aay that dias~nta delayed final rav1alon.l7 
In an adclraas in 1934 Tupall outlined the ideae which the psr-
aonnel ot the Co~1'11 1 Counsel \Jroupt to the negotiaticm of IIBrket• 
in& san-ta. lit •phaalsecl tile nae4 tor protection of unorpnlsacl 
eo-n in a JDOdara •c:OIIOIIIII' and the depelldenoe ot the -..bola •conalf' 
oa the coneenation of eOQ.SWIIIIr purohuina power. He preaentacl ata-
tistioe on the incraaas of the •spread' bet"'"n 1910 and 1929, statill& 
that the •aprea4• had to be ra4uoecl, v1thou11 interfer1na with efficient 
dietri'blltiOih it the l'800ftl7 PJ'OCftiD wa not to be eelt-detnti~~&• 
Be noted the bitter opposition oa tbe part Qf 11111111 prooeuore alltl die• 
tr:l.butore to the eou- Counael'e aU•P'• to write into 11111rketill& 
&JIW ata PI'O"iaiODa tor etalldal'tla ot quality, identit:y, labelill&, 
all4 peoJra&e till. 'i'u,swll conai4ere4 atudarda "intillllltel;y correlat.ed• 
vith prices ill the proteouoa ct the COII8\II!IIIIr.l.8 
The 110at im,pol'ttont and llit._ oont'lict in tha drettine; ot ~~ar­
ll:eti116 ear• r nta we oue which 'i'u,swll 414 not mention in hia 1934 
e44reu - the olaak Dftr previaioaa tor •••in1116 CCliiiPIIIIJ books. 
'l'ld.a oont:rcmtray vaa pert ot the -~ ot the ah<*lowu de~~~~~nded 
teDCIM that peekera alltl oaQQ8ra who ball received exeaptione fr<lm the 
anti·t~at law ebClW.d open their boob to the Fft~t to auure p:ro-
teot:l.oa ot the intereete ot tarmera and conaumera.19 'l'o them it ..a a 
on tha baaia of tairnau to the ta~ra tor whose praii\IMd benefit the 
-.o»>l¥ wa to lie lepltze4o"20 Tile toocl trades, on the other balltl, 
lllllirlta1ned that •:rouas l1llerala• ia the AAA aouant to pin tull ••-• 
to oat.P8111' bGeka u a ... ot ett'Mtlllfl aonnant control ot buaiuu • 21 
5f17, 
Peek aicle4 vith the packers. 22 
The 4lUHt1Cn ot the gove~nt •a access to CO!llJI8~ booke an4 
:reooft8 heCI. b .. en a ltCIIIII ot cOAtentton at least since a FeCI.e:rel '!.'ralls 
•More then aD)' other th1J11o • 1t vas the question on vbich •rke'ti.D& 
6111CI*P'- _, afll'OWI4• 193.3 wa a year ot ti'Witration tor all a14aa 
- tbclae vbo viahad to uae •rketlDc ag:reamenta to pee; prices in their 
- illtaNat, those 'lho apected &Uatantial pins ill term prioea, aD4 
th- IIIIo bopell to reform •n&Unc praot1cea. 2.3 
Mark SUl.U'ftla callad the ff.&h11 in the AM a • • • • atruaale 
bet- contnatill& ideals ot 80ftl'lllllllnt.•24 :J:ja described Peek's 
o,..._u aa •Sooial1ata• or •naar..SOoialiata,• 1114 by Rex 'l'llsvell.25 
J'iu coaolu484 that 8011111 of the fitt;r or liiDZ'8 laW)'8rs on the AM staff, 
aH7 ot thlllll ll:r1gbt YOUII& urllaa 11~111. ware leas interested in 
ra1e1ne; farm pri ... than thq were in controll1ae; buaineaa in s011111 
authoritarian way outai~ ot the ~rioan tra41tion.26 
1.J11 apa11nnta to aooG~~~Pliab llftatia lf1118•1'Un social an4 aconCIIIIic refOI'IIIII· 
fu&wU, llho ba4 no practical interest ia foreiill Weeloe;iea, vas per-
bapa Wloll8oaaaer11T barab ill deal1.JII vitb prooeBSora -- aa ... n in a talk 
c.r11ar, 1ohll r.,J:MJIU DM1eD• 147· 
Nourae, 14via a.. Herpttpc •• r •u•. 43. 
14itor1al, '*'· Sulli'ftln Ions t~ Without,• NatiAA, Vol. 1,36, 
110. 1S7', .Tanuar;r 1'7, 1934, OJ.. 
liM• Vol. 22, !10. 25'• Deorllblr 18, 173.3• 9. 
Ftta, OUbert c., 9M79 I· It&• 261-62. 
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whioh he saw to the AAA'a Food ID4uatr:Lea Adviaory Boerd. 21 There 
ws, however, every reason to tie kllt.gerent in dealinc with the prooes-
sora. The,y were senerall.v a touah-llillde4, aelf•intereated SJ"Oup, re-
luotent to concede en inch and eaeer to advance their position at the 
a:peue of the fan.r and ibe conaUMr -- a short-sighted attitude. 
Moreover, Peak, Cl1J1€1na to a narrow view or the farm problem, turned 
C*t to be, in effect, on the aide of the proceaaore and distributors. 
He ,.. quick to oell 8Jl70M 'Wbo took a broad view or the farm problelll 
a C m:Let. Given the beaio d:Ltrereru:ea am<ln£ AAA persollDel in 
approeeh to the plight of asriouUure, :Lt is reasonable to assume that, 
evea in the a'llaence of the militant lettiata, there would h!IYe been a 
fi&bt lMtwen 101111 Alllerioeu like l'Mk, Frank, and Tuswell, 
Tuswall oooaidered the prooeaaore and distributors formidable 
aataconiata wbe thoueht the AU wuld help them increase the •spread;• 
they were :aot interested, he ua!Ata1Jie4, ill the fal"'llllr and the oona\IIR" 
er. 28 The adlilinietration of Jarketin& a&ftl-nts involved a !lumbar of 
:Lno1dente which jutitie4 'l'qwllll 1e dUtu4e. For example, a Federal 
a'll41t ot the books of lllilk 41atr1llutora, instituted b:y tlhe USDA e.tter 
the proclucere balked at price•eettill& at the retail level, showed hip 
d:Latr:l.llutor prot:l.ta,29 Ill thia :LaatanCMt the producers stood with the 
tliatri~tora. Cbarlaa l!olman, Seoratary a1nce 1921 ot the National 
eo-.,eretive Milk Pro4uoera• Fellttfttion, det'eaded. the distributors, 
'Wallaoe oalled. Hollllan'a t!l'OUP •&iatributora •aqueradina in overalla.•:JO 
!he situation 1n the allll: ind.uailry typ1f1ed the prod.uoer-41a• 
tributor a111anoea with rea_.ot to a IWIIIber ot cOIWI&lditiea. The larp 
states Cha!lber ot' c-roe, the NeUoael HisbleY Uaera• CoDreranoe, 
aDd. the l'fatioul Incluatrlal lnt'orauoa CGISI1ttee, a:ponaorad by the 
Jlat1onal Aaeooiation ot' Mallllt'aotunra, raveelat. tihe all1anoe ot' the 
'b:\a fal'lll operators an4 the proceaaora ot' farm cOP'IIM1tiea.31 
Within the AAA, the prooeaaora, \hrOIIah the Foo4 Induatriea 
A4v1aory Board, axpraaeed. a desire to 118¥ parity priaea, red.uoe the 
apraed, and elill.tuta \lnfalr tra&e :praoUoea1 the Board declared. 1>het 
it would cooperate by ezall.tning a,.cific propoeala by the AAA.32 The 
1nduatr1ea in the tOOd•tra&ee group, it is •rua, pva Pl'OIIIPt couidere-
Uon to the AAA'a epecitio requNta, but the General Couneal and COD· 
.-zoe' Cowaeel etarfa and the o"" td.it:r diviaiona canerall)" reprded. 
their p:ropoaala aa Wlllcoaptallle - eaprclallT in the •tter or aooaaa 
to llooQ,33 The fCillowra of the tana leaders in the AAA, on the other 
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han4, like those outside ot the sgcmey, stood with the proceasora. 
'l'heJ were w1llill& to •so easT" on bia operators in the llllltter of final 
prices provided the fal'llllr sot a •thicker eut.•34 lluaaell Lord tou.n4 
this cU.tflcult to understand • ••• when old-line aparlans had for 
:reara been creat ill& a •peraooal dii'Y11' of the middle man •• J5 
It is &r&\l&ble that the prooeuors lmd honest dtfterenees ot 
opirlion with the Oeural Colmafll sn4 ConaUlllers' Counsel divisions. It 
1s clear, however, that mall¥ ot them refused to recosnize the right 
ot the c:orunus.ra• Ccunael even to partioipete in poU.cy~lll!l.kill& diaeus• 
aions. In 1937, recallill& the quaSTels ot the e11rl:r thirtiea, before 
a aWI-_,ttea of the Seaate Ccalittoa on Agriculture, Holman said 
fazara• aseaOJI" he thoueht that it shOuld be en independent fact-
fil\dill& bo4¥ without aZQ' polic)"**IBkill& funotioM.J& 
i'erhaps the best 1114ioat1on ot the processors' aimll and atrencth 
wa the failure of the A.AA to achieve a1pif1Q8llt !'flfOl"'lllll in lllllrketllla.37 
Rqllond Gl'IUI1 Swins OOIISUlerecl Davla' dialll1aa1na Frank and his followera 
from the AJ..A in Febl'\lery, 1915, not a •purp• ot ra41oala but an exprea-
a1on ot the political power ot prooeoors, Ustributora, and bi& pro-
ducen to prevent a ahift ot eooMllllic power from tbe!UelTes to the P\1'11• 
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lie in the interest ot the cons-r awt the amall pro4.ueer.38 In 
Maru, 193.5, u Tut;wll we prep.;rinc to head the Resettlement Millin• 
aoadsm1o, intereat 1n the processors• anti-eoeial attitudes. 'l'he --
oraolua sa..ar1zed the results ot an inveetis-tion by the state Senate 
paebra, uerted Oft fel'BI l"dera and aaencies or the state goft~nt 
COftll..ted with agr1eult\ll'e.39 
'l'he prooe.aaora - te haw \lettn atron& enouah to have takea 
eara of th-elfte even if the peJ'Ilonnel or the AM had been unifie4 ia 
a broa4 approach to the farm problem. But the prcceaeora sot help, 
~· where the)' well 111Ft not have I!Xpaoted it •• in the pereen of 
Ceorp N. Peek. Despite Peek's t1n4ea aaainat the m144la llllln, he ,.. 
lellient on prooeuora end dietributora as he concentrated on raisins 
tam prioes. '!'hie concentration reflected, or course, Peek's aarrow 
approach to the faJ'lll problea. Aoccmii~~& to Tuavell, Peek cUd not 'WOI'I'T 
al>out •the oount17• and •the eConOIIIJ,.~o Be liB& interested in specit1cs. 
a. we inteneted 111. gettina the faJIIIer a higher price. When the proll• 
l811l reached the next ah.p or dealine vi\h the proceasina syste~~~ which 
hall kept fal'lll prioee 40\lll o4 retail p:oiaee up, he •sud~ wnt nau.,...•4l 
,a. 
39· 40. 
41. 
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Peek's c;perienoe in the defUnct Moline Plow Coaapany helped to 
explain his failure to see the relationship between equality for the 
farmer and retail pricu. He ws, Tu&well noted, a •'brother• to thollfl 
vho sold thincs -- seedamen. fertilizer l!llnl.lfacturers, and othera --
and wanted farmers to be able to pay tor thalli -- •That wes a SiiiiPle 
1m,pulae and Mr. Peek was altopther a simple men.•42 In 19.'34 ll'ortl!M 
ca.mented that vhile Peek's lack or st~oh for theories belenoed W.l• 
lace's penchant for s'batraoticne, Peek also provided a balance in 
•another and less helpful direction• -- he hed 'been an implement manu-
faoturer, end he eaw the fanzr primarily as a market for goods1 he 
would eolve the farm problem in the interests of the processor.43 
Peek's atet-ilt of May 15, 19.3.3 -- the AAA's activitiee would involft 
• ••• ae little interference with established institutione end methode 
••• aa ia consistent with the fixed JU1110ea or the lawJ llalllely to rain 
farm prina•IV4. - turned out to IIIBiltl that he wouiW. let proceaeore and 
distributora conduct busineaa as usual. 
'l'uti,"Vell wa.a not alou in referrlnc to Peek's one-track mind. 
:r. '1. Carter wrote in 19.34 that Peek's •vest-pocket• remedy for the 
farm crisis -- the equalization fee •• remained his sospel lons after 
the ~incipal ~porting countries or EUrope bad established tariff ~lla 
u4 quou qat- to trutrata aa;r effort to subsidize our ~porta.4.5 
42, 'l'ue"-<ell, R. Q., l'!l!. Str1g1sea ~. 2,3. 
4.3• Fortnu, Vol. 9, lfo. 1, 1all\18ry, 19,34, 61. 
44. Nourn. B4vin o ••. M!lr)!Uy •m=1ta, )8. 
45· Carter, 1oha J., :l'.lll. !t.x DeltrJ• lf6. 
OU.Mn J'ita DOted that 
Peek '• jp"'lllt .. t wealalau aa a fU'III laader wa hia ovar• 
a11apl11'lcaUoa ot the pobiA.at aa4 hia belief that aari• 
oultura1 4if1'.10\ll.tf.u !101114 be aolved apert trca tboaa of 
la4uat17, f1fttlaoa, all4 tl'llllQOJ"ta'Uon.46 
Hie taihare to take into aooouat l'ft911ltioaal7 cbancaa in Aaerican aari• 
culture-
••• ahow by bia oontill!MIIl a4.,...q ot about tba -
•tho4 tor dealinc with tara MIJ'Pluea both ia 1923 all4 19~3.47 . 
1a a.,.ral 01'01111 hall hao011111 ~t. HI conUmaeA to advocate full 
IU.a 14eea on export 4-.plnc n4 •r&et1nc acre n 1 ata were 
aet enOUCh to ban4le the .,.r•1Dn.aainc surplUHa ,48 
J'iM aonollllle4 that 
,_k lliaht haw aoocapliahecl 11101'e it he had been 1110re cora-
,. : Iaine aD4 leu WQ'ial41DC. SOluUona to problema 1D a 
4811Hft07 ooaa thZ'OII&h a proeaaa ot experiaaatat1on an4 
&lYe an4 take. He oa:a., uv 'lllaek an4 white oa the farm 
quutioa •• naYar .,.,,49 
hell: tended to call • ••• aYaryOM • • • in Waahi~ who dia• 
aareed with Ilia either a fool or a knave.•SO Thia tendency, caabil'led 
Uoa ot hla t1&ht 1n Waahlnctoa oontualD&. Not all ot. hia oppcmenta 
46. 
47· 
48· 
49· so. 
lite, Gilbert c., 9MFe I• JIM• ,301. 
J'ite, Gilbert C., S!eerp I• . .II&• 302. 
J'ita, Gilbert c., 9NWi' I• llll5, 302· 
nte, Gilbert c., o.ow I· Zlltk, 302· 
.IlK *'W "dt$tr• Ombar 0';-'"1936, quoted 1n J'ita, Gilbert c., 
9tent •· liM· 293· 
wn C aa1ata. 'l'ucwll wa iatollerent or c misa.51 l'l'alllt ,... 
a aeftre critto of Man:1aa.S2 'lila ~k beoame a Fe48ral Ju4ae in 
1941, Clheater Dll1"1a sent a ooncra1nllatoq telepam to the ll!ln he had 
fil'ell tl'Gil the AM.5.3 heclariok c. How, c:oruna.re• Cowlael Wltil 
19.3.5, wa an o14-time Procreaalfto Be had bean a atata sell8tor in 
Ohio thirty years before and one ot 'l'al1ohaaon'a faToritaa. Moley 
111'\ed tha11 .How • • • • innocent)¥ soared the daylight. out of buainua-
Mn vlth talk naWI'al to h1111 after • .., )'liOn of pntla qitat1oa.•.54 
'l'hfl 'battle batwen the 'bolder• ot 118n"OV and broad view ot the 
tam pro'blea had a baclqp/oulld ot tvo yaere • atl'tlgle. It w.a to be 
•peote4 'by aqoM who \llllleratood the •tura ot the qricultural situ• 
atioa • .55 It wa not, U.pite the JII'INeaoa ot c-ntata in the AAA, 
pla1M4 retR&Ua4 hell an athlllpt. ill the Allerioan tradition, to inject 
the 4octr1u ot pul)lte &ood 1ato pnotical affairs .56 
'I'll• 4flta1la of the ficht 411 aot 11111ka a pretty picture. 'l'he 
leadflre of the oppoe1q a14fla 1a a aix -tba' civil ve.r 1na14fl the 
A.U. vera, of couraa. Peak and 'l'llawll• '1\tpell, b.aTiDa no official 
poeitioa ill the AM. did not neap in direct combat with Peak. J'el'S8 
J'rank au heclezotolc c. Bow PI'QIID\84 Tucvell'a viawa.57 LiMd up 
apillat the Gallaral Cowi8el and the ecm.au.n• Counsel and their dlvi• 
aiona vera hek'a auppOrtera, includS.q Cheater Davia, Charles Braad, 
au 14 0'5eal • .58 M. L. Vilaon an4 H. R. Tolley, the lat\er fol'!ll8r]¥ 
of the Vninnity of CeUtomia ant head ot the Special Crepe Beotion, 
Hl'ft4 aa •41•t1111 intluenoea bet- the qrarians aa4 the city llll· 
snla • .59 Vellaott, who hated qurnlilll, oppoas4 Peek, eapeoiall7 after 
the AdlllDiatntor Clhelleaa-4 hia authclrity •• sacrata:ry. Hova'IIIZ', 
after llaHilll J'ranlt apinat Peek 1a 1933, Wallace backed Davia asainat 
J'l'llllk in 1915. 
l'rindahipe alld tiae of lllltual respect had t'o1'111114 acro88 the 
line ot 4Ufennotte, but when IIO*tleneoka in the whole prooeaa of 
or4erq adlllaietnUOD drteloped, pereonel antagon18118 beoams •int-
Hyon4 ellduranee.•60 Peek noalled that, •'!'he General Counael'• ott1oe 
appeared to be the n.eck ot the boUla, an4 it w.e quicltl¥ repOrted to 
• tba11 ••• J'l'lllnk waa doallna 41raotl.T With Me .. ra. Wallace a114 Tupell 
••••• 61 It wae true that lftllk -rly elw.ys aaraed With Vallaott aD4 
Tupell on ~ant 1aeuea an4 •• in a •u, poaitton• to hamper or 
block Peek'• plana.62 hek'a •1• ooaplaint wa that the liberals 
57· 
sa. 
59· &o. 
61. 
62. 
4ele)'e4 the approyal ot •rkeUac e&ftiJII'Ifnta, 1u1at1ac oa maklac 1t 
a •tlel4 «ay• for aociall•·'' 
AlthCIUih Peek wa lepll,y a aubodinate of Wallace, he tr1-' to blook 
uop re4uatioa.64 He bi'OII&bt ill lila OVft -· praeticell¥ pleklac a 
MJal'ate atatf which 4\lp).lcaHA tllat of the AAA at lllaiQ' po1Dta1 he 
lpored hank, retalalac J'N4e1'1ek I.ee •• Ilia personal eounael at b,ia 
ova ....... 
6
.5 Stubbonl all4 headati'OII&o Peak • • • • trle4 to :run tha 
whole ahov a114 appereatly \lelinad up to the bitter ell4 that be we 
l'lnalftlt•a fawrita.•66 
Aa era-vitaaaa :reponed that the fi&ht aoon beC181118 a dirt7 ou. 
Botti alclea 4..,.lope4 eha""r taolu,lqUNa planfotac queationa 1D preaa 
OOilfN"Iaoea, dipplDC wt forial 11Bll00111 to cenaln corzoeapondenta, 
oultifttlac ooluldata with • ......,_. tlpa, end, the lowat trick ot 
the ... ~. 1D • ., oqaa1&at1ea. hol.Uq up papera or deciaiona b)' 
l'll&171118 th• 1D detail or •tr1clk1DI th• out• with lepl or bueaucra-
tlc haraeaa ..m1oh killed 01' tlelaJ'ed aolea -- "Both aides had learued 
to do &004• aa eaal:t a14e Av it, ea the aJ.¥.•67 Tusvall • ..mo aHIIIIIIl to 
eaJOJ a fl&ht. cot ia bla llckl. .Ia allep41J uae4 the 11\fon.tloa 
that he, •more then •IIJ'OM else, • wated to pt rid ot Peek aDd. •neuv-
U'M to to1'08 hill iato resipil\l• 6' 
Peek's seven IIODths in tk AU, from the middle ot May to the 
ld44le ot ~. saw eolltlifta Oftl' •rketina asre8111enie, aorwace 
_.,atnle, 8Wia1dillaUon ot .,ons, and adlainistretift relatioaships. 
!be ttrst tlportant opea coatliot oeae in September with the nesot1-
at1oa ot an asree•nt tor t'lu-ourad tollaooo. Peek objected to the 
U.l d1v1aion'a awep1q speoitioeUons on aocess to coapaiiF booksa in 
earq Ootollttr he tCIQ the dispute to the President, who backed ha,70 
MMawhile, Charlu B:naad res1pe4 Oft S.pteaber ,30,?1 By November Peek 
ws f1pt11\1 •d -· ..,.oialq at the prepa:naUOD ot plana tor acreap 
CIOilVOle tor 19311 oropa,72 anA the ailtUu4es ot the Geae:nal e-el. 
Oa !foe >er 15, he sent a •111Dft114ua to Wallace, statins thet J':ruk had 
~ tqcuibla aDd requestiua his r-•ala wen Wallace tailed to 
repq ~~Hie repeated hie request ill a IT :naad11111 ot November 25.7.3 
Beton actiOD resulted t'li'OII Peek's ultiat11111 -- either he or 
Frau, he daolared, voul.d haft to so - an incident occurred in lata 
Jlovllllber and earl¥ DeH!Ihar vhlch appears to line bean the last st:naw 
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tor I'Mk. I'Mk had a:rraD&M for the a~aba141zad upon to Europe ot 
baUer. Tucwll. actin& for liallaee. 1olho '11118 in Vera Sprin&ao ntwle4 
to approYe an adftaee ot $500,000 wt ot prooeuill&-tax 1ncOM for the 
equalization ot the dlffereRce between fore~ an4 tomeatic butter 
p:rioee. 'l'ucwll explained hla aotioa in a 118110l'an411111 to liallace and 
Peek ot Deoembe:r 2, vrUtac an aeuy oa the eYila ot 4111!1pi.ng. Peek, 
1olho had been aaoua1na Wallace an4 'l'uawll since April ot deatro:rtna 
toreip IIBrlutte, nov eceuaelt ths ot ehelYlna the tara policy which 
Rooaeftlt had prcaiaed tbe people. He a1Dta11UIC1 that no d11111Pln& wa 
1aYOl'N4 in the blltter 4•1 beoaue the iJDpo:rtina nation bed ao obJeo-
Uou to reoeivin& the bllUar (he failed to •ntion the reaotlcma ot 
butter-precluoin& rae tiou). Wall•• baolred up Tu&vell. 74 
'rhe adda wre ecwainet Peek'• ultillat11111 sotna ti!J.'Oil6b in hie 
tuor. Prellld'ltrtar had ~ J'ranll:.75 Fn.nk, liallaoe all4 Tua-
vtll had a4jo1nill8 I'GGIIIII at the CO.O. Club tor a vhilea later, af\er 
walla• 'broqbt hie fud.l;y to VaehliiPOZl, Frank and 'l'u&vell shared an 
apertll8nt.76 Freak bed beea read7 to reaicn llllln7 U••• but Vallaoe 
and Tucwll hel4 hiJD 1a l1ne.77 I!' FrnJt had reaiped, '1'\leWll. alld 
PMk, George N., lf.bl; 9.llU-S• 1.31, 151-.541 Peek'• atat-nt 
ia 19.36 that '1'\ICWll w.a act eoU118 on hie own w.s eorreot 1 1'1la-
well recalled, 8 HeaJ7 ven11 out ot tOVII, tor that one,• ipterviey 
JdSI:I. !!l'itar1 Tupell .,_ to 'ltallaoe on the phone on the eftn-
iaa ot l!fo'raber 27, Plte GUbert c. • Qtotae I• J!!IU• 26,. 
J:la, Vol. 25, No. 7, Fellrwa17 18, 19.35• 14. 
Lord. !UnU, ltul l!!pllfw J1t .ka• 340. 
Carter • .Tobn F., :J:U Jlu Dn1trt, 99. 
ship I!IJIIOftC the three ofticiau we thalr aareelll8nt on acraase controla 
as a pr1818 inst~at, and on a ~1'0114 view ot the objecUYaB ot market• 
tUrect}¥ to the PrealAeM -- • ••• uw he had ra1aed. the iasue ot 
Walla"'• e\ttbority and would. haft to 10·" 79 The final, dec1e1n ale-
1118Dt 1D Peek's ouster ws the villlnaueaa of the Preeid.ent to haft Will· 
Wore Peek resf.ane4, he reoei'Yad a •slap• froa Wellace --
all...UV conoeiftll 'by '1'\taWell. 80 Peek aat -t to Wallace in the sacra• 
tal'J''• ott ice d\11'11:1& a press conterenoe on V..-ber 6. lfo one. J'ohn !'. 
Carter wrote • 
••• who attucled ••• will &ftr toraet it • • • • With all 
the fairnen alld raatr~~iot of a .f8dp and without a a1ncle 
unklad reterenoe to Peek, Wallace calmly uid tlla.t Peek's 
llilk aan nata wre a failure and proceeded. to write fltt 
Jl'eelc'e 1IOrlc as a total lou. Yet it we done too illlperaon-
al.q and uo adroit}¥ tor Peek to take offense ,81 
Wallace auo aa14 that Pia pi'Ciftotion 1IOUld. 'be cut due to a decliaa ia 
poD exporta, alld that eodea tor pao.lrere would ai'Ye the goya~nt access 
to their booka. 82 
78. Carter •. J'oha F •• :DI.I.IU I!rlert• J,46. 
79· J'ite, Gilbert c. • Gtorf!ll• J!ll.k• 265. 
80. U.• Tol. 22, Jle, 25, Deoe.har 18, 1933. 9· 
81. Carter, J'oha.F., Dllu ptelep, 8.\. 
82. 11811 Tol. 22, Jfo,; 25, lleoe.har 18, 1933, 8. 
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aZICl Jiach .Jol:laua to the White HDue, att•PUIIB to aohi&ft a eCIIIPI'•• 
\IT haTing the Jle&OtiatiOD ot e m••r Of oo4ea t:nmaterre4 f:rta the AM 
to the !IRA, B,3 The DUt ISq 'l'V&wll allll Wellaoe NV the Preeident iD the 
lllmliiiBo Peek bail luch at the White Houee, and then Peek conferre4 vith. 
Wallaae before eeal!IB the Preeident aaaira; ora Peek'a eeeon4 TiaU, 
Rooe.,elt eeke4 him to ree1p. ~ 011. De04111111er 11 Peek and a I!UIIber ot 
hie MPJlOI'tera realped. 85 
The Mm1r&iatretloa taoed the )IZ'Obllllll ot what to do vith Peek. 
Tile Pre814ent 1114 Dot wat hie outalde ot the Adllliniatratiora attackina 
the tana Pl'CfP.WI• 86 'fu&wll lftiM8ate4 •kina Peek Minister to CaeohO-
alotald.a, vith a rcwina aaeiDP~Dt ae a Mle-n tor .American rena pro-
Clllcta ia Blarope; hell: tU1"1184 dow both.B? Peek finally accepted the 
poeitia ot Special A4Tiaer to the hu14eat ora Forei&D 'l'raa.. He wa 
to work ta 0011,2lmotioa with the State Department. Hush .l'ohnaoa thOI.Iiht 
hie tnellll bad liND •kicked ta the alate.•88 J'OhD Carter thousht 
Tllia we poetic jUatiee vlth a 4aah et irony • • •• Peek 
thoupt the tana IIUI'plwl oupt to be exported. Let him 
t17 to export Ul Hall belt.net that the nationa ot the 
'110rl4 wre ree4)- to naaae ia hee trau. Let Hull aee 
wat haPPIIle4 whea Peek'a IJU'Plu appeared on the vorl4 •a 
•rkeu.69 
83. lJal., Vol. 22, No. 25, Deeellber 18, 1933, 9· 
~. J'tte, Gilbert c., Qqq:zs I• ·JIM• 265. 
as. Peet, o.oq., liiiX iiU s •· 155. 
86. rite, ca.lben c., 919rn .1· au. 155. 
tr(. %Ja, Tol. 22, No. 25, 'lledllhr 18, 1933, 9· 
88. Jla, Vol. 26, No. 20, Jo'MIIIber U, 1935, 11. 
89• Carter, .l'ohD 1., fM IQ Pttltrt• U8. 
fit the failure of his policiN to liiNt the teat he profseeed to applJ to 
•liT prosraa ~- the pnetioal one. Hie first and 11108t important •rket-
111& aareellleAte, whieh covered the handlill& of milk in the Chioaco are., 
wre at the point or oollapae by DNember.9° An authoritative student 
or the AAA conelnded that the fluid milk asreements demonstrated that 
state, na:rrowl;r cil'Cllllllcr1be4 the rNults which could be acec:apl1ahe4 
thrOU8)1 gove~nt eontrolled JErketiq.'ll J.JJ earl¥ as October, 1'1.3.3• 
Chuter Davis atated thet a production control Pl'OfP'IIIIl for the entire 
4a1ry 1114uatry •• aeeded.92 
In Peek1a last talk with Dena before he left the AAA, he told 
his auccaseor to • &e' rill of hallk .and the rest of that crowd• .. a con• 
dition of his aoceptenoe1 Davis believed he could 'handle• them.9.3 
Dena, who had a better eduoat!onal llaciqsround, a wider lrnowle4p of 
econadca, and a more elastic mind than Peek, had shifted fro111 McNary• 
Blugeniam to the allotlllsrlt plaa.• 1fll hs4 &6l'er1sa s)'lllllllthies, but he 
was not IK>uD4 in b7 for.llated lalldl.or4 86l'er1an1amJ and he knew bua1• 
usa •n, hav111f; taCttll them tor ;rears in conterenoes and price netoti• 
at1ons.95 Ruaaell Lon deaeribed Davia ea • ••• kind and intelligent, 
Uatd.a& learnlaa.•76 Lord beUeftd ~t it •Ill' IIIBII wa equipl*i to 
""'P'8e iiUtt~ncea of view aa4 t~nt Wille at the - tiM 
DqOtlatlfta &al .... llta amona qrartau. thet lllall -· Iiada.97 
Aa Aaldniatmtor DaVia ahow4 ea wwaual aptitude tor nesotiaUon 
in the lq contereuoea eaeent1al to AIJ. routine. He departed. fX'CJOI hie 
own btu. explored, llateaed, pro44e4 both atclea, an4 kept diaouaaiona 
oballllelecl. He prcwiaecl aldllecl en4 paUent e41111n1strat1on Wlen it wa 
IIIM4ec1 -- eapeo1ally 11noe W.llaoe leapt liiDl'e a114 more to bimaelt. Davia 
tr1e4 to eeae tenaiona with aollllt 1111410888. He ahowd no personal dia· 
lika tor 8111' ot the •n who oppoaecl hila. He bad diaasreed w1 th Peek 
oa MallarT•Hnaeni.D, and ill 1934 he 41..Uae4 about one hundred ot 
Peek's appoiateaa, but the two ~~an ftleinecl fr1encla. .Aa Administrator 
llllvia ooDiluote4 Ilia battlea e'llove a peraOIIal le"t'el. 96 
Dn1a atraeaecl production con11rola while racoan1z1ac the poteaU• 
a11t1ea tor ra1aiaa tara prtoee t~ ratora ot marketinc practioea. 
'l'he 41ttereacea bet-a hila an4 the ·~ lillel'll.la' involved admin1at1'11.• 
U'9'8 technique rather tllaa policy. He tavo:recl puttinc throu&h all 
q;nurata Witch prcaiae4 raal bea.et1te to the farmer. He did not wn 
ettorta at BD• •n to fail llecai&SO ot •dootr1aaira 1naietance on a 
oena11l icleal 1'8flui-nt. • He acceptecl 'llbat he oov.l4 set 1t it aeellllt4 
reaaoaa!Jla, 'b1d1D& h1a tiM tor the aoooapliahiac ot raaulta not obtaill• 
,&. 
97· 98. 
For all his modaratina qualities ot intellect and persooelity. 
Da.ta waa not •at home• amons hia Youa&-liberal asaistanta.100 Within 
a ;rear he had taken t'ran them a~ut a1l thlilt he could stand. Two 1nc1-
ddta at the tum ot the year ( 19.34•193.5) appear to have exhauate4 
Davia' patiaMe. Be was 111 a hUJTY to neaotiate a !IIIU'ketin& ape11111nt 
to.,. aaparasua 'because the PlellUD& aeaaon wa approechtna; he believed 
that he could not sat the 1n4Witry to accept the atalldana cleuae ae 
vrUtaa. but \he ConsUM1'8' Cclunaal vould act 1110d11'y his atalld,lOl 
Da•is waa rea43' tor a ahovdown. 
The 1asue thet 1'1ully •t.lev the root ott• had nothing to llo vith 
•ratl~~& •sre-11ta or acceaa to booka. The youna libere.la tried to 
t1a lD aocial ret'ol'lll vitb benat'it J81111111b to cotton t'a:rmera, 'nle Cot• 
oontraota would aarwe not to reduce the nuaber ot their t8118nta du'l'iDC 
the tirat )'e&r of operation. Prov1e1oa vas made fo-r exceptions in 
"11'',..1 1114bidual ceaea. WbUa Dada waa ave.y oD a tielll t-rip in the 
Waat. the Lepl D1Yia1on relate~ the AA Act alld sent out talesreme 
to atete adllillistntora in the SOUth orterins them to entorae 111 the 
aaCOild ;rear ot operation a Tllltna wb1ell vlrtuallf OOIIIP81le4 landlOI'Ile to 
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U.J the .... t_.ta 011 the AM laf14 aJI4 in the ee• h0118aa. AD 
unoar 1D the SOuth Naobecl Davia, who flaw into 'ilaahlna'oa •with hie 
jaw shut ti~t.•182 
DaYia nov ba4 Wallaoe'a auppert -- which he did not have iD the 
Upaft&ll8 •ttar. Both - were awn of the aerious p:roblelllll of tara 
te!IIIDCI)' in the SOuth, but they ._... that the TOIUIC l1bctrla' - wnt 
bctyond the p!.ll'JO!Iea of tbe M Act af14 wa be7011d praetioal pouib1ltty.l03 
Wallace cave Dana, who wa •Ure4 of aharp tricka•" pel'lliae1011 to 
haf14le the •tter.104 Davia cleo14e4 to fin J'ral:lk and hie triaf14a. 
Tuawell w.e vaoaUonina 1D Jl'lor14a, rewperatina fl'OIIl an attack ot 1111'lu-
ansa.l05 H1a abeance wa a "&048884 it there wa to be a purp •• 106 
Oa Mof1481, Fetmul17 4, Davia 1aaued a lllimeocraphed sheet annOIIftc• 
1aa a reorpniaation of the AAA.. He fired. Prank and tour IIIIIIDbere of the 
Leaal Division• Lee Pre_n, Yietor Jilotnem, Francia J. Shee, and 
AJ.aar Hiaa, Pre4arick c. HQw, the cona-r•a COU.nael, wa demotecl1 
Clerd1ner Jaekllon ot Kowe•a atatt wa out 1 Profeesor Calvin B. Hoover 
be- COlla-rs• COIIftsel.l0'7 '1'be ~~ext day, before the start of a _,_ 
ina of the '-raenq Council at the White Hl:luse, Wallace told the Preai· 
dant about Davia • action 1 vhen the preu 10t wind of the story, Wallace 
a114 J)eYll aDDouna.d e preaa c"""•••••. 108 
were •ple1Jll7 hoetile,• the Seontaq we1 '81'8J'•face4 and l!at!Prdo' 
•aa4 end WMHUIJ•" lllalleoe aai4 that hank we d11111iaeed for heZIIIOQJ, 
DOt beoaua ot his social or eCIOIIAlllll Yiew. DeYie abo streeaed 
in ortfto to ~e efficient opaatioa. '!.'here wee no particular 
we jut a MW&tiJI& d1tf1eult, 1a .ntin& thillp doae, ead attar all, 
our job 1a to pt thiap d0111.• Valle .. decU..C to elaborate en hi• 
resreb ever the re~ipatlon ot Victor allrt•teau, •no city liberel• but 
etator viMtl the Llpl Dlvilion ainteJ111"8ted the cott-pe;rmeat• order. 
'l'be SMn'lla17 eonolu4ed with a cllarectel'iatlo 1Did4le..,.y stat-nt: 
••• when ,oa elllropte eati•tl'llllt lava ••• you are reapona-
thle tor pnt1te to 101111 extent ••• and I don't wnt to be 
in that poaition 'Without haYinl aOMea to the booka •••• 
It we place ouraahea 1a that poaition, we ouaht to haYe 
_.. powr thea we nov haW I blat it w 414 haYe the CCIIIP~te 
powr, I .. not au:re that 1t would llle doiiiDoraq any more.l09 
W&lleoe • e only nterence to 'hlwll we, •Mr. 'l'llpell is out ot 
town aDd. you 'Will haYe to aell: hilll *' he thialal ot thie ohanp.•llO 'l'he 
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:reponera 414 not han to wit lOll&• '1\icWll en4ecl his reoupeJaUQft 
f.a Pala sm..- encl. flaw back te Waahtqtqa to een hie fr18Jicla -- too 
late. 'l'ha Pruident heel all"N47 tolcl reportal'll that he did not 1atea4 
to iaterYeae 1n thie •tatarnal .. tter• in the AAA,lll 
TU,cwll we not eun whether be we in or out hielaelf. He n-
a1pe4 to tihe Preaidut, who aeked hill to stay at least for the Uae 
the Preaident that he prate~ to 1101'11: with the reputedly difficult 
Iekee then to atq with W.llaoe, who - preparinc to •take a broa4 Jwap 
from a bowl of Jelly. • 'l'he Prea14ent, awre that Iokaa 1111nted Tuavall 
tor OOIU!UftUQft aoUY1Uee, tolcl '1.'\ipell to talk thiaaa over with Wel-
laae. W.llaae wated 'l'llcWll to w .. ia ill Aaricultun, with the Ullller-
ataadf.ac that he haft nothina to 4o with the AAA. Tuavall said he wa 
9 Iolraa telephoud 1'uf;wll, tellinc Ilia to •su tisht" until he ( Iekea) 
sot \!aU frail a trip. Oa Febl'UIIl'f 20 'l'ucwll vent to - Iokaa. He 
told the Seo:nata17 of the latarior that he vcul4 so 'back to Col\llllbia 
u:aept tor hie loyaltJ to the Pruideat. Iekea ea14 he hopei\ to cat n 
O'ader Seoratarphtp for 00118enat1oa, aD4 he vcul4 be haPP.Y to haft 
'1.'\ipell tor the post. 112 
Ul. 
w. 
Tuavall, noe:Lvinc aeauranae trca the Preaident, ~1ned f.a 
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Apiculture. Re.-aurauoe took the t'OI'II or appointment or Tugwll to a 
DeY •operating OOWlOil' Ot' the AAA, other gOTel'UIIIIInt joba tor Frank 
an4 hie ev.pportare, and the praalae that Tugwell woul4 have a reepona-
1ble part in the apellditure or wrk•reliet' f'Ull4a,11.3 Moreover, How's 
ev.ooeaaor, Hoover, pre-bJ.T -14 ad'fOCIIte polioiaa a1111ilar to hie 
predeceaaor•a.~ 
What wa the a1pi1'1oance ot the 11111as t'1r1DB? .U.. aaid it wa 
Wlllliatakable1 •the bia&eat s1118le be'~)' ot Brain Truatere in the A4111n-
iatration had been quietl.T but firmly turned out as trouble-ukera .• 115 
Raymond Oraa Swine; decleftll that the diallliaMls apelled the • elld ot an 
ere ••• the defeat or the 8901el ou.tlook in esrioultural polioy.•ll6 
.tila we too opt1miatic allll Swing too peaaillliatic. The President inten-
ded neither to rid the A4111aietration ot' all the ho1dere ot' post•l92CJ 
idees nor to abandon the Slllllll t'al'lllllr. 
The problela in the AAA we one or deoidine; on pue and illStl'll• 
1118nta in the reeoncilietion ot short- ead 1ona-run obJectives. How teet 
and 'by whet deYicaa coul4 the AAA oa.bina relief, recovery, and reform? 
Ja Henry Wallace eaid, • ••• people with the highest ideela don't haYB 
the - oonceptiona •••• •117 All wnte4 to increase the ta1'11111r 1a 
inoCIIIe. Moat, :Lac1\ld1na Davia, u .. sree4 with Peek on the -.in -• 
113. li.a.• Vol. 2,5, No. 7, Februel'f l.8, 1935, 141 Finney, Ruth, SCrippa-
Howar4 staff writer, clipp1ft&, Twnapll Panre. 
114. Swing, Re;viiiCind Gram, ''l'he Purp at the AAA,• 216. 
115. lial.o Vol. 25, lfo. 7, February 18, 1935, 14. 
116. Swina, Ra;r'IIIXId Gram, •The Purp at the AU.,• 216. 
117. .:n.. Vol. 2,5, No. 7, February l.8, 193.5, 14· 
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ot attainlnc the til'llt obJecUft. After Peek's cU.s11118eal and the 
aseu:raaoe ot ftll)haela on aoreep oonti'Gla, there ws still plenty ot 
roGa for dieqne•nt. Tuawll anA l'rallk were interested in the in• 
oreeaea which 11011ld aoc:nte to r,li"OCSaaors and distributors after the 
termer recei"f'e4 his pin. They were also intel'llsted in bov increased 
1nOClll8 11011ld be d1atr1wtad ai!IOIIC farmers themselves. De:vis • who was 
not adftrae to a 'broad Yiev ot the taftl probl•, faaad the reality, as 
SWine conce4e4, ot claal1nc across the table with producers, procusors, 
and d1striwtora 'olbo could uert toftl1dable politioel prueun.118 
Yallaoe -. in the •iddle. Soalethillc bad to give. 
a, the oature ot his aotf.nties, Davia bad to give first coa-
siderat1on to recOYeJ.')', an4 the A.U., 1t 1a true, pert}¥ due to the 
aature ot Us origiu, be .... the Me ta:nars • apnq. Perbape U -. 
'li!IJO"dhle to caRbine short•rua wl~ loaa-rua, and apec1t1c with aeneral, 
obJeetivea •• or even to reconcile certain s.-41ate objectives -- 111 
~e A.U.. One -td not have te aocapt the 1Japlioet1ona ot Peek's deals• 
nt1on that the Dapan.Dt ot Agr11N1Ml'e -. not •the Dapart•nt ot 
Evel.')'thills" to..,.... that the potaaUal1t1es of the J.AA -were li111ted. 
'lha J'ara Credit AdldnlstreUon daalt with 0011 phase of the tam 
probl•· Pel'llape other apnoiaa could IIIOI'e ettectivelr rapreaant tha 
oona~r and the -11 tanar •• a probl• 1n illplementation. Vary little 
118. Svi~~g, 11aJ110114 Gram, •'lha Purp at the M.A.,• 216. 
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we 401111 tor the cou-r u no.ll9 Ia the aprtns ot 1935 the Rent• 
t~t Adll1aiatreUOilt with ~11 at ,ita head. •• created to dael 
with the farmers ~o d14 aot '-netit troa the cperati01l8 ot the AAA. 
TUpel.l we bitter abou11 the tirinp. tellilll Iokea they were a 
•aallcu11.•128 .At11er a ;year ot the AAAt it we apparent to hilll that the 
proceaaora, tlle equiJ~~D~ent •1Ut'ae1111nra. an4 only twenty per cant ot 
the taraen -14 oc.a ott WllllJ abare•ol"'l)pera. tenants. and tazm 
la'boren wre "baYias a har4 tiM" abari111 in AAA benatita. Ya11. in 
retroapee11. be did Ht Juq. Wallace laa:rahl;y. wallace. he raoallacl• 
Wilt.._ to help all the faJ:mere alld the nation. Aa a tipt 4eftlope4 
quiclcl7 •richt ullller hie aoae. • Wallace cOIIIPl'QIIIf.aed tor a tillle in the 
hope ot plaaa11118 all. When a choice ot a14aa could not he poatpone4. 
he felt waabla to oppose the lobbfiMa he had ll\ll'lled back to health. 
'1'\I&Wll dill BCit ~ Wallace. who •aoaceiTe4 he had to he a atat-n.• 
'J.'be S.Gfttery •48 hie aZTOr at tu atart ia depending Oil the profea-
aionala (tara l.U.n end leb'byiata. and lan4-£1'8nt collep gredu.atea)l 
be coul4 fin4 no altematiw an4 had .to go alons with thea-- •I took 
the other 11na.•121 
OltYicual;y. '1'\lpaU cUd DOt Joia the ailitanta llho con4-.d 
Va.llaee.122 llfor waa be aulltF• u tbeJ aoaueed h1111. ot quittins un4er 
UC). 
120. 
121. 
122. 
fire em the ehare-oropper s1tuauoa.123 He souaht to help the non-
staple fa1'1118rs throuaJ:I a nav inat~nt. {After April 8, 1935, he 
spent about an hour a day oa 4eper111111tntal atta1ra.124 He cont11184 
.,.t of his oounaelliag ot the A». to his apeeohes ,125) 
Despite the invol..a.nt ot Preaaman and Hiss and other notorious 
ftaurea in the .uA. fight, there •• no •purge,• as the 1118811 tirins we 
otten called, it the use of that tem wa -nt to 11Dply that operative 
foreip 14eolciea bed been removed. .Taro. Frank wnt 011 to beCIOIII8 a 
special couuel to the RJ'C 111 railroad reorganization, Cheil'llllln ot the 
s. E. c., a Ju4&e ot the tlaitad Statea Court ot Appeals for the Second 
CirGU1t, a viaitins lecturer at tale taw School, a fellow of .TOIIIIlthan 
ll'4w.rila Collese at Yale and the author of several vol- on lepl at• 
tera.l26 'l'ha telepoaa vhiob Davia aeat to Frank vhan RooaeYSlt •P-
pointed the latter a Ju4&e in the 1941 OOIIIIliated of the laat atallllll of 
Kiplf.ns'e •L•:ravot.• • 
All4 Gal¥ the J.1eatar shell pzoaiae ua, and only tbe Master 
ehall -~, 
All4 no one ehall work for 111011eJ, and no one ahall vork 
tor t-• 
But eaoh tor the joy ot the wrk1fts, and each in hie 
••nate ater, 
Shall draw the 'l'hilll! •• he -· n_. for the God of Thinse 
•• 1'b.,- Aft tl27 
123· V.ril, Paul w., 'The End ot Tupell,• Nation• Vol. 1.43, No. 22, 
tloftlllber 28, 1936, 623. 
].24. MacMahon, Arthur w. and Millett, .Tolm D., J'a4eral M''niatmtora, 
211. 
125. Loril, Ruuell, l:ht lflllaw Jit.lma• 403. 
126. Frank died em lamaaq 13, 1957, at the see of aixt;y-saven in Rev 
Ha.,.., 7M 1U I2U '1'17!• .Tamaaey l4o 1957, 2,3&1. 
127, Lonl, ~~~~a .. u. JU Val1feu Sit. JQa, 402, 
531. 
014-Liae alld Other AotbiUea in the USDA 
Ill the Je&rl 1933 alld 19.34 fllcwll worke4 hard at his job l1f 
Aedatut Seoretery (UA4er Seontery ill 19.34) ot Aarioulture. Be&ill· 
n1uc 1n the aprina ot 1935, he deTOte4 lilOet l1f hill enersr to hie 
aotivUiea aa Ruettl...ut A41a1D1aU.\or. Hie personal relatione with 
his bclaa, wh• he had rear ••'llde4 tu the Searetaryahip, and who had 
11181ate4 that he beoaaa Aeatatant Secfttary undoubtedly enhanaad hia 
ettect1Wilella. 'rhat their tria~ip aurvivad real a4111in1atretive dit· 
Uaultiea aDd policy ditterencea atteate4 ita atrenst;h.1 
.l'olm T. ll'lJM 8\lUIISted that 'fuaWll dCIIIIiooted the relationship, 
1nteeUuc Wallace with his superior 1111D4.2 Moley recalled that Wallace 
captivated 'r\lpell with hie 1110dea1:)' • cham• and intellectual raclical· 
1slll.3 Aooortin& to J'ohll Ch~rlaill, there waa no oloee relationship 
to be 4GIIiaated by either llllin, ainoe '1\Jgwll •• •too Dlch ot a total 
pl.aDIIer to get al.ouc with the 1110n pluraliatia He1117 Wallaoe.•4 Rua· 
Mll Lcml, who Obeene4 'l.'upeU aDd Wallace 111 action at first hand, 
atoated that Tupell neither en~ted 11or bewitched tha ar~tat1Ye 
Wallaae, but that th417 did have a wm r.prd. tor each other beneath 
their aOiltreatiuc peraoaalitiea -- the oool, 4ebo~~air, ablptioal, 
oooaaioul.ly curt, all4 oas11¥ tisllUaa Tu..-11. aDd the 1'\1111Ple4. amnii, 
u,. tolkq. rel181oua. aD4 frontall)' a1itaoll:1na Wellaoa. '1'h8J had, 
~ .oonolu4a4, ho SJIIportant tblnaa in co.aDDnr •respect for the aci• 
entitle att1tu4e aQd oontempt tor the lower levels ot political i»ara• 
tiaUon aQd behaYiozo.•S 
Iaaae41atalif upon takia& ottica • Wallace and Tuawll faca4 a 
problea which would create ti'J'illl olrOUIIIStanoea -- the allocation of 
'IIOZ'k. Wellace apparentq eaalana4 reapCDIIibility for all the old-lin& 
bureaus to Tuswell, oonoentratina, h111111elt, on tbe a41111niatration ot 
tba IJ.Io.,6 Ill tact, than wea no such clear-cut d-ra.tion. While 
Val.lMe pYa a&oh of hia time to tbe AAAo be 111811 keenly intereated in 
depe.rtllantal 'WOrk, baia& an agriaultural 110ientiat and a student ot 
ataUat1aal lllllthoda.1 Tuawllo OD the other hani\ 0 played a fo:r~~~~~l part 
in /J.Io. attaira, reprcaentlna the Seoretaey in the laUar•a abaenoa and 
aerY:lna aa a couultant on llllllJOr eOODOJIIio policiea. 8 In1'01'1111lll;y, Tuc• 
wll pTe adviCitl and support to Je~ Frank' a srouP ·in the 'llattle 
lnalde tho IJ.Io.,9 'l.'ulilwtll bad lllloh 1eu to do Witb the /J.Io. in 1934 than 
in 193310 -- attar Peak'• reaisnetton aaaured unhallpered application ot 
prod.ucUon oontrola. lfeY&rthelaaa, tbe hnJ linea of llhision ot labor 
s. Lor4, llwlaal1 0 l'Jla y.nues 9t. l5IB (Beaton. H<nlebton MU'flin, 19/,17} 
315. 345-.46. . 
6. tcml. flu.atlell, l'U W!U•M•Il. laa• 343· 
7. MaaMahon, Arthur w. aDil MlU.to Jdua D •• fedtrel M""P1!!traton (New 
York, Columbia Ulliveraity "-a, 1939) 211. 
8, MaaMahon, Arthur W, alld Millet, .Tolm D •• fdtrtl Mptpistretm, 211. 
9. Sea a boY&, this chapter, seeuoa, •!he /J.Io. •••• • 
10. Yard, Paul W,, •Wallace th• Orcat lleaitator.• IU. J!at19n, Vol. 140, 
No. ~. MilT 22, 193.5. s3£. 
produced, an • ••• aMIII!IlOWI sitlletion, certain to crack wide open a 
it was ·~ a 1118tter of t1a1e.•u 
'l'he uploaioa, when it tinalq OOCNrred in Februal)', 1935. vith 
ll'uk'a 418111iaaal, t'OWI4 T\lpllll and Wallace on opposite sides of the 
fence. Ditfenmoes on AAA policy had bean 4avelop1ng bet wen them tor 
•- tia. Tugwell raeallell that llallsoe 414 not Jmov his trienda f'l'Cllll 
his e1181111es in l9JJ•l2 lr.l Septlllllber, 1934, Harry Hopkins told Ickes 
that there bad lle8ll a falling 0\lt bet-a Wallace and Tugwell I Hopk1u 
VIIS of the opinion that Wallace VIIs beoOIIIing more con.senat1ve.l.3 
Ill s real eeaae. Wallace was DOt on the opposite side f'l'CIII Tua• 
well. Hs was ill the 111441e -· bet- the old-line t'arm leaders, and 
the urban libere.ls wbo, beoketl by 'l'ugwll, wnted the AAA to do more 
than raise prieea.l4 'l'he tension betwen the two 1118n \10\lld have devel-
tift relationship to tho MA. Pollq DBUers saide • 'fugwll asserted 
that -.11aee's in•betveea position hurt the Secreter;r•a 8Sneral admin• 
istrative etteotiveaeaa.~ Ickes .ada the f'ollovins entry tn his disr,r 
ll. 
12. 
lJ. 
)4. 
:t p~er that 'l'qvell :!.a not quite so happy in Asr1-
oulture as he wa. :t haw ba4 a teel1116 tor aoae U• 
that Asr1culture 1s baU, adllin1stere4 and I 8111 1110n1 
than •••r certain ot that atace -r talk with TUawell. 
Hs1U7 Wellaoe 1a not a f5004 ada1n1strator • • • • 'l'he 
other Aallietant SeoretaJ7, Dr. M. L. Vtlsoa, is as bed 
as, or worn tbau, HaDJ7 Wallace when it c01118a to exec-
utiw work. 'l'he reault is that 'l'Ucwll baa a lot ot 
raapons1billt:r Without the -•17 power. 'l'hia 1a 
eapeolalb' t1'1M eince W.llaoe lnaiats oa keeptnc 1111tn tn 
~ant poete in Aarteulture 'lbca 'rugwlell 1'86ftl'dS as 
atrustliOI'tl!¥ ud 1aokba ta abtltty ,16 
•• able to 4o a lot ot ao:Ud vork iA ~~~ USDI.. His aaJor contrtlNUon 
,... reorpab1llf! the ol4-U.ne bune.u - a Job which does not aake a 
spectacular BtOS'f, bUt which bad a baaio, penaneot etteot on depart-
11111atal ope1'1lttona. TU&well'a tnt-t ta this aatter we nident in 
his report to Alt're<l 1. Smith 1A 1928, which 1nclu4e4 a section •eon. 
t111Uina and Streaphellinc the Work ot the llepartlllltnt or Aariculture.• 
'l'hat he had a &811\liu intenet in reoraanlzatton, and believecl it we 
bedb' -ua, was also atteete4 liJ' hie wtllill8fteaa to take Wallace's 
plaoe as the tsraat tor the in ot eat~e4 bla'ellucrets •17 
PreparaUons tor reorpnieaUoa MeaD before the uv A4111tn1atn• 
tion tOOk ottice. In late 1-17• 1933, Jloo&eftlt asked Wallace, Wilaoa, 
allll '1\:lpell to 4rav vorkinl plane tgr reorpnizina the USDA as an • wtru• 
lllllllt ot act he aatiUial Plellatna• 0 A -P1118 8(mi1'11Dtllt p:r:oSJ'8111 tor 
qrioulture woul4 require the wl41nc ot the USDA, ita field foroea, 
state oollesea of agriculture, end experilllltnt atetiona into a coordiute4 
16. :tolru, Harold L., lll!. St9nt P&err Rt ... Js!wu l&£1 £a, 24. 
17. See below, Chapter XI. 
SiS· 
Ruaell Lim\ aot;ec1 that Wallaoe, Wilaon, an4 Miltoa Eieenhowr 
•.wooeedec1 1A a ... 11\tH. iA aohieYiD& over.ll coord1Aet1oa b;y 1938· '1'he 
•n wo traYUa&4 tb.e atOZIIY iattial. apPJ,'CacbU to the aftatual WDl'IWII 
llunaua, Wallau'a li.WU.Dt wa aa etf1o1aat adlllirliatrator an4 •Ia 
•- u:oelleat appoiat-ta fll youpr - •• Jlllrticularll' Lee stl'CID8 
to heed en'-loe aa4 Kaovlaa a,.noa to hea4 plaat indwstry. In leal• 
1J1a with ftatec1 bunauen.tic intei'Mta, 'rupell we '4aliberatelJ' _.. 
i.ft'itatiac than PleCIIItory.• He 14aatifia4 the Lanc\-Grasn COllage s;yatam, 
and ita State El:taaa1on D1ractOR sac\ corps ot COunty Apnta, with the 
well ala thia idaatit:lCIIItf.on, IAI'Ito hl.luelt a laDc\•grant-oollese pro-
dUet, CODcec1ec\, "in Jlllrt 1101'11'8CtlJ'.• 'l'ugvell •de certain hie position 
,.. lmovnJ iA 1933 he add to Wallaoe, 111 front ot a srouP ot federal 
aDc\ state ott1c1ale, •No, I haftll't a 4am bit ot oont1da11oe ia lb:ten-
a:l.on Direotora, Hellry.•1'~ 
tupell did net oarry his fiaht to the public. Bla a)'lld1catec1 
colua ot Deealnher 17, 19.33, dealinc vf.th the aiiiNill reports ot the 
llunaws in tb.e VSDA, did aot Nter to tb.e 1n-ti&ht111B ot a bureauora., 
uadeZOSOiiiC :NOI'pnt.satioa.20 !lather it l'etleotec1 hie inta:reat in bade 
operaUona, he took aa ext8114ed field trip thrcup ten western statu, 
Auaut 17 to Sept__. 20, 1933, oontaot1118 peraoaael ot the Bureau 
ot PII.'Dlic Roeu, the Joreat s...:t.ce, an4 :t.rr:t.sat:t.on aDd cOI!Bal'ftttoo 
aot:t.•itt ... 21 Ha ooaa:l.atentlr t~t har4 aeainat proposed reduot:t.ona 
:t.a l'OMai'Ch t'IUI48.22 ID4eed, L:t.D4l.,y declared, • ••• ooly the tellll• 
ti&e weok:I.IIS ot •- ot the -t nluallle an4 ettioieat)¥ aclmin:l.stared 
aerrioea ill the 7Mual CloftnD81lt •••• • 23 
In ad4Uioa to norpnizill& the ol4-l:l.u buraaua and protactha 
reaui'Ch, Tuawll •de aipiticant OCRtrtwUou to the cauaa ot oooaer-
ftUOG ~- a aabjeclt treated in a toU.owi .. aeot:t.on. 'l'he rea.iader ot 
h:t.a aot:t.nu .. aa Malatant aD4 Uadar Seoretaq .:t.noludecl apeeoh-k:l.ns 
on both JJJ. pol:l.or alld lan4-e, <- BU>l1081'811b7) and ftriCII.Ia apaoial 
aa•'-llta.24 Ha we aoti•e :1.n the IIU'plua Rel:t.et Ma:l.ll:l.stration, cle-
a:I.SM4 'by h:t.a tr:t.eacl Zercae J'ftllk to preYent atanat101l :l.n the lll:l.clat ot 
....... rell\lot:t.oo.25 In.,. 19~. he 41s0\18aa4 the drought with the 
Los ot 'l'r:t.p, :ryswu Ptwg. 
See belovo th:t.a ollapter, Seet:t.on, • ••• T1IO New Deals.• 
Lllldley1 11:-t X., U.ltwr Jd.* 8P"tDlt (lllew York, Vik:I.D&o 1937) 
268. 
Mlehael, George, 11Dp4put (New Tork, o. P. PutDIIlll'•• 1935) 62, stated 
that Paul Porter aheated 'l'acwll'a books • 4:1.4 he refer to nt, Bt$t1t 
til: 2 zuaqr, the only book 'l."uawll published llur:I.D& the tiM he 
aerft4 ta V.aldaaton? '.L'qwll nalled that he wrote his own mter• 
tal acaP' ill ran tutu"a •• lack ot tiM •4• it impoaaible 
tor hla to do 001 :l.n thc!H ca ... , lluaell Lord or .John Fleiii:I.D&• aat 
Porter, pnparecl a clJ.oatt, letMr 12 wr:t.tu, May 11, 1955· 
Garter, 1. J. (Vaot't:l.otal Obaener), 2:rAa Jf!X lleelera (New York, Sillon 
aa4 SChuater, 19~) 91. 
) 
the Pruident, 1At01'1111Ba hSJI 1ihat USDA experts thOIIS}!t - were about 
half•W7 throueh a f1ttaan..,..r qele.26 In 1ihe -r at 19.311 he wu 
aeaiped the teak at dafen41DB• in a Dational broadcast, the AAA pol1q 
of reduoinc orop aareep duriDB a 4rousbt.27 In the autumn of 19.311 
'l'upell repreaea.ted the United MatH at a lllletinc in n- at the 
Inter~~atiODal Institute ot Agrieulture.28 He had 'bon larsely reapona-
nla tor the NMWl of ~rican .... rabip in this 01"pnization,29 
0118 at 'l'uawll's IMpart-tal auis-nta, a study at the quota 
syatem tor auaer production, took hla to Puerto Rico, to W11ch he 
would return in 19U as Ooftmor. 'l'lla United States, ita ineular poa-
aaeeions, aDd Cu'ba aeptiated a sapr peot thrO\Ish the s-r of 1933 
with011t reaohinc a aat1staotory OCIDoluaion. The auaer aeot1011 at the 
AAA baiq 'rll.pall's special asata• at, he -t to Puerto Rico in 
Mltroh, l9.3llo in order to aequ1re a btJtter u.n4arstancU.q ot the 1n4u.atry.3° 
1n the •-r ot 19.311 HawUaa aupr planters an4 J'rank lent, 
aiiiDI18 others, oharp4 that 'rll.awell •• partial and arbitrary 1n aatt1116 
tuotaa .31 It appears that there would haft bean OCIIIPlainU no llllttar 
how the qi:IOtaa wre sat. 'rll.awll called the reoonaUiation ot the inter-
26. Ickes, Harold L., %At §tmt plen .Qt. ... Ip!s•ll l&&:1.2d• 165-66. 
2'7· :u.,, Vol. 24, No.7, Aquat 13, 19311, lOa 'rll.pall. a. G., A4dreaa, 
Colwllbta Broe4caat1as S,Stem, 1lllT 31, 1934, .1ll'mA Prua R!1M•· 
28. See e'boYe, Chapter III. 
29. See below, Ollapter XI. 
30· 'l'laawell, B. G., 7.t1a Strtggp lAIA· 32a Tuewll to Rooa8ftlt, Mltroh 
,3, l!Meepl' Pewg. 
31· .fJR• Val. 23, llo. 26, haa 25, 19,34, 111 !Cent, J'rank R., ltitbOR) 
Olgyu (Jilev York, WUUem Mol'tow, 1934) 273• 
r' 
eata or elomaatic, Cuban, Pl.lerto Rican, Hawa11aa, anel Ph:l.llippine crow• 
era a 'wholly illlpoaaible• taak wich heel to be undertaken ancl brQ.lght to 
a01111t reault • .32 Coaareaa fa'f'Ored the Lou1a1ana ancl watera beet gl'OWNJ 
the state DepertJ~Bnt faVOl'ed Cuba tor raeaona ot tore1gn relationa • .3.3 
Each sroup heel ita utrama]¥ a1JI&].e-1111n4acl lobbyiata, 'Whoae failure in 
priw.ta negotutione had reaul1ie4 in a requaat for govel'llllll!nt intenen-
t10DJ no one Sl'OIIP adlllltted fair treetlllllnt, each harboring grudgea a• 
pinat the othera a114 the aovara.at • .34 The intereated partt.ea held 
JIBIQ' conferenoea and ,tookqed fol' poaiUODI filllllly a ayatem ot SDiport 
ancl production quotaa was nentualq emllodied in law1 the whole atory, 
'l'llswell recalled, ''IIOUlel make a 'lloolt ill itaelt .• .3.5 
iaacl hla J\1dclllllnta, if aot hie reo-uauone fol' current policy, in 
the ausar a1tv.at1on. Ia 19.34 he told a Coaareaaional ~"" that 
ausar waa a •pemstte illduatl'J' 1n the United States - •Qod Knova,• 
Ickea conCIU'red, •that thia ia ti'\IAI ... •.36 The President also thought 
the baet•aupr aituatiOR waa •acancleloua,•.37 Tugwell concludeel that the 
tarltf axtiJIIPtiOD on Puerto Ricaa aupr artificially cnatacl anel Dillin-
Tugwell, R, G., %Jm §trlelren 1Mtl• ,32. 
~ll, R. G., nut strigpp lilllll• .34• 
Tupell, R. G., fU. StriC!Up liRA.• 32• 
'J.'ucWll, R. o., nt, @trlppp Wo .32· 
IclrM, Harold L,, :ZU §tent RliEI, ,tt !aroJ.d lt• legs: ll.£1 ThrJt, ~.Yn$'DS G'Pifr• l9'ft:1QJ,flllev York, Simon a114 Schuster,l954) 
aoonvelt to Ho~. 1UDe, 1.9.34, flm'!!!U Panra• 
ta:t.IMICl aa eoonoar.r ot 0011tndict1ou aa4 paradoxes which supported the 
bletticieat .38 
Rico's naar quota, uadez'taltf.na a atu4T ot the island's Me4e in J'Ul'a1 
rabal:l1litat10D 1 soil oouel'ftt101l0 and ntd1atr1but1on ot land-hol41Jia.39 
He .auaeea11a4 a plan tor a soil 8\ll'ft.J, 'llbich the t1SDJ. cmlarecl aa4 GoY· 
eraor Viaahip approye4.4° 
On h1a return to Vuh1Jiat01l0 'l'uawll diaoused w111h the Pred· 
dent h1a c01lolu1on that .... 4raet1o anae. with lau emphaeie 011 
8\18flro ,.. •ede4 in the Plaerto RSaa eCOIICIIIW't l'looaevelt 4iepla;re4 an 
exteuive 1cnov1114ae ot the Cenbbeaa, mentionina the pouibility ot 
1ncreu111£ the production ot la18li•Prohin l•&UID8• to replace eterchee 
and 1JIIpor\e4 rice in the Pwtrto Rican diet, and liattna t.~MXplo1te4 
reewroea• bardvooda, ... .......,, 1aeect1ci4u, apices, end o1la.41 'l'us· 
wll decide4 that ba nee4e4 t11118 to thiDit out Puerto Rico's probl- in 
relatioa to our vbole colonial pol1q.42 He would be wll prepared 
vben lcku aant him to Purto Rioo erterel yeare later aa a teot-t1adar 
After the .X,loeion ia the AAA in ear1J J'ebi'Wlry, 193.5, Tuawll 
we re.dy to IIIIIYe ca. In re11-peet, lle did not con4- Wallace tor hie 
I 
$40. 
atu4 in 1'35·4.3 At the 'UIII8. he ,.. b1ttar and d1eeuetet.44 In the 
11144le of P'ebrua:ey ~-11 wa in the West on drousht and l'llrlll•reliet 
aaa1.-nta45 •• an Ull4ertak1na which torellba4owed hie next IIIO'f'a. (He 
•• about to beolllll8 h.ee4 of the Ruettl-nt Mminiatretion, which -lcl 
brina rellet to thoee t'a~n who wou14 not. he conclu4ed after the 
•purse.• benefit t'raa the UA.) Ill the lliddle ot March Wallace denied 
any iateatlon ot torcina hie t1R4ar Beoreta:ey out.46 It ia true that 
'l'U&Wll con1i11111led to ho14 the office of Under Secretaey. but after ear}¥ 
April he pve little t11118 to departMntal attain. uaually spen.diq an 
hour each 11101'1lina in hie tlSilA otfice siflnill& papers and kaepill& in 
touch with current a..alopmente.47 
When 'fuawll reaipe4 at the and ot 11J,J6, a llilitant leftist COD• 
eluded that hie chief vel\le to the USDA had -.n aa a • ... court faYOr• 
ite able to keep his pet as-nciea iR tunda and protect them fraa rivals' 
l'llida •• 48 Rwlaell tort. a 1011&-ta- acrieultureliat. declared on the 
other hand, that in the t'fNr ;yean 'J.'Uawll labored in A&rioulture "he 
did that Departaent a sreat del ot &004·"49 
Tqwell eajo,ed some ialporhllt a4nntasu ill hia work. Be we 
able to work 1011& and •ad• hours. althoueb hie hay fever sot hila dOVIl 
4.3· 
44· 
45· 
46. 
47· 
48. 
49· 
/ 
.541· 
attar tho f1rat th~ee hectic mDatha tn W&8hiQI\On.SO He poeaaaae4 
the ab1l1Uea of 'llbet Robert -. .. later eelle4 a "first rete Pl'U14• 
ina ofticer.•.51 He hel4 an appointive poeUiCIII -- • in aCllll8 w.ya a 
walawae .6at alec iJ atren&"'h vbea the aeture of the Job 18 ... anti• 
all.J' ClY:I.l Ser'rice.•S2 :r.rbape .on tll,ponant, Tuswll represented a 
•rely ttiCiultcel sa4 aotanUtic ..&u of fal'lllina \Jilt deale with the 
brclader q1188UCll'l of the fer~~~~~r•a aooii!Rilo a'-tUII •• 53 Tupotll, it 
llliabt be a44e4, w.a lntareated ia the atatUJI of all far~~~~~ra •• aot 
jwlt tho larp ataple ift'Wre. 
IIUJieell I.ol'd, vbo we 1a an tato:n.4 alld tmpart181 poeition to 
juAp, •de th ... -lit• (~which detailed refereucaa to 'l'ugwll'a 
oouenattllla won, the a~abJeot of a fellowtna section, are Ollitted) oa 
'l'I&&Wll'a contrl\111111CIII to the tl8D6a 
'!!here are few qwtaU0118 oa wioh I, an4 othara ot oon ... a-
Uonal agri.OilUual oollep tainl!llo are apt to aee 8'18• 
.....,_ vUh Tucwll. But the ,..ra ulna perapeou ... an4 
rew1Wit10118. A snet 4181 that nov aoe• on iD the Depart· 
•nt of AariOillture ln tha W¥ at plaDnlll6 for 4eoent 1&1111 
UJie, aoil ooaaenatioa, the rahallilltation of tenants, a 
reoopitioa of the ripta of la11rn', OCIII8-r proteouon, 
allll a ftliut olaar nell• 4eri.ft 41reotly fl'CIIII Tt.tpell. 
He brvuab11 11o the Depa7Wnt of .A&rlO\Ilture a IMIV point 
.50· I.ol'd, R\laeell, D&t 'flllt•er .at .lla• 347· 
51. WaN, Palll w. • •Wallace the Gnat Heai11ator,• 133· 
.52• Lozd• R\laeell, •oo...mor JIG of Pllerto Rico,• p. ?" S!tQ"• Vol. 
11, No. To 1ulf', 1742, 224o 
53· MaoMalua, Arthv v. alld Millet, loha D •• lt4ml 6fm1Diatraton, 
211. 
( 
ot dew, JUJUI!lar exolui'Ml7 I'IU'IIl nor urban. Jfe brou&ht 
a •ture4 OOODoaic philoeoJib7, a lih:raliem beyOD4 that 
or the B:rall4eu orcter •••• 
Pan]¥ • • • beOilWie he ha4 act beea reared in a complete]¥ 
calloused I'IU'IIl t:raditioa 'r Old Homestead or rusge4 pi• 
oaeer nudarda, '1'\apell ooul4 DOt npl"d hired Mil 
( thoae lOTableo h'UIIIIIle, ilh1f11leea cl'\88turea at Nl'lll lepll\i) 
as aa.thina aub-~a. MTon4 hope of ad"fance. With .a obar• 
acterlaUo COIIbinatloa at ob1ll reali8a ancl Wl'lll aeuitivit;r 
he .. w pldalJ that, wUb the aountry tilled up sad tarmiDS 
iaoreaaincll' 111\iuatrialbed, the da;r had paeaed wan fsl'lll 
la\lonn ooul4 he part at the flllllil;r and work their wy up 
the la44er to fal'lll CNDarehlp. Jfe bald that fal'lll laborere, 
fixed and trauiant, ehoul4 he "fa a union aad a atrons one. 
Be bald further that it ODe ai'IR ot tha Department, Triple-A, 
worked tor the ad"fantaaa' al.ailtat in the tam populaUoa, 
it ws ~. Dapartaeat•a raapoutbilit;r equally to aih'aaae 
effective proarua. to~ the lot at the 41aa4'ftDtepd. 
l f1D4 it almoat incredible now how complete]¥ iiUiaDaitlve 
1110at ot us Lead Cnat coll.,. 8ftl4uates were to the vida• 
pread apeotaala ot :rural JOYtlfl:r ancl the clesred&Uon ot 
runl labor, whea the lfew Deal started. 
The stenotyped public pictun ot Tu&wll as an iJUJftecUve 
41'88Mr 1a OO!IIPlatel)' t1scre41 ta4 'r the •-Pins chaDSH 
1a the Departllellt ot .&arioult\ll'll JI1'0Sl'8llll wich be 1n1tiata4 
....... T\lawell had aot. ot oourse, '•de America over,• 
But I Rllltt that, ill the ,., f"81'8 atven, Tuawell 1n1Uata4 
a areat deal to •a O'f'llr 110\ ·41nl;r tba actual soan• or 0\11' 
ciiWltJ:7, 'r ta:rraoaa and atriptiel4 culU"'Iltion, but areatl¥ 
to cbaa.. the &OY&r~aea~~ attitude and procaaaaa with re-
spect to tba 1'U1'11l poor ,.54 
,-~ 
The RNeU~ A..._.iatl'lltion 
The Jlleaettleuat Adlai.Utntioa ulertook auolt vast sad wried. 
~ .,..uou, ita arpat•ti-1 ell4 atataiatrativa prot!~ ware so clif• 
tiouU, au lt wa Ue4 la la aua a _, vltil 'l'\igvell'a whiPPlJI&•'boJ' 
!'Oleo tllat the atUIIaat ClaD len alaflt ot l\8 llaaio JIUl'PCHifNI• It wa 
lla1J1JI4l the people wa aa e••..-07 probla111. Conaerrill& 18114 
.....,.... re...,ll'e4 1=-·raeae · ~· 'rlla short- au loaa-l'Wl aae4e 
1IIN'e rels._, alaee it •• aBfMNI8817 althar to help poor people ake 
their laa4 tletter or to - • ..._ ta tlettar lall4. The whole ope:ratioa 
Wll relaW to all'ioultural •••••lu, einoa the product of unprofitable 
fucweU invented. the ill an4 aakec\ the President to auppgrt it. 
He tlelievec\ that web an aa-or wu ued.a4 at onee to halp that part et 
tll.e tana JIIIIIUlatioa vll.iolt 414 lltlt tleaatU rr. the AAA •• •aa auwr 
to a lotltlriat 1a 41'8all,• vUoh tleaUvM .utricht benetita vlthout requir• 
lJI&, in mum, better pnotleaa aU. a Hoopltion ot the utioul lnter• 
aat in lull.a •aatapl- aa4 rlaltlla a:ploltationa• ware not tha oaly 
r•aou 'fllawall aakec\ the Preet&ftt to approve the oraation of the RA ·-
then we •the laD& itaal.f .•1 U. MliaYH that rural relief -- people •· 
.5114· 
..... natitiD -- lu4 -- had to .... traatet topther -- •the nrderl11Mt 
'llet'IIMII. tbe -rpDCI)' au the basie prolll.ea 1e not ab.olute.• 2 
TUcwlll was well aware ot Reoeevwlt's interest in rural lite. 
aa4 be oewatet on the Prea1d.eat•s auppon,3 He pt it. Roolllftlt• •• 
OoYernor ot .. v York, laa4 •4-ted a loac•raaee, cOIIP1'8heu1vw program 
tw tlaa bopro• ant ot lellll-ue all4 ruJ'el liviD& cond1Uou.4 He ere• 
:-"- atet the RA 'liT 111. lueut1Ye Order, 8114 he showed a 11'1'817 interest in 
,-..:.;__ 
Jletore TJIU start a rasetltlemeat or Jt.Ull-division under-
talciiiC /.OD Brullana•a privata la~ do run down and 
lwWI with • baoausa it ia ou ot Jill pet holtbiaa and 
I hne civea a lot ot study to n.S . 
'!'he prelude to the creaUOD ot tbe RA went llack at least to 
retire tl'WI produotion t1tt1 million acrea •• to start with ·- ot au'll• 
.-ref.Dal lan4.6 A year later, ia early 193.5, when his trienda were 
tired tl'Ca the AA.A, 'l'ucwell bapn to pro!IIDte in aarneet the eatabliallmut 
ot a new tana apaq. He learned. that M. L. Wilson we not happy aa head 
ot the Sllltaiateaca Honeateada D1Y1aioa in Intariw. !:Ia an4 Wallace 
2. Tucwell. R. G., •Cbansioa Aorea,• CMft:tpt Hittm, Vol. 44, lllo. 6, 
sa,._.r, 1936. 59· 
3• hawellt R. G., :rJlt. SU19!re JMA, 25. 
4. Liadlay, Enaat x •• Btlfwr JAllll'rrnneu ( .. , York, VikliiC. 1937) 
129·30· 
s. Bepttul.t Pa•re. 
6. ~u. R. c .. 'file Place ot 08Ya~nt tn a National Land ProcJ'am,• 
ad4reaa, 1ot.at MHUoa. a.rt.- EatlllCllllio Aaaooiattoa. Farm EaonOIIic 
A411ta1atftt1oa, aariaan StatlaUaal AllaooiaUon. Philadelphia • 
Daaabar. 29, 1933 • .lllll PI " Bp}•!f• 14•19. 
nne..t tile •apnwW allll lllixe4 dia~at;• or naral houeinc aa4 
nUet thi'OUflh ~ ~ apuiea. '1'llay teoidad to bl'iDC Wilson 
'llallk b-' to Ap-1cuUura aad oonaolUate all auoh work uader ~ll 
la a .. ., ..-or.7 
a, the ead ot March it wa p•ralll' !mown the\ Tupell •• 
aMut to •.- head of •- k11114 ot ow.o114ate4 lall4-wae w eroa1on-
ooatnl. JII'OSI'Illl.8 Ia late April U •• raporte4 tbat he vae to teka 
lllal'P ot a ~1 Rehab111tatioa ...... 9 .l!Xeeuti.,. Order No. 7f127 of 
Mar 1, 1935. eataltl1ehe4 the RA.10 Ita tulll4a •ra dei'1Ye4 frca the 
lllieli'&Qot Relief Act of 1935· Fruk X.nt 4aplore4 the initial alloca• 
tiea ot $2,50.000,000 ae •quite a 1-' of _, to be spent in a year 
S, e IJI'O'lP oiJ J'CIWIC an4 quite adftlloe4 ••• thillkera, fit till€ well 
t.a11o tbe Tuawll atiiOtlphe:re aDd all UookeB aut vith theoriea.•ll 
All Reaa11tl .. nt; A41daiatftl\010, Tuawll bad two difficult taeka. 
He had to orpalae illto e- k1D4 ot •""sl-:raUOA an aaaortant of 
ac111Y:ltiea :lallerittd. frca other ...--nt apno1N • state and faderal, 
:lnelllllinc the Laa4 l'l:llp'D 11114 the Rlll'el Rehabilitation aactioa of the 
re4eral llllerplle¥ ReUet A411Sa1atJIIUoa, the LaDil Policy Section of the 
AU, aDd tile Sla'bliatooa Jklaatea4a D1Y1aiw ot the ti8D1.12 He hat to 
...S.iater a ftd aa4 ftrled pl'Ojp'lla, 'tllbtab oan lie cleeortbe4 IID4er twr 
bea41 ... , rellaa1l1 uuoa, nM11U-nt , reur-nt, ant conHrraUoa 
Hanaa no ,.__, statu, the RA had to a11aora a liUIIber at 
uateui'ble preJeeu.l3 ften becl lleea 110 aucceutul propa~~~e lleton 
1733 ta the fiel.U 'tllbiCIJk tll!.e RA we entertaa. ant the worth of the 1933 
~ heel Jet to 'be proftcl,l4 It ,.. "41tfioult to reft1ue an.d 
OOCIN1Jiate the halt-eCIIIQile1la4 .rrene of a:istillc aaeactn.•15 At the 
_. of z.a., 193$, 'l'qvell oalle( a contereace in order to pt Yarioua 
't1.ew oa 11he lMtais ot wUCIJk lie eoW4 fOZ'DI&lete a procraa.16 Oa J"ulf 
5o 1,35, N•M Jnaaer of Colulbia 'l'eaohel'll Collep wrote about the 
ot tu RA• 
Bft17 asenOJ ia Aatrtoa hae Deell bollbanina Tupell w1 th 
plene for tlut reeettl-nt a4ain1atraUon an4 each one ot 
th .. has l1tera11J ole~ that oa.plete heaYeD woul4 
ooae on11 J>f ita JII'Oaftll• 
I !Mc1M the a4Jid.n1et1'8Uoa 4eo14ed ,10 br1JI8..ell these 
JeOple t._nher to flcbt U ou11 ••• /..and. shOJI/ the a11aurd1• 
tlee ot aoae ot the proposals. 
13 •. O.ua, 1ollll M. all4 Wolcott, Leoa c., £pbU.g •1etat•tmtt• AIIL .lB 
Jllt"'f svw Dt•rtru st. tcrtgvlbrt (c:hs.oaao. ~ttea oa 
l'l:altllo A«<dAietnUon ot tile ... tal SOieDOe lleeearoh Cowaci1e 1940) 
21i1a MltCIJkeU, 8ree4wl, !ltee*• (lllew York, Rinehari\, 1'47) 
210a - 'below, CUpter • 
)4, ~. R, G., "CIIallliDC Acree,• 62. 
15. 'l'upell, R. G., •Obaaatnc AUHe' 59· 
1£. JU .lfa IJtr& ttw, 1\illJ lo 316. 
,,;i;.~'tit .. 
~11 J.a Yel')' soh bo11lulled ellalat the ldlole •tter 
or aOhle'tllll the .... aaeJ:7 .r:tte11111t bulDNa ac11dal• 
etntiOD aR4 at the- tiM the -ial obJectives •••• 
Jloltod¥ t:roa 'l'u&wll 40IIIl .... ,. to 01'811 te re«eral ialaQda 
• • • • • •• 1'\U'Ill rehaltilitation aa4 rurel reaettle•nt 
llhould be pared late the looal ~ mitiee aa Marly 
•• poaeible. 
'1\lcWll J.a tully oonaoioua or 1the neceaai ty ot vorld.ac vttll the lend•lftnt oolle&N• 7 
Wltll the proll~ iavol'f'84 1a eetaltliabllsat _, the task ot lla1"1'7• 
lila eut 11 pro&ftll Vbioh iDOluUd tile tollov111C act1vit11181 
'p'gJtill11tUOP 
..... or .... 
Mttlftl dillaater 
droqht 
tlao4 
ell..,., o 4:1.auter 
lllllaJH ot prloe11 
..-t.ae toralNuru 
a11eietanoe 
flMDOlal 
--, .. 
ts-H 
tana teaaat11 
OI'OJ,.H 
ta:na laltonH 
tors 
land 
llqll.iJIIIIDt 
'"" 111114 
food 
olothiQ& 
Una took 
..... 
ultt a4Ju11'-Dt 
teohnlaal 
17. Ze'Wll ,.,.,. 
1.8. hlle4 oa a llll.llller or aouroea. 
Dtt11 pg\ 
A.._qiaal lands 
INJ'ohaae 
aOD-aP'icnaltural ueea 
wildlife praearne 
reOHational tacilitiea 
IndJ.aa reaenN 
Jii.Stl&ra&a 
ratoraatatiOil 
rural 
•tntiltration• type 
0 0 1DitJ0 tJP~~ 
A'IKlrltaa ( "TI&cwell TOVJIS•) 
nil llli'N ioa 
-0081111 111'08108 
at~ pollutloa 
flood control 
toraatatloa 
raf01'88tet1oel8 
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which wa 4il'i04 iato three watts. 'l'ba llural Reaattl-at Dhbton, 
Cerl c. 'fe7lor, Director, aWdatare4 reba~ilitation en4 rure.l reaenle-
•nt. The Suburban Jlaaettl-at Dtdaion, 1obn s. Laaaill, Director, 
edlliniatare4 the "'1.\asWll Towaa.• 'l'be Lalld Utilization Division, L. c. 
Gray, Dinotor, adll1nistere4 retire-at or aulDiaal'f.lilllll la~ elld OOIIIIer-
vetion projeota.19 
While rauttlemeat reoeift4 a lot et publicUy, the bulk or the 
Rl.'a wrJr: wa ia the field ot rellebilitation.20 Since 1')18 the govern-
meat had llllM au4 end feed loaaa nu4e4 Clue to Mtural causea1 the PIA 
.USa loau -'-84 Clue to eOOIIOIIic cauau ee wll, eupplementiD& the 
lcaaa with &n~Rts al'l4 technical guld.anoe. 21 There were lllliQ' kinde ot 
caMs to d.eal with, involvi~ 1'ioanc1al, physical, mental, al'l4 payoholo£1• 
cal 4et1oieno1ea -- in addition to poor land end poor aquipment.22 
The anraae ortsinal loan waa $412, the averaas supplemental loan 
$202.2.3 The Republican lfatiooal eo-tUu chargri that the HA laeaa4 
~ iaauttiotent s8CNI'1ty.24 The COP obarp waa valid to SCllllll u:te~~t-
a ,.raoa who ooul.d obtain a lean trca ea aetabl1ehe4 credit agency ,.. 
iaelilibla tor an R4 laea.25 Nevertheless, TD&•ll replie4 to the crit:l.oa 
1'). 
20. 
21. 
22. 
ltegl DID l9]6:l!b3. inq1yeU. 
Jallliliea reoe1T1ng loaaaa 
J'uliliea repayinc in Nls 
Total lilaOUilt loane4 a 
'l'otal aiiiOWlt repa14a 
HOD•reparable granta: 
A.azace intereat rete• 
$ '.150.000 
200,000 
778,000,000 
'If8,000,000 
1.52. 000. ~..27 
2.,J~t-· 
Re,.,_ta, of oourae, ooat111Ue4 attar the co!llpilatioa of then figures. 
In :taot, the peJ"CRtqe o:t •turtd principal repaid, as o:t Febrwu:y 28, 
194.3· -· eisht:r-siz per nat -- ~ ot m lllill1ona.28 
'l'Gtel loan al14 srant tigu:ru 1nolu4e4 the IU's extensive program 
to aid droqht•at:ricken :tarman. In Sept8111ber, 1'.1.35• ~ll sul:ldtte4 
an ...adment to BZecutive Order 1027 which would cive the RA additional 
anthorlti:r to provide relle:t in at:rtcan areast the Aotinc Budpti Director 
an4 \he P:rea14ent approved the •BMIJIISIDIInt ,2'.1 In 19.36 Tucwll played a 
ke;r role 1n the :tOIW&lation a114 axewtion of a droue;ht-relie:t procraa. 
ra luBe the President ordered him to mea a survey or relief requireaente • .3° 
'i'uawell axtell4ed the IU'e relie:t activitiea, conterred with the ~1dent, 
traveled throush the etrickall areaa, and preeente4 his conolua10118 to the 
Prea1ilet • .31 
30· 
.31· 
SSO· 
h•4e4 IIF Morrb Cooke ot the RIA, as Chairan, an4 Tuawell. as Chief 
C0.4Jutor • .32 The o-ittee mde a 2000oollile tour ot the atrioAil 
areu. start1ne tn No"'hera 'l'aaa on AU&ust 17 and 11111eUD8 the rr.e1• 
4ent at Btamrek, N. D., 1a eerq Sept-'ler.33 Cooke and Tugwell pre• 
auted loftc-:ranp oonaanation plaua tor the present, the WPA, NfA, 
MAo and RA _, into action to a14 ~oo.ooo t8111111ea who u4 eutterell. 
a lou ot $)000 000,000 1a the IIIIDft than oae thoull8n4 c0\lnt1• ( ot 
th:rn thouean4 1a the u. s.) vhtch wre listed ea dro\14!ht 811111rgency 
areaa.~ 'l'be RA 1111!148 $20 a 1110nth poaata, declared a one-year lllllnl• 
tonu on 30•000 l'Ul'llll rebab1l11oation loans, and prepere4 to lend 
$18,000,000 for OIJOP loau aa4 lcllna tor forqa.l5 The RA also halted 
a ~r ot ita proJects to permit uea or allotsenta tor emersenc.r 
relief in the Waat tlhrwp tlha w1Uar.36 
4 apaoial pbaae ot rurel rehaltUitleUon vaa dabtl-adJuatant, 
• ,.l1ola the RA ai4a4 -..etentl hrman whose propartiea wn 1110rtppd 
tor - tban their ca:rrylJt& power to U.p their tar..37 This prosna 
..a separate fraa the act1Y1tiea ot the Fa~ Credit Adminiatratton, 
32· 
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llhlob oCII!IbiiM4 all the apooiN iaftl'lllll in the tiD&nci~~& or ap'lcul-
wn.38 'l'Aa IU. aiiiPl¥ fineace4 -t11l8'1 of voluntary farm 4ebt a4Jut-
mant oORlltteea an4 dde4 them with a aupeniaoey ate.tf rather tllaa 
throqh 4irect pertioipet1oa.39 'l'b.e o-'tteaa, appo1ate4 b)' acweraore 
en4 aenina; without pay, rectuoea. 1114a~aa or axtalldad tillle for 
Pll7JIIIl\ b,y II&S""JJIIttlt • 40 
IA 1933 tba wtataD4ina Mtal or tal'lll 1ndalntt4neaa waa ea11111111ilad 
at twelve b1ll101:111, plu about espt and. one-half billiona in mort~aa.41 
IA the periocl 1910-19,0 the uarace IIIOl'tpp 4ebt per term increased 
tr. $1,71$ to $),,561.42 Intal"Nt oa old Clebi:a ate up profits ao that 
..,.... tha farmer 011 pod lall4 oou1d DOt meka all4a -t.43 Life inaur-
anee ccapelliaa, IIOrtpp OOiiiPIIDiea, e.D4 other holder& Of mortppa 
wre. •1Utle leae 1ntereate4• thea 4alnora in •giv1nc life to th1a 4ea4 
w1pt ot debt.•-" 
'l'hare was a vidaapnad aDd urpat dWIIInd for the RA'a support ot 
abt-e4Jwstmaat work. Wile it waa haltt4 en Allf;Wit 1, 1935, due to aa 
Hlaia1atrative c0J11Pl1catioa. aaftra1 aovenora proteate4 to thll :Praaiaat.45 
Lf.Jullq, lraeat :r;., At !!mertll Bup1uUm, firat PM" (Jfaw Yo:rk, 
VUII.nao 1933) l08..Q9. 
W1ot 0 M!Tq, .b£11 PoHe1ee .ltJII& P.1te4 St;atg, 327• 
'fllcwell, R. o •• •Cihaft8ina . .._... •• 59· 
L1D41_,., El'DIIat Jt., 1M 'SRPFD" Bpel.ution, lint .rtwae, 108. 
'l'llpall, R. G., •Cha'ft8181 .Aawao• .$9• 
T\lcVItllo R. G., "Qhane:iq; Ac::ru,• .59• 
LiMley • li:nwat K., Jlll. J!!ps:Jtl.t Htyolut1on, Fipt a 17 • 108-09. 
TalefP.'llll, Olin ll • .Jcalmetoa, Ooft:raor, Sot.th Carolina, to Rooanalt, 
Aucw~t 2, 193.51 tel..-.. 14v111 L. J'ahllaon, Governor, Colo1'114a, 'e 
lloeaevelt t AIICU*t 6, 193.5• *spv~S l'l•rt• 
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llooHvelt turned the proteata over to 'h&wll, who outlined the history 
or the vork, which becan ill the CVA, liU IIO'fed to tbe Rural !leha'bil1ta-
tion Di'fiaion ot tbe :PERA, all4 wa talrell over b)' the RA 1 the RA worked 
out a plan ia cooperation vith tile J'CA, but the plan, &\lbllitted on .JulJ 
8, had aeitller been approftd nor rejeoted.46 Approval wa neceaaary for 
contll:luing the work attar August 1. On J.upat 16, 'l'ugvell wa able ~ 
wire the aovernora or Kentucq, MieaCNI'i, Montana. North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Orec;on, and Teua that &rranpllllnta wre being •de to 
oerr,r on debt-adjuatment act1v1t1ea.47 In the tirat year attar act1v1-
tiea were reauae4 the total 1D4eb$edae .. of 31,566 tarmara ot $102,lOJ,OOO 
we reduced to $76,24J.,ooo,48 
Rural rehabilitation involved technical aaaistanoe in man, oaaea 
in which t1aano1al aid ws aot the 'lilola solution to the tarmar•a prob-
1-. 'i'hia aarvios vaa gi'Mil to 455,000 falliliea, 1936•43·49 :Roouvalt 
abowd hie interest in thia wrk in a latter to Ro&ar A. Derby ot Rev 
Yorlu 
You are right about the fal'llltra vbo sutter throuch their 
ovn fault. s- day wben TOll are in 'Waahi~on I wish 
you 'WOUld have a talk with 'l'ucwll about vhat he ia doing 
to educate this type ot tal'lllltr to be- selt-auatainiq. 
Durin& the peat year his osopnization hea 111110 104,000 
tara families practically Hlt•auataining by supervision 
46. 'l'qwll to M. H. Mcintyre, AU411at 5• 1935. Rocute!!l1! fa!!I[J. 
47• 'l'qwll toM. H. Mcintyre, I!qoatytlt flap. 
48. Tuawell, R. G., •Cbancilll& J.orea, • '!11· 
49• Mers.-, Lewis, Htlllf UA ftlkl St!!11Eifte 295· 
aad 84\UIIlUon alq_fraoUoal lt.aea. That ia a 
preU:r &ood reoozCIJU 
553· 
Ia tvo artt.elea vbida he 'Wl'Ota in 19,36 Tupell explained the RA'a 
lall4•ret1,...nt proaraa.Sl He notell that •attempts to oulti'f'llta poor 
land constitute a drain on the eoo~o wall•being ot the nation as a 
whole. • Sul8lr&1nal fa nan 11011 oa1:r upeet the 'l:lalanc1ng ot pro4uct ion 
with the •rlatt, but the;r ooul4 not oontribu\8 purohasinc power to the 
national 8CODQIIIF• Ill tact, vbila the;r wan Ullll'bla to pap Uxas, the;r 
requ1ra4 eoutant, cona14ara'bla expaii4Uur .. _. local an4 national 
..... ~-·. 
When the RA vas orpnlzed, thara ware 650,000 fana fallliliea on 
100,000,000 acres ot poor land, vbioh evan experts could not have tal'll84 
at a profit. Abusive praoticee datinc 'beck to the nineteenth eantur,r had 
ltroucM thia situation about, 'but tenare on euUBraiul laa4a had ft• 
caivad little or no raoocnt.tlon aq4 benefits troa BOY•~t ..-notes. 
Wlthwt fiaancial u4 techllieel aid, they would have no hope ot 1mprov• 
~11 1uine4 that •a4Jlaat~~Qt• rather then •si.lllple ratirament• 
we the lteat polict• The diatr11tiR1on ot au'lllllarstnal 1all4a, vbila 
•rkecl by oonoeatration in the senexal areaa ot the Appalachiena, the 
Great takes shores, and the vaatoera border of tohe Great Plai1U1 1 was 
1UUIVOD ia apeo1f1o local1 ties. IA the oeaaa ot •- individual taD~& • 
SO· 
51. 
.Juae 23. 19,36, Roogult PtJ!!Ff• 
'l\!awll. R, Q,, 'Dcla to F.art~a.• C111'1'!At Hiatorx. Vol. 44. No. 4. 
J'ulp, 1936. and •Cbsns1DC Aorea• Provide tb• basta tor this a114 
the 11.8t three parall'llllh•. 
-- tbe r18bt crope and the rit~ht tall'lliac and grasi111; tecbniquu •• we 
wd'eaaible 1 rr •oral to aev oewpet1CIIIa or to better lend appeere4 
appropriate. 
,.,.. RA'a initial prcsraa 1nelllile4 208 deiiiODstraUon project& tor 
e4vcaUonal P\l'f:POHa, and the purahaee ot 9,000,000 acraa tor retirement 
and reatoraUon th~ non.,..rlcult'Ural uaea. Retirement -nt remoYal. 
Both the purebasillf; ot laD4 and ~1 wre carried out on a YOlllDtary 
Mala (TucwJ.l'a oriUoa otte 4aacribe4 the prop~~~~~ in texw ot cCliQUl• 
aion). Actuall.7, 1110re taxwra applied tor reeetU-nt then the ItA 
oou14 take care ot. Thera wra two types ot Nral raeettl-nt 1 em 
t:ypaa and on lersa traote. aull41•u.t. to 8\lpport a c-ity, the eraa• 
Uon ot 1111licb waa caloulato4 to Jial4 eccn0111iaa :l.n cc:aatruotlon and in 
pro•141lll! ut1lit1 ... 
The ItA lnbarUed • 001 mty• type renttla•nt tr0111 the Sllhaistence 
:a-ataau Dhi.ton ot Inter1ar.52 The Praaidant. Mra. Roosavelt, and 
Louie I:klw hd d1aplaya4 a «eap ~tareat 1n tbie kind of project.S3 Their 
52· Seaa41ct, Murray, .luJt hliai$• !ill. !Ill UPitl!\ 8\ataa, 326, J26n 
ain a brief bieto17 ot wutatnce h-ateada betora l9J5. 
53· 'l'elaaraa• Rooae .. lt to ClaOIP w. Riptaira, Pnlaidant, Ohi-o state 
Ulli .. reity an4 Chalxwn ot tblt llat1onal Conteraace on B\abaiatance 
U..ataada. Dee.-.r 7, 1933t a rrandua., Mra. Rooaavalt to Rooae• 
.. u, DesrV.r 3• lCJ.36a tslalftll, Louie How to COl. Graer, Pnlaton 
Lt.Pt a114 PoWr ~'9'• Reota•illa, Wast Vircinta, llovallber 2:1. 
1933, 'W'mU p,plg. 
ldeaa oP the aubject differed troa Tuswell'ac 
We cl1Nere4 aherpl)- about reMd1 .. jjor aaricultu~. 
Up to th:la tt.a hia pOlioiee had been tboee whiCh a 
....-mor neecla4. The experta.Dt in the billa uar 
CftDall ot removina au'-rciMl laftcl trca productiOD 
and nturDiDI it to pau and t:rwa we both thoueht a 
aipit1cant inti~atioa ot rqeae~ation. But o'bdoualy 
55.5· 
1t it auocaeded there weft 10111& to be a lot ot rurel 
people turne4 looee, just ea 111111ona in the citlaa bed 
'Oaea axclucle4 trca increaainsly etf1c1ent tacwries. He 
thOQibt they aipt be taken .oaft ot on aubatateace tal'lllll 
in nearbJ Yallaya llhere 110re inteaa1tie4 praciices wre 
poaa:l.'ble. I tollow4 hill tllat tar1 but wan lie auaeate4 
that thia •ilht be done tor a lot ot idle city tolk, too, 
I belktl4• ••• I thO\IIht I llad Blllde TII/I point thllt it they 
were to 11111ka a Uvina they ~d add to the alread¥ 
troubles- surpluses, all4 e'flln 1t they only re:laed 
produce tor b- CODIIUIIIPtiOil, they vera by that lllllch re-
duclas the lll!lrket for o-rcial farm products. As to 
hia arjiiiiii8At that induatriee cOUld 1M induced to 11101'11 to 
aueh oolODies, it seeDIBd to • th8t people had allll)'ll 
bad to - to incl.uatl'iee 1a tu interest ot attlciency 
and that leas ettlcient oparetiona would not attract 
privata entei'Priae. 
He pve 1118 up. Blat aeveral tl- later CD he retUrDed to 
the arau-nt. I lmew that he we reintorce4 b;r Mra. RGoae-
ftU an4 Louis How. 'l'lle;r ~4. tiaally have their Wf• 
too, and a 'llrava trial VQlld 1M llll4e at Arthurdale, Pine 
MDI.\nta:l.n, WeatJIOrelaftl\, ead 88ftftl other placea • .54 
Tuprell Wished to acca• -lddalate tanara who vented to axchaase their 
unproductive fal'IIW for better looatad and 1110re fertile trecta,_ where 'hay 
could ha'fll the oppol'tuit;r to do - outatde work tl'OIIl t111l8 to tilDe in 
tonstry or in nearbJ -11-acal• induatry.5.5 Thill ecc~tion applied 
to the people CD th4 nine aillion acrea -- a relatively ti117 aJIIO\Uit --
.54· 'l'u&wll, R. G., •'l'lle Prepanat1on ot a President,• JfMterp folitigal 
ol!lrt;•rlY, Vol. 1. lifo. 2, 1uae, 1948, 132·33· 
55· 'l'upell, R. 0., •The Placa ot Oo~t in a National Land Pro&raa•" 
13·14· 
which \he RA retina. 'i'here were definite preotioal Uldtatiou to a 
••• \bia line ot dn'$l.,_n, oaa onl7 be worked out step 
'17 step aa othel" lill8e ot aoUY1t:r an dawloped and 
expen4e4. It -14 be rash to aaoouraae a lel"se INilbal" 
ot people to 1111m1 ••1 s-diataly f'ra aubllluosinal land 
4ul"1DC a pal"iod of' dep~ton ~ there is no ef'f'eotive 
4nrn4 f'w their ftiiiPlo~t elnwllera. Convel"nly, •11¥ 
attemp\ to establiab peoPLe pel'UaDeDtly in new ooemnsi• 
ties -t -,L !leaH on - aAielll'aaoe of' an a4eq\18te noa.• 
Ollie buia ..;;~V 
lilft only 414 TujJvall look with akapticilllll on Mra. Rooaevelt •a ea4 
Lolaia Hove's establiallmant, with the hope or attraotinc 1D4uetr:r to 
abon up an acO!lQIV "-*" on lltl'INiiataaH tal'lllilli and haa41crat1oa and 
other hlliiiB 1Ddustl"1ea, ot -1tiea for eoonomioally •stran4H" &J'OUPIIII 
he 8lllllllaaisa4 the •tntiltration• or indiVidual type ot h0111eatea41DCI57 
aDd he reJectall lltlbaiatenoa bOIIIeatea«ins 88 capable of allswbilli the 
· ra .... ra who would be releaae4 by eJI¥ larp•aoele retiremant ot aullrarpnal 
lsndal 
,56. 
57· sa • 
Our Subeistenoe ~stH4 project& will provide a011111 
u:oaa4111&1¥ uaetlil a:perilleats • • • • Aa a whole, however, 
I am inoliaed to believe tbat such nttlemants will tunc• 
tiQD •raJ¥ as ... u ed41• ot retnat for excep\ionsl 
per.ona1 and that the sreater pal"t of our poPQlation will 
prefer to u.,.. aDd work ia tile •re active and vi,Ol"OWI 
•S.aatreea ot a hiabl.T c nlflU: e1Y1l1za111on. To the 
uteat \hat th1a 1a tnte, • .. t be prepared to abaor'll 
ver:r larp llUIIIbera ot peraOQS from f'atlllll into our pneral 
lnduatrlal aDd urllan l1fe.58 
'l'\laWll. R. o., •HaUOII81 Slsnitleanoa of Recant Trenda ln Fal'lll 
Populaticm,• §Mid lmn. Vol. 14o. No. l, October, 193.5, 7. 
Lorll, Ruaaell, Ill& yeuew !ll.. .O• 429. 
'rqwll, 11. o., •ft• Place ot Oo.NZwt ia a National Land Pre-
.-.• 14· . . ' 
stead pro~ectis aa •• atti..,t to daftlop aalli. hOilHa on little plota of 
l.an4 •• a retuae for fudllN "WIIlDle to find placea 1A the noral ~ 
peUtin eOOIICliiiY •• S9 '!'be projecta 414 act acb1we larp 1.11ponance.00 
The aul:lllrllaa ruett~t didaion ot the RA built the "TI.Jswll• 
01' "Gnell.helt" tOWII •• Greeabelt near Waah1naton, Greelldale De&r Mil· 
wU.., and Greallhilla aear CiaeiADaU. Tlulae toWll8, exampl.ea ot m1A1· 
aoule ree;1oael plaMii:ICo houae4 SCJ0-800 fsllliliea each.6l 'l'beir JIUI"PCI"Bo 
aa oftleiall¥ stated, warea 
1. To a1n useful work to- Oil unemployment relief, 
2. 'l'o deiiOilatrate in practice the sOUlldlless of pleaaiaa 
and operating toWllB aoeor41na to oertain esrden•o1t;y 
prioci;plea. 
3· To prn14e lev rent hGIIaiaa iD bezltbful surroWMl• 
insB •• , for low-a- t..S.Uea. 2 
flaawll'a oritiu ooDce&trate4 OD the bi&b 008t of 1:11.e pro~eota.63 
He aattte4 that the1 were a failure as an exuapla of lov•008t houaiuc •• 
wt they ....... 1\ot 1nte&U4 to be such. He explained that the firat pur-
59· 60. 
62, 
558· 
pose cootrt.buted to hil!h costa, aiace the W!e of unskilled relief lallor 
increased total costa by abwt rtrty pc~r cant • He also pointed out that 
the RA buU.t cOJII1)lete caa:amitles, hou81n& accountint; ror only about 
forty pc~r cent or the total n:pendlture. About sixty percent went ror 
reveaua•produo1J16 services which would yield direct ~nta (electrici\y, 
wter) and taxes (streets, se-a- cUspoaal). Good oraan1zation on the 
Job and the e'bsence of spec:ulathe profU•tekint; resulted, be asserted, 
in reasonable eoats ·• tor uample, csratul plaanina 11111ant that there 
vculd bs no owrcspecity of. utilities. The N. proJected costs over stxt:r 
years, wen the houses would still be good, and liquidation would still 
'be certain. 64 
Tu&wsll anticipated critieima OV8r hish coats due to the sap~-
11111nt ot VPA labor ua1111 shovels iaatea4 or bulldozers. Roose'¥8lt, how-
8'¥8r, wnted to put the DD:iBialll D\lllller of men to wrk in the shortest 
ioesibla tilllll. It ws reported thatTuswll infuriated the Pras14ent bJ 
suaeattna that the 11111a usa spclftS iutaed of aboYBla. 65 H1&h coats 
also reeul ted, '1ilgvell noted, rrca the lSIIIi ted size or the program. There 
wuld bs no lov•coat hous1DI;, he cleclare4, until there ws a housing 
1acluatr:r on s taotor,y bsaia. 66 
414 not interfere with the other tw purposes. The housiaa and aarvisea 
'l'upell, a. c. I ·The MMdna of the Greenbelt ToVIIII,' !fll! f!epublig, 
Vol. 90, No. 11.59, Februar:r 17, 19.37, 42, 43• 
Ro4&era, Clavelaacl, l!pbsrt 5o a• (New York, Henry Holt, 19.52) 131. 
'l'ucwall, R. G., •The Motanina of the Greenbelt Towns,• 42· 
were cheaper (and beUer) than in the ordinary am1cipel1ty. '!be 
• desaonstrat ton• .. pect ot the tows turned out to be s1p1tioant • Tuf>• 
well wote4 to show that the peripheral areas ot cities offered. the "kat 
ohaDCe w heft eftr bed 111 this country for at'fect1118 our Uvilli allll work-
illS envil'OIIIIItnt fa't'Ol'e'lllt. • The tovu vue llea1ped to provide better 
liviaa by preventiag orowdin,c within and, through the creation or preaer-
fttion of a nrroull41aa •areenbelt• Of field end woods, encroaohlaent froa 
without1 they emphesf.ze4 lipt, air, and apace, playgrounb and parka, 
aooaaaible prdene, and Wli ... ira4 root-traffic ways. 'E'bey were to k 
ideal tor ohildrea. 'l'u&wll n:platM« that the to1olll8 vera baaed leaa 
Oil the flllrdell City Of ~alell4 then Oil poplll.ation IIIQV-Ilt8 in the United 
Stetea.67 
plan to create a fourth at Bouall IJ'Qok, Nev J'e1'8ey, b\lt it wa droppe4 
when rea14eata of the area ol>Jeated, ebteinin,c an inJWlction asainat 
this RA activ1ty.68 The Aa.iniatration was not easer to puah the iaaue 
ia aD election year. fuawll W1'0M the President, "'l'hia ia a t'o1'181dable 
attack and 11' the s.n .. ta lands u .. lt' to it you. c:an pieture what tha 
,_blicity would be ia a oa~~BiiD·*" 
'l'ba three toWM were healt~ llllnic:1pel1tiea, Jll8tit'yill8 Tugwell's 
'l'ucWllo R. c., ''l'M MMDiiiC of the Graaabelt 'l'ovu,• 42, 43· 
l:U,Jiu ltD TiW!J, April 28, 19,36, 11111 May'), 19,36, IP41 May 1'), 
19j6, lt51 May 20, 1936, liTo 20:21 July 15, 1936, 4&2. 
Mamoraadllll reviewiiiC llt1811tioa to date, T~aswll to Rooaavelt, 
December 3• 19,36, II5!Uinlt flllll'l· 
_56o. 
prediction that, deaplte the probabilit7 that the nateriala would be 
Olltlll04ed, &004 dea1p and conatructit'll vould make them attraotift tor 
an 1a4ef1n1te tt.e.70 The to.na ware intecrat.~ into the structure of 
local aa4 atate aoftraant like •DJ o\ber tOWII8.7l On J'vne 5, 19,118, 
'l"qwll delivered an addraae at tbe DHennial Celebration ot Greaildale, 
Wiaoou1n.72 In the 1950'•• ia aMOI'daaca with a policy ll!IDGWloed. ia 
193ft, the tO'Willl wre turned ewer to pri'lllte OWII8reh1p.73 
The principal aipitiaanoe or the tovna 111!18 the deaoutration 
ot poaeibilitlea for auburbaa livins •• a subJect on whish ~ll wa 
eatbuaiast1c.74 Two students ot olt1 ploaains called the Greenbelt 
tovu •wtatencuns• ai!ICIQB .New Deal houaiD£ proj.rts.75 Another ranked 
them aa .. ooa4 on11 to TVA sa aa n; .. pttoa to unprod.uoti ve boond.Ofl:8l1JI& 
aDd a damoftatratioa or future poealbilitieat 
ThCl7 hna indicated that certain uauaual pracUoea 1a tha 
plonnina, oraanbat1oa, aDd eperat1on of c-.mit1aa are 
liOtb atl1inot1Ye and hi&bl1 pnotioal. 'l'hB7 han iadloated 
thftt oertain d..elopment methods that have been followed 76 in the past are oltaoleta, unnao .... r117 wstaful, and. ual7. 
Tqwll believed that the Greenbelt tcnlns iRVited COIIP8ri.80n with other 
70. 
71. 
12· 
13· 
74· 
15· 
Tuawallo R. G., "The Meanlq ot tba Greenbelt '1'owu,• 42. 
Stein, Clan~nce s., fowrd. Ia Tew lit Al!erlu. 148. 
Tpawll Pt•q. 
Stehl, Clarence s .. Toyar4 .Ia "PY" .t2£ jf71ca, l60a "What's Tue:• 
wll Doiac?,• i!uatvg la6• Minh 21, 19 , 160. 
Letter to ~..elt, Deceabar 12, 19.35, l!ocat!eU fnera. 
'l'unnar4, C. and Reed, H. H., ftl'riMA S!syUQ!t !Ill. Croy!ih S .bJ:Ia 
.tt .511a .GU.Ua. · . w Tm· (JfevTork, lfev AMl'ioan Li'bl'lley, A,..., 
Doole. :l9.56) 1.80 .• 
Sta1a. Cloreace s .. :ro-rd J!u Tsnms .t2£ America• 101. 160. 
eu\Juoben pro,jecu and the whole theory ot e1- clearance.77 ltrMet 
L11141ey -nte4, •Jlren Pl"iwte reel eatete deftlopera may be ccapel-
le4 to take heell and tr;r to 1•1tata th•.• 78 
The Greenbelt tCMUI, 'lhicls wn !lOt deai&Ded for industry, all 
beiDC lttoated aear centera ot r~illl!l eaapl~nt, •1 well b&ova pleated 
the -.t ot tv.ture city developaeat -- aa Clarence Stela c1a~.79 
In·~ event, aearq ona-balf Of •r population 81'014h• 1940·19,50, took 
place in the eulNrba Of Ilia aUiu, aa4 ~~Cm~~~.t;r-two per e~e~~t ot the 
ai'OIRh in the tvehe larceat •trQelitaa anu wee in the nlNrba.80 
Prhate bu:l.ldan have aoco ll?il.atad thia srovtlh with •u-producUon 
taobaiqua • aa in the f-• LeYittovu. 
In .a4dition to nba'bilite.Uon, rati-nt, and rural and aub• 
urban raaanl ... nt, the RA wulartook ocn•:rvaUon projects. 'l'be 
-b11118 lb:aO\IUve Ol"ller did clearl:r ditrannt1ate the work the Rl wee 
to do tl'Clll the opera tiona ot the Soil Erosion Be nice. The Rl e11miaate4 
poaaibilitiee of conflict or OftrlappiQC b;r continins ita activitiaa to 
•rainel end n'-eraiaal land. 81 
oontv.eion ia ita creation, includia& the raczuit.ant of pereonnel, end 
hip eWnietrative coate •• both .._anted b;r thoH 'lbo Wled 'lupall 
77. 'fucvell, n. G •• •'l'he MHnina ot the Greenbelt TCMU~,• 4.3· 
78. Litlllley, !meet IC., lJtlhv J£WI. b"•mU. 186. 
7'). sta.ia, Cleraaoe S., fN£4 ltll .......... .ta ''Qt1M, 101. 
80. Inat1t11te ot Life lUU'IInOttt adftrti ... nt, 19511· 
81. lleM41ot, ~tuTey, lllll Pgll&ig st.1U·Y!!1Uf4 §t•tfl • .324• 
562· 
tor a vht.ppiq boy. Other pro'D~ wre the reconciliation ot relief' 
with d..onatretlon tuDetioaa, the aelsotlon or clients tor the Orae&Delt 
tOMUI •• coaoerntnc 111\ich, it a-.t, no policy at with wide apPJ'Oft). •• 
and the reha'Dilitation of tcnorant and almost helpleaa clienta.sa 
All ReHtt~nt Adld.niatreto:r, '1\iswll be- invol'leci ia OGII!Pe• 
titioa with Hopkiaa and Ickes tor a~ilallle tun4a.83 There ws a jul'ia• 
dioticmal conflict Oftr certda lA!:III4 Jllll'oha••• betwn the IIA and Ickes • 
Jlurea'll ot ReelamatiOil.Bii It ws also uoeaeaey to work out a policy, 
fi'GID the polat ot viev ot .. griCNl\111'111 ecoaomioa, ooacemina the rela• 
tlonebt.p Mi-a ret1...-t and reolaaatloa. Roosevelt's deeb1011 
eppeered to be a coapxllllln 'D8H4 011 poliUoal end adld.DistreUve COli• 
a1deret10118. He detend.Jae4 on a halaaoe bet-n land taken out flit culti• 
~tioa all4 land bJ'ClQ8ht into oultlvatioa, detera1M4 II)' dollal'•for-
ciollar allooatioas tor then eotiv1Uea.65 
62. sea belev, Clulpter XIV, tor a 110re cieta1led acoOilllt or adminiatre• 
Uve probl-1 the 'beat JMII'IICI"Ml often prefeJ'J'eci to work ia eetab• 
Uabed ecencsaa, Mllrsa., Levie• Relief m SQglal S!!w•Ur, 318. 
%Jilt, April 8, 19355 May 25, 198'• tile tbrq 11111n bact hllh repJ'4 tor 
011e aaotber pei'IICiaall.)-, aa in4188tM II)' this nota, 'l'ucwll to Rooae· 
velt, March ), 1'.34' •I had a lone talk 111eteJ'day with flaJ'J')'. I a11 
IIUl'e you clo not kiiMtv how unoue hie tiaancial ai tuatlon 1e. He 
reall7 hae not eJIOilSb 1110ne1 te pt lily 011. He 1s tJ')'iDC to devise 
w,. alld BlftiUio \rut he eupt not to have to think ot &llCh thiap nev. 
~rhapa I ahoula•t worry you with this \rut I 1mow he WO'Uld MveJ' 
tell )'011 1 end I th0\141ht you 8Uiht to lmov,• RC!C!!U!lt laJ!ID, 
'l'laawll to Dr. llVOG4 Mea4. C..ieaioaer or .. Recle•tton-;-ltMil to 
'l.'qwll. Ickes to Meat. ICkes to Roo11velt,_ Rooaovelt to 'l'IJawll, 
'fllawell to Roeeovelt, Ill ill 1u1y, 1935, RoO!tyelt Pepeu. 
Tla8wU. a. c., •Dova to :Earth.• .15'· 
beocainc the li'SA. It sndualq cloet\1 out the subetatence h0111estea4 
proJects, and it sdmlnietered a lons-term cr.dit PTOe:mm for farm pur• 
chases by tenants. Ita C8llllNI for miamnt tam workers and ita support 
or experiments in cooperethe fl!lmina provoked bitter sttack:e by oon• 
sanatiVe term el-nts. Attar a thorough 'Go:l&l'Oaeionsl 1nnstipt1on 
1B 1943•44. the li'SA we alloliehed 1B 1946 by the Fal'llere Holle Adllliniatre-
t1on Act, acme or its act1v1tiee beins treneterred to the Farmers ·Ha.e 
Corporation. 8ft 
One ot the basic iGDBr&l prob~ ot the BA w.a tha Qatura ot 
the people it sOUGht to help. They lacked the ability to orpnias for 
their owra seed• and their -kness 1111de 111 difficult to detenci the ettor11s 
in their behalf before Concress and the publ1o.87 In 1936 and in retro-
spect, Tqwll eonsidered ahort-na rsltet the principal ac~hte-nt ot 
the BA. All an approach to lona-rua aollrttons, it served aa a 4-t:ra-
uon. 88 In 1936 I'IICwell worts that the lend retirement prograa pointed 
PI'O£l'lllllll tor Mlldllna tex-delinquaat lellda, and tor rural aonina. guidance 
ot priV!Ita sett~nt. and aupervisioD ot credit facilities in the lt&ht 
of' lead cleasifications. •In the mesnU.1111, some one hall to take the lead 
to point out the basta ot the lend preble~~~, and chart a course for the 
beat use or the lend,.S!t 
86. Benedict, M.ll'J!ay, !11m PoliciM Slt the United StJltea, ,364, 492-93, 
McCune, W.slttT, :C.lua .l..l.a (Garden City. Doubleday, Doran. 1943) 
29·31J see below, this chapter, •Resignation.• 
87. Childs, Mll1"!lu1• W. aDd Cater, Dclqlua, Dhig .11! a ll!y1Mg Socit!x 
(!few York. lfew American Lib:rar,, A Mentor Book, 19.54) 11. 
88, Xa 1.'154 T\tpell Pi4 the 9.000.000 acrea ratir.4 by the BA wre •taw 
in r.letion to the need. just a 'd-atration of 'llbat cou.l4 be done, • 
iatenieic JIWl yritg. 
89. Tupell, J!l, O,, •Chaqing Acres,• 63. 
'1'\lpell an4 the COAF-1' 
The AM aad the HR4 
eat, ;ubllllhed 1B 1922, ~11 c011olu4e4 that 
_564. 
A. rddntorpn'hUOil ot IDflllah GGIIIIIOD law lilllited tho 
SJIIMiOil of a salutary dootrtae ot public intoreat. That 
4ootl'ine bad alW78 been a prooteoUon tor oon-na 1t 
ha4 liMn tz'lutat~. in .-rtoan law, into a protooU.,.. 
4e'Yioa tor other lluaineaaoa. A 0 0QIIII0n oall1na• had to 
OCIIIII to -• one lolliCih,.. •~ to )Qa1aasa, not to con-
._. - en intereatina illustration ot th.o penobant of 
Juc1aee for oontuaiac llwi1DA8 With aoo1ety.1 
llur1na tho 19201a hia atucl,y ot econOidu n1nforeod his belief that 
lasal interpretatione vhioh diareear614 tho oonsuaer•a basic right to 
pu'ilha" &Ood8 Of a raaoonalllo q...t.ttJ at a reuonabla prioa worked to 
tho diad:raatqa ot aootov aa a wola. 
A.a a Jlev nealar, ~11 ccmUaa4 to assert, ia ariicloa aDCl 
apaeoltaa, that protection ot o••=r pvchaaUa power wa requisite 
to an n;pandlna 'MORCliQ' ot alnuldaaoe.•i 'l'ho cona-r, he •1ntaiaa4, 
waa •the lr.ey to proapertty.•3 our pi'CIW.ea, he atated, waa to diaeo...r 
1'. 'l'II&Wll1 R. G., •The .. , Daal' 'l'ba DHliaa of OoYel'IDBnt,• Pari I, 
VUUD PJ!l.iUyJ. 9Mrhrll• 'fol, 4, !lo. 2, .1uaa, 19,51, )0). 
2. 'l'tlpell, R. o., qDCiloaW oelt!•, •Jta4uee the Spreada• 81D4loate4 
oolua, 'Purohaalac Powrs• "''ae ADI ot the 9RM'=r•a Oui4t of the 
AsricultlQ'IIl A4Ju-nt A41Df.niatrat1oa,• rmw=r•• Cl1i4f, NeTa.,...r. 
~. 19).31 .A.\4rua. 'A Rev Daal tor the Col!'·-r,• Colwaltla Aluall 
Llmoheon, J'elmlary 12, 19~. lJlm6. Prty Btltwa A44reaa, •eonaum-
era eD4 the Jlev neal,• eoa.a-ra• Laajple ot Ohio, C~land, MaT 
11, lCJ~. ln l.U BeUJA t2r. Ill I . DB• 
3· 'l'tlpell., R. o., •'l'ho "''"" fit ll'aUoaal Plaulac,' Ill!! Hewblig, 
Vol. 89. No. 1149, DeU!IIber 9• 193£, 162. 
"abUt frCIII a proclucer eiiClDCIIIT to 8 COIISIUIIIlr eOODOIIQI' o 
troa habits aDd ia.•ltutioaa which were appropriate to 
the vest atretohea fit h~n 801ll'Oity to new inaUtutioiUII 
arl4 MW ballitla vhlcll. will be appo>priate to the new pos-
sibility ot plenty tor overyaae.4 
Tuawell llllintaiJlllltS that 1a a teohnologicel society COIIBUIII8ra 
they batS to tom a atrona, orpnlzetS co~ra • movement to back up 
their rapreaentet1oo in goverlllllllnt apnclea ,.5 Aa thinp were, e-ra 
ottea wre •partiea to the debate who are not present and would be 
- -UlllMloc.t to IIIIIIJ it the;y vera, ./)saYlrw/ to stand 1nY1a1b]¥ b;y eftl'J' 
public s«l'Yant 1a cbair.•6 
Tugwell we eapaoial]¥ intereatef. :l.a cciUII\IIIIIIr p:rotect1011 in the 
AU and the liRA, throup the COI1818era 1 Counsel and the Cona\lalera' 
AdYiiiOIT Boari., reepocU:ntq. Bl.a ~nt , both oootemporar;y aDd :re•n· 
apectlve, vas that in thia reepe~ Do$h agencies • ••• 1111cle veey little 
~as ot an uuertain arl4 teebl4t sort.•? In a publ1e addreiiB in 
193lt he attributed the taUura of eCI\11-re to enjo;y equal represent&• 
tiCIII .,1.th producers in the I.J.A aDd the 1'IRA to their taUure to •ert, 
'-h1a4 an orsan1sat1oa, a preaauno ot interest •tor which repreHntation 
1e onq an ouhari. 1111D1teatat1011.•8 PriveteJ.T, in Yiev ot hie remark 
4· 'fuevall, a. a. I •A llfew Deal tor the eona-r.• 1 • 
.5· TII&Wll, R. c., •eo-re and the Jlev Deel,• 268. 
6. '.fu&well, R. a., Mines, lliallllft County Pioneer Aaaociation, Olcott; 
!leach, New York, AugwJ1: 8, 19,34, l!mll PrtU ~~· 17. 
7• ~11, R. o., •ecm-n aa4 the lfev Deel,"8t eee abcmt, CbaP-
t81' llt, Sa~ ion, • ... liRA,• Claapt.er X, Section, • ... AU.• 
8. ~uawu. Ft. a •• •eon.u.ra all4 the llaw Deal,• 268. 
,566. 
to Iokaa that the .AAA purp ot Fabwary, 1935. was a •aallout,•9 he 
probably would have acned with Ra:ramd Graa SwillS that, "'l'ha repn-
santaUoa ot the Q0lla\11118r all alons baa bean artificial. It could only 
haYe beea real if there had beea a fighttns spirit :l.napirad by the 
White Hausa.• 10 SWin£'• conolua1CD fitted in with Tuswell's view that 
the natura ot the ~ Deal waa essentially •Progresaiva.•11 
The Pure Food a114 Drucs Bill 
'I'Upell aona14ewd the prnatioo ot the sale ot adulterated or 
liO:rtlhle .. pda a vital aspect ot the QOnaenation of ~r purobaa-
:I.D& power al14 hu.a raaourcaa. Aca01'Cliacly, he sponsored a pure food 
all4 4ruaa bill to replace the illa48fluate, obsolete law of 1906. 'l'ha 
s-41a11e etteot of thia scUOA vaa a euocaaatul campt.ip bf opponent• 
of the llill to 4ieoredit hia in thtl eyee ot the American paople.1 Ia 
the oll4, ~ra Nnafited trca Jlt'OteoUve la&ialat:l.oa in an Act ot 
luna 25, 19,38, etrect1ve Oll8 year later. 
'l'he pacticaa of the patan....S1o1ne and o-tic producer• 
whiCh provolaMI o~ro• erpaiHUona to 4-nd new protective le&ia-
laUOA perta11184 to product conwat ancl advar11111DS• The list ot 11114:1.• 
eel prcd\lota and 0011111t1• 11hiell ctllltailled ao11ually or potertUally 
19~ See above, Chapter X, SectiOA, • ••• AM.• 
to. Swing, Rqllolld, •'l'be l'llra- at the AM,• IU.IiAtiAA, Vol. 140, Jlo. 
3633, Jellruary 20, 1935, 217. 
ll. See below, Chapter XV, S.ctiOA, 'The 'Prosroelive' Reture ot the 
Nclw Deal."' 
1. s.e below, Chapter XI. 
hal'lld'ul lnpdienta •s a loll8 one.2 As tar sdvertieine, it •• no 
~Uon to assart that lllediciDe mauu.facturel'8 fousht for the 
• ••• aac:red risht or a freeborn ft.merican to advertise and sell h01'88 
linilnllnt as a retlllldy for tuberculosia.•3 A Federal Trade CclmllissiOR 
l'llport or 19.38 indicata4 that patent medicines accounted tor tha 
areetfl' pert or fl'lludulent advertisin,s.4 The Food and Drut1 Adlllinistra• 
1:1011 ot tbe USD.A. exploited the oveNbel.ID1na nidance sge.tn.e't the pateat-
llled1e1ne aen, satt1n,s up an exhibition which reporters dubbed the 
Cl:lulber ot Horrol'8. 'l'be piece de resistance in this 41aplaJ •• a 
"' her ot taatimcmiala fer a 41a"Hu cure next to which appeared tha 
4aatb oart1ticates of the writere ot the test1mon1ala.5 
The law ot 19o6 ftSUlatad labelin8 bUt not advertiain&• A 
trau4ulont sdvertieel!lllllt in tha 4ruaist•s vindov could provide the 
panuaaion which laballD& resuJ,atloM preventa4 from appearillg on the 
cofttailler. Even fraudulat claims tor bal'lllleaa products could have 
delatarioua arteotaJ the oo..-r lllleht act on them instead or aeek11l& 
proper protesaional tres.tmlnt. 
2. Seldas, Oeorp, Ia eep•t Jla Dll (llav Yol'k, Mo4arn Aaa BooD, 
1938) 95, noted tut llav 1'orlt ct\J', \IDdar Ma7or La OU.l'lt1e, Ua-
tad 48 M41cral producta 11114 71 ..... uce oonta1n1na potantiall¥ 
harmfUl 1~1enta. 
3· Seldee, Oeorp, Iea gep•t f12l'1111• C)B. 
4· Seldea, Oeo:rp, X5ll cu•t f121'JII1, 91J lla4 Ju .I.I1I.Is TJ•a, ~ 
ber ll, 1933, 4a4, aaaeari:l:ad the traudll aDd miaNpresentattona 
leading to the introductiOQ ot legislation. 
5· Gillis, A.. and X.ttha. R., a&E -rig (Boeton, Little, Bl'OWil, 
19;36) ;368. 
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Which protected the consumer ia41ceted that he 414 not Qeed the Firat 
teq•s U1'fi:l.llf; to act. J.. letter Vlich he wrote to the President in 
March, 1933, reveelecl his 4eep interest in obtainiag new le0islation. 
He steted that the AJ.. Act and the Pure roo4 and Drusa bill were the two 
thins- he wanted to accomplish befo:e leaving Waah1ngton,7 It waa 
reported that 'l'u&wll •aecured the aupport• or Henry Wallace tor a uw 
ao1o.8 However, there ia no evidtiiiCCI that the Secretary vas especially 
enth\Uiiaatio about the proJect. 'l\Jawll'a ke:y aupport or, rather, ev.th-
orla.Uon, C8llll fl'Oll a h,_er IIOIU'Oe. 
One IIIOnlil'l6 ill March, 1933, 'l'qwll talked to Walter Q, CMJII"U, 
Chief ot the FOCJ4 an4 0~ MminilltaUon, about poiaonoua aprq reai-
duea Oil fruits and v..-tablaa. 'l'he1r conversation roamd over tho 
vbole t:l.el4 ot oona\!Mr protection. Later the - day c~ll re-
ae1ve4 a ...... to aee T\la¥811 &pill, '1'he proteasor illto~ CulplleU 
that he bad apoken to the Pnsideat all/1 received authorization to reviae 
tb41 Act ot l9o&.' 
O'bT1ouely, there was no llaala ill tact tor the widespread belief 
that 'rUf(wll lost fevor with the Pnlii4ellt by aJOilSor:I.Df!, JDOre or lees 
6. %.ila• Vol. 23, No. 2b, 1une 25, 19:Jl, llJ Vol. 25, No. 13, April 1, 
193.5, ea. 
1· March 17, 1933, nog.eveU Pt"D• 
8, Gordon, J,eJ.en4 J., tsa:. CoffiPIIt• 2d ed. (New York, Aller:!.• 
can !cDok CcQpaa,, 
9• I.aab, Ruth, pr:l.an t:haabtr Jlt Horror! (hw York, Farrer an4 Rille• 
hart, 193') 2"/9. · 
on hill own, a bill wMch &1'14>ered the proaa. It was true that Rooae-
'tel t ws not loud in his public support of the meuure. It was alao 
true that ho conaiderud the political liabilities which Tugwell 
aaquire4 aa a roault of his aotion.lO But the .President could not 
have held a(.ll!liDBt Tui;wll the espou.ul of a bill in which he Willi soDU.-
iael,J interested hilllllelf. Tugwll thr.~w th1a l.isbt on Roosevelt 'a 
interest in food and druse lqislationc 
I relllllalbere4 • • • and used • • • UDIIorupulousl,y, I am 
afraid, Ma-. a-v.u•a ..... ot oontinuit:y fl'lllll T. a. 
I suppose the '1'. R. bud~ ws ••• o'lrrioua, and per-
haps he would IP'ill to hiiiHlf ..man, IIIII.Oh later, I would 
raa1ad him in c0111.vernUon about the l"ood and Dru,p 
bill (he wa not slviq me the support to 'Wb ich, 1n rq 
enthWiiaaa, I woul4 t•1 araUtled) that the existing 
aot had been a prcdv.ct ot '1'. R. •a progre .. iT8118aa in 
19o6, and that DO President atnce bad dared ttptea ita 
restrictions on the patent E84icina man or the puryeyora 
ot poieona4 ~Ue111. Bui li vou1d han the deeired 
ett'ect.ll 
UDder 'l'ugwell'e directiOIII.o Professor Milton HaDd1er ot Co1UIIIbie 
Law School and Professor David F. C.nra ot Duke Law School drafted the 
bill which Se~~&tor Rc;;yal s. CopelaDil (llem., 11. Y.) introduced on 1une 
6, 1933. as s. 1944.12 Apparenil,J fupiell wanted to introduce a bill 
quickl.;y ia order to beat the lobtl;yieta to the drew. In aQF eftllt, 
Consreea took ita U.ma, aad ihe lobb;y1ata 4eaceade4 Oil 'Waah1ncioa1 
llllllatins a btu·nae of Pl'OJ11118Bada lllbich proved too 11111.c:h tor the Mlllinie• 
10. See below, Chapter X, Sect:1.0111., •Reaien&tionf" Ct.apter XI. 
11. 'J.'ua'well, H. c. • •rile Preparation ct a Preaident,• !(utern PoUUal 
QMnarlY, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1\Uieo 1948, 1.34. 
12. carter, 1. P. (tlnot1'1oial Ollaener), ,D& .1U Dultl'l (New York, 
SiiiiDD aad SohWiter, 19~) 90. 
S?O. 
s. 1944 ,.. • bill 
••• to prevent the •DIItaot\lre, ehipaent, and sale ot 
a4\lltente4, lld.abrandecl food, dftp, and coe.t1M, aD4 
to replate tmtflo tberetaa' to prevent the falee a4ver-
u-nt ot foodt UuaBt and o-UM aDd for Other 
ptli'JIOll88 .13 
La bela had to - all aott.e 1118N41enta, lndi011te the preaeace ot 
aloohol, aDd wra apinat a!Q' hablt.fonatll(! 1De;re4lent. For all items 
a"pt fresh fruita aa4 Yeptablea, the Seoretal')' ot Ae;riwlture ooul4 
1t the Yolwltar, inapeetloa aernoe p1'0'1l4411l for p~ inallequw 
tor aohi..,lll(! the JIUJ'POIIIa ot the \till. hrrut 19-t1ona throv&h the 
11841um ot the Fellenl 'hade c-taef.oa Act. an4 the uae ot iajUDOUoaa 
wre authoriaell ,14 
'!.'be aecUoaa oa advertlalll(! wre the eubJeo11 ot 1110at or the 
OODtl'O'IOI'Q' over the bill. Maaututurere. 41atr1butore, a4verU•1111 
aceno1ae. and a4vert1a1na 11841a tloea~ 80J'Utln1ze4 two paraarapha• 
AD a4wrttarm 11n ot a fOD4, cb'Ua• or -tlo shall be 
deemll! to \)a telae if 111 la mf.elecuUnc in •111 partic\llar 
rel.Amlsn to the purpoaea ot tJilf.e aot. Arltf repreaentatloa 
ooaoeralll(! •111 etfeot ot a 41'111 shall be ~~~ false 
Wl4er this ,..,....Jil l8 IIUOh representation l8 not eua• 
taiDed b7 d•nnat:ralll.e aa:lntltio taote or aubataatul 
aDd rell8ble aeilioal optnloa. 
JOII' purJIOHII ot thl8 act the athert:laeulant of a drue repre-
aeattaa lt to haYa 8117 thenpeutle effect ln the treatmallt 
ot Bnctat•a 41eoeaa. cancer, tubanUlosu, pol.iC~~~~relit18. 
13. ao~. Lelan4 ; •• 1csmm1u rs. w=mra. 608. 
14· Gordoa, Lelatid. ;z •• "enrla• m l!smera. 608, 6ll, 6141 :u... 
April lt 193.5, 68, 
u4 ftHI'M1 cu. . aaa shall 'be 4eeaK to be false 1 
except that 110 adftrtiailll shall be 1\e.-4 to 'be talH 
1t U ie dia~DatM ~ to -bera ot the 11111cUce1 
or phanBCfttiea1 prote .. icma or appears oftl7 ill the 
uientitlo periocUoab ot thoee proteaa1CM. 
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Other aeouona on adftrtiataa proh1b1tM the a4Yert1-nt ot a pallt• 
attw as a ourea plaoecl the ~n ot proof repr4illl allesaclly talo 
the bllpra and eakltUahM an •iatennoe alld ambtsui'F" clet1nition ot 
talae a4wrtS..1JI&.15 
s. 1944 ,... a 110ft e IEilbnllift alld a stricter piece ot l~~tpsla• 
Uoa than the Aot ot 1906. A s-....t ot 11411l.-r eoon<atca oa..nted 
that the 
••• experience of tWDty-ee'IU yean wa reflected in the 
first Uatt, lt beinc eo 4ft• as to aultatitute atrencth 
'llhere theft ha4 'been Plllhl• aDd to lDOlwle apeeitlo pro• 
•S..iODa -.... the,y had lleeD .Uslou.16 
Ill new ot the fn.alent pneU- 'lllbtoh lad to a '-ad tor new 1qia· 
lation, tua-11 414 aot oonaHer the tatll too ·~·· But, it 11: 
• • • • wa aueh le.. than Dr. '.l'usWll an4 Mn. Roo..,..lt had orta1na11y 
plalllled, }j.t vai/•e 81eh _.. \baa ••• OftltUie et al. oanf. to •-P' 
.ol.lmtaril¥.•17 4eeord1111 " ~. s. 1944 •trf.abtaaed a'ftll hoaeat 
a4...nt.aen •• a 
16. 
17. 
18. 
OOrdGAt 1Alaa4 1 •• JBsi11J?-11'riMI W, 9=•' FA• 6111 U.o April lo 
19.3.5. 68. 
Gcmlon. 1Alead z •• !Mn=u J:lt '79M=n· 
na. April 1, 1935~68. 
sa. ,__ 2.5, 19,r.. u. 
6o6. 
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()ppoaellta ot th41 'bUl aso&U4 that it pn~ tha S.antU7 ot Acri• 
0\&ltMN •alltOOI'IIUOo OHriaUo• JOWI'II ill Seotloa 23 ( •tha fiDdlD(!I ot 
tan _. tha S.ont1117 ••• ahall be oonoluai.,.•) • daprlTlnc allqad nola• 
ton ot tha ri&ht ot trial by Jur.lt 'ftla oppoaitiOD. also 4allllan4 that 
ill thtt bill Coll8l'eaa WlCOillltlt11t1~U., dalapta4 ita powre, all4 that 
tha prorla1oa for taotol')' tupeniGII all4 aCIDtZ'Ol wae ua~._r1eaD allll ua~ 
ocutitut1caal.20 !han wre atl'OIIC ebJeoUou to proy1ai011.8 ffll' food 
otaa4ai'U.21 Tha proJOAl to hol4 ...-a\e otttolale paraoaaU., l1allle 
Sa GilllDal aaUou noka4 expruatou ot ala•.22 S.. orit1oe at s. 
1,_.. o1W Ua potentlalll llal'lllf\al aoa.a.to att.na, aclllpl.ailllnc that 
111 'tiiWld hu'tl the NCICNI/7 ot U tllponaat ia4u81117•23 
"'- bopN which tha 4 4e1DI81II'IIUOD a11 haft ha4 tor a alp1f1eall11 
apl.tt 1D thtt etppHitlOR wn 'Utultille4. A taw joumala, euch u JIU.• 
lilt .1111 fpbU•IF• euppon.t the W.ll, poiDUaa out that the pZ'OI\Ual'8 
ot leaf.t•te pzoo4ao1la would Dot ..nar tna hoMet olas-.2ll Blat PDS~"­
•ll¥ the oppoaiUOD pruaa11a4 a uai.W tzooat. Aa ea:oaptloa to tho .-s--
al ~· oaa11arad oa tha qllOatiOD ot l1a'b1l1ty for talea a49ertta ... Dta. 
'ftle ••••tuft~'~~ taYON4 a 111041tteat1oa ot Jl'l'bliehara• aDd 4ealera' 
513· 
euap111ou to pi'O't1.4e penalUea tor vUltul perUoipat1ora. 25 The pu!J-
ltahen 1aalate4 on liiiiiN apeo1tla elauau vhioh would put all the b~ 
tor: Yiolat1ona on the 1111mataoturenJ all4 dee.lere, nou 011 the a4'nlrt1ailla 
aaerwtee aa4 -papere.26 '1'h1a 41aagi'MMrlt 011 Uab111117 Jll'OY1alona 
414 an, hOWTer, e:t.cAU1oanUy walrea the CMliiiiiOil aaUH. 
SGIIIII oppouata of s. 19~ eew, so to apeak, the handwrittua 011 
the wu. Repl'lllua sC*II ldll4 ot ebllap •• illedtabla, th87 ad'nlua4 
proJIOiala ealoulaW to •aottw •ll1 aaw lacislat1oa. It wa arpe4 that 
there ahwld be aa -n4laallt ot tha Aot ot 19o6, rather 11haa the irl:tro-
4ut1011 of a 'llhoU,r - a at, 1ll oJ"'lar to retain the belletlt ot 11wntr-
........ ,._ of ooun 4ealatou. A af.llllar objection pointed out that 
tOI'tiJ'•tvo eta tea ha4 law patilaned aner the Fedanl statute. sc-
....-ra of the •wvltaliUlt;r• aehool ooatanda4 that the Fa4anl '1'ra4e 
C' teeloa rather thall the J'D04 all4 Dna •&etnSatratioa should aoratrol 
ad't'e:rt1slnfu it ,.. hopa4 that the tw apao1as would olaah, pra-t"antlac 
•• real ~t1on of a4"N:rt1siac.21 
The A4mla1stratioe•a aida ot the story ael4aa reoe1va4 fair treat• 
..at 111 the preu.28 ~11 htsnlt 1111Ae aC*II effort to a:plaln the 
,1Ut1t1eat1oa tor, aa4 the provtalou ot. the bUl. Ha devoted H't'411'11l 
apeaohea all4 a:rt11Jlaa, ill llbola or in part, to the aubJaota 
~: 
21· 
28. 
19.38) 
• A4verU.a1q an4 the Hew 10011 an4 Druce Bill, • 
••• aMue•r. SeJteaber 16, 1933. 
•'!'he C0pelall4 Btu aa4 the Food IJI4lultr1ee • • 
prepared tor the !Jnet17 Tn4t Jllaa .tam& 
lftu 'R1gtt 0 October a, 1933• 
•rreea• trca hkea,• Ney. J~oveBer 17, 1933& 
SA ,!U WSle la pqggreg, 9?•104. 
•'l'ha Gnat Allerioo Fre\14 1° l:tla tzrtep Bgh9lar, 
Vol. 3, Jio. 1, Wb.llar, 19~. 85-95· 
'A litw Deal tor tba eo...-r,• .A4dreas, COlVIIIbia 
Al.umai Llmcheon, Jlev York City, Fe'brwul')' 12, 
19.34. ll§il Prtu!• "'r"• 
"SbCIIll4 ~ l£aaot • Jlev Foo4 and Drup tav,• 
99nf1Mf19P'1..ilJ&u1, Marcb, 1934· 
•• Pmei4a a,so~ P''e•w Vaty•rJUx Qalan,, Vol. 27, No. 1, Maroh, 1935, 
ao-,36. 
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'hcwll ata11e4 that tba Act ot 19o6 w.a liiOJ'tbvhile as tar u U 
went. but that it ba4 'beocat aaaGbi\OiliaUo aDd oontaille4 a m~~~~bar ot 
1oopbo1ea ancl Clllli11i0111. Ita allihora cwl4 not poaai'bl.y have tor888a 
llhe treDd ot 11104tra a4verti&inC• 1411nt0ver, -st of the povib in the 
GO&Mtios tDduatey bed ooourre4 ataoe 19o6. Loopbolea incl.u4t4 a up-
ttve la'beU.aa olauaa (it 1DdioaM4 wat ooul4 • appear on la'bela), a 
'4iatinotive 111111111' saotioa UD4tr vhlela-bopa products vere often marketed. 
a proviatoa oa poiaou which rateft'ed only to a!ld!4 poiaona in IIIIIXS.. 
U!Wilts without ooverill& patupllr een1M poiaona ancl astabliahinc 
1111nf.aa tolarenoea, an4 a olauaa oa poiaonwa-sprey reatduaa ao compli-
caW that the 1'004 and Druc Ade1nlatnUoa bad to devote about one-third 
ot ita t'wllls and tS. to this ~~attar. 'l'ha burdn ot proot that a talaa 
29· 'l'haaa name. axoapt tor tha last, in -which 'l'llswll's oharecter Mrs. 
1oo11a proola!me her riabt to Jmow 111hat aha • s bey1Dfh 'prOYida the 
'basil tor tha -t tour parepaphs. 
515· 
lalHil olaS.lll wa alao f:rauclulent la7 wUIIl the pvernmeat, 'Which bad to ao 
throuah all sorts of lepl ~atiu - al*etl•s for yeara on a •1Dal• 
caae. 
ser101.1s Ollllasione in the .Act of 19o6, Tucvell o<a~enta4, 1aclude4 
the absence fit provbiona for :raeulat1118 paell:afle fill, standard& dea18• 
uuona, aDd "1'1ft41ahly conceiftd" •chanioal devices such as -..orthlesa 
contraptions to treat rupturas. 'l'he principal defect or the 19o6 law, 
••• of courae, ita failure to replete a4vartia1ng. Tucvell cited au. 
examples ot f:rau4uleat tha:rapeutie olat.. tor PhOD7 eonoootiona. 
OlaulHir'a aalta, a aalifte laxat1Ya, vould cure, accordill8 to advartiae-
menta. llllllba8Qo arthritta. uuruu. dialHitaa, naural&iao liver aDd 
kldliiOT troublea, atl*eoh diaorda:ra, 111-tlllllo aDd aoi4oa1a. It took 
the pvernment eleven yaara of lepl action to atemp out the aale of 
•B • M,• a lllb:tura of _t.a, turpentine, and eaa which purportedly 
could cura thirty dlmenta. "MIIantlhila, thcuaanda of credulous aoula 
,G.rij takill8 the concoction 111 all Fed taUh and sattins no batter 
or perhape eva dTins fl'CIII it.• 
Tucvell continually aaaerte4 that lagialatlon for oon-r pro-
teoUon 11118 atMd at a lllinority, that 
••• oonteaptibla, dearaded :raee of fakers, quacka, and 
poieonoua n011tl'wll lll&kara llllich 1a ooncetve4 in the alUIIII 
at publ1e 18noranlla allll nOill'iahe4 by the pain and olHiaaaiona 
at the dlaeaae4 aDd a1UJ18, · 
Lawa which wiped 01.1t this minority, be declared, protected. hoDAat daal-
era W1o had 4ec1dd Yoluntaril.y that boneaty 111111 gOOd buaineaa, fl'CIII 
crooked, ruthlaaa competition. 
~11 Uated the objeotloaa to aav le&1alat101u 
1. It 11101ll4 atop all aelt-.41eaUon. 
576. 
J• 'l'he oollaJH ot adYertiailli tor tooda, 4r11p, u4 0011· 
mttloa 1110Ul4 coat _.,ia lli1110IUI ot dollara. 
4• 'l'he es1aUJ18 Food aDd llnp Aot, Federal Trade C-1•· 
111011 Ac11, all4 poa11al law Jl1'0'14ed ample o-r pro-
11eot10A. 
Hit rapl.led to thoae obJeoUOIIII apeoltlllllllf• 
1. 'l'he bf.ll W8 predicated 011 the oont11N8t101l ot self• 
medieattoa, a praotioa olaer than o1Yilizattoa. 
;i, 'l'he iOMffRIDt had to pn!YO 1'1 Cbal'&N in Oourto '1'l1e 
USDA had rao ,su4io1al authority. 
3• 'l'he 1:1111 ooul4 aUUN oont14oftco in food. dl'Ua• and 0011• 
•tto a4YOrt1e1... M.ft'ft111Jic .olwle had 4eeneae4 in 
YOluM attar 1929 •• u ba4 buelaaaa tn pneral. It 
wa tacnutna and -u .-tiiU to 4o eo in the lone 
l'WI.o 
4. 'l'bo 10114 and Dl'ua AdlliaiatraUon we oonacioaUOWio 
\lador 11be law ot 190ft 111 coul4 not reaoh ..., abuaea. 
OfiO ot the basic objeot1.,.. ot the bill we to ralae nal inoca l:ly pre• 
YOCit1Jic 00118\111111' expenditul'U on wort:hloaa aooda· 
'l'he tate ot pure toot aQil 4rUa1 leaialeUon in the 1930'• WI a 
olaulc esa'Qle ot the uaa ot Coap'eaaional prooal8e8 tor purpoae1 ot 
clalq aa4 -8<NlaUOD. laoh CCIIIPI-.. bJowibt reneW4 d-nd8 l:ly the 
oppoat.Uon tor further o...,..OIIi .. , u4 lnueaaed 4111&\lllt upon tha part 
lt.sMd aeYOCI Seaate bUla (19114• 2lS.So ~. 28.58, 8Jl6, 580, 5) an4 aix 
HDwJe b1lla (6)76, 7AJ6, 796A, Yrf2, 880.5, 8941) which were introduced. 
bet-a 1uae 12, 19.33 and 3'11)¥ 23, 193.5.30 JlepreaentaUV'ea ot 1a4Witry 
tmtnbelllliD&l¥ 40111aate4 the bear11:1&8 011 the variOWI llilla.Jl Fiaell.To 
s • .So 1a an -.eeulate4 vera1011, pa ... d the Senate on May 28, l93.5J a year 
later, 3'uaa 19, 19:36, it paue4 the House in ••llda4 fOl'lll, but CoD&rea• 
e4Jou:rnecl the u.ext 4ay •• before a cmference c011111Utee could iron Ollt 
41fferenoea • .32 
Du.riD& the Consreaaional ..aauvariD&o on May 7, 19.3llo :U. rela-
ted aa 1no14ent which implied 1ncoaaiatenoy on the pert of a laadiD& 
a4..ooate ot food and d!'\1811 lteialatioa. The neve Dl!.pzina noted that 
the llat ot Ju44planta b7 the USDA 1a 1933 included e. caae in which a 
8h1PIIIIIt of g:rapefru1t and OftJIP Juice in cans contain1116 lase than the 
declare4 .olume resulted in a fine ot tU'ty dollare. The CCIIIJlBD¥ iavolved 
we 'l'll&vell alld W1e-n ot J'lorua, Inc. The pns14ent of the tU'DI we 
the father of Rextol'd 0\q Tucwll, a atoollholder. The order tor the fine 
•• aipa4 b7 the Aaa1ew•t 5e$l'lltarJ or Aariculture, Rextot'd Our Tu&• 
weu.J3 Tu&vell'a reapc~~UJe to the .lla story wa, •Their account ,... 
aoou.nte. I aianed the order. '!'hat waa the aot~~g rate uDder the law tor 
30. •Lqialativa Hiatory of the Co»eland Bill.,• 329· 
Jl. OOJ'don, Leland ;., %Motu tiE 'ien"ara, 6ll-l4a .Alldaraon, Paul 
1' ., •waahinaton S14a Show,• l:Jul.lfaUop, Vol. lJS, No. 3.585, Mareh 
21, 19~. 331· 
)2. Oozodon, Leland; •• Erf!n9n'M LSI eowwrs. 6llu :na. Vol. 2,5, No. 
23 1 luna 10, 19l5o 13, oalla4 s. 5 •emaeoulateda• Editorial, ll\1 
.!ftt;il'l• Vol. 140, No. :3649, luna 12, 19:35. listed the chargee. 
33· :ill• Vol. 23, No. 19, MaJ' 7o 1934, 14· 
.578. 
An interesting aspect of the legislative mel'l')'-SO•l'CUnd vas the 
lea411t8 pert in it which Senator Oopeland played.. Copeland, a pbyai• 
Oien t wrote II COlWIIII Of lllld.ice.l h11lts in the Hearst press J he had a 
n41o :proe:ram sponeored by Phillipe' Milk of Mapeaia. Fleiaoi!Drm's 
Yeast, Nujol, and Pluto Water 1 the COpeland Service, a bua1neas office 
run by the Seaator•s son, adYised a4vertiaen of proprietaey med1oi~~ea.35 
lnetead of conduct11t8 hearings before the whole C-ree CCIIIIIIittee, ot 
which he was chail'llll!ln, Copeland appo1nte4 a auboouad.ttee under Senatw 
Bellllatt CbiiiiiP Clark, an no'lllld opponent of any changes in the l9o6 law, 
to oonduot the hee.rill£8 on s. s.36 Why 4id the Administ:rat1on allow 
Copeland to apouor this lesislation? Tupell recalled that Copeland 
, • • ws runnilt8 tor re-election in 1936 and saw a chance 
tor an lane. BoWYer, he taten4e4 to temper the bill's 
intentions. Be we suooentul in toperill6 it, Be also 
we re-elened. 'l'he PreaiUa\ allowed him to sponsor the 
bill because ot the 4el1cate situation in New York. 
Copeland '118.8 a '1'-ny aft\'8114 a Hearst colUIIIRiat ,J7 
C0116111as finally passed a Fedal'lll Food, Drug, and Co-tic Act 
in June. 19:;8 - attar 't'upltlllsad lett the sovarnment. Copeland bad 
1atro4uoe4 a aew s. S ill J'anuaey, 19.37. 'l'be opponents ot new las isla• 
tion appeare4 to be Yiotort.oua Oll08 asaia when two a1pificaat develop. 
menta took plaoa. A ftWilber of states 'bltpn to introduce billa patterene4 
XIS•ntey J4lb. wrttv. 
Villari, Oswald Q,, •Iaaues an4 Melle Let Us Abate Senator CoJN1-
lan40" til!, Nlltiop. Vol. 1.36. No, 3589. April 18. 19:34. 433· 
Gordon, ta1alllll 1 •• lgon'B'M w Copa••n., 613. 
1.4tter !a yriter, May 1. 19.55· 
attar the var1oua Copeland •asurea, and in September and Ootoller, 19'57, 
at leaat .eventy•threa pereona in tU'taan stataa diad fl'OIII taldll8 a 
wte4cm ot those vho oppoaad a law tor vllich there w.a such an obYioua 
need· AnUcipat1118 a ,...,.. ot publ1c reaction and 11101'8 etate lava, they 
daotde4 to so done With Copalallll'a lataet bill. Copeland hilllselt 
woftecl tor the bill, dupite tba tact that the advertiaiDB ot OTMt ot 
It was ehersad that ~ll'a sponsorship hurt the cause ot nov 
la&1alat1on. He would ha'l'e beaR the tint to ada1t that he lacked apa-
cial qual.1fiaations toT aaa111B a bill through Coll8re••. It is PTObablJ' 
~aibla tor the historian to datelmino the effect ot Tugwell'• parti• 
c1pation on the la&ialati'l'& h1a1101'7 ot the food and 4J'up billa. In 
'fiav ot the •d1c1u -·• ability to stifle aUampta at cbanp tor 
naerly thrae daoa4aa, it ie pouible that TllcWll's ainoe'l'ao hard fi&bt 
w.a a aeoaaaary prelude to the Aft ot 19,38.37 
'1\aaWll aA4 alatllftl Reaaw.'oaa 
CouenaUonlata' l'rftl:retu,. tor the land has a ralS.Cieu quality. 
38, Gol'llOfh Leland;/,, lfr>nr',M"" Ccmr"Rilh 608, 615•17, 
"' 52 stat. 10405 Ce'ftlra, Da'l'14 s., •'l'he J'oocl, Dnleo aacl co-uc Aot 
ot 1938• Ita LegislatiTa Hiatol'7 and Ita &lbataatS:'I'a PrcwlaiODa,' 
Ia Ul ept. .... n "M1 n (1C~ttrael or Dlike UlliTaratty Lev 
Bohool) llftlatar, 19,, 1a authwttati'l'&. 
,580. 
cmar he oou1d -- 1D the USDA alld alaawbare, as well as in tha AA. For 
,._ra he had been, in hie own worde, •an earneat, if relatively l!liiiBteur, 
oonae~tioniat.•1 BegiuniQ£ in the 1920'a he devoted a number of hia 
artiolea to the eullject of coaeerntioa. Tha moat iJIIportant of thaaa 
,.., •lam Relief alld a Pe~aent A&riwUure,• 1929, 1n wbioh be atrea• 
ae4 the inaapanbilit;r of policy fol'lllllaUon in agricultural economiaa 
alld Pl'Oper lend l&lla.2 Ill 1933 hia 4eair. to participate in oonae~tion 
activities wa oQB of the deaisbe teatora in his decision to eo to Waah-
1acton.3 Dllring the first Roosevelt Adlld.n1atretion, 'l.'u&vell. aa adldn• 
istretor an4 publicist, prcaote4 and preached the preaa~tion of our 
Tha basic th- -rg:lng fre his writill&8 and addresses was 
that tha •onaMss of Mture• 1D\poaad rule• on IIIBn. the violation of 
which lii'O\liht. slowly blat aural)'. acmar. puniahlllent.4 He 111ustra11e4 
hie thule at 801118 ~h. c1till8 abuaa ct tha land in Cbiua and tha 
t1nite4 Stetaa. He pointed out bow abuse of tbe soil in the four buDilrad 
yaera after 1.500 raduce4 Cbiaeaa agriculture to a p1t1eble pl1ght.5 
1. Tvpell, R. G., l'JI& §h:iclgm Jail (Haw York. Doub1ade;r. 1947) 24• 
2. 'fu&wtllo R, G., 0 1'ara Reliet u4 a Pe~D8Dt Agriw1ture,• tyela 
Jat lQa jptl•p j•frr .It P,litiu1 Allfl Spgifl 89it•O', Vol. 142. 
No. 231. March, 1929· 
3• 'fu&wtll, R. G., l:bl. §tricktm ~. 24•25. 
4• 'fqwll, R. o., •:r.rthllolm4s 'l'ha Prolll• of PlaiiDlD& alld SUrvS.val,• 
Mtiet!' llatiey, Wiater, 194?-.SO• 477•78, 480-81. 
5· !fuswell, a. a •• •eonae~t1on Reclaf'iaed,• .A4clr.aa. l1'1t'tiatb AAnivara-
a:q of' the P'OUUdill8 ot New York's r-t Preaarva, Alba~, New York, 
May 15, 1935, lf&lilll Jl:ree• l!llaa•, 3• 5· 
ChlDa •s «<tJiillrlllllce ba4 aerlou lmplloationa tor .Amerioans, tor we, too, 
heel i114ul&ed ill aanaerOUII Pfactie ... 
Tla£wll wrote and apoke loa pat detail about our orQ ot explol• 
tat1on ot the and 1n the n1aeteen\h all4 twentieth eentunu.6 A ld.ll4 
ot C:reehem'e I.av seelll84 to applJ, •'l'be worst practices ,5riumph1ni/ 
cmtr the beat 11' the;y are 'broucht into competition.• 7 He did not oall 
tbia 4evelo}llllllnt iumoral, but it wu i.DIIoral, he declared, to call it 
YirtlWWI. 8 Opposition to the ravesill,s of 0\11' resouroes was allsht an4 
inst'tective, while protests aea1net tl'UO\Ilent 1114ustr1alilllll were •••att, 
'becauee the exploitation ot man 'OGD14 'be seen for what it wu 1110re 
eaall;y than it it consts.tutecl. a aew attack on netura, which miiht result 
Just as diaastroualJ, in soil erosion, tor instance •••• •9 ~tr1but1on 
6. 'l'upell, R. o., •Dow~ to Earth,' bmat Hiatoq, Vol. 44, No. 4. 
~. 193&, 34J 'Clwlg~ l,ene,• .. M Hta\9rr, Vol. 11.4, No. 6, 
Septamber, 193ftl ''l'ha ll!v Deale The RiM of Buiaeaa,• Part II, 
YM!etl PcalUWif Qp•r!r.ez:lx, Vol • .So No. ), 5ept811ber, 19,52, 487• 
911 •The Protaaonlab• Rooailftllt all4 Hoover,• Antiogh Redex, Win-
ter, 19.53•.54, ~311 'Ya!'iatt• on e !h.- lit' COOley,• Jthig, Vol. 
59, No. 4, J"ulJ, 1949, 241-"2t •The Place or GoYernmant 1a a Nation-
al Laa4 Prc!pua, • A44rau, 1oint MMUnc, Alllltrioan Xooacmic AaaOc1-
ation, Amerioan Statistical AaaOciation, all4 Fana EconCIIIIiu Allaooi-
auon, Pllila4e1Jb1a, De..._. 29, 193:3, l!&l PaM Rt1""• 1:41 
A44rau, 'I."GIIQ!klu COunty DeYa1o.-eat MMttnc, Itbaoa, lfev Torlc, 
M~&Ut 7. 1935· li&A' " , ••• :3-4. 
1· fupell, R. c., •Tour flltun. an4 Your lfe.tion,• c-nC11111811t Addrau, 
Unberatty ot Mev M•dco, Allluquerque, 1\tll8 10, 193.5, l!§i6 Pwt k-
1••••• 10. 
8, ~.U, R. G., •'l'be Haw Deal1 '1'lut Ileolins ot OoYe~nt,• Part I, 
ltdtJ:II l$Jl1Uq•~ q,prtarlr, Vo:L. ~~ 110. 2, 1\tlleo 1951, Jl.O. 
9. Tupe:U, R. o,, •FarthbOUIIIl• 'l'be Problem ot Planllinc llnd SUrvhal,• 
48,3. 
we 4elaye4, but in«<torable, and '111111\ire,• 'l'u&wll a\ated. in 19.35, •1a 
jwlt n01o1 praeent1ua tb bil1.•10 The bill we )0,000,000 acne ot laJI4 
uthl'l¥ Nined b,y eroaion, and abJect povert)' for !a:l'lllllra.11 
In 1933 there we an urpnt neecl for action. .Ul cOii.ld support 
conael"ftltion meaauraa, for they wre Uterall¥ conaerYaUve,12 aDd 
th117 wre above polit1ca.13 Coaaenationiata, hcwYer, could not u-
8UIIIII public aupport. Aa effective polio,y bad to be an attractive ones 
Thoee scientific conaerveUoniata llbo criticize the vaate-
f'lllDHe Of our NOellt .. ., lane!. polioiee lillY tail to give 
eutticient wei&ht to the hot that the earlier policy ot 
coaeervet1011 414 aot •Jre ..... ill tel'lllll or ldul1; people 
wanted, and that 1\ did no1; work •••• Adjustment to even 
the wieeet raY-1 of an 1D41aorim1nete pro- will not 
be eaay.l4 
AD effective policy alao had to COlllbiM the couervetica ot bllll38n aDd 
aa\ural reaoureaa.1.5 J'iaallf, an etftilthe polic)' had to be 1111t1onal.. 
tor 'Drouaht, tloo4, and 41aaa11er kaov no local 41vla1one.•l6 
in CBI'J.71D& out a national polio)', ba had acquired. a reputation ae a 
a11a11Uh co~~~~el"ftltionlat. In Much, 1933, he received a 1eUar tJ'OIIl tu 
10. 'l'u&Wll, il. G., 'A 'l'hil"'l Eoolloii\Y•" Mdreu, lloclleater 'l.'eaobera 
Maociat1oa, Rocheatar, If. Y., AJI'll 9, 19.35, ll§J2& Prte' Be'te•• 6. . 
11. 'l'll&vell, R. Cl., •Plannecl tlee of the LaDd,• 'I'odev• J'enua17 20, 19,34, 
6. 
12 • 'l'llgvell, R. C. 1 A4Areea t 'l'cspk11l8 Cowlty DeYe10JIIIIIIIlt Mtetl~~&o 5• 
13. '1\lgwll, R. G., Mdreea, 'l'CIIaJk11l8 county DaveloJIIIIIInt Meet1Rt~e 81 
•Ooneervatioa ila4etinac!.,• 10. 
14. 'l'u&vell, R. c., !be .fi'.t'o6reaa1ve 'l'ndition,• Atl•at;ic MopthlY, Vol. 
1.5.5· No. h.. April, 19.35. h.l3· . 
1,5. 'l'll&well, R. c., •coanrvetioa Re4ef1Da4,• 1. 
16. '1\a&Wll. a. a •• •A 'l'll11"11 Ecoacav.· 6. 
tulated btlll OD bU appo1ntant to Aealatut Secretar,y and noted that 
•oon-erTat1on1ata 1n seneral are srattriad.•17 
'J.'uaWll b11118elt waa pat1f1ed that be worked under a Preaideat 
lllo aleo we a atauaeb oouerTationist. He believed that an interest 
in oonaerTatiOD preceded a reeard tor ~e wltare ot others in the 
4ev.lopment ot the fOUQI Rooee.,.lt.lB Booaevelt's early interaet in 
ooneernttion wa attributable 1a pa:l"t, '1'qvell tnd:l.oated, to pride in 
the acUvitiea ot a :l'lill.etiw ~o aernd as President, 1901·1909• 
••• Mr. BooaaYelt susaeated •• , spaak1q with unoonaoiou.e 
noatela1a, that OOWltr,y Ute bad been a taYOrite center ot 
intereat tor another BooaeY8lt •• •r. B, • be called him. 
Aad by the Wf be spoke I realized that I bad been shovn 
a pattern withia lilich b1a llind and spirit telt at hom 
with a1111U.t1on. I tollowd 1t up rather shiiiiiClesaly. True, 
thu we conpnS.al to all I believed and hoped. Bllt ita 
ueerw.- we :l.a ~• eatra it furnished. Asein and apin 
w uplorecl the deliabts ot oountl')' lite, detailed the poll• 
aildlitiea ot tmproy_t, end apeculated about - tor 
:l.ntroducina rural virtuea iato c1tiae.l9 
Ia e apeech in 1935 •--!Hih'l:'ll-at1ne; the Fiftieth AlllliverAey ot the 
J'OWldias at lfev York'• Foreat Praasrve, Tuswll described Rooaevelt'a 
t:l.ret public connection with conaervetion. In 1910 there were comm!tt .. 
chdrtlllnshipa eaoup to so aroi.Uid in tba New York AaaUiblyJ the leadera, 
•not wntlne; to trust aa;rth111& important to so youne; and poaa:l.bly obatra• 
pei'CIUI a legislator.• ,..,. :R008ewlt the cba1ransh1p ot the •ocmpara• 
17. Ovid Blltler to fuawell. March 17, 1933, T!aqtll faUFI• 
18. 'rUcwello R. o •• •'!.'he Protasoniataa RooeeveU alld Hoover.• 433· 
19. 'rupell, R. o., •The Preparation ot a President.• 'lftatern pglili· 
Jill ClutOtrlz• Vol. 1, No. 2, .7uae. 1948. 133· 
U'Mq 1111100UIIIWI' o-tttu ou ronata, J'isb, and Came. RooaenU 
toza4 llll allianoe w1th 'l.'bCIIIla M. Oaborae, the s-.ah Ccmalaa1ouer ot 
ronau, rub, and Oa•. 'l'he7 dnote4 p-eat enera;r to le&1alat1ou to 
preaerte the toreata, 1ncl'll4inc the •UOil'a first top•loppine; law, 
an4 to oonael1datlon ot tbe atete•a ooa.el'VIltion aotiv1t1ea. Roose• 
velt enlbhd the aid ot Oitford Piuhot to al'OWie hie apathetic ool• 
~· •It ia,• 'l'u(;wll OOA01u.4e4, •a lleedle .. elabOl'lltion to point 
out illlat :rCIIlllfl leaialator•a o01lt1DU1Jlfl interaat in coftllel'VIlt1on an4 
ita elab0l'llt1on into our present Jederal poliQ¥.• 20 
'1'bru llll:ltha latel' 0 lo an addnu i:o a TCIII!Pkins Cowat:r Develop.. 
Mnt Maetill& in Itbaea, Jlew York, tuawll outlined the conservation 
proaraa ot Rclosevttlt as Oovemor. Hl8 lend-usa polio:r vas '4••1&De4 
-.o etten a lllln'8 sat1stao11017 ad~nt ot the people to the lend 
reprd to tueble valu.as, all4, •aboW all,• it eYant\llltad in the 4eveloP-
IIIIftt ot ~lne 04Rlln;v aa a demonnratiou ana tor plaanift& •'llaae4 oa 
local 1n1t1attve and looal antarprtae, but carried out eooperativel:r 
and with help troa the Btata and \be l'ederal Clovel'IIIII8Dt. •21 
Tu&wll could \le INl'eo wball be ~t up the subject ot lend~ 
20. 'J.'uawll, R. a,, 1 00ft8erwt1ou iledet1ne4,• 2·41 Tu8Wll aent a cow 
ot tha apeeoh to tbe Prtta1denta •I th0\I€)Jt you mlabt like to sae 
bow I told the atory ot :vom- sarl.J oonaeetion with the oonae1'1'8t1on 
~t at the Alball7 ••tlae: you asked • to attend,• May 20, 
1,,34, Rppttytlt Pt•rt· 
21. 'l'llcWllo 11. C., A44:rua, TGII!pk1na COunty Development Meeting, 5· 
at the Wblte Bowie, that he woul4 t1A4 a read¥ l1ateoor eA4 an11111ted 
ooavenattoul1at. AD obeenation liF Melley 1111k8a 1t eaa:y to \1Dderat!IA4 
the Preaident•s fa'nl:rabl.e reeotioa to 'l'upeU •s idea of oree.tin& a 
Reeet'ltllllllent Adlaf.niat:raticn ·- •The oentnl problem of asriclllture •• 
the pa:radCIX or acaroi t;y ta the midat ot plenty •• ha .. , aa a problem 
ot oonaal'fttioa.•22 Her .wu JlooMYeU jut an lll'IIIOhair CODMl'fttiOn• 
tat. He l1lrll4 to look at work 1ft prosreu on the land 1taelt. When 
'l'upeU spent two days at Wam Spri.Jip in November 19,34, tha PrH1dent 
droYe btla to an erosioa•control proJect on his l700 .. cn tara at -rb;y 
Pine Mouatata.23 
the Ruettleaaat M111a1statioa .a, ot course, 'l'llswell'a prin• 
ctpal IOIUienation activity au.td4e ot the USDA. Within the Dttpartllllat 
his chief contribllt1on al0118 this u.,. waa to the SOil Conserratioa 
Sentoe. He alao helped the J'oreatry Sernoe in the tlBDA, and sa•• hta 
-1 and verbal 8\lpport to an -rpaoy apncy, the Civ111aa Conael"ffl• 
Uon Corpa. 
the CCC •• aot, aa Blair Jollee, tor -»leo stated, '8\lfla .. ted• 
11y 'flapell.24 It 'lias one at RooMvsU 1a pat proJeota ainoe hia OO....mor• 
,ebip, vben retonst.ntion •• pan o.r his state Plannin& and Lallill Ut111-
aatt.on pro~ftL as LcN1a Holle ole-.. a ;part 1n the tol'lllalation ot the 
as. 
Melley, i!.aJaoa4, Nta;r Sntp tgp (N4!1v York, Harper, 193<)) 12. 
tia• Vol. 24, lito. 23, Dltcaaber 3• 19.34. 13. 
Jollea, Blair, •'!he SvaetWrt ot the Rst;1mnter&,• ••rigp HK-
.11111%• Vol. j<), No. 153• Septaaber, 193(», 83. 
Stiles, Lela, lU.- t I ''l" BppqyeUa »a am st. L9uis J49H'D'7 
.lfAla (ClaYelaA4, Vorl4 1\abUshin& a.., 19.54) 266-67~ 
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14• ot a CCC. ila would M"f• "l'raaklill and I had the CCC idea for 
years. We even had ~~epa IBde and p1U atuclt in every place 'lllhere -we 
wate<l 08lllll8•'26 'l'upell 41scla1-.4 authorship, recalling• 
Mr. Rooeevelt hlllaelt --.1: 1llUlllillllted tor me the art 
ot lite he PftCtice4, by leacU.BIIIIIo fi&Uratively speaking, 
ovt iato the open fields •• BOOB aa he discovered ~ upstate 
ori&in. l reoall, tor t~~tample, how llhen -we were alone one 
aveaing ~n 1'3i}, we be .. n to talk about toreata, wild lite, 
and their ooaservetion, and he sketched the outlines ot what 
laf'te~:rda betaM the Civilian Co!IBervatton Corpa.27 
'lihUe 'l'vavell cUd not de't'iae the CCC, he waa deeply interested in 
interest was kDOwa amons people eonearae4. The Executive Secretary of 
the .&MriOIIll J'onetry Aaaooia\ion, in a letter anttone<l above, r-rlted, 
•va trust thet yovr 14ees rep:rding apl.O)'IIIIInt relief oa11 be exten<led 
to state toreata L'ia taking e<lvantese oiJ opportun:I.Uea tor oonatnustSva, 
28 
oJaareoter-bu1l4:1aa emplOl'JIIIIDt •••• • P. 1 .. Herbert, Proteasor ot For· 
eatry at Miohisall ~te Collese sent 'l'utwll a -randwa, •Qonaarvat1cm 
WOrk ProJeota as a Mw.n.e of .Al.lenaUns UMlllplO)'IIIIIIIt,• outl1n1n& s plan 
tor BIIIJilOTi!ll 2,000,000 •n at s liNt ot $2,000,000,000,29 
The Mainiatration, too, wa awra of Tugwell's interests. IA 
March, 19.3.3, the Preai<let tol<l ND1ay a'bout an idea to which he had &iVH 
a lot of thouabt aDd had •fo~late& to hie aatiataetton only the ni&ht 
betft'l8.•.3° On March 18 'rucwll delivered an address, •J"oba in the Woods,• 
we allwt to euwat to Concnas tbat there existed an opportunity to 
•otter a Job or the sort 111011t - lf.ka to do. In the craat V004a 
thera la heelth1 •• oaa reCOYer the manhoOd llbich baa been sapped, 117 
)'MI'e or Wl08rtaiDt7 aDd 4r1tt.•3l On Mllroh 2<}, Concreaa passed: the 
CCC lliU. 
The an~r wpp11e4 the oempa tor the bo;rs 111 the toreatl')' .. cuon 
ot the coc. Artll1 pan1c1pat1on, T\apell later explained. ba4 noth111C 
to 4o with prepa:raUon for any future wr. It ws Louie How's 14 .. to 
oell on the Arlq beoaue it ws the ~ aaeaq that ha4 the eqv.1)1118nt 
for 1110:rk in the VOG48t the P:rn14Rt 414 th11lk it would be a good expert• 
•- tor Arlq officers to have to aerc1ae 1 .. 4erahip 'llithout benefit 
of 11111ta:ry :replat1ou.32 
vitll giviiiC llhole._ 1110:rk to UD4111Plo7lld youtbe llbo, ba\'iiiC no chance 
tor .-,!.,..at. loitered in city streets aDd wre up to no aooc~.33 Tuc• 
wll apla11le4 to a conta:rance of social workers 111 19.34 tbat the la'bor 
force 11114 increased b7 th'a 111U1on alaoa 1928. and that the tendeno:r we 
tlo 1'8t11PlG:r those llho had lost their JON in 1929• lentnc unompl.,..nt 
OCDMDt:rate4 in the 18·29 aae &J'OUPJ ttl •• tor this group tbat the 
31. '1'\laWell, ft. G., •J'oba tn tlae 'lfoeea.• Al.d,reaa, Co1UIIllia Broadoeat-
ba ,.,..._. March 18. 19.3.3• !Sill PD .. RtW"• 4· 
)2. Iatt"iiY lEi!J1 Riter. 
33· Xaten"!y .&a vrisg. 
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Adllinutrat1oa created the CCC, which could handle only .300,000 at a 
tiM ot the :;,soo,ooo, aaea 16 to )4, wo received 11114 fl'CIIII the FERA • .34 
ID 19.56 'l'v&veU 'hO\I&ht there •• aUll a need for an apney to set lloya 
ott tbe o1ty atreetaa 
When the neUon retlll'lled to ita care tor the laod an4 
nher raatunl rlohea, ao4 tired at temportztna with 
juYeftile dellnquenq, t!'!! Ginltan conaanation Corps, 
af.&ht lie reeonet1tute4.» 
~ll'a principal ooatr1but1on to ccnaerYBtlon ot the toreate 
et.-4 fl'CIIII hie adii1D1atrat1ve reapauibillty for the Forest Serrice. 
A tour of USDA 1natallat1one in the W.at in 19.33 ccavlnMd hilll that a 
laob foreatry dbieioa aa rll to hill a pr1ac1pal1ty ia it. own ript, 
J.'I&Ulll& th1JICII to auU itaelt.36 He started repaira at the top b)' lie&• 
stna fa:r.!inand A. SilCICIIK, a coaeenatioaiat before T. R. and Ptnchot, 
wo had lleen 011t of the Poreat Senioe tor sixteen y•re, to be- Chief 
loreater • .37 SilCICIIK accepted, holdiq the poaition fl'CIIII 19.3.3 until hie 
.34· 
'51· 
~11, R. o., •Relief alld Raoonetruct1on, • A4dreea, National 
Coatennn ot SOCial Worlren, .,...,e City, May 21, 19.34, in l'At 
Pa»le ts£ Q MDIX• .3161 Bailey, '1'. A., l!!.i Wrlgp fa•pt 
(Boatoa, D. c. Haeth, 19,56) 8,38, etatea that a total ot about 
tbrM lllillioa - Hl"fed 111 the CCCI MerlaJa, Lewis, Jltllt( .uf. §8s'e1 qegritt (Vaahinatoa, 'l'tte lllookinaa InaUtution, 1946) 
4Jll.-35• &1YH an exoe1lent brief aecouat of ceo a41111nistret1on 
all4 tile h1u to lleya of CCC •pertnoe. 
'hpell, R. G .• , •1. D. R.& Livina Mtmortals,• Da, Uatioo, Vol. 
Ul2, No. ].4, April 7o 19,56, 276. i:"' Ran~l4 L., ~ ::. 
l9.51l • . 
Jlt lia£914 Jc. Ig!st•, liG.tJalo 
Yqrk, Sillloo all4 Sohuater, 
Lor.!, Rueall, 111& yeueg• .lit, J111L (Boatoo, Hou&htoa Mifflin, 
1947) U4· 
,589. 
lleath in 19.39· He wa hapP.)' in hia work beoauee 
• • • foreat17 111111 a field in 'Wh 1oh public 1nvaat11111nt could 
'1M ooaa14era'bla 1a a trult pro4uoUva aenee without IIIHtill& 
the tmplaoable resistance 11111t alaost eveJ:7'Where alae ,38 
Tucwell'a selection of SilcCXIt wa, in itaalt, a greet contribution to 
tlw oauae of conaervatioa • .39 
'l'u&well '11 book ill& of another lOII&•tilllll conaervationiat, lNgb H. 
Beaaett, 1111e his arntaat contribution to erosion control. Attar gradu-
aUJI& frat. the Univarait:y of Nonh CeroUu, BeRDatt bef,an his civil 
aenice career as a laborato17 aes1etant in the Bureau of SOils, USDA, 
ill 1903. Ill 1929, after :veara of pleadins. he raceiva4 fuD4.a fl'all con. 
i1ftU to stud;v the affeeta of eroaion. In that :year he alao took charse 
of moisture -..nation ac1:1vitiae ill the Bureeu of Chemistry and So1l.s.4° 
In~~~ •-r of 1933• under the .IIIR Act, $5,000,000 in PWA tuads 
we aaeicUa4 to tha USDA for erosion control.41 Benaett, vho wa now ia 
oharp ot the erosion expariMnt stations of the Bureau ot SOils, heard 
that tlw USDI wa con.ei4ar1ns a tarreaill& program, callins 1t a soil 
conservation proaraa,42 He vent to aae Tue:wll, as J.ea1atant Secretary 
in chars- or old•liaa bureau., to argue that tarrecins alone would ta1l.43 
42· 
Tuawll, R, 0. • lU. §trifkeu lAB4• 57. 
Tu&weU, R. o., •J'orener•a Heart,• Ill! Rewblic. Vol. 102, No. lJlS. 
Mlroll 4o 1940, 1e a tribute to SilcGII. 
MlaMahoa, Arthur w. aD4 Millett, J'oha D., :reural Afm'pi§tptore 
(Mev Yuk, Columbia Ullivarait)' Preas, 19.39) 326•271 Daniela, 1olmathan, 
"'fha Rivera Are Reel,• in Loft, Ruaaall eD4 Lord, Kate, ada., lore!U' 
1bll&llll (ll'ev York, Harper, 1950) 100. 
Lord, Rueeell, XU. Jtllaya !1l. Jma, 322, 3731 MllcMal\On, Arthur w. 
alld Millett, 1ohn D •• Npl A"P'n'''l'lton. ,326. 
Lord. Jlwlaell. At lfll1l.aw sL lsa• 372J Brink, lfllllinston, JU& Dllb.• 
Jath!r sL .§8U Qop.......,Uop ( .. w fork. Macm1llan, 1951) 63. 
Lord, RwlaeU. %a *llew sL lmll• 3'72· 
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plovill!l• crop rotation, allll araaae4 wtar•wys, a4apte4 to each indl· 
Yldu1 place ot lsll4, were easea11ia,l tor erosion con11ro1 all4 cons-· 
Uon of n.illtall. 44 Tu&wltll reoelved. l:he &11117 IIBn, 'llhaa he calle4 11he 
•Father Of aoll oonaenation,• ·~diate~ and -~ •• 4.5 
'l'h8 uvly arr1'N4 Aealataat Seoretaey had atresae4 raUre•nt 
tilt aulaar&lnal lsll4a in his vritinp. Later, in 1934, he •• to aulllllt 
plau tor public aoqulaltion of aullaqlnal lsn4a.4° With the eataltllah• 
•nt ot the RA in 193.5, he heaW all lan4•ntire•nt activities. But 
TlapeU -r oonai4are4 ablple rat~t a aolutlon to land-use prob-
1-.47 He e&ree4 Vl11h Bennett, aqlna 
I'll aee wet I oa11 do to direct the use ot the 111DM7 a;p-
proYe4 b7 the public wrlal Mari uDder Secretary Ickes. I 
haYea't toraottea that 7ou be1.Pe4 write the soil oonaana• 
tton chapter tor ..- boOk, s 'am•• §Qdatr U!llU 
Ptobhs • Yw•ra golac to baH a 1ea41ll& part 1D whataYer 
Pl'OCftll la a&I'M4 u;poa.llll 
Short!¥ aftaharia, Bullett raoalftd a latter tl'OIII Ickes llot1fy1J16 hilll 
that on the re01 Ddation ot ~ll he w.a to aat up and cUreot an 
apaq ia the USDI to 'be lcnovll u tba Boll Eroa1011 SarY1ea. 49 Oil Sapt&ID-
bar 19, 19.33• Banutt, on loaa hca tba USDA, baeama Dirastor ot the 
aD4 w.tar areas, Xt raport414 the fol.l.oviQg findingas 
total. aona 
little or no ero.ion 
sl\eet aroa:lon, s11abt to OOIIIPlste 
win4 el'OIIion, eapaoiellf ia M14wst 
(ru1De4 
ane:re sul.l7 erosion 
.591. 
BeaMtt bat his 'IIOl'lt out out for hla. Ha dtaok84 his task with sreet 
eursr. When aa "eJIUV' of Beuett Oharpd that UIJill& eovernmeat tuD4I 
on privets land ~ 1lleaal, lokea appointed a spacial o~ttee to 
i_.itlate SES oparaUona. 'l'he co.tttae eubmltt414 a lO,OOO·wo~ re-
port ill De-"r• 1934, reo-ndiJic the transfer of the SES to the USDA, 
•proyt.W that Departant will etteot a OOIJIPleta couol14at1on of all 
erosion control and re-rch ssendea workln& on el'OIIion control on 
prlftte lall4a.•52 '1'he report, ln eft••'~~• COIIIIIen4e4 Benaett'a pel'formance 
and ... hie national Pl'OfP"88I. ncorou• push aheea.53 
SOon etter the eulllllbaion ot the report. :rec-n4iDC a transfer, 
the White House called in Bermett. The SES Director then info:rmed lcll:ea 
that the Prea14ent intended to ~ve the agency into the USDA. Beaaett 
enJO,e4 c:cellent relations vi th Ions and w.s grateful to the Seclretal'J 
592. 
of th4t Interior tor th4t opportUII.it:Y tlo exercise his ideas on a national 
aeala. Ickes, who appreciated Bellllett•a torthris~ttneaa, was not h4tppy 
abou11 the transfer, but be did 110t fisht it. On Maroh 25, 19.35• Ben• 
nett went back to the USDA. coacrw .. reinforced the execut11'a tnnater 
1:11 paea1Jii a bill, s1po4 on April 27, 193.5, directina the Secretary of 
A&J'loultura to create a Boll Conael'ftUon Senice as a permanent part 
ot the Depart11111nt ,54 
Iclcn later CCIIIPlained to a Conael"f''ltion Conference th4tt his 
falM tritlftd.st Wallace and ~11. had urged him to rest for a llhlla 
1D the Plori4a wn. While h• \1118 awy, Ickes stated, they beoked up 
a ti'Wik to Interior•• back door oa Maroh 2.5 aDd stole the SES, renamlill 
it tbe SCS on an es:aoutive order frca the White Houae.55 Tugwell racal• 
lei\ tbat he did ateal the apney, but only after Ickes had stolen it 
nor the USDI 'WOUld incorporate the tMl'Piley aroaion apney without 
first OOIIIJUlti~~g the other Departlllllnt. When Ickea, who reliahe4 e1'e:ry 
dealt and file Wider hla jurie41ot1on, set up the SE8 in Interior, Tus• 
wll told him be 'WOUld pt it beck. Whan Ickes went te> Florida, Tuswll 
wnt to the White lfouae and act an Exeouti,.. 0rder.56 
54· 
5.5· 
,56. 
Brink, Wellln6ton, IJ.& Jila• 100.011 Lord, Ruseall, Ihl. W!lleou 
.It lQa, 173• raperte4 a drdatlo incident 1n which Bennatt we 
teat:lf:YU8 before the Sa1111te I.aft48 c-1ttee on April 2, 19.35• 
when a dust olou4 traa the Midwst hit Waahillfiton, illuatratinc 
tbe need tor a atroneer soil conaer.ation Prosram• 
Lord, Russell, 2hf. y.u"t' .Sit liDs.• 3731 Iii!!• Vol. 25, No. JJ:, 
.April 8, 19.35. I"f~ 
Iatenity Jda yrSter. 
'rha • ateaU.aa• ot the SIS iD'fOl ved liiOl'8 thaD a clash ot pai'IIOII• 
alitiaa •• Tu&vell and Ickes vera friends until the latter's death.57 
It retleo\ed a OOilflict of l.oD& standing between Agriculture alld later• 
ior o.tr jurisdiction or coaaeryetion activities. Ickes continually 
reten'84 to this conflict ill hie diary. 'l'u&vell we quickly ewre ot 
the club, vritill& to tba Preeidall11 Oil March 3o 1')31P 
There is rapidly srov1A& up aaaill 11he traditional ,tight _ 
"-'-n A&&'lcul11ure and X.MI'ior. I thillk lfalll'17 /Jflrlkiq/ 
QOilld 111841ete aad do 1 t wll if he vera to heed a policy 
.-ttt" elld.lar to the 01111 ;you nt up on ca.e:re1el 
pol1oy.S8 
Icll:lta reported an Aar1cul\ure-Ia11er1or CQ:Iference in luna • 1934, 
Oil the Taylor GraziQ& Bill; the coatereea, includina Ickes, Wallace, 
~11, an4 Silcar dieasre-4 on the aar1*- ot the bill as e conserve• 
tioa aauure.59 In December, 19341 Ickes discussed at leQ&th with '1'ua-
vall a reorp.n:lzat1on be\- the tw dspartaa.nts, Agriculture givine: 
up the Poreat Service, the Bureau ot Roads, and Biolosioal SUrvey ill 
retun tor Reclalllltion, Laft48, SubaS..tenoe H~eteads, and Erosion 
Coatrol; Ickes veDted to srouP ell oonaervation activities in the USDI, 
with Tugwell as Vnder Secretary ill cbarge. 60 • I would not be surpr1118d ,• 
Iokea wrote, 
57· 
6o. 
1Jltentg liUll. Wi1i!£o 1a vlliall Tu«wll slao recalled that he end 
lUH used u ttcJat trequentl;y. but he bell gmt atteot1011 tor the 
Cul'lllt.ldpon and believed Iokaa liked hilll too. 'fll&wll and Hopkins 
bad an aaxaaMnt tbat they would cc:N'ine their araumente to the Pna• 
1441Dt •a ott ice. Ickes would have 110 pert ot such an aenrMnt. 
B"ftul$ PAP'£1• 
Ickes, Baro14 t •• .tu s.:I!lfu .at Harol4 1&· zsJse•• :m. .12111• :a 
JlD1 Theuap4 .IKao 191 ___ (lift York. Sf.JI:r:)n and SOhueter. 1?.53) 
lb9·"10· 
Iokae, Harol4 t •• P'NZ• la£l.2.M• 250. 
••• if he ahoul4 acaept &'lloh a poaition here it I can 
haft it created, aa I - pla8111118 to do, end it we CIO\Ild 
a1'J'aDge an aUracti ft sat-up, 'l.'uawll is an able man and 
it l had hila ust in liae *•lh• Department, 111 wuld 
••• ll?l' burdeas considerably. 1 
lileitller the exohanp or buntma nor the ONation ot an Underaecretary-
llhip in Interior 1111terializll4. The tisht went on. 
Ickes recalled in l1J.)6 how 'Wallace end 'l.'u6well ageed in 1935 to 
an exohaaae, and then Wallace had renep~~. 62 A rev yean etter '!'uc· 
wll. lett Waahington, he visited Iokes end found b.im still diasatiefied 
that he did not receive more aupport fl'OIIl the White House, which bad a 
••• habit of deleyiaa 41tfioult dec1aione and of compro· 
llllstna 81110118 olatmaata tor powe:w. There had been IIIID7 such 
issUea in the psat, that Oftr C~CGtrcl ot the Forest Senice 
allll other epnolea ha'riD& to 4o vith lan4 hadac been the 
hotMst and lOJIIIISt-4ravn..wt ot thea au,63 
'l'qwll. hilllllalt, before talkill8 to lokea about the position ot Direetor 
ot the Division of Territoriee and Insular Poaaeuions, had turned dovn 
Wallaea'a ot.'far o1.' Chief ll'o:'eater becauH • • .. the old quarrel exiaMd 
betw.n Interior and Asr11Nltura alllout connrYBtion in seneml and for-
estry in part1cular.•64 The o0Dtl1«11 provided a lesson for political 
scieat1ats in the ateyiq power ot ~uorab. 
'!'ucwell had no part in the draftliiC ot the Soil Coll8anatiOD allll 
~stio Allotment Act ot 19J6, ~~ substituted for the unconstitu-
till!lllll proeaaains tax direct payillllats for the tulfil.JMnt o1.' oel'Min aol• 
59.5· 
eatitio requireatnts tor conaervlaa the soil. This Act improved tech-
niqutus tor 1ncreaatq production, without providtna effective meana of' 
cmrolll~~& production. Other auloulturel legislation attar 19;36 
tee414 to atrenathen the Soil Conaervetion Serviee. In 1937 the USDA 
ereete4 an Of'fice ot Lan4·Use Coordination, with M. s. Eisenhower as 
Coordiutor, nine burn1UI were l1nke4 to the coordinatina oft'1ce.65 In 
Octo'ller, 19.'38 • Eisenhower beoame chail"'Bn or a new Af;rioultural Proe;raa 
Bollrd.66 In connection with the reorgen1zation of 19,38, additional 
duties wre transferred to the SCS ln 4l:nler to conaolidate in one a&IIDCI7 
eroa1on-control an4 rlood•oontrol activities 1nvolvtna actual physical 
work on individual rel'IIIS, ·waterahds, and other areea.6? 
Althoush tugw8ll was not ln on the arowth or the scs after 19,36. 
his earlier contributions to that acency placed his name on the per..• 
Milt roll or conaervetioniats.68 Ernest K. I.indley credited Tugwell with 
pointina out that • if ,.,. are not to so the way ot China, we cannot reprd 
lend ae lend alone, but ~~~~at look on it ae •one ot the central end 
controlllns elements in our whole national econ~.·69 Ruaaell Lord 
65. MaoMIIIhOD, Arthur w. and Millett, .John D., [lderal Mminiatratm, 70. 
66. MIIGMahon, Arthur w. all4 Millett, .John D., P'4aral '"W'Dldi'Jtm, 70. 
67. MaeMabon, Arthur w. end Millett • .John D. , ltderal. Mm! pistraten, ,326. 
68. Rollbtna, Roy M., ~ Ln'e4 Mrttae (Prlnaeton, Prlnaeton Un1Yere111:r 
PrNa. 191!2) 4l7a Oaua, 1Clha 11 •. and Yoloott, Leon c., l'!+blic Mm'n· 
iltmtigp .Mll !llll!lllA (Ch1.oa&o• tor the COIIIIIlttee on PUblic Admin• 
tetration or the SOcial Science Re-rch Council lly Public Adm1n1etra-
t1on Service, 1940) 143. 
69. Lindley, Ernest K., Halrwav Jlllll Roosevelt, lJO•Jl. 
atateli that Tu&well was the first ott'icisl stron,;ly to back &&h S.n-
~~eu and hie awidina strateay in at late:r became the Soil Conaena-
tiOD SeZ"t'ice.7° Lo%'4 explained '1\ipell's approach to soil oonae:rvat1oau 
&eoauae he waa not one lwDdrad per cent rural, accust01111d 
to a 8l'84ual altinniBS ot tara ant Z'BJI&ll lan4aaapaa 'IO!lich 
s~ to :raaldents to alt.er ltUle from ;yea:r to year; 
la:rp~ lleea\&88 be had •• ay.- end an outside Yiev wbetl 
travellna throl.l&h t'an~a h'lld and range land, 'l\teWll saw 
that soh of our opera oowa\17, quite apa:rt ti'Oil 'bull1e4 
w a at e • , was in tearful)¥ bed shape. He sew that wblllt 
aa,h Bonett ssld about tmpu,.epti'ble erosion ws true •••• 
lt was due to ~ll ~ than to en¥One else thet Santl8tt 
all4 his nav corps or soil raapn, the Soil Conaarrat1on 
SaZ"t'1ce, could •roll up thei:r sleeves• and go out to "llllllke 
.m.nea tmtr• sloBS the lines of eater ferm1n& in a new 
4edp.71 
~ll himself, in the 19.50'•• felt thet a great deal r8111111ined 
to be aeccmplished in soil conaenat1on. He stated that decentralized 
a~alstration of the scs enabled local interests to offset serioue st-
te~~Pta at raawlation, espsciall.J •in wbst will soon asai:n be called the 
Dwtt llewl..• 72 He kept in his office a file ot newpe.per articles and 
pioturas 'Which att .. tad the aowraey ot his prophecy. 13 But he ~a~~~t lie 
he could -- which waa a great deal ·- for the cause of' oonaervet1on. 
70. 
71. 
'12· 
'rupell aDd the 'l'vo llew Deals 
'l'he hlatorS.au Bu11 Rlnlch. ill one or tha earliest senenl ao-
OOWlts or the Rooaewlt en. elaborate4 on the concept or •two New 
Deale, • 1'1z111B the year 1935 as the turnS.ne: point in bea1c A41111uiatn-
Uoa policy. 'l'he Uret lin Daal, accor41ne: to llauch•s broad chal'llC• 
ter1zat1on, vee l)l'O•'bwlia.u, emphaeizine: recOTeey. 'l'be ncond llew 
Deal ws aati•bueiuu, atrassine: ratol'lll. 'l\lsvall'e participation ill 
both New Deals complicates ·~ attempt to define hie attitude tovarda 
Rauch l1ate4 tha •ill e!Qhuas ot the two New Deale as follows 
:Racovar.r 
Bisher prices for lllduetry 
and qrtoultura 
EoonClllllc nat1onal1aa and 
acarcit;v 
Bis 'buainaas and larp 
1'&1'11181"8 
SttOQd lty p.al 
llat'o:ra 
Increased purchasins power and 
social security for the popu-
lation as a whole 
latercational economic coopen• 
tion and abundance 
Labor and aall t'al'lll81'1ll 
The two llaw Deale, :Rauch stated, represented the reactions to the depraa• 
aion or two distinct groupe. One fP'OilP• identified with lobn T. Flynn, 
favoracl reoOT&ry or the capUaliat a:vat• as a meall8 or proTidins for 
h'llllllln -del the other, 1dent1f1e4 with Stuart Chase, d-nd<td the refol'lll 
or oapital1• in or4er to prOTide for thoee needs. 
.598. 
llTia attrl~ted the dapreaatoa to a ayat~ ot graft by which 
lNaiDeu- fleeeed each ot~aer, as wll aa the public. Eventually the 
Vatted Statu Challber or o-ne and the National Aaaociatioa ot Matau-
faoturera accepted Flynn's propoatttoa that only government entor~nt 
ot nlea ot f'dr OQIIIIIItitioa cC*U eave bwlineea men trc:a t~elvea. 
Chan oond-.cl J'~ •a propoaal aa the enthronement ot -poly end a 
a'llap t0118Na tuot•· 
Chan declared that oap1tal1• had solved the probl• ot Pl'O. 
cblotioaa fllultJ 41atribut1oa, llll!lrlr.e4 117 1aa4equate purobaaing power, 
caued the depreaa1on. Chan •sreed with Flynn on the need. tor retona 
lewe to elt.daate buaineaa a~a which oauaed. a lag in d1atr1bution. 
Be listed then a'INaeat raatrioUon ot output thJ'OIICII 1110nopoliee1 dia-
tortiOB ot llll!lrketa by toned eell&aa ot ualaee ancl barml'ul oODIIIIDCl1· 
111 .. 1 jlllmlll1n,; in tbe prillll!lry "on01111o eaaentillla of lancl, raw 1118te:r1• 
ale, and aaourittea; eoollClllllio paJIUitl-. 117 raoketeertn,;, politioal and 
bualneea graft, and the •-tin,; ot labort and needless 4upl1oation ot 
pro4uot101l taoili'les. Ch .. e ad-ted, tn eddition to reform law. 
-•rea tor the raatoration of purobaatne power• d8Y8luation ot the 
dolla:r, hieb texas oa le:rp incomes, lfllwr tariffa, higher wps, 
aborta:r boure, 'IUlfiiiiPlo,ant iUUI'IInoe, nat Pllblio works prosr-, pub-
lic bouatng, 1'1.11'81 electrit icat1on 1 and national and regional plannin,; 
.n\a.2 
'l'uawll supported aas-ots or both approaobas. Ill the f'irat New 
Deal he ws en author ot the 1m Act, which, Flynn itadicated, t'\tltillecl. 
the desires ot buaineaa • .3 He vu an a~&thor of' the AA Aot, which pro• 
MtiODI!Ilist. 'i'uSWll also favored t .. tures or the second New Deal. He 
.,..sized the fltada•l'ltal econardo al.flllitlcance ot purobaalns power, 
acGeP'ill& ref'l.llltion end ad't'Ocatinc ,p'll4\18teQ. taxaUon ot ino011111a, hua-
Pilblio works, and economic plannilli• He headed the l'leeett~t Mlriin· 
iatretion, which deled -11 tarme:re. 
'1'be fact that 'l'uewll ws mre illf'luential in the pro•'buainess 
ti:re'll Hew Deal than be ws in the Bll.ti•llusineaa second New Deal doe& 
DOt provide an a&lquate basta for aceuratelr jud£1DS hie attitude 
towr4a bllain-. The two Jlew Deale, ae Rauch noted, overlappe4.4 T\lg• 
1wae u:s-n41turaa f'or relief' and publto worka throu&h 4et1c1t flnanoins 
•• to which Jiooeevalt eventuallr tumecl in earnest onq reluctantly. He 
lnaiated in 19.33 that the USDJ. daol with the problau of' sDI!lll tarmera 
1u1 wll aa thouo of' the staple pi'CI4uoel'lla concludine by 193.5 that the 
big farmers heel •captured• tha AAA, he ..,._ in that year the fil'llt 
'l'li&wll'a pert1o1pation in the f'iret Mev Deal •• not as pro• 
600. 
INainess as it lllisht appellr. He auuested, in vain, several measures 
of ~ich. business would not bava approved. He favored nationalization 
ot the bank1ae; system an4 hi&hl.J" cutralizad control of credit. While 
be did not share hia friend Stuart Cba .. •a snti•trust inclinations and 
opposition to the NRA, be did not inten4 that business should •capture• 
the NRAa he bad hoped that the BRA would institutionalize the llllkina 
ot economic decisions for the benefit of society sa a ~ole. 
BwtiDass, itself, aistak8111J' considered Tugwall ita mortal 
8D8111f• When be interpreted certain laai8J.at1on, actually paned, as 
' pro•buaiaess, buainasa would not attribute to him any intentions other. 
than destructive ones f'raa its point of view. In Tugwell's opinion 
axpea41turas for work relief' and public works were pro-business. Work 
relief proyidad austgasrs for ccnauaer SOOd•• public works for heaT,Y 
aquiPI8Bt. Buainasa did not credit Tuavell with considering ita 
interest. in au;v a1 tua tion, clasaif'yioc hilll, Herol4 Ickaa, Mile. Perkins. 
end Harry Bopkiu as the radicals among A4aini8tration leaders ( Cor4ell 
liull, HeDf'Y More;antheu, Jr., Daniel Roper, las .. Jonas, and Raymond 
Molq were •aaf'e•).S Tugwell's belief' tlle.t work relief' and public works 
voul4 help both workers and business wee in accordance with hie call 
for a •concert Of interests• and his d8111ln4 for a 'diversified attack• 
SOY&rlllllent aid at both the bot tea an4 the top of the econlllll¥. 
'fu&vell's relatiouhlp to both !lev Deals ws on the level ot 
-raenq. ahort•nm action. From his lona-run institutional vievpciat. 
110rlt relief • public voru, an4 detioit finenoina were etop..aap -8\lrea 
which the exi&enciea at the Ulll!la • the1111elvaa the re8\llt of' iD&Iiequate 
inatituUoul develOJIIIInt, 11114e uceaaaey. Silllilarly, econ0111ic IIA• 
t1anali .. we not ultimately desirable I 1t vee a poliO¥ of self-protec-
tion lllllid the anarchy end exolualftaaaa IIllich prevailed ln interD&tioul 
eoOHm.c reletiGDS. IDA•d, the shift fraa the t'irat Jfew Deal to the 
aeoon4 ••• Deal repreaentad to a considerable extent an empirical 
raaponae to aoonamio and political ooa41t1ona beyond the control of the 
luataaas did not oonaidar Tucvell a •sara• member of the Admini-
straUon, yet attrilluta4 to hill araat iatluanoe 1n the pro-llusineas 
tiret llev Deal. Buainese d1cl not contra41ct itself since i1 did not 
look upon the tirat New Deal ae pro-lRtainaae, slid it aasiUiri. that the 
f'irat lfev Deal woul4 have been 1110re anti•llua1neu than it ws if Tua-
vall'• influence, araat •• it •--'· bed 'Dean greater. 
There is nidenoe that business exaaarated Tuawll's 1nt'luance. 
Oa J'allWll')' 26, 1933• Forrest Da:vie of the lf!l! Im Worl,4 Nterem iDter-
vie....cl 'l'ugtfell, aeekin& a4vanoe int'oration on the policies of the 
inOGIIina Adllinietration. Oont•pozaey c'-!lta, 8\ICh as that in l!ial• 
accepted. 'l'ugtfell's v1evs, •thoup he spoke only for hilleelf, fNjJ ••• 
an autheritatiTe retleotion ot the Rooanelt 1111114.•6 In view ot Tuc• 
6. 1111• Vol. 21, No. 6, February 6, l9JJ, 14. 
lllltll 1a pedt1Clft as u adTiser to Roosevelt, the interview eave Wall 
Street a H'ftre attack of • jittan.•7 :U., aUIIIII8rized the seven-point 
PJ'CSJ'BII for noovery after March 4 lllh1ch Tugwell outlined for Davia• 
1. A sharp increase in ina~ tu:ea, especially in the 
higher brecketa. 
2. A public vorlca procram coatina up to $5,000,000,000 
with direct ll'ed81'8l rellet to the jobless lllfld7· 
.3• A recluoUon in retail prices, utility rates, interest 
Gil monppa. 
4· A Federal 'budpt balanoed viti! the aid ot Prohibition 
S· A sowul ounmq, vtn ao intlation. 
6. A new ba~e kt,_n .a.leaale ud retail prtoea. 
7. Rationaliation ot toreip 'ncle and wr de'bta, with 
a possl'Dle l'BIIisa1on ot all 1n1Jereat oharpa in retura 
tor OGIIIIIIti'Oial 114'ftntapa. 
Tile ool\alista Drew Pearson and J!Obart s. Allan reportecl. that 
'l'qwll, either • ••• politically naive or alae betreyad 'by the Jll'888 
• • • reoehat a sooroh1116 tela81"881 trom Roo.le'ftlt, • who 1nstrv.cta4 
Molay to aoqvaint 'l'uawell with the taota ot lite. 8 'J.'upell thought the · 
1· "the Jboain Trust,• l!tr1Wf Jig. Jfu'oh 22, l'JJJ, 17. 
8. Peareon, D. ant Allan, R. S., •Talelltino of the RevolUtiClft,• map• 
zine olipp1J16, 'l'wnn!ll ll•ra· 
interview wa an off•the•record coaverHt1oa.9 He did not speak for 
the President. Buaiue ... \lllll'illlre af the inner structure of the Rooee• 
nlt advisory fSl'OI.\P• considered 'l'ugwll'a statement an advance &liliiP8e 
of Roosevelt's prosrem in the uakine;. Ill the election year of 1936 
opponent• of Tugwll looked back on the interview as prophetic, a 111ort1 
aoCI'IU'ate pr&881ltat1CG of the Adlll1niatration'a program then the Demo· 
Ol'lltic platto:na, end a foreout of the entire history of boondoal1116•lO 
AD it--by-itera examiDStioa ahow that Tuawell'a etat-nt 
proN4 l'J'Opbetio ooaoemiac taxation. "'lillie wru. relief. adJvatlllllnt 
of tars IIIOI'tpeee, and a llalenc1q of 1Coleaale and retail pricea, 
inaeter •• the AA Act •OUCht to proaote 8\lch a balance. On the other 
bea4, Rooaeveltl 414 not 'balaaoe the budget with the aid of Prohibition 
repeal ('fuawll doullted tlbetber repeal of prohibition wuld etblallate 
IMaai- au-quarter ee lllloh aa it. a4'10C8te thousht it vouldll). 'l'he 
•N•iatnt101l did not a4opt a no-inflation policy. reaortina to •refle• 
Uoa,• of llblch Tvawll epproved.12 Hull'• reciprocal acreementa only 
partlJ retioaelized foreip trade (Tvawell fnored reciprocal ecree· 
9· SH below, Chapter xv. 
10. Sollee, Blair, •'l'he Swet!leart ot the Hecilllllntere,• AMr19M HI£• 
.1111%• Vol. J9, lllo. 153, Sept811111er, 19,36, 831 Deavernine, RaOIIl. K •• 
Prrttn1!ls ll''Mlfe {lllev York, Il044, Mea4, 1936) 1011 .7ohnaton, 
Alva, "'l''lpell, the Prea14ent•a ldu Man,• S!ttmi!Y Euniy lslli• 
Vol. 209, No. 46, AU&\IIIt l, 19,&, 8. 
U. nat• Vol. 21, lie. 6, P'ebruai'J' 6, 1933• 14• 
12. See abou, Cbapter VI. 
••'- aation b7 aation, CCIIIIII14er1~~& Hull's outright tree•tra4e ideas 
uareaUaUc llopa in the 1930's). 'Rr 4ebta contixw.d to be a aou.rce 
ot interaational diaacre-ntt Mclay aa4 'l'uavell, contreliiotiD& the 
aaventh it• on Davia' list, auourap4 the new A4Ddn1atration•a 
retu..l to trade debt conceaa1ona tor aaraement by torei&n aationa on 
policy 1D other economic mattera,l3 
In au,y·neat, eYeD 1t bwlineu ba4 leaned 'l'upell 414 not 
apeak with authority, it liOUld hava.1Dterpreted hie statements to 
J'orreat Davia in Jaawu7, 1933, aa prot~ ot hia antt•buaiuaa atti• 
tude, arauin& that tbe A4lld.niatrat1oa liOUld have sons farther at once 
in aa aati•buaineu 41rectiotl if Tua-U had had hie wy. 'l'he AdDdn• 
iatratlon'a later adoption or expaaaioa or aoae policies which ~1 
a4voeate4 at the outset ..._4, to lauaiuaa, to reflect 'l'u&wll'a 1ntlu-
eaae. Alltlllllly, the Maialatration altered ita view on various PJ'OO• 
leu aa eon4Uiona chaD&e4• It appeua that the supe:rtetlation ot 
lebl'Ual"Jo 1933, alld the au\laaquent dittloultiea which the recover,y 
Pl'OSftll ran into, rather thea ~l'a intlueace, accounto4 tor oh•apa 
in the Mla1nia1;rat10tl1a prosram. 
haineaa' conoluaia tU.t 'l'ucwll wa anti-buaineaa repreaanted, 
or couraa, only ona polllt ot view. 'l'ucWllo hilllself, beliaYed that the 
t1ra1; New Dial, although it tell tsr short or creatins the iutituti-1 
4e•r1oaa which he recCIIIIIII8114e4 tor the preaenation or capitalilllll, we 
--------
lJ. 5ee above 1 Chapter VII, •fte LoaAon KOOilOIIIic Conference.• 
6os. 
unntial.l7 an attempt to ilan the 'lluainaaa s:ratem -- evan thou&h buai• 
lUlU objauri to •- at the -aurea IUie4 in the ul'wa&ina operation. 
He wa willing to lllllka vllatenr contri'llution Ita could to the job at 
bancl.. 
Baail Rauch empbaaizad tha pro•buaineaa cbaraoter at 'he tiret 
Hew Deal. itoosaYelt 1a Prosz'Ul llP to 1935, .Rauch maintained, wa an 
at~ to aolva uaemplo.r-ent thro~ the NRA ancJ. private enterprise, 
a thorwp expar!Bant with the 111111'8 OCI!Uierfttift -thocl.a of achieving 
reGCn"ery, ancl. an appl1oation fit a •saep down• rather than a •rtaa up• 
econa.io pia1loaopbF. Jluaineaa leaaare partiaU, llraw up the A4111niatra-
Uoa•a •rl1ar pol1ciaa, Milch wre 4ea1pe4 to benefit; all 4P'OUP8• 
UU.nu, ODM daaiaallt ll'OIIP8 at lllllaineu 1111111 were cJ.iJtaatisfied with 
pa:rtioipatioa in polic;r-lllllkiDc on a b&aia at equality with othsra; 
tbeJ reaiated CClllap~u .. end cooperation with the Mllliniatretioa. In 
19lS tbe A4111a1Btl'lltion ended ita • ••• support of tba aconcmic pol1-
ciea of 'llllaineu -• •••• • l4 
An earl¥ example at :!iooMftlt'a acceptance at lluainasa advice 
wa the Glau-staapll BaDitiag Act at J'UDe 16, 193.3· Jluainaaa would 
baYe ~ correct ia atatin& that the act did DOt ProYida tor actioa 
wich fu&wll preteneA - utioaalization ot the banking a:ratam. 'l'be 
Pras14eat repo:rta41¥ requaate4 orv.-u•a opiD.ion on the llanking aiw-
6o6. 
ation ill J'ebruary, 1933.1.5 In 11117 event, 'L'ugwll's views were know. 
la an aniol.e. "Bauers• Beaks,• purl1she4 in 1928, he stated that 
what went on inside the Federal Reserve 8,yetem ~• quite different 
tram. what a view ot the taaade ot the etructura pve one to believe; 
the b1& '*nka were ae powrtul aa aver, receivina aid throuah allmin• 
iatrative rul1naa, which, at the Mll8 t:I.Die, were used to deny the 
I!Gel't' a authority to aot when nCIIl•'*akera soush.t asaiatanc:ft. Ill the 
aa• arUcle he declare«s 
• ••• either modifY their atratecie situation at the 
-ter ot OGIIIPl.a: ralationahipe or llllilke thea ••- the 
raeponaibil1t1ea t:rca which they ao tar have been protit-
1111 but aot cUacharatna.l6 
Ill aa a44reea ia early 1932 'L'upell eugeated that the government mi&ht 
be a •re atficiant beaker than pr.inte gl'OQpa,l7 
'L'upell meiotaine4 that the baakera tailed to diaohllrce their 
crucial aconOIIlc raaponaibilitiea ia at leeat two :reapeota. They pro-
lllllta4 apeculaUoa 1D aeouritiee t~ tiea bat-a in1'eetment an4 
4epoait llankiiiCJ they were 1rraepona1ble in their ceneral control ot 
the Will ot credit tor speculation. Studenta ot Allleriaaa bankinc tor 
yeera had reoc=rll4e4 the aeperation ot iD1'88tlll8nt tram deposit bankiiiC 
ae a aeane ot pravaot1ng the kinde ot a~ea which Seaatorial 1nveat1• 
ption WlC01'era4 io 1'1.33·18 By 1CJ.33 -t benkera bal1111'e4 that thrae 
15. Sullhan. Levra11011, PreW4e 1i Puics 11a storx st. !U ~ Jli!LU• 
JAR (llaah1J1111on, State-n Preu, 1936) 9~. 
16. 'L'upell. R. G •• •Baakere' llaakr,• ltlf RepvbUc, Vol. 57, No. 732• 
O.oelllbar 12. 1928. 95, 1)6, · 
17, •Diacouree 111 llepreaaion,• 'l'w!wll PIPer•. 
18. Mol.e7• RaJ1110nd, After §tup I11p (lfev York, li!irper. 19.39) 66-67. 
ot tbe refo:rae in the Olaaa-.steaaall Act were necessai)' ~- the separa-
Uon of investment from co-rcial banking, insurance of deposita, end 
the ecq.uieition by the Federal Reserve Board of ;>Owera enabling it to 
pravat excessive speouletion with borrowed money.l9 
In a a(ndicated column of 1933, •Banking for the People,• TUa-
well ~riaed the prov1si011S of the Gleas-steaaall Act aivina it his 
ea1111ui.ast1c approval -~ as tar aa 1 t vent. He lauded the 11111in tea• 
\urea of the act • the protection of investors, depositors, and homa• 
ovne:ra1 tlle atrenathenin& ot tho internal structure of the llankina 
and controls over the relatione betwen cClllllllercial bank8 and their 
atOOk atfiliatea1 an4 the srutina to the Federal Reserve Board of 
powra to control apecula'Uoza. The BGard could detel'llline whether there 
wa undUII uae of bank credit tor apeculatiozaa it could exeroise, if nee-
eaaary, broad preveative powera1 the vithdrawl of credit fecilitiea, 
the l1mitat1oza ot loena backed bJ aecuritiea, and the control of the 
amouzata which banks coul4 land to their 1nveat11111nt affiliatea.20 
Jlaylloll4 Moley obaen.d that wader \be Oleae-steacall Act the 
Federal Reserve Boerd'a ectiYiUea were • ••• headed towrd the exer• 
ciee ot credit control cc=paral:lle to tlle monetacy control FDR bed 
l'). Rauoll, Basil, :U "'"!lEY gt lila Ia lllll.• 63. 
20, '1\lpllll, R. 0., •lankina for the People,• syndicated column, in 
:u ""lim f!mmcl'IIV• 30·32· 
608, 
acquired.• 21 Tugwell eona1dere4 the act no more than a move in the 
right direction. It waa a •areat atep forward,• it did not • ••• 
&O all the way in creatir.a a consolidated, national banking systellll" 
it hindered, but could not absolutely prevent, irresponsible mnegement, 
speculation, and bank fa1lurea,22 
'1'\tgljell would have preterre4 nationalization, with atrot>.ser 
credit controls. He vas not alolle in his belief that nationalization 
was ebtainable in 19JJ,23 In 1939 he bemoaned the teet that •Even 
the releaae fran monetary feudalism bad to be carried out within a aet 
of 111TIIllC811311Dts intended to distribute private powers rather then to 
qake public onea effective.•~ In 1'48 TUgwell recalled Roosevelt'• 
reaJODBa to the counsel Qf the representativea or finance end industry 
vbich prevented nationalization• 
21. 
22. 
2J. 
He acoepted a good deal fraa thea. 
For instanoe, they tau.aht him bov to handle the banking 
or1s1a. '!'rue, U f1Ua4 with Mr. lleruoh'a constant lean-
ina toward retrenehlllent and the reatoration of busineaa 
cODt'i<ienoea t>ut it •• thelr Wclhn1que vbich vaa uaatl. 
Did not Mr. Mille, Mr. llellantine, and Mr. Awalt, :Repu\l-
l108NI all a1iay Ott tor vaeka to operate the ucbinery 
expertly? As Ray Moley say a, •v. vare Just a bunch of 
- try1nc to aave the benkinc ll)'stem. • 'l'hia wo prob-
ably accurate 1 be doubtleaa 1dent itiea the banking system 
Moley, Rayi!IOnd, Mt!!r Sayen Xaap, l9JJ Moley referred to the 
~s 'QBDdmeat tl& the :AA4ct. 
'l'u«vall, R. G., •Benking :t'Ol' the People,• ,32-.33· 
Macdo1111ld, DwiFt• !IDa. 'Mll.UI• !bl. .&a .t.Bill!ll Hnb. (New York, 
VallgWlrt. 1'147) 4~. rqre,ted that the New Dealera did not take 
a4VBn1iap of the oriaia to Dllti-li'lle the banke, 
'l'llcvall, R. G., 'After the llev Deels 'We Have Boupt Ourselves Ti• 
to 'l'bink,'• I!Jl Rewblic, Vol, 99, No, 1266, 1uly 26, 1939, 324• 
with the general t.~elt'are now, and perhaps be did then. 
Jut I IIIIBt •eept ~~raelt t'rca this identification. I 
thought lleoretl.)< that the panic or depositors could have 
\Inn allete4 in o\her '1111181 and that , in anr can, the 1118n 
and women - Ulilllona of them in the past year or two - who 
had faced the days aheed vUh no food in the house could 
have told ae:re depoaitors tho true 11111nnina or panic. And 
tben bad been no gn~~~t allddea eUr over them. I did no\ 
rsonfP11lle, even at the distaaee to which I had by then re-
treated, the •n who, in Allla~JT, heel eat with U8 ni&ht 
after ntsnt, not depressed certainly -tor he vas never 
that • but ooaeemed, deeply oonoemed to discover W711 ot 
izaple111111nt1nc, the old proaraaai va faith in cOIIIAQn people. 
I eJa ready to concede that I llllJ' haft been wrons, thet this 
vas anutber lnstanoe of his superior instinct for public 
aotioa, and that tha llliddle olue llliaht sa.how ha'fe revol-
ted and torn up the streets or invaded atoraa. Perhaps, as 
Jiley Milley 11117•• it o\her ach'ioe had been taken it would haft 
•wreaked incalculable damap upcm our whole eoonomic ord.ar.• 
lilt I cannot help tb1nk1111 thet he contuaea, jWit as Mr. 
Roosevelt Wl8d to del1pt in fo1'111.11atins over and over in a 
oNacea4o ot ironic delisht. Sqs Ray Mole,, • It cannot be 
fllllpheaized too atronal7 that the policies which vanquished 
the nnk criaia wre th01'01&&hly eonserYetift policiaa •••• 
ThOIIe 'tlho conceived and u:eoutad them were intent upon ralq-
illg the oontidenee, tint, ot the conaerntive buaineas and 
bankina leaders ot the country and, then, throup them, ot 
the pu.blio pnenlly.• Mr. Baruch, and his General J'obuaon, 
were, I sa:y, sraat educatorat25 
In 1953, two decades attar the passage of the Glass-Steapll 
Act. Tugwell continued to condemn Jlooaevalt's response to the advice 
or the spokeaman or industry and finenoe. He noted that moat students 
ot the bankln& oriaia had oollCludlld that the Prellident could not "have 
done other than he did.• Ml:lley called the couree or action taken inevi-
table. Evan Proteaaor Lallki asserted that aJ1¥ alternative would han 
25. 'l'upell, R. G., •The Prepa:ntUOA ot a President,• wutern 2!U• 
Up& ouertserl¥, Vol. 1, No. 2, JUne. 1948, 147·48. 
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beeD too fore1p to "-rican precUoe to be achievable. Tugwell did 
••• ahara this interpretation. J"udpd by the lone test 
of oouet&nanee it will 'lleecne clearer that the hua1l1atina 
oOIIIPl'OIIillee concl114e4 it.lrinc th ia era with the financtera 
wre IRietakea. 
It ae ... that those vho araue .,.taat the existence of al· 
teraatiYBe minimise \he 41aored1t into which the B7atea 
bad then fallen aft4 tile rea41nees of a paralyze4 people to 
accept dnatic aolutiona offered by a truste4 leader. EYen 
it the hfpothetieel cha.-.ter ot this argument is admitted, 
it ta worth ellktnc whet the alternati"''B ws end what the 
oouequenaae of i1l. adopUCift aiaht haYs been. The finan-
cial collapu of 19.3.3 oou14 hftYe been approeohed b7 two gen-
eral -• ot ettaok. Olll8 vee the naUonalilliiiS of the 
llankina qat- end the other waa the nae of national credit 
u a llalanciq •obaniam. I arped tor tbeae altentions, 
althwsh I vee excl\lded troa ao\nal deciaioo-mktnc in tia· 
ancia~ll8ttera, aa poliq waa adopted in earl7 lifllv Deal 
daTe· 
RooaaYelt•a ooafideaoe in \he •pnctical• aclYioe be bad taken 
veYBred in tba tell ot 19.3.3• vhao raoowcy faltered. AcaiD the Praai• 
dent took •practical• adYioa, fraa Protuaor Warren and liency Morgea-
tbau, undertakta& the tuttle exper~nt of sold purchaaea.27 Mean• 
while, in October, 193.3• ·'~'~~pall iavited MarriiHir s. Boclea, an Opa, 
Utal:i, benker, to Waahiqtoa. Ev"BDtuall.J' Eccles• policies von wt over 
the WI8Uaoeastul •practiosl• onaa. In apoftllorine; Eocles' entrance 
toto aovenvMnt, ~11 •de a aiSDitiOSII.t contribution tovel'lls devel• 
OPI!Bilta 1D t;he 41ract1on ot the propu~ ot his preference• net1onal1• 
26. Tupell, R. Q,, •'ftle Ccmproraiainc Roosevelt,• liutern PclitiClfl 
o"'rHrlY• Vol. 6, No. 2, 1une, 195.3, 333•.34· 
27• Tupell, R, G., •'ftle Com~illf! Rooaevelt,• 334• 
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zation of bank:l.nc, central credit controls er~~~bl:l.ll8 the injection of 
a balancill8 factor into the eeonom,y, and. tha fol'lll.llation of tlscal 
policy to promote the general intereat -- objeotivee approached in the 
second Hew Deal. 
Eoolu •4e 'l'uawall's acquaintance in February, 19.33• throuch 
stuart Chase. Chaaa IIIBt Ecclee in Salt Lake City in Februarya illlprea-
aed with the banker's id .. e, Chaee told him that he should see Tugwell 
in New York after testifyins before the Se~~ate J'inanoe Callllittee in 
l«<lahi-c\on later in the 111t011th. Eoclea had l\l!lch w1 th Tugwell in a 
4J'upton. Ha tOUP4 the profuaor, whoaa specialty in economics 11111a 
not -7 and bank:l.ug, onl¥ pnarally 'ftlrsed in the 'Wilys the sovern-
•nt could uae aoney, credit, and tieeal policy to praaota economic 
reYiwl. '1\lgwll wee in a glo~ trama of 1111Dd -- an attitude vhich, 
Eoclu feU, acon<D:I.c co114itiona juat:l.tia4.28 
'l'uawll• for hie part, on readill8 Eccles 1 statement to the 
SeftBte Finance Coamittee, • ••• expresaed surprise that a banker could 
urp a program of locical ra41cal1a.• Eccles ccncluded that their 
~ine. wile pleaeant, -· fruitleaa. He .... 
• • • llliatakaD in this belief. I 11111e to hear tl"OIII him apin 
atx lllODtha later vhen, attars synthetic spurt in recovery, 
the cycle ot deflation bq:an all O'rer apin •••• 29 
In hie teatilllODy in -shinaton Eccles outlined a aweepina pro-
Cl'Ui for r8CIOYel")'o Jia auggaated the fOllOWing IIIBIISUreSI high inCCliiiiB 
28. Bcclu, Marriner S, • Bet!spniQI! frpptie£1 (New York, 1\nopt, 1951) 
85-87. 114. 
29. Eccles, Marriner s •• BtekoniM Froatiera. 115. 
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better llelance betwen oonauaar pu.l'Gbea1114! pover and cepital expan-
peAaion la'IIIIJ sovel'Dlll81lt appranl of all capital issues offered to 
the Jlllblio and all foreip financii!CJ a national plannine: board eillli• 
lar to the ver ioduatrias 'IIG!t.rd properly to ooordinata J~~~blie and 
prhab eoon*o aotivitiea; adoption of the doaatic-allotment plan 
for aarioulture 1 and ref1aaQOill8 of tua 1110rtpps on a l0118•tal'lll 
lleaia at a low rete of interest. With reprd to bankine:, Eccles 
recam~Bnded the tneurance or deposita and the unification of the 
bsllkiJI& ayatem wuler the auperviaioa of the Federal Reaerre System 
W ••• ill order IIIDr8 effectively to control our entire 1110ney and cre4it 
qsu..•.30 
In Bodes Tuawll fc'WUl a ma whO, far 1110re expert than hill-
aelf ill •ttere of ba.nkine:. 1110na:y, and ~it, would cln'ote his 4eta1lad 
knovla4sa to the aohieYeaent or the a ... enda which he oonsi4ere4 
esaSII.tial to national wlfara •• nationalization or bankill& and central 
cre41t oontrola. Tucwll thoucht the absence of strona credit controls 
wa illGflioal. Chanita aarre4 the - function as dollar billa 1 U had 
never really dared, until the panap ot the Glasa..Stoapll Act ill 19:3.3, 
to touch eheeka • .31 In 19:3.5 Tu€wll expraaaed his approval of the aoqui-
.30. Eo olea, Menlaer s., Bt•kPD'" li'9JlUtrs ,108-10, 112•1.3, 
31. 'f\a&wll, R. 0., •Bankillfi fOil the People,• 29· 
tieaa 
••• ell credit reate on the Qovenaent -- throuah ita 
oontrol ot curreaq and 1\a pove:re to ent'oroe private 
oOBtl'Ute tbl'O\Iih the QCIUMa. The trouble bae beaD that 
the priYBte banlten haft lla4 control ot' the volua ot 
outeteuina crecltt. while the reaPQUibility tor •111· 
tainig& tbe credit 878taa baa ~ted with the Qovern-
•nt.,.e 
Tuplell did DOt see the total t\lltillment ot b:l.a deairea repr4• 
ln& llanklng ao4 credit. Through the illtluenoe and ettort ot Ecclea, 
the ~n1stretion did take important atepe which pleaaed him1 
the l:lankina qstea •• ntm~r ~~attoaalized. although the 
Bankine Aet ot l9.3S ten4e4 1n that direction and Mr. 
lcolea, whose OOU1Uiel this writer bad atronal7 rea-
mnded to the Preaident, •s larply responsible tor 
ita llhape ••• • 33 
Stepe to'IIU'da aat1o118.l1Htion -•t strengthening ot eentral controla 
of bank oredit in order to tater stability in the ec:onCIIIIY. The Fed-
acooni1n& to the state ot the ec:onCIIII'. 
'J.'ua*ll alao favored a new use ot govel"lliDIIIIt credit I 1t could 
proyide a basis tor financing a broad recovery prc>gra~~~ in which tha 
gOft~t. throuch expenditures. would balance det1eienc1es in the 
._... in inveatant and purcbasiaa power. It ws especially in eon• 
neetion with tiaoal policy that Tucwll asked Eeclea to come to Waabill411• 
.32• 'l'llc*lle R. o •• •A Firea14e S)'IIIPOeiUIII.• CpJuemie YRheqUxllJII£-
1i•W• Vol. 21. No. 1. March. 193,5. ,30 • 
.33· 'l'llcWllo R. o •• •the Colllprwlislna RooseYelt,• 334• 
tOD. A reYiev ot the 8\'0ln•nt ot fiaoel policy fro~~~ 1935 shove, 
u in the oeae ot bankinc pOlicy, that lleficit tinancina of wrk 
relief anll public works oa an increased soele was onl¥ reluctantly 
approftll by an orthoci.OJ: President. Econ01111c and political denlop• 
unta, not Tucwell'a influence, acoounted tor the shift from the 
flrat to tba seoon4 Nev Deal. 
Ill e letter which looles rece1Yed on October 10, 1933. Tugwell 
asked hill to cCIIIIS to the capital to diaouas aOIIIIl preasin,; problema. 
Eccles ~pl1e4 that lle VOillcl atop ott in Washill4i1ooa after t~ll8actinc 
aCIIB buaineaa tn New York at tba end of the month. On October 27 
!coles .. de a apaaoh before the U\ab Eduoat10118l AaaociationJ he con• 
aidarell this sd4reu a •trial run• of what he waa to tell Tuswall. 
Eccles stated that the depression wae not the ordinary cyclical sort1 
it was the eDil phase of a 1,50-)'ear-elll international economic an4 
politioal or .. nization. He listed uaauraa which the situation called 
fora so•e~nt innatment to compensate for the lack of prints 
incanth'e; expandii!B public an4 ~-Jll.lblic expenditures for cultural 
an4 quaei•cultural urT1cesa relief of coll8\llllDre fi'OIIl direct taxat1on1 
haa'f')' iacGIIW taxes in the upper brecketa1 a tax on undistributed pro-
f'ttaa and fundulental economic plall8 oentartnc on the • ••• diatrtw-
tioa ot pure~baaing pOwar a!lll on the allocation of income batvaan invest-
Mat alld expend1turea.•34 
.34. !oolea • Marriner S. • llegkoninc Frpp'Uer• • 129·30. 
In earl,y ~r Eoclae Jarticipated in three daya of coafer• 
ancaa. '1\lswll 1ntro4ua.cl him 11o Ml;lriecei Ezekiel and h"enry Wallace 
an4 aeooned him to a dinner at the Shoreham; 11fallace, Ezekiel, Harry 
Hopkins, .:re:rome Prank, and Secretary of War O.orp Dera attended ( Ecolea 
1nY111M Darn, a friend f1'0111 S.lt Lake City). The problem which oauaed 
'l'II&Wll to aak IOGlea to 001111t to Waah1Dc'on waa, briefly, thiea 1f 
there waa to be deficit finanoinc of ·~ eon, there had to be an 
W14arl,y1nc objective that 1iha defioUa ware to pin. Eoclea wae spec-
ted to proTide practical anewre1 no one at 1ihe Shoreham dinner c1te4 
.Ke)'He' theoretical rationale for 4et1cit financin&l probabl)", l!:oclae 
obaervef., 'l'uswell and Ezekiel wre the only men present who bad heard 
of Xe)'llea .15 
kol.N •• aaked bow he expacte4, in arsuins for hie fiscal 
ideaa, to sat ar0\lll4 Levie Dou&lae, Director of the Bureau ot the Bud• 
&eto an4 Seoreta17 of the 'l'reaeu17 Woodin. Eoclea dacioled to conTince 
Dean Achuon, Under S.cretary of the Treasury. He dined with Tugwell, 
Dam, and Acbeaon. In the diacuuion 'l.'u&wll supported Eccles, who 
felt that Acbeaon wae conTinaed •• Aoheeon eTentuall)' left the admin· 
ietration over 1110netary polioy. 1\aawaU next $41ok Eoc.lea to eM Harold 
Ioku, who apreaae4 pneral eare-nt with the banker' a Tie we. Tugwll 
t'inell,y infDrllled Eoolea tbet the Adlllniatration wanted hilll in Waehinaton. 
35· Bcolelh Marriner s., Beekop1y lrpnUert, 131·.32· 
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poaalbl¥ aa houalq adailllstnator. lklcles add he woul4 haTe to retuse 
such a poaUion 'bttoauae he knew ftQthiq about houaiq. '1\iawll d:l.cl not 
praas the otter. Oace epin Eoclea lett the East tor Utah, onl.7 to M 
oalla4 la118r to the earYice ot the Acl:m:l.niatration. Ill December, 1933, 
at the 8Ugltstion ot the Shoreham tUaner auests, Seerata17 of the 
Tree&U17 Morpntbau -ed leelH tel Weehinaton,J6 
!'rank Kent, in hie column ot January 3, 1934, asserted that poli· 
tical aeo,sn.phy had sa.thiq to 4o with P:colea• appointment as a 
Special AAiaietant to Morpnthau. Aocorcliq to Kent, a pooup ot Sene• 
ton le4 by Couzens (Rep., Mlch.) iatol'lllri the Secratary that he bet-
ter look outside of Jfew York banki!IC circles for a technical adYisar. 
Earle Bailie ot New York resigned as ~thau's Special Assistant 
~ile the Senate w.a oOQ814ar1116 the Secretary's oonti:nation. On J'anu-
ar,v 12 Moraenthau a.m.d a new Special Aaaiatant, reaohiDC 
••• clear across the lilolllf¥ MGuateins • • • • That oerteillly 
oqbt to aaUaty the Proare .. :l. . s-tore, to aay nothlnc 
ot "Youiall L:Llleals,• ~oae al .. J 1a cUaturlled by 4reau ot 
wall Staat wolYU oreep:I.IIC thiWSh lfew Deal portals. 
Jre11t also OOQ81dere4 the economic rea- bahin4 the .. leotion ot loolea, 
••• e 'IJlova-:Ln-tlle-IDottle Liberal, a oonpnttel Proarea-
ai'la, not e 11111re oon"Hrt liJie so 111111117 RooaeYelt eclherenta 
~oae ortho40111: hearta '&Jaat t1ra1dl.F beak ot their New Dllaliah 
word&. Mr. :lcolse 1e the real th:l.116 .... Actuall.7, he we 
a New Dealer before the l>law Deal - in. 
Boclea had reoai'led little pu.blleit,. wen he testified beto:n the SeDate 
f1~~enea CCllllll1 ttee lo J'elmlary, 1933• 'beeeuaa tew people beard him aDd 
;36. Ecolee, Marriner s., leS!koa!ps Jtoqtlera, l33•J6. 
few took his tilaal recOIIIIIIIndatioa.a "riousl.y. Now, Kent aaaertad, 
Eoolea poliaial fo~ the foundatioR of Rooaa~lt'a program,37 
111& to Rauch. -.rll:ed the obuge f'I'OIII the first to the second New Deal• 
Mot until attar tha rlsit Of John Maynard Ke7ua in 1934 
all4 the appoint-.nt of Mr. Boolaa to the chair-.uhi» of 
tba Federal Ra"rva Board did fiaoal p011c7 baocme really 
affMUVII tor public purpo-. In this case the altarna• 
thea bad baall thcn:ouahl.7 wi,ghad J the pract1cal course 
bad 'been follovad J padually all4 emllarnaaai~~&l7 it had to 
liB aball4oM4. Inflation wa doulttlaaa batter than atap-
Uon. It we oould not haw plannad rellelenciq, inflation 
wa a possible recouraa, althG\ICb it we a daqeroua na-
tiODal ha'llit to acquire. Mr. Xoclea ws oppoaed to NlU, 
thus proviD& 1110re real11Uc than those who apeotad too 
aoll of it. But he vould ha~ tall:an 1110ra tama41ata mea-
auras for rebuildlna purolluiD& powr and fcrr reoraanb• 
ill& tha Cll'Mlt 818Mm· 
The ooatuaion, tha delay ia raoonry, and tha sutfer-1118 of 
the uaempl.,ed aad their familiae in the years immediately 
tollow1118 cannot liB -•urad. They vera, how~r. vary 
araat. Aa4 they 1111811 be eharp4 to the •practicalitY' of 
the buaiaaea laadara aa apiaat the •radioal1111B" of thoae 
of ua who would haYe ectad d1tterantl.7 aven if we did not 
traciaal.y ape&. Our pural ~ had in the all4 to liB 
aocaptad, ann 1f 111 mod1tia4 to:r~~., and with an 8dm1xtura 
of HIC1oua inflation. Much of the atory ia told in Mr. Ec• 
ol"' Btekonhc lmptiaa. Indeed, the story offers a 
raalll' 1llull11111till& inatance of OOIIpl'OIDiae with 'COIIIIIOil 
saua• all4 •ortho4oxy" em the adY1ce ot practical -~~. a 
course which proved to be the ftJ'II1I poasible resort if mea-
aurad bJ lOD@•I'Wl ll8CBU1 u .. ,:JI' 
~ll's ooatr1'11Ut1on to tha eTOlution of fiacal policy in 
~·•~1t•s tirst te:r~~. we his ra~ndation to the President ot Eoclea. 
37· 
38· 
lent, Franll: R., With91.1t alm;t (New York, William Morrov, 1934) 
14.5 .. 7· 
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A. 1110re 'basic factor than the influence ot Tugwell and Eccles in, brine• 
in& about ohange was the failure of initisl policies to promote aua-
taiaed recovery. There w.s a presllina practical ueed to try another 
ap,lll'OilGh. 'l'he handline ot aoYel'lllllent oredi t in a Keynesian 'WilY did not 
rest eaaentiall.T on a theoretical uelyais1 it developed in an empiri• 
eel IIBnner out of the need for action. Rooeevelt, with his orthodox 
view • found Eccles • ideas distasteful I he acceded to the change onl.T 
reluctantl.7. •But, • rucv.u recalled, • orthodox handling of the aovern-
•nt•a credit 41d 1'inall1o evea if reluctantly, give wy to the balanc• 
ina conoept.•39 
'l'he test~ ot participauta ia the formulation of Nev Deal 
policies an4 documentary e•ideaoe oontra41et the popular opposition 
atereot;vpe ot Rooaevelt aa an eapr. irresponsible spender. Ra7J1111nd 
Mole7 4iaCIWIHd relief 1111aaurea vith 'l'ugvell and Senators Coet1&Jm and 
I.aJ'olletM in nrl1 Mare~h, 193.3· Roosevelt. • ••• they knew, was 
leai'J ot the arc-nta for pulllic woru.• The President, Holey recal• 
184. •repeate417 ah1e4 •11117" trt~~~~ public-worka proposals in the first 
part of l'J331 he did not thea aubacr1ba to the IJWIIP•prim1116 theory. At 
a White House ... tiDa on March 16 Boosevelt prolldsed LaFollette, Coati• 
pn, Mllda118 PerkiiUio and Harry Hopkins that h• would l'!lflntion public 
vorka ill his ~~esaa&e on relief to Concreas on March 21. Roosevelt 
siped an emeraen111 relief bill on Mq 121 Moley relldnded him that 
.39, Tupell. R. G. • 'The Compr01111B1114!! Roosevelt ,• .3311· 
nothiDC 11114 been 4one about public works. at the lllllllll tilll!l cautionioc 
apiut JWIIP•priains. Finally, Rooaevelt • ••• •• won only reluct• 
antq 1a 19.3.3 .... • to the policy of' spending for public vorka to etilll• 
late the hee'V)' illdWitriea, The pump·prllllere, following Mole;y 1 a advice 1 
vrot& a bill in which the NfiA en4 publlo vorka, •ab011t which l"DR •• 
indifferent at heart,• oarried. each other through. Moley considered. 
the appropriation of 3·3 billion& a compromise between the 5 billiona 
which Tugwell and the ProcrHIIi ve a-ton advocate4 and the ~00 mil• 
liona tower4e which Roosevelt 1ncl1De4.4° 
A aisn1t1oant indication or Rooaevelt'e orisinal budgetary 14eaa 
wee hie appointment ot Levia IJouclaa ea Director of the Bureau of the 
llu!ipt. Tu£well ettribu11e4 11he choice of Douslae to the latter• a • ... 
fervor tor eCODOIIIY mtched ll)' only tvo other contemporary etat-n •• 
Ser.10tor Byrd an4 Rapreeentatin 'l'eber.•U It was Dcl\lcla&, Molq ao\414, 
who prepared. the Preaident •e falllilue econoq message callilli for a red.uc-
tiOft in government aalariee qf 100 lllilliOfta and l'eviaion ot the pension 
and ftterana• cOI!Ipenaation B7Btea at a ~~&ving or ov.r 400 Blilliona.42 
Rooaevelt and Doualu, Tugwell recalled., saw •e:re to ere• on 
f:leoal attere tor more than a rear.43 Duriq that year a cleall between 
Douala a aDd Tugwell on reoovery polio:lee occurred.. Accor41na to !meet 
620. 
LincU.ey, the Preai4ent•s cabinet CGRDittee split wide open over the 
Pllbl1c•wcrka prcgraa when RooaewU took a Yaoation in .rune. 19.33· 
noualaa, belie'flna that reCIO'ftii'Y •• on the _,, advooatri l11111tri aDd 
aradul expenditure of the Jllllblic-wcrka appropriation; 'l'Uf!W8ll, con-
vinced. ot tha inaubatantial and speculative nature ot the riee. wanted 
to Pllt wt the .3·.3 billions quickly in a awepine; gestura.44 Harold 
IIIQa recalllltl the ar..-ot batwan Doualea aMI Tugwell at the first 
-tina ot the Speoial Boart tor Public Worlra oo .ruly 1, 195.3· Doua• 
laa, aaserttna that the tetlet1ona17 epiral was at an and, lllll1nta1na4 
that there 1111lS no need. aa tlaere had bean in March and April, to inject 
an artificial factor into the aCOIICIIIIf by spending all the f'unda pro-
Yiclll4 in the appropriation; Tupell inaiate4 that it •• not aaf'e to 
operata on the aa818Ption that r••••I'Y wee on the _,.45 Tu&wll 
placad sch faith in a sl.OOIII¥ latter lui had receivet frca Eoolea in 
M&rob 'lhich cleapdrad OYer Reonvali'e bwlaet-balancina lllllSaaae ot 
Mardi lOa Eccles expected the eoonCIIIIio aUuat1on to pt wcrse.4° 
46. 
Whea RMaevelt retunwcl to Waehtnaton in .7uly, he struck a o-
Lillllley, Ernest lt. , Ill.t Roc!MJ!l.' l!eyolut 101• Firat Phase (New 
York, Vtktac. 193.3) 231. . . 
Ickes, Harold L. • .II& 12 l51ik1 !D.!. a.e,a !ll. .W (Jew York. Mac-
llillan. 193.5) 25-271 Lltamn R!••t. :tuly 15. 1933. in -nunc 
on the cootlict bet-• 'l.'uSWli and Dollala•• notet that the latter 
would de~ public•worke fuads to political 4iviaioos which 41d not 
bave bela aced budpta. · 
Boolea, Marriner s .• Begl!:ontpe Froptiera, 118. 
Milt WQUl4 apen4 the wole appropriationl Ickes, wo vas to be Public 
WOrka Adllilliatrator, would ausrd ap1nst usft, wasta, an4 useless 
cooatruction. 47 Un4er Iolcea, apellllill6 did not take place fast enoup 
to support cont1DU1116 recOYary. 'l'ha Civil Worka Administration vas 
crMted to set 110ney into oirculation 1110re quickly. The establishment 
of CWA did not -n that 'fllcvall had defeated Dw&lsa. Eccles noted 
that b)' the end of 1933 Roeaevelt •• preparing to end CWA ia lille 
with Doualaa• arsumeata.48 
Boclea readily understood Roos.velt's respons1vanesa to Douc-
laa • tu•l 14ee.a. 'l'he Oe;daa banker described an 1nci4snt at the 
White Houae Which illustrated the Preaident•a aversion to deficit 
spendins. At a Matins ot the Rational Bmergency ~neil late 1a 1933• 
3'oltn H. P'ahq, Cbai:n.n ot the Boar4 ot the Federal HoM Loan Bank, 
requested two billion dollars tor WLC operational Roosevelt illquired 
wather there wa • • • • all)' 1111.7 to get the e;ove~nt out ot the 
len41ac buaineas.•49 Eccles obsarYet that 
As I - to know him ... Roosevelt •• at heart tar 
mora the budget•balancar -- reprding a balanced budget 
aa a selt•contsinad sood •• than some ot his sharpest 
critics. At this tiM, fflr all his latent huanitarisn 
ialpulaaa, hi a ecOIIOIIic thinking we that of a • saver, • 
a •covJOn clipper,• a •couervationiat,• and a •crecti-
tor.•.:>U 
'l'llcWll ~rked ths't Roosevelt undertook relief moauraa 
47 • LinUS)' t Ernest X. , Ibl pqe-ueU HtJ91UtiO!lo fi;rst i»M t 231. 
48. Eccles, Marriner s., lt•lmpty Fpptitg, 145· 
49· :Eccles, Marriner s., luksmiM fnntieg, 145. 
50· Beclea, Marriner s., BtftkMiy lmj!Ueq, 98·99· 
622. 
• ••• balUII&lY eD4 not with olet.B of diecove17 eD4 ahouta ot virtue.•Sl 
Rooee"f'el.t aouaht to out relief expeaAUurea as soon as he thOUflht auoh 
a ntuetton woulcl not hurt rMOYery. Ia 19)6, reaiatina preeaurea f~ 
a tete leaielaturea, ha llaltet FERA pant a to the atataaa he atuck to 
the teX'IIIIt ot hie March relief -•••' 1.5 billion tor Hopkina' WPA, 
6oo lllillion tor the CCC aD4 a tev aelecte4 public works, no 11ev tuD4e 
tor Ioke.e' PWA end ~l.l'a RA • .52 (JIIIoeeYelt'e •-ic calculatione 
ia 1936 pro.ed to be in error.) 
TWo ....,lea trom the Whits Hause tiles provide evidence ot 
~U'a tirat-hlu\4 taa111ar1ty with Rooaevalt'a fiscal ph1loeophy. 
Aotilla Bu.claat Director o. w. Bell, ill a •mcrand.WII to the President ot 
1\IM l5o 19.15, ete\ed that the IIA bad available about 17 lllillion dol• 
lara, ten llillioa ot wbieh •• ill aa illpoull4e4 atetWI uader an order 
'117 tbe Preaidenta at Ball's •saaatioa, Rooeevalt allotte4 the \IJWioo 
JN114a4 aevan lllillf.oa rather \han the r&lne lllillion the RA requested. ,.5.3 
Ill a -raD4UIII ot hq l.5o 1935, 'l'qve:Ll reqW!ate4 fun48 tor the lalld 
propu~ durina the OUl'l'ellt tieaal. yeer1 opposite each u .. appeared 
ftODaBYelt'a penciled notat1oaa1 
51· 
.52· 
53· 
, .... 
By the J'o:reat Sanice 15 1111. 
Ropatytll 1 1. lotai19M 
l2 
Jr the Reaettl ... at Admtaiatration 
Per Bioloat.cal ilur'niF 2.5 ail. 
For Indiaa Senice 4 1111. 
J'or Park SerYt.• 2.5 11111. 
For Boil Coaeerwation 2 ail. 
:ror Acl'i.W.tural ProJena 20 ail. 
Roottult 1a Nota\iou 
out 
4 
2 
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Ia 1953 TQawell deacr1~ 1a detail RooseYelt'a position on fiacal 
1MUera1 
'fttat apaeeb .li.a October, 1932. at Pittsburg, in which 
Jlooee¥eU premee4 to ~ .. 1iJle eoet ot currant pvern-
•nt opel'aUona by 25 per ..s/ would return to tOl'lllllnt 
Mr. Rooeuen. but 11hat b \oo otto oYerlookecl ie the 
piiiUiM- or the tormeJlt. 'l'hoae wo worked with hill 
Wl'll al~aJa a'llllre ot hie lODiiD& tor eeon01111, a belencacl 
bucl&et 1 aa4 a aOWlCl 4ollar •••• 
With wat reluetaDGe President RooeeYelt waa torce4 1ato 
detioit apendiD& en4 bow he reaieta4 it at &Yer,y step 
Ba1'17 Hopkiaa, Baroi4 Ickea aD4 -roue other New Deal 
allainiatratora 09Ul4 teatity. lati•te• ot need wre 
al~aJ& pared dovn1 this proJect or that ~~aa tako ott 
the list 1 tor a loaa t:ble eYeey proJect 'lllllS repl.trJ.1' aut 
fi'GI ,_10 to- 25 per cent • And aa earnest attempt •• a4e 
to 8oiaa eve17 re-roh 1te11 trc:a the bud&at with the 
laJM excuse that th1a waa the k1a4 ot thing ua1vera1t1ea 
Oqht to 4o. 
M eYer,vone kaowao S3oJGOo000oOOO ~~aa appropriated durlna 
the Bwl4re4 Days tor rel1et and public woru. That _, 
have 888118d aa aatroaoaioel sum to conaerYetive oltizena1 
llut SeMtora Robert La J'ol~te and Robert Waper -- who 
Wl'll the real experts in thla •tter attar the years ot 
du.elllq with lfooYer •• llaew that a IIUCh more realistic 
8UII wuld haYe ben $12,oo6,.oo,ooo. 'l'hey ware quite 
r18ht • it' aat was 'tllllntacl. we what -• proteaaa4 to be 
11Ulted •• the relief ot UDellflQyllleJtt. That, it nothiq e 
else, we prOYa4 111\ea expndlwrea ot that order bepn 
54· '7PJ!Dlt Pa•rt· 
in pre)llll'lltion tor wr a few :rean later. 
The New Deal expelldituru '111P'41 aenr enOU&h to relieYS 
UM~~PlOJ'Mnt alld OODHqun~ to aeeure reoovery. They 
tll.erefora ia the lena rua bad to be tar 1110re thaa they 
would have bad te be lf the initiel attack had baen lO&i· 
oall:r all4 OOII.Z'Il8e011alt earr1e4 out • The reaaoD 1 t could 
not be, and the :reeaon ~erewa always wverina end inaut-
ticienoy, we that President Rooaenlt felt jut as IDU.ch 
convicted or sin 1il:lell the budpt ws unbalanoe4 ss Hoover 
had been. 
Then too, llllch ot whet we appropriated was not usad in 
Vll7S calculated to aet the D&Xbaim effecil. This spin ws 
tor a 1110rel resaca Hoover -.at ban approved. '!'here were 
reputed and serious strus&lea within the administration. 
not always !mown about by lllltlliders, over this llllUer. 
There were those who contanda4 that direct relief ws 
cheaper. easier to administer. end quicker than public 
worlce, ana those 'boadoal.ina proJects ot CWA and ita 
aucoeasora. But the President we adelllant • People IDU.at 
earn their llvlnp 1 the goval'Dllllnt mat set out ot the 
relief llueiaeu. It we a •tter ot morale • 
... 
These Ulutrstiona are cited to show that it Hoover car• 
ried his principles too far, they were not dirterellt fl'OII 
the Rooaevelt principles whiah on oocaaion were 1110dit1ed or 
atteDil8ta4. '1'he looa deaile, Hoover va. Rooeenlt, is IIIia• 
concaind it it is thouaht to prooeed rna 1110rala or ortho-
4011 on the one aide aeainst 1Dmoral1ty or unorthodaxy on 
the other. It President ftoeeevelt unbalanced the ~udaet, 
4eYSlue4 the dollar, end involved the federal govel'Dllllnil in 
the direotioa ot anterprlee, iii was ·beoauae theae expedients 
vera forced on hill ~ depnnion an4 wr. In resortina 1io 
th• he wa, 111 hia own 111B4. doi.Dc wron&• And ao be wa 
aena1Uve 1io •tteok.SS 
4et1o11i financing U1Witrata4 the empirical neture of' the New Deal. He 
55· 'fu8vell, R. o., •The Proteaon1Bta1 Roosevelt and Hoover.• 429•31. 
urp4 hv&e eove,._11.t expeDdUurea •• 11eouaary and lepl. !'rtllll hia 
lutit\ltioDal Yievpoint • 4etia1t tinanain& .... an -rsency policy 
wb.iah '11101114 create aeri0118 social teuiona it it oontioue4 indefinitely. 
Ia early 1932 Tuswll crit1oi11e4 Hoover tor permUtin& tbe fri• 
eral det1o1t to increeH • .SO MDley recalled that during the CIIIIIPIIi&D 
at 1')2 nooa ot ioOaevelt'a e4Y1aera thouaht ot planaed 4efia1te •• 
all 1118t~t ot re8U'Iery.57 Marriur Ecclea, it hu been note4. wrote 
that 1o 4uacuaa1ou about relief ill the fall or 1933 no OM reterre4 
to the theoriaa ot 1. M. Ke,..a. The new a4111niatretion wane4 to 
apendios on a practical 'baaia. 
The tiuncaa ot the atatea wre badequate to _, the relief 
llurden • .58 Only public tuDda, aubjeat to federal control. wra nail-
able tor application to national eoonaalo probl .... 59 In a modern 
aalariea, panaiona •• a4111n1atratora bad to look tor oompanaatory flex• 
ibUity in currency and in the aational bullpt; the eoonOIIIY waa • ••• 
too rtsi4 to raa4,1uat itaalf bJ' individual action. 60 Eccles fOUDd 
buaiiiiUa 1aa4ere, who lat.er 4aplore4 deficit tinanoinc, approve4 ot 
Wlbalaocins tbe b\14pt in reapaue to practical naeda -- up to a point 1 
~11, R. o., &:.:. Hsoyu'• heem'c Polity (Hev York. J'ohn,Day. 
1932) 11. 16. 
lloclcl, W • E • • fnh[ et'4if I!eM 'a Piuy • U 13• 38, ed. bJ' llocl4, Ill. E • , 
1r •• and Martha Hev York, Harcourt, 1931) 99· 
Maley, flaploa4, Attar iiDa I•n• 367 • 
Chilb.o Marquia w. al'14 Ca.ter, Doullaaa. hbisa J.a a ~·iN•• B&!si•tx 
(llew TOI'k. Hev AMrioaa I.f.brary, i. Meator Book, 19.54 125. 
L1JIPIIII.llrh Welter, na·Jix I 7 nuu (Hev York •. Mllaraillan, 1935) 'j6. 
unl.le.lanoe in onler to support fiMnOift& by the IU'C of ore411ior insU· 
the use ot goni'IIIIIent credit tor the relief of the distressed aQl un• 
emp~ was radiea1.61 
Ia or1tioizina HooTer's deficit financing, Tugwell did not 
oppose unbalsncillf) the blldcet aa such, but he obJecte4 to unl.le.lanciDC 
it without gaining llllcll. HOOTer aug:ested the restoration of balance 
in two years, in the belief the p~perit;r would retura by then, 
'l'uawll did net belieYa that the measures which. Hoover supported 
throup deficit financing pr.oted reoonry.62 He did not object to 
Hoover's calculating the attai-nt of balance over a lonaer :period 
th•ll·ll fiseal year. .II& obeerve4 in l'J33 that the fiecel yeer vee 110t 
secre4s the fiscal period should be l~:~D& e!lough to be typical over a 
c:rele. 63 In later years Tu£vel1 referred to •tbe erbitrer;y annUli' 
aliA the •tetish' ot en a~~~Wall:r bela11eed budget.64 He took credit tor 
rent troa emerpne:r expenditures! there would be en attempt to balance 
the tol'lll!r while hart~~& bonds outatauUng - like e corporat1011 ~~ 
tor the latter • ~1 waa op,...& to printing press money.65 
61. Icicles, MarriDer s., aesw&u rumuera. 10l..o2. 
62. 'l'qwll, R. G., 111:• W"r'• I'MM'' PqliQl, 25, 
63. T\1&11811, R. G., •'l'lte Budpt,• unp!lbUthe4 note, Tugwll Pt"l'l!• 
64. Tugwll, R, G., •Irnplelllllntioc th.e General Interest,• fublic Afm!a. 
Ja1iptiop lll'rliJ• Vol. l, No. l, Autl.llllll 1940, 361 'l'ugwll, R. 0~, 
•The D1reCti?e,• 1our111 tt sgpto+ Pbi,e•opkr &14 lyriaprudtpg•. 
Vol. 7, No, 1, October, 1~41, 11. 
65. Iattniey JtWl S"'V• 
'l'ualftlll'a Cl'itiu 1dentit1e4 hila vith the reckless spen4era in 
the admin1atrat1on,66 They scotted at the •golden thecrlas• on deficit 
financing which he allece417 solei to Rooeevelt,67 Other observers 
plaoe4 little strus on thaoJ"iea. They bal1evaci thRt Keynea' ·<10rk 
pn •aca4elldc respectability• to New Deal econolldc thought, "But the 
tull impect or hie jj.yn..!j tl.ink111C wa more poet• than pre-natal 
as r ... r ae the Jlev Deal wa canceJ'De4.•&8 In acidition to practical 
aeecie aud theoNtical rationales, oonat1tutianal1ty had to be conaU-
ere4. The Adlllin1atratioa 1 aner it hoide4 to launch a apendill(l; pro-
era•• detarlldne4 that ita pelioiea of \axiq an4 ependillfl tor the public 
valtal'e v.re oonatitut1onal.69 
It we decidaci to apen4 &O'f'sX'IIIIItnt funds for public works and 
work relief tor the 'benatit of both oona\lllllllra and business -- a "ciinr-
aifie4 attack.• In 1932 Tligwll had ur&e4 public works and unamploy-
1118nt CIGIIIPflnaation for tha raatoraticm of purchasing power. 70 Duriq 
the ca~iiD ha o4viaad Rooeevelt to coma out for a t'ive•billion-dollar 
Pllltlio-vorlca prQCI'UI. 71 The public works program of 1933 vas tc;o 8111811 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
Kent, l"ranlt R., Without !inau• gzui!!l!l B!!bnior, 1934-1236 
(llew York, Will lui Mo~, 19)6) •77. 
Fl.7na, J'ohn T., lU. IJM•mU J:ldll (New York, Devin•A4air, 1948) 
182. 
Childs, Merquia 'II, am\ Cder, Douala••• Ethig• J.a .a E!ulinafl au,-
.IU• 123. 
'l'llf;vall, R. C., •The Rev Deals Tile Decline of Governlll8nt, • Pan 
II, Yeetm PRHU•l 9Hnrterlr, Vol. 4, No. J, September, 1951, 481. 
'l'uawll 1 R. G., vith 0\lUer, A. '1'. aDd Mitchell, o. s., "Flaw ia 
the Hoover Eoonoaio Plaa,• 9u'I'Ft Hi.Jtm, Vol. 35, No. 4• 1aDU• 
&ITt 1932· 329· 
Moley, Raymond, After Stvg Xgra, 173D• 
628. 
to pl.Mae hilll. 72 He insiete4 that the PWA 111811 not apendill€ money f'aat 
anoup to •ke ita atfaot fel11 ia 1933• aml he vaa r1&ht.73 
Tucwell ta.ore4 a larse-aoe1e prosrem of work relief for hu.aai• 
'-riaa eml econoad.e reaaona. lie calle4 HoOYer 1a excellent atudiae ot 
Ul&tiiiQilo,...nt po1nt1eu beoeuae the llmlrDMnt, mistakenly upectill€ 
quiok reoover,y, dld not follow thea 11p with relief planaa meanvhile, 
public an4 pr1w1:e relief was croaalf inaclequate. 74 Tupell atreuecl 
the h-nitariea aspect ot relief, aaaertin& that the pTel'DIIIent ball not 
bella 1111l&tetu1 ~t n118arcllf ia proteettng ten million familiae fraa the 
pcwertr vhich fell 011 cuiltJ and i1111ocent altkea he deolare4: 
For 'lll{f pert I hope our e;over-nt will never aooOIIIIIOdate 
itaelf' to the :ruth1e .. ctoetrine of aun1w11 I hope it 
may c011t1nue to repair vlultt~Ter raTa&•• of industrial 
ruthlee&DNa it ftalla itaaltr'\lllllbla to prnent.75 
RepreaaatatiTII Fre4 M, HU4abraa4t (Rep., S. D.) praieecl Tugwell tor 
hie belief that the IDT8rDDa&t waa reepoaai•le for the aecuritJ of 
Jl80llla to •• the llluaiaeaa ayata deniacl a livina.76 
12· 
73· 
74· 
15· 
76. 
llep.rcllq the eoo~c ilqlaot of relief. Tue;wall emphaaizecl the 
L1aUeJ• Jraaat x •• •War 011 tlba Breina T:ruat,• §sribaar'a Mllpa&y, 
Vol. 94. llo. 5, Hovembel', 1933• 264. 
Carter, 1. J'. ( UII.Dffidal Obaaner), lilt Ju pealere (New York, Silllon 
ellll SOhuater. 19,34) 88. 
Tucwell, R. o., "I£• BPP!'r'a !Fensm's Poligr, 11, 14, 16, 21. 
~ll. R, 0., Ac14reaa, D toratic State Ceatral Coaa1ttee, Loa 
Anplea. OotoHr 28, 1935, •rrun u Metpiatuua Btlgg, e. 
Gen'J'"•iO!!!l Dltcor4, 74th CGearells, let Session, Vol. 79. Part 4e 
March 2'7. 1935. 4.53.5· . 
62<). 
11884 to lNS.ld up pm-cbesine: ~r. He etatsd that sixty to seventy per 
oent of vor~·relief funds went directly for ~see, providiQB cuetoaera 
tor private enterpr1ae.77 Harold Iuea reported en erEUJ~~ent in \dliah 
Tugwell, because be favored federal proJects 'Which would put •II¥ people 
to work quielrq, e:~tpreaaed a wider view ot wet constituted creat111C 
waltll then Ma4ame Perkins, 'Who fawn<l local projecta as more likely 
te be socially deeirable.78 In 1934 'h8wll oelled the FE& the •tore• 
1110et ot all the recovery ~~&~~Dciea.•?l) In 1935 he atete4 that the P1lRA 
vas aipifioent because it •b4tpn at least a partial restoration lilt 
80 
'IN.1111C power. • 
Bueiaees not oa.ly pined oustoaera for cona\llllllr sooda tbroush 
the relief proaram; public works provide4 a •rket for the produeta of 
hR'17 illduatry. The or1&1nsl NRA propoaal ot Tu&wll aDd lfuP .7obuon 
conta1ne4 a achea for IIIIPle~Tins public-works fullda to stiallata dellb· 
ereteq a particular industry at a aiYeD tt•;81 the separation of NRA 
· aad PWA preYente4 the direct aid wioh the COOrdination of the Tuswll-
Tl• Tupell, il. G., fU §\risl!ealou4 (New York, Doubledey, l<J~7) 57. 
78. IU.., Harold L., J1aM 11 .!fiBs Da Stprv .9l. .W, 28•30· 
"{fl. 'fucwll, R. G., •:Relief end Reconatruetion,• Addreaa, National 
Conference of Social Workers, Ka-• City, May 21, 19~. in 1hA 
BAttle .t2£ Pszrnsx. 311. 
80. 'fucwell, R. C., •Your :Future and Your Nation,• c-nces.nt Ad• 
dreaa, UDivera:lty of New MBiao, .U'Itllquarq,ue, 1\ID8 10, 1935, l§IIA 
,. Btl••. 8. 
81. :Perklu, Prances, fU Jltotenlt l.IIU (New York, Vikill6• 1947) 
211. 
414 paerallf aU the •nutaoturan ot construction equipaent. 
Tucwell axplaiDed in dltail that the public-works and raliet pro• 
aram ~ide4 ~!.neee with cuet~ra in line with the basic intention 
ot reTh1.nc tne enterpr1ee, not uc..-oh1118 upon it. There ha4 to lie 
haft craate4 a uavy burdln ot axpeneaa tor upkeep, driv!.na up tax 
rataa and reduoiq •e-••mni.tiae' a-..1lable income. A 4epraeaion vae a 
aoo4 tille to bu114 a lot ot 4eaira~ pulllic works, but • ••• they 
eholll4 lie the apex ot a pyl'P!14 vhOn lovar courees are supportiq pull-
lie e~tarpr!.ees.• Leet-rak1D« 148 necaeeary it there vas not to be a 
t1PUciallf OWtrwhel.Ja1D« Jl1'0Cftlll ot public works, and it the aovem• 
.. nt ..- not to take OYer productive en$erprise.82 
'!.'\lcWU, the er4eut ehoHte of 11101'11: relief and :PUblic works, 
held longrun view wb1oh took hilll out ot the category ot reckleea spud• 
ere. Jfe cone14ere4 4et1cit financ!.Da a crude balanctDa device.83 He 
4ao1are4 that it -14 haft bMa wiser to have kept the rec1p1ente ot 
rallat in health and CCIIIfort throup a system of increes!.ne; ecooOIIlc 
aetivitiea \han to allow a 4eel!.De which urpntlf require4 relief. 84 
awre that Pllblic wortas, thoqta they edaht be eelt-liquidatina, -u 
82. 'l'u&Wll, R. G., lhf. Str1ska .Lull• 3'). 
83. Sea above, Chapter III, Seetioa, •'lllpell's Lona•Run 'l'hink!.na.• 
84· 'f\l&wll, R. o., J.Adreae, n-craue State Can\ral Cclllllllittea, Loa 
.&~~plea. October 28, 193.5, 8. 
have to lie paid for by tuture cenarati0118.85 He oba&ned that all 
upea41turea wbieb d14 not CG into direct relief were beina 1nveste4 
in oapital asseta an4 wwld lie repaid to the sovar~~~~~~tnt -- banks and 
rallro.48 were peyina ott their JllC loau 1 the HOLC allli :rCA had sOUDd 
.naaca• to ahov for their operat:l.ona 1 Public Works had aood inYeat-
•llta iD llouaina. brtqea 1 and ut:l.litiaa. 86 Moat of the f'a%"11111 wb:l.ch 
reeehecl aiel f'Z'Cllll Tu&well'a ~tlement Adm1111stratillll were to be 
..ortlzecl on a torty-;year baai11 at three per cent interest. 87 
to the restoration of' prodUction in normal ways. HI alao balia.e4 that 
6etio:l.t fillanc:l.na 111Wl4 lie iuutf'lcieat to pro110te t'ull reOOYecy and to 
assure apiut economic collapse ill the future vi tllout illlportant iDSt1• 
tutiODSl chancea.88 HI noted that Rooae..,.lt ha4 to ao •on and on• 
with an unllalancecl buclpt • .svbai4:1.z1ne; the 1110at Clemandin& el-nta Gt 
the aOODQaV.89 !'Z'Cllll the events or 1929·33 and subsequent partial reooY-
ery throup &Oft~t action. wrote Tuawll. bi& buailless •n end 
Farley an4 Morpnthau, vho coul\lllllecl the caseation of unorthodoa: CC\111111811.• 
eatery apen41D&o •learnecl notb:l.na.•<JO When Rooea..,.lt attel3Pte4 to with• 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
!'uflwllo R. G., •The 'l'h11't ECOilCllllf', • Address, Rochester Teeahera • 
Aeaooiation, Rocbeater, Jlav York. •pril 9, 1935, limA Pru• i!tl.eMe• 
s. 
Tuawll, R. G., •A Fireaide B713J10sium,• 27. 
'l\laWll. R. G •• "Chansill& Aerea,• CJ1rnllt Hlt.!tory, Vol. 44, No.6, 
September, 1936, 62. 
Sea abcwe, Chapter III. 
'fuawll, R. G., •A Planner's View of Acrioultura•a Future,• .Tourpel 
.It lim larn='R'• Vol, )1, I'CI. 1, :raft'uary. 1949. '57· 
'fUawell. 11. o •• "'l'ha Ccapreaialaa: a-Yelt,• 329•30. 
I 
/ 
dftv wlleidiea an4 ftlief s:paadilll in 19)6, the recession of 1937 • ••• 
abowcl that 1t owl4 not be dehe wUhout disaster in an unart1oulah4 
eoCIIUIIIIIF ,o9l 
well's abort-run apeo1t1cat1ona, waa uaaco~n1e4 b7 basic inatitutioaal 
ohanaee for the lone run, allll wa iDtlllplioable in tar~~~~~ ot hie int'luenoa. 
When the New Deal IIIOVed into ita eecon4 phase in 1935, shifting, in 
the wwcls ot the historian Eric &:llclmen, t'l;'<llll New Nat ionalial to New 
J'ree4c:a, RooaeYelt applV'l'ed. It w.a the President hilll&elt', Mole7 wrete, 
••• who cradualll/' w'bordiDated spend ins tor public worka 
• • • to apeii41U tor VOirk ftl1e1' • • • and we slowly came to 
reaard spend1118 tor work reliat' aa -.ch ae a naeded econo-
mic atlwv~ aa a rellet ... ~.92 
the d ru\a ot the ••ODOIIIII'· Hie chaapA attitude on eoQlc:aic quee1110IUI 
alao retleote4 llaaio poliUoal teftlo,..ata. The Second lfew Ileal 
appea:rri to la• 'Hiaind ratller then 1ae• a reaursent libe:ral1811. 
takin& cretlt tor noonry ln ap"iwl.tue an4 lnclustrial procl.uction. 
The aew aoe1 wou.lcl lie IJOtial Jw!Uoea nto:ra wa 1ue:parable t':raa reOOY• 
WT• 'Pile Prea14ent aQa~Ued a p:ropam to CoQareas tor the eata\lliah• 
lllltlt ot thna tnea ot aeeuritys the naoue or atran4e4 populatilllla 
91. 'fu&wll, R. o., "A .Pla~mer'a Vlev ot Asrioultun•s Future,• 37. 
92. Maley, ~. N')tr 1tJM TVD• 367-'8. 
/ 
throush efficient use ot natural resources and intelltcent diatribu-
tion ot the -u ot Uvel1hoo4a Mcur1ty apii!St the llllljor hazards ot 
Ute •• WlftllllOJII8!lt• old ase. 111 ..... and physical handicapeJ and 
houatas.93 
tonulated with the advice ot bus iDe• leaders. In 193.5 there were 
still about the million pe:raou on reliet rolla. Delllasogues like 
file7 Lonao Dr. 'l'ovll8ell4. and :raner CcNPUn exploited the situation. 
It •• deoiW to tlll'D over the 1.5 million unemploya"le• on relief 
rolla to local aaeao1ea. wh1<1h -ld reeei'l'tl federal assistance. 3·.5 
las the fiRA and all PWA activities ~ .. pt a tev normal public build• 
1118 operations. Wacs• vou1d lie •"- the dole but 'Hlow the pft'f1l1l• 
ias private.aoale. The WPAo uD4er JfaZT7 Hopkins, aleo head ot VERA. 
ws to intesrete relief wort vitb the pleiiiUid de'l'tllo~nt ot natural 
reaounea, eapeeially lend sad wter. WPA utilized •- forty n:ist1118 
tedeftl aU&inltltrative asenclea in orpnizias ita projects. Three 
llllportant new asenciea wezw orpni.zedt the Rural !lectritication Main• 
iatraUon. the National Ywth .Mainutrauon. and the Reaettl-nt 
Atm1nutrat1on.94 
Basil Rauoh c-nte4 that l1111ues or class interest were 1nYOlve4 
in the ehanae to a new prosram in l9l!h he blamed the opponents ot the 
aa.lntstration for introducing claaa antasonisma into public affairs. 
Rauch asserted that the Liberty Lsaeue, which trie4 to override party 
diviatons and win elections on the basis of class interest, climaXed 
the ref'Wlal of business to oaapromise or cooperate with the adllliniatra-
tion ·- even when business had a fair share in the i'ol'IIIUlation ot 
policy. The Democratic ,perty had to appeal to farmers and labor to 
me~ up for the lose of conaerTatiYe aupport.95 
Jraraers and labor, lllllanwhile, were increallin& their deJ>lllnda. 
Charles Beard attributed the Democratic victory in the mid•tel'lll elec-
tiona of 1934 to •thunder on the lett.• It was expected that the 74th 
COII&l'N• wuld dellllnd an end to cmceeaiona to bus ineas end a full· 
fla<lpd farmer-labor PI'OSftlll for recovery and refol'lll. The labor --
ment all4 l1haral1aa in pneral were reaurpnt -- in 1935 they criticized 
the social aecurity prop'lalll for ita liaited scope. Some busineaa men, 
leedera ot the Ch.-.r.ot c-rce, decided to accept the President's 
otter to confer with thema tllay ho)Nid to check the impact or a "rediaal• 
COII&l'N•·'6 
•Thulil4ar em. the lett• referred to more people than the follovera 
ot Loq, 'fownaell4, aD4 Cove;ltl1n.f7 S..Ol Lubell offered a panetrat1nc 
95· Rauch, Baail,l'UHiftory.ttJibi.JuJllal, 15'1· 
']6. Rauch, lilasil, .!'4! H1etqn .It SllaJiu.laal, 138•39. 160-61; their 
concili,atina attitude soon coat tham their :positioaa. 
97. See below, Chapter X:, Section, •The Undistributed Profits Tax.• 
aaalJsl£ ot the political developaenta Which accompanied the poliey 
chance ot 1935· Lubell called 1935 "The Year of Decision:• 
'l'o go beclc to tho old order or to 1110ve fonerd to sa.-
th111C 41ftareat'1 'l'bat _. the tuaaUon poaed tor dec1• 
B1on in l?J5, in countleai different 'Wilfa • in e't'flcy 
phan ot life • • • • the - iaawe was WOUld the • pocl 
old a.ys• or unchallenced buaineaa dominance be reatored? 
or vas AMrtoa to M reabaJed'l 
In 1932 Jlooanelt bad aplit ott '" •prosreaaive• Republican Y011e or 
the IUdweat aod Jar waat. In 1935 Ilia ap.-1 ahittad •rrcu aCift8&8 to 
populatloa.• Mora social lec1alat1b .. eucted in 1935 than in eey 
other year 1a Amerloaa history. lla vict017 in 19,36 retlaotad the 
cll01oa vb.ioh tile Aarioaa people bad •de 1a "The Yur or n.otaton.• 
1936 we •the 101' ot raalia-nt• lll which the o-orata broke the 
Repu.bliceu• poet-Civil War clCIIai...,., MOIIIIi£18 the net1oa'a •n-1 
•Jority Jerty.•98 
The t:riWIIJh ot 1936 we a~ pined without a bitter oODt11ot. 
RaOGTBI7 restored the oQlrap ot buiaasa aen, who were ready to act 
as if there ba4 Men no dap:oaea1011. The ludera ot orpnitled labor 
alae raoovared their nerve. 1ohll L. Levie' deand that the J,. F. L, 
ellbraoe the prinoiple ot induetrial wtionl- or let a new labor IIIOYa• 
aent o~nize the .. aa-productioo 1Ddvetriaa 1n41cete4 that •at luat 
oae srouP ot labor leadera were detualaed not to co back to the old 
mer.• 'l'b(' key to the ebaiiCB la labor un1oa1-. t.ubell concluded, 
<)8. Lubell, S~tiiiUd, IU I3Wltt. !!L ,AI!!el'i!l!!!n Pplitict (lfev York, Double• 
<laJ, An Anollo:r Book, 1956) 48-47. 
we the tus1na ot the interests ot s-sarent end netive-stook workere 
in the aau-product:l.oa 1nduatl'1ee were reoial and rel1gious aataaenia.e 
bad lleea at :rona did.aive forces. There we 111 rise ot e cClGIIIIOn class 
oonsoiousness IIIDOll8 all worken, "qroes vera another group ot YOtera 
which deteradnad to so forward rather tban llaok, 
And eo it wnt all thl'QUCh the oouat17. It woul4 be iJipoe-
aitlle to t:r .. e in full all the duterent wya in which the 
quutioo -· Whether to ao lla.cll or forwl'd -· w.a asked ot 
the A!Mrioan people. s-tillu the que17 was put bluntly 
in ao any wo:rda. More oRen it ws illlplicit in the loaio 
ot e't'Snts or in rellindera ot the 4epreasi011.99 
Reala....t wa equally ahal'P Ul01'JC the opposition. Bankers' con-
tributions to DIIIOoretio 08lllpll1gn f'lancls dropped fi'DIII 25 per cent ot the 
total 1D 1932 to 3 per oent 1D 1936· Many voters, especially in rural 
areu, returned to the Republloan:U. ot their ancestors. At the same 
time, in the induatrial ce11tera political allasianoea which had -raad 
from the Ch'il War wre •uprooted for 8004 1 ' whether the cities wre 
heevily foreip-'born or ~~ative AMrtcan, Catholic or Protestant, misrent 
Necro or tillite in aake~p. Lubell OIIIUilud.e4J 
A new utionalizina force had clearly been injected into 
American politics. In tbe Jest American political al1an-
118Dts haft alW)'S tollow4 H01iionl!ll 1111118• 'l'be Revolt ot 
the City, hOVIIftr, had dreVIl tile - olass•oonsoioua line 
ot eoonaaio interest aOJ'OSs the entire count17, Oftl'l'i41na 
not onq resJoul distinottoM but squally stronc oulturel 
41fterenoes.l00 
'l'lle shift trca the first New Deal to the second New Deal, con• 
fil'lllld attar the hitter OIUQPSign ot 193{>. -· to 8 srest extent empirical 
99· Lubell, Sem!.lel, %U J'utpn S: W"iMP Pflitics, 47·51. 
100. Lubell, Saael, fU hUn It "irtign PolitieS, 51-53· 
in ita nature, retlectiq econOIIIic exicencies and beaic chanaes in 
Alllltrican political patterns. One could net explain the transition in 
tax. ot 'l'lipell'a 1111'lueaca. His illaplct d~~riq the firet New Deal, 
deaptta hie adYOCaq ot the llltio~~ali&atlon of bellktne:. wa 1110re pro• 
buaiaees in a real aeasa thaD bwlillaas beltnad. 'I'ugwll's raapcmsi• 
11111t7 for the •anU•bW11neaa• aacond New lle81 was ftatl)" overestimated 
by his critics, althoup he did peft'o:rm the educative function of •k· 
ill& knOVII to the Preaiolent an alt-tive policy. By 19.35 hie illtlu-
eDoa at the White Howle wae Oil the wae. He was absorbed in the HC\11'• 
1t7 work of the Reeettl-nt Admiaiatration. Sipiticantl)", the trau• 
ition of 19.35 HW the aaoalldanoe in the White Houae of the tl'Wit•bwlter 
'tOIIIIII,V Corcoran. 'l'u&wll'a iuUtutional idees wre anti•antltruat. 
A. consideration of 'fucwll •s relationship to the two New Deale 
indicataa that be we intareiRed in both the top and the bottca of the 
eOOIICIIIIV in accordance with hie hol1etic ecOilOIIIic thoupt. Hie part in 
the two Hew Deale, and hill lnatitutiocal eftluetion of them sa aurtaca, 
aho:rt-run 110-ata, do not augeat a re'l'iaioa of the conclusion that 
he looklri on buaineaa aDil ita place in the soh- of thinae euentiall7 
in an f.lllperaonal lillY• 
~ 
IV~ ill 19)\ the ,.._ ~ that Aala.._. SatnJMI7 '1'118• 
.UIIiah' '"'- .._, sa..na17 ot .\411'1.W.t11ft1.1 r- 1e.INU'f \llllU 
the IIW41e ot lea, *- tu S..h toDthw4 'l'UcWU'• ans•uoa to 
the Dftll' CII'I!8M4 JN1UOR, a oonxo•IWI OOMr hla Jr1C•rt101l took 
plaee 1a the PNU a1141 Oil the flwr ot the Saah,2 n.ohiDS a elt•• 
taa lfl01a7, 1t .........,_u,., taean. Won the snau ec.t.tt,ee Oil 
.ApS..W.wn an4 ,.,.....,.3 
I'Nilk !raMo 1a hla •"- ot Minh 2tao 19341 ••• r 4 that the 
aM••na,1ca .. OS'MtiDS the JN1tlca ot V8iler Seontu7 ee,peoia\14' 
tor fucnUJ r.n br nald the lilltlShCIGII that the 70W1& Jn'OfUa• 
WillA haw lllllft JOIIIU' t1wt tmtr • •ri'T a.n hu l.OIIa-aaae plaaa -
•He Jmav the talk alKM the• thiDaa ./Jiev Deal~ 'betas •• s•r· 
Uf ............ Cia Marek 26, 19»• ID approprlaUGD ld (.S stdo 
-'7) CII'I!8M4 the _. ot V.S.r ~ • .S !hat .... a.,, lfl.roh 2&, 
'1'lqJwU to tile ,..tuoa fit Wei' SeoNtaq ,...._., to the ~ 
.....,_ A.PPJ'OprlaUoa Aft ot 1935, •tth •• • ••• eo wrhll tut tu 
pl.& ..... lie en.'-lSaUa all4 t11le4 a-41•Mlr· I llellne tbu 
wul4 lie the bft1e ~-··' A IIDilth later, oa AJrll 24, 19,., 
auu••1t llMSM\ell 'f1I&WU tu the..., ottt ... ? 
tu ...S.t ... ,• IOillll:a-4 • 4Uln to 11.,. 'l\tc1leU tile nta ter 11141-
081 ..-...uoa ot tu .-n. ... ..-,1e. 8 AD u\l•RocNMrrelt fttllor, 
.... tor foral.ltt• 1D UtlM aa4 lolls aa4 IO'IPl«r -• tor ita 
MW•'' Bet•llllll 110 BrDIIftltte 4M111 to 81"11 'f1I&WU _.. ,_.. 
'* wa ft1i4 u tar u th~W -'• thtW 4!4 aot aOOUfttelT a..anlle 
tM Pnau.n•a •UftU•• 'RIIll'fltlt oout.....a the pr'CIIIOUOD I ... 
ot t~au Bata '1'lNitel' 11r .- •PHhl•n o1 Pllllllo ;pretenaoe ter 
hla u4 !lie aentNJ • .lO fte Jll'NldeM •-tt.n4 ea tunau 1a !118-
'· .,. a. , . 
....... 
10. Dll," 'P• M. 2). lo. 19. Jlq 71 19,.. llh 
&40 • 
.U•a pnatt.ea aa a14 to 'llhe • 1 •tloa ot U'Pil'll ... _...., ....,.,_ -
ao'll a a1alla1 '110 ~a fiUI" Iltll ftfOJ.'MtiCID ot llaalo 1Datit11• 
u.... .Aa ~a'll Pftnt•l oaul«eftU• mteh -.u '• or1Uoe 
OftdODIDijl ,.. hie ,.:raonal tlnallole1 at'lluaUCIIlo '1'he pr'Oiteuor ha4 
tate a out ta 1...-. ta Oli'IU' to .....,. the lfew Deal a he couJ.4 wU 
ue 'llhe ftiaa, fi'Ca $'7JOO to SU.OQO, lilteh the pu rUCID atferta4. 
Ill ona 111tak, at tlle H4 fll .Qrtl, 19,3.\, -.u •• 'llhfta 
•TM Rnua to D .. .,. •• .-rteaa SOot.nr ot lfewapaper 
auton, --~· Apftl. 22.. 19,.. 
•Joarca•• rua.,_ aa4 tu :ra~,· lfev Yon S'llato •akUII 
AaiOiiltlCIIlt lllttalOo Alft1 a8, 1934•11 
a ....... :a., ... , hta .-taauea ot 'llapell to:r Vll4v s.ontu7 to 
1'6TOluUea, the Naiaaba ot a ......... tteok oa ol'iUoa ot 'llhe a41dal• 
atntua.12 .t.aa quotall hallk &tat'• ., Tat oa the ttret a44rua• 
•a. ....... tho etitlon uul ,.., a:Ua11eaa4 lille peaaa4 polM 1a the 
lllllllbSPa.•1' 'l'qwll 'llllllwMt4l.J' uthtpaW a atOJ'Il over hta .fl1liiD<" 
u •• 
u. 
'-'· 
•••ae 111!.1oh, tile - ....... ob111 na. either • ... looke4 liD 
tUe1ld pol1Uoal OJportuA1• •• •• IPJ!J npuaenW the •turel effort 
Of a tall COM 14.-1 l:&aW liMa nrtllt to via th- MY eet .... •l4 '1'bl 
quotatllos nad.t 
It 11 not to M ~ thlt a ..-nt10D vh1oh a4e 
eo tolonal • ta11.wle ., •ooill • .,....., will INOOMcl 
..- Mtter 1a li'ICOftltl'Uotioa. 1't 1• tne that soYerD• 
_, etfa1n en llOY 11ltJ'UWI to etllere who alWJ't lla4 
J8bP•lnp conllftlf.Jia tile old. a-..uulUw 14111• But 
._.. than 11 ,.l'f'laba to M leaftl4 abol.lt eo ocapl1· 
tatell a bUlMN, 1114 when .-v a\Utu4ee are not lbare4 
:1J7 a powwfl1llliDOI'l\T, 1t 11 d.OIIMtlal whether the pial 
will lie ..., np14 or ..., oc.pl.ete. It ill aot tJ:U 
tl:&at w lball lie allle to Cfer FOUl' pnentioa of \t81• 
ftftitJ' _. • wtlollf •v tal ,._ J0'1 -• u pacl\l• 
.... .,_ v1ll eoatJ:ont thl - 014 ..... with ... 
.-v ........ u 
AtUr '1'11pell1 t CIOIIfU.Uoa, .Daa noelll4 that he 414 not bap te 
plet'tu'e lltwelt u a eoaeenaUw Wlt1l hie aca1Dat1011 ln Aprllf he 
appreoiat• the bl.aOl' of the t1Mt1oa, plae1na oa hill 411k a plotuft 
fd hS..lt ~ at DartiiG'Ilth •taatilla bet141 a trettio tip pla1al,f 
..,...., .,.,,,, nm- .... , 1Utlb'·"16 
Ia -.u•a thlr4 epeull 1a a ,..k he told. the llev York &Mte 
BaUers Auoo11Uoa that tile AA.l •• • • • • aa ecOBOIIIl• bill of rillttl 
tor 11M ta~n ••• , • '11110 lle4 eet up ao crv of •:rect.atat1on.•l7 
:sa ...... - 7. 19.34. lj. 
Ita •••••• - 7. 19.34. l4-l5· 
.. lfltftl'•· Vol. 2), 110~ a, ,..... 25, 19.34• 10. 
·~•· Cr1Uoa ot Jllaa bJ s,..oh•••" 10. 
tq ,. apeMh at a DqaJ"tMat fJit a--He exhlblUOfto ta llalat-
atu. all4 Ia 4n'llliaatlo crt ...,iateAGe h._n .. .S.t ~· Prea14ent 
appreft4 ~ JII'CIJe•••• atatlDCo •w. are aotna thf'QU&h noluttoa. aot 
NYOluUoa.•l8 .A Ol'ifllo tat...,..'-4 RooNNlt•a .-r~ra a\ the Depart• 
.at ot C sreo aiiDiUoa .. aa •11'01"11 at ot TIJ&Wll'• ru.t~~auon 
al\4 the pnfeUOI"'a 14M• oa ~lion thi'QICh naUonal planallll•19 
.n.. la a 11 .,,.1 •• ata17 oa fucwll•a tbi'H APJ'11 a44re ..... 
H\414 that • ••• hla wftll aa4 s-.- to haYe llllUJ:'IOil4' a •rW 
t.....S•• llllt laa OOilala'f Ul• ta..,. oo~~aenatha te~ .. P'" tlaa e 
a.v ••Plot to ,.,_,.. tho .,....,. fill ,..Uealtoa.•20 Blair Jolla OGDOlU· 
4e4 tbat 111 the UlNa .,..,... '1\ipel.l 4ea1414 hta tatareat ia aaUGaal 
phaRIIII•2l loU•' OCIUlutOG wa JaD Jleta. 'l'Uawll 414 aot 4elilr 
hta t~ 111 •U-1 plasf.118alaa...., a poaut ... •poetUoa ot 
Ilia ~ - .. Da SaUeatet. 
Olin~. tqwl.l be4 tbe s 1 1 ,.tna ...._,.. OYer hia oonttna-
uoa 1a 111114 1IIMia lle 4eUrere4 ~ thn-e 4144J'e .... Ia APrt.l• TheN 
....,.. -..u ... ,~utlttoauou, • 41£Plaaattou. of hia a4Jua'Milt to 
.~..... Ita u.... •s.• he 4S4 aot ...,. wre weU lalOWa •• at 
leaa' he ba4 Aili•••e4 thea .ur ,_.. artflloa had 4ta'ort414 hta 14eaa 
ta PIUOatl.lls ttl• to~ pu'bUo. Mh reaa111on w tile poliUoal taota 
18. 
19· 
20. 
21. 
to 11011t lllfiiMelitfta ot lte kU4. 
oa the poe1Uve •W.• 'l'llptll tol4 tbe ti'Uth -· bla real opia-
1011 •• at DtJ'QI.Iutb iD hie eftS.tl of "'- Sllplot ot thO llev Deal Oil 
.-.:J'ioaa U.te. 'l'he Jlllv Daal 414 not ltllli04J 11he iuUt.Uonal obanau 
*illao u •• aea4rpleiaD. he bad~~ he 414 not contradict 
h1Ntlt ill hie villi'IIJIIIo d a .....,., nt a4111ll1etrator, to JarUo1-
pa118 111 s..4il.te l'IOOfW7 aoth1.ty. 1ft. pural eeUlllfllte ot the lillY 
Deel tllln, pan after the Dt:n.Mttla a,..eh l'llllfllilled the ... aa the 
nal.uaUoa 111lloh he~ at ~r. IUs cr1ttoe 41apJ.e7e4 ao 
41.,..111lon to 4il.t1apiall l>et.....,. hie .-s. . •• an aea4elaio oute14er 
al*4 llll w$ aD4 work u an a411talatl'aU'fe 1Del4era 1ih17 orU1oise4 
Ilia wdt lll .......,._,, w1a)a 1ibeJ had ao reel reeeon to tear,22 oa 
tP 11Ula lflt hie prot"tMorlal opla1on, wllle, s.a 1111e1r rr-. ot refer-
..... thiJ' llilht wll haft eoneltfnd ra41tal. 'l'llawll'• llartl110111111 
.,.._a~ '1111&114 haw ap,..nll ft41oal, ra11her 1lllan OOBMI'WUfto 
-, 'llhl4tll lle ~ 1111e lillY DHl .oeaeuau.-.. h'oDloallf, the tall\11'1 
ot flltaWll•• criUee to ~ hie .lutiwUooal 14- vorked, la 
1111la S.Uteaee, 11o Ilia a41nta ... 1ft. ,.......,ll'RUoa a,..ollee 414 not 
OOIIp).ete\J' oc ad Sellatora • ... to tllt.Dk up aGM11hlft6 baat.4ea 'ft41-
oel' all4 •••,.luUoalat' 110 .U.t toto tlle reoor4t•13 Ilia a44re .... 414 
22. ... .,.. rr. 
2). ·~· CriUu of 'fu&Wll lal11114 -, steeohu,• 10. 
lllut the Saatorial attack so.nt~d - at a OOIIIIIS.U .. heariq Chair-
.u EUtaoa D. (fi8Uoa 14•) Sldth •• to ccnoaJttftta on the aaNaU• 
ally il'ftlaftl'lt teet that Tuawll wa act a •4tn farar.• 
Tupell au the Pftddent oel'tatl'll7 had autr1e1ant reaSOD to 
otloiJI!te a fi&ht ower tha pzor....,.•a prll!Wtion. 'l'qwll•s QOIIMt• 
ttoa vtth the AU au a Pure Foe4 aD4 Dnp bill hall a1'01Uie4 ohar&N 
~t he Je:NOnUied ft&i81uteUoa. 2l · 11 the apriac ot 19.31+ hoatU.it)' 
to hie preMue 1n '1111etactea lla4 'Ileac. so 1reat that the a4ainietl'tl• 
ttCID 8CI'll4 e&Jtet to hln OIU141nble 41tfioult)' in obtaininc the 
Seaate•a 4011tissauoa.2.S 'ho SO.then SenatCII'I, the colorful E4 &lith 
ot Sou.th Cuolina alii! the 11011 lfev Dealer Harry BJr4 ot Y1rpn1a • led 
the attaok on 'fu&wll• 
1J8 atated oa the tleor ot tbe SeNtta on J'uae 8 that ha ha4 
ehanp4 kill ort.cf,Dal imantton to VOM for '.f'uswll 'beoaue the latter, 
who V0\114 'bee._ the • ...,.. ot ._iculwre, 414 not 'belieYe 1a Merieea 
prtneiplea ot 69"~t 1 Bf1'd oi\ed aa the baBia tor kill views Tu&• 
weU•a a44rue, "\''..e Pr1noipJ.a ot Plennill& aD4 the IaeUtutioa ot 
taS..S•1aire,• deli'reret 'befon tile uerioaa :loonallle Aeeee1aUoa ia 
Duea\'er, 1CJSJ.,26 Buator Bla* ot Ala._ 41upn4 v1th Bfl'd'• 
interpl'ftaUoa ot ~·· 144lu 1a ...-nl ..a the llearhr, 1931, 
64.5-
• ..- u ,.ns.a:r.2'7 
Oa ltulll 9t Ia the anate. .,.. 4llltae4 in the RoOOl'4 a lette:r 
,.._ Tttcwll Ia I'IIN to .,..... •• lar&W.17 ceaoemtns a atattllellt 1a a 
Wullf.llc"D ....,,.,.., .att:ritii&W to Tlapall. Ia tile qv.otaUoa ia the 
,..... """'•11 .... I'M4 tllat PJOJII e1 erne nta to the .v. Aot • ... 
\flU Jel'llllt u to ooatiaHI •t w alftdr Ire,. \leea 4oiJ18. lt w 
n.l4 aet • Ht'tiaB Ia coun. w wu.\4 baw to atop aotns oenau 
"1illp ~I' pruen .~ ..... • 'fllewll WIOta the Baator that 
tlla ...-.uoa ...... ,~aUF ..... ._, .,.. .. olal'llll that '!'qwll lla4 
ao ....,. .. trw tile c.uuwuoa, the ODU"Uo or the preweau.,.. fit 
~.28 .a.\UallJ' 0 'f11awl,l JOtalt4 CIU that the ~ 414 Ia .a 
..... ..,.,.oH •l"'lltUnc ee;un •"te, 111111tll ,., 11 entad the vUl ot COD-
.,.._ 1 he MUewd that a _.. a,..1t1o lev WOtll4 S'ell\tee 4epen4anl• oa 
OOIIJ't tlat~ton ot ~10JIIll f.llteta ta .tune the eouru• 
po!lft' to atop adablf.atftltive a11t10N,. he ...._, :rupeat tor Ju41o!al 
11:'4 '• sri.._.. repl'llinc prtnctpJ..a ot gover.-at • it aot 
wl!lt to othen, WN ..-tae to hs-elt. se~~ator &lith obJected to 
oOiltU.Uon tor other l'!lldOlUI· Kf.IJ oppoeltton to 'fuawll he4 e PNO• 
Uoal .tteet. clelq1Jia the pJeiMNe ot the BeQate. Sllttho aa Chal..a 
fit the a-t"" ca Acl'inltve u4 l'erestey, ,.. in • atrateato poet• 
11· 
28. 
Uoa to hol4 up eont~uoa. ~ ..U.• ... ooneeJ'IIe4 Oft:r a.tth'a 
~ 'Ratlaaa he Wl'Me to tbe Pnddeftt on May 14. paaa1D& •loll& 
S..tor a,:wa• Mli&f'8\1oe that a .ntoe ta -ntee 'II)' snato:r IJo:r:r1a 
to:r repo:rttq the a.traatioa f'a'toftb]¥ VOill4 be the beat way to pt 
Mlltt-uoa. 29 oa Jue S ,_..* lilat CC~mBattlll to hf.a oolua that then 
•• •utue aeue• ta Se1111t01' a.tta.•• 4elq1JI& 'f\asWll'a eontt-Uoat 
.,.._11. Jraat 4eelal'e4, VI'Ml4 oontU. to be very powerfUl, 1'81ak111& ou:r 
e1n1taaUoa, zoesa~ ot SeDate .. uoa or taaotioa& :etueill& h111 a 
tlt:&. a11111 a eal.ar)- tMJe~~ee 110\114 Obaase aothill8 at aU 1 •• to the oltJeo• 
Uoa that 'rQswll •• not a •tin ruwr.• Jfoth1J16 could be szoe l'fAtou-
1-.. •.. Bia 1101118 ta la the olQacla.• 30 
lD eer]¥ ;r.,. Roclattve1t ·~ a.tth to let the -11111t1oa -
ov.t ot ....,., .... 31 8111\h }!.84 si~U two :eaaoaa tor hta atalllls (1) ._,. 
wU •• not • •urt f•~•· ( 2) tha poait1oo ot OMer saonta:ry ba4 
•aUJJ84 into• the aaneultUJ'al appJ'OprlaUoa 'bill withO!Ilt Ilia lmovl"4p 
when oal7 a tew SeaetJJn w:e • the noor.32 By 11u1e acaa ot a.tth'a 
..uaa&uea .zoe •t;hOl'OUf,b~ 'fe-4° at hla.33 
oa 1\me 8 a 4e'llata ftV Slllth.'• 4elafi11! taotioa took pla.. ia 
the Sellllta. Sellllton X.S ot !Allllida. Rob1naon ot Amuaa, Vbealer 
ot Mo!ltalla • aJI4 Berrie ot Jrebftllla • ._.., Smith ot pre.,..tiq the .-. 
at.ttee t.- tuUc up tilo 111 1•\ioa. S.aator OlaN at 1'1r&laSao CJaah'-
._ .r tho App.~opdattou Collllt._, •platned that hie ooatttee 4tA 
aot UIII'P aav t\moUou ot the c:-tttn oa A&rtoulture ta mN~tias tM 
UV oft'loe la the qnO\lltvra). hf.U; _..,.1'8 of tho C0111111.\t .. 08 Qri• 
oul.Rno Mft!D6 OD • .uoc-tttee ot the 1-ppropriaUou ~''" 
a.l.lna wltll tM qrtoultwal t.t:U. aJQUOHd. the leatelattoa. 'lfhl.tl 
•• ta the tinot ellarp ot S...'P JlueeU ot 0e01'aU• Smf.tll auW 
$kat be ohjeetel • )lftaotpl.a to the one\loa ot an unaer Secntarphipa 
be W 110 ,.nonal teeltas ..-tut 'llllpell or au4ea!o aohteve~~~at. hut 
he hellftwl4 that a •~~~m ot the 110111 OOill4 heat till the posUiOil. fta• 
11U. the Seaailo dnJPMl ~tuoa•a IIDUOII to dtaoharp the ·ll l•t1011 
hall tM a-lttM • .a,r1ftltun •• that Cclla1ttee •SMM to npon 
Oil .... fti*Sattoa ., IUIOil em 'hlllq. luae u.3ll 
'Jho 4ttfenooe betwea tile .......,_ &lith ene tor hta OPJOII1t1oa 
to ~1 aD4 11het .... to baYe bMo the real reason tor hia tacuoe 
U.lutftW tho •• lasly IIID"''Hl'UU wye ot pelitioe. S.Uh atn...a 
hie belief tbet etrtotala ot the ti8J)A fllll6bt to be •tin ta..n• - a 
OOfttaatiflll 11hiU. tw Ml'iOU atll4eeta ot SOftlWW'nt fOUII4 "••atne:.•lS 
Silll.tth'a objeettea to noa-41n tai!IIIJ:'e ta the Dell81'fllllrlnt ot Aptoulttmt 
414 not tully aOCOWlt tOJt hla atttttaae. Pati'OQIIp a1ao ..- tato tM 
~· eoacr-e. 2nd BeN1on~. Vol. 78o Pan 10, 
• 
AJ'1.,_1S" v. nt JU.llett, 10!ba o •• le4orel.iftd!d"I'"'9D• 
648. 
,...,_.. - tho .U.lv aau-a fit biOH aooellt an4 atrt.aa bow u-.36 
D QJIU'II that Ilia •Voa& hall• tut 'l'V,pel.l, act llelaa a 41ft tam •• 
•• Ulltit to M UJIMI' S....U17• 414 ao11 '"-loP uUl Rooaa"Nlt talla4 
to appotat a ... fit Sill til •a uol• u Vild..S statee Manhal la ..... 
S.tlt Clai'Ollaa.37 a a'q'•JamaU• aJMcla-wriWl' haa DOW tbd tha 
•'-r ai'OIDIII WUbJ.aatoa la tile •JI'iltl ot 19~ .. tbd Jlllaat"Nlt thnat-
__. Slll.tlh with palU14aJ. IIMth .,... tile aoatlZMti.Oa.38 ~ flit 
tdult ..... ,.u •14• or 414 an..,. Sa tile beat ot aa aJ'8111111at. tbe 
• .._. .. a JOUU•l uu.. Sldtlh aot aa appetat••at tOll' hilt -., 
RGaaa"Nlt aot hta ••taauoa .., ... , ... 
• .._, aaau .. u•a "' ••• to,.., •.. t•• 
•u ,.., .,Ja alaOvlllc tile ....Ullttna Pl'loa flit polttl• 
•l II Ill 1•, vhloll .. .,... -- "AknlMl to 1aWl' 
muoa. u o1oea at baD4 oSaoa tt ftlaMa to tho v.I'1Mr 
fit tltu antela •- eeatliMUoa bJ tile Seaete aa UII4U-
~ flit ae:rtault.n lla4 .... ftt'aa\414 "' ........ ,
a.•••~• 1a 19~· D ,.. ~ tbet tlta appetat.at to 
a llilt'ft Jllldo Jut ..,.,414, IIJ 14 niaa a tlnt-clau 
etalll fit PZIMit ap1Mt tlile ~- fit tbe •fllcwll btll• 
tor tile atrinu ft&lllaU• fl t11a tn4a 1a too4 aa4 4Jouaaa 
._taat ._ .,,,.._ 811tbol'll·et .&.U. all4 IIIAJ ... San tlla 
.... .n ...,... .. fit .-ut t u .,_tat to Ita paid. fOil' "' 
lli&tlft ._... all4 '11""01114 thllM flltt ....... qaiaat aa tatlu• 
•tial ttr fit the •ad• '-'•" X thCIUPt a114 •14 
tbet ., ~ .. tot all"' to JutU, t.1aa w alit• 
-.. fit .., JDI,lu•l 081ltal· . ..,.. t.~aa .... ,..... •- to 
t.II'Nat • .... ..U ta ., IIi rtsta. Won 1t .. O"Nl'o l 
bed '~~•••• .,.. _.. raotOI'l ..... beftll8 'llaaa aul:IJeatecl to 
~ e$ ~ 
• • • • 
r!r. lJ'.II I~ I ; t~Ps~r r~ P::c .... ; .,.  
·. ·f• ; IJ;U ~ r11~~ n~1 ·~d I. 
~'"' i .. , I 
. ~E #"i• 
. ' . 
! ~ r ! ~ I t ' I g i E ~ 
.. ~ II ,- ! ... f ; f - .. I ••. - ... -.-
,. 4 " . '- : ~ i I · ; .. 1: • ~ ,;! I £-
: 
1 I ! r j : ; f 1 i ! : : t 1 J!r!~!!l 
1 ~ ! i I : ~ i fl ! ! ;, ! ! !!III!~ H 
== • I .. ' ~ . 
1 ( ! ~ r # 1 ' ~ 1 ! : • ~ ; r.a 11-.~.1=!, • 1 a. • f. ;" s ; J r 4 J• • 1 r s ~ I. ' • ,. ' -• f ~ ' .. .. t ~ ~H ~· r, I i .. ' 1 ! ~ I e i l f i I 1 ilt'IJ;f ~ I a f • a .. ! .. r z ~ i t .. ~ ... 
1 ; $ r ! i ( ~ i ! i e 1 r r1ral~'' 
i : i ~ '. : i F. ~ I I i B ~ : ,;;[~?!~! 
• .. iF • ! .. . t.e 2 ! r • .. ' HI i ft .. J ~ ~ t lH!•J r 
.:.; ~ ii :.s." 0 .. I·.·Hlrl~~o_ 
... '"" .... II f • (I ... • - -· . r~'!i~f .. i~t= .. ie , t 
. : I I. ' i I ' ~ J . , i ; ~' ~ 
I . ... : ~ 
........... Tu,swU tw tile , ........ .nnw ot a-at .. 
8111tll ot Solatlll aueltM. A llhwt U• •ao lie ._, ia the 
- ot ... tuawU fOff ... - ... -117 ot A81'1ftll1an. 
'file ..,... .. uoa,.. • ..._..to s..wr 8111th'• ...au ... 
Bat ....._llld'll 111111111 to I'IITD .. hoJA 1t u4 ln VOINl 
10 '*' to ttae 'lft4e liH'W ._, lie -11ft't I'IIJOft 1t f•-~· 
It ._,.,.. that 8alllltor 11111&111 Ilea waMI a •rtaia ... 
~ uattel ........ Mll£111. ftS. ... s. 1114 to .. ... 
• ....... lii!MOftt ""' ....... ,._ tluat .... to ..... .... 
_.. n;pgtatt•· so tile PntUeat .. t tw lilld.th aD4 tol4 
Jtla lie ,..u 81ft hill IllS. Vld.M4 8htu Nal'llsal it he Vlllll4 
... ,.. tva 11111 - fa;:: ""'·" 
..,_.. llllltlll •• Nlf to .._tonal aD4 Jlna1U.ts.1 JIZ'IIIMin to 
... ,_. tlla --santosa. lie w h11 •· 'I'M npon •• 41le oa '~'~~•••• 
Jllu 12, 1931l• Cia Mrrtq, ,_ Ut BaUII llloQaht 'hpJl1 Won tile 
~ttM • .Ac1'10\lltun tu peatt..ua allotlt Ia- •• upar1- lila 
,.., ...... lla4 llla4 ••• t .... ... IIOir ntieal. h1a ta.u ..... %ala 
I'IIJ 1st•t that 'l'llpall•a M_., toeil hill tu a ,... ....... ia the 1C1UDtJ7 
1a OJUI' to ,......,. hta t• tile haadal • pautaa hill ~ • .u 
iawnteaU•t thq ulle4 hta. ._. an ,_, IIIJiaovt* a •What aort ot a 
1too11a alii IJIIeflh•, repodatlr •Utlle4• to set bill WOI'II th• ia ~--
._.u At tile lleuia& tile GOP S.. .... ao W C.PIID811l 'l'qwal.l 414 110\ 
IJlMU' 01' --- 1a .............. "' .... , .... ant .... S.Sth OQte ... s. 
~-tz: 
W - att.o~t. 'h&wU aft'i'ftll with a nat llt, •'!he ,.,.a...,..ota to 
the .A,pi.G'IIlwal....,...... Adt Sa- JJt1'4 l'ni'N4 tbat au\l.teft.ll7 
lp4 41.4 lMR 4l•PJ Diat 'l'llptU, ~~ 
t ..,., ... that he bu.-&*'-' •••• w10h he u aaldftl 
the CMS tn ot tlt.a Vld.~ Mat• to nUfy .... It la 
Sat r Mi..atle to • *' a aa ,.. alre a .,.._ Sa 
'llbicb he RJ11 autala thlap ql ~ _,, •I 4l4 ut 
- •t I aata.• a. taa• ut the alllouS.v ••• a -.. 
t~~~euW taaw -. hoW. hlP pultlu otts. ... ,., 
lp4 IIRt eooOIDtl'llW • .,...U •• Sa._... s.a ••Uonal pluaiftl•" '1'11&• 
.U atdH that ke 414 DOt llell ... la ...,let 14eaal he llel1ew4 oaq lD 
t1t.o lliat ot •aaUOial ple__., ~ 111ae Prea14eat propoae~~.Jt.CJ s.a.tor 
llcln'la, ..._ .. _.. 11.v Jtu lli..,.JIIU1' u •-.r to a.taJII a wonbJ Op,poaellt,• 
., .... vhicb ba4 no llllllft to 4o with tJatt .. uoa t11aa •ttaa •••1S.. 
llhlcb ...n la the _,.n la the C.pitGJ.,• llloft'la rearlce4, 'The oal.7 
thillll lllaailll _. tu lilld.ae Jllai,..SO 
lllttlh nll4k \o hia ooDoatiOa tllafl .,.._11 ta1le4 to q\llllUJ tor 
a. 1a a •••• n , .,1115141¥ .....,.. pat~ • • • • llllt 
th1'ov hill tato the •'"" tt.w. all4 he 1101114 atarw to 
-· • ... ..,... 1lbo GoO .......... 1'4 40 ..,.. 
tw tala that 414 aet ta'Mlw ... a.v to the tUWJn..5J. 
lnator ...,..., ot Io., a ~-•· 11 rW ot 'hpella •1>14 J01a ...., 
toUow a plcMI?•a •»tt ,_.,... baftiiUS • your bootlat•• •no yCN 1a1ov 
hOw baZ'Il 1t 1a to pt a 4ollar at fill the aotu•.52 'fllcwll· Wei ba4 
-••4 Ilia tathe&'1a onhar4 hr.a lbwiiiC ._r 'ftlHtlona t11ca ooU...,. 
Nllllet •1' ... str,• to •oh •-·u ... ~. 1t WI:IMI4 out. dl4 an 
latle4 to ai4 Bid"•• u ~·r·at •"-"• u• fill atta4Jld.Jifl the aatauv.-
U•a alaald.IIC bla tilt \lll4er the :r..a•a aoae. Sldth abCIItlte4a 
117 tu atcaal Ooil, I 110111t atallll tor theM 41z'V laaima-
att.oul 'llllall w took the ONWA flit the heat ot Jtillfl 
Qeocp. thdk Cello w pat '' ..... (~lllllfl tl'CII the GIIOW) 
llupiiJ' alllllllet .... 
.... ,ou MJce the 11•4 ott ~Mat Rooa walt, Oo4 
fiiiJr 1aaow -.n "* •u Jilt H.,)' 
S..ton Blatk ot .U.lldl 4lpt J1M1.r ot Waat vtrslrda jolaa4 the 
..,...._.. ot ~. ""81.'1116 dMlanUou u -.1oclftatio •• s.t.th '•· 
Blaalc 4aolaral.s 
'fbla aaa • • • baa 'bnbul •.. Ht baa 4aft4 to ra1M hla 
... , .. Ill ta'tW ot ow. ...... ,... • .. • !ftuool 
'he .. •J Let Ida 'ba tuu ._ -. ateUI Let the la-
tuWU«a be t\u'll84 ..- Mal 
JIM.lr~ 
• • • to 'tOte tor aaothar uulttxtloa. l ntue to partlo1• 
Jl8ta la ...,.uliiC oaa ot ~ hea14aat •a Mat unhl tna1111e 
to 41"Uak a t1ow1 ot halou. · 1 . ratue to help IJ1114 a Collallua 
ot the Jlav Deal with ohalu •••• ., act 111 ao 4ol11C vlU 'ba 
to • Ill htve FSIIftl •• 
.1 :ralllllov to th .no~. ot lite. 
'l'he ..,..lllfl llaaa that rn .. the olou4t. •WI' 
Aa4 Uata t.onow vltll 'pophetlo rq,..)ll. 
'l'\aplll1, tMtifJillc ill Ilia ova bebalt, CllllltW retereaoea to laiiU, 
SOaraMe, aa4 the J.dal:nal ot the Ooeaa s.a. a. brou&bt to the hearllll 
Wl'ittu aktsm .na oa the ..,.tatatnuoa•a qrtoultunl Jll'OP8II aa4 oa 
hia ..-1'111 belteta IOAOUiliJia poP8l'117 rlabtao Jll'Ciflta, 44111ooraq, aa4 
tba Coaatiwttoa.SS Be tuiell be ,... a o IDSata he •• a eoaaanatlw, 
uatl'iltl • • • • to GOILUI"N ia .a.n.. Ute all thoae thl... I iftV vp 
to na»eft aa4 l.cmi.•.S6 lit bact taltla la AMrloaa 1na'Utuuoaa, bellnbc 
tbat it we aot lleMIIMI'J to o..mep * COutl tut1oa 1a order to _. 
aU •uaaaJ!7 wtw::w.ST 
'l'qwU beau hia a.ta1le4 ata'-' OA the Coaat1t'11t101l bf ....n-
111& that hia 
•• • 'fiew oa the att,~Mt ot * C...t1t'llt1Cill ot the 'Oalte4 
ShtM an puelf MOCIIId•baal. I aooept aa oornat the 
n.- fit Reb .,_, la.,.n ... J-4 ... fit tba VD1te4 StatM 
..._ Couli .. hat,... lilllr • • lfanhl.ll, 8tOI'J. ·-1'. 
lflllhu• ll'ua.ta • ....,.., dl cutoao. 
t.at.lalle4 to nbeiJ' a Jal'ttoula:r eoe le th80J!71' •'l'ha po'fia1oaa fit the 
CoutUtdtoa • •• Jl.pJ~¥ ti/ OJ'IUiO li'fiD& ill:Ut'llUoaa.• Bt oltacl 
JIIIIM:rta oa e801l01do •twrac ... ,tlav popel'tf :rtsbta ae:r ooatl'llot l'labta 
an a"-lnaa• •an.• at eaaut a1at u1ua u oaa praftat allua fit 
theM rtchta.• '1'qwU baU.nttol that ... k1a4a ot ... 1111sht ... Oil 
.ss. 'l'ha a a1ata atat. ata an la * ,_u "liD' •Propan, Jl1allta 
aa4 tile flootf.t s,atta,• •eo...uwu .. u.,,• •stattatieal llltonaUe 
oa A81'iealft1'111 Prot a• ill U.. lattel' ~ n801'1la4 that tna 
Mq, 193.3• to ...,, lt~. tba oull lMCIIIIII fit ....rteaa aar1oult'lln wat 
Q ,., ,._ 3•9"19 liUltoa to 5·5.30 W.Uf.oa, vltll natal aa4 beMtU 
,.,..,. .. aMiuatlDC tor~ fit tile lllonaM. 
Rottiaacla, Burr M.. II'- (Bev Yo:rk, Haroou:rt, 191l3) 2'10· 
aa ·•••· ~~ma u. 
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a PI'IIJDiat Maan .-4e tt ...... ,...,.nSa1a he polPad wt tllat 
sa.. ot OIIU' ... , uetu1 1a• 6e lS.'-4 the &pllura An, 
Mtat IMJIII@loa -"'• foo4 ul »wca An, 1114 rea.-1 
RNa:tW •41 "''nllhe ltU-.n a114 ... , JINJil41oe4 
ONH1Uoa ._\h., were JrDJOa ... Yet et'Mr a ellOl't 
trial tb., .- the approyal ... r1t thlb• oppoa•ata.61 
'l'ba .... 1111 1laaor ot the laau'tal. nwahHow4 the queaUoa1118 ot 
"*Ptll oa ht.a qualt.t1aUou •• aa aptoultuallat all4 oa ht.a llleu t.a 
polltltal .._.,.. The a.aaton wra.,1.a NV atl)r. Putt.au la tile 
Ol'lh4 plla4, llo014o all4 applau4e4 ~ Ol' BTZ'4a 'l'll&wll at -ldl' 
t.a ht.a uau, ......- aott.• a &G04 ,...- ot tile tt.M.61 m. uawn 
otta ._. aa ~1 , ... •• lae apl.at.a.a to the 8ellaton that the 
• ... llltbNJ zpht.a t.aklPietatlaa ot ..-ta .... • ,.. ftl7 plat.a63 -· 
wlela aa WlfnnUr ~tat dliaOI'llled aa • ... thaUo .unt.Uoaiaa" 
1114 a t1auau., ot aeon. 64 'l'be Snatwa. th .... 1•ea, 414 aot •JJDU to 
ruera ~·· attl11W or,._. d the -••· Vll4alibte417 the oaa-
4U11 ot tlae .... 1'181 ..... ll:&a .... .., reel ... 1'1'1 ..... 65 
Oa hoi 121 19,_, the 417 after the hariA&• Sllllth raporta4 .,.._ 
wU'a an'aetlaa to tlae 8ealta.66 .,.u_. tbat 41)' two Republlaaa Sua• 
ton wt.414 ~........._ ob,1eotiou to !»&wU'• PII auoa. Snator 
lai'Hv (.Rip., IJ. 1 .) ..._,.. la the RIIOR't a let\U' fr. the .-rtaaa 
61. 
62. 
''· '~· ~: 
.. ... 
a..aiiiJM- .Ill Jia .. rtM { .. w York, VilWII• 
CO.UUoa ot Patriotio, Ohio, all4 ha,_l SOOieUN which l&Mled 
.,_,..11 a alwal'at.Te who WOIU4 tSNtro.y the_, char1ahed Alllerieaa 
t.uUtuuou.67 Saflator Sollall (Rap., JUDn.) au a lema apeech, ne 
aut ot -hioh wu that 'fll&wll'a ooU..Uviaa wa atr1otlr a RuHiaa 
Jlaa.68 Oa 1uae 13, Sllith atatel that he etill oppoeed coatb-Uoa 
ia a apeech 4wllia& Oil fu&wll' 8 aft \18111& a dirt ta:rar I whea Sella• 
tw Conl8a• {DIIa., Colo.) 1~te~ S811th to aak bow aoh ot a 
41n tu.r aa uu..r Becnta17 ot )Crioulturo ahwlli \18, Smith ailllpq 
reJMted hie .....ntoa.69 seaator .. u., (DIIa., lf. c.) thea o atea 
tl&at 'llbila .,__111 • bOCiiU 414 "" JUUf7 charpe that he had abaorW 
"'• view ot l\\IHiaa leuera, hia tf.Nvowl ot l'laaaill& to Se1111tor B.fJ'd 
p1a..a tdll ~leetual hoaeaty 1a t'l8atioaa JlaU.ey wnae4 that \IIIISer 
Tuewll the ~t 'lliiiJl4 ta11e cnru the taru ot -.rt .. aa iD tee-
•f.IGle with aNolute 80Mrol.'l0 
Oil lue l4 the dellete 4nget Oil to aa ..a, and the Beata ~ed 
oa ...rt. .. uoa. Lose• (-•• lfl'•) a..lared that oonttr.UIID ->.4 
- the •..a ot laia--tet.re.• Rclb~ (Rep., Iacl.) oallod !'u~~Wll'• 
14eaa •Rauiaa C •ata.• Olarlt (DIII!J., Mo.) dt.eapproved Tupell'a 
ideaa oa the CoaaUtllUOA. •tt1e14 (Rep., w. Ta.) proteate4 •we haw 
-... all wt auat.aabet.• ,... (Jlep •• ~10) lpl88tiorte4 Tupall'a 
68. 
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... 1 taWCI'tt.v. Dtatu. (Rep., to.) ca-ote4 'fv&wll'• ••u ....n• 
Oft!"' ,... ot 191.5 all4 eatue4 h the ReeOI"'l :rnu Jeat •a ooh- rl4l•· 
liiC 'fllcwll'a 4 .. U'lJtlOD ot hlale1t •• a _.onatl'ft. S.lllltore Btft 
ud BaUttY ~olaa4 tho attaok ea f\ap~U.7l 
'l'llaWU 414 aot laok tat-.n. Belllltor Noma lau4a4 TucwU 
ud lila~ ot qritultun, polatlllc Gilt that the 1CIWIC prot .. aor 
attnntll4 the tlrn ooatoreaoa ora &ll'ioulture eYer •lla4 _. a Praal4eat 
(llmll .. ) vlthOilt 8'ftD llalllc 11n'1Wa lforrla or1tlollla4 the oon4uot ot 
tbe botal'lllco wla wrke4 up the ti'MIIl Oftn' Wlftlatat .ttere allll turaa4 
lato aa 'latUlaiUoaa• atlllo IIDIT1a aotod, the aa.ttteo 'f'Ota4 16·2 tor 
rtJQI'\1 .. taftl'&\tl1. SHator.Meltllar (o.., 'l'eaa.) aake4 DlokiDIIOil W, 
au ot ..,.. Repallluau Oil no -"'he fttll4 tor 'fv&wll. Sallllton 
Baa'dl•t (O.., Ala.), Roii1UOil (0.., Ark.), C.tUaa (Rep., lf. M.) all4 
WU.lft' (O.., Moat.) 4ateJIIIe4 .,..trtU qa1ut 11Jr'4 011 the queUoa ot 
ttt. tla~lllc •• ' ~· to tt&e .U .Aot. ,.._lar ••tot that '1\lpell ba4 
an ounteppot lata athOI'l'Ta the...,., bat upbel4 bta tl"M to oae. 
llaok (~Mia. o Ala •) NJII!IillaW allqa.U.. ...,. IIJr'4 aa4 lla llttJ' neel"41118 
,....u•e ....,.,_,1 ... 1 aa4 ...-to Yinla Blaoll: toa4 aothlq 1D Tua-
.U'• _.. oalllaa tor the allol111S. fit Pl"l"Mto owenblp. X.O., (Dill., 
J.e,) aa4 leeq (Daa., v. v..) IIQJIIilrM4 'hpall. 'l'owl'U the •114 ot tbe 
tallato ... l;r ea14 that .,.._11 .n vUia opJ081Uoa 'beoauae he we aot 
UQI NMt101181'7·12 
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'1'he wte •• 5.3-a 1ll teftl' of ooatiJ"MUoa, vUh 19 not ·rouac. 
4llftb (Bep., 'ft.). ca... (DIIa., 1111.). llntalt (Bep., :R, I.), Bee4 (Rep., 
Fa.), aa4 llaleo" (Rep., coaa.) wou1t han vo144 •lfea• u the, hacl beea 
'"*-'• IWROlcla (Dea., lC. Co), 'l'h-.a (Dea., Okla.), 'h'ullael (Dam., 
na.), t.'Jtiap <n... Mel.). aa4 Valah (Ilea., -...) Wlll4 haft wtecl 
'1' .. • U they hacl Mea pnaeat. The wte, acljuatecl tor abeeateea vS.h 
new poatuoaa, wouu haft lMa sa-aa.7.3 
~wrote to the Pnat~. nalptac u .Aaa1ataat Seo~ 
.rtaot1ft at the temillaUoa lilt 1ue 18, alld aooepUac tbe poatUoa ot 
VGMr S.orataq .rtaotln 1ue 19.14 '!he appropriation tor the pq t 
ot •larT Wlllcl aot 1le aftila)l.e uUl hq 1a .ltto~..Qeaeral '7 1'18• 
Mel ecl'ftaecl Rooaa ,.u that 1t ,.. J»ftduable to n'-lt the DCIId.aaUoa 
tor aa otttee onatac1 ~ ,. n•t ~alation at aa.v tS..a obta1Jl1ac 
ooatU.tiOIIl aa4 1101111 the oath ot otttee batora lulJ' l -u atae 
aeoowa11tac qUHUoaa. TS 
Oa tbe 4q ot the '10M 1ll the S.,.te Rqwll 41aplaye4 hie Plea• 
aura ia the WuhlnaMD ..... r tanltnal"UF auooiatH with nob ooeutoaa. 
Jla raeetft4 ooqatul&Uou 1ll hia otfl•t 1a tha eftai'l8 h1a triell4, 
tha DOftliat S11lolair X..vta, lift a Ja~ to oelamte the 't1otor,.76 
RoOHftlt raaeta4 to the IIO!d'U.Ua ta lata 4a~1r WJI he aakacl lfeU7 
Wlallaee to ooacatula-. 'fllptll oa hta tent_,- batora the .-tttee, 
~: 
a44ialh •1 hOJII that Rlllt t.e eaoqla •u:n• oa ht.a by thta tu..•'77 
A mroa,.nt-.. Ntel'elloe by 'l'apell to hie qua1Ut•111oll8 u a 
'41l'tl tax.&"' wa tar ti'CD clalloaa.t.ra 
A 1004 Mal ot auatortal aa4 ..... ,.r taUt wul4 ariae la 
1933 a'llon ha.U, a "41ft ,._. 1a the Depai'Win ot Acri· 
wltueJ 'hie wul4 haft to to •JMlall¥ vUh llf' appot.at-
.. ,. Oaa ot .u .en ..Utatw pllaa• ot tha laqulatttoa 
l•41ac to ., afttltual ooat.-uoa aa Ull4araaontaJ7· ~ 
haft to to with tha uoown.,a ot a pan tor • with 'ft.ataa 
ot tt.U aa4 atable U wU aa talJU• That 1IOUl4 be~. 
Jut aa Mr. Roc111ftlt'• tailS WJilrieaoa ,.., tor .U tulia 
ha hall baa1IJl to ... ahla4. h VOIIl4 ooatrilRda --'11' 
llfthf.aa to Ule ,_, ... 1184 tha .r 118h1p .. lie .... , .. 
sa the .&AA uta a...ttliMat 01' 1a the oouenauoa ot aou, 
fOIIUt, aliA v114 llta. 'l'hoaa ~ lie eat.eatU1o Joha, 
llfilla4 Ollt by etrinlr •4111'11NI_tnft...01p h aaintaln .. 
uao, llft ''""'illl or -.cl,t ... TfJ 
-...u retanell han to Paul J'ort~ar•.e ooaahlaa tor the haartnaa ae a 
'boJ ~ n1M4 a heifer, wilt& :lie.._, Portarleter aa14o the._., 
ofti'WOILJA heUar tn the htatoq ot the vat.te4 stat•·•79 'fupeU 414 
11011 ....- with SellatOI' Sldth tbat 1ae we 'llflllUillU1e4 tor ~Uoa be• 
..... he wa aot, 1a llalth'e vordAI, a •a:illlwte ot 004'a GNat '111lt.Yer• 
81117.80 
Olda14e ot the Sell8ta, obJefton to hswll'. ooattrmtioa anatlr 
111111~  - at l.edt 8110111 thoae Who pt&blloq apnaael a 
optatea. la tile Kolule, ReJI'N8ataUYe foulkila (Dill., Mich.) prataall the 
77. 
78 • 
.,. 
eo. 
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eoatlnaUoa, relent .. to 'l'qwll u ~ 1Bil ettieilnt, .,..... 
tbetla to the t< ID -· aa4 1 hero 1D the tigbt 1p1Dat aped1l pri"fl• 
J.ace,8l Other RltJftMataUYaa wra a11en. Ia the prau obNrYare oa 
kth len ea4 rigbt er1Uo1za4 'l'lllwll '• ptrfor.aoa at tile heariJIC. A 
lllUtaat lllilel'al ......u4 that .,.._11 'l&Ult \UIIler tire• vhaa ha tol4 
the .-~_. .. that he wa 1 oou-.u ... 82 '1'he ooaa_u.,. Alva J'olul-
aoa ot the I''P*! lnplv Jill _.... tbat 'l'uptll •turaa4 1001 AMrl• 
.... WON the saute .-t.«ea. 13 11u1c Sl&llhu oc ata4 11hat 'l'uptll 
,... ... J'OUIIl allaar akill la 'IIOIU, dlloitMa ot a1114, aa4 aMft axplau.· 
Uoaa.-. 'l'ha ~ DM llv£Ml 11841 
Ba4 llooat• • • • JO•••••• a *th ot Jlatorcl. CktJ 'fuawll 'a 
ulllla ueliatac a ...-u. ala, he 1IOUl4 aot haft be4 
to dri• the ll•look • ., 
haDit Kent, aa ou lUCht DXJitfto ottand the loqeat, -t •reM-
Uo ••-•*17 oa '1'114"all'a haat1N• :r.at aaUUa4 hla sol- ot .z-
81. 
ea. 
Ot OOU"Mo he la a Coau:natt•~ l'lla aa1llrwllaa vlth vhloh 
th- t-. Caaaenau ..... ._.tor o.o... w. Jronta ot 
.....-, a.a 1l1ar1loa Jt. ,...,._ ot ......_, olaape4 him to 
their .,..ft&onnl' llor=a .... ~ hill apiaat attaok 11¥ 
that v114...,.. ft41oal ot Yuwaaa., saoator 111'17 I'. lfrd, 
pzorree that. 
:Bftlt: 731"4 C•sreaa, 2114 Saaa1on, Yol. 78. :r.rt 11, 
Yare!, W., •1M1114 ot 'l!lqwll,• ,IU ¥etig, Yolo 143o 110. aio 
.. ........ 19,.. &23. . 
1oldtRoa, Alu, ._.11, na PwaiteRt'• I4aa ~~u.• StS»rfenr "n 
Jllllll• Tol. a~. 110. s. a.aun 1, 19"· 1~. Yeti_., o.oraa "·· •• ,,...., ... '"'· ~u.• 33· 
Gltel Ia Vwitrt Geer .. 11., •A,..laaa hot. '1\laWl.lo' 33• 
••• 
Clearl¥ the Proteaaor ia aot onq a eo..enau .. -lui 
1.a a 'hzy. Pla1al7o Mr. BGrunu. with hia ... l"'ea• 
._... QOD the COIIaUtution, bta crall4lon "pleau4 
e.aa 4 ~·· 04 enna Ptosl .. aliva poliN,aa. hu 
-.. toole4-, the Prot ... ._. 'I'H Pre.reeaor laa't a 
U'lleral at aU. Be 4088 Dot 'belOftl ill the A4111a1.atn• u... vttl ao l.deea ot hia llllllo lui 1a juat a IIHk 
JCIWI8 CoUUtv.Uonal la1P ~1¥ aubolllta about in 
\ba """' ald.a ot a n41oa1 wit. 
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:r.at, 1a a aariou .. ia. 'bel1eve4 tru.t 'l'upeU •OftlT supart1o1all¥" -
ott Y817 •U at tlul hear1QSI the Sllpnaaion at Yictozy tor the protu• 
1101' •• 4u to 1aapt1tu4e ot hia 8uatorlal queat1onerr ia oroaa alii• 
uUoa all4 \hair leek ot 4ip1.t;y 8114 4aoona. "-- 41aoriaiad1Jta 
~.:r.atuMnM.~ 
• • • 4:1.4 Jlfthilta to :lftOl'!lan raapan tor hill • • • • IDataa4 
or tl;y:f.lla 1118 011a oolorr. he .,.. up another t1q. ln-
ctaa4 ot ah:lb:ltiQS \be 111Mf111.11"MJ 8114 tb ..... ... 
upaeta fl'!a the tl"'ll7 leap 'l•»er, the Proteeeor aida 
atappa4 wi\b tla abill'F ot • •ta4or, aoqht fttuc• 
blrbia4 \ba Buu .. u akina, ~ .. :zy wll the s.na-
torial bulla voal4 an JII.!I'TW hill there. lDataa4 ot 
'-1., etalchVonart, he wa IIIIJOOth all4 ahifty. Cut· 
•1.al7• to •n olner thaa the $uat0n, be a....S to 
'- .U.w, ~. -.141ft • 'd6 a kaaa eye tor oo..r-
:llla tap, all4. with all the abMr1t7 ot \be •11-lmova 
Oh1Dil e .... 
Eeat w.a ..... tiall¥ 001"1'80t oa t'tG GOIUlta. Ia tbe tint plaoe, 
theft wn UD4ftl~M417 ~Uo S..ten 1a a441Uon to the aix who 
YOta4 .... 'lltto wav.l4 ba .. 'YOtM otharvtn llut tor the taot that a neaa• 
u,. .ote voal4 ha ..... , a M~SlanUoa ol DO-OODt14eaoe la 'l'u6Wll'a 
Jlll1:roa, PnaUeat Rooeevelt.87 S.oo•Uy, the Picture ot 'l'upell aa a 
tiaul.o 288..S, • 
. 1936. 10. 
"111ft taJ.Wr• 414 llM pt o.ers it lllt DOt 41atract thouehttul obHn.ra 
t~ tbe tact the11 fvcwU we aa aea ... oiaa vho blld Witten H'M18l 
4eaor1'Hil hla HHaUal oonaal'ftlU• eat\ hie •a;per:lenoa• aa a fiU'Ml'l 
lla 4laplqed ao uaaeluea. appeerlD& 1a • ••• t.a.ftlate white aa4 
.{l.epant.w oal.y eUptlJ' Nttlell, with •• dr ot eat ae.-4 to lie wll· 
11184 S u=pat.•88 •Bato• the frf.eii41J' JlwiHll Lori ObHl'ft4t 
••• har4.1¥ a~ we ;pe-u4. '!.'he c\eYioee that arabal 
)lllbl1e oplalOD, npt all4 left. era u little &1'MD to 
nael"nnUOtDII all4 abetlea ot ... in& u traffic 11pta. Red 
1e na.89 
ICaat • • charp ot 1DataaerU11 _., lie eooa11lare4 ill a GCliiPlilillltell 
OMttn vhlell tnll'7I'O!IIDtl the hearlJl&. .&a aa acallemetu Tupell lul4 
wtttaa eNI&t lut1twUoul eh•npe, iavol"fiD& e...-Sc JlaDa1nc. la 
eftlutlODal'J teJ.W. Aa a.....,_., dlllaietntor he helpe<l to a&I'I'J' 01111 
llllon•ru I'UOYel'J PNCJIIMI tbel8 wa ll!lft to hla etat-at that be wa 
latereetad 01\l,J' la the Jc1114 ot pl•u•.. *1oh the Praaltleat prc;poea4 thaD 
Mt tbe .,.. WJI,f 414 DOt 'ruplll, 1Da\u4 ot llaJirlD& to Seraator B1ft 
hie 1atara1111 ill aet:1.011al ple,•taa, toUov the 0011rea which aa editorial 
1a the lrrr• .k,U& 1b£ H14 he eh011l4 llaw p!U'INad, lle1D& • ••• e1aaere 
tiJ' a&J'lD& 111 J$1e 14M.e 011 plau'ai/ •• a eollap thea1e aad yw laaoV 
,.., that te•t90 'rhen wn two oM'lOila IIUWIID to the aewpa;per•a 
queeUoa. '1!\laWU kDew, oa tbe beau of vbat had happeiUid durtDC hla 
fitteea moatba ia aov--t, tbat hie critioa 'WCIU.ld ( l) ridloula •DT 
ettm wllioh he lllilbt •• to 4nw a cliatiaetion 'bet-n himult as a 
.. lklle pnteaaor alld aa a pultl.1c ott1•1ela alld (2) dilltort hie pub• 
lillhecl dew wllea tbey did, on o-ioa, look at hill booke.9l It 1a 
«ou.bttul that •Ill' direct approeoh 'WCIU.ld haft won for hill real uncler• 
position alld ideaa. Yet, wa it ftOt JINIIible tbet 'J!\IaWll cou.ld still 
haft esplainecl 1n aO!i!'*-t or a berok W7, tor the beDtfit ot 11811 wllo 
in the tv.tura wou.ld leave univerai tin tor aove~at. the tl'lle f~o~ncUon 
ot the aaa4elll1oiaat 011 a pnct14!!11l .._,_., beeewse of Rooa8Yelt • a poll· 
Uaal inYUtmat in Ilia PJ"QMtioa, 'l'\lpllll we in no poa1t1oa to ti.U a 
DOble atalld. 
Polltiaal P\llldit Mark &alllvon atbi'bl.ttecl bealc political aipl• 
t1aaaca to ~ll'a coatb••Uon,92 the nation, SulUYIIa coaolll4e4, had 
roaohe4 a tl11'11in& po&at ill ita.hiato171 one of the mJor parties had 
opealt 4eclare4. itself 111 favor of aatiODtl plaDDln& aQd oollecttv1am.93 
ot the ..Sa& electioaa. • ••• pnpenll to do their beat to aaara t:be 
001ant17 iato bellev •. ll& it •• , •• 911 ""cwll we in Europe durii!C the aam-
91. Verity, Georp M., 'APP"i- hot. 1\Jpell,• 331 see Chapter XIII, 
secuoa. ''l'lle Allatl"\lea 'fllawll, • 
92· •aouoa oa Elavotion of 'fucwll Watched ea Illdioathe of Polltiaal 
'l'raacl,• Jlu It£k Bta14 'h:f-· luna 6, 19~. eaterecl in the Beoori 
by Sell8tor Autin, <nz'r.'!!tnil•atn'• 73rf. coasraaa, 21ld Seaa1on, 
Vol. 78, Pllrt 10, .T- , 1934, 1«1831. 
93· tilllllt•"•· luna as. 1934· u. 
911· fill lt•iaa, .nuut 25, 1934, 11. 
""· 
ahe 'f'lctOI'J at the polla 1a ~. 'l'be aubaeque-.t courae ot 'l'lla· 
vell•a aovemaat oaree:r, in wbilh u cle'IOted hlB enerQ to the iarlld1• 
... prolllea ot •4alala11e:r1D& :ru:ral l!lll1.t llll1le h1a aeu:ral 1ntlueaoe 
decl1ae4,96 tailed to Jutlfy SU1ltftlt1a aias1v1naa -- at l.eaat, 4eap1te 
the tearet wb1oh :repel irltl' the eoatl:raUoa, one ooul.4 not ex»la1n 
•haalel 1a 1aet1tut1ona and political pbllceopbT 1n America at~ 1934 
ta .__. ot Btxto:rd '1'\lsveU • • pow:r la WUII1flaton. 
'l'qwll'a otticlal poalt1-.. wn AaeS..tant Sec:reMJ'f ot Aa:r1oul• 
tun, 19»·1934• 1JD4e:r seunary ot Afl:r1oultun, 1934·19.3&. an4 ReaetUe· 
Mat •tetaletato:r, 1935•193{t. a. alae conUnue4 to aene after the 
...,_lp ot 19)2 •• aa a4'f'1HI' to 11M lna14ent 1a a.-thin& like a 
,._l'lll .. tett •peo1trt he •• aaaQ41ate4 with naPQDai'bilitT tor ftrloua 
pol1o1u ot tu lllv Dul bu14U tba as:rioultunl proaraa.1 Two atudenta 
ot pulll.1o a418U1ataUoa oalle4 "'-U'a J0111tioa •a~~C~~Dloua,• partlT 
Moai&H tUn •• tllea 110 pro'f'laloa tu aoa•pollt1•1 pne:ra1-•tott 
aHlakata attalhed to the lx414UU .. otfl• ot the l'rea14ant,2 'llhe oo-
\bat ~· appotntlllllt ot 'fus1Mll aa ANhtant 5eCN\eJ7 ot Aal'lllll\ure 
~· •ere thaD 8 •rel,y OOD'feDlad 1la7 or )1'0Yi41118 8 title a114 8 8111• 
aq tor a preai4aaUal a4•1 .. rt• 'fllawll ba4 a paulDB tntereat in tbe 
tara )1'0lllaao dHOtl118 ••t or hta tt. 11o hla 4apart.atel d\&Uea • .3 
All aCUIIU'ate 4eav1ptt• ot Tuewll'a ac\lvi'Uea in -..1118toa 
tell ... llbare bat- the two teaOI'ipUona aita4 hare - llut nearer 
the J.aner. 'l'vlwll• it 1a tNB. ba4 ....., aooe .. to 11he ~ita Houaaa 
ln ht.a liaiW epare tt. he aouW.re4 aaUCIQal probU.. ottaa oa aa 
•••••• la'fel •""" the tuaoil ot poUUu aac1 the s-41aq ot 
aatul adldaf.atrauoa, paaotns bia .,_. oa to the Prea144mt. He 414 
aol4 P•nllip oa Hftl'lll boai'U ia 11be ...,atat:auoa. He trequatl¥ 
VI'Cite aad apolre abcNt ftrlOIIII ....... ot the lev Deal. '!'he .o-oella4 
praoUoal •• ot tbe .-tat•traUoa, wah •• Doper, Darn, all4 Farley, 
414 oall him 1a oaaea101111l1,r tor a "bit ot e4uoeUoa.•4 Yet, aooounta 
wllioh et11&te4 'l'\lcWll'• DOA..qrilllltural aaUYi'Uea with hie 4epart• 
... tal wl'k ....... 4lftorU- ot the ..-1 alwattoa, eapaoiall¥ tnaotar 
aa th• ••.,.,_. the 1wpuaalOD tbet :be •• 4eeieiwlJ influential aa 
aa ott•tbe•naord Wbite Howle a4'f1.._,,.5 Dur1.ll6 tho -pa1p, •• a ..... 
bv ot a tairl,r Uptl,r IIDlt arw~. -.u fult1lle4 an ed\&oatlw hao• 
Uoat after the eloaUOil, all4 ,...iwlerl,y attar Roaae'felt'a iaaupra-
.3• MaAh .. , Anh111'. v. anc1 IWJ.oU, leba D., t"p1 'WP1eWton 
(lin YOJrtt, COllllillia VDlwnlt7 Preea, 19.:W 211. 
4· Carter, l. harlklia (Uaetflolal CIINMtnv), JU J11x lleeltD (llov 
York, ss.a aa4 SOh\a8ta, 19~) 91. 
s. sea Cllul~er :n. 
uaa, "'- olnle ot prea14eaUal a4T1Mn allll OO!UNUanu v11leae4t 
there wre •IV' •e~tueilltCift• la Yuh~ 'bea14N '1'\tcWll. 
Xa hla oolua tor lk.t tar 2, 193S, J'nak X..t ob8ene4 that 'l'lla• 
....... to ..-at .. tha f1lHUou ot Mlllalatrauoa 
~r aacl ... r with that ot praoUeal6•a ot at-tam aa11 aaUODill plaaaer par •oal~. 
Anllal.l¥• 'l'lapell'a aoa....Uabhst.l .... aoUYiUea all4 iDtlueaoo dMreaaed 
to a ldDS.. attu he be; • llllaettl ld Mlllaiatrator ia the aprlq ot 
193.5.? For Gll'll'le, u _.. timM tS.. .. •• .,.. ... 1n 19~ aa la 
193.5.8 AttU' .AprU, 193.5. M'f!lra1 Mlltlul Won Jrect•a eo~ aPJII8Nd, 
Tqwlllld ll"le ,._tor llootbae7ille• 
Jlcut MllllMtnblpa 
7uplll Mr'N4 OD a.....-1 a~1 lloa:rl\8 alii\ ocalittMa lid v.p to 
GOOI'tiaate the ..... ,, di....re1tla4 ~tor re11at aDd reOOYei'J'. sc.a-
ti8ea he eat lD tor lfallaae oa a ..,. or lao pe-ceat l:leala. Jf1a 
f.ld'luaoe 111 theM pou.pe did ..- •IIM4 that ot an 1aclf.Y14ul ..ona h1a 
peen. Bla newpoict preqUa4 111aea lt oo1aolda4 with tu •.S\)1'1t7 or 
e411f.aiatntlOD OJlaiODJ cnhel'wiM it W8 I!IR hea4Mo 
Ala llulll1S1 .... Orller ot luae 16. 1933, Mtabllabed tbe Special 
Wl'ial ReiOfti'J' Boal"d • .,.._11, 11bOM interest in aarteuUun directly 
""· 
atteo.a hla i4eaa oa iadlultrial ~. JoiMd thia ll'OUP• lila ooa-
oen vUh •pantr -. ... ap-1oultunl. aD4 illdutr1al prioea broulht 
hla into ooatliot with JIRA Maillinntor aap 1ohuoa. 11ho 4cairaate4 the 
sw. '.l'u&w'-1 llel18'ftl4 that priea-tix1R& had to be ealeoUY\1 -- a-. 
iaduatrlal prieaa ahould ao up, 80M ahGIIIl4 - Aowa he ball m18fl1'f1114111 
that the JIRA ooU8, hurie41.7 4ftwa up 117 1Rd'Ut:r1al lawyera. ~ be 
'IIH4 prilaril7 to rt.c prioea upwarl\ Sa4iaarla1Ratel7 'b7 lillitf.D& proctao-
Uoa, ottaetUD& 11he taraen• p1Re. lobuoa atood tor the a1a&lta118t!U 
aAY\IIlU of 1D4utr1al alld aariO'IIl'Wftl pnoea. 1ohuoa von the at~, 
eatJJ- .,.._11 a..-4 that hia view npr•aate4 the Proaideat •a. The 
Yiotor,r of lobuOR, vhoao ill4etN~Ddaat utun ue4wbte417 eaused him to 
pnter liOl'kill& 41reot1J uaar the Pre.U•t nther tlheD threucb a board. 
~ _., that poliUoal eouiH~aUoaa cutveiahe4 eooDCaio .-1J'a1a --
v111h Rcloae'niU'a &Pl*Oval. .U~ ')lel'HO'IIted• bl&a1Deaa iateraata 
4etend.Da4 the uta. of the priu Pl'OIP••l 
~l aaoouatend aafthaJ' atldaiatnator of incltltNID4eat 1aoliae• 
Uou 1a Barol4 Iolcea, chair.& of the .,.o1al Boari tor Public woru. 
Thia board •• c••••4 of the Seeretariu of War alld C• roa. tho 
Attonq Odn'al, repreMdaU.,ea of the Seoretartea ot Labor end the 
'l'reuur,r, the SOlio1tor OeMnl, a npnaerdlative ot the Bureau of the 
....... alld t'WO ..,., ooloraala.a YUh tev exeaptioaa, Tuawll aote4 tor 
1. See Chapter llt, SeotiOD OD !IRA, tor 'fl.lavell'a detailed Yiev oa pricaa. 
2. leU., .Harold L., luk .sa .IIJ:k• JU Men J1t Ill.( .. , York, Ma..S:Uaa, 
1935) 23· 
11ho s.er.~ ot Aartoul11un.3 'fucwll we aUo a 118111'1er ot the .Ulo'li• 
..a11 A4Y11J0r7 a-lUM ot 'lihe Pl&blh 110rka Joana otbezo --.ra ot 1ih1a 
~-- ware the Prea14eet, Iokea, Jfaiiii'J' Hopld.nlte al'l4 hank walker, 
treetl\tl'ezo ot tho DellooreUo llaUoul ~''"•4 '1'h1a Board. d1abtai'H4 
the $,3,,300,000,000 allotiiM to JYbl1a ooutruo\1011 Ull4er the Milt Aot. 
Ill P~~&ftl, Ttapoll 111111 Hop!ciU, fa'fOriq qu1olc apn41Dc tor 
1!111o1J' atia&laUon ot tho eoODOIIf' ll7 tho onaUon of puol\ae111i powar, 
Uaad up aeatut Iokea, Walker, u4 tavt. Doue;laa, Director ot tho 
Bureau ot 1lhe ~. lokea • ..,atatored. tho Pulalic VOrka Mlllniatra• 
1!10D 1n aooord.aaeo with hla t•r 11hat ha-'7 cpea41turea ~4 ~r­
•111 lit' aaabl1na patt aa4 corrupUOD w ariao. lloue:la•. it ·-u .. 
ouart. wa aeatut allrloat OII,J proJect. for lUll' purpoao, 11bd oost 
110D4J7 .S 'fu&wll aD4 Hopttea tuiatM tba11 h .. te wa UGOOHl'J it the 
'IMtUt1ota1 etteou ot the J~Ublio-won. Plotlftll were to lao telt lit' 
vtatezo ( 1933-.34). Apia, u wa the oplaton ot the Preoideat. llbo uw 
MUte boar Ollt the view ot 'fVIwU 11114 Hopttaa, 'llhioh ~UMa Bop-
ld.u' Yorlla ~· A41dnto11raUon we set up tor rapid, lorae•soala 
~t. 1'u&wll OUJPftta4 hla nana with oOODOIII!o ars-ntaa u-
401l"bM417 Rocln'Nl11 alao hd pol.lUoal conai4oraUona tn llirl4• Ill aar 
aYR11, the pellolu a4op\M b7 11he s• aa4 the SBPW ret\ltM tho ellop• 
"'· 
tid IIOt utMt 'l'qwU, XU.. 414 DOl 1on 'o 'l'u&wll -the Pnta14et 
•• pollq 4eo1al•· T\a&WU 414 UM 11.18 ..arahip on tile Boal'll tor 
PlabUo Worlca \o PJ'CIIIO'• the lntenata ot tile USDA, atrh1118 to proteot 
hia llqal11Mat•a re ... :rtb aoUnUea ... 1D8t n... • .,.,. • .. t-ae• budpt 
Ot&tt1DC.6 Utl40ubte4l.J, T\a&Wll preaente4 hia Depal'Uent'a oaaa to 
'l'qwll ,.. alao a •••r ot ~· Pre.S.4aat•a m QellCIJ' Ccaaittlaa 
on HllwtlDCI ~'rank Walker •1"184 aa Obai-na liarr7 Hopklna, Hear.r lllal• 
laaa .... rna ... PerklDB- .... ot the Mhar -'len.? 'l"ha ..... 
tl'~• Ccalttaa oa c-rolal Poll., laelude4 TuawU 1D ita MabarahlJ. 8 
1\tcWU- a ••IIIIer tor a ahon tiM ot the Ccaaittlaa oa Social Sacwr1t7• 
vt.tiwlavla& wl\h Haft7 HQklna waa tii&J' loat their ara-nt ap1nat 
taoeatrel1aaUGG tie ~ atataa to JltN Perktna. 9 ~11 •a other .,. .. 
olal ... tan=ata wan ralaW to hla pn.q 1ataraat 1D acrtcultura. 
Be •• appointed to the SUplt&a R4!:U.at .tdldnlatraUGG,10 woaa oparaUoaa 
wn ealCM&lata4 to prenot the 4efti.OI •• ot ...._, woulcl have bean a 
li'Oilla aitulltlGG •• ahnatle Sa a MUoa wlab \1811leJI'took a PI'Oez'IIIR ot 
oi'OP n41lot1GG. la 1UTo 1,)6, ~ Pntaf.tellt appof.Dte4 a Gnat PlalD8 
Dl'oQht Area ec.dt'- to 4et.._ ~· M8d8 ot the aevenlf atrlokn 
Chai~W.Dl lOiua C. Pep of the Bul'ft\l tit ReolaaUOD, Colonel Richert C. 
Moore ot the Afttt COrpe ot bs,.n, :rrtlderlok H. Fowler ot the lfatioaal 
ReeO\lrou c~ntee. &arq lfDJirtu. all4 "'ewell wen the other Mlllben.11 
A llll'lllth u4 a halt lletore 'l'llpeU left the 10Ye~D11, Rooae-relt appoiate4 
hill to a oo.al"ee 111biob we to atw tan taJiai10Y lmder the oha1r.uhip 
tit He11.17 Walleoe.12 
Ilulna hia M&OblJII oener '1.'\i&WU aoqu1n4 a aeaeral lmovletl.p 
tit aolaolerlt aotidtlea 1a tlla ao....,to worl4. la the tielcl ot eoontatoa 
t.D pent.ovlar he ._. awn tit wht.oh proteaaon wn P\U'Rlna wh1oh liMa 
ot lDYe8t1pUou.. 'l'be Prea14Gt 4nv 011. Tqwll• a kllowle4&a ot penoa-
.. 1 1D oolla .. a au uat-reratUu, u.alal the protaaaor aa an •arrall.d boy.•1 
Ia GODDaoUou. with oer11a111 • ..,... • ..-uoae, Rooee-relt aake4 'l\lpel1 
to la'rlte aaaUalio people • repl'ltleaa ot their particular points ot Tiev 
all4 eo 1-a •• thar ba4 no •Jaoial ue to p1114, to IAl"-it their 1deaa 
to tu frea148Dt 1a wriUIIC or 1D peraoa.2 All a result ot Tupell'a 
ceaeeJ:'IlU& 111bioh his OD1,r role lla4 Mea to oall in apeotaliata to cooter 
with 11M l'rul4Gt • .3 for ezewple, the pnee attribute4 to Tucwll a part 
1D the tol8llaUoa ot ~ ....... , he ba4 aothiDC to to vitll deter-
u. 
12. 
1. 
2 • 
.3· 
ld.llqiOD crt poUq t.a GU.:rftllO¥ •tten af\er Maroh 4, 1933• In fan, 
IHI wa opponcl to. the aol4-bu71na aeb- or Ootollel', 1933-.J&DWII'Yo 
1934.z. The •' eff"t of 'fll8wU'a •uallll bo7' role wa an Oftl'llaU• 
•Uoa of h1a inflHBM ia the ..... nlatnuoa.5 
Uoa ot lona-rwa wuwu-1 waee.l 1111 414 oona14er them eiaMrelJ 
latenate4 1a aoldaa the nat.loa•a probl.-a be believed their polldea, 
with the aoep\loD of their aaU-tnat taa4aDo1ea, wn the beat avaU• 
able at the tt.. 'fla&wU 4la....C reU.et ...urea and publlo worlal 
at leJtc1lll with Senaton Wiaper, Ooftipa, and La l'ollette, aa4 COqran• 
•a La Guardia· HI ha4 snat napaot tw Setlator Cut.UIIIo payina elo-
quat tribute to hill ia aa a44J.'ua in Ca"lnl'• aliopte4 atate.2 
It TqwU•a loaa•l'llll view wn 'lllllilce thoae of the Procnaaivea, 
hia iaatituUoael 14eu eliiO 4eflftitelf 41ftel'fl4 fJ.'QJD the p~ of the 
.Sliteat lettuta, 'llhoae t.hOIICht IIOft4 1a t.IHI 41reouoa ot 4onr1Da1n 
aoolallaa. Wt•villlli\MI:nla ottea OOB4.-.4 'fupalla-' .- or tha 
IRl,PPOI'ten on the lett aa4 hia detraetora oa tha ri(!ht. Hia wwl4•11e 
friea4a ~oke4 an ua4erataa4U.. of hta iuUtuUonal 14eea. H1a oppc1110ata 
4. a.. ChaP'er x. s.ouoa, ·~tal7 View.• 
5· see Chapter xv. 
l. SH Chapter III. 
2, ,.._11, R. c., •Tau.r 1\lwre a114 T1IUI' Natioa,• c-~at Addrua, 
Vnivara1t7 ot llw Me:aoo • .u~. lue 10, 193.5• lliifa P• " 
"-. 13·14· 3· SH Chapler Xll, Senloa, ·~1 1a the JII14Ue.• 
1111-iiMft)¥ aUnlMW to .hia the Yiew ot his eniac Wt1a11 a4miren. 
Dupl.\e tha elTOn ill the oplniou ot _.., ot ,....,..u•a voul4•be 
trt.llllla, an ew«tl ru ot "UbenJ.a• ooaa14ere4 hia 11ha1r apoke..a ill 
oal aoaaa bali.8Ye4 that RooaaftU -a.4 fttuae 81111 otter b7 Tuswll to 
nal.p ( '1'acWl1 414 tNIIIait his naipaUOD ill earl.7 l'JlS after the UA 
"1*1'18') lletaUe to •Df ha aJIIIIIOlisa4 Waahlnatoa P1'011'88•1Yiaa, a&\18• 
lac Ubeftla to 'be cntehl 11!1811 a _. •eo awn ot the •Jor OUft'ellta 
S.a ICden Ute wa cl.oaa to the wMe1 ot the ahip ot state. •ll OA 11ha 
oo ... ioa ot aorra 1 . 1 n that 'l'li&Wll wa kaYiQC the &O"ltl'lllellt, aa 
a4Uorial ia 11heJiu Deebli• aac-~aatet, • ... wan quite 8\lre that 
1t he /liocval;iJ a-•• Mr. lleoaaYelt'a nuAiq amoDC tha 11'benla lihoaa 
taYOr he eo 411ftan OOU'h ill hl.a .,...._ viU be e.aa h&nher "••P'l 
than 1 t t.a todq. ,.S 
Ill 1941, 'llbea 'l'tapell wa Ooftftlor ot Puerto Bt.oo, a jO\IJ'IIaliat 
ntana to bia sa an •aartoultUI'al .....sat ot W14GWIM4 abili.'J afl4 
pnatl&a ta liM:ral ail'olq.•' Allfthv wntar naalle4 11bat '1'qwU'a 
statu Ia aorra a~ 1AYol•a4 •re iba pi'Mti&eJ be wa •elad ill the 
ahla1D8 aN01' ot the 11ev ,. •• 7 T~ape,U•a oppouata lll1atakeal7 i4eaU• 
tiel bia vi" b1a al'4eat a~J •to blll --.lea he w.a the plaui'ble 
aa4 alallltu apoetle ot the revol.u'taa.•8 Ri&ht•vlll8 attaak8 calle4 oa 
Tu&..U to 4efeU all4 explaia his "re41oa1• view.. ID leb1'111117• 19.34• 
~ Molq, thea a4itor ot the asa&iae TMet• wrote to 'fUcwll• 
l w111 a4...n1• .[;-ii artiole Ta:I'J extuaival¥ 1A 
amaee ..... "' it fOI'th aa • ··-·· ot the IIIOre liberel vtav 1a the •WohtraUoa .... Ia a auae. 
tJ&enton, 1011. VOil14 1»e ·~ tile Olll'l'Ot w.il• 
1J1ca ot IINl Uk8 Mark Slalli'I'U•' 
Tu,plell'a pnnip with Proa.t .. ai.,.. aqpata the poaaibU.Uy tllat 
lloo .. valt 4e»ea4a4 Oil the prot...- to :r.taia "eir aupport ot the adllia1• 
atnuaa. .I!Dw!'IWo there is 110 evld- theti the Preaideut eaa1plt4 'l'q• 
wU to auch a poli.Ueal role. Tu,plell'e call tor f'an~~r•l.abor poliUcal 
ul'r .,...na4 to- obMrvera that he llliabt alip hi.IIHlt with a 
farmer-labor pan:y, to Wlich he 0411114 eontrilmte a tollovlll8 ia the Mid• 
dle WUt •10 It ia poeaible that 'rllewll 1118ht evant'Will:r hava aupport414 
nob e JJ81't:r •• at11ar it f'onld. llleu ta. epoke ill 1935 a'bollt tan~~r­
lallor uait:y baton a ptberiaa ia Clal1foraia ot »-eraUo rep.lara, he 
did net bava 1a 111114 a th1r«•panr _.. n •11 ma loyalty to Roolleval11 
w.a WIClWiatioaeblet he aifpla4 a letML" to the P:r.a14eat, written s-di• 
atelr attar the :r.u Anplea apaeob. •twra to •-•··12 
8. 
9· 
10. 
u. 
lao 
'fu&w.ll ,.. 11011 lateraatM, la the aaae ot panlo1paUoa, in the 
aa4 polial .. a he lla4 ao 4ea1n to ...,_ ... hie penooal atatua ia a peftT 
b1enftb7.13 Then wa ao besia 1a taot tt:~r the lftl8&eaUoa that he 
l!llPt at._. to lea4 a poUUaal -.~•••' on the buia ot h1a preauae 
wUh Jlnlcneaivea. ~. 'f\a&Wll's np1.1taUOD with the ftat •Jor· 
it)' ot the -.r1aan people wa :ntille4 bJ tlla qnioal all4 UJU~orupul.oua 
attaok aaainat hS. at the twe ha QOUon4 a lHIV Pu.ra Foo4 an4 Dnl88 
l»lUallu 1a 401lbthl tbat tlla a'a'V f4 people 81110118 vbc:a he ha4 eo. 
pneUae,.. 8\ltflaientq larp ta be pel.1Ueal.q aicn1t101Ult. The 
prindpel reauU ot 'l'taawll'a pnatiee with l'rocr'eaa11'U ,.. hia •zaiJMIIP 
ot neva on aation JI'OSftlll8 with taponaat -=era ot OOzlsnaa 111ho allan4 
hia 4eatn to taaa the tapnaaiOD llol4ll'. 
flaaweU's at11.-pt, 1D hia l181te4 span ts.a, to approach u.t10DIIl 
probleM on a bula, lntallaotual laftl baa nan lllnt10u.4.1 Ooaaalon• 
all¥ ha aant to tb.a Prealtad ••• all4a Gil the thoupta wb1eh 08111 to hS. 
ln bill ettflrt to \»a aa •14aa ..... 'fllcwll 41souaaa4 tbraa ot h1a 14aaa, 
nlaU.D& to hia lOD&•rua lnaUtnltiou.l -.lewa, With tha Prea14ent. The 
1.'3• Wll.ea ~1 aupporte4 .fl8u7 Wallaoa 1D 1948, Ilia onq flrPDiutional. 
caueaUOII with tha Pzoocraaahe hl'\7. -aJel'llhlP on the plattoa 
.-lttea, laftl'Nil 14aaai ha ·lett the part;r whan the .-111\ea n-
Jeote4 his auppon ot tbe llll1'1111al1 Plan• - Cba)MS' xn. Saot1oa. 
''h&wll Detinaa Iatenati.-1 c •••• 
ll· See Chapter XI, 'Vlllppbc Bf1r ttn' 'ha Mmu.iatration. • 
J., Sea a\»>ft, Chapter x, Seotlon, 'M41111onal ruouona, Iat1'04ucuon.• 
41.._.1'U4 Tlapell'a .,..tal7 vtewe 1t a4oP'II4 tbe 11\ea ot aa ws41a-
trllllltll4•pntUa us tor MUih reaaou u4 tn auoh a sreat17 l11Dcl1tte4 
tom aa H 1Jl4toato tbat tbe a4oJ'toa ,.. aot a reapoue to Tupell11 
tU'Iilll• 0\her illpot:1laat 41aauaiou 'NtiiHil tho Proa14aat u4 the 
PJ'Ofooaor 4oal,t with ,_ ~~of loa4...,.. oa which tho two CIOiliOZ'Y-
aUoaiiU _.bl¥ van ill ol010r ..-unrt than they wen ta., cnbar 
nl!Jaot. ,..,._. OOfl"NreaUou oa lu4,..o -rao4 tho Ro .. tu-at A41111l• 
1etl'aUOG.2 
lll4anl laool'poi'IIUOD 
'ftapell peillto4 oat tlld tho Gidaoe or fonr-oi&ht taoorporaUoa 
lave 1e4 to OCIIIJijt1Uoa .,.,,.. -. 1tatoe ill tho fora ot &l'lllltilll OOfl• 
.... tORI to wainaeoee. 8tat81 .-tU.e pftto4 00fl811e1CIIIII 'llhtah 
.......-. ill hil op1a1oa, to a 8Uftll4er of aovu-ntel pftftPU'Ne, 
aealentras to JI1'0Y1U tor tho pa.nanton ot tho aeunl tsnenn. Tvpel.1 
nvtft4 a 41-aiOD 'llhloll Meaa ll1IOWIIl 19001 heal4nt 'l'att no sMo4 
a to4onl illaai'JOftUoa lav in 1909 .- 1911. 'f\lpall ,.. illterseto4 1a 
noll • newt•• .PU'\lll&larl¥ ill a.,..o\lon vith hla i111tU1uUOilll 14.., 
on tho CttAU.l al1oclaUon of ~ 1 
lev ta 1933 aa4 19~· 'f\lpaU, lerla, aa4 tho Attorney Cnal'lll atu4lo4 a 
utiCIDill i.ftaOrJOftUoa btl1.2 RIMIHYelt wa 8JIIPI.thot1o to thoal a\UI\loaJ 
"'b the !'ru14ant an4 tupeU falt \blat the appropriate t:la he4 aot 
arriwt to puab a 'biU, a&l"Hiac thllt it voul4 zoequire a snat 4ea1 ot 
rtw1¥ a114 ~ 41l\late.3 'l'be PI'O~ 414 aot so beJ0114 the 41acu-
aioa •he•· 
~1 - aot en int1at1oa1ata ha beliaftll that •pantY" _. 
•llalaace,• tuU all4 fair ex.._. .-.. tho 'flll'1GU Hnora ot tha 
allftGIIIJ ot their pa'04uota, - to \Ia aoble'fllll throt.JCh wp alld prioe 
polloiu aDI eff1oi•t a11oMUOD ot I'NO\INtla.1 He re,Jaata4 iatlaUOD 
u a ~1 rr•tt tor lileaio Moa-.c •WJuatanu. 
Ia tu aupnUf1atlOM17 atau ot 19,, tupel.l, 1t 1a ti'U 
ta'IOJI84 •retlat1oa.•2 'l'hzwe ,_. ot llepreuion, with U"''Pl'OIJlllllt, 
buairleu lileliiii'I&P'.taa, u,ooo lileu taUuru, all4 goyel'lllle&t iaaottcm~ 
had •dl1 a4 tu -.noaa people wt.tll. u vstuntla 4etlaUoDaJ.7 blu'4llJl 
ot 41l'btJ t.wr datta wN pa14 u ts- I*•••• ooe 4o11ar eqwaU., ill 
'Nl.wt two ot 1926 a tha '-n4 t• 1014 btoo•• owantlalll111&o the Uqv14a-
Ucm au at Naohina a arleta ., ... 1a ,...._rr, 1933 • .3 
WlaUcm thJ:ollab ,...,UIIfl the 4o11ar to oiu to ita •aatual• 
l.e'fel, reqaire4. 1a 193.3. de}lartlll'e h'a tha aol4 otan4ar4 1D mar to 
pn't'Oilt twatp 1DM1'fareaoe wit!a .4 .. aUo CIUI'I'UC17 ••a at. SUoh 
""· 
1Atel'feNACe llacl ooOUJ'INI4 s.a tlla t-'leaa ~11 la\or )Miaaecl oa to the 
PreaUeat the obaan.Uoa ot a hitll4 aliA oolleapa that ED&la114 _...... 
tbe aol4 aka\41m1 Ul to the 4e,..._1Gih 4 Vll4er the mUoal ai....naaON 
ot eulJ 1'''' 'l'u&Wll coaaluNcl &Oill& ott ,;ol4 a ~~~mt •tow.rcia m••• 
tr. en Ol'thoelG IIII,Fth •• s 
The Ualteci SMtea, J1D1eJ uplat.ll8cl, vent ott the aolcl aten4arc1 1A 
Orcillll' to pJaiUt tllnller detl.&UODI lclaheU tMil noaptK the fUIOUII 
'ftl_. •arnt•u, W:llcall ,..,. the JneUeat pel'llllaal.,. nthonty to s.a-
tlata the OUI'NDOJ lA ou or _.. tit tift wva, prtar11J to o~t 
...-.tJOUo4 iatlaUoa b.r ~.6 \1Dc1ar the Hooftr adllllll••nuoa 
tben u4 1IMa a11ft\ $,t.,ooo.ooo,ooo ot UMGfttJOl.l.a4 intlatioaa the W1pt 
,.. DOt MJ.aaMci, thAt '1'nu11s7 Mkilll ap the 41tte:ruea batwall ~ 
.... eQeG41tuu"" 1all\11ll& ahon ......... nriu ... 7 Ill 1933 Coacnaa -· 
4atel"lliM4 OS iDtlaUODI the OD1J q11118Uoa wa vho VCII&l4 oonti'Ol l"o 
Raala'felt aooepllef \be t'h-• .. «mrnt aa a Mallll ot otteettiDC the 
llt.Utan dU._. ot ._ .. iDtlaUoaf.ate 1n OOJIPMO• 
'fupell 414 •aot tb111k tha\ *'• llooaaftlt eftl" axpeota4 to aahlO'fe 
the a8M &'WIIIAlte fe,.nty!J with ........,. .. INI'Hf" the Praaluat bopacl 
to nua Pl'lON aliA u:ut clatlaUoa, •T1JIIIIIi44leol.aaa ia'IUtmrau.8 
IJ.Ud x. Lill4le¥ atated tbat ncunaU 414 aot aoHPt the 4ootr1M 
tbat the pria17 oev.eu ot the 4Qnae1on lq 1a the 11110ae7 ayst•a 
the 1Tui4ellt 414 Dot Mltew tbat i.atle.Uon aa4 eululeq,ueat ~ 
••a t nt vue ou.n-ella.9 Departun hom the aol4 etu4ar4 aa4 the 
'rhCIIaa AIIID4r"' -u lie attrtW to the 'JOW1't'Ul Htlll- ot 
anata• aa4 !IIOH-oouattaa ~ CC~apeu~ •• taotona lihS.Ob 414 aot 
aoOOIIM tor the teatillc ot the ~ theoriN ot Proteaaor Oeorp r. 
lfanea ot Comtil 1a OotoMro 193.3• 
MltleJ', ntenilla to 1ltlftell1a ae.., Doted that aa aoti'ra 
Aeaira te> aohten a 4oUar won £014 ooatat fluotuate4 wltlh the prioa 
leftl - •aot .viai'bla u A.Pr111° :Nti-llaation. ~1118 a nrtua ot 
aaoeaalty, ... later, tollllDS the •tatellaot\aal 'bridpa to a a11l7 aa4 
t\ltila• IIOMtaJ:J J011q.11 -.u•a GJ1aioa ot Warraa'• theoriea 
•tolled Molal''•· Be lalleled .....,.., -eure• aa ... .,. aaoape• trc:a the 
taU ot t111411lc tud· Uttal eooaado aol.-Uoaa; !looeenlt taU rtot1a, 
partloularq with repr4 to •atpulatlQa ot the prioe ot gol4, to tba 
•t ... lutioa ot all •111Pla aol\ati- tor 41tt1ouU pro'bl- ••••• l2 A 
lliatoriall ot the 11ew Deal, Ptxcra Weoter, J.ace4 that RooaenU•a ltiiDftd7 
watuna 8bOWI4 Ilia 1a hia expaJ'iaaataliat rola.13 L1D418J ooati:r.& 
let. 
u. 
a. 
13. 
et llltlaUoa aD4 -$0)' •••• ,u •• "I'DII&b 1ut~• tor brlll&ltla 
prt ... aa4 allan lPO DIN Wl'llabla relaUouhipe to •oh cnber.•l4 
Ia .., .._,, ..,., .. , the aA'floe et.liDl-r aD4 ~1.1. llii•••Ml.t Wlll•r-
took the .,..._., vith p14 1D Ofto11er, 19.3.3• 
TM pl4.._.. • ..._ tilt on.-. lute lMiu Yal'louaq aalla4 the 
qUUtl\7 th..,,. aD4 the theoiT tilt tlul I PIUJ' 4ol.lar, tbl CJCIIIPIIDMtl4 
,_.._, ..a llL'Illtk .a.. ,.._ Jilt Goz an, all4 , ... H. ~ all4 In1llc 
li.WI' tilt YaJ.e ,.... Uate& alllllll8 lla .,_ ... 15 'lll&wll, '"• ,.. 
ol'MlW vlth • ,.... 1D foz tau .. eo .,..tuJ' pollq Ott let• l933t hla 
a.wal ooal'Uutioa _. _.,hi tile .S.... ot ... ot th• _. 1late&, or 
........... 1AMI'flewa fer thea wltll the lnatAut.16 
lfu1I'H all4 llueoa •P"'Itaht tile ~ 1a 41tall., preeuUna 
atat1atleal. •..utaauauos• 1a itl6 111 Mans ( .. w Yon, .Toba w~. 
193,5). The th•_,. • la ita af'lf)aet toa. holt tblt ••• 1a the prtoo 
ot ao14 Wll1t ..... the ,n ... ot • nllU• to wq proporuoaatelf. 
D ,.. -..nl4 tblt tate aapentlaa at 111ut Ullar tr. a fSXI4 wf.abt fit 
1014· all4 .. laoreeH 1D tbe ,_ ot 4ollare 'llllloh thl .. ,. " wDUl4 
.,., tor a &lwa wt,abt fill p14, .....u S.nuo the pr&eftl. leftl Ott pn .... 11 
w.~. Zneat x., •War oa 1iha Bn1u ,.....,. 2.58. 
I.I.DUeir• lftHt x., •War • t1141 antae 'hut,• 2.58· 26&1 fvcwU, a. 
o., •Mma1•ac .....,., • u-Uebet llllltea 1 19,., 'bqell le"D. 
Til? t'U .ld.IIL CUrt ... CIIQhr XV. •'.~Vcwll•• lppaftal IDrlv••• 
Ot ..... taifiiiia.• 
~. a.o., •MsaacfocJIIDM7.• 
680. 
'fllpNl, llho lllt aot pnMDA to 'be aa expen oa ~01' oauera, 
njMWa the 'faiTell taeaie beclauaa U •• ad a nlaUouhip 'bet'IIND 
,014 aa4 aU a41a ot U:DIIIP•l8 .. u14 to the Prea1481\t 
It l )laoe tea 'IIGOka oa JOil1' 6eak MIX1I to tea •aa-4oJlar 
llUla, •• book ia Wld"tb • 4oUar. It I I"BCluM the aol4 
ooateat liT oaa balr. eaCib 1JoR 1• worth t1n1 oeata • .,.. 
,._u,. 'ftle tl'OU.llle te w 41111 11 uobup ao14, or -
.alt pepv ...._,, tor soMa• 'l'hat b, the OWirwbel.aiDc 
JSftft'-&8 ot llulDua ................. ple .. thnNI)l 
obeolc'. llhto lJrfOl.,. tile llhole oNd.tt qst-. Veloou,, 
• 4ollar W.1'llSIIc owr ...,..1 tiMa la a 4q, le another 
ft~nor that ......._,. tMoz7 .._an take late •oeout.19 
faawll beaM hie e~. ottbU4 •-IR• on the opbloae ot epeol• 
al.lat• llho 414 aot ..-. vltll warna•• etaUaUoal 4.-matnu .... 20 Jill 
CCIIIQ,IIIn4 tile pdoe ,..,_1 to the 411Rh rate, llhioh ooul4 aot \le atfeete4 
liT the laJI.lPQlaUoa ot a •iaale tan•a pnoe •••• mt MUld aot lie 
oeott.M4 to the laJI.lPQlaUoa ot aol4 aloae -· ewa thoueh aol4 •• illpo&'t• 
aat. upeoiaU, 1a ~UOSI&l ...... n 
'l'he adllhlatnUoa •• a wola, 'fa&wU DOted, _. ..... ,. hto tile 
oa•a sat ot the prion ot " 'titiu other thaD pl4, silow4 that it 
4H aet •••Jt warna•a 14eu. a. 11J1M4 vlth the oaJor1tT• •intalaf.as 
thet ao1A ... ftlaable ae4S. ""' an .. abeo11lte -· prioee h ... to .... 
........, .. lefti'ftq liT o rl1111aa aa4 produeta - corn aa4 eboea, tor 
1 'Q:1e (the adllhiatfttilll 414 not a4opt sa 1aclu1ve eelect1"N pnoe 
prqp:u fteb u 'fta8Wll ~) • ..,_U 11ete4 ..,.,. ... 1 pol1olaa other 
!it. ~ •a~ 
• • • • • • 
Jf!!r Jfl ~Jrr.-i ~~!" 
0 • tt• 0 0 
: • t:.· fl,r = . = 
~r ii!U,~P ~f:.f(flJ{ 
&\tf~,!4'; 
• ,. & 8 
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·. 'ti lhl~ 
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662. 
a f'llllio otflolal, ,.. ao\ onl7 an la41~Uual, ll\lt he w.a aleO a ..-.r 
fit a ,_.. After \he nje0\1011 ot hia Ylew, he bad the altel'lllltlYU ot 
nef.aaliiB or atafl!IS oa -· a ohoiM llhlob oontronta nearl.J e-Rry a4111D-
1atn.tor ia _....,...,at- tt. or aaotlulr. SiDee he -1ae4 ill lllaah• 
i..._ he 414 uot o011teaplate nei&al!IS cmtr the 'ifel'ftll plea) , he ,.. 
_,...414 uot to or1Uo1ae .-asatntlora po11o11 he •• 4tftll auliJeot to 
d.eDt ot eAataSatfttift hf.at017 ooats-U¥ anoouaten the pbenaanora ot 
41•& ••••' vithf.a aa e'Ncda\ntlora 81141118 ¥1\h a tf.aal poliq clui• 
at.oa, all4 1D4l~IA»da auPPGl'tiaa -.-. llhith the7 oppoaat ~ tMI 
41._..1ora ...... aaoh iMUeata 4o aot Jtaat1f7 oharpe ot lntelleotual 
4~. The tblrt all4 ..n ~tact whlob 'l'uawll'a 01'1\loa 
ta1le4 to oeaaf.Ul' •• hla nr.naoa to the eol4 PI'Oiftll aa a •ttnt 
ate,. tow.ri a 80WMl lftl1'1'8llOT•I8 'h&WU •a 14eaa 011 a aound lllll'JIUCII' 
vest hloa4 the aou-11uFlD8 ··- to • a-utae • .. lltJ'' dollar •• 
pa:rt tilt a procna ot priM ooatrola u4 .. lit alljUailllnt tor the •laten-
anoe tilt JUO,Il8alJIS powr. 
prt.....tlzil'll 4aY1M pl'Oftll OOft'eot. '1'be plea toroe4 e 4aftluat1oa ot tMt 
4ollal' to alSCJatl¥ laaa tho •lxt7 par Cl4tD\ ot ita fOS"MZ' pld ooneat J 
it failed to lltt the 4-.-to o rll\7 prt. .. ~1 appnciebl.J, prolluo-
181 aeUher tMI IIOdente retlaUoa 1At•t•4 DOl' the \UlOOiltroUed iatlatioa 
W.ll stne11 PN4ioted•29 While a altpt la\PI'OI ndl ot tonlp trade 
683· 
~. the prlaoipal 'Ylelble effmo n. to the blah prioea pa14 for 
pU, •• the flow ot the -.1 ~aU Oftr the vorl4 late Fort ~nax.3° 
The ...,_luatioa ot the 4ollar oa 1aJIIIal'f ,31, 19,34, ia aOOOl.'ltaDoa with 
the tntlitioaal iatlaUoalat 40otriae, ~to aa aolalovleda nat 
ot the tallwe ot the Warraa aoh_.)l MDlaJ" noalled, •I we riaht. It 
ct.ua•t lad aarthllle - a:oaP' w.rraa.•.32 ott ictal aoJmovledS'"IDt ot 
faUura .... la 19)9• tdlea the J'e4anl Ruane BGar4 a4'f'1oacl CODp\Ha, 
'IQal'lalloa haa ahow ••• that prl_. eaanot lie ooatrolled by the ....,.... 
&114 ooat ot _, •• •• OUh all4 prt.oee 4o Dot 110ft tO&Phel'•'.33 
Ia 'fllcwll'a Jlllbliahed t rata cm the tfaz'fte plaa he nfft'ftl4 to 
it a1 a fll'at atep 'llhloh 
• • • will fOl'W u 1a ,.an to .,.... to look fol' a nall;r 
aatlataotol'f Mdi1la fJ6 •oba,.. • 'IIIlich aol4 auar we 
all4 aewr o01&14 -..,.. 
Hit aoaept;a4 the Praaic\aP1a 4ats.1Uoa, 1a a ••aaae to tha LoD40D laea• 
faio Coat.,..... ot a eouD4 lllr:Naq aa oae la tdlioh the 4oUar VOI&l4 
haft •a au'bataatla1 eqtaalitJ' ot JU'oha•iDC powr all4 4eln•PR1111C powr 
~ oae 81flfti.1110D to lliiMIIH•'lS RINiftlt, 1a PRFilll trillllta to •aoua4 
....,. •• 414 aot pauaa to Wiae It 1a ..,. aetau.-36 'l'upell a:pula4 aa 
the ....,.1 4etialt1aa ot HWI4 ... ,.. vrltiDS al!Gut 'the IMIXt lo&iaal 
ateP" 1a a ~i"M prioa p~Yf 
1912-l!hl.. "· 
Ia 'fqwll•a otilltoa, * Vann Jl,tut dS4 aot ... k to onate a 
•oc 11\7• dollar. the ..t lostoal ••• -u be tn oration ot a 
,._iae •• . 'IU\7" 49Jl•r ~ the •palllUH ot the .,_tur' .e«t. 
t~ Ua bQla oa a wJ.abt ot ael4• ~u• 1IIOill4 OBl7 nianaw 
aol4 u a 11141•• &l•iaa u, •• the~ • ._ 414. a oeu:ral PMl• 
un. A •• tli\7' Iollar 1IOal.4 trat _.u u O!llF 0011 ot the o !Jill• 
Uaa to 0011 ootlwrt• 'flliwll bella.,.. Qat nth a dollar we •t ... tllle 
with ov puaeat naUaUGel neour .... •38 
'lila 4Sftlault7 with the &ol4 ataa4al'llo 'llqwll aot..t, vaa tnt 
&014 W8 8~ aaother II llt7t it W8 ODl¥ a atan481'11 of Wlabt aUee 
tw .,.;we fluatuW- aliA ~~tJf.IUf'• upees.au, ill W ttmea *- tben 
we eosrUtt.GD e111011S lullal'llen allll .-aut. for poa .. ulon of a llalW 
~.39 the llftl naaora 1"14 we ue4 •• a ftl'l"'ttllF aWNia:rd we aot 
that " -· ....... tall Ill .......... ""' that it hftlelle4 ,.., 4t04IAf)ooo 
alate .. u .. a •non of 'f'&lu.e40 Ia bla WllJUbltah..t aotu, '1'ucW1l 
• • • a dollar ,.dell la r111 tile ill 1-thl118 lib tell 1a 
pazwuatq Yal¥allla. ,.._. &114 ..,.ran Yaltlelllea 
all tha ate rata tor a """' to ~ IIIJM1 OGUl4 lie 
ue4 to --- • 0 .. ,. 4ollaJ'.\1 
Wlth tha ue of u t-. be .. , he nate4 ill a .,.Utoate4 ool_, the dol-
38• 'fuawU, B .• o., •Pn. ... alii Del'\fra,• 48-49· 
39· .,.._11, R. o., •Prlau ldl4 DeUan,• Ill· 
flO. -.u. a. e., •llri ... aa1 ~n.• Ill· 
U· 'f\1aWl.l, R. G. • "MIIIIIlcUc Meae7 ·• 
• • • oen lMt JrQt oeutaat s.a ,...ftll JUohaala& powr • 
liMauae aot &014 a:LoM 1• ~le tor -.r IICIOdll 
liiGt •oh I :111)' 1a ... .....,.la tor aftl')' othvo 
'IIlla 1IOal4 hniA • ataltle Pl'l• l.lnti au ..u aleo 
she u a toller whloll IIOUl4 ,.,.Hat a aten f# •* 
.......... ,.._ ...... ._ w an· nuaa.• 'IIlia ,.,,, 
ot Yin vi:U 'M •~lJ •taT bF thoae who N."' 
~17 4...rtW u ala eatltit · "liCNQCl J~D~~ey.•IIZ 
•theQetf.eellJ" liMp. ~las ,..... ......._,, •PftotleellJ"' than 
wn snet cl.!ft.1wl.U-.~' A ••• la -tl17 14•• u4 a pleoe 1a 
•• etteett• eoOMIIie JOlltt'a U oou.l4 *" •tau the pleoe ot lOoaet 
............. t!II'OIIBh tJie ..... , •• " ot moe •• •~ It • •o-.41tr 
4ollel' J.'Utlltfl4 1a a atallle prioe J.Mel., tllue -u lMt ao ~· 
... 1 ........... el.ullip - the m• laYal .. eta'bla rr. 1923 to 
l,at. It ,.. aot aiiOqb w lriiQ ~ pows- oouteat with retft'oo 
.... to the MUD flit • .,......u ft Wll •a1eaate17 that JIIIHIIa•lllil 
JIOWI' ..n ..,.,_ Ntatl ~~'iaN it aeUri., 1a to be •1ate111114.•-' It 
n4uOe4 J)r041lot1oa ..na Wft aot ti'IUlaW tate l.owr meu aa4 hlPer 
-.-. PII/II4Utl011 WOI&l4 aftiiWallr •u- JIIU'ollulllrl paws- u 1t 414 ia 
the l'f2QJo 'fMbMlclc1oal fl4wMe .OU14 ftq\111'1 a PJOtPI&IIh'e lcwuiJIC 
ot-. m• leftl. All the"'"",... .. 4oWil. '-"' •l.uN -u 
i.Ul'lelll then VOillcl. alao haft to be a .JII'1.,1o aoellas 4oWil ot a.Ma 
Ita· ~~ R. 0.1 •l'l't ... a8l Dollen,• 50• 
43· \'asWU. L o •• •l'l't ... a8l Jlollan.• 50· 
,.... 'h&wll. R. o. I ·~ ....,. •• ,. 
llS. ••· ,.,_Ut II. Oo1 ••eqi .. IIDDel'·• ~ 'fuawUo Ro Go 1 •s..t<-.,.• 3• 
Sa orter to •llltdo pvohaa!JI& .,....,:.11.1 'l'll&wll'a aonetaX)' neva auc• 
P•'- tlex1'1111itr 1A Oloii'NAOf'o prt ... -... end cl<lttt l)Ol1o1ea tor the 
taphanltaUOG or a thea to 11h1eh he tMil4 oouietaotl.J' aislee the 11)20. 
- .u •tnltMilee ot pun~~aa!JI& lo101IU 11a omr that aoo1et1 m&bt nJOI' 
the full tw1ta or ita te0hllelcc1ea1 uftlos-ot. 
Pna14ant RCII:IIII'Nlto 1A 1"107 I IUin& lll hia ~ -118&1 ot 
Marth J, 193£, the -o-..t ot a V.X Oil un41atr11Nte4 potita (•oor-
poratt.oa 1A~ not pd4 Ollt to 111i1M4\ulla throuch 41Y14enda, aal.ariN, 
lntaraat, or •AT other 111Hwa•1) pw qyera1 raaaoaa tor hta propoeel1 
the olttaiat.as ot 1Aoreaae4 raveiiUO th1'0\18h the pnrrent1011 ot corpc>rate 
tl•aoial praotloea 11h1eh llftcle4 tuaUoa, the •111Pl1tioaticm ot aoOOilll.t• 
dana aa l»t- bwlf.aaaaea ot nrioue alaaa and batweea aall aad larp 
atookhol4erl. 2 Oppoe1UOG to the 11ft v.x •1AlJ iavolved oaa or the 
......on. wtlf.eh the Prealllent ott.nl tfW hla request, but alao 1a a441t1oa 
allf' ... uer cmea, oGOtellb4 that \be •tt..- of the 'IUI4innb\lta4 protUa 
tax • their """ .. ettaet ·~ t.at•U011 on the pan of tbe Mat.atatn-
uaa to,...,. ~llUea 1a ..,orate tuauon th:rou&h tile Reftla\e 
.lot ot 1'3'· 'l'he obJaou- ot ler&U' OOI'JIOnUona ~ 4NU with 
•ttell'll to Vhioh BDoMYalt 414 ~ ll'llfel' •• the 1alpl1oaUona, 1a rtnual 
a lllhlcm ot tietnwUon ot IIOiporate INJ.'P].ua, ot &0'18ft11Bat -tnl 
' 
ot 1~mta.._.t oap1Wa a • hi' ot ..-..uta &44114 their protena to 
thou of the le:&'811' t1-• q..nt.ODillao oa a th8011'11Ueal le'ftlo lllut\bu 
etten • qal1eal tlwttwat10118 1a the eOftGIIIJ. 111u1r oppoaeote ot the 
ta uan..a \bat the Pnei4eat 414 not. ot OCUl'Mo n:pleia the pol1Uoal 
.nt ..... beh1D4 hie ~ ...... . 
Or1Uoa aa4 atu4eata ot the ..Unn'll\1ta4 prot1ta taz attr1butetl 
l'a \1118Mtefl Jlii.Z'JOH ot iaUr.ftlJ' laterterlAc v1th corporate pol1q to 
the t-1' prot....,. .. _ cu ....... Geael'al CGwulel ot the 'l.'naeul7t 
u4 '11a1Wl1.3 Oae ._._, ot kDUou aote4 thet 
... Pnt•.- 'l'ltptU, 1a hie 'Mll• 7Ja1 Mlfl£iel pygi-
pliae <1933) u4 1a b1a ,.r...,_ .anoe to the Prea14eat, 
a4'"'"""- the ta aa a .... et 118Ch&cift8 n:oeu1'ft e«<II'PU• 
ate •naaa. t.nenutac GOd wr apea41q, all4 ataliUbiAI 
--'-· 
Be, Olipbaat, ea4 onen belllml4 ~- ~ tax WJOUl4 11.,. 
tile notllb.W.n .n tatlv.eMa u tu t~uoa ot oor-
poratloa 41n...,_ ea4 110111nUoa aa•1D88 polht• ea4 
woal4 re••• •nata a-.. ill eu:POraUoa tt•DM•li. 
nre l'e'r01're4 ai'OIIIIIi .... fact \bat • ••• there ,.. llllah el'it1ol• ot oor-
ponte ••1RCt 11hioh ,.. pepularlr belA to \Ia aa 11QOrta.Dt cue•• ot the 
~t.oa•S - a o 1at Vhteh WI~ .-rlHcl Tupell•a prlary 
lauran la the ux. 
theft 11&4 Melt a 1 ' er of e\t...-. s.a Allerloaa htnory to ... n 
aa U41aW!W ~ita tax la order to px>eMDt larp atookholura trca 
••oqt.RC tuaUoa oa 4tndn4a"' laan~a~ ~with GOI'JOI'IIti-- • 
P""t• llbloll a1ao ,..,. laJ'8I atoUIIAJAel'll liON llltl'Ge~U~e ia OOI"jjiO'aUOJll 
tllaa -11 fteloldlol4an, llbo on.a •••• ~hair 41•14a114a tor O\ll'1'8at 
..,. .... ' \'ucWll ,.. -' pdal'ilr ~IIUMt with r•••- aatun, lla 
,.. aoaoai'M4 with tba JC sa\ lOll ot 4111MIU1 8IIDllfJ atoollholllen I.JUIOtu 
u 1t VGUl4 •• tor.,... ettieieat ilmtatllallt of oorporau aurpl.uea. 
Be alao b4111_. thd .,... baaio ,....... tllaa pr U.aa ..._....., 111110111 
ato~ ,.,. ....... ry tor the ......... of etf'ioteat in_._l\t ot 
l!"Mt!rte! flfM"''"• Cbaptv m1, •GoYe:ra.at allill ID4u.ft1'7o" SeoUoa 
~. •'l'lt.e AllooaUoa ot Cap1te1.•7 He •-n.a ~at • ..... , ot ~• 
tJ'OU\tle ./i.epruetoi/o~• ti'Cil Mlt .. uooauoa ooovrinc atrtctlt vi~ill 
a aiaale orpabaUoaa• • • IV., UD4e4 te reill'ftat 111• aurplu in 1\a 
illllwltq, er ot tbe plaN or that illbatrr a the tnal • .......,. a 1Ua1R-
'"'•'_. 1e4 to ~ouoa in .,..t.tit aoodao a'ftnt'IUill¥ produoinc 
hai'Jihl etteeM oa the libole eOODGI!f'• It teutioa foroed a\ll'plua illto 
4bt1.'iwt&.oa u 41Y14ei\M, oorponUoaa would he'ft to IMI4Ik tn--.at 
oap1Ml thl:'Ot.lah rec111hr e•u·l.aa -. .,_ ill'ftat.nt •rlfet -.w oheok 
a tb'll'a plau tor UJ~~~D~ioa, ...nne apital in'ftltllllmt libtch -.14 lie 
ettiei.at ti'Cil a aatloul poat et nev. Tu~WU augeeted an e4d1t1GIIal. 
..... et npe"iailla oapital 11mta-.u1 i'e4anl inoorpoatton -.14 
reqaire ~· renaion ot ort.cillal tha$1111 tor tbe pantinc ot permtaaS.• 
to .U. .., capital s...ua. 8 
itooH'ftlt Uluatrated hie tu1lia1.'it7 vUh 'l'a&wU'a i4eaa on the 
IR181lM ot oorporata aarplu 1a the 11)20'• in Ilia aoooptenoo a44raaa at 
Ch10810 Clll lull 2, 1932·' A poap ot ReP~J\tlioan eoaa--n 4atlare4 
that • • • • the PnM1'7 ~· ot ~· • • • \till we not to rata• r&V811\111 
bll't to ''"" ett.- \0 'the ~Uaa phf.ioo~ ot fOrtin& the dia'trillll• 
••• ohlef l)l'O,...\ of \Q 1&114f.a\l'11N\e4 pi'Of1U tdo 
...... for nu aa lie .... 1a a .-.I' ot .., Wr1U1118 
oou 'lite PJw.IUellt '\ltl .... t fll.TPI4 vl\h the MIIIM 
altf tor •oh a ua.u 
'IJae Rln"r..., A.ot ot 19.36 414 11ft pnyl4a tor 411'en ~ OOD-
tzol ot oapltal tawn.a a u 414 1IR Pl'"l&l for thl npla.-.t ot '" 
ux. 11114 \H ezaiiiP\UIIl ot 41Y14aata fli'Ga tH ~l tax oa inA1'114ual 
iaa I I vi \It a flat 3SI udUtrillu.t.a JI'Qfltl tax •• 81 thl heai4eat 
viahl4.12 'fila llll411\l'11N\e4 protlta tax, •• a lll'IIUX OYW aoraal tau, 
1n•ut.at au '''"' pea 1 oat .anm. 'IJae l\eJJP11aaa ~ 
11bo tll0h4 ~·• booka 41apla,yllll 4tCD118111J" tor •.t.aicmariu,•l3 aoa-
4 "4 the tor.- 4iltr1nU• Ifill aai'Aillflt ut orU¥ tor u .. u, u aa 
1Molia111 --.rws tu, alH ~ lt •• aa ta1Ual etep tcnen ewaWal. 
4tnet ..,..,._, tNJel'\'iaia. 
~ Mol_,. ._.1.4en4 ou.-at TT1N tntlueaUal 1a 'MlUac" 
thl Ulllatl'l'llll\414 PI'Gf1W tax \o \H JlnaU.t thla fUswll.~ ThaN wa 
a as,attloaa 41ffaNae~~ 1a 1101 11 tbaucM lllt'IIMa thl two protueora. 
Ollplaaat we aa 'a'Yaaflelieal ,..,..~ 'IIIlo beltne4 that thl tax 
'1101114 Jli'ftellt tha 8JIOV'h ot IIDBO~.~ tupeU, 1a aooonanoa vUh hll 
10. 
u. 
12. 
patiela !lll4 \he ftC\tl,aUoa ot o.tUal s.a .... ._ .. , • ••• woul4 · .-4 to be 
&eftlopecl ..... b7 ....... 16 
'l'lla ... .-, ot tlut a..... .a.t ot 1936 oeounet after the law 
Deal hail alllarulOaM t:U iatepattac ettoru ot the law latioulillll tor to 
••a oa \he •a• .,.._thlu CJt t1ut •• J":wac. - a llh1R 'lillioll _.. 1ft 
a ·-l.t.lz'lre4 ~1_. at11er the lmllllU.UCift ot the MilA an4 the Triple 
A la 1935· .. ., qrieultual lealalaUOB IUoppecl sah CJt the aaUoaal.• 
Jla••na tuwn. ot the orl.cl1111l T&'f.ple 4. 'l'lle U.aalUoo la \he llw 
Dial, '*'cb anar dlA,... 4Jftl' 110 • atrlotl Jtev heallca J18\t4mto Nv to 
e"'aSaaloa to \he traDer olnle ot '1'allllr ectroona anA Be• Cohea, yo~&tllhl. 
......,. ot t:u s..nu .. anA:~~~:.-..- Aft. tbe Becnu'lti" Tax 1111, allll 
tb4t BoldlDC C I _, Aat.l? 
Tb4t \J"Wt\-liUtlDC lciAiaa ot Olf,JIIIIat, tbe ahltt attar 1935 ill tb4t 
all4 Cohea. allll 'fllpall'e .__.. •elul• 4IOIIGII1'I1 after the aprtna ot 
1935 with the .Jia .. ttlERiat Afa:ln4Mftltloa (aa 11C111107 ti&(Pip4 ... att.all¥ 
1a the 'II&OIU'l\1" anlYl\J wlf.all ,.._,. • • ••• Aurias both the law 
Jte\loaal.lat alld 11w haeac. ph·wa ot to lev Dial .... •18) ettwn 1111141-
tlMUOM ill f101lt-.ozu7 eetilllt" ot tbe llltllleaoea oa the Pru14a\ 
tor the wa41ttrt.Bte6 protlu ~· 
18. 
Tha tax oateul\11¥ reea\1184 TuewU'a lutUuUoaal ldeaa oa tile 
caldral allooe.Uoa ot I'UOIU'Oea. Tha Dlnotor ot tha Dldalon ot ila-
'"reb aacl fte.UaUu ot the Tnuury 414 olta to tha Saute c-lUee 
oa J'Saauu. la haUtrillc tor '" •aiNn, ~ ra1aua ot oorporata auzo. 
lila u a .. _... ot tu 4epnut.oa.l9 Yet, the uooadaaq bf 19.)6 ot 
tnet•\luatiaa all4 oertala tnet•'llllatan, aacl tha a411lalatnUOD'a ta1lue 
to Jli'Uth fflllt the Pftatc1Ut 'a flllt18laal propoeal and a fedel'lll lnoorporaUOD 
law, .... tel oaU tor a u-ra reYlaloa la aatlmetea of 'fV&waU '• 
lnt1wmoe Oft thia laslalatton. It, • Hllle1 bellne4, one ot Jlooeeftlt'• 
aliltl'llttlDC v1ahM we to atl"lka llaelt •' OOipWatloaa,20 QOW UJICI'Iltettall.T 
orltleisillc hill attar henaa uoeP'M llle aid ln an alllersen07• ha we 
aauna oa d eal\f tflllt 'tibia than we ao p1aoe 111 'fV&wall'• 11Qar80Dill, 
,.._\114iJMH :LutUaUCIMl •teve.21 U tha Pfte14ent we •plqlaa liJ .. r,• 
u tile Uetol1.aa Brio 7. 0014•• o rateA,22 or it he we aetillc illpll-
81Hq, ae Mala7 noa1le4,23 it l8 tar!lell\lle to cl.,. aaet •lahta to 
I'Upogaee tel olallhillc a.....to phlloeophiea wn oaaplieeMcl. liJ hla reec-
Uona to politieel ooui4el'llt1oaa. 
Ontiu ot the atbdalnnuc o11area4 that politioal IIIOthu 117 
llehta4 the ReMIIM Aota ot 1935 H4 19,0 - ell eoeuaatloa slob the 
oppealUOil baa laverta\111 aJP).lel. Ylth .- ,1WI111t1oat101l, to Allln'leall 
MaiiiU'H tw ratetaa lft'tl_.l dl' ta oa lao- ta U..pera'ble fl'Ga 
pfilUIIll ooul4eaUou. Tile pel.ltioal eUuaUoa ill wloh llooeevelt 
tOWtd lthnH' ill 1935 11114 19" •clle hill tile tarpt ot c0114-t101l 
tl'Ga rf.&ht all4 lett. Ia putt.w.ar, the lett, w1oh lea'llfld '-ao&to 
ot the raaU•'• lea4iaa pOlUialea. 1a 19.53 '1'\18Wll :rece.lle4 aa taoS• 
clot ot the OOIIJBSID perlo4 Whlcb t~ tlte eveDtul -qenea 
flit the luatia.tftltatt lett to a pealUGD ot Jfi1UIIll ,.....,, 
••• a f/fll u .... pe"" •• ~ 'llf e talepll.oll8 oall 
'llblcb the GetWUII' teN lll the dtJWtc I"CCGao Be JUt hla 
heD4 O'fH' t!le ,,...." .. IUI4 .. ~ to the raet ot u Ylth 
a .._, ana au .. u. •n•e BMT•" a114 he bale\ the N001ftl' 
ao that a onuUac wl• oaldat GDt t.mo the ~ 'l'he 
r....tau• ' .. ..,. w ,.., • tu ... ttoker that Mr. 
ow. •• YOIIIll be4 YfJtita4 .. OO..tiWII' that ...... He ,.. 
oallinao be Miele to _,. late oaii41UM asalttet 8llOh GOUDIIOlo 
He Mlcl, •tt I ba4 eot "* • pu m Chtoaao ,_ 001114 raot 
,..,. beaa .-uw• 1 •• vAtll • klD4 ot pntulty 'llllioll 
,_, mrrr& 'betac •••••, M ,.,.. • to lnelloate ,.., be 
liOill4 4e lt thara .. .,. .._ eouortll!l Ylth theM party 
OOIINI'IIatl,... lUll YCIWIIo Dr?U, IU:aro eftd tile raet. 'l'he 
tolftllt ot la ..... Wilt .. t• .• loll& tiM. 'l'he GoYemol' 
took U l.lna8bi111l1• lNt LoiUI -.. 4ee4l1 eed011a. All4 wllea 
he flMllJINDc \iJ the IMOlftl', Jill'. Rooatmtlt •14 to u 
Yltlulllt a J1aaa ot ••• at. •n laae ita tuaar etta llat 
aot:ull¥ B1&e7 la ... lilt the ho ... , 4e~~&ai'O\UI •• ill the 
U.tta& steM• \Oc1leJ. We 8haU lul'fa to clo a_..hiaa allwt 
hS..· 
••• lfllllr LGac woul4 f\al'lllaht all throuab the otJUtac 110atba 
ot Mll'o IIIIIUNlt 1e adldat.at .. le,· a "f011&\ll.e, ..,.. it 41 .. 
tofte4 plii'Wl'ao ot aUaftllUfta to the poliO)' thatl beiac 
u.aacl. lila Qopa, •lh'eq Mn a ~. • •• u aPPI&l• 4--
IJG8la 111 la twe. au t.qo .. tltle ia a FUUoal -· jut 
ea ftbal'll later oa wu14 1Mt • tllo 'l'o,m•aaf 8114 Btpl.ov 
eoh_, au Calltonla'e ... aa4 IiiilS" • but it '111*14 otter 
..... ,, ..... h'fltattae to Jll).lllier ot ..... ,raatiDa eon. 
teu MDI14erloe tor -.u.... u4..,.. seourlty tor ..a aDil 
.- 1IICNl4 M lll&q'a tOilatlld aJIIIMl to th- who ba4 bed 
atlllqe4 liJ' the l!M\wttrlel qsta or by tha laii41CIZ'U ot 
aptaultve. All4 1t VOilU taU 1Uie aev ... 111 oa apblttt 
an'Nl.la4 liJ' t .. r. I'Milt.U, llr• Reolwftlt would. reapoo4 
te thla t~r aa the left 1a hie ow ,., .~ 
A atutot at -.rten tuaUaa ll-.4 that H1ae7 toac• • • Shanl-our-
~ ot S001al 1uu .. w:re MI'OIIB ellfiUP to arouse !Soh apprelle11111aa 
t.a ltuhtactcm liJ' the •JJ'llta ot 19l5•as Cbarlaa aDil Ma17 Beal'd o1Hiane4 
,., 
'JJia _. _...,. };t 1\ula 19o. 19..15. ta which RooMYeU ealletl 
tor a ...-w OOrJIIWoUoa \q/ t.U vUb a aplaab ia tile 
.. 17 lta11er ot aaUODal polSU• .. .. Sudol' JAaar Lollee 
th• ••• at*Milha the aMiliatftoUoa !:Ill the latt flak. a4-
4XUHC aa epea latter t atbf tb1a propoaal. '!be Sa•tor 
adalltttlcl tbat tba v1J14 ba4 ..._ -.-. wt ot bla aalla, 'but 
llaalam _ ...... ,~ \bat u ..._ plea ven -ftet 1at9 lav 
he 1iiCII&l4-. •aoo,ooo aJian~tll al.uN• at:relaht t.no 
tu a.v n..1 ...,. Wttb the ..... saa ot 1936 onepfJI& .. . 
tllla J&otfal' et belt - .- to w trea'-4 .. a trU'la .. .. 
S..tor La I'Ollatte lllllinet toilet...-. bea., taaUOA oa 
larp llltGaU aliA 111b41rl ..... ,..U aot rteld a re•- ...., 
......,.._ vttb tile IIIOdt ot ,.u,1oel JtOtu :reiu4 vltb to. 
..... etiea o • • • lJl the ea4e ~. SelllltOI' La J'Ollft .. -
~ .... As a l'et'IP e PJ'C)Iluoer the attau 110J.'ke4 no 
waUN. As a eUu to lleat ott tile atora troope ~a.a.tor 
Loctc u4 Jatller Couahllllt lt - ao\ without tor ... • .. 
tloviJia toaatllel' al\4 C178talltset1oa ot • • • • tvo btpuleee - the ,,..1M 
to stl'1kle ltau at his orlt1U ellA the t~ee to •steal I..oaa'• th\1114er. u27 
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that a.t,poue obMk ••t illllerltliat•• by ~ 1Diulr1teaoe, euo .... 
aloa, 1eaaar. ell4 ctn tuea • 'ftl1'7 llrce U~CUBte I'IM1'N4 liT oae 
),ep1!M W IIAetloleJ7o HI elao ........ 1HI'IIIlai tl:.l iftcl\IIW 
........ C>a ..,., JMIJ'IIOD8l iatJMI ea4 ....-111a th- \Mtpoa4 tile Clld'-
nat Ullllt fllt $1,ooo,GQ0.30 
'ftle tol.lowlJia tellll lbow tJ&e 4llllfll1'1\1W l'lkl of the 1leYeD8I 
Alta ot 19311 ... 1935• 
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31" OftS' $.SO,CICIO 
.,. O'IV l,GOO,CICIO 
15'1 ..... s.eoo.ooo 
111'2 M "' Cf' • '"AI b'W 
$1 tw 4tUh u,ooo 
1ft tet)•TIIl -- fllt 
..... 
Ati'M'z!trt-
... Aft ot 19.35 .,. .... ftinills prooe4uzw. 
Ia a _.,...,. ot 3•\IIU'I '' 19" • tleoal. -~ten tbe l':ruiteat 
•'-te4 "-at tlse ....... vee 1a '~~aluM, ... ,_ tw nUet •pea4111uft•a 
be RIC adil4 DO D1t11 -...32 0. 3aJW·w.r 6, 1936, \be 5\l,.._. Clour1i 
..,UU'le4 ~ Acrieultual ~at Aft (BDoaae MUla oa .. ), elUilaat• 
he S.SOCMIGO,OOO 1n anUe1pa\e6 n:nm •· •~ ~he ell4 ot '111 -~h eoa-
anee pu...t a \IW tor ~he to ltate ..,_n~ ott a eoWere' lloau, 
a4tP& to •• .....,. $120.GOO,OOO 1a ..... l .. Uoa obU'IH• Oa Manh 3 
Rooa.,.lt 4ellftn4 • ____ , ..._.. Me•aaae to the Coafp'Naa be 
lat.,.. the l.e&lal.aton: tha~ aev apteulfNftl leaialaUoa ( tbe sou 
OoadJWUOD ellA ~'-taUt All.o118Rt ut ot r.-.Z'J' ~. 19") aD4 tbe 
eo141en' bGau (A4,1UaW CCIII ••U• ,.,_., Aft) nlfl'lil'el ~n. nlelac 
ott S6ao,ooo,ooo 1a d4lt1oa to tn. ,., .... n. laiUeaW 1a llle ••••11 
ot IIA\IaZ'J' 3•3.3 
Ott. lllaNb 3 Rueualt; PIIIUtt a Gbaap 1a tba -~oil Ott te41tft1 
taJratla ot OGI$¢1N\e ....,.... Be nar 14114 a t:u • ... llh10h WCII&l4 
d!QlUJ • ..._,lac bt NJiaUII& ,._1 ..-ponte 1aac.e -.., tbe eapi• 
tel .. toelc tu, all4 ~ a .. te•,.atltt '-• ~eplaoillc thea wltb a ·~ 
'IIU1a t.na- • lf114Wttlt tax a •Htl"lllllt414 GOI'PGftta prot1te1 it 
32· 
,,. 
RIDCIItwJ,t, r. D., lila 'V'*if ·- llll "tmeW 1/Jl. '!'nkUR Jl• 
an awa. w. a-re;;". 
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- ... s...... .., .. u.ooo to 
oa lid lai•lo a~,OOO to 
oa lid ia1 Hit lS-4ftOOO to 
oa an Sa1 ...., 41•000 
the llttiO lflt 11111lle~ an iAIIIU to a4Jute4 .. , iDICRI .... 
........_ ~· Sllt4UtSGa ot taa. :rat .. ot tu aev u.. •• sa- ll1aU 
ocu\l...._ • ..,.__. -' 1.-. .. n'DtaoUoa ot 4h14hlll 41a\NIIte4 
anll enait •Umat sa 081Qzaftlt lftOI' to lilt' 1, 1936, 'tllb1eh nat1'1ote4 
......... llde4 aot 1IIAOM aot sa ..... ot lOS ot the ad.Jute4 .. , sa.-. 
to a ..ss.a ot 2'1'1 ot tlut 11111llet1'1_... an sa.-. sa ..... ot 6M ot 
11u ~ ... iiDZh faullM U4U1111.W pntita Wft 4i'r14e4 
1ato ........ tlut tote]. .. -· ..... ot ~ ..... s ...... the 
4Uf__. ~aao~r.n~~.-" 'ftle ._..nsaauoa ot atee oaa ~to CIXPI'I_. 111 
.......... 
rns=!f:t."'.t:r -:tl - = ~..:. ~ ::a:llute4 
•• ,., • 1\. o. u4 o. c ••• 
1\f? h R. G. _. o. C. o JU 
.. ,...,.. 
., 
lnat414 protita tax - •'•• 1\ 4iat.a:lillaW all of ita urJWt,p.17 
\lhe Ml 1 GOt,...u .. iaiCIIll ta JI'OY1a1ona ot tile AneiiiiHI .lot of 
1936 ...,,._... the PNalUd'a ual:ra t. elilllaata laaquli.U .. ._, ..... 
J.a..- a ...U tnut1Ma118a - lletwea 11141~1 tb'M or pertpl'lthlpe 
all4 ....,_.,iOU, allll lletwea ...U allll lar .. eorporaUou. A tOI'MJ' 
s,..w Aa.ti.-11 to -. S.P'ft•l7 ot \be. 'l'NNul7· E. e. Al'f01'4, u 
.,,, • ..., tile MW taz, ... .....,. VJat Utf..,.._. 1D tax ratea •• of 1935 
_.. tw tlai•JIUul :ra\ber 'llbaa J:raats..l ~liUua u 41tfareatla 
.... ..nou, 11l41n4uala w pr.Jil!ulllb!pe ltOUld lr.oflrliiJI'a1le.38 .Uwr4 
nt...- to .U l,SIC flat ft\e Oil 11811 IIWPOI'*te la.-e Mer $40,000. 
CWJnatS. ._., it la 11a'IMI, ..,. lowr t11aa 1DtiTidual taPa at the 
uo.oeo l.Atftlt tbe7 .... ll ..... tile loveat laftla - 12.,5% Oil .... 
OOCJGNte ,.,._ 1111 to $2,000 u OCIIIIfiU'e4 to liS • the t1rat $4,QGO til 
Ptt•w.l. 11811 1D011111. It -.llal' 'INI ...... a -laed WllaoorJwa'lled 
la eavr to POS4 hllbU' \a4Jae 1lhlf' a114 aot, til eourH, ••Jot the a4•at• 
.... of UiDC llllalMH ..ur tile OGriiOht& torra of Ol'plllAUoao.39 
'l'he nctut1ou ... aozal .... - ... OOI')!Uato s • ..- Wlllll4 -
to faaft 11141•\414 11Ut the Jln...t.~ til 1936 el4e4 -11 corponUQU. 
•• Ull&lat~ parotUa ._ uue4 -u OOI'JIOllltiona to ........ both 
., ... all4 aner ,. ...... tllet, \J ... "u of the etteot oa oorporata :ra-
w ••• the wtel fllteet of the Aat we balW'ul to thOH GOQO:raUClU 
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702. 
rauiJII ~.112 s.. tl~ 1 JldM4 that the app1f.oat1011 of tu 
- n'h8 414 aot ...,. that tile tu tne.t.« all oozoponUona alike 
-.ue 111 414 Dot talce prior 1-.. 1ato aHOUDtJ a .,.....,. reoatrtaa a 
ftl"la'-la fttVa paf.4 __.. tO tH &O•w:r-t thaD - heYiDs aD equ.l blat 
.,.._ lao •·"' 
ta 0 • .. s ........ n.a, •PJIJ -. .. UU1aa qrpluea J oo:rpontiona 
aouU ..,., .... to 4e41&at open.Uaa ......,.. tw depreaiaUOD t~ ~~et 
in.-ea •ar oazpunUOIIa wul4 l'lltalD a tdl'll' Wllatanttal aurplua with• 
._, JQ!lac ... tuaa thaa 1a 19.!5•,._ 'ltle TI'MMtl7 repreHC~tattYe •1 ... 
taiud tut oorpuw.Uona WOIIW M a\la to aeoure oapUal. tor Mpauioa 
u4 other 'laa1t&ate JUJMea,• laolu41Jta the •1nteDeaoa of eolftiWIJ 
$:Uit(IOO -.-14M lOWI'I tU. 8Cil14 oMala oapUal tu4a t!1 eelltaa IIIIana 
to tllell' .._ atoellbol4era ucl to irfeatora 1a p~~enl..4.5 
S..tOJ.' stalwao (Rep., 01'11.) nM1Ye4 o'*J).dnta fi'OIII oonattw.ata 
oa the opeml• fit tiW tu. Be prepaN4 a oaNf\1111' -truote4• 4e• 
tau.t qll.lllltl .... lN l.a oJ.'4v to aatbel' Sntoaatioa OD W\loh to bull lnli"' 
lao 
,_..ieu tor eMM at. 1.438 ot the 3,&Go oorporaUou raoe1T1D& the 
'lliHUCIIlllllira ia .1de, 1937, "»11414, p&'Oft41aa a v14e eu•l1aa ot the 
.tted ot tile ._ oa QOI'PONUOil •1e1... Seutor Steillltl' tumft. OYer 
l&la &tta to M. Bla4e lie1141'1okt vbo ~ a atu4r flit the rapliea tor 
,., 
tl&e ........ 1M\ltut101l.46 
'fw aaUeat ~eluiou -~rel!4all4il tna a talNlaUon ot the iato--
tift 11111oll. Seaator Steiwr noetftta tile IO"era.llt'a td'tort to toroe 
41atr1buttoa ot JJ'ottu IleA..._, ta pan, etted1TeJ INaiMaa rai...S 
tM - ob.Jeott.cma to the tax that it IleA '1011414 Won tbe ... aun 
II••• low - the """~'' t 41ota_. 41n4ea4 poliotee all4 hltllpeiM 
...a.u• ot the repUaa, a1tow4 t!aat 
&61 ot the tl- 11M oll.aql4 tlle1r Pftllt1W1atrilMUoa -111 .. 
85f ot tlw tt- 11M iaONeatll ._11' 41atrUru.Uoa 
80J ot tile tU.. W ~ tlaeU l'eHllle a.--leUon praotl ... 
951 ot the tt- W vtthllel4 41Y14n4AI Sa the put ia Ol'4el" to 
•tM«la I'UUWil apiaat lMa ~ 
1!11 ot tM tt.- 1la4 oba..,A tMU" praott ... ia 1M1141q Q 
l'enl'fta fiR -too J!III'DFTI 
7QI ot the tlzaa anat.e4 or 1la4 ue4 reaai'Tel Ia order to •iotala 
a ooutneat JOU07 Ia the ,.,_., ot 41v14e.U OYer a perte4 
ot ,..n 
901 ot tl&e ttme IIM4e4 or W ue4 naal"fta prior to 19)6 Sa 
_....,. to 0011tiallla ~ vttltot.tt relluotioa 
Vtrhallr dl flit the tizaa ataW ~t the 1- ill a prior year ahoul4 
Aft'¥ OTello tbat tile tu abOIUil • a.PPl¥ to • oartaia peroeatace ot u'l 
ia._. ill all aeaee, u4 thet the ta we llloouiakat vith aOWIIl INaiaeea 
polieiu. ltl~ ot ll'MMOt aiaaiti...,.. in OORileotion with the oOil-
t~ her neenaa •• the 11141oaUon la the :repliea to Beaator 
Dalwr that OQJ/'pOI'aUou ha4 uu4 ftMI'fta 1Jl liV• that the aa.iJlt.atn-
uoa he4 Hilled that t11e7 hl!4.~7 
1:ea41'1ok toua4 it 41tt1oult \0 Pll8ftlize about the etten ot the 
ou.et on a partieular tira. 'l'be tax ..,..ted • ••• a aeriea ot aew 4f.t-
aUGUa• oorponttou earaiDS fti'Jil!c prottta, haYill& wak capital atl'llo-
'-• 01' oparatiDS in a uv ~-- d a tex diea4ftatep ta nla• 
Uoao I'HJIIOU~l7• to oorpozaUou with aMble eaJ:"aiap. poe .... iDS 
HIIUa4 oapt.Ml ati'UotUI'U, or opanU .. in el4, eaMlt11ahe4 iadllatrt. .. J 
•Aa« vitih theM tiftonaUala 1n the ocpnate aituatiou co 4lttanatiala 
ia the altutiou ot the atoolltaoU.......,...... ••••• 48 It 1a 41tt1Alt 
to ~ 11hft1Utr the 111141atrlbute4 Pl'Ofita tax wrla4 IliOn towNa 
the obJeoUwa 11hiob. ita atreoatea a4YIInoe4 then ali!V fl'CII thea. 
lwli .... t 1D iaaiat1Jl& Oil .... 1\18 .... 1'7 ot l'ltM~ fOI' oapitel 
ln~n.at. queat10DII4 the OODMailiPD ot the 'l'naaur,y•a Dinetor ot 
Jluee.rotl aa4 statiatioa that owponUoaa oA1d o'btaill a4eq\late oapital 
fiiiiU tZ'CIII the aale ot ahana to 1-.tora coaeralq aa wll u to their 
011a ~•144mt• B\lalaeaa -.1ataiu4 aeurall7 that the \111.41atrlbv.W 
48· 
'""''• tu 414 an elf.ldaate f.MtgiUea bftwea larp &114 ... u GOrPQI'• 
auou - .. the hea14eDt, 1a hilt llllee ot Nenh ,. 19.36. bll4 aa14 
that it 11011l4.49 lluhaua apeoit1alq.Njeo\e4 \he uaerUoa that ... u 
oorpo~~atiou WOIIll4 haw an a4.,....,_ cmtr laret OMa becaue their ..., 
,......_ ot orpabatioa wul4 ~' ia IDOl'e 41reot aa4 11$1'ol'IIB1 an1oa1 
aa4 a ll'Mtar PI'OPOrUoa ot their araiap would be a.ailatlle tor re• 
la~.so 
811111 c.orponUOBII aatloipate4 cr-t 41ft1ov.lty aa4 expenee in 
•t.1atnc oapf.tal hatla Warouah the sale ot aeour1t1ea. 'l'he iaveatatat 
.arket pnfel'ft4 •••aon•4 aHUJ'l\181 ot larpr oorporattCDa • .51 Ill 1936 
oalr 4.CIOO oorponttou, 011e per Gellt ot the llllUoa'a ,500,000 butuaa 
oo..,....uou, Uatall tllelr aeCRIII'tttea oa ne atook ..:cbaapa, civ1nc 
th.a 41reot ....... to the aeounty .rata tor raia1DC aev tua48.52 la· 
~ lla;llrera aa4 the SeourlUea u4 Jla:ohan&e CGB!u1on atate4 that 
tile UlllatrillutM PI'Otlta tax eftatM o ilaportaot oon barrier bat-a 
the OOI'pontloa aa4 aav eaJ)Ual; llhaa'lee wN partiCNlar~ ~-- • 
Gl'84U raUapJ the oorporaUon 4IGII1l4 pq a tax oa aarall)(6a lolb10h it 
Ntalne4, or f/&'1 Clllt ita •ra&aae and oM4l1a upUal at an aqulftlot 01: 
7o6. 
SeM\01' Harq 1. 1)'1'4 ( Dea. • Yeo) ot the Seaate Flnaaoe a-t..-... 
orlltfl tile '"-" owr 11he proJIIIIMI4 tax, w1t1clH4 tbe ll111 u WMI»l~ 
tawi'IDs larp oupoauou • .st. the -.1.1 eoJ'POl'Rtiou, u ooatruW 'ld.tll 
tax 1111 their nHI"'M an4 se•nl tlana1el poa.itiaaa they obJeotel .,.._ 
... u, to the S.,UcaUou ot the annaue, eona14el'1ng 1t ~n 1n1t1a1 atep 
1111 11ba Z'OIHl to COft~t ooatrol ot tllie ltOIIJ'Oea ot capU:al. Tbe tax, •• 
aohlllll' aaote4, 41.4 II.Ot GG~~Pel .ozpcnaUon.n to 41atr11Nte all ot thalr 
UrDHael by lllpli•ucm, the b1s oorpoaUou aa1ntdne4, 1t po11lte4 to 
a t!l'll 1lbell oorpontlou -14 ill aU - ba"ftt to so to the inYeatmant 
aarkln, an4 8'ntntuall¥ to the ...,.~nt, tw capital tlllld8. 
'!be IIDwle o-t.ttee ora llt7• aat Meau aeaociate4 the -- vtth 
the vialonan•• oup~u~at u4 ~.ss ~-n 'l'l'ea4wy (Rep., 
Mua.) 4MlaN4 tbet the tax •• aoc1aliaUe. in.ol'lf.Dfl 80ftrnaant inter• 
teruoe in the .s.tel'lliaat1oa ot polio,r 1la priftte eaterpn. ... S6 Repre-
...-u.,. Jlta4 (~~ep., .N. 1'.) tell .. tile .. INI'Il a plaa ot 1n4utrtal ooa· 
tJ.'Ol.ST 
4 tmldallt fit the u41atrUKt\114 protlte tax cltND\114 tlaat the IJ.O'fUil-
•D11 OtN14-...... •P1tal ,..,..-...left attltianUy than pri'f'llta n\er-
• 
74th ~. 2D4 Seu101l, Vol. 80, Put 6, 
PJ'1M bat 40MI be 4Mlared that tho ~t vaa 110 bul'lielllld vUh 
Pl'OIWNIIa ot the depn .. t.oa aD4 vUlt tn4U10111ll tunc1:10IUI that U wul4 
N Uloat~el to v14an ita latluaaM \IJ at•ill& it control O"f'er the CIII!PlCIT• 
MBt ot fuda 111 illclv.lltiJ'.58 B:efttrloll: 1\14 aot bell.-.. that, ill a aitu• 
atiea llhort ot &OftfiiMilt contftl, tn.,..tora an4 baakera could .a .ue 
latelll&eat uola1oaa than oorponte •JiaSOra.59 The aul.yat wbCI 
that tba puuat1011 ot 4 :oraq -aa atooll:boldara. oaa ot the :re~~aoaa 
llhtu HMHYalt ••• ta na1 adtna "- tax, would not uiii\U"e ettt.oiallt 
ta ... -..at ot aui'Plu 1 lui llel1a1'81\ that 1110at oCII'pOratloa stookholdare 
,... DR 1n a poettioa 1IC1 axarcin intallt.aaat Judjpii!Jnt oonoarnill& oor-
pontioa ttnaaot.al pol1om.60 liHUSok oonolu.Ge4 that COIIIPlete upaa4-
.... oa ou.ta14a fuda, tzoca what.,... aourca, t.ntartarall v111h • ••• the 
proper axaroisa ot 1a411'lllud ;IU._..nt an4 tlul •1ntananca ot aaoa ... ry 
tlftt'-'11117 ta buslaeaa eatarpr1H •••• •61 B:endr:l.oll: coacaded that tlulre 
lla4 heea abuaea in the f.mleft-.11 ot oorporata l'&Hr"fHJ the und1str1lllltad 
pnttta tax •a not tha proper -• ot oorrectill& th•· 62 
.58· 
ro: 
SO. ortUca ot the \11141atr1lluta4 profits tex oonteD4ad that the 
Buhler, A. o., lU; PrptUa IK• 2!/1. 
laa4r1oll:, M. S., at fgtt.te fa, ?(.. 
,_,.,Jar, A. o., ,at hlfi'l fill.• 140a beoav.ea the tax 
natad aav 4inal'8Jltia1a, ._ .. 'n=!stcl.dar repn-ta4 u 1a41· 
1'14uel -· than,.. luattt.uat lata u 1\atualne whetlulr the ta 
vorlcd tovar4a oltldAatln& ~l1Uoa !Mn-n -11 aD4 lazp atooll:-
bol&eral the latter a1lti11'7 )lft!t1W ln the put \11 not vitbdftvill& 
thatr 4:l•t4a48, tbora"' 01'841.Rc taation on tbaar. 
B:ea4r1oko M. s., at lJ:eCU• .II&• ?6. 
B:eMrtck, M. s., Jill frs(ip .tM• 80. 
&OWI'88Dt llheuld aawn apart.na all4 ettioieat expen4Uura tit aW~Uable 
tu4a before lor.latina aev ta pollotee. Coaareaa.n Taber (llep., •• Y.) 
.._...._. uoi41118 aev tu:ee bT nduct.na expan41turea.03 'l'ha tlnite4 
statu Cllu1ttr flit c-ne adY1H4 \lut.neaa to fonulllta for preeentaUoa 
to Coaaraee a • ... c-.rela ... t'ftl plaa tit oerelullr dntaed expend1turaa 
u4 remuuse, leokina town Pro&ftllei.,. t.Japro' nt of thAI fiaoal ooad1• 
Uoa ot the Qoq!:Dfnt •• 64 
The DOftl'Y ot the tax enlrd ltbJeoUona on the fP'OUDde that bu81• 
aeu wulil 11114 a lav 1nwl'r1DS • •panure troa fixe4 prlnciplea tit 
corporate tuatlon 4lttieult to haa4le. 65 The Seaate J'illllAoe ca.atttee 
raporte4 em t.he Mala of ita heartnp that the propoHil S)'atem we 
utrte4 11114 theretore wuutain •• to l'll'ftlmla y1el4.66 
IIIIPIC •leu • ·111414 the Qlllliatribute4 protUa tax on a theoratieal 
le.,.l abow the obJeeUou ot buitleN •n and lqlaleton to ~tate 
ett..U Gil eonorate 11111111 .. and to the.J)Oea1b111tiea ot aoqm.nt COil• 
trol ot oepital i.n'r88tMIIt. S.. queaUOIUid the a4ainlatnUOB'a ... _... 
UGilB that the tax would haq a beaetieiel effect Oil the buaineaa qCleJ 
thay a•••n117 reJeete4 the axpl.a1111Uon bT 'l'raa&nU'J' repreeenta111.,.• of 
the part wbial:l OOI'JIOftte avpl.ua JWe4 1a briD&ina a'llout the depreuf.OSI. 
OtlileiN eupport;e4 the a..,_ntatnuon. OM ooul4 onl.r conclude trca the 
.. aanlata1 at1141ee ot corporate .uplua that there exiate4 in 1936 ao 
ao Wlaf.Uft ualtala ot tho nlattouhip betwea aueh aurpl.wl aft4 tho 
INIIlMU qOlao 
A 'hea81117 otfiolal ,.._ate4 tho a4ala1ataUOD'a Tievao Oor-
ponUou 414 no\ UM auzopluu aos laft4 tn the 1920'a •to &QV creat 
.a.M• tor the •1ateaauo ot ~t •• a atat-at which, 1t v1U 
H ncalW. oorpontioaa oontra4i.W 1D their npl.l .. to Senator 
StalVd''a q1allnloauU.. CoQoaUou, tho TreaaUJ apoke- ooaUJRIH, 
la ..., taa...._ o•e:Napaale4 out 1/11 the 4aaire of ooat&"Ollins atoolc-
hol4en to niDftat .. mlDaa 1a Ol!lilr to a..ot4 texauaa. lllroe .. lft oor-
,...te oapUal _,_.,tan atal'ftll oODnllpUcm, oontd'Wting to the 
doft~t ot tbo 4epl'eaalcm. 'lhe pill .. \lP ot oorporata &\li'Pl-• •• 
ou ot tho noloua latl\18 .... lleUa4 tho apaouleUft atook aarat '*-
It tho late 1920'•·'1 
Jooaadata _.\10111114 *other there ba4 been OTOftXPIIIIIIiOil ot 
plaat .. ,..,__. aa4 tllether ,.tJDJate aurpluoa lsrael¥ aooounta4 tor the 
ta4a awilabla tor ••• •rllot apaoulattoaa thOJ iact\llre4 .Uther the 
•1•..._ ot Ul leta4 avpluoa acl rU, cuhloaat the &hook ot the 
4apaoeaat.oa.68 Ds'. Carl 8aFdft' ..... that Allartoa ovM. her sreet iadu-
tl'la1 d&ftlopa u te a OIIIUitallt ...._... 1a the .-uat ot sapltal ilrfrut• 
.Ut thta eaplBl - abiaf)¥ tna v1th1a ln4uab7J •D¥ lilaitaUon oa 
protlte -.14 tie 4atrt.atal to --'181104 blpzow nt la utlonal wU• 
7lo. 
llhtoh le4 to iiU depruaton to •oudft ~h ot aev plant aD4 ell'liP• 
..n .10 hot...or Han rea ot Bal'ftl'll wU.eftll 1111a11 overoapacUy 1a 
taaut~ 414 aot ar1aa troa ~•lllc 111&11 tr<a other CG~~P1ex t.at~ .... n 
J\. R. l)aaae oontiiD4e4 tbat the ~~atH& ntt•rea trom a ~ara.:t ahonap ot 
oap111a1 in 1932.72 A atwlaat ot the Wl41dl'1bute4 prottte tax ottaret 
tnto-uon 'llh1ob t,..... to 8U.JIIOl't Doane f he oonalu4a4 fi'Oa atu4J1aa 
a11aUeUoa1 1llYNUtllU0118 that then •• aot a ~arkd tea4anq te .or-
JIOftM .,.,,.., to laereeae traa tba W.14 war to 1930.13 
S.. a0011loa1ate a,na4 vita tiM a411lniatntion that the UH ot oor• 
'"*" ftl'p1u Win1talf' att-... tM buaiaeu qola. Prot .. eor lle14aa• 
U..r uaerte4 tlilllt tM tnly laft8-Dt ot Ma•JJ011st1c protita 
aueb PNfiM into •• BRIQ011ft1a 1n4lldrf.ea thl"ou&h tuation eD4 aooial 
1uunue. "" ProleHOI' 1. M. Glal'k 'bella.,... thd Gball&'e 1a the 41atl'1• 
M1Uoa ot iaoOBa eou14 baft ~t .Uaaa on the bl.tainaae cyc1a1 he 
... uOMcl. hOWYer. \hat attona to o-.o1 the 'lluineaa eycla thJ'OIIIll 
"· 
'10· 
71. 
7ll· 
eft-' to...,. laoc.a fl'Oil OOI'POftte eon-a lato etoekbolclara• beaclll) 
..,. • ._.ucateci aDA oou.l.4 wU k aeu....,. .. ull8.?5 
n ie olear that \h .. -· JlO .... l acre-• aiiiOilfl eoou.c.lleta 
oa .._ nlaUOIUihlp bet-a tbe 4laPN1Uou ot oorponte eurpl.ue el'lll tbe 
lluliiHe qcle 811 the '* tbe dlllniftnUGD p:ropoN4 the ul'llllatr1lilu'-4 
pi'OIUa tu. The nbMquaut aaoellllaMJ' lD eCOftC*1u ot the theories ot 
theala that the IIIIMpwnt ot OOI'j)Cil'ate aurpl.u can pl'Cla~~Re or ntaN 
ao....So atah11ltl'• ...,... act Ollll' atroeeell the 11111ntaanoa ot piUmll 
purohaolllC IJICNIN'o whlob -.14 caU t• ~~aee1118 OD prottu to worker• in 
the fUll ot.laJ.cb ,.... alii\ to atoollhol4ero ill the r-ot d1v14al'llla, ill 
OI'Hr tbet eot:u~U~~Ptloa ldaht liMp paae v1th pro4uottoaa he alao 0011814• 
end hltttlolant aDA 1Jia4equate capitAl illYUti!Rt reapouaible for eitu• 
auou ill whlob ... aaato eqt&lltbrlua ( .... ,.uou ~ulle4 pro4untoa) 
•Sete4 v1th laae tlum full ~t. &e,.ee 414 not cleal v1th 1..,..t• 
1111at oaq Sa eNol•te aeoeral MS. I tlaii'O ldaht be OYer1a'ftetlleDt ill 
.- 1114uetnaa alliS ~t 1a otMro, ,Ul41ll4 or lea41nc to a 
aft l'UI&l.t ot uu~t 1a the total 800DOIIf'o &evae•· •1nt&1a1JII 
tbet tla1l ~ .. the mt8J'1011 ot etf1o1ent MOilGCe ....__,, 
Mlle4 tor entnU.HCt oontrol ot oapihl 111'ftet .. t to aanre etf1o1Ht 
aDA ._.. .. capital npeus..~ 
15· 
?6. 
712. 
apqd1na tor nlWa ·- -..nen, 1aolu4111& 'l'a,plll, pout 011t that 
paii:Ue VOI'ka ,..._ 1aull4e4 t;o st'-late the cap1te1-cn4e 1a4uatriuo 
u wll •• to PI'0"14e ..,1.,..nt - •• 1ateaUoa 1a 11ae with x.,.a• 
.... nloa that SO"UUIMD ta•eaaen Hlll4 stiallate .u UOftfllll' oa tbe 
prolue'Uon ea4 Ia lle4 ta.a 11bea priftM 1Dftat.M tell ott. The t,._ 
1D8 ot ..,_., 1at1tael\08 on tbe Jlev Dal is opea to Uaouaaion. a-
• .._._ •ntalM4 tllat a oonaoloua pol1q ot JUP-pr1111Da bqaa. attar 
..,_., Yia1t to the UalW statee ttl ;._, 19,..71 Ollher .-ntaton 
uaane4 tut the eAIIIA1atn111oa 414 aot a4opt a W1eU epen4111& polioy 
u • -~ •n• ot neo••1'1 uaU1 the eprina ot 1938·78 It ia 4Wllttll1 
tut ...,...s.u eoaeept;e ha4 u •ob 1ot'ueaoe on ~t•a tiret a4ain-
letnt1oa u aar ~· thoupt. 'l'he edalnletntion •• l"'\\Ch~ 
tllialdaa ill ..,_stu ta&W oa e praotieal llaais llaton aeerq ell ot 
lta --.n wre to aq 4ltiJ'ee taatlur with the •1eva ot the Br1Uah 
••• let. soae SeMnl T'"RP ..,.. .... t.a 19,&. :ta Roea•••lt'a budpt 
..... ot Jiianh 3o 1931lo be nferftil. to •opentins upeuea ot the n&U• 
181' Go..-r t eate\I:Uetrnata• ell4 •all npea41turea W.1oh ay INI bread~ 
tdueall u eaunll bJ .u aeoeeaity t• reoO'fWJ tna tile 4epruat•a• lie 
~ tllMe upell&it~ aaer "- hea41QP •0eraera1• u4 •llllllrasnq.•79 
Ill QJ eve=. du4eata ot tile Udinrillut414 pnttta tc vho attributet 
1\ to tile ~ioa vllioh 'l"'tpall aD4 ~11phaa11 •de on the Preaident 
wUh 1 CIIIr.NH 0'9'8:111'811'finp and Ullereoa z Uoa 11heor1ea•80 tailed 11o 
JMiint 01.111 apea1t1Gally 11be JlllraUel in illle writinp ot 'l'Uswll and ~· 
Htwaa their 14eu oa oaatl'al11U14 aoa11:rol ot capital 1nwa11•nta 7et, 
'l'UpeU'• t ... a 0<*14 ROt l'afleat the Wluace ot X.,Ua oa tile lfew 
DMl, aiD .. lle had to~tet hh atb a tor ratiollllliziaa capital 
tnftatMat 1114epe114antq ot •liT atu4T ot JeqMa. 81 
.... .,.,., ot aorporak INl'Plu ""'triKhd to 11he cleprudoa o01ll4, like 
Clerk, aUU quaUon the ett1 .. ., ot the ua41atri'INte4 protUa tu •• a 
oeatrawal.leal deY1... The tu 1'-tlt .. not in attaot a auttioient 
leJIBth ot tiM to attol'll atequate data oa 1111ioh a atudeat ot 11ho AIDiriiU 
aeoMt~~r ewl4 llaae aa .-111aU. ot ita PJ,"'llabl.e lona-nm atteata. 
OppoaiU• to the tax oonUIIMDil in full tor .. attar ita -otlleat 
oa .JUDe 28, 19,36. The .,..itioa at•PJIIII up ita a-nde tor tlle repeal 
ot the ~ vhtlll 'b\lat.a. .. an111.11y alUIQied in the apriaa ot 1937.82 
!'he Rlmlaue Act ot 1937, wrUtall •• aa ~at to thru Utl .. ot the 
4011 at 19,36, oontained. tev Uaii&'U·8' The Re<reau Aot ot 1938 -•aulete4 
tile un41atlr1:Wte4 p:rot1U tu MJ uul neealaaee to ita ori$1nal roma 
tile -ltua l'IIM liUI 2lpw aeat, wttb the tu •PP111DB onl.J to corpora-
80. I 1 hlR, A. G., Jilt. pP4it!r&Mar JDtUa lao 153· 
81. See aiiO'ft, Chapten n u4 m. . 
82. lear4, .c. all4 Jl., , . '" J.a z:=zr·· 371· 83. Bl.akeJ'. R. o .... e. c •• a .. tts= lll• 42&-35. 
to tu ,..ra 1938 aDd 19391 oa Mq 21. 19.31• tU P!Nelelant •xPl"8aae4 hie 
llieapproval ot the An, leUln« it &O ~hroqb without hie a1gne1Uo&nt.84 
It ia Utt1wlt to .-..lute tba ooatncyol1881 aeonOIIIlc ottaata or 
poMatialiU .. ot the IIZI418\r111ute4 pntita ~. It the RaYanue An ot 
1936 ha4 88llall tor a dft&le OOl'JOiaUoa tax on un41atr1butall protita0 aa 
the i'l'uillant N~&UMteclo .-..luat1ea Jdcht be leas Cl1f't1cult. A aillpli• 
PN'ftl4 u etteetlft contracycl1eel lleYleeJ there 1111a and ia inautt1c1&At 
either a~tbor1~t1Ye oon~zary ~1n1oaa or detinit1Ye ratroa~1.,. 
JM41& . ata. 'l'be 11Ul 1da1oh Colllftaa anually Jeeaall 11118 eo cCli'IIPl188W, 
eo ftr.Ylai ill ita 1.811&-' oa 41fte..at oorponaUoaa, an4 1n operat1e eo 
l»rlet:~ .. · • u to ran4er U Clittillll't, tt not impoaaible, to 44IIIID!llltrata 
th-. 
'fU l.~Qortenee ot ~ •a illtluen88 iu ~ •ttera in 1936 b 
alec 41ttlalt to -.-re withwt peaetratirlg the irul41r reoeaaea ot the 
Prasllleln'a llln4. 'l'be aaoendauq Ill the tl'\18'\•buatera aen!M4 to 1114188\e 
that Roaatvelt 414 DDt 1ntea4 a t~ teat of Tucvel11a 14eaa oa tbe 
oantnl e.l1ooat1on ot raew:roeaa eerta111l,)r the .. sure, aa Jeaae4, 414 nCJt 
rapi'OMat euab a , .. ,. It appean that 'lia&w1l an4 Oliphant 'IIUtall the 
tax tor 4ttfenat naaoaa. It 11110 ,...ibla in the llav Delt1 period tor 
8/l. Blea,., R. G. and c. c., Da h..,.l Is•= .fU, 4.31·50· 
,, !':~~' 
nallln of 41.ffanat achoola ot •OM«D.to thOUCbt. of Wl1«h there wn 
at lean a1ne acool'd1DiJ ._ Bnttat Jt. Ltn4t.,-, 85 to uUa 1a eupport ot 
a apttCI1tto IIMCIQftl. eaoh -ina. aapectall,y 1n the ase ot a ooatpl1tate4 
-n:n. a .au ot a4w.nce towl'da ita O'Wft ol1Jeot1•••· hrhapa Anhu 
II'Ook ot l'U Ia IGk '£'•• oonol~~Aed oorreoUy thst tha Preeideat 414 
an think 1111rcu8h all tha natf1tattou ot th<t un41at:r1bllte4 prot1ta 
tu.86 
fucwll, Wlo, u an aoa...Sotu. bad wnttaa ia a.olutionery 'kJW, 
p:roMblJ' 414 an apeot all ~lata, 1011& atap in tha diraouoa ot cea-
t:rallud plau1aa ot oapital 1Dftetaent. It ta dou.btltul, ann in a.olu.• 
UOJ!U1 'kJW, that tba anaotmeat of an Ull4161t:r1bute4 PJ'Of'1te tu •• 
the laeat 1111' to awr-ch hie obJeotl'fa ot eooncaic atab111ty. It appean 
that a4a'nht:rat1Te obaaau IIOI'e bu'lil thax. tu reviaioD Wllllld be, 1t 
loftpr ill a:r:r1v1DiJ, the 1110at atfan1w 41:rMt app:roach to the p:rolllaa ot 
att1o1aat aUooaUOil ot reltOUl'CIU. The 1aatltutlonal1ataa or plaiiiWJa 
.-ohaaU. had to p:raaala, aot foUov, 14tef.alat1on euch aa .., 4epar1iu:raa 
1a '-at1oa. Attar 19.36 'I'qwll nnaae4. •• ha had P""'101181J, iutlW• 
Uonal ehaap to aac: lata plaiiiWII as a requi:reMnt for the ach14mt-
aant ot aa01l0111o B'kb111tF. 87 
'!'110 ~ta in the ,..., pan attar 1936. one in pol1t1oal 
aHDIIIIF and one :La taoiiDOlQG'. are pan1nent to those 14M a of 'l'ugwll 
86. 
87· 
b1111e4 prof'lta ta. Perhepe tbe aS.QCl.e -t SllportaD.t faot:or in \he eooa-
_, aiaoe 1939 hea \leen the budaet ot the te4eral emt~at, 1118 ........ 
... , llr llo~ poliUoal parUu repre88nta e I'CIUCko 1D4ireot kind ot eea• 
tnl aUouuoa ot reaourH•• MeaatlbU., aetenUate and eJI6ineera haw 
oreate4 eleotroaia oalouleton ot llftllllieblll& oapaoity and apee4J buai• 
aeaa Ma and aa.iaiatntora OOU14, w111h aa etteoti'f8Maa W~&ttaiaa"le b 
19"' aUaok ~· probl- of etatiatioal analya1a antaile4 ill oentral1ae4 
plaaaiq ot the allouUon ot re110\11'41U ... if 1n4ireot 1118\hoda ehov.ld 
eftlft into a direct approaCib. 
Dupite e...-sn.• oontl:le\1118 •1- in the 19;30'e on oorponte 
nrplua aa related to \he depreaatoa, fv&wll'a propoata tn the 1920'• 
~tu ....,. aaift. lcoaGidata wbo eqvate4 .AMI'ioan eoonOIIISc srovth 
with ooaUIDIOWI oapital kvut•nt vue vritiDC about a loac·nm tnn4, 
ill. 1932 • ...re not uaill& the upita1 plant tho in aiatence. Ia the 
19.50'• 8GM &Ml,yllta of the •CIOMIIF ...re • ••• feartulat the aipa ot 
'•oaa• capeo1t7' ill certda c_...r aii.Cl capital soo4a 1Dduatr1ea.•88 
lwo18toa t._I'Cla a ~liM the oaa 11h1Cib Tupall outl11184 wW.4 
ret led the l'Mallon ot the -.rs.oaa people to pereiataat aoor.IGIIIS.o taet:a' 
thue facta 1tO\l14 hew \0 Mo-o ta \he qvaat tor aoonf*io atabi11t7o 
..rttolent:l¥ 4eo1a1n to 011\lM the people to conclude that tutita.Uonal 
ohaapa •n in order. Sllon ot lutita.U01181 ohequ, al:tuaaa ~ 
Pl'O\Mta, Wlioh llep11 retoNa. looeeto &Mlyaea auoh aa the ODII '1'u&WU 
pn88A1Ie4 are 84Uoati01181. Slue 1IJie depuaion, OOJI'por&Uona haft 
88... Spip~n. 10114!ph B., •It We Vera J'aoed with a Dapraaalon,• JU.IIIx 
l'aK Jf=: MnpqSg, Aquat 5o 19_56, 1• 
.,,. pnaou ... 1111 the peat. Dl8GUU1oa at uy Uae of the poeaibla 
OOU'- of eoonOIIio 1\e\'el.o.-nt alii\\ the JOaa1ble llaea or action in &IIJ' 
.,..,•Uty la a ll•1t~~N aoUnty tor the uUGta. 
Putlllaf.ft 
Ill 19~ a neva •saz1na re•lle4 that 1'1.ts'well he08!llil •tlla Mev 
Deal'a *• 1 phU.oaopber .£wij Uftl' quite Mt1lle4 hie bout /J.n Ilia 
191S poea that he weuld. •~~~~~t~te ~rica owtrfi • but he D81'18r atoppea trr-
lite" ... he turael\ wt lloou, •psilllt artiolea, newpaper co~. an4 
a)lllaa.a b,r the blm4re48.1 'hawll eay wll ha,.. been the •moat prolltio 
atld widely 1Ate~o4 ot tile llew Deal s.a-.rpretan.•2 The alluloo w 
Ilia "•k1DC Alllilrioa 01I'W" •• lllltOCRII'IIte lneotar aa it illplie4 thd 111. 
the JMI'II 1933-1936 he 4!aOWIM4 1n detail hla lcmg-nm 1natitutiotl81 
Hil-a tor 1114utrr. He 414 vrlte and tJMlt at 1ell@th, as an oft1oial 
ot ~ USDA, allout a lolla•nan land...,e PJ'OII'UI• 
J'ftllk Ken, w .. hm.pon ooW.iet tor the BalU!!MtT!! ~. refel'l'ed 
011 Mq 2, 1934, to the aatl\'itiea ot fii8Wll aad Melley •• publiciata, 
notlrlc tibet they OOMeeled their tailtu'll aa alllltnietratora behind a ....a-
aaraen ot woru. 'l'Uswll aDd Holey, Kent !'llllllrked, reaoheil a llelsht ot 
Tlutln 1a not the t'iel4 ot 110nent. aocCIDPli~. 'l'hey 
t•U o a hltPJ.' plane, rtu uJQII pllUoeopbioal olouu, 
tJ'fiD wblch the)r explaia, .apouad, •pan4, aDd upoae.3 
'1'laue wre Hftral aain rea.-a tor Tvcwll'a efforts u a pultll• 
oin. Jill ba4 •a lqaq or Propeeai'fla ot the old ao:rt.•• Pro&RNS.fta, 
ll7 .... _,... ot the ,..,.., llllture ot their 1110 r IF ant , were in the hab 1 t ot 
.,..~ Olltt 
CCaaerfatla aan effort quie•--•• 41eouallion 1a aure 
to etlr Q ...,.._.._.., JJC81au1'11a la • llattle 
-'ieh •lW¥• _., be won tty • ._nton. It onnot PN-
""lJy hol41DC S.ta ova. I\ 1111811 ,_.trate the a1114a 
ot aillf.one, aot a tev ••• .S 
TU&wU ata thia o• at lolhu he wa a proteuar at Col.ullbia. AB u ..._ 
..-l' he tausht 10Uth1 aa a Jlll\t11obt tae naapd in a4ult MUoation. B1a 
aoa'-1o aaner el.ao sa•• hila ftlua'bl.a a:perianoe 11'1 wr1t111CJ he publ1ahe4 
llllltll •re •tonal then the aftra&e ooll.eae proteaeor. 
It •1 'be ulluad that tbe Pree14ent conld not haft been 1D41ttor-
eat to 'fllawll'e tuDet1on u a apo'= • ot the Rev Deal, 'beaouee the 
l.atter•o aht_.a wn ottea 1ntOJ'pNte4 ee 8XtmJN111a the new ot ttae 
WbUa ~.6 BooanaU'a 4Mia1on 1n 1936 to noid orlUo1• 4ur1na tbe 
CIUII*taa aU.oocd 'flaanU.7 Sill• Roo.e'Mlt 1a aUUu4e balW 'ftl&wll'a 
ac'UY1t1ea •• a pu.bl1o1at, ODe can 1Dtar tbet the Pl:'es14ant 41raatl,y or 
tao1U7 an~ Tl&pall, before 1111cl•1'36• to write and apeak: about 
tile ... Deal. 
A trt.an4 ot 'f'ucwll'a aonal\14M that the profaaaor1a vrUlQC aD4 
apeeeh.,.kln& 414 not l'Hl~ aeoQIIPUeh aorth1118J Tuewll oonoade4 tha't 
b.ia friend •Jli&ht lie r1pt.•8 It la dlttioult, 1t not 1mpoaaillle, to 8ftlu-
tbe 11111Jor -urea ot ~ Mev l:laal I.IAI4Giolbte4l)' would have von vida aooapt• 
anoa Without ~U'a ex;pl.aaatoq attort. H1a lolli-run 1natUut1oll81 
'fUWt aioll he 4iaouaae4 1n da\a1l 'llefore and after the New Deal per1o4, 
ldiCloullMdl)' ...., to the aUantioa ot aore J18Qple than would ben UI!OiaM• 
and 11hea it Tu&liiU hall 110t beoou a ll'aiD l'nwtar arul public ott1o1a1. 
Yet • tile pv.lll1oit1 wh1Gh aUaDOed hla JU1Ucna '1111& 1110t1tly ot an a4ftre8 
ldn4' 1110811 ot tl\8 J18Qple ao loctke4 1ato the 14•• in hia preY1ouely pa'll-
11aball vritlJtp beMuse of hia ta11111 414 not approach thn with open at.ll4e. 
:tt 18 tCAoaiYallle that the nation Mf a4opt at &01118 t111111 1a the 
future 1nat1tut1oual. 4aY1cea reaftlbllq in ac.. _,. thoae 'flaavall pro-
JOM4. .&ca1n, the •te~~.Jer•ot-the-tS.a• al'fPlMnt woul4 \1114w\lta4l7 apply' 
tile hiatoriaa ot 2200 VOill4 conol1J4e that the inat1tut1oul cllanpa ot M7 
6 • See CliaptV XV. 
7. S.. l.alaptel' XI. 
8. tqwll, R. c .• lU, asnwa l.ll&• ,.,. 
ot \lltJIIIIIM ..... ttoa, the Jllbllotn•a twant.oa htaton•11J llaa bella, 
at . .n, the acthatioa ot the Jllb1lo al114 tb!"'UCJa at~ a I'NpoDa1'N 
ohori-.9 
Raal.-Uoa 
'f\acwll'• ne1anaUoD u VIIIH' Seol'etai'J ot Aplcwltun 11114 
a._.tlelltat A'Jlat.atatrw,.. Pl"llaly MM•aoed oa NoTRIMI' 18, 19~t 
it 'laaJ • .rtHtlve u ot 1aD111117' 1, 19.37· Than •n ...-tun ~ 
e1aoat hla 1/NlpaUoa - a 1 £11 Jb• llOII lll Wuh1alf;Oil. At ta 
Mclul• ot 19~ ta t$•1 Nque._ ot zoepona a.a laDlala ooCitll"l'e4.1 
'fben ... bo,.,.r, • acural wu tw --~ .... 1 .. v1th •• 
laUer Jill'\ ot 17.15• 111.1'114 x-. aote4 la hla 411117 oa Jfo; tor 28, 
193,5, tut tare •• 1 ~ 'bl 
••• a JI'IU7 a•••ral tulba .aaat Rez _.u v111 eoaa til 
oat ot the 81'NnaMt. Bl tau Mea uUe1' tll'l'ltto attaok 
latelJ a ...._, ot a .,.... u _.. 1a Loa Aap111.2 
... I Uft .110 4outltt laoloeN.r1 that 0D11 ot tb181 4aJa I v1ll 
tlllf. .,..u -.. •"Jeft ot lllarp ...... beoa\1111 ot --
11111'-ll't --. em ot the ooat•t ot a .,... alll4 4latmed 
1111 Blazoetlaa .Utorlal 'WI'ltll'le 
lltftt liDp.ldaa toM • t~ '1/qwU baa a Ute Job at Col\111-
tlla at $9000 a year and that he ehOil14 haft to 4eo14e pretty 
aooa ••••r ~ Jlfl 1auiC ta ~ OS' ... ._. Be IIUJIOt 
-' 8lloh lea'N ot •beolotl· ,erv.wu•a leaft ot aMalloe •· 
aptn4 a hM 1, 193f.J/. 
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atte:r 'fqvtU lett the ~-• .,.._ll aad .uauunt A"'dat•uaW:r 
WU.l &l"'Ud'4er ollalleJII!IIl Wallaoe to ... llbat the II& wa-.s pllaW 
Wore lie _. a •1a1oa.' 'ftle ta..,fleaa""" .-t\11 .. •• to take a 
200CI'IIi1e to\lr ot tile SOUfllleut. Rl"NJ'illfl flbe wnrk ot the R& ill that 
...... 1• 
'J.'U&Wll t1ev to Mllqlhla to Main tile tour ot the SouthNat. 
tCIS'Pfltllla ua- ...... reua Beleir ot %118 J1a .xeU tmn •aooope4• tile 
rutpaUcm at017 wb11e t~ to ...... 1• vUh .,.._,.u. After bnak-
ten t.lae ._, daFo 'l'upltU 11111'1'1Ji&PP1lo •O.Jt •• boTe• I ..... I llllf N 
wll 11,. t.a. 'ftle rapoa!'t 1a tzwt.• 'ftlell, 111 .,. rapofte4. he tleake4 
ia a tn.eadlbNa ot a .en lle lla4 ••••II 4\U'iRI ralltiDt ,-era. Joahllla 
v1 t~~ ",.....,...u 
'ftiN'I _,. ao oltt.oial apl.aaaU0111 ot the rauou for Tupall'a 
lhlpal'hna n S0.1ahr 111, $lae lftl.ita JIDu.M eDDOI&Iloeil the tat ot $lae 
lett••ae~tr•••• .. TUpall ... tM '"-'•••·12 
10. 
u. 
12. 
,_ J"aUOU wb1oh ...... Mea clia0111aaecl bft-ll WI ..... thea 
oaaa, I e!IOIII14 lllla t• lui paftll"-4 to ru1p hca tbe CloY• 
*' at u4 nt\arA to JriftflaUt• vith1a the DBt tev lllllltha. 
I haYe ""'"' 11ha 'inter pan ot :rou:r tt.:rat tem •• Pnat.-
4tlat with arowiDI ocmt14elaoll la ,.aur pollolea aD4 la FOil• 
I 4o !lOt IMIII4 to 1187 that it JOU. .,..r haw l'ftl ... , tor 
• ... t.a, I ehall N em 0111. 
R • 0. 'l'llawll 
I full¥ \1114e:rate114 the I'MIIOU that ake 701.1 fael 701.1 8houl4, 
tor a whU. at lean, mva to pzohate lite wt.thta the aaxt 
few MDtha. Tw haw atwa .... l'GU~ all4 etflolot~ ot 
,..- ....n ... to tha ~11 tor theae paat tour ,. .. re, 
aD4 I Wilt FOil to kraelf that late em I t\lll.T .,. .. ;rw to 
... •• to 1'WIIIIU' a44lUoaal Al'Ttoe. 
Later oa ••• I baw N\...-.4 tna ., trip to SOUth .a.rtoa, 
w ... telk owr tha aottaal tate oa lillloh ;rw wlll Wilt ;rwr 
zutpaUoa to M etfeotlYe. 
VUh _, wm naar4a, 
•-r~, 
haDkliD D. Rooaeftltl.3 
In \be anenee ot aa etflotel ea;plaaaUoa, ~· rzoeae aD4 pwl4t.u 
ottere4 aewral raa.... tot: TapeU•a nataaaUOII • .1111 aaaW 110ft 
.,.,. to.,... hla t..u,.l4 • Hu a.a .. ot .-. ... tn. COll&Ute •· 
pln4 iA 19,..l.S Hta illtlwnaoa at 1lha llllta Hawle had. __.. •16 Ba DO 
J.oDan' •atoo4 aaar the tlll'oM.•17 Hie otttotel poalUGD ha4 srowa WI.,_.. 
t_..1t1e.18 He _. .DO loa.tll' Ia a paeltioa vUhlD taaa adllf.aleilntioa 
to &d-* ••• Jllab ... 19 
BtteutiiiiC ..... 1U. '• f.atl_.., - ot hla ol'1Uu a8HrWo 
4\ll'ha n .. t1111110illl ot 1936. *' • ••-. JOWWtul. thflll ...... A 
lepa\llioaa _..... that llolll't'41ltl'• neleetiGD Wll14 M a-<ilatalf' _... 
......... tu ....... t. wllloh ..... 'l'ucw11 •• .... • • • la oner .. 
..... wllat tM7 •PGak ot •• • ,,,._.. aora"" .... ••20 Ia 1934 Fnak 
,... bat oalltlll 'flaaWU u •u• ua!WI pen ot the.., DM.l.•21 Ia 
len 1!7• 1936. r.a• oa14 that '!llpi.U. aot !Ioper. nat17 1"8JJ'UQW 
the ,...u..t '• new u 11M ••1411' appoaoha4. 22 Later 1D 19.36 let 
wraa4U.I'M4ltna 
11M tlat attar tha a111oUoa ••. Dr. Tuawll wU1 M 
... 117 Ia poelUIID to tiKM1I4 bt 1lt eo IMt aboult. ThaD 
••• tu e~tul 1oa4ero ot tiM •• Deal vU1 ao 10IIICIII' 
hew to •,.U tlltlb' pultl_. tor t .. r ot pollUtlll .-. 
ttaeaau • • •. 'lb., au tllaa ao aJilall4 Ml at.... • •• w 
VlU ... tanaplaatliiiiC that real~ 1e tftlUIJlelltl1118• 
It tile Mlln • ....,. •• , Lll• 1e eutallUI4 '117 tu YOhre ~~nt 
•" lltw tlala ·~ et'!lf aboat au U, • the CouUtltaUoa. 
the 111U'U aliA 11141.,..1 Ullertr au M , ..... Cll&t ot tba 
~ u4 !hr. -..u vlU '- a\lla to tnlUIPlaat peopla 
lr a _.. •w fit the ball4. Ml lt tha tl'lllUiplaat .. an 
llM hQllr it vlU '- thalr .. fult.23 
DuliiiC the tiiiiPlila ot 1736 the DnloanUo poUUtlll etntqlata 
aU..otlll ...,.11 ia oner to a..-o14 Ol'l"at.-.24 fha J~"laolPill uatataata 
11111 the PNal.f.eM 1a a,..lll•WiU118 ID 19)6 wra Charlea Miobalacm, &rs al 
Ro811F •• S'-All1 Hi&bo 'lh.c~Maa CorMI!Ia, ara4 Beajallta Cohaa.2S IMP1118 
'hpNl quiet 414 aot aU.eaoe d'-alra e hila. MS.ohelaoD, DaiiDoraUo 
JUUel\7 llliet • naalW ~at t1ut RepuWaana IIO\Iih11 to avoU a CIGIIIPU'l• 
aoa ~ ,...114ell111al aaaltdetea bJ 41l'lot1118 an .. uoa 11111 hrleJ •• a 
Yillata ~118 all the -n- ot 'l'e 'Q' poliUoa ara4 'l'upa11 u a 
•aa.ialtn ..,.. ..... a VaUJre J'raak IIII!Dt, Wuhinatoatau ia aaaeral 
tltlu..ecl 11lu111 'l'11awll'a lntl ... oe _. 41UWI111&1 thq tnterpnW hla 
atlnoe 4\lrlll& the ...,. ... aa ea IDI.iMUoa \hat hia 4eJ111'11vn _. 
~-·····2'7 
A J1x .xu& Ttas raponer annw 'fucwU •a reat.paUoa to u 
•s.atn~~ibl¥ ta\lllr aa4 a:paulft' 'llz'MilVe he prapara4 ta 1936 to "Nll• 
tile RA. w the OCIV.ID171 ~~~~ pul)lto1117 etten •llaokttra4 vUb aueh a:plcl-
alft r ..... • t~aat he t1aall7 .... .,....28 ··UN !fee••u ata11e4 tb!lt one 
~ t1ut •ta rn aoaa tor ~l'a realpaUoa _. hta aatioipatle ot 
4Uttcul11J' ta setttaa an q•nJl'latlGill traa Cnar .. tor tile N..29 A 
anat ...,.,. Wart ... ta c-.,...a OYW t11a RAa it •••••"' quite oemta 
that eppiOJI'latlGill Wlll4 1ltl to t"uta ter a eoaUmaaUOD ot the ... ..,,, 
Jl¥1 a ,30 It _. raporte4 that ..... U •a ••- to aat approprtaUoaa · 
as. 
a£. 
21· 
28. 
29· 
30· 
tor a plea to lea4 $,50,000.100 a ,.ar to btllp teaut taJ"Mra JQn~~a• 
thell' hoMe "' tnuteniiiC tM B.\ to tM V8DA had bMa tllwl'hd llr 
w..u. .. •. waWiUtneaeu to aHCizoll tbe 8.\J the tara-t111aa.Q7 ....Stt,.•e 
tov nporte41J lett WaUaoe tar fi'Qa ,.,..... 11.1 the B.\ • • aoecapl1ah• 
-··" '"•'t npon oa 'llllllaM'a att1\ud.e towl'de the RA JI'OYed taao• 
•nte. llur the ead ot 1;be. Mul-, aaoo1'4111C .to a.a...11 Lcml, Vallaoe 
._..... 
It Sa roell¥ a anelcNa J0\1 that Ruettl ... ut baa dOQ8 
towl'4 I'Mit0111C --.., ...._ the ~t:dlqe4 tu.n 
fill tbe 8euth a114 t.,.n Q'I'!NitliiC fvther 4Ntnottoa ot 
Ua PM._, nacuoe. the ..u. BapaeteUT 1a that tne 
l&aa ,.. OCIUilel' that ..U thla 1101'11: -. doae Witll 
__....., t\1114a tbet •lle 9)!11raUou other thea oa a -th-
to ar th llula lapoaallllt~o:Jol 
Ia Lort•• optatoa tile tou ''ri~ oltatllad' the eete'lllhlr tot tblt 
RA u Jlll't ot tM UIIJAA, VII4U' ._attw 0:1:4er 1530• Duu 'er )l, 193&, 
the hoe14eat ~ .U the pe!Mftl a1l4 cluUaa ot the B.\ to tbe 
.. uetal'l ot Acn•1turat • S.J't r ... 1, 1937. Walla ...... ..- ta. 
- ot th41 •ll•tr• ,._. aaU'fltl• reoetftd nawto1:7 M~thontr -.. 
the Baakboi4-Joau hN .._..,. ..._. ot lalF• 1937, to the laJII S.CMll'l'lr 
................ '3.3 
C £ 'rr Wa r Gualll aloac vlth Ilia IUlpaU•• Jfe we to \Ia a tJ'aWl• 
, .. QOIIInl'kat aa4 ..... , ... n .. ,...._u., in the :tim ot hla h'iead 
O&aal'l.M 'lauata, a JN04•Ual e4naft oa Cai'J'i'beaa attain, A401t A. 
lei''-• 1r., ,.. oa the Mall\ ot 4S1redON ot t!MI OJ ,..,.,. Whea npor-
'kn tuniCIU4 'fupiiU about the RA at the tiM ot hla :resipaUoa. he 
~w. •an 4oa't aek u aballt .,.'-a. Ita a IDOl•••• •n.• a.. 
..._r~~~e:re tOWICl it .-.1ns tllat the autere, a-OIAla'k 'J.'u&wll lhoul4 
.. lato the IDOlaa ... llulaeea. Be to14 hie h'ieD41 with aleao •Our 
leali111 Ru4 1a 'Giul.a•' aa4 ~ ~~'•• 011 the la!Ml, eo help •• 1a 
·~ te Onfl1!mf 011 the eaa. ••"" l 
'kilt len. It is tru t.bat hla 4Qutue ,., 4ea01'1be4 •• the etePJinc 
4owa u4 out ot tile ·~ ~r ot the New Deal1•35 1CIIla '1'. 
Flraa .-.. tllat 'fulwll •w ltie econ Ullllller a bwlbel wtla he oravla4 
oato the Jqi!OU ot ou ot tlloaa _..., ea 101 ot the C:• a lila - a 
l>ta ~ N.eu 1JU41111" eorpnets-.•36 Tat, oa tha wola, '1\acWU'a 
_I..,..J"f&tl'nt unt.• wn aUetw with hll netpaua, oon:tin1118 their 
.-au to 4IQI'elllOU ot paanl dla»PPOftll ot '1'qwU all4 nliet at 
Ilia ..,,_uoa. lolrlle •• in......., ~ the pnaaaoe ot a at181bar ot eoa-
,.,. 
~: 
...,.u ... ta lams.,., 17Jro at a tuewl.l c\18ael' tor 'l'upeU, wbloJI .. 
•.u la a 1tpt ... ~a.•" 
ftae.N Ja7 baw 1IMa a Pi#--loal ea:plqatloa trw taut OOQUJ N• 
Ur•• ,..Nl attiftfleJ poadltJ¥ IHil' ~at 'l'uawU'a clepanve .. 
t J una bi' tU k"Wlatee tltd ...,. ot ttut thla&a the~' ha4 aai4 ·--• 
Wt. 'hp1ll liU a 'IIIIRII1~ who vltbtnv at the JI'GtJIMt fll a fiabt 
to- liMp "Itt at. Sataot, hTC•ttac t11tt PI''VIIIi're ..... tv ....,. m4 
HRI'1V•38 Bia • ......._ ot a 
... :l.tMfttf."& Jilt aa a lluinua ...... u .... pvta aa llll,.,to 
aGil llepu Dlbd ~ ...W.s-4 lli''C .,,, .... toHiltl/• 
Mtle11•• 1a a au..., .......... all4 ur ,. .. ,. .. fll Mr. 
~·· '-laa ale ta ...._. llUaelt ,.._ " •• ..._ 
. a 1 ...... fll the lli''CFIIIITI f ........ .....,. 4tataldo" 
At ... Mkt• a bua!laNa ,., 81 u 801ltlt .-.rioa, ~ ltlv• Cllau.zt 
t1 tha lev 1'..-k cu,. Jbnt .. C1 •..soa 1a 1938• Mala .... 414 aot J7'tl'ftl 
to .. .....,. .. , •• 
.... JIIIJJI• ,. •••• • ......... thall' npet at --u·· I'Uf.a-
=u•· lfiUIIt' v.u.oa aol&NI• 
J'Oil kllow, a. haa ..._ oae fill the .. , •tao:rou tf.chten 
t• tlltt aaPltalhtlo .,.,_ I k11ow fit. MsD ot ~ '• 
........ m4 tnf .. t an ._., ,.,. lillaU aU Ntlwt that 
be la .. lOftiU' ila GoiW llt•+t 
u ...,.t•vaHJ>, utt, •Dr. 'l'u8wU s. tu ....... oauut•tht•lr1"1 
_. la .. ~-·" 'ftut .. ._ .. of Walla .. 11J14 Alaaa4e:r Wft 
•tw'nllllq ataoeNe al...-•sh tbiiJ eeul4 be wnttea ott 1»7 akepUu u 
aotlltc ia bia 4f.ur• 
I • 11tmtT to ... IIIK CO• 1 '1l1Ak that he haa beft tar-
rtlal,r ....,......, .. a4 .-... l>J' the P&blla J1NU IIJI4 
•• •• ot na Met•'"'auoa .... 42 
otlv Jrift'l 0 ate W19 _.. 1»7 _,ICIJ'eeD ot the RA. D. P. 
'l'l'eato -.s-.1 ~or aa nau.. ......... .,....llla ... r to 
... ..,.... " ,. .......... u .. ,. -· ... ,.,. 1A wbiell 
,.. ........... ,. JGU' ~lftleaa ••• aa4 tot: -- .... 
.u.u ...... ,rt1Mtiou ., .. ,.. ....... , .... Widell'• 
1¥1111..,....., .. ,. ··" ., ............... ,., 
a. 1u PMnoa ot the IIA wotaa 
T• bue laalttl ~ M put a tllail' , .. , a _...., 
....... JIIIOJla ... etlumf1ae .-14 be a --·· te ........ ~~au..,.. a.w-..-.. vUJ. .-. to JVV .-u 
·afMI' U'lUU aft &0111 aal ,_....._ ... 
n 4oea ... • ,..1" tllat \'laaWll liMlcD14 ia omr. to laoftDM lib 
iaiJJ . • to awH a tlellt ... ,. ItA 141 &IClatlou, to l"MaiD Ilia ~ at 
C0111Mlao or lletl'llla bia aao..,.... 4ue to Ilia 4Mlltdos iatluaoe at 
till llhit& llsus. S. 1lliiiLl4 ..... ,_..,.. ill &MMWt at the Pl'eaH&U's 
.._..,. 'l'lloJ Pftsl4&M 1a ........... ot 'l'llllwll'a Nai&DatiGO ~ 
ntlHtl .. w ac. dl8fti'? --~·• • ..._ iatluaaoe Sa the White Houae 
7JO. 
u4 .... tan that, •• IoJIH Jat u, •tlllliiiPilbte417 he baa beea a eo011 Ue1 
ot • JI01tttoa1 1oa4 r.. * Plutteat ,. eanr ... u 
~'a atatua d .... '11111te IIDue 4eol&M4 u that ot CONOiall 
... -.. .... 'l'ucwU'• •Jl•...,.. aapitali•" lllolu4e4 the uu .. nu-
tnat IIOiaOQt ot ·~•U• 81111 eoatm.• eono..a. a protepe ot 
~. a4Mn4t UJIIIala ....... to tha vuacm..a.._..t. Propn. 
alft itea ot WonaA at--. Ia 1935 ara4 1936o wheo 'l'qwll'a Ol'iUaa 
uaentl4 .... , he ...... ~ ~ -· hla atar •• 4eaoaa4iJII .. 
Cleroona'a wa al1881141Dc· Iateu.ma1 41aqusnsat •• ao.-paalad by 
COIJGCZdl •a 1IQ'IIOfl8l 4ial.Urlt te fuawll •• u aDs-. itT ot Wllch IlaJDXIil 
MD1q l.euM4 wheo Ita YblW Conoru • Jlo; 'tn• 1), 1936• 
'- --. .... ailaaea by .. Ill& • 1t I Jmev whaD TucwU 
.. •eettl.Dc ou,t.• . I a.v th&t .,_ 41aaBne4 nt~t 'fvcwll• 
aa4 l .. a1lalt , ..... 1' ..... . ltaJl¥, whaD 'l'ca ... .. 
uti aaU• •t•.,. _... .. ...._ ........ like hilll tlill" uz pnoe. 
8a Pl..., Q .... clftft ot a 'IJtaoh the Slcippel' •• to akit, 
laU U clcMa 1a ti'ODt fill•• fOlJatet to the ,... •..,.u. 
uoa• aa4 aaf.4, "l'hat ._., to a.. out. • •• 1 pet4 ao 
attelltl4dl to hillt he tune~ to tbe Pneidnt u4 aau. ..,._ 
IIMv ,_ toa•t -.ue ... , .. ,. • the hutteat ~aBorad hta. 
Ou JC1U. '-alaa the unwf' V.U ••• w•U b.ke an rift him • 
.,. that lle IIMIIa't Hl'ft a 1IMtUl fllaotloa. Ba la 81/11"\ ot 
a oattiah 'hi -.P tU uatw ,._ pttlJII al..,.SIIh when 
* ,...... •. ... 7.r ... t.o port. ... * Skip. 
,.. ah811&141l't .- tu t · .. · • 1a .. attltla ttllh.• 'l'llat 
II I to tia,... ot ... 
n.. 'faCwU •a atara4Pt&at ...,. wn no •Un naaona re hia 
natpaUoa - ona apee1t10t ... J$111ftl. SpnlticallT• he 414 not anJOJ' 
llaarilla tile ltnlat ot tbe -J!Qb1ioua• attaok 1D the 1936 OUII*icll while 
45.· ~~ BU~Il4 L., Jl&t.eW',JUAJx.•W. Jr.• IqJse,JliDlae 9• 
... ~. l'Qlllllt .............. -,.; Harper, 1939} 355· 
lMth& UIIW. '' apeak wt - ..,..sau, wb4lll aD aaUa1pate4 wenllelJdlls 
.,.,....,. ... , that 1\le aoU•ltJ' ...U.4 u li'Ue, 1t ...,, llalaap 1D the 
.-... •• the Dsmontio •ue• ·. While 'hpell 4lcl Dot PftteD4 to a 
p#Otu110Ml ~ ot pellt101e U ._. Dot eurpr1e1116 to 1\1111 that 
... Pnalclet ftlonqU vUecl lato h1a 8&COft4 tftll vith 
~ ..., 'I'Oeal o,..nu. •••. '1'lleft wre, ot ~. 
'iU LilMti1lJ' I-J' s•• all4 t11ae 0JP811t10ft ot a lara- per-
Ill ... ot tM llutaue =• 'I I ,..... Bv.t aU. that 
•••••• tor J'atllU tlaaft •••"" Ilia with the alM'Ol'ate -
...... Vhk&l, 1D tlla ll41M ., -- ........ " ... bal'c1 to,...., ..... tNt will-., MNtllhelue, ._. otwhU. s.ell 
o,..Ui• -. a ., .. ., • ., &OIII'blaUoa ia "fC'Aua• .u4a 
*' tllall' .... t•M& w .... ., ... ,.,. .. 1 
MaMa aau ,.....u au aot n.~tp .,... '" .~.uoa OAl.J -..... u 
tiel raot wat to t(Ult UMr tint u atllllW \he\ h• w lleall thh'rf"' 
fll IINAPIIII tw: .-. ttoa, -.. w 4eaiM4 lt ... ben to •" •.u 
anar _. al.enioa.U 
'1'U ooo ..,_..., ~- ,._ ~·· raalpaUoa aaa be 4ae• 
U'lW CIDl¥ ta ..-nl pan!ODSl '-• Aocol'41D8 to aa..eu Lcml, '1'118-
...u ._. •uN4 ..,. .....,...,...- nnlwt• he pla~ to 6ft wt at 
.. ,n ••·" 'fqwll.naelW*t 
~·· so. 
:r ._. fiMll¥ to t1114 .,..U 1D ROll aoat\iaioa about ._, 
I W al1SIP lJell_.,.. all4 • ..._. .U JIC!Uiblltttae W.lft 
W el...,. aun 1 to be~ 1D Aael'ieaa Ute, that ar 
1e·.a111 tw ._. vJ.tYft•l ~ ben 11 weal'll~. I 
.....,. MJe to tlacl .._ ~llltJir_qaiD 1t :r ..U eaeqe 
tw. tile ... ._. ot .U Mlftlale.JI 
'l'ltpitU'e PltftODill relau ... vltll BooMult alt111e :reaaiaelt 
fiONI.al. 1\aa\ Won Ilia ~uoa .. pabUaq anaouaoa4 1 he 1adtell 
tile PnaUeat to ..UU u. lA Ouanalt to. at llenfra, Mar,rlalul.Sl 1'he 
Pl'u14eat 0011 1 •till 'rw8wU to Bll"f1l HYenl Clqe later • .52 1'he Prui• 
unto J011Uealq .ntwte4 anl ... , 11b1eb 'rw8wU 414 not ooaeU. 
eUiwlr ..... ...., er kh4. 414 DOt· *••• hu lOJaUI' to :Rooaeveu.53 
The Nfft'•••• 1D tlleh' lnten oa 'flllwll'• I'Uipatioa to the JOUi\»U• 
l'J' Ill a. latter•• ntua to ...,., I nt in tke htva Pi'OiM to lie 110ft 
-.. I'OI&U.. -su... Ill 1938 1o11:ae ""''• •I tM.ak tbat thu •4etnl• 
nmu. owe u to flqp•U. to &M IWI au ... s.n. • ntten4 1110n 
Oi'Wl tNaWatl tMa allliiiJti ·~ tz. tho .._.bl'lhll ot tke Uwla••ta• 
tU.. Ull 1111 t. • •"'- Ull n 1 w r rlh&l ..a.•,_ After 'l'apeU ba4 '--
out ot t1111 "01ater ot 111111 etnt•W (Or ... tbll1 he -. •JPDiatell 
~ ot ,_.. Moo ia l9U1 he "''" in that ottioe Wltll 19U. 1lll4ei' 
the -..se ot hie ol4 triaD~ JIIZ'o14 Jllrilu, 
Ill 1936 i'VcwU •• von aD4 ..._..... liB ba4 tOQ&l\t tiaJ'Oil¥ ter 
•• he llttUtrH4,.. fer \1111 lln'-!lt ot \1111 aaUOih 'l'he baotlc, ..-.. 
uw, eldlaaet1q aar111' ot a Plll»lio aflliu1atntor, 001111110de4 to aa 
•wr 1 fqsea ia 'fllawll'e .... 1:1r Jelit1oal oou14ant1one, aruba 
tNa Ilia-~ l'Ola1 took lta toll. Tup!IU'a career 1a the oap1tal 
.. ., 1 nU'NlJ' loac •• aaela WI un fll' CICl the •••1'88t• Ba we 
obJeotiva and f.DMlliciDt in 8PfllllUiDC hie a1tuat1oa. 111 1936• 1'11 
the 'VUialfta\on etrru'• ... u4 '1\II•U Jmev aov to tiatlt ... J8idlaJ8 
it we lJMm,table tllet a ataoara, ~tift tntallaftual, t«ll:tl.taa 
u a lla~Jdaa at~~tatatator, llb""'h1 neCih • nate ot .•Oilha.toa., 111 
a JlllluoJbtc ...... and tat~. PU1al..to aentoa tor the oruuw 
PIJbUo a1!!1 .. bu ottea netlle4 ~· poillt ot 4t•a&ehUI& zoetuJu. A 
._..., aa4 a lllalt -.o an ItaUaa eciGJIOIIlat, OD hearlJic ot 'l'Uiot'• 
appolrr• sot, 'll'.rOte to a h'lu4 111 J':lraUa u tollove • 
S. '1'111'&0' ta oonUOllar ...-.1• He ~1 aot. H d'A 
Ia ottt• ~ 'tlllftl&b to .tu17 •t Ilia Jl,au. · • .n.u 
p . . ... . .... Hlllllll4ftla'J a rill l:tluatal' abotlt ... loaa 
iaia t ¢•~~'• lae vU1 M auu.. t1o to .-... llld w!ll 
.,.. apSU\ Heteelu eat ~""W~• at -4mN'7 Wn• PU1t11c 
eMit vU1 f•U.• he vUJ. ..... __ •• , it wtU ... 8114 
tllat he 1a DOt ti~ tn Ilia' ta.k. lllt....U• w!ll 
...,.. Jle 1flU fttiJ'8 f1l<' ........ eft I ... W .taal1 llaft 
a uv pnor ot the *'* ot ttUinc a JOalttoa liD 
hie U 8 ........... like ,..... With - 1lJl'1lht - aa4 8 
JIIIUNo,_...» 
a • .n ... l'lltloll&blia hal ea.JoJM the ""' ... ot a llUIIIIeZ' ot upnpt, 
~0111 ad.S'Alltl'lltora. Oa oane\oa it b.aa abwlell MUih •iltpnoti• 
1111• aaa •• 110M Mra ·tllan 'l'qwl.l, ,. ... tour yure 1a fll'ft~t ....., 
the ctnu.taaau attNt hie U.\ra teHna the 11at1oa. 
r ... ·0) 
::::/ " \j 
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Part IV 
The Man and the M,ytla 
XI. Whipping Boy for the Administration 
Sincerity and politics are rarely to be found 
dwelling under one roof, end little justice is 
to be expected from the exponents and manufac-
turers of what isetyled public opinion, when to 
gain some ••• end they undertake the description 
of a character. · 
Stefan Zweig, Marie Antoinette 
(New York, Viking Press, 1933) 
Introduction. 
Why Tugwell ~eceme a Whipping Boy 
General 
Tugwell's own traits end background, combined with a coincidence 
of circumstances, resulted in his becoming the whipping boy for tae 
Roosevelt administration. He was handsome in a fashion ideal for ceri-
ceture, he had written poems, end he was a professor.1 His academic 
background provided the starting point for his critics; it was an old 
practice to deride professors involved in practical affairs. ~oreover, 
Berle's decision not to go to Washington in 1933, end Maley's departure 
from the capital in September of that year left Tugwell as the most pro-
minent professor in government. One observer dated Tugwell's emergence 
as the chief target for all the foes of cha~e from Moley's departure 
into journalism.2 
Tugwell's academic activities included the production of a mass 
of writings in the area of political economy. Both friends end foes 
1. •Tugwell: New Deal's Leading 'Red' Gets Job in Wall Street,• Newsweek, 
Vol, 8, No. 22, November 28, 1936, 16. 
2. Carter, J, Franklin, (Unofficial Observer}, The New Dealers (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1934) 85, 
73'6. 
eagerly studied his works, and he became the apologist of the New Deal.3 
Friends searched his writings for a rationale. Foes often searched his 
books end articles for phrases which, when lifted out of context, dis• 
torted his views. Few critics distinguished between the academic analy• 
sis of problems and the practical approach of s government administra• 
tor.4 
Tugwell himself offended some politicians and journalists with 
an air of disdein.5 His condescension stemmed pertly from his feeling 
of urgency in the midst of a debacle6 and partly from an impatience with 
those whom he considered as having contributed to national disaster. 
Something had to be done. Tugwell talked openly about unfamiliar and 
unpleasant things -- thereby evoking far more critical comment then did 
the quiet Berle, whose economic thought vas as unorthodox as Tugwell'a.7 
At a time of economic collapse, the nature of Tugwell's unortho-
dox 'planned capitalism' made him a likely target for critics on right 
and left. In a period of emergency reconstruction, the anti-capitalists 
wanted more than a New Deal; they wanted a basically new system. The 
anti•planners did not fear Tugwell as a monstrous radical; they feared 
his approach to the problem of government as a threat to their dominance 
of government.B They hoped to retain their dominating positions beyond 
B. 
Gillis, A. and Ketchum,. R., Our America (Boston, Little, Brown, 1936) 
367· 
See below, Chapter XIII, 
See below, Chapter XIII, 
Interview with writer. 
Section,•The Abstruse Tugwell." 
Section,•The Arrogant Tugwell.• 
•Taxes: Mr. Tugwell's Ideas,• Time Magazine, 
bar 25, 1940, 86, 
Editorial, Nation, Vol. 143, No. 22, November 
Vol. 36, No. 22, Novem-
28, 1936. 618. 
737. 
the time of relief, reform, and reconstruction. In a sense, the oppo-
sition of the extremes to his unorthodox thought reflected Tugwell's 
position as a symbol of the inner conflict of the times; attachment to 
the familiar opposed the pressing demands of the times for innovation; 
there was hesitation at the crossroads,9 Tugwell's desire for essen• 
tiel reforms to foster recovery and avoid catastrophe in the future 
conflicted with both the last-ditch defense of established power and the 
zealous agitation for out-right junking of all existing institutions. 
From the right came some diatribes, often uninformed. One such 
etta~ attempted to convey the impression that the author's views were 
baaed on a thorough study of Tugwell's book The Industrial Discipline. 
The nature of the critique revealed skimming, misunderstanding, or de• 
liberate distortion. For example, the Veblenian conflict between the 
10 
engineers end the financiers became a dispute between capital end labor. 
The ills which Tugwell cited, this writer asserted, bed nothing to do 
with the efficiency of producers, who could not deal with the abolition 
of poverty.11 This author took the trouble to defend producers on tke 
grounds of efficiency despite Tugwell's statement that producers were 
not inefficient but uncoordinated; the absence of coordination was 
ultimately inseparable from the problems of income distribution and 
poverty, Tugwell's talk about labor released for alternative pursuits 
by technological advance was in this writer's opinion a justification 
10. 
11. 
Gillis, A. and Ketchum, R., Ql!!: America (Boston, Little, Brown, 19;36) 
371. 
Neilson, Francis, Control fr<a the Top (New York, G, P. Putnam's, 1935) 
31•34· 
Neilson, Francia, Control from the Top, 44• 
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for shirking; Tugwell's anticipation of the automatic factory was 
ridiculous,l2 As for Tugwell's assertion that laissez-fairs had ne~r 
exiate4, this critic commented that the professor obviously did not 
understand Adam Smith, whose doctrines had nothing to do with Tugwell'a 
ideas on immorality,l3 In diaeuaaing laissez-fairs thia critic here 
asaumed that •competition was daaigned by Providence to provide an 
autoaatic subatitute for honeaty,•l4 Tugwell rejected any such as• 
sumption. He insisted that a study of human nature was essential to 
an understanding of aconanics.15 
From the left came disparaging estimates of Tugwell as a com-
promiser without courage or sincarity.16 He vas called a •third•rata 
Voltaire trying to be a second•rate Rousseau;• he should have been a 
French or English courtier when the industrial revolution was in ita 
infancy. It was alleged that he and W&llace thou~ht they were opening 
the gates to an abundant life wben they were really holding them open 
for the Trojan horse of reaction. Each was declared psychologically 
immobilized by his middle-class roots, which made the preservation of 
'hlliiiSn liberties• a prerequisite to change, Tugwell and Wallace, in 
one leftist's opinion, mistook 'human liberties• for the "minor privi-
12. 
13. 
14· 
15. 
16. 
Neilson, Francis. Coptrol fi:2!!! the Top, 49. 
Neilson, Francis, Control t£91!kl Top, 69-70, 
Tawney, R. H,, Religion .!D5l the I!!!! .2f. Capitalism (New York, New 
American Library, A Mentor Book, 1947) 29. 
Tugwell, R. c., •Human Nature and Social Econom,y,• Journal .2t. 
PhilosophY, Vol. 27, Nos. 17 and 18, August 14 and 28, 1930, 
Ward, Baul, w., •The End of Tugwell,• Nation, Vol, 143, No, 22, 
November 28, 1936, 623. 
leges and creature comtoris• of their middle-class rearin~.17 
The impatience with Tugwell of discontented, idealistic youth 
found expression when he visited Columbia in 1933, He remarked that 
the administration had met the t.Bediate needs of a population hungry, 
cold, and in despair. The student paper, Spectator, criticized him for 
his failure to get to the bottom of economic problems and for his ad• 
vising avoidance of coamitment to blind doctrine, The student writers 
di&Ddssed his idealistic phrases and his call for experimentation as 
mere political pre~tism, They .anted an all-inclusive 'plan.• The 
students forgot that •prssaatism is the essence of the American poli• 
tical technique• and that 'the ~nuteneas of a blueprint does not 
establish its validity.• 18 An economist on the left also condemned 
Tugwell for his conservatism: his ultimate coocern was with markets 
for industrial output in order to insure capiteliet profits,19 Another 
writer stated that any attempt to apply Tugwell's technique of control 
to modern capitalism that failed to "first break the back of monopoly, 
that is to say, of capitalism itself,• would mean that those who had 
20 power would still hold it to use in their own interests, The attack 
from the left reached its logical end result When it included Tugwell, 
along with the Liberty League, in a list of Fascists,21 
Tugwell's unorthodox thought also presented a problem in comsuni-
17, Ward, Paul w., "Wallace the Great Hesitator,• Nation, Vol, 140, No, 
3644. May 8, 1935. 535· 
18, Wechsler, James A., The Age .2!, Suspicion (New York, Random .House, 1953) 
44· . 
19. Corey, Levis, The Decline of Allerican Capitalism (New York, Covici• 
Friede, 1934) 95· 
20, Hallgren, Mauritz A., Seeds£! Revolt (New York, Knopf, 1933) 343, 
21. Lindley, Ernest K., Halfway.!!!!!! Roosevelt (New York, Viking, 1937) 6, 
cation to publicists. Journalists who •wrote down• to their readers 
often knowingly misrepresented Tugwell's ideas. An authoritatiTe study 
of Washington correspondents cited these remarks by members of the capi• 
tal press corps: 
I'd like to see the 'l'ugwella and the Frankfurters try 
to write up the stories they're making for the big boys 
and girls who read Little Orphan Annie. That would be 
a laUflh , , ':!21 ahays know I' a do ill!! a better job than they could, 
A newpeperman who had labeled Tugwell a radical with CODIIIU.nist leani119 
said 
I know that Tugwell is no Coammist. I am well aware 
that he is probably a Social Democrat in the European 
sense, But bow can you conny that impression to your 
readers? They are ignorant of what a Social Democrat 
is. They ban got to ban labels which they understand. 
They doiiDov what •radical• means and what •caa.unist• 
meana,23 
An important reason for Tugwell's becoming the whipping boy for 
the administration was that he chose or volunteered to assume that role. 
Newwek noted, at the time of his resignation, that Tugwell bad decided 
24 
ae could aerTe the President by deflecting attacks from the White House, 
There was a substantial basis in fact for this estimate by the new -sa• 
zine. 
22, 
In the USDA Tugwell played a whipping-boy role. He took pressure 
Rosten, Leo c., The Washington Correspondents (New York, .Harcourt, 
Brace, 1937) 95• 
Rosten, Leo c., ~ Waahii!Aon Correspondents, 268, 
•Tugwell: Hew Deal's Leading 'Red' Gets Job in Wall Street.• 
Neyayeek, Vol. 8, No, 22, NoTember 28, 1936, 16, 
7$. 
off wallace by assuming responsibility for the reorganization of the 
old-line agencies of the Department of Agriculture. The strategy was 
to eltainate bickering and backbiting among the bureaus in the accaa-
plishment of this vital task by having Wallace dis.iss complaints vith 
the explanation that Tugwell's connection vith the White House placed 
the matter out of Wftllece•s reach.25 Tugwell not only served as a 
buffer for a Roosevelt Cabinet officer but for the President htaselfo 
The most significant single reason for his becoming a target for the 
press was his sponsoring of a new Food and Drugs Bill. It was not 
generally known that orders to write the bill were issued direct fraa 
the White Houae,26 and Roosevelt long remained silent on the matter.27 
A letter from Professor David P. Cavers of Duke University Law School, 
who worked on a draft of the bill for Tngwell, revealed how the letter 
was bearing the brunt of the attack. Cavera wrote to Tugwell that an 
opponent of the bill 
• • • insists that one man (guess who) is spurning the 
support of the mesazine publishers and their allies 
to inject a 'personal hobby' into a bill where it does 
not belong. I resisted vith difficulty a temptation 
to drop a hint or two to the effect that the decision 
eaanated from a point higher up,28 
The amount of criticism which he deflected from the White Houae 
25. Interview J!ilh writer. 
26. Pearson, D. and Allan, R, s., 'Valentinoct the Revolution,• magazine 
clipping, Tu8well fapera. 
27. Finney, R., Scripps-Howard staff writer, Washington, April 12, 1936, 
newspaper clipping, Tugwll Paper•• 
28. Letter, David P. Cavera to 'l'ugwll, January 18, 19311, Tugwell Papers. 
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exceeded Tugwell's expectations; he real4' had no choice as to whether 
he would be a target. The press hesitated in the early New Deal period 
to critici~e the popular RooseYelt directly and took the politer and 
safer line that the President vas a sensible, loyal man -- if only he 
would diSIIIiss the crackpot radical adYisers around hilll. 29 Paul llock, 
editor of the Pittsburgh Post ea~ette, expressed his faith in Roose• 
Yelt's Americanism, but wished the President would get rid of the 
Socialist and Communist juYenile brain trust,3° Mark SulliYan, in caD-
manting in the New York §erald Tribuif on The Industrial Discipline, 
stated that RooseYelt vas not a radical but under the evil influence of 
professors. Sulli.an then quoted a verse of H. I. Phillips of the 
School days, school da:r.a, 
Good old Golden Rule days, 
Moley and Tugwell and Dr. Berle 1 Telling us how to aaYe the worl'.3 
During the period of presidential immunity others joined the cry 
that RooseYelt, a conservatiYe at heart, vas unknowingly being trapped 
into sponsoring a radical policy -- primarily by Tugwell, the leading 
left•wing reYolutionist. P. c. Edwards wrote in the San Francisco !!mfa 
on May 19, 1934, that no one objected to the use of brains in gover~~~~~ent 
in the past American professors had made notable contributions to political 
31. 
Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Maea~ine, 
Vol. 94, No. 5. NoYember, 1933, 257. 
Verity, George M., •Appraises Dr. Tugwell; Finds Lack of Appreciation 
Problems of Business,• Part II, The .k2!l. A£&, Vol. 134, No. 4, 1uly 26, 
1934. 33· 
Looker, Earle, !.!!!!. Alllerican War: Franklin Rooseyelt in Action (New 
York, 1ohn Dsy, 1933) 71; the rhywe was in error, Berle being pro• 
nounced to rhyme with •early.• 
74J:o 
science. But the Brain Trust bad brought itself into disrepute and 
cast reflections on trained knowledge in general with its half-baked 
ideas and irresponsible talk.32 Another writer illustrated the indirect 
attack on the White House by recalling a recent dream in which Roose• 
velt delivered to a .meting of Townsendites in ayde Park a speech pre• 
pared by Dr. Frankfurter, Professor Tugwell and Secretary Wallace.33 
Members of the opposition considered the strategy of deflection 
highly effective. One prominent Republican, in retrospect, frankly 
admitted that be had once believed that Roosevelt was the victim of his 
advisers (but no longer believed it because TODIIIY Corcoran had replaced 
Tugwell as chief •plotter,• yet the •mischief• continued),34 A journa• 
list believed that Tugwell was an effective shield for the President 
against criticism because people gave credit for the good part of the 
New Dsal to Roosevelt and blalled Tugwell for the bad part. Moreover, 
admirers of the President were not inclined to regard Roosevelt as in 
aD7 way responsible for Tugwell. Conserrative farmers seemed to consider 
Tugwell an •evil of spontaneous origin, a natural calamity ••• for which 
no political party can be blamed •• 35 
The administration itself vas aware of the 'heat• which deflec• 
tion focused on Tugwsll. Roosevelt reportedly sent for Wallace at the 
32. Cited in Odegard, Peter H. and Helms, E. Allen, American Politics 
(New York, Harper, ,1938) 557 • 
Proctor, David M., Par 11!.I (KDaaas City, Brown Book Co., 19_36) 144. 
Knox, Frank, We Planned It That lf!u (Naw York, Longmans, Green, 1938) 
vi•vii. 
J"ohnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Saturday Evening 
Post, Vol. 209, No.5, August l, 19_36, 74• 
height of the attack and said to the Secretary, •Tell Rex to keep kis 
pajamas on,•36 Ickes recorded in hie diary on October 9, 1936, a con• 
Tersation with the President in which RooseTelt got on the subject of 
priE donnas: 
He remarked that no one connected with him or the 
Administration had been subjected to so much cri• 
ticism as Rex had. Yet Rex has never whimpered or 
asked for sympathy or run to a~one for help. He 
has taken it on the chin like a man, The other day 
the President thanked him for the way he had stood 
up under fire,37 
If Tugwell Toluateered, in part, to bear the burden of publicity in a 
quantitative way, he was not indifferent, however, to the quality of 
the attack.38 
The Pure !'OOd and Drugs Bill 
The press concentrated its fire on Tugwell when he sponsored a 
bill to supersede the Pure Food end Drugs Act of 19o6, Opposition to 
such legislation was a familiar phenomenon. Between the introduction 
of the first Pure Food and Drugs bill in 1889 and the passage of a Pure 
Food and Drugs Act on June 30, 19o6, about one hundred and forty suck 
1 bills failed of passage. When opponents of this earlier law found 
that they could not prevent the enactment of some form of legislation, 
31· 
38. 
1. 
Pearson, D, and Allen, R, s., •Valentino of the ReTolution,• mega• 
zine clipping, Tugwell Papers. 
Ickes, Herold, L., The Secret Diary .2f Harold h Ickes: brt .Qy_, 
The Firat Thousand Jl!!n, 1933•19'36 (New York, Simon and Schuster, 
1953) 692. 
See below, Chapter XI, ~ction, •Tugwell's Reaction,• 
Gordon, Leland J., Econa.ica for Consumers, 2d ed. (New York, Ameri-
can Book eo., 1944) 601. 
745· 
they sought to weaken the measure by the insertion of qualifying teras 
and by hampering and restricting enforcement. The leading pioneer 
agitator for legislative action in this field asserted, perhaps with 
some exaggeration, that President Theodore Roosevelt's creation, in 
response to pressure from the opposition, of a packed Board of Food 
and Drug Inspection to replace the effective Bureau of Chemistry and 
2 Soils of the USDA in enforcement virtually repealed the Act. 
With Tugwell's sponsorship, s. 1944 was introduced on June 12, 
1933· This bill called for truth in advertising as well as on labels. 
The drug manufacturers shoved that they were even more alert to the 
danger of interference in their affairs than they had been in 19o6. 
This time they accomplished their ends with infinitely less opposition. 
The contrast between l9o6 and 1933 vas personified by the columnist 
Mark tiullivan, a muckraker of the earlier period who now defended what 
could only be called reactionary interests. "The ghost of H. w. Wiley 
appeared alone at the Senate hearings to remind veterans of what the 
muckrakers had once advocated.•3 
The introduction of a Pure Food and Drugs Bill •paralyzed witll 
fright" every food and drug lobbyist in Washington.4 The bill brought 
to the capital one of the most vociferous and determined lobbies of 
recent timas.5 Stuart Chase listed the groups included in the impres• 
2. Wiley, Harvey w., AQ AutobiographY (Indianapolis, Bobbs~rrill, 1930) 
241. 
Filler, Louis, Crusaders for American Liberalism (Antioch, Yellow 
Springs, 1939) 39lo 
Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Magazine, 
Vol. 94, No. 5, November, 1933, 264. 
Editorial, •Poison versus Honesty,• Nation, Vol. 138, No. 3574, Janu-
ary (l, 1934, 5• 
sive lobby which the •Pain and Beauty Boys• summoned: 
Drug Institute 
National Drug Trade Conference 
National Association of Retail Druggists 
National Wholesale Druggists Association 
Institute of Medicine Manufacturers 
Allied Manufacturers of the Beauty and Barber Industry 
National Publishers• Association (•slicks•) 
National Editorial Association (weeklies)0 American Newspaper Publishers Association 
James Rorty added these two groups: 
Proprietary Association 
United Medicine Manufacturers? 
These groups coordinated their activities through a Joint Committee for 
Sound and Democratic Consumer Legislation and a National Advisory Coun• 
cil of Consumers and Producers.8 
A survey of the leading lobbyists made obvious the reasons for 
their opposition to the bill. Of five men falling in this category, 
one held an interest in a company whose product the Food and Drug Admin• 
istration had seized; another was an attorney for a company whose pro-
duct the Department of Agriculture displayed in its "Chamber of Horrors,• 
an exhibition of harmful and worthless drugs; a third, president of an 
advertising agency which had the Ovaltine account, wrote to publishers 
that it would be impossible to sell a "chocolate-flavored dried malt 
extract containing a small quantity of dried milk and egg• for what it 
6. Chase, Stuart, Democracy under Pressure (New York, Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1945) 41. 
7. Rorty, James, •Who's Who in the Drug Lobby,• Nation, Vol. 138, No. 
3581, February 21, 1934, 214. 
8. Chase, Stuart, Democracy under Pressure (New York, Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1945) 42. 
is -- at least for a dollar a can; a publishers' representative for a 
group of religious newspapers in the southeast which had a combined 
circulation of 300,000 and advertised, among other things, rejuvenators, 
was also secretary and general manager of the Institute of Medicine 
Manufacturers; a fifth lobbyist was a food broadcaster and publisher of 
a vitamin magazine who claimed that he spoke for Dr. Wiley, although 
Wiley's widow supported the Tugwell bill and USDA files contained no 
correspondence between this gentleman and Wiley.9 Of the three mem-
bars of the Board of Managers of the United Medicine Manufacturers, two 
bad had their products seized, and the product of the other would have 
10 been subject to seizure under the proposed law. 
According to Chase the drug people obtained the support of the 
newspapers; the canners 'delivered' the women's magazines.11 It is 
doubtful that 'delivery• was necessary. The newspapers' reaction indi-
cated their interest in patent-medicine advertising revenue, which may 
12 
have reached the •astonishing• figure of $400,000,000 annually, To 
Wall Street and the conservative press Tugwell appeared to be practically 
a cOIIIIlUilist -- •especially to those newspaper proprietors who feared that 
his proposal might cut into their revenues.• 13 The advertising people 
9. Rorty, ~ames, 'Who's Who in the Drug Lobby,• 213-13. 
10. Rorty, ~ames, •Who's Who in the Drug Lobby,• Nation, 214-15. 
11. Chase, Stuart, Democracy Jlll!!U Pressure, 42. 
12. Laski, Harold ~ ., The American Dem9cracy (New York, Viking 1948) OJ9, 
673; other estimates were lover, about 350 millions, Rosten, Leo C., The 
Washington Correspondents (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1937) 287. 
13. Allen, Frederick L., Since Yesterdgr (New York, Harper, 1940) 173; truth-
ful advertising would bring in as IIDlCh revenue as untruthful advertising, 
but some advertisers could not do business if they (con'd on page748.) 
748. 
made their attitude known to the various media in no uncertain terms. 
One spokesman for the advertising interests asserted that one could 
infer from Tugwell's text-book comments on advertising that he did not 
desire a better food and druga bill; he aimed to destroy advertising 
by a measure which would provide an entering wedge for other legisla-
tion arbitrarily and despotically ordering all economic and social 
activity through the dictates of a political bureaucracy.l4 
The fact that the food and drugs bill marked the first break 
between Roosevelt and the press indicated that opponents of the bill 
did not have to persuade the press to join them. A writer Who satir-
ized the Roosevelt administration underlined the predictability of 
press reaction to any measure affecting advertising: 
(Roosevelt is considering vote-getting measures.) 
Rexford 
I still think a bill to regulate food and drug advertising -
The Throng 
There he goesl Threatening our press relations againl15 
13. (continued from previous page) told the truth; Tugwell believed that 
the net effect would be to drive out the minority of quacks without 
hurting revenues in the long run. 
14• Groom, Williams., •Tugwell's Mischievous Idees about Advertising,• 
Printers' Ink, Vol. 166, No. 9, 36. 
15. Wolf, Hoverd, Greener Pastures: !. New Deal Fable (Caldwell, Idaho, 
Ce:z:ton, 1936) 72; e copy ot this book signed by the author is in the 
President's personal library, Hyde Park. 
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In 1933 the publishers had, in effect, voluntarily pledged non-
partisan support of measures designed to bring about a more equitable 
economic system, Now, the Hearst press, which had called for Roose-
velt's election, deserted him; Paul Block, an associate of Hearst, 
16 
raised the red flag in his papers against Tugwell, Fxe.nlt E. Gannett 
offered his chain of papers to drug manufacturers and advertising men 
for the free expression of their opiniona,l7 
The newspaper press fought the bill through its official coordi-
nsting organization, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, At 
the annual meeting of the Association in New York in May, 1934, Tugwell, 
who had spoken eloquently on the freedom of the press only two weeks 
earlier to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, was the personal 
target for most of the publishers' hard words and feelings. Lincoln B. 
Palmer, general IIISnsger of the ANPA referred to the anti-advertising 
views of qany administration officials end reviewed the fight of the 
Association against the clauses on advertising in the proposed bill. 
Because of the Association's fight the modified and amended bill was now 
•reasonably satisfsctory.• 18 
In July, 1934, the •slick• magazine press, through its organize-
tion, the National Publishers' Association, issued a statement concern-
ing its lobbying activities• 
This has been a most unusual year in the publishing field 
and the National Publishers' Association has due cause to 
16. Seldes, George, You Cen't Do That (New York, Modern Age Books, 1938) 
91. 
17. Seldes, George, Lords of the Press (New York, Julian Messner, 1938) 212. 
18. Time Magazine, Vol. 23, No. 19, May 7, 1934, 50. 
be proud of its operations during the year in the 
interests of the entire publishing industry.l9 
••• 
As originally proposed this legislation would have 
been a serious blow to all advertising. Your cam• 
mittee and executives were ~bnally successful in 
modifying this legislation. 
The food and drugs lobby also devoted large sums of money to 
21 influencing Congressmen. There were many avenues of approach to tae 
legislators. For example, J. Bruce Kremer, chief counsel for the Drug 
Institute, was a former Democratic National Committeeman from Montane 
and had important friends in the conservative wing of the party.22 The 
Congressional Record revealed the response to this pressure. A typical 
statement was Congressman Blanton's protest to the House that the food 
and drugs bill would close every country drug store in the United States.23 
No holds were barred in the tactics of the food and drugs lobby. 
Letters to the President, Farley, and Hugh Johnson included threats of 
political headache and defeat aside from the merit of the issues.24 The 
drug manufacturers demanded the dismissal for lobbying activities of the 
20. 
21. 
22. 
Seldes, George, One Thousand Years {New York, Boni and Gaer, 1947) 
62-63. 
Davis, Jerome, Capitalism~ Its Culture {New York, Farrar and 
Rinehart, 1935) 303. 
Seldea, George, You Can't Do That {New York, Modern Age Books, 1938) 
98. 
Editorial, •Poison versus Honesty,• Nation, Vol. lJ8, No. 3574, Janu-
ary 1, 1934, 6. 
Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 78, Part 7, April 
2J, 1934. 7166. 
Rorty, James,•Wbo's Who in the Drug Lobby,• 213. 
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chief of the Food and Drug Administration, Walter G. Campbell. Campo. 
bell had simply testified before a Senate committee at its request. 
The chief propoponant of dismissal vas a manufacturer of a home remedy 
supposed to "dissolve gallstonesJ• 25 The principal basic tactic, hov-
ever, was to blast Tugwell, who obliged the White House by fronting for 
the bill within the USDA.26 Opponents of the bill used the personal• 
attack approach of 19o6, substituting the name of Tugwell for Wiley.27 
The publishers and the advertising trade were •up and roaring; they 
made Tugwell a target from the minute he proposed the measure, and same 
28 
of the most powerful among them openly threatened to •cut him down.• 
They 
••• ascertained that the bill was sponsored by Rexford 
Tugwell; Tugwell was a •brain-truster•; brains were a 
dangerous ingredient in any government; hence the bill 
was un-American, revolutionary, bolshevistic, and to be 
reviled by all good 200% Americans.29 
Regarding the merits of the legislation itself, the press did 
not •even attempt to tell the truth about the fight of Mr. Rexford Tug-
well ••• against the gross and deliilerate frauds practiced on the public 
by the vendors of patent medicines.•3° Leo Rosten has revealed misrepre-
25. Shannon, Fred A., America'! Economic Groytb, 3d ed, (Nev York, Mac-
millan. 1951) 799-800, 
26. Lord, Russell. The Wallaces S!f. ~(Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
345-46. 
27. Lamb, Ruth deF., American Chaaber of Horrors ( Nev York, Farrar and 
Rinehart, 1936) 90. 
28. Lord, .Russell, !J!!l Wallace• S!f. lru!l.• 346, 
29· Shannon, Fred A., America's EconO!!liC Growth, 799. 
30· Laski, Harold J •• The American De1110cracy (Nev York, Viking, 1948) 
673· 
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sentation of the food and drugs bill in the press in a study of Wash• 
ington correspondents; he received a grant for this study from the 
Social Science Research Council,3l He found that the press treated 
the bill with •extraordinary delicacy, and eight separate Washington 
correspondents stated that they 'wrote around' the story or ignored it• 
because of the intense opposition of their publishers to the measure,32 
Many publishers were so aroused by the threat to their revenue that 
they would not print such unmistakable news as Mrs. Roosevelt's endorse• 
ment of the bill,33 
The most significant revelation in Rosten's study of press 
treatment of the food and drugs bill was the response of one hundred 
and seven correspondents to this statement: "'Most papers printed unfair 
or distorted stories about the Tugwell Pure Foods Bill"• 
Agreed 
Disagreed 
Uncertain 
No Answer 
Correspondents 
49 
23 
34 
1 
Percentage 
The percentage of correspondents agreeing in this case ran far ahead of 
the percentage accepting statements reflecting on the impartiality of 
the press with regard to other matters, Rosten concluded that the 
"famed objectivity of the press ••• is open to serious challenge.•34 
Tugwell was aware that the bill would meet with intense opposition. 
31. Rosten, Leo c., !h! Washi¥1;on Correspondents (New York, Harcou:rt. 
Brace, 1937). 
32. Rosten, Leo C., The WashinatOP Correspondents, 229. 
33. Rosten, Leo C., The Washington Correspopdente, 287 • 
34• Rosten, Leo C., I,h! Washington Correspondents, 217-18, 
753· 
F. J. Schlink of Consumers' Research warned Tugwell that the facts 
would not reach the public because the press would ignore the story 
or play it down. Schlink sugges~ed: 
If you really want a revision to have a chance you 
should spend six months ot5intensive publicity in educating the public •••• 3 
By the end of the year Tugwell had voluminous evidence attesting 
Schlink's foresight. In December, 1933, a writer, Frederick Painton. 
wrote Tugwell: 
I tried to sell the •meriqan on a 'story on your food 
and drugs act, but the suggestion was politely ignored. 
I can't imagine why save for the advertising threat.36 
Late in 1933 Tugwell wrote several articles on the bill. He 
discussed in detail the problems involved, but he made only brief ref• 
erences to the opposition. He was aware of the rife adverse propaganda 
and predicted that it would increase before Congress met in January. 
The food and drugs lobby, he stated, would spare neither time nor 
money.37 In February, 19.34. Tugwell estimated that the drugs orpniza• 
tions had distributed •tons of propapnda •• 38 
The effects of the food and drugs lobby's activities were devas-
tating both with reprd to the bill and Tugwall's reputation. No food 
and drugs legislation was enacted until 1938. The anti-Tugwell attack 
37· 
38. 
Letter, May 26, 1933, Tue:wll Papers, 
Letter, December 16, 1933, Tugwell Papers; Collier's, which was a 
leader in the fight for the food and drugs lav of 19o6 published 
no articles on the subject in the 1930s. 
Tugwell. R, G., "Freedom froa Fakes,• Today, November 17, 1933• 97; 
•The Great American Fraud,• The •mericap Scholar, Vol. 3. No. 1. 
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stemming from this matter was the single most effectiTe development, 
in e way adTerse to his standing in public opinion, relating to his 
whipping-boy function. Patriotic societies, Tillage chambers of caa• 
merce, and public men of high and low degree expressed their opposi-
tion to the bill.39 The conserYatiTe press blamed Tugwell for quar• 
reling with eTerybody he should haTe cooperated with and forproTokin& 
so much bitterness that no law on the subject had a chance, thus set• 
ting back the cause of pure food and drugs.4° The liberal press 
accused the administration of backing down again and again before the 
opposition of press, radio, adTertiaing, and patent medicine and other 
manufacturing interests, and questioned whether •at any time these 
gestures Lin behalf of consu.erAi were seriously intended.•41 
To Stuart Chase the activities of the food and drugs lobby were 
the "baldest illustration of the Me Firat principle I know of.•42 The 
Pain and Beauty Boys did not want to kill people; but they were •norm-
ally in a hurr,r.•43 (Paaeage of the Tugwell bill would han preTented 
the tragedy of the sulfanilimide deaths of 1937~ The highly organized. 
well financed, ruthless effort to discredit Tugwell, and thereby dis• 
credit the bill. was successful. Tugwell has obaerYed, "They set out 
39· 
40. 
41. 
42· 
43· 
Shannon, Fred A., America's Ecopapic Groythe 800. 
Johnston, Al TS, •Tugwell, the President's Ides Mane • SaturciaY ~­
ill&~. Vol. 209, No. 5, August 1 1 1936, 8; it can be argued that 
legislation would not haYS baen forthcoming as early as 1938 without 
Tugwell's efforts. 
Editorial, "AdTertising as Usual," Nation, Vol. 139, No. 3600. July 
4. 1';134. 5. 
Chase • Stuart, !lemocracy 11pder Pressure. 42. 
Chase, Stuart, DemocraCY under Pressure, 41. 
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to discredit me with the ~rican people and they succeeded.•44 The 
common version which read thet Tugwell irked Roosevelt by originating 
the bill and provoking press opposition was inaccurate. Roosevelt 
requested that Tugwell sponsor the bill -- •To understand that all you 
have to do is look at Teddy's adainistration.•45 The end result vas 
the creation of the stereotype, which bas persisted in the public mind, 
of Tugwell as "Rex the Red.• 
The Attack and Its Impact 
General 
Tha reasons for Tugwell's becoming the whipping boy of Roose• 
velt's first administration have been considered. It remains only to 
sample some couments on his whipping•boy function to see that those 
reasons resulted in a verbal eruption. If Roosevelt's advisers provided 
targets for violent obloquy and disparagement, the "bullseye of the lot• 
l 
was Tugwell. He became a synonym for everything in the New Deal that 
2 the anti-Roosevelt forces disliked. No man in public life aroused 
more criticism or more praise.3 
At times the attack on Tugwell reflected what was virtually a 
phobia or histeria. ~trong men. presumably in their right minds, saw a 
sinister threat to the American system if Tugwell said. in effect, that 
44. Interview yith writer. 
45• Interview~ writer. 
1. Phillips, Cabel, •The New Dealers- Where Are They Now?.• The New 
~Times Magazine, September 29. 1946, 52. 
2. •EXit Brain Trust,• Literary Digest, November 28. 1936, 6. 
3• Gillis, A. and Ketchum, R., .Q!u: America (Boston, Little, Brown, 1936) 
359. 
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he would like to see every American have a •safe job, his family in 
comfort or security, his own home or farm, gadgets, protection in old 
age, his children get as much education as they can take, good govern-
ment, freedom from oppression and fear of the future.• When HOOTer 
voiced such sentiments, as he did on April 4, 19}6, in the quotation 
just above, no one saw a threat to the American system.4 
Manifestations of an amazing furor over Tugwell appeared through-
out the nation. Chicago formed an anti -Tugwell club; n.t. Wichita Beacon 
warned parents not to let children see his books; the members of a 
church in Oregon petitioned Roosevelt to dismiss Tugwell because of the 
way in which he had written about American wines.5 Foreign studies of 
Tugwell were generally calmer than American appraisals,6 but undoubtedly 
a distorted picture of Tugwell reached other countries. When introduced 
to Tugwell at a social gathering, Takami Miura, a Japanese opera star, 
said, •Not the man who knows everything in the world?" 7 
1934 
The general attack on occasion focused on specific developments, 
each indicating the undiminished determination of the opposition to •get• 
Tugwell. In the spring of 1934 Dr. William A. Wirt, Superintendent of 
4. Lindley, Ernest K., HalfwaY x!1h Roosevelt (New York, Viking, 1937) 
359. 5. Lord, Russell, The Wallaces !If. 12!!1. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
42-43· 
6. Chalufour, A. and Desternee, s., •Deux Theoricians de le Crise Ameri• 
caine, Rexford Tugwe.ll at A. Berle,• Revue des Sciences Politiques, 
April, 1934, 221•25. 
7. Lombard, Helen, Washington Waltz (New York, Knopf, 1941) 186. 
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Schools in Gary, Indiana, made his fBIIOUs charge the t Tugwell was the 
real leader of a reYolution in American government.1 In June, 1934, 
hearings on Tugwell's promotion to UDder Secretary proYided an oppor• 
2 tunity for a reYiYSl of all previous charges. 
The elections of 1934 found Tugwell in Europe, a coincidence 
which same critics considered the result of an administration scheme 
to aYoid criticism,3 Tugwell reportedly planned to make a speaking 
tour of the West in the summer, beginning with addresses to the Iowa 
Bankers' Association in Des Moines and to a group of farmers in Brook-
ings, South Dskota.4 He cancelled a scheduled speech before the Caa-
liiOnvealth Club of Sen Francisco,5 and the western tour was cut short 
in July. At the end of July he made a radio speech attacking the foes 
of the New Dea1.6 At the beginning of August he addressed the Niagara 
County Pioneers Association in New York state,7 After conferring with 
the President in early September,8 Tugwell departed later that month to 
9 
attend a meeting of the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome. 
1. 
2. 
3· 
a. 
See below, Chapter XII. 
See above, Chapter X, Section, •Promotion,• 
Johnston, Alya, "Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Saturday 
Eyening Post, Vol. 209, No. 5, August 1, 1936, 8-9. 
The New X2J:11; Times, June 24 and June 28. 
The New~ Times, July 15, 1934, 20:1. 
The New York Ti!!!es, August 1, 1934, 8:4. 
Tugwell, R. G,, Address, Niagara County Pioneers Association, 
Olcott Beach, New York, August 8, 1934; USDA fi!.u Release. 
Til& New ~ Ti!l!8s, September 1, 1:2. 
~ Mai!!!.Zine, Vol. 24, No. 13, September 24, 1934, 55· 
7)8. 
ly the end of September Tugwell vas in England.10 In early Octo-
ber he was in France.11 During the remainder of October he was received 
by Mussolini, delivered an address to the International Institute of 
Agriculture in Rome, met Ambassador Dodd at Kostanz, Germany, and visi• 
12 ted Geneva on his way to Paris. In early November Tugwell visited the 
Ministry of Agriculture of the Irish Free State.13 The tour kept Tugwell 
out of the United States during the closing months of the campaign and 
through the elections. 
A Republican remarked in August, 1934, •Let us demand a cracking 
down on the Tugwells and their mny hare-brained expariments•14 •• a com-
ment which typified the opposition's line of attack as the campaign @Pt 
underway. Moreover, according to one account, the reaction of farmers 
to Tugwell's talks was unfavorable; Congressmen complained to Farley, 
the outcome being Tugwell's trip overseas,15 
Tugwell's Secretary Paul Appleby, on the other hand, stated to 
10. Letter, Tugwell to Mirgaret (Missy) LeHand, September 25, 19341 
Tugwell wrote •I have had a week looking at English farming. Tell 
the President the celebrated English housing scheme is making tae 
whole damn country look like Philadelphia,• 
11. TI.mtl. Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 13, :leptember 24, 1934, 55· 
12. ~ ~lQtk Times, October 23, 6:3; October 25, 14:2; October 30, 
1:2; Dodd, W. E., A4miral Dodd 11 ~. 1933 - 1938, ed, by W. E. 
Dodd, J'r. and Marthe Dodd (New York, Harcourt, 1941) 181. 
13. The New I2tls Ti!!!!s, Nov8111ber 7, 28:6. 
14• Bacon, Gespar, Address, Lincoln Club of Cumberland County, Maine, 
August 21, 1934; in Individual Rights ~ !S§ Public Welfare 
(Boston, Privately Printed, 1935) 263. 
15. Michael, George, Handout (New York, G. P, Putnam's, 1935) 171. 
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reporters on board ship just before he sailed to Europe with Tugwell, 
that neither the President nor Wallace had pushed the trip to Europe. 
Appleby stated the trip waa not Nev Deal stuff, but was in the inter-
ests of scientific agriculture.16 Documentary evidence discloses 
that Tugwell had displayed a deep concern with the renewal of American 
participation in the I.I.A. when there had been no concern vita elec• 
tions.17 Maley referred in his book to Tugwell's early deep interest 
in the international aspects of a program for agriculture.18 
Tugwell obviously was a leading object of Republican attacks st 
the outset of the campaign in 1934· At the same time he had a genuine 
interest in the I.I.A. It appears that a combination of these tvo 
factors resulted in his European tour. It does not appear that the ad• 
ministration pressed the issue in 1934· The events of 1936 were another 
story. 
1936 
Ickes recorded in his diary on May 9. 1936, that Farley had told 
him the day before that the tvo points of greatest attack by the Repub• 
1 licans in the coming campaign would be the W.P.A. and Tugwell. On May 
16. 
17. 
18. 
l. 
~Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 13, September 24, 1934, 55· 
Letter to Congressman Joseph Byrns, January 18, 1933; letter from 
Congressman Joseph Byrns, January 19, 1933; these letters concerned 
an appropriation for the I.I.A. in the State Department budget; Tug-
well Papers. 
Mo1ey, Raymond, After SeTen Years (New York, Harper, 1939) 124n. 
Ickes, Harold L., The Secret Diary of Harold 1· Ickes: ~ .Qn!. The 
First Thousand ~. 1933 - 1936 (Nev York, Simon and Schuster, 1953) 
sao. 
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24 the press reported that Tugwell intended to stump the nation tor 
the Democrats in the presidential camps1gn.2 It turned out that 
Farley was right. In party councils his prediction outweighed Tug-
well's intentions. 
As early as March RepresentatiYe Fish attacked Tugwell,3 In 
the next month the publisher, Bernarr MacFadden, critici~ed Tugwell's 
economic theories.4 The pace of the attack quickened as the campaign 
proper approached, In September nevspapermen Paul Block and William 
R. Hearst cited Tugwell's •subYersiYB' doctrines,5 Representative Fish 
again Yoiced his opposition,6 and George Peek critici~ed his toe of 
old,7 In the early part ot October Republican national headquarters 
protested Roosevelt's retention of Tugwell in the government.8 In the 
middle of October the Republican National Committee renewed Wirt 1s 
charges, issuing a statement that Roosevelt was the Kerensky of the 
American revolution which would destroy the capitalistic system under 
the leadership of Tugwell, Frankfurter, and E~ekiel. 9 Near the and of 
October Alfred E. Smith and Alfred Landon condemned Tugwell's ideas on 
10 
economic planning; Smith repeated this view in early November. 
2. The New XQrt Tips, 26:1, 
3• 1!1!!. lW! ~ ~. March 7, 5:6. 
4• 1!1!!. New I2l:l& Times, April 9, 9:1. 
5• The lW! I2l:l& Times, September 8, 4:2; September 21, 1:4• 
6, The New York Times, ~ptember 24, 9:2. 
7. The lW! l2l:!> !1!!!!§., September 29, 23:1. 
8. The New I2.U Times, October 1, 17:4. 
9· Smith, Charles w., Jr., Public Opinion in .!l Democracy (New York, 
Prentice-Hell, 1939) 182. 
10. The lW! l2Ill; Ti!!!!!s, October 25, 1:6; October 27, 20:2; November l, 
45:3, e. 
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Farley has recalled the Republican strategy of 1936. The opposi-
tion varied the monotony of campaigning with a unique slogan Which, 
when paraphrased, read •Turn the Professors out ,• They used Tugwell as 
a symbol. They described him as the leader of a cabal of dre~ intel• 
lectuals who had taken actual control of government policy away from 
the President. At the same time G,o.P. literature referred to Farley 
as the •spoilsman• who had tastened "Farleyism• on the nation to suit 
the desires of an ambitious President. •rt was a paradoxical picture 
which never failed to charm those who drew it,•11 
Farley was, of course, indispensable for campaign purposes. Tug-
well was not. In the fall of 1936 Farley told Roosevelt that Hopkins 
and Tugwell should not be used in the campaign. •r agree thoroughly,• 
replied Roosevelt. •I•m going to take steps to eliminate criticism in 
12 the future.• Since he had become a target for the opposition, the 
party campaign people kept Tugwell strictly under wreps.13 To Tugwell 
the request that he remain silent was just about the last straw.14 
The Resettlement Administration 
A complicating factor in any consideration of Tugwell's activities 
in government is the overlapping and interaction of criticism aimed at 
11. 
12. 
13· 
Farley, James A., Behind the Ballots (New York, Harcourt, 1938) 219. 
Farley, James A., Jim Farler's Stou (New York, Whittlesey, 1948) 57• 
Gosnell, Harold F., Champion Campaigner: Franklin £. Roosevelt (New 
York, Macmillan, 1952) 160, 
See above, Chapter X, Section, •Resignation.• 
the whipping boy and criticism of the agency Which he headed. Two 
students of public administration distinguished general criticism 
of Tugwell from criticism of him as the head of an operating agency. 
They commented that the criticism of Tugwell for his •presumed gen•, 
eral political views inevitably was a factor affecting attitudes con• 
earning the RA, which was also, of course, the subject of attack for 
1 its own actions and policies.• 
Undoubtedly the public did not readily distinguish between the 
two types of attacks, so that the case for the RA could not generally 
receive fair judgment. Supporters of the RA felt that the President 
lost interest in the agency and its plans because it bad become a poli• 
tical liability through misrepresentation growing out of the attack on 
Tugwell.2 It was difficult because of Tugwell's whipping-boy role to 
arrive at an accurate evaluation of any undertaking with which he was 
associated by depending solely on press comments. 
Refutations 
Dissenters in the Press 
The press attitude toward Tugwell was not a unanimously unfavor-
1. Gaus, John M. and Wolcott, Leon c., Public Administration and the 
United States Department .2f. Mrieplture (Chicago, Published for 
the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Re• 
search Council by Public Administration Service, 1940) 241-42n. 
2. Editorial, •Tugwell to the Wolves?•, ~Republic, Vol. 85, No. 
1099, December 25, 1935. 187. 
able one. Favorable cOIIIDents were rare. This rarity of favorable 
comment did not necessarily reflect the personal opinions of many 
journalists, J, Fred Essary of the Baltimore~ confessed that the 
professors in government who had been subjected to a merciless attack 
in the press were "intelligent and decent citizens•; Essary was •really 
1 a little ashamed at some of the derisive matter written about them.• 
Essary's remark implied, of course, that many journalists who attacked 
Tugwell in accordance with the editorial policies of their respective 
papers did not personally believe what they wrote. The personal be-
liefs of journalists, if unpublished, provided little consolation for 
Tugwell. Editor~ Publisher did deserYe credit for at least publish-
ing the article containing Essary's statement. 
Sherwood Anderson, the novelist, wrote that he liked to talk 
about a man like Tugwell as a mind. He had no interest in the clothes 
Tugwell wore, what kind of cigars he smoked, his age, height, color of 
hair and eyes. Did Tugwell have, sa those who knew him said he did, a 
dispassionate interest in work, the scientist's attitude?2 A writer in 
a business journal seconded Anderson's plea that people refrain from 
accepting opinions of Tugwell based on hearsay. This observer was con-
vinced after trips to various parts of the nation and several visits to 
washington that practical businessmen accepted generalized, prejudiced 
estimates of Moley, Tugwell, and Berle without •a moment's consideration 
1. Mann, Robert s., •Capital Corps No Propaganda Victim,• Editor and 
Publisher, January 4, 1936, 3· 
2. Anderson, Sherwood, •Give Rex Tugwell a Chance,• magazine clipping, 
Tugwell Papers. 
or analysis• of the true facts,3 
"Fight the Tugwell Bill• in the National Printer Journalist, 
January, 1934, was typical of the editorials appearing in trade journ-
als. However, in fairness to the advertising trade, one must mention 
an editorial in Advertising and Selling of November, 1933• This edi• 
torial dismissed fears of oppressive regulation and catastrophe for 
ninety per cent of all advertising as fanciful, cited undeniable abuses, 
and suggested that protesters transfer their energy to wise amendments 
of inevitable legialation,4 These examples of support for Tugwell or 
his bill were few, Among prominent newspaper columnists only Drew 
Pearson and Robert s. Allen supported the bill. Any support Tugwell 
enjoyed in the newspaper press liBS on an individual besis; no important 
newspaper backed him editorially, 
Tugwell's Friends and Co-Workers 
People who worked with Tugwell or were acquainted with him com• 
mented on the picture which the press presented, They saw no similarity 
between the man they read about and the man they knew, Russell Lord 
recalled: 
4. 
l. 
••• the opposition papers smacked the red tag on him, 
and created around that tag an almost completely ficti-
tious character, vain, intellectually arrogant, imprac-
tical, dangerous, but - paradoxically - utterly inef-
fective. That was their story then and they stick to it 
now and print almost anything which lends credence to 
this false likeness of their own creation,l 
McCall, c. H., •That Columbia Crowd,• Credit and Financial Manage• 
ment, Vol. 35, No. 6, June, 1933, 16-17• 
~rtising and Selling, Noyember 9, 1933· 
Lord, Russell, •Governor Rex of Puerto Rico,• Coumon ~. Vol. 11, 
No.7, July, 1942• 224. 
4im Farley commented, "In view of the real situation, I think that the 
abuse heaped on him vas too raw and uncalled for.• 2 Raymond Moley des-
cribed Tugwell's three and a half years of service in Washington as 
years •of fame, of bitter and unmerited criticism, and of courageous 
and intelligent thinking.•3 At a press conference Henry Wallace 
scolded the reporters• •You may not realize it, and some of you ap-
parently do not, but you are insisting on erecting a ~thical man. Dr, 
Tugwell has an excellent scientific and agricultural background. He 
has worked very closely with bureau chiefs.•4 Louis Hacker, who knew 
Tugwell as a colleague at Columbia, wrote that •the Assistant Secretary 
of Agriculture was made the victim of a good deal of open misrepresen• 
tation and covert abuse,•5 
On the House floor Maury Maverick of Texas declared that •the 
nation bas been washed with a billion barrels of bilge about 'Tugwel-
lien philosophy' from critics who know nothing of Tugwell.• The critics, 
Maverick continued, had only words end resorted to personalities. Mev-
erick related that he had spent ten days with Tugwell in 1935 on a trip 
in Texas and Mexico. He found that the Under Secretary could bota take 
6 it and dish it out and that "he talks the American language.• 
2. Farley, James A., Behind the Ballots (New York, Harcourt, 1938) 219. 
3• Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years (New York, Harper, 1939) 124n. 
4. Lord, Russell, :!'!!.!!.Wallace& of .!2Jm (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
406. 
5. Louis M. Hacker, A Short History of ~New Deal (New York, F. s. 
Crofts, 1936) 108. 
6, Congressional Record, 74 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 80, Part 4, March 
19, 1935· 4o68. 
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In the 1940s sn incident in personal relations pointed up the 
contrast between the Tugwell of press accounts and the man himself. 
In 1941 Senator Taft made a speech against the confirmation of Tugwell 
ss Governor of Puerto Rico, Taft did not expect to prevent the appoint-
ment; he only wanted to discredit another Roosevelt appointee, Same-
time afterwards Taft had occasion to discuss Puerto Rican problems with 
Tugwell. •Mr. Taft,• Tugwell noted, •would be a little embarrassed, I 
think, when he became acquainted with me later, about this unimformed 
diatribe. And certainly he would turn out to be a useful friend in the 
exigency of the blocksde,•7 
In 1946 Sumner Welles prefaced a review of Tugwell's book The 
Stricken laD£ with these comments: 
••• no member of President Roosevelt's earlier Admini-
stration was more bitterly derided and more unjustly 
pilloried as a strange amalgam of a Fascist, a Communist, 
and a menace to the liberties of the American people than 
Rexford Guy Tugwell. During the first years of the Roose• 
velt Administration be was selected as the chosen target 
for attack by every reactionary interest in the United 
States ••• as the symbol of what they most feared in the 
original New Deal: a philosophy of government based upon 
the fundamental American principle, •Justice for all, 
special privilege for none.• 
Those of his fellow citizens • and I fear there are many 
of them • who, as a result or one of the most vicious and 
effective campaigns of character assassination in history, 
have been deluded into believing that Rex Tugwell was a 
Communist or an authoritarian bent upon depriving them of 
their rights and liberties, and who are willing to read 
this book with an open mind, wgll find conclusive proof 
to the contrary on every page. 
7, Tugwell, R, G,, :rJa Stricken~ (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 142-43• 
8, Welles, SUmner, review of ru Stricken~. Saturday Review 2f. Lit• 
e;ature, Vol, 29, No, 52, December 28, 1946, 9• 
All of the statements by Tugwell's acquaintances suggest that one must 
go beyond and beneath press accounts to discover what kind of man Tug-
well really was and what he believed. 
Tugwell's Reaction 
Tugwell's own reaction to criticism by the press appears to have 
passed from sensitiveness to insensitiveness. At the beginning of his 
career in Washington he may have been •sensitively thin-skinned,• 1 and 
at a loss to know how to meet the Yerbal attack aimed at him.2 It vas 
reported that he had given up hope "that people who don't know me or 
anything about me will ever stop talking all-knowingly about me,•3 
Tugwell did not reveal his sensitiveness in public; he possessed 
sang-froid under fira.4 He did seek to avoid embarrassing the admini-
stration,5 later 
the less success 
recalling, 
I had.• 6 
•The 1110re pains I took to get out of trouble, 
Occasionally he appealed for fair jud~nt, 
urging his audience in a speech on the land program not to approve be-
causa •va mean well or our hearts are in the right place• and not to dis-
1, •Tugwell's Dream,• Neysvaak, Vol, 28, No. 1, July 1, 1946, 28. 
2, Farley, James A., Behind the Ballots (New York, Harcourt, 1938) 219. 
3· Block, M., Ed,, Current Biographx, 1941, (New York, H. w. Wilson, 
1941) 875· 
4, Gillis, A. and Ketchum, R., ~ Alerica (Boston, Little, Brown, 1936) 
364. 
5, Letter, Tugwell to s, Early, May 16, 1934, requesting that the Presi-
dent check Tugwell's draft of a speech to be delivered to the National 
Conference of Social Workers; Tugwell was willing, in any ease to 
assume full responsibility for the speech; Roosevelt Papers, 
6, Tugwell, R, G., The Stricken .I..!ula (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 347. 
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appro•e •on the ground that we are dangerous fellows,• He asked his 
listeners to judge the program by wnat it accomplished, not ~ what 
anybody hoped or feared it would accomplish.7 In an address to some 
newspaper editors he referred to distortion and cle•er selection, c~ 
menting, 'I may be old-fashioned, but I still think there is much to 
be said for intellectual honesty.• 8 
From time to time Tugwell struck out at his critics with denunci• 
ations of the extremes, left and right, He had long criticized doctri-
naira socialists vho •struggle against the introduction of petantly 
vise reforms on the ground that they simply mitigate the hard conditions 
of an essentially rotten system of capitalism.•9 As for the right, kis 
sarcasm vas cutting in this comment on laissez-faire doctrinaires: 
I imegine that among the cannibals there were many 
vho regarded any attempt to interfere with their diet 
as highly radical, immoral and certainly unconstitu-
tional. And I imagine that the tribal witch doctors 
occasionally arose and assured the cannibals that be• 
cause the missionary wanted them to cesse
1
aating each 
other, they were to perish of starvation. 
In his hardest-hitting political speech, perhaps injudiciously belliger• 
ent, Tugwell asserted that slight modifications of the system, the check-
e. 
10. 
Tugwell, R. G,, Address, Tompkins County De•elopment Meeting, Ithaca, 
Nev York, August 7, 19351 .Y§!;!4 ~Release, 7• 
Tugwell, R. G,, "The Return to Democracy,• American Society of Neva• 
paper Editors, A.pril 21, 1934; The Battle for Democracy, 199· 
Tugwell, R, G,, 'Chameleon Words,• New Hepublic, Vol, 48, No, 612, 
August 25, 1926, 17. 
Tugvell, R. G., Address, Democractic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935; Resettlement Administration Press !lelease, 8. 
ing of the most obvious abuses, and the abridgment of free enterprise 
and profits only in traditional American ways did not justify the claUn 
that the Administration had committed itself to complete communism: 
•This is an obviously false and vicious statement of the case •••• •11 
In the same speech he noted that part of the press was fair; the at-
tack by that part of it which was an accessory of privileged groups 
would •cost us only the receivers of unearned income, their hangers-on, 
and some Who confuse laissez-fairs with the Constitution.•12 
In time Tugwell became largely insensitive to verbal shafts 
directed at him. He has described this inuring process: 
••• a certain numbness and cynicism about it all ••• 
would develop in me but ••• in Mr. Roosevelt, with 
fer greater provocation, would gain no foothold. ~ 
capacity for indignation would die down, much I ime• 
gine, as does systematic reaction to a drug, I would 
be educated by experience,l3 
Some of Tugwell's developing cynicism revealed itself in a complaint to 
the president-publisher of the ~York Times. Tugwell noted the short• 
comings in the corrections of a misleading story on the RA. He concluded, 
•However, you have gone further to correct an injustice than I perhaps 
had any right to expect, the world being what it is. I appreciate it and 
I thank you •• 14 
11. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, 1•2. 
12. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, 5. 
13. Tugwell, R, G., •The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol, 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 152. 
14. Letter, Tugwell to Arthur Hayes Sulzberger, Publisher of The New 
~Times, November 27, 1936; Roosevelt Papers. 
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Insensitiveness produced in Tugwell not only cynicism, but also 
something of a humorous approach to the situation, In June, 1936, ~ 
reported that Tugwell spent half an hour skipping stones at Edenton, 
North Carolina. remarking •rr a fellow could do this every day, he could 
soon forget Frank Kent and Dave Lavrence•15 -- rivals among columnists 
for the title of number-one critic of Tugwell. (Moley also found Kent's 
colUIIIIUI in the Baltimore Sun irritating when they described him as a 
lionized diner-out When he was working night and dsy,16) An earlier 
incident shoved a light-hearted reaction to the press caricatures which 
poked fun at Tugwell for his immaculate attire. Moley wrote in a letter 
that he (Moley) would pay Tugwell's hotel bill, in connection with a 
dinner in New York, to avoid bookkeeping complications and valet charges; 
"I vent to contribute to the good reputation of the Brain Trust for 
marked appsrel.• 17 Rugvell replied, •I could not think or letting you 
in on the responsibility for the sartorial effects of the Brain Trust. 
After all, I must have same distinction.• 18 
In his role as whipping boy, Tugwell considered the sources of 
the attack. His explanations of his detractors' motivations shoved that 
he could account for their activities. Understanding obviously did not 
mean approval; it undoubtedly contributed to Tugwell's ability to ride 
out the storm. 
15, Time Magazine, Vol. 27, No, 25, June 22, 1936, 38. 
16. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years (New York, Harper, 1929) 170. 
17. February 2, 1935' Tugwell Papers. 
18. February 2, 1935; Tugwell Papers. 
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The single most important source of opposition he placed under 
the general classification of 'business,• and for this enmity he offered 
an interesting psychological explanation. There was no economic basis 
for the attitude of business. It had really been favored and rehabili• 
tated to restore national confidence: profits rose faster under the 
New Deal than either wages or farmers• incomes,19 The relief program, 
in doing for the newly underprivileged what business had a contract 
with society to do,20 provided purchasing power to relieve business of 
its piled-up goods. Yet, business men •arranged to be told daily how 
21 badly they were treated." Busin~ss men's protests did not begin at 
22 
once. They were grateful for the moment, It was only with recovery 
that they began their repeated propaganda strokes.23 Tugwell considered 
their attack compensation for a loss of prestige, 
Roosevelt did not contemplate any conflict between government 
and business; any suggestion to him of an equality of historical forces 
met with rebuke. •To him, government was something sacred and business 
was merely one occupation among others,• deserving no special protection 
or privilege.24 The favoring of business was •not done in an atmosphere 
of adulation, but in one of reproof or of coolish tolerance.• 25 In view 
19. Tugwell, R. G,, •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, June, 1951, 302. 
20. Tugwell, R, G., 'After the New Deal: •we Have Bought Ourselves Time 
to Think•,• ~Republic, Vol, 99, No, 1286, July 26, 1939, 323. 
21. Tugwell, R. G. I •After the New Deal,• 323. 
22. Tugwell, R. G.' •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
23. Tugwell, R, G., "The Preparation of a President,• 151. 
24. Tugwell, R, G., •The New Deal• The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
25. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
302. 
301. 
302. 
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of their previous dominance in Washington under Harding, Coolidge, and 
Hoover, business men interpreted their new status of equality as not 
only a demotion, but outright persecution, Because they had lost face, 
they snarled at Roosevelt until he died,26 
A critic of Tugwell asserted that the government had an enormous 
advantage over the most powerful business interests in facilities for 
propaganda.27 Tugwell pointed out the responsive chords in American 
society which business could strike, He maintained that few Americans 
had Roosevelt's detachment about business, which to many represented the 
source of all good things: jobs for workers, foods for consumers. taxes 
for government, advertising for newspapers, campaign contributions for 
legislators, and donations for churches and universities.28 Whatever 
there was of a propaganda war found business, with its advantages, vie• 
torious. Certainly business won in the case of Tugwell, whom the admini-
stration considered a political liability by 1936, Although Roosevelt 
agreed to keep Tugwell out of the campaign in 1936, by then the President 
•would at last recognize something of the implacability in the enmity he 
would face, an enmity far worse• -- end here Tugwell completed his psy-
ehological analysis -- •because he would be recognized secretly es the 
true, the curative friend.•29 
26, Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Pert I, 
302. 
27, Mitchell, James G,, "The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust' 
and Its Many Manifestations,• ~Annalist, Vol. 43, No. 115, June 1, 
1934· 847-48. 
28, Tugwell, R, G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
301. 
29, Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• 151. 
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As for the newspapermen who reduced the anti-administration view• 
point to the printed word, Tugwell was aware of their problems. He 
knew that for purposes of communication they had to hang a program on an 
individual.30 They had to use labels.31 In his own case, he understood 
the difficulties involved in using labels which would simply denote his 
sophisticated thought: 
Adolf Berle and I - I more than he - have, in the course 
of years, been called some harsh names: Reds, Communists, 
Socialists, Anarchists, and even on occasion, Fascists. 
Perhaps the only label which would have been at all accur-
ate would have been Collectivist, although if we were to 
accept it, we should have to insist on its dictionary defi-
nition rather than the one which was intended by those who 
flung it at us.32 
Within the general category of business the drug interests, and 
the media in which they advertised, had the most obvious reasons for 
seeking to discredit Tugwell. He knew that many advertising men were 
aware that he had had no more to do with the Food end Drugs Bill than 
some others. They called the measure the Tugwell Bill because they wanted 
a •red label• on it; they knew an underground, personal attack was more 
interesting to people and more potent than the public argument.33 Tugwell 
noted that •no enterprise had got so poor• that it had to get rid of high-
30• 
31. 
32. 
33· 
Tugwell, R. G., •A Fireside Symposium,• Columbia University Quarterlv, 
Vol. 27, No. 1, March, 1935, 22, 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, "The Return to Democracy•; in~ Battle for 
Democracy, 199• 
Tugwell, R. G,, "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 3· 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, •A New-Deal for the Consumer,• Columbia Alumni 
Luncheon, New York, February 12, 1934; USDA Press Release, 5. 
pressure advertisers and salesmen or Washington lobbyists; lobbyists 
who had to justify their employment thus had •a professional as well 
as economic reason for making war on newcomers• like Tugwell,34 
Finally, in his survey of the opposition, Tugwell had something 
to say about the politicians' stake in propaganda: 
There is an immemorial struggle among ••• politicians 
••• to attain credit for giving advantages to those 
who can make private use of them. It is necessary to 
do this and still maintain a reputation for public 
service, except when utter cynicism will go unpunished. 
And it is sometimes, though not often, possible. In 
this struggle a favorite weapon is the representation 
of an opponent as the ene~ of one after another of 
these private individuals and groups until the total 
disaffection is sufficient to discredit him.35 
The opposition was sufficiently motivated and skillful to mount 
a formidable attack against Tugwell. Neither he nor the President ever 
contemplated meeting the onslaught with the dictatorial methods the 
press attributed to them. Tugwell regretted what he considered abuses 
of freedom of the press, but believed they did not warrant interference 
with thet sacred right,36 He sympathized with Roosevelt's scrupulous 
determination to adhere to the letter of civil liberty himBelf despite 
the daily violation of its spirit by those strong groups who controlled 
the avenues to public opinion. "And yet this very nicety made necessary 
a longer and more wearing fight.•37 On perhaps the single most signifi• 
Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 22. 
Tugwell, R, G., •Implementing the General Interest,• Public Admini• 
stration Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Autumn, 1940, 48. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, •The Return to Democracy,• 194·207, 
Tugwell, R. G., •Must We Draft Roosevelt?•, New Republic, Vol. 102, 
No. 1328, May 13, 1940, 630. 
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cant test of totalitarian sims, the accusations against Tugwell did 
not hold water regarding either his actions or his beliefs, 
Tugwell was not only aware of his foes' relation to his whipping-
boy status; he was also aware of the impact on his friends, In retro-
spect he explained the President's position in the metter: 
If you took one of these jobs, you went out end did whet 
you could to establish an institution in whose purpose 
you presumably believed. If you got into trouble with 
vested interests, ran counter to the purposes of other, 
competing institutions, or threatened someone else's pri-
vileges or prestige, it was your battle and you were 
expected to fight it. If you ran to the President with 
your troubles he was affable and even, sometimes vaguely 
encouraging, but he never said a public word in support, 
If the thing was creditable, he, alo!!f!,With you, profited; 
but if it was not, the penalties were all your own, 
If this made you indignant, and it practically always did, 
there was nothing you could do and, when you thought it 
over, nothing of any use you could say. The President was 
not a person; he was an institution. When he took poli-
tical chances, he jeopardized not himself but the whole New 
Deal. And the New Deal could not afford to be responsible 
for practitioners who threatened its life - that is, who 
might lose it votes. Principles or persons were never im-
portant enough to stake election success or failure on. 
And judgment as to whether votes were actually involved was 
one which the President made in the recesses of his gwn 
considering apparatus which no one ever penetrated,3 
The fact that Roosevelt appreciated Tugwell's taking verbal blows with• 
out complaint attests to the validity of this later comment; the Presi• 
dent was aware that his silence often placed a burden on his sdministra-
tors. 
His thoughts in September, 1939, when he desired to do something 
in public service as international relations deteriorated into war, indi· 
38. Tugwell, R. G. and Banfield, E. c., •·Gress Roots Democracy • Myth or 
Reality?•, Public Administration Review, Winter, 1950, 47. 
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cated Tugwell's understanding of the effect of his having been a cause 
celebre on his friends below the level of the presidency. Maybe, he 
reasoned 
••• my friends in the Administration who protested their 
admiration for my courage but who would just as soon not 
be seen lunching with me at the Carlton or the Mayflower 
might have regained their courage or figured I was suffi-
ciently forgot to admit me again to respectable compsny.39 
The private support of people who preferred not to associate with him in 
public obviously did not win for them Tugwell's admiration. But on the 
whole his fairly matter-of•fact comment does not betray the bitterness 
such situations usually produce. Later, when Tugwell informed Mr. Truman 
that the new President might be embarrassed by the association of the 
former Brain Truster, as Governor of Puerto Rico, with the administration, 
the response was gratifying: 
Don't worry about your enemies. Everyone who is any good 
has them. And yours, besides,_ar~ all reactionaries •••• 
the ~ources o~ opposition to LYe~/ are well eno~n_known, 
it Lcauses m!/ no concern end it should cause LYo~ none,4° 
As it turned out, for various reasons Tugwell's connection with the 
Truman administration was a brief one, 
During the New Deal period Tugwell did make several attempts to 
promote a general understanding of his character and purposes. He wrote 
some syndicated articles for newspapers, being published in as many as 
fifteen. When he wrote about the Food and Drugs Bill, his outlets immedi• 
ately dropped to two. He then wrote two more articles, principally for 
his own a11111sement. They wre something between a Platonic dialogue and a 
39. Tugwell, R. G., Til!. Stricken Land, 62. 
40. Tugwell, R. G., ~ Stricken~. xviii. 
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satirical minstrel show, Tugwell acted as interlocutor, The chief 
characters were the western Senator Progressive and Beauregard Boone, 
a friendly publicist who instructed Tugwell in the attainment of popu-
larity.4l One of these articles summarized Tugwell's views on his whip-
ping-boy role: 
Beauregard Boone 
This guy L; columnis!/ goes the whole length this time. 
He's been working up to it for a good while. He comes 
right out now and puts his finger on you as the admini• 
stration radical. He says you're a Socialist, that you 
have designs on our American institutions - subversive 
ones - what I want to know is whether he's ever talked to 
you. 
Tugwell 
Once •••• Of course a man with his powers of divination 
doesn't need any more than that to go on, He reads 
people's minds from afar. If he really took the trouble 
to understand me he would be deprived of a lovely dummy, 
He gets a great kick out of standing me up and knocking 
me over. I don't see that it does much harm and it lets 
him work off a lot of spleen. 
Senator Progressive 
You never were a Socialist, were you? 
Beauregard Boone 
He's always been the ene~ of any 'ism.• He's what you 
call an experimentalist which means, I suppose, that he 
doesn't think it's possible to read the future in detail; 
so he won't tolerate any doctrine about it •••• 
••• 
41. Lord, Russell, The Wallaces gt ~. 359-60, 
This guy here (he pointed to the psper) and some of 
your academic friends are by way of making you out a 
real danger to American institutions. That's bad. 
They'll get you if this keeps up • 
... 
Tugwell 
In the first place the die-hards always have to have 
a goat, Unfortunately, through no fault of my own, 
I'm it, The game is, of course, to pick us off one 
by one, and gradually work toward the center. I'm 
vulnerable because Americans don't love pedagogues 
end I seem to be one. Also because I really am the 
enemy of all these fellows represent - they exaggerate 
my effectiveness for their own purposes - but essenti-
ally they are right. I don't believe the institutions 
which gave us these years of misery can be altogether 
sound. I'd like to change them. Why should I hide it? 
Beauregard Boone 
Yes, I know. But how? 
Tugwell 
Well, you see, I grew up in an American small town and 
I'll never forget it. No one was very rich there; but 
no one was very poor either, We're psst Christmas now. 
But it wasn't really Christmas to me without snow on 
hemlocks, bob-sleds and sleighbells, a Christmas tree 
in the church by the common -all these th.ings, They're 
really American to me, I can't make this Park Avenue, 
country-club life seem right, along with slums end bread 
lines. This fellow you complain of represents slums, 
bread lines, ballyhoo, speculation -all the elements 
in the lest few decades that I can't make fit into my 
picture of American institutions. I'm for decentraliza-
tion, for simplicity of life, along with a recognition 
of the complexity of industrial and scientific civili-
zation, It seems to me that electricity, vacuum tubes, 
Diesel engines and all these other things ought to make 
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it possible for all of us to approximate that no-riches, 
no-poverty kind of life in which I grew up. I'd certainly 
set the sleigh bells jingling in thousands of village 
streets if I could. 
Beauregard Boone 
••• you know, that's the line you ought to develop, 
These guys are making you seem like the big, bad. 
wolf. 
Tugwell 
I wish I were to them. 
Beauregard Boone 
I know, I know, but put the emphasis the other way. 
You're always negative these days. You're seeming 
to object to everything, holding things down, pre-
venting these fellows from getting What they want. 
Just reverse it. Talk about what you want. People 
are getting convinced that unless these birds can have 
their own way, the whole country will go to the dogs 
pronto. 
Senator Progressive 
No you're wrong •••• 'rhe people really sense it. No 
one was ever so discredited as these die-hards are now. 
The reason they're after our friend here is that they 
suffer from the illusion that if they get rid of him -
and a few others of us - they can run the Government 
again as they're used to doing it, People really have 
an instinct that this administration is sound. As for 
him, personally, it doesn't mach matter. Most of the 
dust up about him is irrelevant. It's connected with 
the Food and Drug bill. A lot of quacks and fakers who 
prey on small people and therefore have close connec• 
tions with them are spreading poison all right, but 
they'll soon see through that •••• it's a good cause 
and will win its own way. I believe that we ought to go 
on as we are, simply and straightforwardly. If we try 
to fight this fire with another fire we're likely to 
lose the advantages we have. 
Beauregard Boone 
Well, nobody likes to have bricks thrown at him. 
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Tugllell 
But that's inevitable, They've tied me up to same 
things the newspapers don't like a bit. I think 
they will, I'm sure they have more to gein than to 
lose in the long run, But ~ telling them that mekes 
them just as mad as it alwys does when anyone takes 
e holier•than•thou attitude. They're telling me 
pretty freely to mind ~ own business, 
Beauregard Boone 
Good grief, you do, 
Tugwell 
I know, But that isn't the point. It serves the pur• 
pose to call me all the names which indicate the atti• 
tudes people detest most, Accuracy isn't desired. 
Beauregard Boone 
Well, anyway • it mskee me sore, And I think it 1 s time 
you fixed yourself up even at the expense of a little 
mendacity; if necessary, I'd sacrifice some of the 
program, 
Senator Progressive 
If you're going to advise him on his relations with the 
public, you'd better drop that line, No one person is 
as important as all that, Maybe I ws wrong to say that 
all of us have to stick. Maybe someone ought to be sac-
rificed. Their illusions may be justified, Maybe the 
whole cause would be served if they did succeed in dis• 
crediting him. If we could go on then and seem more 
respectable for having lost a discreditable colleague, 
it might quiet down the opposition. 
Beauregard Boone 
Rats. That's an old politicians trick, And it works 
as well as most of them- just for a minute •••• If 
you lose him you're that much poorer however little you 
think he counts for, You'd better stick now. They'll 
be at you next. Then someone is going to get the bright 
idea that you'd better be dropped overboard •••• 
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Senator Progressive 
You're right. I'll stick •••• 42 
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Same years later Tugwell outlined the picture which the press painted 
of him on the occasion of an investigation in Puerto Rico by a Congressional 
committee. His retrospective comments indicated that while he would have 
preferred that Senator Progressive •stick,• he did not really expect hU. 
to do so: 
As a public figure I had carried .over, even after a gap 
of years, the synthetic personality fastened on me by the 
embattled advertisers, publicity men, and lobbyists, not 
to mention the rivals tor Presidential favor. The ele• 
ments of this stereotype were contradictory; that is to 
say, I was a boon-doggling 'theorist' and yet so effective 
as to be 'dangerous;' I was extravagant and a waster, yet 
if I were not watched I should succeed in reorganizing 
high areas of American life, This kind of jumbled assev• 
eration seemed, however, to frighten certain people because 
of its very confusion. I was a person to be distrusted, 
from whom any kind of crazy proposal could be expected to• 
gether with the insane energy to carry it out. I had always 
failed in everything I had undertaken; therefore I must be 
a failure in anything I should undertake in the future. This 
did not need proof. It was, in fact, impervious to proof 
of an adverse sort. And if it was not consistent with the 
fears that I might be effective in an almost revolutionary 
sense, that inconsistency was a kind of added basis for dis-
trust. It what I wanted to do - which was never exactly ex• 
plained - was a failure, it proved that I had been wrong; but 
if it succeeded it was worse because it was anyway 'un.Ameri-
can,• or 'Red,' or 'Socialistic,• and so, dangerous1 
••• 
••• it was unlikely that any Congressiooal group would - or 
even could - penetrate the layers of falsity and prejudice 
and reach an impartial judgment. To expect it of them was 
unreasonable. They were not inveterate watchers of the news• 
papers. They were sensitive to public feeling; they were far 
42. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Senator and Beauregard Boone,• in~ Battle for 
Democracy, 138·42· 
from crusaders for lost causes. What could be expected 
except that they should confirm what had already been 
announced in loud, firm tones by the ••• papers •••• ?43 
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The evidence indicates that Tugwell did not exaggerate the effect of 
the press csapaign to discredit him. However, one who attempts to appraise 
him must avoid meeting reckless charges with unquestioning exoneration of 
praise. On the other hand, those predisposed to condemn Tugwell without 
having examined his career closely must bear in mind that he was the target 
of one of the most effective •smear• CSBlpeigns in the twentieth-century America 
The Controversial Tugwell: Charges and Rebuttal 
Tugwell was a controversial figure, especially after the introduction 
or the Pure Food and Drugs Bill. When the press linked him to a given govel'll• 
ment activity, published accounts invariably involved attacks on him which 
also made that activity controversial. It required two sides to make a 
fight; there were defenders of Tugwll and his activities, They were, how-
ever, vastly outnumbered among the contending parties who expressed them-
selves in the media which formed popular opinion. Consequently, it is neces• 
sary to go beyond press accounts in order to approach an accurate appraisal 
of Tugwell as a man, a thinker, and an administrator. 
In a manner often characteristic of attacks on public figures, the 
charges against Tugwell fell into two broad categories. He allegedly was a 
dangerous threat to the American way of life as a man with subversive aims 
and consuming personal ambition. On the other hand, some critics maintained 
he was so unrealistic and practically ineffective as to be harmless. 
43• Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken~ 456•59• 
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XII. The Dangerous 'l'ugwlls SubTersion 
He desired a new form of government. 
Charges 
Tugwell's economic thought was certainly unorthodox. Opponents 
saw in his proposals for 'planned capitalism' a desire to achieve 
through class warfare the abolition of the profit ~stem and free enter• 
prise. He would replace the existing system with a dictatorial planning 
body for industry and total regimentation of agriculture. The end of 
political democracy would naturally accompany the establishment of 
Tugwell's autocratic, socialistic 'Third Econ~.· Moreover, Tugwell's 
aims did not merely constitute literal subTersion -- the overthrowing 
and destruction of the existing order, His ideas stemmed from emulation 
of both the tactics and the objectiTes of foreign reTolutionary groups, 
Some of the charges that Tugwell was a subversive came from unre-
liable sources located on what was generally considered the lunatic 
fringe in American society.1 Other charges appeared in reputable peri• 
odicals. Time referred to Tugwell as a 'Parlor Pink,' quoting a state-
ment by Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr., that the open attacks of Com• 
munista against American institutions were far less dangerous than the 
2 
subtle and insidious attacks of New Dael spokesmen such as Tugwell. The 
1. Winrod, Gerald, COIIIIUIIiB!Il and lli Roosevelt Brain !tY.!1 (Wichita, 
Kansas, Defender Press, 1933) 1 Dilling, Elizabeth, The Roosevelt 
Red Record .A!l4 Ita Background (Chicago, The Author, 19]6). 
2. ~M&pazine, Vol. 27, No. 11, March 16, 1936, 20. 
news weekly also referred to Tugwell's doctrines as neither hard nor 
soft, liberal nor conservative; from the standpoint of economics they 
were •bright red.•'3 An article in another popular magazine asserted 
that Tugwell was disgusted with democracy by 1932.4 A Saturday Evening 
Post writer stated that in his speeches Tugwell rolled up his sleeves, 
dismissed the Constitution and existing institutions, abolished property 
and profit, organized all activities into government monopolies, plan• 
ned every man's life, and forcibly msde him happy and com:f'ortable.5 
The accounts of Tugwell as a revolutionary divided into two main 
types: those which deplored his open expression of revolutionary inten-
tiona, and those which expressed a fear of his leading a subtle, silent 
revolution. Same observers saw no effort by Tugwell to conceal his 
subversive plans; it was obvious that the young intellectuals in Washing-
ton, led by Tugwell, thought they could make the world over in a day, 
6 failing to realize that we progress through evolution and not revolution. 
Tugwell's impatience was evident in the fierceness of his revolutionary 
writings --"he was •sick of propertied czars, sick of a nation's stenches.••7 
6. 
!ig Magazine, Vol. 23, No. 2, January 8, 1934, 16. 
Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• American Mercury, 
Vol. 39, No. 153, September, 1936, 8. 
Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Saturday Evening 
Post, Vol. 209, No. 5, August 1, 1936, 9· 
Verity, George M., "Appraises Prof. Tugwell; Finds Lack of Appreciation 
Problems of Business,• The Iron~. Vol. 134, No. l, July 5. 1934, 428• 
Bolles, Blair, •Prose and Politics: Writers in the New Deal,• Saturd&Y 
Review gt Literature, Vol. 21, No. 23, March 30, 1940, 4• 
An acquaintance of Jerome Frank ccncluded that Tugwell was a 
revolutionary simply by looking at him. This visitor to the Frank-
Tugwell household had known Frank when the latter was a corporation 
law.yer. When he returned to Wilmington, Delaware, after his visit to 
Washington, he wired Franks BEWARE COMMA JEROME BEWARE STOP THIS 
MORNING AT YOUR BREAKFAST TABLE I SAW THE FACE OF ROBESPIERRE STOP 
THAT MAN WOULD WILLINGLY GO TO THE GUILLOTINE FOR AN IDEAL AND TAKE 
HIS FRIENDS WITH HIM STOP BEWARE. One night as they were driving home, 
Frank showed the telegram to the Assistant Secretary. Tugwell, usually 
s careful driver, swung a corner without signaling and grazed a curb. 
He said it was a hell of a life when idiots came in to look at you and 
then just said what they read in the papers. Frank then told Tugwell, 
8 
"'In any event you drive like Robespierre.• Others besides Frank's 
friend, saw nothing obscure about Tugwell's persistent pursuit of a 
revolutionary course.9 One author sounded the warning in a chapter 
entitled •The Constitution end Tugwell.• He declared that it was unfair 
to apply the term •socialist• to Roosevelt, an •agitator of the worst 
sort.• 10 He warned the people that they had to weigh their own problems, 
not permitting "Roosevelt (Tugwell)• to think for them.11 The last 
sentence of this chapter, italicized, read, •A Vote for Roosevelt in 1936 
12 is a vote for bloodshed in 1937•" 
8. Lord, Russell, The Wallaces of .!2!!1. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 347• 
9· Ely, Joseph B., The American Dream (Boston, B, Humphries, 1944) 178. 
10. Crosby, Percy L .. Three Cheers for~ Red, Red, ~ Red (McLean, Vir-
ginia, 19]6) 460. 
11. Crosby, Percy L., Three Cheers for the ~. Red, and ~. 458. 
12, Crosby, Percy L., Three Cheers for the Red, Red, and Red, 485. 
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Mark Sullivan, columnist and confidant of Herbert Hoover, most 
notably advanced the thesis that Tugwell and his adherents were silently 
bringing about a revolution in American government. In a series of 
columns in December, 1933, Sullivan repeatedly expressed his conviction 
that Tugwell was the leader of a group of young intellectuals who were 
•gradually• and •quietly• transforming the familiar American type of 
social organization into one which •the word 'Russian' described more 
nearly than any other.• Tugwell and his followers, Sullivan alleged, 
had gotten hold of the 'key places in government,• They were quietly 
but powerfully bringing about a revolution. Sullivan demanded publi• 
city about the revolution in order that the public might be able to see 
the struggle and choose sides. When the activities of the twenty or 
thirty young radicals, typified and led by Tugwell, were made known, 
there could then be a roll call in Congress for or against Tugwell's 
•workers' World.• 13 The Tugwell-inspired revolution, so apparent to 
others, was a hidden, mysterious matter to Sullivan, 
Tugwell's fighting address to the Democratic State Central Cam• 
mittee in Los Angeles on October 28, 1935, couched in military terms, 
occasioned many flat accusations that he was en advocate of class war• 
fare and violent revolution. This •Call to the Barricades•l4 made clear 
to some critics the communist connections of the New Deal.15 The speech 
New York Herald Tribune, December 12, 13, 17, 18, 20; 22, 24, 28, 1933; 
Tugwell hss recalled that Frank Kent •was humorous at times; Sullivan 
became boring,• Interview~ writer. 
Dilling, Elizabeth, The Roosevelt ~ Record and Its Background, 352, 
Marvin, Fred R., Fool's Gold (New York, Madison and Marshall, 1936) 19. 
showed that the New Deal sought to accomplish through the Democratic 
Party the principles of communism, socialism, and fascism. 16 A Liberty 
League member wrote that this address was in the mood of Mussolini 
just before the March on Rome, of the Bolsheviki in 1917, and of Hitler 
in the late l920s17 -- but there was to be 
No bloodshed •••• Not even a chairman of the board is 
to be slain in his bed. Tugwell is a great peace lover, 
like Benvolio, who used to enter a tavern swishing his 
sword and slapping it on the table, with the exclamation, 
"God send me no need of thees•l8 
Frank Kent of the Baltimore Sun, who seldom passed up an opportunity to 
lash out at Tugwell, considered the Los Angeles speech an expression of 
the school of New Deel politicians who believed that the wey to victory 
in 1936 lay in a bold call upon the farmers and the workers to rally 
against the bourgeoisie and support Tugwell's •new order• -· a completely 
planned dictatorship.19 
Some charges against the revolutionary Tugwell dealt with specific 
aspects of his subversive attitudes and activities. The first corner-
stone of American life which a subversive would be expected to attack 
was the Constitution. It was alleged that Tugwell had no regard for any 
obstacle which that document might put in the way of his plans. 
Again, as in the case of general charges concerning Tugwell's 
revolutionary intentions, critics divided into two main groups. Some 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19o 
Ely, Joseph B., The American Dregm, 174• 
Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1936) 
102. 
Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• 9· 
Kent, Frank R., Without Grease: Political Behavior 1934·1936 (New 
York, William Morrow, 1936) 284. 
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observers asserted that Tugwell concealed his true attitude toward the 
Constitution. Others maintained that his real beliefs were easily 
seen in his speeches and writings. One commentator identified the 
secret of Tugwell's success as his outward obeisance to the Constitu-
tion, his public professions of respect for democracy. Tugwell's 
theology was orthodox if his practice was irregular, "like a Renais-
20 
sance cardinal with children.• Another writer stated that a careful 
consideration of Tugwell's statements made it obvious that constitu-
tional limitations give the crusading doctor no great concern.21 Sana-
tor Dickinson of Iowa observed that Tugwell's books disclosed an eager-
ness to get at the Constitution first in a tour de force aimed at over-
throwing precedents by changing the Constitution and government once 
for a11.22 An important columnist was certain that Tugwell had a dan-
gerous disregard for precedents because he (Tugwell) deplored the 
confusion of ends with means, the emotional attachment to.the instru-
menta of social life which resulted in some Americans' •unreasoning, 
almost hysterical• attachment to the Constitution.23 
Tugwell's views on the Constitution included references to judi-
cial review and the regulation of industry which evoked critical comments. 
In a college-commencement address24 Tugwell assumed what one author 
called a "defiant• attitude; he showed contempt for law in describing 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23· 
Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 83. 
Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism, 106. 
~Magazine, Vol. 23, No. 19, May 7, 1934, 14. 
Lawrence, David, Stumbling into Socialism (New York, D. Appleton-
Century, 1935) 24. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Your Future and Your Nation,• University 
of New Mexico, Albuquerque, June 10, 1935; illJ2A Press Release. 
his impatience with judicial restraints which prevented the acceptance 
of his views.25 Frank Kent observed that a 1936 campaign in Which no 
one could question Democratic allegiance to the Constitution and respect 
for the Supreme Court would be rendered impossible by such speeches as 
Tugwell's "disturbing• University of New Mexico address,26 
Regarding the regulation of industry, Tugwell was the subject 
of adverse comment because of his contention that the absence of any 
reference in the Constitution to industry, and the subsequent formula• 
tion of public policy by the courts, was clear evidence of the flexibi-
lity of the Constitution, A journalist inferred from these opinions 
of Tugwell that anything which was not specifically protected by consti-
tutional reference was subject to extermination -- for example, cock-
roaches,27 
Tugwell's address on a "Third Econ~.· the economic sphere 
Which was to belong neither to private enterprise nor to state socialism, 
met objections on constitutional grounds, In this speech he referred 
to a reassignment and redistribution of economic powers through the 
exercising of public authority. Tugwell's remarks were labeled •strange• 
in a nation "where governmental powers are constitutionally assigned and 
25. Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism, 180, 
26, Kent, Frank R., Withgut Qrease: Political Behavior 1934-1936, 
165. 
27. Bolles, Blair, •sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 84. 
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distributed, and in which 'public authority' means constitutional 
authority and the limits of that authority have been defined and the 
purposes of their use stipulated! •28 According to this critic Tug-
well's constitutional views enabled the arbitrary classification of 
enterprises as being affected with a public interest and so subject 
to governmental control; the "Third Economy• would inevitably include 
the total econ~.29 This author continually referred to the "Third 
Economy• as an all-inclusive system, 
Tugwell's •Third Economy• suggested to critics two lines of 
attack, First, his detractors contended that "planning• schemes, in 
the very nature of historical development, inevitably led to totali• 
tarianism. Secondly, they maintained that Tugwell's desire to initi-
ate this historical sequence stemmed not from conclusions independently 
arrived at, but rather from an emulation of Russian policies. They 
particularly stressed the fact that his visit to Russia in 1927 hsd a 
basic influence on his thinking, 
One writer asserted that Tugwell's mentioning in the same book 
his desire to save democracy and the native American system, along with 
the idea of a planned economy, was hypocritical; a planned economy, after 
all, was synonymous with a tyrant state,3° Another writer, in retro-
spect, applied his analysis of •planning" to the earlier stages of the 
28, Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism, 100, 
29. Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism, 100, 
JO, Agar, Herbert, Land of the .l£U. {Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1935) 
126. 
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historical sequence in question. He believed that it was political 
hypocrisy to use the word •planning• instead of socialism, because 
planning was simply national socialism in its initial stage.31 In 
either view, whether quickly or slowly, directly or indirectly, plan• 
ning ultimately led to dictatorship. Tugwell clearly fitted into the 
planning-socialism-dictatorship chain reaction; he was the acknowledged 
leader of the members Of the Roosevelt administration who were "for 
most practical purposes• Socislists.32 
In his book Stumbling into Socialism David Lawrence, who ranked 
with Frank Kent as a foe of Tugwell, in his cOIIIIlents on Tugwell's 
ideas elaborated on the. planning-to-socialism-to-dictatorship thesis 
by citing recent EUropean events. Both Fascists and Communists, 
Lawrence stated, assumed that voluntary and democratic processes would 
mark the traDBitional state from capitalism to socialism; after de-
cedes of belief in the necessity of revolution, Socialists finally came 
to believe that not economic collapse but acquisition of political 
power was the most effective approach for their purposes. The Socialists 
believed that political control would enable them to preserve intact 
as much of the existing system as was necessary to prevent during the 
transitional period the disintegration which resulted in dictatorship. 
New Deal philosophers, Lawrence noted, entertained •somewhat the S8llle 
hope.• But veteran Socialists knew better; Mussolini and KerenskY had 
31. Moley, Raymond, ~ !2 !UJ! .Qy Liberty (New York, Knopf, 19.52) 93• 
32. Time M&gazine, Vol. 22, No. 25, December 18, 1933, 9· 
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been Socialists; Hitler had drawn his original support from the Soci• 
alist Party.33 In Lawrence's opinion planning determined both means 
and end: violent revolution and totalitarianism. The weakness in 
Lawrence's thesis lay in his attempt to predict the outcome of develop. 
menta in America on the basis of European history. 
Tugwell's "Third Econ~,· in addition to evoking objections 
on constitutional grounds, was the basis for further allegations that 
his objectives were clearly totalitarian. Tugwell proposed what was in 
essence an enlarged public-works program to absorb surplus labor in 
activities which were essential to the community. including business; 
these activities were to be chosen from those which would be unprofit-
able to private enterprise. In the view of a spokesman for the opposi-
tion, the •Third EconOJV" was a proposal for an entirely new social and 
economic order;34 he asserted that the "Third EconOJV" had a definite 
fascist orientation which was basically inharmonious with American 
constitutional concepts. Mussolini spoke of "liberalism,• •socialism.• 
and •corporationism,• the latter being •above• the first two. Tugwell 
referred to •socialism. individualism. and the Third EconOJVo" the lat-
ter to •reconcile" the first two,35 This critic implied that Tugwell 
and Mussolini were as alike as two peas in a pod, 
General attacks on Tugwell's thought seldom involved detailed 
33• Lawrence. David. Stumbling into Socialism, 27. 
34• Desvernine, Raoul, De!IIOcratiq Despotism, 101. 
35• Desvernine, Raoul. Democratic Despotism. 107, 
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analysis end distinctions, He was at the same time a Socialist, a 
Communist, and a Fascist, In 1ohn T. Flynn's opinion, no distinctions 
were necessary, Flynn referred to the influence of Tugwell on Wallace, 
Tugwell's mind, "keen, busy, and widely enriched with economic and 
social history• had gradually infected the far less able wallace with 
the idea of state planning for the welfare of all, Unfortunately, 
Wallace failed to recognize the basic affinity between state planning, 
fascism, and Communism; he did not understand that •they all belong to 
one great generic philosophy.•36 
Despite the references to Fascism in Germany and Italy in cam-
mentaries on Tugwell's ideas, the greater part of the adverse criti• 
cism attributed his belief in subversive means and ends to the impact 
on his thought of developments in Russia, This impact begsn 1 according 
to most accounts. with his tour of Russia in the summer of 1927, The 
fact that Tugwell once spent time in Russia chilled the blood of con• 
servative Congreasmen,37 They deplored Russian influence in the farm 
bill of 1933, attributing it to Tugwll.38 On the Senate floor Senator 
Scholl devoted a long speech to describing Tugwell's collectivism as 
strictly A Russian plan.39 Senator Hatfield declared that Tugwell and 
37· 
38. 
39· 
Flynn, 1ohn T., Th& Roosevelt H;tlh (New York 1 Davin-Adair, 1948) 
224. 
Time Magazine, Vol. 21, No, 25, 1une 19o 1933, 10. 
•Tugwell: He Blazed a New Path in 'Dismal Science,•• Newsweek. 
Vol, 1, No, a. April a. 1933, 16, 
Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 78, Part 10, 
1une 12 1 1934o 11156-60, 
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his kind had all but Russianized the nation,4° Senator Robinson of 
Indiana labeled Tugwell's ideas •Russian cODJDUnism.•41 In the House 
William H. Wilson of Pennsylvania described Tugwell as an advocate of 
revolutionary socialism42 and Assistant (sic) "Commissar• of Agriculture.43 
Wilson also referred pointedly to Tugwell's visit to Russia. 1~ 
Concerning the oft-cited tour of 1927, one journalist stated that 
the trip was the •supreme experience• of Tugwell's personal education; 
•Tugwell Rex, as the New Deal's master romanticist and collectivist, 
was forged in Russia •• 45 This critic offered a strained explanation 
of the belated effect on Tugwell of the trip to Russia, He pointed out 
that the Russian impact on Tugwell was not apparent at the time of the 
visit, When Tugwell proved that he still had •a good deal of the sopho-
more in him" by having •run playing the bad boy away from home,•46 Tug-
well's chapter on agriculture, in the book written by members of the 
40. Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol, 78, Part 11, 
June 14, 1934, 11460, 
41. Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol, 78, Part 11, 
June 14, 1934, 11453• 
42. Congressional Record, 74 Congress, 1 Session, Vol, 79, Part 9, 
June 27, 1935, 10332• 
43• Congressional Record, 74 Congress, 1 Session, Vol, 79, Part 9, 
June 27, 1935, 10333· 
44• Congressional Record, 74 Congress, 1 Session, Vol, 79, Part 9, 
June 27, 1935, 10332, 
45. Bolles, Blair, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 80; in 1934 
Tugwell commented, •seven years ago I visited Russia for two 
months, That visit has often been considered sufficient proof 
of 11\'f adherence to colllllllilism, as though c0111m1nism could be caught 
by contagion, like mumps or measles;• Address, "The Return to 
Democracy,• American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 1934; 
in The Battle for DemocracY, 200. 
46. Bolles, Blair, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 80. 
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visiting group, had no propaganda about democratic discipline and 
industrial regimentation, Such propaganda, it was explained, appeared 
in his later writings •When the Russian idea had more thoroughly fil• 
tared through his romantic brain ••••• 47 
Critics attributed Tugwell's Los Angeles speech of October 28, 
1935, calling for the political unity of workers and farmers, to his 
Russian experience, Tugwell had picked up in Russia the communistic 
concept that farmers and workers would make a natural combination to 
bring about a new social and economic order.48 A magazine columnist 
noted the similarity between Tugwell's remarks in Los Angeles and 
statements in early March, 19Jbo by Earl Browder and the Daily Worker. 
Lenin, this commentator continued, had grafted the policy of ·~chke" 
on Marxism to assure the triumph of COIIIDUIIism. ·~chka" was a Rue• 
sian word denoting the theoretical community of interests of the workers 
and the peasants; it required the reeducation of the latter, Who did 
not support the revolution out of an intense desire to establish a soci-
49 alistic system. Obviously, Tugwell had reinforced his affinity for 
Russian ideas by absorbing the works of the saint of the Bolshevik revo• 
lution, including "SDIYchkra,• 
Tugwell, the alleged believer in the Soviet experiment in agri• 
culture,5° caused critics to hurl the 'Russian' epithet, His remarks 
on •planning• in general were even more provocative of comments Which 
associated him with Russian ideas. Tugwell himself observed in 1932 
47. Bolles, Blair, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 81. 
48. Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism, 105. 
49. Garrett, Garet, •National Hill Notes,• Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 
208, No.4 6, May 16, 1936, 
50, Michael, Georgr, Handout (New York, G. P. Putnam's, 1935) 127, 148. 
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that some politicians dismissed any suggestion of planning, as Presi-
dent Hoover did in a speech to some Indiana Republican editors in June, 
1931, as a dangerous infection from Russia.51 Two authors were appal-
led at Tugwell's text~book suggestion that the challenge to America 
of developments in Russia lay not in comparative standards of living, 
alleged or actual merits of the Russian scheme, or agreement or dis• 
agreement with Russia's philosophy; ~he Russian challenge to America 
lay in the idea of planning, the demonstration of man's ability intel-
ligently to control economic forces for the achievement of desired 
ends, as a substitute for an outdated laissez-fairs philosophy.52 
The most publicized charges connecting Tugwell with subversive 
activities in the Roosevelt administration were those of Dr. William A. 
Wirt, Superintendent of Schools in Gary, Indiana, in 1934, and George 
Peek in his book Why~~~. pre•released in the form of six arti• 
cles entitled •In and Out• in the Saturday Evening Post in May and June, 
1936, Peek's charges arose from a basic division of thought within the 
AAA on agricultural policy,53 With reference to this difference Peek 
made no specific remarks about Tugwell; lie identified Tugwell someWhat 
vaguely by calling him the leader of the •collectivists• who were 
directly responsible for the policies Which Peek opposed,54 Mark Sul• 
51, Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Policv (New York, John Dey, 1932), 
20. 
52. Lawrence, David, Stumbling into ::locialism (New York, D. Appleton-Century, 
1935) 16; Young, James C., Roosevelt Revealed (New York, Farrar and Rine-
hart, 1936) 125. 
53· See above, Chapter X, Section,"The Agricultural Adjustment Administration. 
54· Peek, George N. and Sanruel Crowther, 'tlhy Quit Q!!!: Own (New York, D. Van 
Nostrand, 1936) l. 
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liven's version of the AAA fight typified press accounts; he referred 
to the •Peek-Tugwell• quarrel as •·a struggle between contreeting ideals 
of government.•55 
Concerning the •collectivists• Peek recalled that there were 
many intense young men in the Legal and Consumers' Divisions of the 
AAA who were determined to destroy the profit system, although they were 
not sure about what they would do after they accomplished this destruc-
tion.56 Peek also summarized the report of a friend who had attended 
severel parties of Tugwell's and Frank's; Peek's friend heard some 
amazing talk of social revolution, beginning with farmers because in 
other countries they had been the main obstacle to socialism.57 Finally, 
Peek deplored the status among the •collectivists• of Lee Pressman, 
noting that Tugwell took Pressman into the Resettlement Administration.58 
The authoritative student of Peek, Gilbert c. Fite of the Uni• 
versity Of Oklahoma, has commented that among the fifty-five law,yers 
on the AAA staff, there were some whose economic thought was collecti-
vistic. They were less interested in raising farm prices than they were 
in protecting consumers and controlling business. They were idealistic, 
impractical, and inexperienced. Disillusioned by the depression, they 
had permanent ideas about remedies for the social and economic ailments 
55. ~York Herald Tribune, December 12, 1933• 
56. Peek, George N. and SaDUel Crowther, Why Quit .Qlu: Own, 107. 
57. Peek, George N. and Sa!IDlel Crowther, Why Quit .Qm: .Qlm, 114. 
58. Peek, George N. and Samuel Crowther, Why Quit .Qm: Own, 140; foot-
notes 54, 56-58 denote all of Peek's references to Tugwell in con-
nection with subversion in ~ ~ Our ~. 
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of America.59 Peek, according to Fite, soon saw that the urban left-
wing lawyers were attempting to employ the AAA, particularly its auth-
ority to license processors, for •purposes not originally contemplated,•60 
They were aiming not just for farm recovery they sought permanent soci• 
61 
alization of the processing and distributing business. Peek balked 
at incorporating their principles in AAA codes and marketing agree-
62 
menta; he dismissed the liberals' talk and ideas as nonsense. 
Fite concluded that Peek apparently did not know of any actual 
card•carrying employees in the AAA, Later events bore out Peek's con-
viction that there were some potentially dangerous radicals in the ad-
ministration, Peek was one of the first to notice that the reformers 
in Washington included men (the subsequent identification of whom will 
be cited below in connection with Wirt's charges) 'who would solve the 
nation's problems in some authoritative fashion outside of the American 
tradition.• 63 
Wirt's charges became public in early April, 1934, when a dis• 
patch from Washington announced that on behalf of the Comnrlttee for the 
Nation, James H. Rand, Jr., Chairman, offered as evidence of a conspir-
acy in the government a letter from Wirt.64 Wirt sent this letter to 
59· 
6o, 
61. 
62. 
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64. 
Fite, Gilbert c., George .H• Peek and ~ Fight f.21: Farm Parity 
(Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1954) 261, 
Fite, Gilbert C., George !• Peek~_!!!! Fight .f!2I !lm!! Parity, 262, 
Time Magazine, Vol, 22, No. 25, June 18, 1933, 9. 
Fite, Gilbert c., George !!• Peek and~ Fight for b.!!!! Parity, 262. 
Fite, Gilbert c., George .!!• Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, 262, 
Villard, Oswald G,, •Issues and Men: The Communistic Brain Trust,• 
Nation, Vol. 138, No. 3587, April 4, 1934, 377; The~ York~. 
April 11, 1934, 1:1, 12:1, 7, 8 gives a full account of the charges 
and denials; an antiooadministrstion account is followed here in order 
to convey the fullest unfavorable implications of the char86s• 
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various persons with the notation that it had not been written for pub-
lication; however, recipients were free to use it in any way they saw 
fit.65 The letter summarized a conversation Wirt had with some New 
Dealers; it became public when Rand made it available for reading before 
a Congressional committee.66 Wirt 1s charges consisted of revelations 
made to him by the Brain Trust regarding the secret aims of that group. 
Briefly, Wirt's informants regarded Roosevelt as the "Kerensky" of an 
incipient revolution and expected a •stalin• to replace him; to hasten 
the advent of a dictatorship, the Brain Trust intended to postpone 
rather than promote recovery,67 thereby convincing the people that gov-
68 
ernment ownership was the only solution to economic problems. 
An anti-administration.interpretation of the events following 
Wirt's charges was that the New Deal, in treating the incident very 
seriously, revealed a significant self•consciousness.69 Even the occa-
sionally hysterical Washington of the New Deal era had experienced 
nothing like the excitement following Wirt's testimoney, when leading 
proponents of the New Deal, including Mrs. Roosevelt, issued denisls.70 
Wirt's testimony was heard before a special committee, called because the 
65. Young, James c. Roosevelt Revealed (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 
1936) 145· 
66. Young, James c •• Roosevelt Revealed, 145· 
67. Younr;, James c., Roosevelt Revealed, 145· 
68. Young, James c., Roosevelt Reveal§d, 145-46. 
69. Young, James c., Roosevelt Revealed, 146. 
70. Young, James c.' Roosevelt Revealed, 146. 
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New Deal was egoistic -- egoists could not laugh at themselves. With 
•longest faces and a pompous manner,• the New Dealers named a commit-
tee to investigate the charges; they also launched a pre-hearing cam-
paign to discredit Wirt,71 The Chairman of the committee of three 
Democrats and two Republicans, Representative Alfred L. Bulwinkle of 
N.C., stated before the House that Wirt had served time in prison during 
World War I for pro-Gerrnan activities; Bulwinkle had to retract his 
accusation,72 
At the hearing Bulwinkle read Wirt's charges into the record 
while the educator occasionally nodded approval,73 The charges were 
not complimentary to the President, who apparently was duped into be-
lieving that he was making decisions for himself,74 Actually, Roose-
velt was only the 1Kerensky 1 of the revolution. The key question was, 
•Who was the Lenin?• Everyone ssw the person of Dr. Tug..ell "looming 
in the shadows;• Wallace came to Tugwell's defense.75 Meanwhile, the 
two Republicans on the committee complained of the unfair treatment of 
Wirt. The New Deal, possessing •too sure a knowledge of public psycholog 
to stand aside,• arranged two hurried meetings of the committee, then 
adjourned over the protest of its Republican members,76 Wirt fired his 
parting shot: •r regard Professor Tugwell as the motivating force 
71. Young, James c .• Roosev~l:!; Reveal~, 146. 
72. Young, James c., Roosevelt Revealm, 148. 
73· Young, James c .• Roosevelt Revealed, 147· 
74· Young, James c., Roose:~elj; Revel!;!,eg, 147. 
75· Young, James c., Rooseve;!,t Reveal~g, 148. 
76. Young, James c •• Roos~velli R~vealeg, 148-49. 
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behind the plan to overthrow our established American liberties. He is 
the real brains of the brain trust. The others are satellites.•77 
Foes of Tugwell continued to cite Wirt's charges during the re-
mainder of the former's career in Washington. In the month following 
the charges the press described conservative Republican Sena.tors, anti-
cipating hearings on Tugwell's promotion to Under Secretary, as eager 
to get him before them in committee in order to revive the issue of a 
Red conspiracy within the New Deal.78 At about the same time, Senator 
Hatfield entered in the Congressional Record an editorial from the 
Washington Herald of May 15, 1934, on Tugvellism, which this paper 
labeled so revolutionary, subversive, and communistic that Wirt's 
charges were unnecessary.79 Press comments towards the end of Tugwell's 
Washington experience continued to refer to the Wirt matter, One writer 
noted in August, 1936, that although Wirt failed to sustain his charges, 
Peek's book and other observations made it appear "highly probable thst 
80 
there was same sort of an intrigue• in 1934• 
As late as 1953 a newspaper columnist stated that the subsequent 
uncovering of the fact that there were Communists in Washington in 1933 
81 
vindicated Wirt. Investigations in the early 1950s revealed that 
the Ware cell of Communists originated in the AAA.82 Among the first 
77· 
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organized Communists in Washington wera Harold Ware, Alger Hiss, Nathan 
Witt, Charles Kramer, Victor Perlo, John Abt, Henry Collins, Nathaniel 
Weyl, Nathan Silvermaster, William Ullmann, and Lee Pressman, the lat-
ter three having been employed at one time or another by the RA,83 The 
press associated Tugwell with Pressman in July, 1936, It was reported 
at that time that John L. Lewis and Tugwell had dinner together shortly 
before Pressman, General Counsel of the RA, began to serve the Steel 
Organizing Committee in a similar capacity; meanwhile, Lewis's United 
Mine Workers had recently raised bail for share-cropper organizers 
arrested in Memphis -- and sharecroppers were one of Tugwell's gravest 
concerns.84 In his diary Harold Ickes also connected Pressman with 
Tugwell when he recorded that "Tom Lcorcoraii hopes that he LPressrmii 
won't ruin Lewis as he said that he had almost ruined Rex Tugwell and 
Hopkins.•·85 
Corcoran's comment, as recorded by Ickes, appeared in print in 
1954; it was the last published statement linking Tugwell with a Cam-
munist, In the light of the charges against Tugwell of subversive 
activities, the next section deals with: (1) the temper of the times 
in which critics accused him of subversion; (2) his views on develoP-
menta in Russia, especially his comments of 1927 on agriculture in the 
Soviet Union; (3) his reaction upon encountering known Communists; 
83, Report, Internal Security Subcommittee of Senate Judiciary Committee, 
August 24, 1953; reprinted in United States News and World Heport, Aug-
ust 28, 1953, 16-19, 88-107; "The Story of Spies in Government,• United 
states News and World Report, November 27, 1953, 21-22. 
84. ~Magazine, Vol. 28, No. 1, July 6, 1936, 17. 
85. Ickes, Harold L., ~Secret lliacy of Harold .!.• Ickes; Part 'rwo (New 
York, Simon and Schuster, 1954) 34-35, under date of Sunday, November 
10, 1937. 
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(4) his ideas and practices with regard to means and ends in political 
econ~ in the United States. 
Rebuttal 
Tugwell, Russia. and the Communists 
The Climate of Accusation 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s the American econo~ had 
broken down. In such circumstances it vas not unusual for people to 
criticize the traditional economic system -- and not only from soap-
boxes. The British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, has described Marxism 
as a Christian heresy designed to offset a Christian failure. Techno-
logy having created the means to abolish poverty, it was no longer 
morally .right for •a small fraction of mankind• alone to enjoy •the 
fruits of Civilization;• the West failed to pay •the huge interim pay-
ment on account of social justice• owing to the poor.1 As the abuses 
of nineteenth-century industrialism produced the Marxist dissent, so 
the breakdown in the distributive mechanism of the econ~ in the 
twentieth century produced critics. 
Same of the critics became Communists; some of the Communists be-
came subversives. The latter created a problem in a democracy which 
wished to remain a democracy while defending itself against international 
conspiracy. It was not in the democratic tradition to label everyone 
who had ever worn a red necktie a Communist; yet it was not realistic 
1. Review Of A Study of Historv, Vola. VII-X, by Arnold J. Toynbee, 
Time Magazine, Vol. 64, No. 16, October 18, 1954, 109. 
to maintain that there were no subversives, The challenge to govern• 
ment in a democracy was to identify the disloyal persons in the demo-
cratic way, by means of traditional agencies and procedures, Unfor-
tunately, shot-sun accusations lumped Communists together with liberals 
and welfare-state socialists who abhorred all totalitarianisms, includ-
ing Communism; on the other hand, many New Deal liberals were equally 
careless in their indiscriminate cries of •witch-hunt.• 2 
In 1938 the House Committee to Investigate Un•American Activities, 
with Martin Dies, Dem,, Texas, serving as Chairman, allowed unscreened 
witnesses to denounce their enemies as •red" sympathizers. Even the 
most fantastic portions of this testimony received elaborate attention 
in the press, with almost no opportunity for reply being given the 
accused,3 Governor Frank Murphy of Michigan was an outstanding example 
of an unimpeachable target for lurid charges.4 Loose accusations really 
proved to hurt democracy and help Communism. They unnecessarily created 
fears and divisions; they injected confusion into the actual task of 
properly identifying Communists; they tended to foster a rigid respect 
for the status quo not in keeping with the historical American tradition 
of continual adjustment, without revolution, through compromise between 
the various sectors of society. The loss of this tradition could con-
ceivably result in an inability to adjust in some time of crises; the 
2. Rorty, James and Deeter, Moshe, McCarthy and the Communists (Boston, 
Beacon Press, 1954) 5· 
3· Odegard, Peter H., Prologue .1£ November, illQ (New York, Harper, 
1940) 26, 
4. Odegard, Peter H., Prologue !2 November, 1940, 26-27, 
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resultant chaotic situation could be of a sort on which the Communists 
invariably thrive, Stephen Spender, a poet end former pro-Communist, 
has written, "I suggest that anti-Communist propaganda has proved the 
most reliable and best propaganda, working in the long run in favor of 
Stalin, since the Revolution,•.S 
Among those who loosely labeled Tugwell a Red there were repre-
sentatives of the lunatic fringe, Gerald Winrod6 has been grouped with 
the likes or Fritz Kuhn and William Dudley Pelley as a breeder of hate 
and poison among his fellow men.7 Elizabeth Dilling,8 whose book of 
biographical sketches provided material for Representative William H. 
Wilson, Pa., in an anti-Tugwell speech,9 referred in her dossier on 
Tugwell to Uonald Richberg as a •leading red light" and Stuart Chase 
as a "long-time subversive.• 10 Heywood Broun took the trouble to 
examine his own history in Dilling's book. He commented that her ac-
count of him showed "how completely a revolutionary can be limned within 
11 
a couple of sticks,• and proceeded to refute her purported statements 
of fact point by point.12 
Mark Sullivan certainly was not on the lunatic fringe, He did 
5. Spender, Stephen, in The God That Failed, ed. by Richard Crossman 
(New York, Bantam Books, 1952) 246. 
6, Winrod, Gerald, CO!!I!!!!l!lism and The Roosevelt Brain~ (Wichita, 
Kansas, Defender Press, 1933· 
7. Pearson, Drew, •Merry-Go-Round," Boston Traveler, March 3, 1954. 
8, Dilling, Elizabeth, The Roosevelt Red Record and Its Background 
(Chicago, The Author, 1936), 
9. Congressional Record, 74 Congress, 1 Session, Vol, 79, Part 9, 
June 27, 1935, 10332·33· 
10. Winrod, Gerald, CoillllUnism and the Roosevelt Bra in Trust, 351. 
11. Broun, Heywood, •Redder than the Roosevelts,• Nation, Vol. 141, 
No, 3654, July 17, 1935, 77. 
12. Broun, Heywood, •Redder than the Roosevelts,• 78. 
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verge towards the extreme right wing of the Republican party, His 
attack on Tugwell which suggested that the Assistant Secretary was con-
spiring to undermine the American form of government, began late in 
1933 shortly after Sullivan had visited Herbert Hoover at Palo Alto,13 
indicating the effect of the former President's personal animus toward 
Tugwell, Other critics who considered Tugwell a revolutionary did not 
share ~llivan's fear that Tugwell was silently effecting a revolution, 
A magazine writer compared Tugwell to William z. Foster, a leading 
American Communist, as a man whose 'big talk• had interfered with big 
acts and whose books prematurely gave away his schemes.~ 
Anti-Tugwell writers overplayed the charges of George N, Peek, 
Why~~~ contained few direct personal references to Tugwell, 
Peek recalled, •I never personally had any serious differences with Dr. 
Tugwell - which simply means that he never clearly got in my way.• 15 
Tugwell, Peek continued, was bright but not profound, never let himself 
get too far out on a limb, loved words and speeches, and failed to 
appreciate the gap between words and actions; Peek's most specific state• 
ment relating Tugwell to subversion noted that while Tugwell's speeches 
exposed some 'deep and fine• social theory and his writings showed •a 
deep familiarity with •revolutionary technique,•• he often •starts and 
stops with the words. It does not occur to him perhaps that there is a 
world where actions must eventually take the place of words.• 16 Peek's 
Carter, J. Franklin (Unofficial Observer), The New Dealers (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1934) 86, 
Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• The Saturday~­
ing ~. Vol, 209, No. 5, August 1, 1936, 74. 
Peek, George N. and Crowther, Samuel, ~ Q.uit Our~ (Kew York, D, 
Van Nostrand, 1936) 108, 
Peek, George N, and Crowther, Samuel, Why~ Our Own, 108-09. 
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personal comments on Tugwell were completed with the remark thBt • 
••• 
neither Dr, Tugwell nor Mr. Frank is the kind of man to get into a dis-
pute. They both seem to believe that he Who fights and runs away will 
live to fight another day,• 17 Despite his hinting that ·rugwell was a 
revolutionary, Peek did not credit Tugwell with the boldness necessary 
to effect a quick revolution. 
Gilbert Fite reported that Peek's personal files contained no 
evidence indicating that as AA Administrator Peek had information about 
actual party members in his agency. Some of his closest friends did not 
recall ever having heard him make such a charge in 1933• Fite explained 
that Peek was inclined to group all left-wingers in the subversive cate-
gory; ••communist• was a term which he frequently used to stigmstize 
extreme liberals with whom he disagreed,• 18 As for Why 'luit Our Own, Fite 
stated that for sales appeal co-author Samuel Crowther injected phrases 
that made the account more dramatic than Peek had really intended. Crow-
ther warned Peek that if the book were objective, people would not read 
it; he insisted on stressing personalities and radical ism in the New Deal. 
Only in some instances did Peek compel Crowther to tone down his exag• 
gerated statements,19 
Peek's own words and activities occasionally provided What an 
17. Peek, George N. and Crowther, Samuel, Why Q.uit Our Own, 117. 
l8. Fi te, Bilbert c., Geore:e !'!· Peek and the Fight £2!: Farm Parity 
(Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1954) 262. 
19. Fite, Gilbert, c., George .!'!· Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity, 
289. 
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irresponsible accuser would consider a proper basis for reckless charges. 
Peek wrote that, "It (Consumers'· Guide of the AAA) is a record of the 
20 
upward climb of the farmers and the workers;• this statement did not 
evoke any criticism such as writers heaped on Tugwell for urging farmer~ 
labor political unity. As adviser to the President on foreign trade, 
Peek set out to establish an agricultural export corporation which, one 
author noted, was a direct parallel to the Soviet trade monopoly -- •a 
parallel which the conservatives conveniently overlooked in boosting the 
'rugged individualism' of Peek against the suave 'socialism' of Tugwell.• 21 
Tugwell himself has written that in Peek's mind sharecroppers, tenants, 
and hired hands were "help" who had to look to the farmer for aid; Peek 
did not worry about the •economy,• a •generalization beyond his range,• 
and 
It was a short leap, for a mind as simple as Mr. Peek's, 
from the suggestion that government might assist the 
underprivileged farm folk along with the well-to-do 
proprietors, all the way to Communsim with a capital •c.• 
•••••• many of Peek's followers would say this, but 
they did not believe it.22 
As we have seen, one author felt that the most spectacular 
charges against Tugwell, those made by William Wirt, provoked a suspiciously 
serious reaction on the part of the New Dealers. This writer believed that 
if some one in the administration had laughed at the right time, the public 
also would have laughed.23 This author did not consider the possibility 
20. Nourse, Edwin G., et al., ~Years of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1937) 398. 
21. Carter, J. Franklin (Unofficial Observer), The New Dealers, 148. 
22. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken~ (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 23, 
23. Young, James c., Roosevelt Revealed (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 
1936) 146. 
that the organs of opinion may have refused to accept a joke as such, 
He, himself, mentioned Roosevelt's tongue-in-cheek response to the 
observation that no leader had ever retained power through the three 
phases of a revolution: •well, Cromwell did"; be dismissed the Presi• 
dent's remark as a demonstration of "What may come from knowing a bit 
of history,• 24 This critic considered Roosevelt's remark smart-alecky; 
he would not concede that it was a non-serious reaction to Wirt•s 
charges. When a member of the brain trust ssw a little joke in the 
affain saying that •some of the boys in good spirits kidded the old 
duffer,• the critic's comment was •too late,•25 In the view of the OP-
position the New Dealers' less-than-grave comments were neither suffi• 
ciently humorous nor timely to allay suspicion. 
One of Tugwell's severest critics believed that the 'Nirt charges 
were based on the "loose conversation of some Tugwell worshippers.• 26 
Another journalist could not understand why, if the Tugwell idolizers 
were going to reveal their hands so completely, they selected the mere 
superintendent of the Gary schools as their confidant.27 Other weaknesses 
appeared in 'vlirt • s line of reasoning. The brain-trust treory, in the 
sense of a plot controlling the administration, was •completely false,• 28 
Lack of organization and differences in the backgrounds and viewpoints 
of members of the administrative machine after ~Rrch 4, 1933, rendered 
24. Young, James C., Roosevelt Revealed, 148. 
25. Young, James c., Roosevelt Revealed, 148. 
26, Johnston, Alva, "Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• 9. 
27. Villard, Oswald G,, "Issues and Men: The Communistic Brain Trust,• 
Nation, Vol, 138, No. 3587, April 4, 1934, 377• 
28. Soule, George, 'rhe Coming American Revolution (New York, Macmillan, 
1934) 207. 
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the term "brain trust• a very loose label -- if it was in a strict 
29 
sense usable at all. John Franklin Carter thought that the logic of 
the attack was weak; even if Tugwell were a subversive revolutionist, 
"which he was not,• the denial to him of the right to pursue his 
policy by peaceful, legal methods amounted to asserting that change 
could be achieved only by violence and bloodshed.JO Finally, what was 
perhaps the most significant aspect of the Wirt affair was also the 
least publicized. Pamphlets disclosed that the Committee for the Nation. 
with Wirt and James H. Rand. Jr. leading the way, was outright infla-
tionist. Consequently. the Committee sought to discredit Tugwell• who 
stood firmly opposed to its psnacea.31 
Tugwell's training as an economist. and his participation in the 
formulation of economic policies, pointed to an additional vague aspect 
of the charges of subversion in the New Deal. A student of subversion 
concluded that for the Communists in the economic agencies of the 
1930s "the aim of influencing policy on the whole was more important 
than espionage;• his evidence simply failed to establish this fact.32 
If the subversives obtained a livelihood from their positions 
while gaining an entrance into government which enabled eventual espi-
onage, no one has explained or demonstrated hou they affected the depres-
29. 
JO. 
31. 
32. 
See above, Chapter VIII. 
Carter. J. Franklin (Unofficial Observer) The~ Dealers, 207. 
Interview with writer. 
Schlesinger. A.M., Jr., review of The Web of Subversion by James 
Burnham (New Yorke John Day, 1954) in The Saturday Review, Vol. 36. 
No. 12, March 20, 1954, 16-17. 
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sion-combatting measures of Tugwell's time33 in a way advantageous to 
international Communism, If, as reported in an article about Tugwell, 
Earl Browder stated at Moscow thet the .American Communist Party was not 
opposing the New Deal because the administration was helping toward 
revolutionary objectives,34 history has disproven Browder's strategy, 
In 1932 a majority of the American people were 'ready and eager• for 
radicalism35 -- the radicalism of action, of •trying something.• A 
refusal by the government to act at that time could conceivably have 
created conditions favorable to the rise of Communism, In retrospect 
the social reforms of Roosevelt are often referred to as •communist-
preventing.•36 Wirt 1 s charges that the New Deal conspirators hoped to 
prolong the depression in order to hasten the revolution was just the 
opposite of the accusation that the economic measures of the early New 
Deal were bringing the revolution closer. These attempts to associate 
subversion with relief and recovery have been exceeded in looseness 
only by the revived acceptance of the Wirt charges on the basis of sub-
sequent identification in the 1950s of subversives in government in the 
1930s. Wirt's charges were •correct• only in the broadest sense of the 
word. His charges were meaningless in any specific sense, particularly 
with reference to Rexford G, Tugwell. 
33• John T. Flynn, one of Tugwell's severest critics, writes that the 
Reds did not move into the government heavily until Roosevelt's 
second term, after Tugwell's departure; ~ Roosevelt Hyth (New 
York, Devin-Adair, 1948) 79• 
34. Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea ¥an,• 74• 
35· Villard, Oswald G,, "Issues and Men: The Communistic Brain Trust,• 377• 
36, Viereck, Peter, •The New American Radicals,• The Reporter, Vol. 11, 
No, 12, December 30, 1954, 41. 
lll2, 
Farmer-Labor Political Unity 
Tugwell's Los Angeles speech of October 28, 1935,1 occasioned 
renewed charges that he intended to import the Russian system to the 
United States, These accusations referred to the 'revolutionary' 
nature of the address,2 particularly to the passages in which Tugwell 
urged the political unity of farmers and workers,3 Tugwell warned the 
Democratic leaders of California against the opposition's attempt to 
separate the two great groups which had benefited most from New Deal 
policies, He declared that the farmers and the workers were the source 
of the administration's strength. He called for a "farmer-~rker alli-
ance in this country which will carry all before it.•4 He then outlined 
what the farmers5 and the workers6 had gained. 
A critic called the speech the •most startling and challenging• 
discourse by a New Dealer to date, describing Tugwell as the "boldest, 
the most outspoken• of the •Minor Prophets• of the administration, the 
•psychoanalyst• of the New Deal. In this speech Tugwell allegedly sub-
stituted the ~ore familiar, American designation• for the corresponding 
harsh word the dictators used; for example, "hate• became 'indignation.•? 
1. Tugwell, R. G,, Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935; Resettlement Administration~ Release. 
2. Ely, Joseph B,, The American Dream (Boston, B. Humphries, 1944) 174, 
180-81. 
3· Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1936) 
105. 
4. Tugwell, R, G,, Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, 5· 
5· Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, 5· 
6, Tugwell, R, G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, 6, 
7• Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism, 101-02, 
81]. 
(It is perhaps worth noting here that had Tugwell employed "hate,• no 
one would have had to eEplain his subtlety; in other words, he was a 
revolutionary in some eyes regardless of which words he chose,) More-
over, this observer contended, Tugwell had •not been repudiated by his 
master or associates .a •••• the implication being that Tugwell's was 
the most significant voice in the administration because he spoke with 
unchallenged authority. This implication did not take into account a 
long explanatory and somewhat apologetic letter on the Los Angeles 
speech which Tugwell sent to the President.9 
Tugwell was consistent with previous statements in referring to 
political tactics calculated to split the workers and the farmers. He 
lashed out in a nationwide address in July, 1934, at the •Tories• who 
were •trying to array labor against the farmers, with the sole if uncon-
fessed object of perpetuating the speculative conditions• which they 
10 (the •Tories•) exploited. Beginning in the 1920s, Tugwell devoted 
considerable attention to the condition of the rural population; he was 
also the only brain truster who had shown a specific interest in labor 
unions. 11 He disapproved of their submissiveness,12 their •medieval" 
9. Letter. Tugwell to Roosevelt. November 1. 1935, from Grand Canyon 
National Park, Arizona; Roosevelt Papers. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Columbia Broadcasting System, July 31, 1934. 
USDA ~ Release, 4; after be left the government TUgwell wrote an 
article, •Is a Farmer-Labor Alliance Possible?', Harper's Magazine, 
May, 1937· 
11. Bernstein, Irving, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy (Berkely, 
University of California Press, 1950) 26. 
12. Tugwell, R. G •• The !ndustrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts 
(New York, Columbia University Press. 1933) 5-6. 
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craft structure,13 their unimaginative leadership and failure to employ 
experts.14 In the view of the opposition, the significance of Tugwell's 
call for farmer-labor unity was that his request reflected ideas he 
acquired in his two-month tour of Russia in 1927. 
People such as Russell Lord and John Franklin Carter, who worked 
with Tugwell, have emphatically refuted the charge of Russian influence. 
Lord wrote that Tugwell, who was sympathetic to the planned march away 
from family-line Czarism, was critical of the regimentation in the Rus-
sian syatem.15 Carter stressed Tugwell's academic function and attitude; 
he was an "interested observer• of the Russian experiment.16 Other 
writers stated that Tugwell left Russia convinced that while many abuses 
flourished in the name of freedom, the American creed of freedom was to 
be valued more highly than ever;17 according to a biographical sketch 
Tugwell returned convinced that Russians and Americans had much to learn 
from each other', but entirely out of sympathy with revolutionary tactics.18 
Newsweek noted that after his trip Tugwell produced a •critical and reali-
13. Tugwell, R. G., The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts, 
133· 
14. Tugwell, R. G., The Industrial Discipline and ~ Governmental Atl.!• 
157. 
15. Lord, Russell, ::I:.M Wallaces .Q!: Iowa (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
350-51. 
16. Carter, J. Franklin (Unofficial Observer), The New Dealers (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1934) 88, 
17. Gillis, A. and Ketchum, R., Our America (Boston, Little, Brown, 1936) 
361-62. 
18. Block, M., ed,, Current Biography, 1941 (New York, H. w. Wilson, 1941) 
874· 
stie• essay of Russian agriculture.19 Senator Bailey found that Tug-
well's writings on Russian agriculture did not appear to justify any 
20 suspicion that Tugwell absorbed the views of the Russian leaders. 
The year after his tour of Russia Tugwell himself criticized 
the unrealistic observations of visitors to the Soviet Union, particu-
larly the report of Theodore Dreiser.21 Tugwell col!llllented in the same 
article that some people thought Trotsky's exile was a prelude to eon-
servatism, "Yet it now begins to look as though Stalin had stolen some 
of Trotsky's thunder and the quarrel was mainly ••• over who should 
make the noise,• 22 Tugwell's impressions of Russia were, of course, 
available to friend and foe alike. Internal analysis of his actual 
work seems to be the best basis for determining the presence or absence 
of Russian influence in his thinking. 
Recurring throughout Tugwell's chapter are qualifying statements 
characteristic of the academic approach. When Tugwell wrote this report 
he was not a New Dealer. He was a professor of economics and a student 
in Whose view any social, political, or economic phenomenon was a fit 
19. •Tugwell: He Blazed a New Path in 'Dismal Science,•• Newsweek, Vol. 
1, No. 8, April 8, 1933, 16, referring to Tugwell, R. G., "Russian 
Agriculture,• in Soviet Russia jn the Second Pecade, ed. by Stuart 
Chase, Robert Dunn, and R. G, Tugwell (N, Y., J"ohn Day, 1928), 
20. Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 78, Part 10, J"une 
13. 1934. 11337· 
21. Dreiser Looks~ Russia (London, Constable, 1928); it is interesting 
to note in connection with the observations of visitors to Russia in 
the 1920s that J"ohn M. Keynes characterized Communism as essentially 
a religion; A Short View of Russia, Hogarth Essay No, XIII (London, 
At the Hogarth Press by L. ~nd V. Woolf, 1925) 1; anti-New Dealers 
later equated Keynesian economics with statism of a foreign-like nature. 
22. Tugwell, R. G,,•Communist Theory vs. Russian Fact,• New Republic, Vol, 
54, No, 702, May 16, 1928, 367. 
816. 
subject for scholarly examination. At the beginning of the chapter he 
stated that his main effort would be: 
••• to state the policies, in as much detail as seems 
permissible, of the present government, as they beer 
upon the economy of Russia's rural regions, and to as-
sess their s~§ess by Whatever tests are available to 
the outsider. 
He then noted that because his time in Russia had been short, there would 
be gaps and misinterpretations.24 
With regard to various details Tugwell continually made cautious 
qualifications. As to the general success of the collective farm sys-
tem, for example, he remarked, "it must be admitted that reports differ.• 25 
He concluded that taxation was actually less than it had been in pre-war 
times, •unless official figures, furnished in all apparent good faith, 
26 
are not to be trusted.• Another passage indicated Tugwell's awareness 
of the investigatory problems involved: 
23· 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
These selected figures give e very different general 
impression then is furnished by comparison of wholesale 
prices for industrial goods; or even by a comparison of 
similar retail prices. Apparently the gathering of 
prices in central localities end the construction of 
indexes from them would lead to the conclusion that the 
Russian peasants are much better off than they are actu-
ally. Suspicion of such general figures is justifiable. 
No real notion of the situation csn be got without the 
use of indexes21onstructed from figures actually taken on the ground.-
Tugwell, R. G., "Russian Agriculture,• in Soviet Russia in the Second 
Decade, ed. by Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn, end Rexford G. Tugwell 
(New York, John Day, 1928) 57· 
Tugwell, R. a., "Russian Agriculture, • 58. 
Tugwell, R. G., •Russian Agriculture,• 64. 
Tugwell, R, G.' •Russian Agriculture, • 70. 
Tugwell, B, G., •Russian Agriculture,• 84-85. 
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Tugwell indicated the objective sweep of the academic mind when he 
noted that Russia was no different from any other nation in one respect: 
the artificial support of costly industries was a burden to consumers 
paid for in a lower standard of living.28 
Tugwell concluded his study on a typically academic note, He 
acknowledged that since he had had no previous experience with Russian 
life, he could not tell what had been lost, He then observed that a 
series of trifles taken together amounted to a stirring of new life 
hardly yet come to birth, but held close within the strong peasant cul-
ture. "What will be its maturity no one knows,• was his final state-
ment.29 The subsequent removal of Russian rural life from the tradi-
tional peasant culture contradicted nothing Tugwell wrote because, in 
academic fashion, he left the way open for almost any outcome, Perhaps 
there was validity in an observation that Tugwell, who •wrote an appraisal 
of the Russian system with ••• calm deliberation,• was •cussed out by both 
Right and Left• primarily because he was a scientist,3° 
Another aspect of Tugwell's work also showed his academic approach; 
the picture constantly and keenly before him, after his return, was of 
an American agricultural problem -- overproduction -- exactly the reverse 
of the Russian.31 In his chapter in Soviet Russia in the Second Decade 
28, Tugwell, R, G,, •Russian Agriculture,• 100, 
29, Tugwell, R, G,, •Russian Agriculture,• 102. 
30. Peerson, D. and Allen, R, s., •Valentino of the Revolution,• maga-
zine clipping, Tugwell Papers. 
31. •Tugwell: He Blazed a New Path in 'Dismal Science,•• 16. 
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he continually referred to contrasts between agriculture in the United 
States and Russia. He stated that the rural standard of living in Rus-
sia was depressed beyond the American comprehension.32 Regarding land-
holding he commented: 
The question whether the characteristic American farm-
stead system lends itself to greater efficiency than the 
Russian village system is not easily settled. It is, 
however, almost purely an academic one; at least for the 
preaent,3J 
In duscussing price controls in Russia, Tugwell simply pointed 
out that "this cannot be taken as having any meaning in an uncontrolled 
system such as ours.• 34 He wrote that the disadvantageous price posi-
tion of the peasants 
involves ••• less ability to buy furniture, soap, 
textiles, and other amenities of civilization upon 
which our own rural population has come to depend, 
But if one thinks himself back about fifty years in 
America, he will realize that most of these were 
then produced locallJ here. And this is the present 
situation in Russia. 5 
This last observation gave the reader to understand that the dis-
cussion took place within a context entirely different from the American 
setting. Consequently, in the 1930s Tugwell saw our problems from an 
angle totally different from a Russian viewpoint. His official acts 
demonstrated that his alleged intention to 'Sovietize' America was an 
"absolute ~th •• 36 At the time of his resignation in 1936 Tugwell pro-
32. Tugwell, R, G., "Russian Agriculture, • 59· 
33· Tugwell, R. G., "Russian Agriculture, • 6ln. 
34· Tugwell, R, G., "Russian Agriculture, • 80, 
35· Tugwell, R. G,, •Russian Agriculture,• 93· 
36. McCall, C. H., "That Columbia Crowd,• Credit and Financial Management, 
Vol, 35, No. 6, June, 1933, 17. 
posed a forty-year plan Whereby tenants could acquire ownership of 
individual farms; he considered fann tenancy neither sound sociology 
nor good economy,37 The individual ownership in American agriculture 
which he favored was the opposite of the Russian collectivism which had 
occurred in the years since his visit to the Soviet Union. Tugwell's 
general approach to agriculture .in the Soviet Union reflected the basic 
problem in Russian farming, underproduction -- a difficulty still 
present in Russia nearly three decades later.38 As a student of Ameri-
can agriculture Tugwell was concerned with a converse problem, over 
production. 
Tugwell's remarks on farmer-labor relations in Russia provided 
no basis for the charge that his Los Angeles appeal for farmer-labor 
political unity reflected his Russian experiences. Concerning the 
Russian peasant, Tugwell wrote in 1928: 
That he has a serious handicap in any economic struggle 
which may come, he knows as well as anyone. The govern-
ment of Russia is a dictatorship of the proletariat; and 
all the recent talk about united •workers and peasants• 
cannot alter the fundamental fact of institutions managed, 
so far as is expedient, for the enhancement of the prole-
tarian power. There are und~btedly serious discrimina-
tions from which he suffers.~ 
37. Editorial, 'Tugwell's 40-Year Plan for Agriculture,• Business Week, 
November 21, 1936, 17. 
38. Wohl, Paul, 'Moscow Bares Crop Failure,• Christian Science Monitor, 
February 2, 1954; Bokor, Bela, •communist Remedies to Overcome the 
Agricultural Crisis,• Monthly Bulletin, International Peasant Union, 
March, 1954; Whitney, Thomas R., 'The Kre~~in's Big Problem- the 
Peasant,• New York Times Magazine, April 24, 1955. 
39. Tugwell, R. G., 'Russian Agriculture,• 56. 
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When the proletariat tried to exert their power over the peasants, the 
latter employed 
••• the tactic of a fighter who opposes his adversary's 
skill with a steedy resistance to punishment, and who, 
•~en fatigue has become his ally wins without recourse 
to strategy. This describes, precisely, rural Russia.4° 
Witness, for instance, the behavior of the peasants in 
the years when the Bolsheviks attempted the requisition-
ing of crops. When one crop disappeared into the tax-
collector's bins, they simply refused to raise another. 
So the lesson was taught, in a costly way, but with a 
bitter effectiveness •••• 41 
Implicit in this remark were the difficulties involved in subsequent 
compulsory collectivization. 
Tugwell noted how state credit policies in Russia indicated the 
disadvantageous position of agriculture with relation to industry. 
While it was conceived that credits to heavy industry were an indirect 
benefit to agriculture because they would result in more effective 
production of farm machinery, the beneficial effects, Tugwell asserted, 
would be later and less direct than if credit were extended in the form 
42 
of loans for growing crops. In the matter of taxation, although there 
had been subsequent attempts at agrarian relief, during the period of 
military communism the city workers in charge of the Soviet government 
considered rural districts as colonies to be exploited.43 The determi-
nation of price policies had occasioned •one of the bitterest internal 
conflicts which has beset the Communist Party.• The fight had been going 
40. Tugwell, R. G., •Russian Agriculture, • 56-57· 
41. Tugwell, R. G., •Russian Agriculture, • 57· 
42. Tugwell, R. G. • •Russian Agriculture, • 68 • 
43· Tugwell, l\ • G, • •Russian Agriculture,• 70. 
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on for several years at the time of Tugwell's visit, A vigorous dis• 
senting group, including Trotsky, disputed the wisdom of the encourage-
ment of agriculture which began in 1923.44 As for the peasants sharing 
in the public goods of the Union, Tugwell concluded that, "The greatest 
benefits have undoubtedly gone to city workers so far.•45 Near the end 
of his chapter he stated: 
In the meantime, it cannot be disguised that heavy 
burdens are borne in the service of the socialistic 
ideal. It would seem, also, in the face of it, that 
they are borne most heavily by the peasants.46 
It is relevant here to consider the ·discussion by Tugwell's 
friend, M. L, Wilson, of the peesant in a Marxist state. Wilson stated 
that every nation faced the problem of distributing national income 
between industrial end rural workers,47 Marxian theory, Wilson pointed 
out, contained very little on this distribution; the old Marxian concept 
assumed only the problem of labor and capital.48 Farmers were really 
the backbone of democracy, Wilson maintained; in Russia, where they had 
supported the revolution in the hope of getting individual property, they 
had been collectivized by the dominant urban proletariat,49 
In his chapter Tugwell made additional comments on the anomalous 
position of the peasant in Russia. The production of agricultural pro-
44. Tugwell, R. G,, •Russian Agriculture,• 74• 
45. Tugwell, R. G,, "Russian Agriculture,• 93· 
46. Tugwell, R, G,, "Russian Agriculture,• 100, 
47. Wilson, Milburn L., Democracy Has Roots (New York, Carrick and Evans, 
1939) 69. 
48. Wilson, Milburn L., Democracy Has~. 74; an excellent study is 
Mitrany, David,~ afainst ~Peasant (Chapel Hill, University of 
North Carolina Press, 1951), 
49. Wilson, Milburn L., Democracy Has Roots, 75· 
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ducts in the Soviet Union was e private business in a socialistic state, 
requiring as a stimulus high prices and the definite possibility of a 
higher standard of living to be obtained by hard work and good manege-
ment.50 The year after his trip Tugwell deplored the astonishing, con-
tradictory, ruthless supression of peasant home-industry, the one 
factor which had made the goods famine endurable to the peasant, at a 
time when difficulties in grain collection were most acute.51 It was 
self-evident in Tugwell's writings on Russian agriculture that his con-
tact with neither the empirical nor the theoretical aspects of Russian 
policies had any bearing on his views on farmer-labor relations in the 
United Sta~es. 
Two Individuals 
Tugwell, as an employer, logically would have hired a leftist 
agitator and fired an anti-leftist when the appropriate occasions arose. 
if he were a revolutionary subversive. Two specific cases in his 
actual personnel relations found him behaving in a manner decidedly illo-
gical for a promoter of revolution. 
Donald Henderson was an instructor in economics at Columbia. 
Tugwell gave him the position with the understanding thet Henderson 
would work on his doctorate. Henderson did nothing on his dissertation, 
neglecting his duties end becoming a radical agitator -- apparently for 
psychological reasons.1 Henderson's radical activities complicated the 
so. 
51. 
1. 
Tugwell, H. G., •Russian Agriculture,• 95· 
Tugwell, R. G., •communist Theory vs. Russian Fact,• 367, 
Interview with writer. 
situation because young radicals intended to make an issue over him. 
When Tugwell did not renew Henderson's contract, the young instructor 
became a hero to the Communists as the result of this •affront• to his 
2 
academic freedom, In a public statement Tugwell rraintained that Hender-
son furthered his philosophy with methods of force; while Henderson had 
neglected his duties, the real issue, stated Tugwell, was freedom from 
compulsion and loyalty to the traditions of schol~rship.3 In subsequent 
controversies over academic freedom there has been no more clear and 
concise statement of the reasons for rejecting Communism in the class-
room than Tugwell's stand in 1933· 
Another personnel matter found Tugwell retaining an anti-radical. 
Pare Lorentz produced a motion picture, "The Plow That Broke the Plains,• 
for the United States Department of Agriculture. In making this film 
about the Dust Bowl, Lorentz suffered a personal financial loss. More-
over, he was irritated by some of his colleagues who had wanted "The Plo~ 
to be "all about human greed and how lousy our social system was.• 
Lorentz could not see the connection between comment on the social system 
and dust storms. He violently objected to being celled a 'leftist' or 
any other cultist ertistic or political. He considered himself a 
realist. Discouraged, Lorentz went into the Under Secretary's office to 
voice his complaints and announce his departure. Tugwell refused Lorentz's 
resignation and increased his per diem allowance.4 
2. Stolberg, Benjamin, Story of the C.I.O. (New York, Viking, 1938) 242. 
3· The New York Times, April 5, 1933, 21:7. 
4· White, w. L,, •Pare Lorentz,• Scribner's Magazine, Vol. 105, No. 1, 
January, 1939, 9-10. 
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TuRwell Defines International Communism 
Throughout his career Tugwell has shown an ability, along with 
his academic interest in Soviet economic experiments, objectively to 
appraise the nature and aims of Stalinism. In his essay on Russian 
agriculture he noted how Russian factory managers were dismissed •with 
characteristic Communist ruthlessness,• 1 The self-explanatory title of 
an article he wrote the following year, •communist Theory and Russian 
Fact,• 2 indicated Tugwell's realistic view of Russia at a time when some 
liberals' favorable attitudes towards the Soviet Union blinded them to 
actualities, 
Four years lBter, when Tugwell was a member of the Roosevelt 
entourage, his views on Far Eastern policy took into account the expan-
sive inclinations of Russian imperialism) A decade and more later, 
when Tugwell was Governor of Puerto Rico, he came into direct contact 
with active apents of the international Corrmunist conspiracy. His re-
marks on Communists in connection with his Puerto Rican experiences merit 
lengthy quotation~ 
1. 
2. 
It was no part of the scheme for the Falangistas to admit 
that they were anti-~merican any more than the communistas 
did, but they took oaths which no American could take, 
just as the communists did. No democrat, no believer in 
progressive liberalism, could have anything in common with 
them. Or they with him. And this was the crowd - they 
and their newspaper • who saw in me a symbol of all they 
most hated.4 
Tugwell, R. G., •Russian Agriculture,• in Soviet Russia in the Second 
Decade, ed. by Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn, and R, G. Tugwell (New York, 
John Day, 1938) 95. 
Tugwell, R, G,, •communist Theory vs. Russian Fact,• New Republic, 
Vol. 54, No. 702, May 16, 1928. 
See above, Chapter VII, Section, 'Relations with Japan.• 
Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken~ (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 146. 
The communists were, for the moment, because it was party 
policy, in favor of the war and so somewhat cautious about 
the use of the strike. But in typical communist fashion 
they worked night and day, admitted no scruple in making 
decisions end conducted themselves in ways which indicated 
their contempt for such bourgeois concepts as promises and 
contracts. Because they we~e allied with the independentistas 
Munoz granted them too much. So he came to extend a dangerous 
tolerance to the cornmunistas, forgetting that they had no 
directed interest in Puerto Rico but were only using inde-
pendence as ~ means of causing trouble for another 'capital-
ist' nation.-' 
It was obvious that the communistas were getting ready for 
the day when the party line of international communism would 
diverge from policies of the United States. 
Tugwell learned that the communistas were encouraging affiliations be• 
tween certain Puerto Ricans and communist organizations elsewhere, par• 
ticularly in Cuba and Mexico, but 
When I remonstrated, I was informed that it was all because 
the c.r.o. had taken so unfriendly an attitude toward the 
Puerto Rican labor movement and because there was felt to be 
a need for an outside affiliation of some sort. On investi-
gation this •unfriendliness' seemed to be no more than the 
imposing of certain conditions for affiliation (payment of 
dues, honoring of contracts, representative elect ions) .... 
No such conditions were necessary for the international com-
munist affiliation. Nevertheless, I hoped that we might get 
the c.r.o. to unbend and extend a helping hand. So vigorous 
a movement ought to be given objectives and direction, and 
it ought to be encouraged to replace its communistas with 
genuinely Puerto Rican leaders. For the moment Munoz would 
take no action. He was fascinated by what he called the 
•selflessness' of leaders I complained of - which meant that 
he was taken in by the parade they made of poverty.? 
In the period of the Cold War, Tugwell continued realistically to 
appraise the impact of the Russians on the international scene. In 
5. Tugwell, R, G., The Stricken Land, 568. 
6. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 80, 
7. Tugwell, R, G., The Stricken Land, 568-69. 
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October, 1941, when the Axis powers were on the mArch, he wrote about 
the need for the United States to straighten out internal affairs while 
preparing against external threats: 
•• , it is not more important to keep invaders from 
American shores than wolves from American doors, In 
the long run man's energies and techniques will have 
to be put to both uses •••• If Americans are incapable 
of recognizing this, or if they are prevented from do-
ing so by propaganda, their nation is likely to need 
again something like that military genius of Washington 
which so luckily combined with strategic ineptness of 
the opposition; and that would be a second fortunate 
circumstance on which no nation ought to count. It 
would be wiser, safer, surer to prevent the establishment 
of outside hegemony by achieving directional purpose and 
so national strength before it is too late,8 
While the Axis threat was then uppermost in American minds, Tugwell was 
aware th~t danger could come from another direction. Referring in the 
same article to world systems -- Communism, Democracy, Capitalism, Fascism, 
and National Socialism, he wrote: 
To the extent which each pretends to world dominion in 
the same subject-matter, no two can exist in tolerance, 9 though there may be temporarily defensive alliances •••• 
The Grand Alliance of World War II proved to be temporary; with 
its disintegration the Cold War reflected a new threat to American free-
dom. Tugwell pointed out, in The Stricken Land, serious difficulties 
which imposed new responsibilities on the United States. He recalled 
that at the end of World War II the Russians, whose Soviet government 
inherited the historic urge to the sea in the Middle East, exploited 
8, Tugwell, h, G., "The Directive,• Journal£[ Social Philosophy and 
Jurisprudence, Vol, 7, No. l, October, 1941, 35-36, 
9• Tugwell, R. G., "The Directive,• 12, 
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Britain's weakness and our own faltering and demobilization; •we were 
exposed to the consequences of any incident which the brutish Russians 
- - 10 
might make too hard for themLthe British/ to accept,• 
The year after the publication of The Stricken Land, Tugwell 
apparently allowed his old friend Henry Wallace to persuade him into 
lending a kind of support to the Progressive Party, In the early part 
11 
of 1948, Tugwell publicly backed Wallace, In August he appeared at 
the party convention in Philadelphia. On the surest test issue of the 
day, foreign policy, he found that the party, led by Lee Pressman, 
acted like a Communist cell; when Tugwell tried in the Resolutions Com• 
mittee to win approval of the Marshall Plan, he was suuuffirily voted 
down,l2 Tugwell obviously was not taken in by Pressman when the latter's 
views ran counter to American interests. He felt that Wallace, like 
Munoz-Marin, was extending a "dangerous tolerance,• expressing his fear 
that the •wrong people" might get control of the Progressive Party, 
Tugwell was asked to identify the •wrong people"; he replied, •I cer• 
tainly don't know whether they are Communists, but they certainly act 
like them.• 13 Tugwell then relapsed into silence, taking no active part 
in the campaign. The validity of his fear that the •wrong' people might 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Tugwell, R, G,, The Stricken Land, x-xi. 
Unpublished statement supporting Henry Wallace's third party, Febru-
ary, 1948; address, Henry Wallace Rally, Chicago Stadium, April 10, 
1948, unpublished; unpublished address, Henry Wallace Dinner, Hotel 
Commodore, New York, April 19, 1948; Tugwell Papers. 
Goldman, Eric F., Rendezvous~ Destiny (New York, Knopf, 1952); 
cited in The World of History, ed. by C, Canby and N, Gross (New York, 
New American Library, A Mentor Book, 1954) 175. 
The New York Times, August 11, 1948; cited in Schlesinger, A. M,, Jr., 
The Vita~n~Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1949) 165. 
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take over the party has been borne out.14 
Tugwell expressed his lack of tolerance for Americans who became 
Communists in these words: 
Those who honor truth and whose integrity is uncom-
promising are in no way excused from going on. Nor 
are they forgiven for becoming - as some did - com-
munists or any other kind of un•American pledgee. 
This is even worse for the soul than becoming a com-
promiser. Because the way is strait the believer is 
not excused from going down it,l5 
It became known to the public in the 1950s that when Whittaker Chambers, 
on August 23, 1939, in a now famous incident, revealed information about 
disillusioned men who had forsaken the way of compromise, he chose a 
certain executive to whom to make his disclosures. This executive, who 
circulated to high officials a confidential memorandum discribing 
Chambers' charges, was Tugwell's associate of the original Brain Trust 
and co-recipient of the 'Communist' label -·Professor Adolf A. Serle, 
J 16 r. 
14. Spolanski, Jacob, ~ Communist Trail in America (New York, Macmil-
lan, 1951) 187-97. 
15. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken l&.ns!, 442. 
16. "The Story of Spies in Government,• United St~ ~ and World 
Report, November 27, 1953; Baldwin, Hanson W., •Churchill Was Right,• 
The Atlantic Monthly, Vol, 194, No, 1, July, 1954, 26, referred to 
Berle: 
,,, countless ••• references in Churchill's memoirs 
certainly betray none of the illusions then current 
in Washington about the nature of Communism or the 
danger of Soviet imperialism. There were, of course, 
some in the Administration who openly expressed their 
concern even in those days of the 'happy marriage' be• 
tween Washington and Moscow. The late James V. F'or-
restal, then Secretary of the Navy; w. Averell Harri-
man, the u • .s. Ambassador to Russia; Adolph A, Berle, 
(continued on following page) 
Tugwell's Indigenous Thinking 
In 1935 Walter Lippmann deplored the fact thAt it was then 
fashionable to think of all political change in terms of ideas bor-
rowed from the Central and Eastern European revolutions, The discus-
sion of current events was imprisoned within these sterotypes, which 
permitted only three choices: 1 standing still, communism, or fascism. 
When John T, Flynn, David Lawrence, and Herbert Hoover drew analogies 
between New Deal developments and European history, they took for granted 
what Lippmann called •something extremely improbable, namely that nations 
which have had different histories will henceforth have the same future,• 2 
Lippmann summarized his comments on rigid and oversimplified political 
views by warning conservatives that if they believed all public control 
led to communism, they •renounce their title to govern a modern demo-
cratic state;• if progressives, on the other hand, attempted to govern 
by imitating Europe, •they will come to grief upon the rocks of the 
American political tradition,•3 
Lippmann's remarks aptly characterized the kind of criticism dir-
acted at Tugwell, Critics who drew analogies between America and Europe 
16, Continued from previous page: 
Assistant Secretary of State; and Sumner Welles, Under 
Secretary of State, were four, among others, who never 
lost sight of the need for concrete peace aims. In the 
fall of 1944, Berle in a memorandum expressed concern 
about the increasing danger of Soviet post-war domination 
of Central and Eastern Europe, 
1. Lippmann, Walter, The New Imperative (Ne•• York, Macmillan, 1935) 4. 
2. Lippmann, Walter, The New Imperative, 5, 
3· Lippmann, Walter,~ New Imperative, 7• 
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would not concede to an advocate of change that he might possibly have 
arrived at his views on the basis of observation of the American scene. 
The experimentalist was, ipso facto, an importer of foreign ideas. At 
the same time, other commentators credited Tugwell with having arrived 
at his conclusions as an American, His conclusions were based on inves-
tigations prompted by his dissatisfaction with shortcomings in the Ameri-
can economy, Tugwell desired to promote improvement in American life, 
He indicated that his dissatisfaction occurred in an American context, 
on a level above foreign affairs, when he wrote in 1927 that 
••• we are conscious of the great good luck it is to 
ba Americans just now, We should probably not have 
bathrooms if we lived anywhere else. We should not 
have telephone service, an automobile, or a radio; we 
should not have electric cleaners and washers; we 
should not in fact, carry on with anything like our 
present efficiency and comfort if we happen to have 
been a French, German, or Russian family, But we are 
conscious, too, that many Americans are not so lucky, 
and this is disturbing,4 
Ernest Lindley asserted that the New Desl was saturated with Amari• 
can ideals; its objectives were security, happiness, self-respect, and 
the 'idea of generally distributed well-being expressed in the Declaration 
of Independence • .... Lindley illustrated his assertion by quoting Tug-
well: "What we sre doing is simply, in the light of modern realities, to 
seek trails toward the oldest aspirations of the race.•5 Moreover, other 
writers declared, Tugwell sought the fulfillment of American ideals in 
4. Tugwell, R, G., Industry's Coming of Age (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1927) 252•53• 
5. Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase (New York, 
Viking, 1933) 5· 
8Jl, 
the American way. If he was convinced that the American economic mach-
ine needed an overhauling, he was also convinced that the new model did 
not lie in imported creeds.6 He believed that we had to work out our 
own destiny by applying our own ideas and methods,7 Tugwell's anti-
deterministic philosophy,8 of course, involved a general rejection of 
foreign doctrines. In April, 1935, he suggested that 
Rather than feverishly scan all horizons - England whose 
fiscal recovery so enamors our bankers, Russia whose col-
lectivism is so enchanting to our radicals, Italy and 
Germany upon whose system some of our industrialists cast 
so wistful a gaze - it would pay them to study the Ameri-
can spirit ••• in a disciplined effort to find and cling 
to the social et~ic which must give direction to our 
national policy as it always finally has done,9 
If a •staunch and Whitmanesque• Americanism was one of Tugwell's 
10 
outstanding traits, it was based on his practicing what he preached in 
April, 1934, to some college students: 
I am not suggesting that each of you ought to be a philo-
sopher nor thAt you should meet practical problems with 
hampering preconception; but rather that you should always 
ask concerning them how does this contribute to those aims 
which Americans hold in common, This may seem to be an 
indefinite criterion, If you will use some of your free 
hours now to explore the American character, the develop-
ment of our traditions, our background of thinking, it will 
seem less so,ll 
6, Lindley, Ernest K,, •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Magazine, 
Vol. 94, No, 5, November, 1933, 264. 
7. Carter, J. Franklin (Unofficial Observer),~ New Dealers (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1934) 91. 
8. See above, Chapter IX, Section, "Anti-Determinism.• 
9. Tugwell, R, G., "The Progressive Tradition,• Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 
155, No. 4, April, 1935, 412, 
10, Carter, J, Franklin, The New Dealers, 91. 
11. Tugwell, R. G., Address, •on Life as a Long-Time Enterprise,• Dartmouth 
College, April 28, 1934; USDA Press Release, 14. 
His writings indicated his own devotion of many hours to the study of Ameri-
can history. He revealed an appreciation of American character and tradi-
tions, capturing the American spirit in these words: 
'Oh, Susannah, don't you cry for mel' was the marching 
song of a generation of Americans who set out to con-
quer the West. Americans want no pity, no one crying 
for them. They want opportunity to use their energy 
and talents,l2 
He suggested to another audience, in this case social workers, that their 
task was 
••• helping people to help themselves - to take advantage 
for the reconstruction of American life, of those springs 
of individual initiative which are so native to the Ameri-
can culture.l3 
A final quotation shows that Tugwell was firmly rooted in American soil: 
The literary economists ••• are tormented by the unrepen-
tant originality of events. 
The New Deal has been consigned to certain failure times 
enough because it is not this or that. 
What is being done is an indigenous development; the confu-
sion arises because our literary folk know everything ex-
cept American history. The clue they are looking for exists 
in their own rural past. Let me suggest, therefore, that 
they try to visualize the homestead and the village of a 
generation or two ago right here in the Eastern States. And 
let me give them a word to embroider and elaborate to see 
whether more cannot be made of it than of Communism, Fascism, 
Capitalism or any other of the terms which are being so over-
worked. The word is neighborliness.l4 
12. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Relief and Reconstruction,• National 
Conference of Social Workers, Kansas City, Missouri, May 21, 1934; 
in The Battle for Democracy, 309• 
13. Tugwell, H, G., Address, "Relief and Reconstruction,• 320. 
14. Newspaper clipping, Tug'""ll Papers. 
Tugwell the Conservative 
Exigencies of the Times 
Long Run 
Frank Kent entitled one of his most tongue-in-cheek columns 
"Tugwell the Conservative,• dismissing the implication of the title as a 
ridiculous joke.1 The word •conservative• lent itself to subjective defi-
nition. There was actually n good case for calling Tugwell a conservative 
in a certain context; his planned capitalism did not represent a radical 
departure from the existing system in the light of his belief that invinc-
ible economic trends compelled adjustment for survival. 
The depression dramatically pointed up the need for adjustment. 
Tugwell believed that overcoming the depression, without getting at the real 
root of economic fluctuation, would not constitute adequate adjustment for 
the long run, Providinr for survival required a long-run view. Tugwell did 
not think that man could achieve either the ecological discipline required 
by the •oneness of nature• or the closing of the physical-social gap in a 
day.2 Nevertheless, society had to anticipate long-run requirements with as 
great a sense of urgency as it brought to bear on immediate measures. 
Tugwell believed democratic government had to evolve to meet the 
challenge arising in modern civilization from the demand of the citizens of 
the democracies for security and the retention at the same tiwe of individual 
1. See above, Chapter X, Section, •Promotion,• 
2. See above, Chapter II, Section, 'The Need for Institutional Reform,• 
freedom,3 Society had to fulfill this demand in the face of an inexorable 
economic evolution: 
••• ,;n~t orthodoxy disapproves, what educators resist, 
what our moral leaders want to reverse -and what in-
dustrialists all-unknowingly are precipitating - i~ a 
vast-scale modernism which no resistance can stop, 
Tugwell asserted that the invincibility of Taylorism had been opera-
tive, if unnoticed, before 1900, The men of the nineties, like the mercanti-
lists who abhorred free trade, illustrated a rule of history; they could not 
delay an evolutionary development for long. Technological advance went on 
largely outside of the control of those who deplored and would have stopped 
it. Interchangeable parts, scientific management, and machine costing re-
moved the rule-of-thumb factory manager to the dinosaur class in an instant.5 
Technology, Tugwell declared, made the •articulation of the whole the 
6 
emergent need of society.• The process of articulation could be evolutionary 
or adaptive, unless it was deliberAtely delayed so that opposing social and 
physical forces reduced the American state to ineffectiveness.7 
If this last s~ould happen it would be sufficiently dramatic 
and obvious •••• For the whole system would either be subjected 
to a foreign executive or submerged in chaos out of which any-
thing might emerge - anything that is except institutions with 
fundamental provision for the participation of every citizen 
after his sort, which is, after all, the democrAtic sine qua 
non.8 
3· Welles, Sumner, review of The Stricken Land, Saturday Review of Litera-
ture, Vol. 29, No. 52, December 28, 1946, 9. 
4. Tugwell, R. G., "After the New Deal: 'We Have Bought Ourselves Time 
to Think,'" New Republic, Vol. 99, No. 1328, May 13, 1940, 325. 
5. Tugwell, R, G., "The Directive,• Journal of Social Philosophy and Juri-
sprudence, Vol. 7, No. l, October, 1941, 27-28, 
6. Tugwell, R. G., "The Fourth Power,• Planning and Civic Comment, Part II, 
April-June, 1939, 11. 
7. Tuewell, R. G., "The Fourth Power." 1-2. 
8, Tugwell, R. G., "The Fourth Power,• 2. 
In any event, technology would overcome all obstacles to its advance, 
Consequently, the •removal of barriers ••• is historically unimportant. 
We need only care as hunk~n beings how it is done •••• it is our duty 
to prevent tha~ being done with violence.• The challenge to America, 
in Turwell's opinion, was to reject the course of other nations which 
had eliminated the democratic and evolutionary process while producing 
leadership and administration capable of creating institutions •suited 
to the world in which they are expected to operate."9 
Tugwell was not certain that America would meet the challenge, 
There was, it could not be denied, an alternative to evolutionary 
adaptation eutarchy, which could come ab<eut by some industrial tour 
de force, •It even at times seems more likely to come about that way, 
so great is the moral objection to the enlargement or the revision of 
10 governmental powers," He saw it as his duty, in any case, to point 
out probable dangers and the means of their avoidance -· literal conser-
vatism. Be stated his views regardless of their unpopularity, which he 
anticipated: 
Natural science has not, since its nineteenth century 
struggles with_religious orthodoxy, had such handicaps 
of pre~dice Las those under wrich social scientists 
lahore£/ to overcome. The planner, like other social 
scientists, may not have great hope of modification in 
these attitudes and the attainment of freedom in time to 
avert calamity; but he must be forgiven for insisting 
that materials are being played with which are likely to 
to destroy the world u~tess they are made to conform to 
civilized disciplines. 
9. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935; Resettlement Administration Press Release, 3· 
10. Turwell, R. G., "The Fourth Power,• 12. 
11. Tugwell, R. G., "A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• Journal 
of Farm Economics, Vol, 31, No. 1, February, 1949, 47. 
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Tugwell insisted that society could not forget long-range problems in 
concentrating on the depression. He did not believe the adjustments he 
advocated were radical in a long-run context. 
Immediate 
On an immediate basis the New Deal faced problems which did not 
permit long-range theorizing and planning. Tugwell deplored the neg• 
lect of liberal policies of adjustment in earlier periods of our history 
which resulted in a situation requiring tremendous efforts, at once, of 
relief and economic reconstruction,12 In the temper of the times, 
Americans demanded action, Q.uestions of survival in the long run would 
be academic without survival in the short run,13 In a real sense Tug• 
well was an anti-revolutionary; far from seeking to overturn the exist-
ing system of society, he was attempting to shore it up so that it 
would work without complete collapse at the moment or partial collapse 
every few years.14 
In a frank speech in 1934 Tugwell indicated his awareness of the 
shortcomings involved in the attempt to patch up the economic system 
quickly through the simultaneous introduction of various long overdue 
adjustments: 
12. Tugwell, R, G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol, 4, No, 2, June, 1951, 23. 
13. See above, Chapter IX, Section, "The Temper of the Times,• 
14, Editorial, "Tugwell to the vlolves?•, New Republic, Vol, 85, No, 1099, 
December 25, 1935, 186, 
I know perhaps, better than most people can, how 
little of actual accomplishment there is to measure 
alongside the country's needs. I know that not 
everything has been done that should have been done; 
and that not all of this has been done well. But I 
think no one can say that terrible injustices have 
not been righted or that What has been attempted has 
not been right in intention. There are reasons for 
delay and awkwardness When you consider the size of 
the task, the fact of new beginning, and the inl~peri­
ence of all our people in economic cooperation, ) 
John Franklin Carter concluded that Tugwell was a •genuine con-
servative• who desired to save the profit system and private property 
by adjusting them to the technical conditions of the power age. If the 
New Deal succeeded in this objective, Carter wrote, Tugwell would go 
down in history as one of the men who saved capitalism. If it failed, 
he would be written off as a •poor, deluded right-wing liberal" who 
was foolish enough to hope that the great forces of the industrial revo-
lution could find expression in an orderly way within the channels of 
d t .. t'tt' 16 emocra lC 1ns 1 u 10ns. 
By 1933 technological forces had burst out of any containing 
institutional framework. The old system was crumbling, An intelligent 
observer described New Deal activities as an attempt to prop up useful 
portions of the old structure while remodeling.17 Stuart Chase suggested 
15. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Niagara County Pioneer Association, Olcott 
Beach, New York, August 8, 1934; USDA Press Release, 4• 
16. Carter, J. Franklin, The~ Dealers, 86. 
17. Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase (New York, 
Viking, 1933) 327; Lindley's books are probably the best on the 
early New Deal period according to Tugwell ( Interview with writer) 
and Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, Harper, 1939) 13. 
8]8. 
to business that if it really wished to hold its position in the future, 
it had best stop confusing the word for the thing, forgetting the 
symbol of Tugwell, a •safe and sane intellectual,• as a symbol for soci-
alistic penetration; business would do well to concentrate on the march 
of events; it had to come to terms not with a few personalities, but 
with a maelstrom of impersonal, historical forces.18 In suggesting 
emergency adjustments, Tugwell wished to shore up rather than undermine 
business. 
Tugwell in the Middle 
Critical rays beamed on Tugwell from both right and left of the 
1 
political spectrum. Reactionary laissez-faire capitalists denounced 
the New Deal as socialism; radicals described it as an attempt to save 
capitalism that was certain to fail and apt to emphasize some of its 
worst features.2 A historian can do worse than to place a man in the 
scheme of things according to the character of his enemies. Tugwell, 
who was called both a Communist and a Fascist, by virtue of the dichotomy 
of the attack against him, was well within the central area between the 
extremes. Such a general statement, of course, must be based on an 
examination of his economic and political views in the light of American 
traditions. 
18. Chase, Stuart, Government ln Business (New York, Macmillan, 1935) 
6. 
1. See Chapter I. 
2. Parmelee, Maurice, Farewell 1£ Poverty (New York, John Wiley, 1935) 
289. 
Economic Thought 
In a broad sense Tugwell had something in common with the classi-
cal economists whom he ridiculed-- a belief in the survival of the 
efficient. However, those who fell back in modern times on classical 
doctrines denied economic developments which had taken place since the 
theorizing of Smith and Ricardo. Survival no longer depended on effici-
ency in the purely competitive classical sense; it depended on artifi-
cial interference in economic affairs. This intervention created econo-
mic conditions to which classical concepts were no longer applicable, 
In Tugwell's view "efficiency• had changed in its meaning with techno-
logical advance. 
Efficiency now involved the creation of larger production units. 
Consolidation became the modern form of expression of the orthodox prin-
ciple of efficiency. Efforts to frustrate the creation of larger units 
prevented our system from reaching its highest efficiency. Interference 
with the principle of efficiency ss the basis of economic survival 
through the tariff, uncontrolled industrial monopolies, and anarchroni-
stic anti-trust laws would fail. In fact, failure was already apparent; 
Tugwell was a collectivist only in the sense that J, P. Morgan was a 
collectivist -- both recognized that technological advance tended to 
result in larger, more elaborately interrelated business units.1 
1. Carter, J. Franklin (Unofficial Observer) The~ Dealers (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1934) 87-88. 
The conflict between Tugwell and business interests arose out of 
the problem of distributing the enormous product of Taylorized industry. 
Tugwell believed that the failure of private collectivism to provide 
for distribution was one of the basic causes of the depression. When 
he called for the creation of a social instrumentality to insure distri-
bution of surplus -- that is, when he advocated that government exercise 
•governmental• powers formerly in private hands -- the bankers who for 
generations had fostered and developed the collective system cried out 
the loudest against New Deal •collectivism.• 2 
Collectivism could not in any event be suppressed; the quarrel 
concerned the distribution of its benefits. As has often been the case 
in American affairs, not many of those who deplored the activities of 
the government were really opposed to government activity on principle; 
they actually bemoaned their lack of control of the government. Tug-
well could not quiet attacks against himself by insisting that he did 
not advocate transplanting Russian methods here or adopting governmental 
controls in violation of the Constitution. In vain he insisted that he 
was a conservative, "which, economically speaking, he really was.•3 
Statements by Tugwell of what was, in the strictest sense, his 
economic orthodoxy were available. In a public address in 1935 he as- · 
serted that the administration's land-utilization policy was "highly con-
servative" and would 
2. 
3· 
Carter, J. Franklin, The New Dealers, 87. 
Hacker, Louis M., ! Short History .2f. the New~ (New York, F. s. 
Crofts, 1936) 108. 
mean that we shall, as a people, follow the natural 
line of least reSistance in economic life and that we 
shall so far as possible eliminate the temporary fin-
ancial and commercial barriers which have impeded the 
orderly development of our economic life according to 
the natural - as distinguished from the financial -
lsws of supply and demand,4 
841. 
The opposition disregarded such statements as well as Tugwell's insist-
ence that only wide distribution of benefits would enable private owner-
ship of property and the individualistic basis of capitalism to survive 
at au.5 
Tugwell was concerned with efficiency as an economic objective 
(Taylorism), planning as a means 
and Veblen), and experimentation 
of achieving that objective (Patten 
6 (Dewey) as the technique of planning. 
The technique he advocated was significant. An unrestrained profit 
system, he believed, was ruining the country. Finding the checks and 
balances necessary to restore equilibrium involved neither a rejection 
of capitalism nor an acceptance of socialism; Tugwell's experimental 
technique was not dictatorial but evolutionary.? For example, in the 
specific instance of the tariff, which Tugwell called a hindrance to 
4. Tugwell, R. G,, Address, "A Third Econo~,· Rochester Teachers' 
Association, Rochester, New York, April 9, 1935; USDA Press Release, 8, 
5. Carter, J". Franklin, The ~Dealers, 88. 
6. Tugwell acknowledged the general influence of Dewey's pragmatism on 
the experimental attitude. Experimentalists, however, did not readily 
apply Dewey's ideas to holistic concepts. It was easier to apply 
pragmatic tests to an individual enterprise than to a total econ~; 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Fourth Power,• Planning and Civic Col!lllent, Part 
II, April-J"une, 1939, 15-16. 
7. Pearson, D. and Allen, R. s., •Valentino of the Revolution,• magazine 
clipping, Tugwell Papers. 
the rise of efficiency, he did not support immediate adoption of a 
free-trade policy or any other program without taking into account 
maintenance of the American workers• standard of living in the going 
world as it was,8 Adjustments in the direction of utmost efficiency 
could be worked out only over a long period of time. 
In 1933 the administration had to provide for the survival of 
the business system if there was to be available in the future a capi-
talist econonw to which a long-run scheme such as Tugwell's could be 
applied,9 On institutional grounds Tugwell was anti-business in busi-
ness' own opinion, Thomas Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen, Frankfurter 
disciples known as the "Happy Hot Dogs• and chief White House advisers 
after Roosevelt's first term, were anti-Tugwell Progressives; on insti-
tutional grounds their ideas were less offensive to business than Tug-
well's, Yet, bitter relations between business and the administration 
marked the second term rather than the first. Earlier amity may have 
reflected business' humility in its demise; later acrimony may have 
resulted in part from business' regaining self-assurance with recovery. 
Earlier harmony also may have been due in part to business' awareness, 
beneath its shouting, that in a basic sense Tugwell,despite the repute-
tion for radicalism which partisan recrimination gave him, was more to 
8, Unpublished statement, Tugwell Papers. 
9. Tugwell, incidentally, rejected inflation as a permanent solution 
to economic problems; see above, Chapter VI, Section, •Reflation and 
the Diversified Attack,• 
the right than the people who succeeded him in Roosevelt's confidence; 
he believed in the necessity of collaboration with the business can-
munity because his long-range economic views re~uired the •transforms• 
tion of business rather than its isolation and terrorization.• 10 
Political Thought 
Evolution 
In 1934 Tugwell was accused of a suspicious error of omission; 
1 
in his famous statement on the difference between liberals and radicals, 
he failed to put himself in either camp.2 This accusation could not 
have been the result of an examination of Tugwell's previous writings, 
which definitely placed him in the camp. of the evolutionary liberals--
a position he has clearly and consistently maintained for three decades, 
In 1926 Tugwell contended that static interpretations of the word 
•capitalism• were invalid; capitalism evolved as its industrial arrange-
ments changed,3 Concerning a court decision with which he disagreed, 
he commented, in 1928, that the only hope for a desirable judicial opin-
ion lay in time and a change in the court,4 In an article on the farm 
10. 
1. 
2. 
Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., "The First Hundred Days of the New Deal,• 
in~ Aspirin~. 1919-1941, ed. by Isabel Leighton (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1949) 286. 
Tugwell, R. G,, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1933) 229. 
Mitchell, James G., •The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust' 
and Its Many Manifestations,• The 4nnalist, Vol. 43, No. 115, June 
1, 1934. 849· 
Tugwell, R. G., •Chameleon Words,• New Republic, Vol, 48, No. 612, 
August 25, 1926, 16, 
Tugwell, R. G., •That Living Constitution,• ~New Republic, Vol, 
55, No. 707, June 20, 1928, 122, 
problem, published in 1929, Tugwell suggested that, •we shall not in 
our generation be witness to great changes. The forces which affect 
agriculture do not come in revolutionary ways.•5 Tugwell preached 
evolution before his period of public service. 
At the beginning of his career in Washington, Tugwell published 
~ Industrial Discipline. Preceding the title page this quotation 
appeared: 
Happy is that people, and proud may they be, who can 
enlarge their franchises and perfect their political 
forms without bloodshed or threat of violence, the 
long de~te of reason resulting in the glad consent 
of all. 
If Tugwell was familiar, as Peek charged, with revolutionary writings, 
his comments at the end of The Industrial Discipline indicated that he 
was also familiar with the history and anatomy of revolutions, Neither 
the French nor Russian Revolutions had ended with the achievement of 
moderate objectives (with the Constitution of 1791 and the Provisional 
Government of March, 1917, respectively); both had gotten out of hand, 
moving on into violent radical and reactionary phases. Tugwell prefer-
red the evolutionary American way of achieving reform: 
I have never found myself greatly in sympathy with 
the revolutionary tactic. •Force never settles any• 
thing" has always seemed to me a sufficient axiom. 
It is my reading of history that reconstruction is 
about as difficult after a revolutionary debacle as 
it would have been in a process of gradual substitu-
tion.? 
5· Tugwell, R. G,, •Farm Relief and a Permanent Agriculture,• The Ann8ls 
~ the American Academy~ Political and Social Science, Vol. 142, 
No. 231, March, 1929, 277. . 
6, Tugwell, R. G., The Industrial Discipline and 1lJ& Governmental Arts. 
7. Tugwell, R. G., The Industrial Discipline and 1lJ& Governmental &a• 
228, 
Then followed his differentiation between liberals and radicals: 
The essential contrast between the liberal and the 
radical view of the tasks which lie before us is that 
liberalism requires this experimenting and that radi-
calism rejects at for immediate entry on the revolu-
tionary tactic. 
The last sentence of the book read: 
There is a kind of duty among civilized beings now not 
to desert reason but to press its claims insistently.9 
During the period of his government service, Tugwell's speeches 
and articles consistently reasserted his evolutionary philosophy. As 
one would expect of an academician, be advocated that research and 
1 . t• 10 ana ys~s precede ac ~on, Some of our departures from tradition, he 
stated in 1934, had done great harm because they were not discussed 
and thoroughly understood beforehand,11 The following year be wrote 
that New Deal policies had an honorable lineage in American history, 
being part of the American "faith" -- not "dream,• because the latter 
word denoted the unattainable; the American faith raised men by 'infini• 
itely slow, but certain stages,• including sorties, withdrawals, and the 
achievement, passing, or abandoning of temporary objectives.12 
8. Tugwell, R. G., The Industrial Discipline lill9. the Governmental .A!:ll• 
229. 
9. Tugwell, R. G., The Industrial Discipline and .:!;M Governmental .A!:llo 
229. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., •The Future of National Planning,• ~Republic, 
Vol. 89, No. 1149, December 9, 1936. 
11. Tugwell, R. G., Address, 'On Life As a Long-Time Enterprise,• Dart-
mouth College, April 26, 1934; USDA Press Release, 12. 
12. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Tradition,• Atlantic Monthlv, Vol. 
155, No. 4, April, 1935, 409·10. 
Tugwell once again, also in 1935, showed that he had not forgot• 
ten what his teacher Simon Patten had told him during World War I: 
•Force, my boy, force never settles anything.• 13 In this particular 
speech Tugwell illustrated his rejection of force with an allusion to 
American history: 
This experience Lthe Civil Wal} should have taught 
us ••• that force is, of itself, incapable of alter-
ing the basic habits and institutions of mankind; and 
that unless they are assessed realistically no correc-
tive policy can be formed. Changes of this sort come 
slowly in spite of heat or strife. They never yield 
to unreason or violent action. 
The use of force would have no better results today if 
if is really reconstruction we want rather than a 
bloody overturn and the replacement of one government 
by another. Fishing in ¢uddied waters is an old and 
irresponsible sport. We might remember that those who 14 are not doing the fishing seldom gain anything from it. 
Several years after his departure from Washington, Tugwell con-
tinued to exhibit an appreciation of the evolutionary aspect of Amari-
can development. In 1941 he wrote to Harold Ickes, "I long ago discov-
ered that elaborate and sometimes expensive devices are necessary in 
order to save face for the orthodox when a change is needed.• 15 Tugwell 
would lean over backwards to avert friction when it was avoidable. He 
wrote in retrospect in 1949 that the AAA •about used up what accumulated 
13. Tugwell, R. G., "Frightened Liberals,• ~Republic, Vol. 98, No. 
1273, April 26, 1939, 328, 
14. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "A Third Economy,• Rochester Teachers' Associ-
ation, Rochester, New York, April 9, 1935; ~Press Release, 2. 
15. Lord, Russell, •Governor Rex of Puerto Rico,• Common~. Vol. 11, 
No, 7, July, 1942, 228. 
agreement existed and could be translated into action,• 16 He saw that 
the overriding limitations on achievement at a given time lay in the 
existing amount of inclination towards cooperation; the inclination to 
cooperate sprang from education and reason. 
Tugwell's proposals for •planned capitalism• evoked a vast 
majority of the charges that he was a revolutionary. A detailed review 
of his expositions of his concepts of economic coordination indicates 
that his expectations of their enactment were not equal to the sincer-
ity and urgency with which he presented them, He considered it his 
intellectual duty to recommend what he thought would be in the national 
interest. He did not expect immediate acceptance; he would not have 
approved acceptance based on anything other than education and volun-
tarism. 
As in the case of his general views on evolution in America, his 
views on the evolutionary growth of planning are consistent over a period 
of nearly three decades. In 1928 he observed that as the official 
theory of competition disappeared, public regulation •gently and gradu-
ally• inserted would enable us to face the evolution of industrial 
technique with more equanimity.17 Another comment in the same year indi-
cated his belief that the adoption of coordinating devices could not 
precede a popular desire for them; compulsion could not produce that 
16, Tugwell, R. G,, •A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• Journal 
of Farm Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, February, 1949, 43. 
17. Tugwell, R. G., •That Living Constitution," 120. 
desire: •I am convinced that in time we shall see that this brice 
control,ii is the only road to an ordered national economic life, but 
perhaps that time has not yet come.• 18 
Tugwell's views on the pace of the development of national econ-
omic planning, after his experience in Washington, were not those of a 
man who was satisfied with his having directed a "silent• revolution. 
without regard for national attitudes. In 1939 he noted that "The in-
struments of wholeness are not ones which can be perfected overnight. 
They require long preparation and maturation •••• • 19 He thought that 
the New Deal had only begun the important task of c~anging habits and 
bringing policy within the influence of modern thought.20 
Through the 1940s Tugwell continued to note the evolutionary 
progress of the planning movement in America. Planners did not seem to 
be anywhere near finished telling one another how wonderful planning 
was; until they got through with justification, he commented, one could 
not expect them to accomplish much in the way of procedural or theoreti-
cal advance.21 The fact that it was at all permissible to talk of a 
"planning movement• in the United States indicated a "need for it which 
was stronger than either neglect or opposition.• 22 It was the persistence 
18. Memorandum for Alfred E. Smith, Tugwell Papers. 
19. Tugwell, R. G., "The Fourth Power,• Planning~ Civic Comment, Part 
II, April-June, 1939, 17. 
20. Tugwell, R. G., "After the New Deal: 'We Have Bought Ourselves Time 
to Think'," New Republic, Vol. 99, No. 1286, 325. 
21. Tugwell, R. G., "The Utility of the Future in the Present,• Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, \'linter, 1948, 49. 
22. Tugwell, R. G., "Implementing the General Interest," Public Admini• 
stration Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Aut~, 1940, 47. 
of this need which caused us to •tentatively but persistently• feel our 
way toward an acceptable agency of conjuncture. 23 
Tugwell illustrated the evolutionary advance of national planning 
by referring to specific actual planning bodies. He believed that only 
their effective functioning could justify their existence,24 winning 
for them support sufficient to overcome formidable opposition. Mean-
while, their progress consisted in a sequence of birth, death, and rein-
carnation. He described the demise of one planning body in these words: 
This Board LNational Resources Planning BoarQ/ had 
been innocuous enough; and it had, moreover, main-
tained a policy of avoiding any criticism of the 
fetishes of laissez-faire; it had had, nevertheless, 
an orientation toward the general welfare. So all 
its compromises were not going to save it from the 
lobbyists' wrath. It represented, even if poorly 
and weakly, the public as against private interests, 
and as such it could not be allowed to live,25 
The successor to the NRPB, as embodied in the Unemployment Act of 1946 
(P. L. 304, 79 Congress, 2 Session) still did not, "if prophecy may be 
ventured, possess very great surval value. And for the same reason. 
It is still vulnerable to its natural enemies and possesses no strength 
of its own.• 26 Tugwell expected reincarnation, as he indicated with 
reference to the New York City Planning Commission: 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
But if the Commission should die it will not be a 
permanent death. It could only accompany a return 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Utility of the Future in the Present,• 58. 
Tugwell, R, G.,•After the New Deal: 'We Have Bought Ourselves 
Time to Think',"~ Republic, Vol. 99, No. 1286, 325. 
Tugwell, R. G., ·~Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 437• 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Utility of the Future in the Present,• 57• 
to power of sinister influences Which, though they 
may be tolerated for a time, are always exposed and 
chased under cover When their depredations become 
too costly,27 
a so. 
A critic might inject, at this point in the present discussion 
of Tugwell's description of the evolutionary development of planning, 
an inquiry as to whether Tugwell accepted gradual growth only because 
he was powerless to promote quicker progress. This inquiry would 
imply that Tugwell, in a hypothetical position of power, would compel 
planning. Tugwell answered this possible question in the course of 
his discussions. He believed that the effectiveness of any program 
depended on consent and support; the government could not compel sup-
port. Rather than compulsion, investigation would be the basis for 
any quickening of the progress of planning: 
Speculation as to the reason for this slowness Lin the 
development of a conjunctural or directive apparat~/ 
would require an appraisal of the stage of evolution 
which human societies have by now reached •••• there 
would need to be investigation of the transfer of dir-
ective authority from the cell to the multicellular 
organism- from the individual to society - and, indeed, 
the whole relation of parts to wholes in human associ-
ation, which is made difficult by the high development 
of the brain in man and the arrest or partial arrest, of 
individual evolution. It is obvious, I think, that there 
is an evolutionary pressure in such changes which makes 
revolution ••• unthinkable ••• ,28 
If, as Tugwell believed, larger combinations were inevitable and 
required integration, man had to identify and stimulate the capacity for 
27. Tugwell, R. G., •Implementing the General Interest,• 48-49· 
28. Tugwell, R. G., •variation on a Theme by Cooley,• Ethics, Vol. 59, 
No. 4, July, 1949, 239-40. 
851. 
integration which he must have somewhere in his nature.29 Man also 
faced the problem of combining specialization with integration,3° 
Requisite to the effective application of all his knowledge would be 
a determination of the logical objectives towards which human societies, 
in their present stage of evolution, appeared to be proceeding.31 Only 
then would there be agreement on means and ends. His statement of 
these intellectual problems underlined Tugwell's belief that only the 
acquisition of kn01<ledge would enable faster progress in planning. 
Without knowledge compulsion would be ineffective as a hastening agent. 
With knowledge, compulsion would be superfluous. 
Crises, Tugwell pointed out, produced no more than temporary 
advances. In retrospect (1947), he saw the depression as having stimu-
lated only a patching-up effort; the •national house was in ruins, but 
we were not yet ready for a new one.•32 Later, he wrote in 1947, the 
back-to-freedom urge after World War II'"made it impossible, when vic-
tory had come, to plan or act in the public interest except as it might 
accidentally emerge from the conflicts among extremely complex interests •• 33 
In the 1950s Tugwell continued to point out how far planning had yet to 
evolve. A directive mechanism enabling expansion, along with fair ex-
change between groups, he wrote in 1950, is •something to be worked out 
29. Tugwell, R. G.' •variation on a Theme by Cooley, • 240. 
30• Tugwell, R, G.' •variation on a Theme by Cooley,• 240. 
31. Tugwell, R, G., •variation on a Theme by Cooley," 2]9. 
32. Tugwell, R, G., The Stricken 1sill!!• 22. 
33· Tugwell, R, G.' •A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• 33· 
over considerable time.•34 As late as March, 1953, he contributed an 
article to the Revue Economigue entitled, "L'Attitude Reticente des 
Etats Unis a l'Egard de la Planification,• Tugwell's contribution to 
the evolutionary growth of Planning was not that of an agitator or con-
spirator but that of an intellectual. 
Reform in America 
Democracy 
Sumner Welles attested that Tugwell believed in a •positive, pro-
1 gressive, and dynamic" form of democracy, Tugwell's writings, from the 
34, Tugwell, R, G., Address, "Relief and Reconstruction,• National Con-
ference of Social Workers, Kansas City, Missouri, May 21, 1934; in 
~ Battle for Democracy, 315; Tugwell's reference to •expansion• 
suggests that economists and historians have overemphasized the 
•maturity• and •maintenance" concepts applied to the American econ-
omy in the 1930s in the contention that we could produce enough but 
that distribution was our problem. Richard Hofstadter pointed out 
the significance for the •maturity• concept of Roosevelt's famous 
campaign speech before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco; ~ 
American Political Tradition (New York, Knopf, 1949) 325-27. Econ-
omists referred to Tugwell's views on the •maintenance" stage of 
capitalism; Lewis Corey, The Decline of American Capitalism (New 
York, Covici-Friede, 1934) 196. In Tugwell's view the fact that 
the economy had reached a stage which called for regulation and co-
ordination did not mean that dynamic expansion would not continue 
within the new institutional framework. In analyzing the American 
economy, Tugwell followed the indigenous approach of his teacher, 
Simon Nelson Patten, who •took no stock in European doctrines; rather 
he set out to create one out of American stuffs - and succeeded," 
Tugwell, "The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3, September, 1950, 405. Institutionalism 
took into account the dynamic nature of the American economy. 
1. Welles, Sumner, review of The Stricken Land, Saturday Review £L Lit-
erature, Vol. 29, No, 52, December 28, 1946, 9. 
1920s into the 1950s, indicated that his democratic beliefs were based 
on careful consideration of the nature and problems of democratic gov-
ernment. 
In Tugwell's time as a New Dealer democracy faced the problem 
of adjusting to a society of urban industrialism, In the nineteenth 
century, because of immense natural resources and the American way of 
occupying the continent, we needed only to emphasize freedom; "Equality 
had taken care of itself most of the time •••• • 2 Under urban industri-
alism freedom had often meant freedom to exploit and to lift the few 
above the many. If democracy was to live, the emphasis had to shift 
to the other ingredient of the dogma, equality.3 
In 1928 Tugwell insisted that government action should be under-
taken with a view to serving and protecting the people on the basis of 
equality, He noted that in financial affairs the banks wanted panics 
stopped, Panics, Tugwell suggested, were only one phase of the busi-
ness cycle; a centralized and managed financial mechanism had to seek 
control of other phases if it was to protect "all of us,• not just banks.4 
He declared that the traditionof democracy was the protection of all 
those of one class.5 vital social interests, not just 
2. Craven, Avery, Democracy in American Life (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1941) 142, 
Craven, Avery, Democracv in American Life, 143• 
Tugwell, R. G,, •Bankers' Banks,• ~Republic, Vol. 57, No. 732, 
December 12, 1928, 96. 
Tugwell, R, G., •Governor or President?•, New Republic, Vol. 54, No. 
702, May 16, 1928, 382. 
Tugwell accounted for the class consciousness which character-
ized business hostility to Roosevelt partly on psychological grounds. 
The President looked on business not with hostility but simply as 
another interest on an equal footing with others - a demotion from its 
6 
previous elevated status which business resented. Financial and 
industrial autocrats, said Tugwell in 1935, feared democracy because it 
prevented their exploiting resources and people. Business was in the 
habit of hiding behind the mask of government, but •not this government.•7 
In Tugwell's view business in a democracy was to be neither subject to 
persecution nor the recipient of special favors. 
Tugwell saw a democratic concern for the welfare of all classes 
in the departure from the gold standard. In the past the holders of 
gold could set themselves aside from the rest of the community in 
periods of uncertainty. Now all had to strive for security and equili-
brium since •we will all suffer alike.• 8 Tugwell considered the idea 
that all were in the same boat especially meaningful in America. For-
eigners often found it difficult to grasp the American attitude towards 
democracy.9 In America 
6. Tugwell, R. G,, 'The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, June, 1951, 302. 
7. Tugwell, R, G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935; Resettlement Administration Press Release, 2. 
8. Tugwell, R. G., 'Our Weight in Gold,' in~ Battle for Democracy, 27; 
the democratic aspect was not the immediate reason for the departure 
from the gold standard; see above, Chapter VI. 
9, Tugwell, R. G, and Dorfman, Joseph, •Francis Leiber, German Scholar 
in America,• Columbia University Quarterly, September and December, 
1938. 
Democracy is a word which is capable of touching off 
••• emotions cf various sorts, but all of them mixed 
with a genuine reverence. Our peculiar history makes 
equalitb more real to us than to people in some other 
lands,l 
Government in a democracy, in contemplating action, had to con-
aider probably effects on all the people, The limitations on effective 
action lay, in Tugwell's view, in the popular attitude toward a given 
measure. Regarding his suggestions in 1928 for an agricultural program, 
he commented that the ease of enforcement would depend on popular sup-
port,11 In an article written in 1934 he observed that it was obvious 
we could have nothing new in government which did not •correspond to a 
new need on the part of our people and of their economic institutions,• 12 
A month later he told a Consumers' League audience that while the burden 
of consumer protection was for the time being thrown on government, 
'Government can do no more than is wanted of it.• 13 These comments 
showed Tugwell's appreciation of what he later termed •one of society's 
most serious problems: the securing of c~ange within a desired pattern 
without serious departure from voluntarism,•14 The achievement of 
voluntarism rested on publicity and education. Democracy could develop 
leadership, and the consent necessary to leadership in a democracy, once 
10. Tugwell, R, G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol, 5. No. 2, June, 1952, 280. 
11. Memorandum for Alfred E, Smith, Tugwell Papers. 
12, Tugwell, R, G., 'America Takes Hold of Its Destiny,• Today, April 
28, 1934; in The Battle i£t Democracy, 266, 
13, Tugwell, R, G., Address, •consumers and the New Deal," Consumers' 
League of Ohio, Cleveland, May 11, 1934; in The Battle for Demo-
cracy, 273• 
14. Tugwell, R, G,, •Earthbound: The Problem of Planning and Survival," 
Antioch Review, Winter, 1953-54. 486, 
people knew where they were going and why they were going there.15 
Tugwell believed that publicity and education did not require 
for their effectiveness the suppression of dissent. Not only was 
criticism essential to the educative process; it was also inseparable 
from democracy. The silencing of criticism to achieve democratic ends 
would be a contradiction in terms, for 
The battle, if kept up and won, could not be one of 
those instances in which, iq_order to s~e democracy, 
what was best in democracy La free pres~/ had been 
sacrificed.l6 
Education by no means constituted a magic formula for rapid achieve• 
ment. The enforcement of a policy without public consent would be 
undemocratic, if not impossible; consent, publicity and education not-
withstanding, was not always forthcoming. Tugwell recalled that Roose-
velt's greatest efforts as President were toward a national policy. 
His successes in that direction were few, limited, and temporary. •con-
gress, and most other people as well, would not have advanced far enough 
in this kind of learning even to follow willingly.•17 
The statement that democracy rested on consent was oversimplified 
description of that form of government. Tugwell saw that the matter of 
15. Tugwell, R. G., "The Place of Government in a National Land Program,• 
Joint Meeting, American Economic Association, American Statistical 
Association, and Farm Economics Association, Philadelphia, December 
29, 1933; ~Press Release, 17. 
16. Tugwell, R. G., •Must We Draft Roosevelt?•, ~Republic, Vol. 102, 
No. 1328, May 13, 1940, 630. 
17. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterlv, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 141. 
consent involved at least two additional basic, complicated problems: 
the utilization of expertness, and the reconciliation of local with 
national interests. 
As an advocate of economic planning Tugwell naturally was con-
cerned with the place of expertness in government. 18 The appearance of 
Walter Lippmann's The Public Philosophy provoked discussion of the 
problem of the utilization of expertness in a democracy. Perhaps it is 
worthwhile to quote in full Tugwell's statement of the problem to a 
group of college students some twenty years earlier: 
Man is distinguished among the animals by his ability 
to learn from the experience of others. Few of us re-
alize the extent of our dependence on previous learning. 
It is communicated to us in such casual and subtle ways 
that its entry into our own systems of action is fre-
quently unnoticed. We accept many of the fundamental 
forces of civilization, and act with them, without in-
quiring into their origins. Only a few have any know-
ledge of chemistry, of physics or any of the other 
branches of learning; but we ride in motor cars, listen 
to the radio and do numerous other things, which depend 
on qualities and forces utterly ~sterious to all but the 
highly-trained expert. This is never a source of worry. 
We depend, with a kind of sublime faith, on the perpe-
tuation of expertness by the attractions it holds out to 
singularly gifted minds. The upshot is that we delegate 
to a certain few in each generation the tasks of learn-
ing from others' experience and accept, by a kind of 
tacit arrangement, the contrast of doing a few things 
knowlingly and most things on faith. 
There have been numerous suggestions 
government and economics ought to be 
There has been more resistance here. 
that the fields of 
likewise specialized. 
Abdication has seemed 
more dangerous, the sciences less exact, and men have felt 
that the basic decisions ought not to be by other than gen-
18. See above, Chapter III, Section, "Reconciling the Esoteric and the 
Exoteric.• 
eral consent. This, I think, is sound. And yet 
there is a problem here which becomes more clear 
with respect to all social decisions as time goes 
on. We did not allow people to vote for the ac-
ceptance of the vacumn tube or the internal com-
bustion engine; we have not consulted public opin-
ion concerning the reconstruction of railroad equip-
ment which will follow the streamline train. Yet 
these things affect the common life as widely and 
as deeply as any legislative change could possibly 
do. 
Evidently there is a need for definition of the 
fields within which expertness may be trusted and 
of those within which a more democratic procedure 
is necessary. We have developed rather carelessly, 
in our generation, a policy of autocratic decision 
about matters with momentous social effects; and 
perhaps we have kept democratic some decisions in 
which a degree of expertness would be desirable. I 
think it would be impossible for me to point out to 
you a more pressing task among those which lie be-
fore you, than this determination of the sphere within 
which freedom should be given to the expert. Some of 
our departures from tradition have done great harm 
because they were not discussed and thoroughly under-
stood beforehand. Each great technical and industrial 
change has had effects for which society was totally 
unprepared. An intelligent approach to them would 
have required adjustments in all the institutions and 
situations they affected. But our autocratic theory 
in one field and our democratic theory in the other 
have prevented this.l9 
sse. 
In this address Tugwell went on to say that the New Deal involved 
decisions on the use of expertness. The balance of weight, he maintained, 
tended to fall on the side of democracy because New Deal administrators 
were prejudiced in favor of democracy; they believed that democratic 
methods worked best in the long run. Yet, consent was never quite com-
plete. Although •social devices usually will not work without complete 
19. Tugwell, R. G., Address, •on Life As a Long-Time Enterprise,• Dart-
mouth College, April 26, 1934; ~Press Release, 11-12, 
cooperation, the administration was reluctant to face the problem of 
recalcitrant minorities. It usually interpreted the classic majority 
as ninety per cent rather than fifty-one per cent -- thus staying well 
within the limits of the democratic definition.• 20 Tugwell still 
insisted after his experiences with recalcitrant minorities that •there 
should be no aristocracy of deciders and proletariat of consenters.•21 
The reconciliation of local and national interests always con-
stituted a difficult problem for an administrator in a democracy. The 
effectiveness of a program depended on consent and cooperation at the 
local level. At the same time, the cooperators might be able to 
advance local interests in a direction which ran counter to the national 
interest in the view of the administrator whose function was to consider 
the whole picture. 
In 1935 Tugwell wrote a homely, conversational account of how 
the administration faced the problem of reconciling various pressures. 
(While not all of these pressures were local, they made necessary the 
reconciliation of specific with general or national interests.) Tugwell 
stated that the government was attempting to consider all views. How 
should the government, he inquired,respond to the various pressures? In 
the past the response had been to the strongest. The New Deal response 
began with an open identification of all pressure groups. Then, in 
responding to a given pressure, it attempted to make specific interests 
20. Tugwell, R. G., Address, •on Life As a Long-Time Enterprise,• 13. 
21. Tugwell, R. G., •Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part II, Journal 
of PhilosophY, Vol. 27, No. 18, August 28, 1930, 489. 
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coincide with an acceptable concept of national interest. There was 
always an unashamed preference for pressures exerted on behalf of 
human rights. While the government could not suppress any pressure in 
a democracy, it had to have the courage to stand against a wrong method. 
It also had to display the energy and imagination necessary to take 
some steps toward a sound objective. Those steps the government deter-
mined only in the short run; in the long run the voters made the choices. 
Admittedly, neither the voters nor administrators were wholly objective. 
Still, the administrator had to assay all pressures in the light of his 
own concept of the national interest; •once this is understood,' Tugwell 
concluded, • ••• government ceases to be a citadel to be stormed, but 
instead becomes a living organism, combining some of the best and some 
of the poorest features of mankind.• 22 
As an administrator Tugwell both observed and sought cooperation 
of interested groups. He commented with reference to the NRA codes that 
no one could foresee the final structure of industry which might result 
from the •essentially voluntary and democratic process now going on.• 23 
In an address in South Carolina on the cotton program•,of the AAA, he 
told his audience that the government would supply information which 
would be helpful in making decisions on adjustment of production; he 
would not "do more than to state the problem at this time - the solution 
must, of necessity, come from you.• 24 
22. Tugwell, R. G., "A Fireside Symposium,• Columbia University Quarterly, 
Vol. 27, No. 1, March, 1935, 34-36, 
23. Tugwell, R. G., •America Takes Hold of Its Destiny,• 261. 
24. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Clemson College, South Carolina, August 15, 
1934; Q§Q! Press Release, 9, 13. 
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In retrospect, Tugwell made some interesting observations, in a 
review of a book about TVA,25 on the administrative conflicts between 
local and national interests. He cited the author's definition of the 
grass-roots approach as a •protective ideology• serving the purpose of 
concealing "cooperation• -- 'The process of absorbing new elements into 
the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a 
means of averting threats to its stability or existence. (p. 13)•26 The 
grass-roots ideology arose from the need to gain power by sharing it and 
the need to secure respectebility,27 •cooperation• often led to a sup-
eriority of local influence over the national interest an agency was 
supposed to promote. 
The whole problem of operation on the local level became exceed-
ingly complex. There was a difference between participation and simple 
involvement. Tugwell did not approve of the latter, in which an unor-
ganized citizenry became a •reliable instrument for the achievement of 
administrative goals'; it was a sham to call that "democracy.• 28 On the 
other hand, he deplored the •cooptation• of TVA by the land-grant col-
leges and the American Farm Bureau Federation •grass-tops' organize-
tiona representing the large farmers and able to prevent long-range plan-
ning in the AAA and Soil Conservation Service.29 In this instance the 
25. Selznick, Philip, TVA and ~Grass Roots (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1949). 
26. Tugwell, R. G. and Banfield, E. c., • Grass Roots Democracy -Myth or 
Reality?•, Public Administration Review, Winter, 1950, so. 
27. Tugwell, R. G. and Banfield, E. c .. •Grass Roots Democracy -Myth or 
Reality?•, 51. 
28. Tugwell, R. G. and Banfield, E. c •• "Grass Roots Democracy - Myth or 
Reality?", 51. 
29. Tugwell, R. G. and Banfield, E. c •• •Grass Roots Democracy - Myth or 
Reality?", 51-54· 
862. 
grass-roots approach served a useful purpose for those '•lho Here satis-
fied ·,·!i th the status q_uo c:1d fer the bureaucr,ts v;ho had tc come to 
terms •.rith them.3° Tugwell deplored the "cooptation" of TVA: 
••• so far as anything of the sort can be said, 
• , • the series of decisions \vhich chan[ed the 
fundanental character of the Authority to accord 
'"i th the desires of the local agricultural group 
ran not only against the interest but also the 
expressed ··.'fishes of the American people. It is 
therefore an expression cf the '•1eak:1ess of our 
• ..:ays of :r.aking democracy effective.31 
He concluded ~-lith e. restatement of the problem of reco~cili~e lccal and 
natio::al interests \·lhich conveyed an idea of the co;cplexities e.:1d the 
challenge involved: 
the Hider the issue, the -.;ider must be the public 
that decides it; but to the extent ttat an issue 
is local, authority to deal -.;ith it must be decen-
tralized so th"t local opinion :ray be brouc:~,t to 
bear on it. T'his is surely a :r.ost delicate 2nd in-
trica·te O:tJere.tion in e.dministraticn, but it is in 
this '::ay thc:t real an<i responsible publics 1.-rill be 
brought into existence.32 
Difficulties did not de.mpen r:vug,rrell's belief in democracy. 
The Constitution 
Tut_rl'!ell 1 s uritings reflected detailed st~dy o:f' ti-le cira~ .. linL up of 
the Constitution nnd of legal 2.nd eco:_cm.ic develop:tr..ents under the Affieri-
can frarne of coverru:.:rent. L·1e ·,.;as particularly interested. in the histcri-
------- --~--
JO. Tug,;ell, R. G. and Banfield, E. c •• "Grass Hoots Der::ocracy - Myth 
or Heality?", 55· 
Jl. Tug"ell, if.. G. and B3nf ield, E. c •• 11 Grass Roots Derr;.ocracy - J.!yth 
or HeRlity? 1', so. 
J2. Tug•.;ell, R. G. and Bc::nfield, r:... c •• 11 Grass ~-ioots :Jen:ocracy Eyth 
or Hee.lity?", 55· 
cal circwnstances surrounding the >Iri ting of the "con1r.1erce clnuse." ile 
found in the t cleuse no basis for the constitutional scmcti ty 'dith •,;hich 
the courts, citinG tr"c ri[hts or corporations under the Fifth and Four-
tee nth Amenlli11ents, clothed laissez-fa ire. 'rhe i'Js·,·; Deal, e:1tcrinc o.t 2. 
late date a co::tstitutional conflict >Ihich the men of 1787 did net end 
but began. looked to reinterpretation of the cor.1merce clause ns the ·,;ay 
in t-Ihich the federe.l· covern..rnent could recapture the constitutional auth-
crity it so urgently needed in the economic emer[ency of 1933· 
Tug•.'lell rejected Charles A. 3eard' s u:-tilo.tere~l econcmic interpre-
tat ion. He asserted thAt the Constitution, 11 ••• .so fnr as it reflected 
eco!lonic ideas at all ( •,1hich 1•/as amazingly little)," reflected old rather 
than current 1 cnes. T~.e colonists, 1.Jho opposed the co!ltrol of ?2rliar.1ent 
but not control e.s such, he.d not yet rr....,_qde Adar::. ~mi th 1 s ide2.s :;J3rt of 
•' . th" ' . 2 
.... r:e1.r lDKl.ng. ·rhe rnen ,:1ho ,,rrote the Constitution '.:ere a ceneration 
behind Adam .Smith -- ttey reached farther b2.ck for their ideolugy; tt:ey 
3 
•.mre nercantilist ne_tionalizers, eighteenth-century centlenen. Jeffer-
son ,;;as t!"l.e only IDP,n of his sf:e v1ho might ~1.2-ve seen t!":!e possibilities of 
1. Tut:;vrell, :R. G., 11 The ~'Je\·l Deal: The Decline vf Govern.L'-r.ent, 11 Part I, 
The 'ilestern Politice,l Quarterly, Vel. 4. l!o. 2, June, 1951, 296; 
2. 
3· 
At this point, Tupiell added: "Our Canst i tution he.d been v;ri tten 
not by si:nyle r.1en but by v;orldly o!les lr:i th cor.~plex intellige:1ces 
and mixed motives •••• 11 ; BrO\·m, Robert E., Ci1arles Bee.rd and the 
Constitution (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956) is a 
se3rchinc rea~praisnl. 
Tup1ell, -, 
"• G.' 
11 The .i:~Ie~:J Deal: The Decline of Gcvernn.snt, " ?ert 
299. 
TU£'•Jell, G.' 11 The lle·,,, Deal: The Decline of Government, 
,, Part ... 
295-96. 
I, 
I, 
physiocracy, but he h2d not taken pert in >II'itin[ the Constitution.4 Yet, 
Tugwell concluded, although the Co:1sti tuticn " ••• read not been written 
altce:ether by and for ••• enterprisers, they hied had an inportant p.e.rt in 
shapinr it; and 'tlere able, during the next century, tc e.d.apt it se_tisfact-
orily to t{""eir needs."5 A mercantilist docU;.Ilent becem.e one of laissez-
ft:cJ ire. 
Enterprisers did :1ct set the sta<Ce for the dc:dnence cf laissez-
faire by 'II'iting specific, positive sanctions for their activities into 
the Constitution. The commerce clause, TU[\;ell ccmnented, ;~as not rele-
vant to tte ar£Ulllents for ·kich it was responsible in succeedine; years; 
it '"as an outgrowth of the Alexandria Conference of 1785, 1.t: ich dealt 
1;ith traffic near the cepes of the Potorcec and on ~h2t river.6 In the 
Constitution 
•.. the ·~.,rord u industry" does not occur any·~,rtere; there is 
no smell of snake, ncise of fact cries, suuesticn cf :nen 
1;orLin[ toe;ether in planned fashion. Fifty years later it 
nrust heve been e different document. 7 
The dominance of laissez-fa ire in the nineteenth century rested, 'fug.,ell 
maintained, en the coupromises i.oihich e:ner£ed from the conflict at the 
Constitutional Convention bet;reen the enterprisers 2"-d the eichteenth-
century [entlenen. These co!:Jprornises produced c: Sen•:te 8nd duEJl (federal-
4· Tugi.~rell, R. G. • 11 The NeH Deal: The Rise of Busi;:1ess • 11 Part II, The 
-.,;estern Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. J, Septemcer, 1952, 484. 
5· Tug11ell, R. G., "The Ne'd Deal: The Decline of Gcvernment': Part I, 
296. 
6. Tug~'lell, R. G., "The ::L..Je'l.of Deal: The Decline of Governr.1ent,n Pert I, 
298. 
7. Tug,;el1, R. G., "The Directive," Journel of 0ocie1 ?hi1oscohy and 
Jurisprudence, Vol. 7, No. 1, October, 191:,1, 211. 
state) sovereignty, Heakening the presidency and restrict in~e federal 
control over economic affairs. 
~ilas::incton, Ha:nilto!l, a!l.d I~'IB.discn intended tc eli::1in,,te the states 
if they could; they h3d no ir.tentio:J of accept in;: the co:qromise tc.ey 
lnter fout;tt fer in the ratification stru€-cle; t:-:ey ;_,Jan ted recccnition 
of no sovereignty but ths.t of the union. 8 J.:emilton, in pc:rticul9r, had 
no locel loyalties, desiring to deflate the infleted pretensio:1s of 
state politicinns.9 To the advantage of the enter;lrisers, TU['dell ob-
served, the ei[llteenth-century rentlemen did not ~.:..uite understand the 
conflict; on the other hand, the states' ri[hters, ,,/l'_o ~ .. rere ~ct theorizers 
but representatives of business men, knm·l '•that ti::ey hBre a.fter. 10 
Tug,1ell credited the enter)risers ·.cith a brge pert in creating 
the 0en.'- te in order to check the other two bran.ches and thereby assure 
freedom for business frot::l central central; from 1709 until l9JJ, he 
declared, the benate s:.ood for Smithian econcr.1ics. 1 l A 11 curious alli-
ance of literary folk and speculative n1£rchants 11 p:revented Jritish ideas 
of a stro:c:g executive from prevailing -- as liamilto::1. and even ~.n/ashington, 
desired.12 rrhe t· . .,ro [;rOups in the alliance S::l'1! t'he bal2nce Of :pOi·Ter, 
8. Tug•,,ell, ... G., 11 The Ne•.; Deal: The Decline of Government, 11 ?art I, 
299. 
9· TU(\-rell, H. G.' "The Ne•,J Deal: The Decline of Government, n Pert I, 
299· 
10. Tuumll, n. G.' "The He, .. , Deal: The Decline of Govern...llBnt," Part I, 
296-97. 
11. Tuc,,ell, H. G.' "The He;r Deel: The Decline of Governr.tent, 
,, ?art I, 
297. 
12. Tug•,rell, R. G. • "The Fourth Pc· .. mr," ?lanninE.~ and Civic Comment, 
April-June, 1939. Part II, 19. 
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,,.Jhich they deliberately ,,rorked out, opsratint: in different WlYS -- one 
thoueht it assured "deliberation, dignity, and a circurnscriOed sphere of 
act ion;" the othor knet·r it l.rould "insure a minirrrur:1 of interference 1:d th 
r business." j The nationalists, Tugv1ell believed, ime" that the federal 
[Overnrrent required mere authority; they failed to meet this need 
because 11 the necessity for cocpromise seemed to ther:J., B.S it cften has 
to others, controlling." ll, 
The creation of the .Senc:te \iaS sit:nificant to busi~1ess men, Tug-
·,,rell stated, becau2e of its iopact on the presidency. Despite 3 vride-
spread deme.nd. for e. ne•lf n:=:tional effectiveness, t~ce executive h?,d e. dif-
ficult tir.1.e finclinc E: co'1.stitutional place.15 Ii.cc·cr Sher:TJe.n cf Connecti-
cut, to 1,;horr: Tu[•,;ell frequently referred as t};e lePder cf the enterprisers, 
t:r.ou.{);.t it :r!ig~t be wiser to allo,..,. the lecislc:ture to creG:te And e_ppoint 
sue~ executives "as experience might dictate." 16 Yet, sorr~eho,.,.;, the 
advocates of a strong executive .,,on a 11 smash inc victory, 11 t;ainin£ their 
·e~ay on ei[ht decisions: 
lJ. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
1. An executive '.·Iould be established sep;:rate from the 
legislature. 
2. 'The executive ~·:auld consist of o:1e r.1El::1, a President of 
the United States. 
3· The President \,1ould he_ve a source of election outside 
tLe lecislature. 
Tue;1,Tell, :i.• G., 11 The Fourth ?o\'ler," 19-20. 
Tu[\iell, R. G., "The Fourth Pc1-1er, 11 20. 
Tu~;1·18ll, R. G., "The Fourth PO\,mr,• 23, 27. 
Rossiter, Clinton, The American Presidency (l·;e·,f York, ~;eH ADerican 
Library, 1956) 56. 
4• The President ,_.;auld have a fixed terr.1 of office. 
5· The President ·.;ould be elii. ible for re-election 
to e.n indefinite number c"!' terms. 
o. The President ~ .. :ould be granted his Ol:J!l pc·,vsrs by 
the Constitution. 
7. The Preside::-~t ·::ou:d not be enclUY.bered 1:ri th e. council 
to •.•rl:ich he '1/Culd have to e::o for 8::Jprovsl of his 
DOI:J.ine.tio':'ls or vetoes or other :Jets. 
8. rhe President cot.ld. :10t be a 11 Ir.ember of eiti1.er house 
durinG his continuance in office.l7 
The enablinc provisions of tr.e Constitution did not autw:etically result 
in a po ... ;erful presidency. r~18 rise of the presir:lency to gree_t independent 
importance required the actiYities of stronc ?erscnalities -- 'dashint:;ton, 
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, ~:Iilscn, enG. Franklin 
rtoosevsl t -- e.:1d the Lr.~.pc.ct of historical forces -- t:::e rise cf J.n.erican 
de:n.ocracy, OUr )rO[TeSS AS f'_D industriel people ·.dtf. its c_;d::;:J.::istre.tive 
reG_uireoents, our self-elev2.tio.:--. to the status o-f co_ r:r:~ jc::' :;:JC':rer, .:J!Hl e 
· · f · f · d · f 1° ;;o •18 shetter1nc .ser1es o emertencle3, ore1[n Pmd o:-aest1c, 3 ter c;_, 
The £TO,~o'th of the pc'..rer 2nd prestit:e of t~~e ;;residency has not 
been stee.dy; stro~c presidents !":2ve been follo~.·red by •.-:eak o::.es; eech ne>·J 
stro::c _preside:1t, ;-_o 1:lever, !12.s tat\.en up 1·rhere tr_e lJ.st O:-le left off •19 
The interv2.ls ·aet·.,:een stro::--~[ presidents in the !li:1Btcenth ce:1tur:; enabled 
the Senr·te to serve es e. barrier bet'.-rec!'l the oxec-u_ti"'.re c.::1d the richts of 
17. Iiossiter, Clinton, The American Presidency, 56-59. 
18. Llossiter, Clinton, The American Presidency, Ch2pter J, nThe Presi-
dency in History, • 54-79· 
19. Rossiter, Clinton, The JW!erican Presidency, 62. 
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business.20 The Senate's endless fie;ht with the e:xecutive resulted in a 
discrepancy between what was expected of a president and what he could 
deliver; he usually could not accomplish more than a normally recalcitrant 
Senate allowed.21 Presidential prudence became synonymous with presiden-
tial complaisance in the face of senatorial aggrandizement22 -- in the 
twentieth century Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover were •prudent• presidents. 
Even the strong executive Franklin Roosevelt cculd not move against the 
will of the Senate after 1938.23 
The Senate, in promoting laissez-faire, received assistance from 
the courts, whose function it was to interpret a vague commerce clause. 
There were several reasons for the generalized wording of the section in 
the Constitution which referred to commerce. Hamilton, who took a pro-
union stand because America's international position was humiliating to 
him, was not thinking about commerce and business.24 The men of 1787 
could not forsee the abject dependence of men on unified social organize-
tion which caused later generations to become interested in protecting men 
with government; they were interested in protecting men from government.25 
20. Tugwell, R. G,, •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
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York, Doubleday, An Anchor Book, 1956) 13. 
24. Tugwell, R. G., 'The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
299; Tugwell, R. G. and Dorfman, Joseph, "Alexander Hamilton, Nation 
Maker,• Columbia UniversitY Quarterly, December, 1937, and March, 
1938. 
25. Tugwell, R. G., "The Fourth Power,• 7• 
The stage of economic development in America also had much to do with the 
careless drafting of the commerce clause. Holmes' famous comment that the 
Constitution did not enact Spencer's Social Statistics showed, Tugwell 
wrote, that the Justice •realized that principles unheard of by its authors 
might not be sought in the document.• 26 In 1787 
One of the activating reasons which led up to the Philadelphia 
Convention was a desire to control a commerce among the states 
which was even then getting out of hand; and that was accom-
plished,27 
This commerce was pre-industrial. 
As it turned out, the founding fathers, according to Tugwell, did not 
settle a controversy; they launched one.28 The framing of the Constitution 
occurred on the verge of the industrial revolution, which was to produce 
conditions and problems unknown to the men at Philadelphia: 
There was a moment in history when inventions should have been 
suppressed or social management should have been greatly exten-
ded, It was of great consequence that the American Constitu-
tion should have been formulated almost at that moment.29 
The delegates to the Convention in 1787 were not aware that they had set 
the stage for an inevitable, continuing conflict: 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
It is not possible to make a convincing argument that the 
nationalists intended the commerce clause to cover the inti-
mate conduct of industrial life, but neither did they intend 
that its conduct should lie beyond the reach of interference. 
To them it had perhaps been unimportant, a matter already 
settled and not a matter of controversy. Its future signifi-
cance, however, had been underestimated.30 
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Laissez-fairs prevailed in the expanding America of the nineteenth 
century, winning the first round in the constitutional conflict. This 
doctrine, •countering the deeper constitutional direction,• came into 
acceptance by the time the states completed ratification, Laissez-fairs 
came in in full force with Jefferson, who had acquired his ideas at the 
European fountainhead; Adam Smith's influence b~came pervasive after the 
generation of 1787 had gone.32 
Laissez-fairs seemed to triumph through the default of potential 
critics. No one until Wilson caught a glimpse of the economic essence of 
the direction of American constitutional progress • ••• because it had 
been not only a hidden but also an unwanted evolution• -- usually unacknow-
ledged and often deliberately camouflaged.33 In the 1800's few Americans 
noticed the dominance of speculation, exploitation, competition, and 
money-making over planning, conservation, cooperation, and service; the 
majority adhered to the orthodoxy of free enterprise.34 
Economists, who had the opportunity to inquire into the actual acti-
vities of factory and marketplace, generally echoed Smith and his successors 
-- Ricardo, Mill, and Marshall. Spencer's Social Statistics multiplied the 
number of dissenters because it showed clearly where laissez-faire led, 
giving critics knowledge of why they disliked what was happening -- but they 
31. Tugwell, R. G.' "The New Deal: The Decline of Government , " Part I, 
295· 
32. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business, • Part II, 485. 
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were intellectuals and few in number. Men of affairs and statesmen did 
not delve into constitutional interpretation; •they operated on the 
going theory, not on what the Forefathers might have meant.• Indeed, 
most people, except jUdges, did not consider constitutional Questions, 
and the justices " ••• had to risk either their reputation as scholars 
or their duty to American business,•35 
The courts• task was an exceedingly difficult one. They had to 
apply a vague commerce clause to a modern industrial society. Since the 
Constitution said nothing about industry, the virtual power of defining 
its place in society, as soon as it became interstate, devolved upon a 
body of constitutional law,rers,36 The courts, in accepting the pro-busi-
ness law,rers' point of view, responded to pressure from the Senate.37 
Law,rers and courts were less concerned with social welfare than with the 
protection of individuals, and in legal matters corporations were indi-
viduals,38 The law,yers prevailed, with few exceptions, in winning accep-
tance of the policy of maintaining a governmental myth of laissez-faire,39 
Tugwell commented on the classification of corporations as indi-
viduals which enabled them to seek protection under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The corporation was a Roman concept (collegium) 
which English common law recognized before the rise of industry, This 
35· Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 486. 
36. Tugwell, R. G,, •Governor or President?,• New Republic, Vol. 54, No. 
702, May 16, 1928, 382, 
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38. Tugwell, R. G., •Governor or President?,• 382. 
39· Tugwell, R. G,, •Governor or President?," 382. 
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concept possessed unique and priceless attributes for industry: 
It Lthe corporatio~/ could own, it could act, it could go 
on perpetually, quite apart from the fortunes of any of its 
creators or possessors. It was not a person, yet the law 
gave it a fictional individuality. It could be a tool, a 
screen, a collector of powers, a dispenser of benefits. It 
could erect immunities against disagreeable responsibilities. 
A corporation could own slum properties; it could hire child 
labor; it could overcharge for goods or services; it could 
corrupt governments. In other words, it could perform many 
acts with which few individuals would care to be associated 
directly. Through share ownership, personal responsibility 
seemed remote because diluted. Many individuals shared in 
its gains who would have hesitated to do so in their own 
names. 
Because the Constitution did not mention industry, control of corporations 
fell among the residual powers of the states. While incorporation was 
always formally a governmental matter -- corporations required state 
charters, competition between the numerous sources of power benefited 
the corporations.4° 
Tugwell asserted that in view of the nature of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, the legal individuality of corporations could only be 
fictional: 
It would have surprised the drafters ••• to know that the 
Bill of Rights would prove to be as important a protection 
for corporate as for individual interests; that in the years 
to come, the personal •liberty,• which English colonists 
40. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government," Part II, 
The Western Political QuarterlY, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 470; 
Childs, Marquis w. and Cater, Douglass, Ethics in~ Business Society 
(New York, New American Library, A Mentor Book, 1954) 121, notes: 
•The corporation, the foundation stone of modern business, is a cre-
ation of the government; its rights and privileges are defined by law 
- law of Congress and the various state legislatures, not some sort 
of natural law pertaining to Adam Smith.• 
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thought ought to be inviolate even against the state, would 
serve to elevate corporations to a position beyong the reach 
of the Governroent,41 
He saw no rights in the Fifth Amendment which were attributes of corpor-
ations; they were anciently sought rights predating the corporation, All 
of the first ten amendments imposed limitations on the federal government 
in its relations with persons. The Fourteenth Amendment protected Negroes, 
against the states as well as the federal government, guaranteeing them 
liberties which inhered in human beings, When the corporations seized 
upon the "due process• clause in order to establish their rights, they 
began a controversy • ••• too long and too bitterly fought to have been 
settled satisfactorily to anyone who lived through it.•42 
Tugwell outlined the development of the prevalence of laissez-
faire in the courts. The Fifth Amendment protected business from the 
federal government. When the states appeared to be a threat, corporation 
lawYers cited the Fourteenth Amendment. The lawyers found the commerce 
clause harder to handle, but they made a "brave try.• Chief Justice 
Marshall, in Gibbon vs. Ogden, made it impossible for a state to regulate 
interstate trade. His decision fitted in with the times, facilitating 
economic expansion. In the course of subduing the states, Marshall 
defined commerce as something more than •traffic,• creating more implied 
powers. Marshall was actually less concerned that commerce be regulated 
41, Tugwell, R, G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part 
II, 472, 
42• Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part 
II, 473• 
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than that the states should regulate it. During his time on the Supreme 
Court (1801-1835) Congress did not act.43 
Chief Justice Taney (1836-1864) had a states'-rights bias; he 
juggled back and forth, creating a No-Man's Land in which business pros-
pered.44 He allowed the states to fill the void in regulation -- in 
instances in which the federal government failed to act. Taney's atti-
tude tended to hold back commercial expansion. Business eventually 
enjoyed seeing the encroachment of state power set back severely. The 
Wabash Case of 1886, in effect, made federal jurisdiction over inter-
state commerce exclusive; it prevented the states from acting even if 
Congress did not. In the end Congress acted -- the Interstate Commerce 
Act of 1887. Yet, the courts persistently refused until Taft's time 
(1921-1930) • ••• to give up for the states all that Taney had kept for 
them •• 45 
The Interstate Commerce Act, Tugwell asserted, did not go beyond 
English common law-- 'it had merely settled where an old power was to lie 
in a single instance of control.• The struggles of an expanding industrial 
43· 
44-
45· 
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society followed. The central question was whether or not the people 
would win legislative fulfillment of their demand for control over 
business. The determination of where the "due process" and "corrmerce 
among the states• would apply was not the only problem. "In every case 
there had been the matter of jurisdiction• -- state and federal.46 
The states lost effective control of business, being hampered by 
the commerce clause where business was interstate and by the dur process 
clause where business was local. Public indignation reached a climax in 
1890 in the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Now the federal gov-
ernment had power to control business. 'But when even the lobbies had 
failed big business, the courts had stood firm.• In the Sugar Trust 
Case of 1895, Chief 3ustice Fuller insisted on strict construction, 
stating that Congress had not meant • ••• to assert the power to deal 
with monopoly directly as such; or to limit and restrict the rights of 
corporations created by the States ••• in the acquisition, control or 
disposition of property •••• • Fuller engaged, Tugwell charged, in a 
• ••• deliberate misinterpretation of legislative intent.• Fuller went 
on to say that if the Court allowed the extension of federal power which 
the government sought, nothing would be left for the states.47 
If the states lost effective control of business, down to 1913 they 
retained enough of their powers in economic affairs to limit the federal 
46. Tugwell, R. G., 'The New Deal: The Decline of Government," Part II, 
476. 
47• Tugwell, R. G., 'The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
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hold on them; the preservation of the states' powers in economic 
affairs also worked in another direction -- it produced a long list of 
occupations affected with some public interest calling for state regula-
tion; it checked • ••• the attempt to create an area of absolute free-
dom for business enterprise,•48 Meanwhile, business thrived, The once 
boiling controversy over government's powers in economic matters sim-
mered. The government did not reopen the debate, as it seemed to at 
first, by assuming war powers in 1917; the court made exception in a 
•controlling emergency,• evading the basic question,49 The controversy 
apparently ended after World War I; the courts reduced the states' 
powers to nearly nothing, and Chief Justice Taft delivered a •ringing 
declaration of business immunities.•5° Then the depression after 1929, 
and the failure of the •policeman• government to meet the exigencies of 
the crisis, reopened the whole controversy.51 
In 1933 the new Administration determined that only national 
action and regulation could salvage something from the wreckage of the 
national economy,52 Laissez-faire was firmly entrenched, and by 1933 
Americans had forgotten to consider that system, which was inconsistent 
48. Tugwell, R. G,, "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part ti, 
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49. TUgwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 485. 
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52. Tugwell, R. G., 'The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
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with much of the Constitution, as alternate to anything else,53 In 
the past, Americans, adhering to the •policeman• concept of government, 
had only superficially considered the problem of regulation in a national 
economic state,54 Roosevelt could find no answer when he inquired of 
himself what powers the federal government might have -- because there 
was no answer,55 "About the control of business, we were still in the 
dark in 1933, and still at the Senate's mercy,•56 In 1926 Taft had said 
in the Tyson Case that business could not be controlled, and 
in 1933 was the last word •• 57 
• ... that 
In an extreme emergency a strong executive might obtain the cooper-
ation of the Senate. As for the Court, no one knew better than Roosevelt 
how slim was the chance that the Justices would reverse Taft's dictum.58 
Yet, the best chance for the extension of federal power lay in reinter-
pretation of the commerce clause.59 During the depression a widespread 
demand arose for a search backward in order to discover where the •stretch-
ing• -- the transfer of the tradition of individual liberty to corpora-
tions -- had begun; there was a further demand for reinterpretation of the 
53· Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business, • Part II, 485. 
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Constitution.60Amendment, the alternative to reinterpretation, would be 
hopelessly slow.61 Tugwell elaborated on the difficulties involved in 
seeking changes in the Constitution: 
Amendment in favor of laissez-faire would have been an 
extension of the Bill of Rights which would have betrayed 
other rights implied in it; amendment in the other direc-
tion would have violated a mode of thinking which was so 
buttressed in respectability, progress, and prosperity as 
to be invulnerable to attack. Nothing, in consequ~nce, 
could be done by way of constitutional amendments.b2 
Roosevelt's rejection of the amendment process imposed a difficult 
burden on the Court. The Court might never have had to face the problem 
of defining the powers of the federal government if the nationalists at 
the Constitutional Convention •had not been taken by surprise,• yielding 
to federalism. Overlooked commercial controls were among the residual 
powers, all of which went to the states. The source of the Court's diffi-
culty 
60. 
61. 
62. 
••• was the attempt to torture meanings into a document 
which was broad and elastic on nearly every question it 
touched, but could hardly be so on one which had not been 
thought of at the time it was written. To construe the 
settlement of the controversy over the capes guarding the 
Potomac and traffic on that river into a mandate for the 
regulation of factory employment, the control of prices, 
and rules of fairness in competition among businesses, was 
the problem the Court would have to face. Perhaps it would 
be unfair to force the Court to face it •••• The need for 
governmental powers to meet the challenge of defiant busi-
ness was imperative, even though the attempts to create 
Tugwell, R. G. • •The New Deal: The Rise of Business, • Part II, 491. 
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them might be fumbling and awkward. Some way had to be 
found other than amendment.63 
Business suppressed its defiance temporarily in the crisis of 
1933· Being nearly frightened to death, it accepted help from the RFC 
• ••• but its la~ers would never lose sight of the permanent questions 
involved even in this.• La~ers who had been undermining government for 
generations would not change their attitudes at a moment's notice. The 
most numerous and ardent members of the Liberty League were corporation 
la~ers who would not • ••• admit even to themselves that they had all 
along supported what was merely expedient and even, perhaps, wrong.• 64 
One could discount Tugwell's retrospective writings about the New 
Deal's concern with basic constitutional questions if a study of his 
career did not disclose examples of concern with the legality of specific 
measures.65 Beginning in 1928, when Tugwell prepared a memorandum on a 
national question, agriculture, for an important political figure, Alfred 
E. Smith, he showed in public statements and administrative discussions 
a constant awareness of constitutional considerations. 
In an article published in 1928 Tugwell called for judicial inter-
pretations which took a pragmatic view of human necessity, enabling the 
Constitution to grow as a "living instrument.• 66 In the same year, in 
63. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
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65. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Available Instruments of Govern-
ment Power,• The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4, December, 
1949, indicated, by title alone, a deep appreciation of constitutional 
limitations. 
66. Tugwell, R, G., "That Living Constitution,• New Republic, Vol. 55, 
No. 707, "una 20, 1928, 121. 
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the memorandum he submitted to Smith, Tugwell reasoned that the Supreme 
Court probably would have declared the McNary-Haugen proposals unconsti-
tutional; • ••• this difficulty,• he wrote, •may as well be avoided in 
future proposals, and price relief sought by a means to which all 
assent.•67 Regarding the advance-retia price plan which he outlined for 
Smith, he commented, "From the constitutional point of view, there are 
two difficulties• -- Would it abridge the right of contract unreasonably? 
Would it fall within the prohibitions of the Fifth Amendment?68 
In 1932 Tugwell was among those assinged to formulate a farm pro-
gram for the incoming Administration. M. L. Wilson, principal promoter 
of the domestic allotment plan, sought authoritative opinions on consti-
tutional questions; he forwarded the information he obtained to Tugwell. 
Wilson sent Tugwell a brief which Judge Hulbert of the legal staff of 
the Farm Board prepared on the constitutionality of the domestic allot-
ment plan,69 When Stanley Reed, Solicitor of the Farm Board, advised 
Wilson that a scheme to compel processors to buy allotment certificates 
would be unconstitutional, the staff of Henry I. Herriman, President of 
the United States Chamber of Commerce, suggested a processing tax as con-
67. Tugwell Papers. 
68. Tugwell Papers. 
69. Letter, M. L. Wilson to Tugwell, September 28, 1932, Tugwell Papers; 
this correspondence qualifies the vi~w that • ••• some of the early 
New Deal statutes were passed, under the pressure of emergency, with-
out the slightest regard for constitutional limitations,• expressed 
in Pusey, Merlo J., review of Mason, Alpheus T., Harlan Fiske Stone: 
Pillar of the Law (New York, Viking, 1956) in The New York Tjmes 
~Review, November 11, 1956, 1. 
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stitutional.70 Wilson then wrote Tugwell that according to the legal 
opinion of •one of the best ls~ers in Washington• the processing tax 
would be constitutional.7l 
During the lame-duck period many suggestions for legislation 
poured into Tugwell's office. Professor J. s. Long of Lehigh University 
suggested a plan requiring a percentage of alcohol in commercial gaso-
line. Tugwell wrote Long: 
The Plan ••• is very interesting •••• You must realize, 
however, that this is a state matter rather than a national 
one, and while some experimental work might be carried on 
by the Federal Government, there is very little else that 
can be done.72 
In the latter part of June, 1933, after the sweeping legislation 
of the "Hundred Days,• Tugwell addressed a group of la~ers on constitu-
tiona! questions. He considered whether the AAA and the t~ were "legally 
proper.• He noted that the opponents of the two measures based their 
arguments on economic as well as constitutional grounds; they considered 
laissez-fairs and democracy • ••• two aspects of one and the same value.• 
•certainly,• Tugwell declared, 
••• the Constitution wes never designed to impose upon one 
era the absolute economic dogma which have been glorified 
70. Fits, Gilbert c., George !!• Peek~ the Fight for l!!.rm Parity 
(Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1954) 231. 
71. Letter, M. L. Wilson to Tugwell, October 24, 1932, Tugwell Papers; 
the second AAA, which the Court upheld, was based on the commerce 
clause, in the reinterpretation of which, Tugwell believed, lay 
the best chance for the extension of federal power, see above, foot-
note 59. 
72. Letter, January 23, 1933, Tugwell Papers. 
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under it in an earlier one,73 
He then made rhetorical inquiries as to whether the new President and 
Congress had violated the republican form of government explicit in the 
Constitution, or hed infringed on the philosophy Of 'checks and balances.• 
These questions, he remarked, 
••• naturally arise; they command respect, for they concern 
our faith in the organization and functioning of our national 
government • 
He answered his own questions, declaring that the laws of the administra-
tion were the laws of Congress. He conceded that the emergency called 
for quick enactment of legislation which required • ••• little policing, 
but, instead, muoh coordinated administration and negotiation.• It still 
lay with Congress, he declared, to alter, amend, or repeal the new laws --
the President was to execute and administer them. He stated that it was 
•not patent• wherein there had occured any vilation of the Constitution. 
Outlining the circumstances of the framing of the Constitution and subse-
quest economic developments, Tugwell concluded that the Administration 
aimed 
••• to rediscover the Constitution, to revitalize the 
powers it was intended to create, many of which had been 
obscured in the interest of economic aims and purposes 
which have now become oppressively obsolescent.74 
Meanwhile, in 1933, Tugwell's first year as a public official, in 
73• Tugwell, R. G., •Design for Government,• Address, Eighth Annual 
Meeting of the Federation of Bar Associations of \'/estern New York, 
June 24, 1933, in The Battle for Democracy, 5-9· 
74. Tugwell, R. G., •Design for Government,• 10-13. 
addition to making speeches, he had to apply constitutional tests to 
actual proposals for legislation, In connection with a food and drugs 
bill, Professor David F. Cavers of Duke University, who worked on a 
draft of a measure, wrote Tugwell1 
We must fell back ••• on the sort of statute which can 
withstand judicial interference - and worse. This calls in 
some places for extreme specification, in others for language 
as loose as the Constitution will permit.75 
In 1934, as the debate over a food and drugs bill dragged on in 
Congress and in the press, Tugwell published a refutation of the consti-
tutional arguments which opponents of the measure advanced, He indicated 
the judicial limitations which the bill imposed on the Food and Drug 
Administration. The agency, in questioning claims in advertisements, had 
to prove in court that there was general agreement of medical opinion on 
the properties of a product. In addition, the government had to prove 
that suspected claims were contrary to medical opinion, Tugwell rejected 
accusations that the Food and Drug Administration would be able to violate 
the separation-of-powers doctrine of the Constitution. He asserted that 
an agency of the Department of Agriculture had no judicial authority.76 
In April, 1934, Tugwell wrote that government was sacred, but had 
to change to remain so -- otherwise it would become •atrophied and obso-
lete,• ignored or brushed aside. Changes in the activities of govern-
ment called for a broad construction of the Constitution, New institu-
75· Letter, ~~y 13, 1933, Tugwell Papers. 
76. Tugwell, R. G., •The Great American Fraud,"~ American Scholar, 
Vol, 3, No. 1, Winter, 1934, 92. 
tiona did not spring full grown from legislative acts -- any more than 
the United States government emerged full-grown from the Constitutional 
Convention: 
We had to learn about democratic government in practice; 
we had to grow into it by trying various devices. • •• 
We express determination to move forward in a general dir-
ection and within an agreed framework of rules •••• 77 
In June, 1934, in a hearing on Tugwell's promotion from Assistant 
to Under Secretary, membera of the Senate Committee on Agriculture re-
quested that he state his views on constitutional matters. Tugwell 
declared that his opinions were largely based on the interpretations.of 
others -- Justices Marshall, Story, Brewer, Holmes, Hughes, Brandeis, 
Roberts, and Cardozo. He emphasized the omission in the Constitution of 
any reference to industry, asserting his acceptance of Holmes• dictum 
that • . .. a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic 
theory.•78 
In May, 1935, the Supreme Court (A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 u. s. 495) ruled the NRA unconstitutional as an 
illegal delegation of legislative powers. In 1935 the Court (United 
States v. Butler, 297 u. s. 1) also declared the AAA unconstitutional as 
an improper exercise of the federal taxing power in order to effectuate 
an illegitimate end -- the regulation and control of agricultural produc-
77. Tugwell, R. G., •America Takes Hold of Its Destiny,• Today, April 
28, 1934, in The Battle f2r Democracy, 258-60. 
78. Statement for Hearings, Tugwell Papers; see above, Chapter X, 
Section, •Promotion.• 
tion. Tugwell's argument that emergency legislation required much 
coordinated administration and negotiation which could not be designated 
in detail in legislation, end his belief in the constitutionality of the 
processing tax, met with rejection by the Court. Roosevelt saw in the 
sweeping wording of the decisions the threat of judicial nullification 
of the whole recovery effort,79 
Tugwell commented on the Court, after its NRA decision, in a com-
mencement address on June 10, 1935.80 On June 18, 1935, Frank Kent com-
mented on Tugwell's 'disturbing' speech; Kent also deplored an article 
by Raymond Moley entitled 'A Living Constitution,• in which the professor 
inquired whether the time had not come to amend th&t document • ... so 
that the National Government can regulate economic life to the extent 
that our civilization makes imperative.• 81 A critic of Tugwell condemned 
the use in the commencement address of 'defiant• passages such as the 
assertion that the industrial •revolution• moved too fast for the accommo-
dation of •judicial theory;• such words allegedly showed a contempt for 
law,82 
Tugwell was not alone in his criticism of the Court. In 1936 an 
author who severely criticized a number of developments in government under 
the New Deal denounced the Court's function as a • ••• sovereign veto 
79. Goldman, Eric F., Rendezvous with Destiny (New York, Vintage Books, 
1956) 274· 
80. Tugwell, R. G., •Your Future and Your Nation,• Commencement Address, 
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, June 10, 1935, USDA Press Release. 
81. Kent, Frank R., Without Grease (New York, William Morrow, 1936) 165; 
note the similarity between the titles of Maley's article and Tugwell's 
of 1922. 
82. Desvernine, Raoul s., Democratic Despotism (New York, Dodd, Mead, 
1936) 180. 
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agency over the other two presumably coequal branches.• He declared 
that the Court, due to its •veto-mindedness,• did not fulfil its respon-
sibility of clarifying the Constitution with regard to freedom and the 
general welfare. The Court applied an eighteenth-century Constitution 
to a twentieth-century problem in terms of nineteenth-century economic 
theories, obscuring the intent of the Constitution and confusing the 
people about the purpose which the Constitution was to serve. The Court 
had done more than veto federal powers which it believed could not be 
deduced from the language and intent of the Constitution; it had vetoed 
methods, thereby taking over legislative functions. The Court also con-
tradicted itself. It declared that government has the power to ensure 
freedom for the people • • •• by facilitating access to the means of 
acquiring economic security,• but it unalterably opposed government's 
functioning in such a way as to exercise that power. The Court could 
best save the Constitution by throwing light on what is constitutional 
method for securing the blessings of liberty.83 
Tugwell intended no definance of the Court. After the AAA deci-
sion, he wrote that the new agricultural act did not influence economic 
balance as directly as the old one did, • ••• and no certain way seems 
open to do that under the dictum of the Court.•84 Nor did he support 
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme; on August 26, 1937, he wrote to the 
83. 
84. 
Ydller, Francis P., The Blessings 9! Liberty (Chapel Hill, Univers-
ity of North Carolina Press, 1936) 79-81. 
Tugwell, R. G., •Down to Earth,' Current History, Vol. 44, No. 4, 
July, 1936, 37• 
President: 
I still think the unwillingness of the Senate to submit 
to the popular will is your real problem and that the 
Court issue is secondary. 
887. 
He suggested a study of the legislative branch on the same high level as 
the Report on Administrative Management, a survey of the executive branch, 
had been.85 
Tugwell's reference to the Senate suggested a serious question 
for political scientists. He explained the creation of the Senate in 
1787 in terms of a compromise between the mercantilist nationalists and 
the laissez-faire states' righters. Once created, the Senate proved a 
formidable anti-nationalist force. There was in 
••• the involved system of checks and balances, delicate 
and almost incredibly accurate, ••• a slight original bias, 
an overweighting, which favored the Senate, and which sena-
torial aggression made more notable as time passed.86 
When the Court overthrew the NRA, it hid behind the Senate from presiden-
tial wrath, The Senate protected the Court in this instance because the 
decision served the •religion of 'little business•• which all politicians 
professed, Later the Senate interfered with the Court • ... when even 
the Justices were swept into the stream of progress. For the Senate would 
not change,.87 
Looking backwards, Tugwell saw definite gains, despite the Court and 
the Senate, for the nationalists. Although the period 1880-1933 had • ••• 
85. Letter, Roosevelt Papers. 
86. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: 
87. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: 
298. 
The Rise of Business,• Part II, 483. 
The Decline of Government," Part I, 
888. 
no parallel in all history for sheer disorder, ccnfusion, and paradox,• 
the Supreme Court's record showed a double trend: towards a reduction in 
state power and towards an increase in federal power.88 The New Deal's 
interstate-commerce cases 
••• provoked a long overdue Constitutional debate in which, 
however, the victory might appear to run, the power of the 
national government in economic matters would be immensely 
increased, if not established beyond argument.89 
Looking to the future, Tugwell wrote, in 1949, that central econ-
omic planning involved 
" ••• matters which have constitutional implies-
tiona and need exploration in terms appropriate to their legality,• He 
was aware that, "Constitutionally, ••• the difficulties of recognizing 
the American econo~ as an articulated whole are considerable but not 
absolute." He did not expect the Court to adopt holistic economic views 
when there was so little recognition elsewhere of "essential economic and 
social unity.• If proposed changes were sufficiently important and sound, 
they could be argued for -- "otherwise not." Constitutional reversal had 
to follow a reversal of public feeling in fundamental matters. The 
courts would grant full recognition of new social concepts and devices 
• ••• if they should be generally demanded. • •• The courts cannot go 
faster than is demanded.•90 
88. Tugwell, R. G. • 'The New Deal: The Decline of Government , • Part 
479· 
89. Tugwell, R. G. • 'The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part 
474· 
II, 
II, 
90. Tugwell, R. G., 'A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• Journal 
of Farm Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, February, 1949, 39-42• 
---
Many of Tugwell's critics labeled him a revolutionary advocate 
of unconstitutional action, They considered failure to accept their 
interpretation of the Constitution a rejection of our frame of govern-
ment. An examination of Tugwell's career does not reveal any basis 
for his opponents' accusations. In 1946 Sumner Welles wrote that Tugwell 
91. 
••• has sought consistently, according to the best lights 
available to him, to rectify the social injustices of our 
modern civilization in the truly liberal and democratic 
tradition of the principles of the Constitution,91 
Welles, Sumner, review of~ Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 
1947) in Saturday Review of Ljterature, Vol. Jl, No. 14, November 
25, 40, 9· 
The Progressive Tradition 
Frank Kent asserted that about once every generation it was nee~ 
essary to put the conservatives out of office and have the liberals 
take over; it was just as essential that the conservatives should quickly 
return to power.1 Tugwell may not have agreed with Kent on the dura-
tion of the liberals' stay in office; his study of the Progressive tradi-
tion in America2 did outline a history of reform by occasional spurts 
similar to the sequence wr ich Kent thought desirable. It was only 
occasionally that the people clamored for reform; it was only then that 
reform was possible. When the pent~up desire for reform burst forth, 
H was rapidly expended. Tugwell recalled that in the New Deal period 
•every item of reform had to be fought for inch by inch, and the fight 
grew harder as recovery proceeded.•3 The rapid exhaustion of the wish 
to reform was not incomprehensible to him. He was awaTe of people's 
reluctance to go beyond rudimentary patchwork in institutional matters: 
1. 
2. 
A bridge is generally recognized as something which cannot 
be built with elementary arithmetic; yet it is expected 
that the more complicated social processes may be provided 
for without the use of devices for measurement, of institu-
tions for coordination, or reference to the relevant body 
of social science,4 
Tugwell's article on the Progressive tradition included a brief 
Kent, Frank R., Without Grease, Political Behavior 1a31<-~ (New 
York, William Morrow, 1936) 42~43· 
Tugwell, R. G., 'The Progressive Tradition,• Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 
155, No. 4, April, 1935· 
Tugwell, R. G., 'The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political 
Ouarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 329. 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 2. 
history of reform and an analysis of the American faith, The New Deal 
was the third of three great battles for democracy, The battle would 
determine whether the political forces of democracy were 'wise and 
strong enough to rearrange the economic and social environment on terms 
satisfactory to the general ethical and moral sense,• Success would 
amount to the •most merciful of recorded human revolutions.•5 
The first battle, in Cleveland and Bryan's time, was doomed from 
the start, The answer to the quest for reform was the Full Dinner Pail 
and the Martial Spirit. There were some survivals of the reform effort 
such as an ambiguous antitrust act and the Interstate Commerce Commis-
6 
sion, With Teddy Roosevelt and Wilson the forces of democracy got a 
foothold in the business system. A short reaction under Taft followed 
the Food and Drugs Act, railroad legislation, and trust-busting. Then, 
between Taft and World War I, came a rationalization of the tariff, 
the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Income Tax, 
and the Federal Reserve System.? 
The war, a futile effort to extend the political frontiers of 
democracy without any pArallel attempt to extend its economic and social 
frontiers, sidetracked the reform movement. During the tense truce of 
the 1920s mass production, reckless foreign lending, and forced sales 
through installment selling kept the lid on for eight years. Tariff 
protection (the tariff was raised three times) for agriculture was an 
5. Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Tradition,• 415. 
6. Tugwell, R, G,, "The Progressive Tradition,• 415-16. 
7. Tugwell, R, G,, •The Progressive Tradition,• 416-17. 
illusion; there was no genuine relief for farmers, Public utilities 
formed .great, privileged systems for exploitation; speculation on the 
New York and Chicago exchanges became a mania. Indiscriminate expan-
sion of facilities and output liquidated the labor movement, Finally, 
control by the directorates of the Federal Reserve Banks made the system 
fail in the pinch.8 
As the New Deal got underway amid disaster, Tugwell was aware of 
the Progressive heritage; however, its implementation in 1933 required 
devices different from those of earlier periods• 
I had known themLProgressive strugglei/ too; but my 
generation had redefined the issues and used other 
terms. They were, for all that, perhaps the same, 
We had more of an agreed positive program in contrast 
to their negative one; but we were not such good 
fighters and we probably had less public support be-
cause our concepts were, necessarily, more difficult, 
Denouncing •the interests• and "busting trusts• had 
been much more conducive to adrenslin flow than advo-
cating more effective administrative arrangements for 
specific social functions,9 
Tugwell asserted in his exposition of the American faith that new 
instruments did not mean basic aims had changed. The fundamental objec-
tives of Americans were not susceptible ,of a materialistic or determini-
stic explanation, He referred to the •stream of American purpose Lai/ 
a steady underground river beneath an artificially ordered and documented 
landscape,• Historians were prone to ignore the inarticulate, placing a 
higher value on documentary evidence than its real significance justified. 
8. Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Tradition,• 417•19. 
9. Tugwell, R, G,, The Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 348. 
The •stream• flowed continuously; only now and then did it come to the 
surface. Then it carried all before it; the statesman's function was 
to moderate and direct -- he could not oppose. He had to have a feeling 
for the people's spirit and a sense of timing. His role was that of a 
facilitator.10 Roosevelt did not invent the New Deal. He understood 
the progressive drift as one of a long line of American statesmen who 
had done the same.11 
Tugwell found the American faith difficult to describe; there had 
never been a satisfactory definition. A study of our history helped to 
understand or feel it. The generation after 1789 eliminated formal 
political and religious discriminations. Economic discriminations and 
privileges remained. Their conquest vas approached continually -- in 
the Declaration of Independence, the Revolution, and the administrations 
of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, and Wilson. Our history 
showed that Americans regarded natural forces and social privileges as 
obstacles to be overcome "for some deeper purpose.• "Clever dodges of 
the privileged' could deflect this deeper purpose; they would not stop 
•t 12 1 • 
The definition of the American faith approached the realm of 
morals and religion. The law of western religions was that the good life 
was the purpose of life, that life was barren without living, achieving, 
10. Tugwell, R. G,, "The Progressive Tradition,• 409. 
11. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Tradition,• 409. 
12. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Progressive Tradition,• 410, 
and human dignity, Tugwell declared that 
Economic hardships have never greatly mattered to our 
people, so long as elemental human virtues were pos-
sible,l3 
Our economic gains were a by-product of our effort to achieve the 
good life, and 
Those who accuse us of always living for material things 
fail to penetrate the surface of our life, The ingenuity 
which produces goods for use has a source outside the 
things themselves,14 
The tremendous protest after the crash arose because institu-
tiona had affronted human dignity, The people demanded that leaders 
find a system which would make the good life possible. When the people 
would approve inaction or a given action, "This withholding of consent 
is the sign to which conformity is imperative •••• We shall have some 
amazingly disturbed and unhappy years if our present social and indus-
trial leaders prove themselves unable to conform to the American faith •• l5 
Society's attempts to adapt itself to the undefined social ethic 
would involve a struggle •to find that adaptation through the materials 
put at its disposal by the recent technological revolution in industry 
and agriculture.• 16 Technology introduced no new factor into American 
political life; it simply intensified the purpose to resolve economic 
problems. The New Deal was the 'first chance we have had to do this 
coherently,• 17 
13. Tugwell, R, G,' 'The Progressive Tradition,• 410. 
14. Tugwell, R, G, • "The Progressive Tradition,• 4ll. 
15. Tugwell, R, G,' "The Progressive Tradition," 411-12. 
16. Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Tradition,• 412. 
17. Tugwll, R, G., •The Progressive Tradition," 414. 
Tugwell ended his article on the Progressive tradition with the 
assertion that the New Deal was reshaped every day, belonging to all 
the people and their tradition. His concluding remarks restated his 
non-economic interpretation of American history: 
That life is good which seems good to the men and 
women who live it. ·with us, with our free tradi-
tions ••• it is conditioned on free institutions 
and comprehensive if unavowed desires. It reflects 
our belief that human dignity is more important 
than numbers or wealth,l8 
We might make mistakes; we might accept false objectives enthusiastic-
ally, only to reject them without fanfare as we haddone in the past 
(with regard to Manifest Destiny, for example), However, 
If they Lour institution~/ fail us, we can change 
them; but if this purpose departs, then we are lost 
indeed,l9 
Later in the same year, 1935, Tugwell again expressed his concept of 
American aspirations toward intangibles: 
It is not a fixed and pbysical goal toward which we move 
••• it is much more than this. We have, by taking 
thought, added cubits to our children's physical stature; 
we are becoming determined by taking tho8ght to add to 
their moral and spiritual stature, too.2 
Tugwell's interpretation of American history was more spiritual than any 
produced by people who called him a CoiDUilnist, an adherent of historical 
materialism or of economic determinism. 
18. Tugwell, R, G,, 'The Progressive Tradition,• 419. 
19. Tugwell, R. G,, •The Progressive Tradition,• 419. 
20. Tugwell, R. G,, Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935; Resettlement Administration Press 
Release, 2. 
Specific Measures 
General assertions would be meaningless if an examination of 
Tugwell's administrative activities did not reveal actual specific 
examples of conservatism. In the American tradition conservatism 
involves compromise, the enactment of measures only after obtaining 
the consent of the various interested parties. Tugwell showed his 
awareness of the necessity of compromise in a description of the 
mediating function of the Secretary of Agriculture: • • • • among the 
special pleas which are offered, a public servant must always pick 
and choose, modify and correct, granting what can be given, rejecting 
1 
that which cannot.• 
A memorandum from General Westervelt of the AAA to Peek, dated 
November 29, 1933, indicated Tugwell's willingness to compromise -- a 
restraining factor in any contemplation of departure from former prac-
tices, a literally conservative force. The memorandum reported that 
Tugwell expressed an interest in getting codes and agreements through as 
rapidly as possible; under no circumstances did he wish to be placed in 
the position of delaying action on any codes and agreements; while he 
was for complete government access to processors' books, he was willing 
2 to settle on some satisfactory middle ground. Peek referred to Tugwell's 
1. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Niagara County Pioneer Association, Olcott 
Beach, New York, August 8, 1934; USDA Press Release, 6. 
2. Peek, George N. and Samuel Crowther, WhY' Quit Our Own (New York, 
D. Van Nostrand, 1936) 151, 
attitude as a decision to 'throw an anchor out to windward.'3 Criti-
cism of Tugwell's willingness to compromise also came from other 
sources whose views were quite different from those of Peek. An editorial 
on the left condemned Tugwell because he did not •always act consistently" 
with his views on the rational planning of economic life.4 
Compromise among legislative interests took place before the 
passage of legislation, compromise among administrative interests after 
passage. Such compromise is a conservative force about the acceptance 
of which there can be little choice in American government. A similar 
force was the reluctance which modern social-democratic statesmen usu• 
ally display, on attaining power, to disrupt a going concern of which 
they have become the managers.5 
Tugwell also displayed conservatism in areas where there was a 
choice. He was intellectually humble through recornition of the enor-
mity and complexity of the tasks which the administration faced. This 
awareness caused Tugwell to consider the programs of the Resettlement 
Administration6 (except for the retirement of submarginal lands) and 
the AAA7 temporary. He also looked upon relief measures in general as 
essentially stop-gap.8 He believed that permanent programs would re-
quire at least a generation for their evolution. 'A sound agricultural 
3· Peek, George N. and Samuel Crowther, Why Q.uit Our~. 151. 
4• Editorial, Nation, Vol. 143, No. 22, November 28, 1936, 618. 
5· Hofstadter, Richard,~ American Political Tradition (New York, 
Knopf, 1949) 34• 
6. See below, Chapter XIV, Section, 'The Impractical, Dreaming Tugwell.' 
7. See above, Chapter III, Section, •Tugwell's Long-Run Thinking.• 
8. See above, Chapter III, Section, •Tugwell's Long-Run Thinking.• 
program, a sound program for t~e use of our natural resources, and a 
sound program of industrial development cannot be established in a day 
after a period of misdirected efforts ending in a great national dis-
aster.• 9 
One could call Tugwell's immediate conservation activities, at 
the risk of redundancy, conservative. He maintained that the RA anti-
cipated and rationalized an inevitable development in applying the prin• 
ciples of sound agriculture to conservation. The effort seemed dramatic 
because it fostered basic practices of drainage, fencing, and crop rota-
tion on a regional and national leve1.10 As an administrator the man 
branded as a dangerous radical in the early years of the New Deal was 
11 
confined to "eminently conservative• tasks. 
Tugwell's conservatism also applied to the details of immediate 
operations. He explained how the RA, through its appraising program, 
proceeded with caution in its land-purchase and resettlement program. 
There were no forced removals; careful planning and checking of soil 
quality, types of buildings, and families' prospects for success pre-
12 
ceded the development of s project. 
It is interesting to note that Tugwell's views, some time after 
9. Tugwell, R. G., 'National Significance of Recent Trends in Farm Popu-
lation,• Social Forces, Vol. 14, No. 1, October, 1935, 6-7. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Tompkins County Development Meeting, Ithaca, 
New York, August 7, 1935; Y§QA Press Release, 5-6. 
11. Carter, J. Franklin, Our Lords and Masters (New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 1935) 286. 
12. Tugwell, R. G., •Changing Acres,• Current History, Vol, 44, No. 6, 
September, 1936, 61-62, 
his departure from Washington, on compromise in government elaborated 
what he said in 1934 with reference to the Secretary of Agriculture's 
mediating function. In retrospect he observed, as noted above,13 that 
a political leader had to compromise between making the concessions 
necessary to hold his organization together and acting in the public 
interest; experts' decisions were often limited by political considers-
tions.14 
In a series of articles in the Western Political Ouarterlv in the 
early 1950s Tugwell described in detail the mechanics and impact of 
compromise in the Roosevelt administration. In his view Franklin Roose-
velt, although he became a Democrat rather than a Republican, was a poli-
tical dissident like Theodore -- "however hidden this quality might be 
at times by necessary compromise.• 15 Tugwell pointed out how Roosevelt 
had to check the criteria of efficiency and weigh them against Supreme 
Court opinion in choosing instruments.16 On the other hand, the Presi-
dent had to appease Congress in order to get anything done; even then 
ultimate conflict was inevitable.17 
Tugwell dealt specifically with compromise at some length in an 
13. See above, Chapter III. 
14. Tugwell, R. G., "The Superpolitical," Journal of Social Philosophy, 
Vol. 5, October, 1939 - July, 1940, 99• 
15. Tugwell, R. G., "ThP Two Great Roosevelts,• Western Political~· 
terly., Vol. 5, No> 1, March, 1952, 85. 
16. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part 
II, Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 
486. 
17. Tugwell, R, G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part 
I, Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, June, 1951, 311. 
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article entitled 'The Compromising Hoosevelt.•l8 Necessary reliance on 
subordinates as difficulties multiplied was one source of compromise.19 
The surmounting of crises and the achievement of reforms eventually led 
to dealing with those who were to enact enabling legislation; these 
dealings were another exercise in compromise.20 Obviously, Roosevelt 
could not avoid the compromise involved in the •operating method inher-
ent in give-and-take politics.• 21 The President occasionally used 
"doubtful, even sinister,• means to achieve his results; he was never 
injudicious about what he did, having well-weighted reasons and sometimes 
deliberately choosing what he believed to be a lesser ev11.22 
Tugwell did not attribute infallibility to Roosevelt. He insisted 
that the student was entitled to reassess the situation the President 
faced, raising the question whether a harder resistance to compromise 
might have had :nore desirable ultimate consequences than immediate suc-
cess and smoothing out of difficulties.23 In the short run the American 
people moved between approval (if tactics succeeded in achieving approved 
ends) and revulsion (on occasional "properly hostile" exposure); revul-
sion occurred •among those who accepted gratefully enough' the results 
of tactics they now condemned. Aside from exposure and popular reaction 
in the short run 
18. Tugwell, R. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Politis;!!l 
guarterlJC, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953· 
19. Tugwell, R. G., •The Compromising Roosevelt, " 320-21. 
20. Tugwell, H. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt, • 3221lo 
21. Tugwell, Ro G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 337· 
22. Tugwell, R. c •• "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 323· 
23. Tugwell, R. G. • "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 323. 338. 
Political means ••• do have inevitable consequences 
•••• They even link up into a system, sometimes ••·• 
••• ••• the system of consequence takes shape and 
ultimately has to be reckoned with. 
It is not such periodic •exposures• which throw the 
strongest light on the compromises of politics; it is 
the verdict of long-run judgment as consequences 
reveal themselves, assume a kind of pattern, and become 
history, which furnishes the significant lessons.24 
901. 
Tugwell did not believe ends were more important than means. The real 
challenge to s statesman was to merge of ends and means for the achieve-
ment of consequences important to the public interest; a merger would 
justify both the means employed and the approval given.25 
Tugwell's writings revealed a familiarity with the theory and 
mechanics in American politics of compromise -- compromise which by 
·definition is conservatism, a modifying factor in departures from pre-
cedent, He did not call for doctrinaire, autocratic determination of 
ends and means -- the elimination of compromise. He insisted that 
practitioners of compromise must consider, in the light of thelong-run 
public interest, the consequences of the means they choose. Beneath 
his unfortunate occasional display of disdain toward politicians, Tug-
well showed a willingness to compromise in specific practical administra• 
tive matters. Despite the aspirations expressed in his verse of two 
decades before, he neither expected nor attempted to "make America Over.• 
24. Tugwell, R. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 321. 
25. Tugwell, H. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 321. 
902. 
Conclusion 
Tugwell did not insist in a doctrinaire manner on government 
activity for the sake of government activity. He wrote in 1934 that no 
one would know •to what lengths the government will have to go until it 
is seen whether industry is capable ••• of arranging itself so that the 
full resources of our productive capacities can be used.• 1 Action by 
industry itself to find the way to continuity throug~ cooperation on 
policies of low prices, high wages, planned use of capacity, and the 
foregoing of speculative profits and deficits would prevent, and was pre-
ferable to, gov~nment intervention. With the adoption of such policies 
for the assurance of a full and free flow of goods to consumers, industry 
would be its own government. Otherwise, serious government intervention 
would involve the "less efficient policy of rigorous regulation, extreme 
taxation, and of widespread provision of free social goods.• This policy 
would interfere with efficiency, requiring many controls which would 
necessarily be negative. A lot of otherwise unnecessary machinery would 
be needed. It would all be expensive and repressive.2 
Cooperation on the part of Americans, including business men, 
could not be compelled: 
No one,with the slightest sense of history,would try 
to fit such a people into a regimented scheme, would 
try to think for them instead of getting them to think 
for themselves. Indeed, anyone who has known them by 
living their lives, by really being one of them in 
body and spirit, could know in his heart, with no need 
1. Tugwell, H. G., "America Takes Hold of Its Destiny," Today, April 28, 
1934; in The Battle for Democracy, 265. 
2. Tugwell, R. G., "America Takes Hold of Its Destiny,• 266. 
for consideration, that law, government, and social 
organization for such a people must be instruments 
through which their characteristic actions, resist• 
ances, and imaginations could find appropriate expres-
sion. Law, government, and social organization will 
inevitably fail if they are not this. In this respect 
I unhesitatingly avow ~self a thorough conservative,3 
The creation of a climate conducive to economic coordination lay 
in education. Tugwell did not expect sweeping changes in public opin-
ion, and consequently in public institutions, overnight. He told some 
students that a generation which failed in social management would not 
accomplish much in reconstruction. Even though the present public 
officials expressed misgivings about the old acquisitive attitudes, 
they had everything to learn about complicated matters. Moreover, a 
powerful minority did not share the new attitudes. Gains would probably 
not be "very rapid or very complete;• graduates would encounter the 
•same old system with some few changes.• The most important thing the 
New Deal gained for youth, through protest and a challenge to complacency, 
was a freedom from orthodoxy. This freedom constituted an opportunity, 
and thus a challenge, to the new generation,4 
Perhaps no other statement by Tugwell conveyed so vividly the 
fact that his concern with social institutions arose not out of his 
ultimate desires, but rather out of the necessity of facing modern condi-
tions, as this passage in ~ Stricken~: 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, "The Return to Democracy,• American Society 
of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 1934; in The Battle for Democracy, 194. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, •On Life As a Long-Time Enterprise,• Dart• 
mouth College, April 26, 1934; USDA Press Release, 5-7. 
MY parents do not know wr.at changed their world - and 
neither do I for that matter. The one we now have 
seems to have evolved ~steriously out of that simpler, 
perhaps more satisfying and certainly more secure one 
into which I was born. I am at least privileged to 
feel that ~ experience spans the transition from one 
kind of civilization to another. Like others of my age, 
I cannot tell whether I like better the old or the new, 
My parents have no such doubts - perh~ps because they 
have outlived insecurity, They like the new. They do 
not like everythine. But they consider wars, heavy 
taxes, governmental regulation of people's lives and so 
on to be errors which will be corrected. They like auto-
mobiles and good roads, airplanes, radios, improved bath-
rooms and all appurtenances of modernity which I am in-
clined to regard as too high a price for wars~ govern-
mental influences and all the rest of it •••• ~ 
5. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 663. 
XIII. The Dangerous Tugwell: Personal Traits and Conducts 
The Ambitious Tugwell 
He would be at tbe head of the new government. 
Charges 
According to his detractors Tugwell not only desired to effect 
sweeping changes; also, he hoped to elevate himself to the personal 
headship of the new order about to take form, Critics warned that he 
expressed his arrogance and ambition as early as 1915 in some "Whitman• 
esque• 1 lines in the magazine Intercollegiate: •I shall roll up my 
sleeves • make America overl •2 A historian generally favorable to 
the New Deal has commented that Tugwell's poem, nearly twenty years 
after it was written still caught much of the sense of challenge charac-
teristic of some eager New Dealers; it also captured some of their 
"theatrical" response to the challenge.3 
It was not wholly reasonable to assume that Tugwell's·verse, 
written when he was twenty-four, accurately described his estimate of 
his own importance in 1932 and later years. His critics cited the poem 
continually during the New Deal period, The verse even reached the Capi-
tol as Senator Dickinson read the poem to his colleagues.4 In 1933, 
Tugwell's opponents maintained, the professor considered his association 
with Roosevelt an opportunity to translate his youthful poetic ambitions 
into reality, 
1. "Tugwell's Dream,• Newsweek, Vol, 28, No, 1, July l, 1946, 28, 
2. See above, Chapter I, 
3· Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., "The First Hundred Days of the New Deal," 
in The Aspirin Age, 1919 - 1941, ed. by Isabel Leighton (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1949) 286. 
4· Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol, 78, Part II, 11445· 
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The •ambitious• Tugwell was depicted as having been eager to 
enter government service. George Peek suspected that Tugwell influenced 
the appointment of Henry Wallace as Secretary of Agriculture in order to 
receive the Assistant Secretaryship in return, thereby advancing his 
own purposes.5 Once he arrived at the capital, Tugwell acted on his 
assumption that the mass of people were potential robots.6 He enjoyed 
a •prodigious vision of enticing men to arrange themselves in fancy 
formation and to jump through hoops •••• .7 Here was his chance, after 
years of soulful writing, to •curb, lead, regiment, and dominate• one 
hundred and thirty million people.8 One critic found that Tugwell's 
dictatorial pretentions emerged clearly in the speeches of the would-be 
Lenin. These addresses began with •r,• which later became •we•; •we• 
referred first to the all-powerful government of Tugwell and his associ-
ates, then to Tugwell and Roosevelt, and finally to Tugwell alone.9 
One commentator on Tugwell's ambition contradicted himself. He 
stated that Tugwell was eager to enter the government. Then he conceded 
that the professor was originally not eager to go to Washington and did 
not at first enjoy his official position; the joys of office-holding grew 
on him.10 Other critics stressed the pleasures Tugwell derived from his 
5· Peek, George N. with Samuel Crowther, Why .2Y..il. .Q!g: Own (New York, 
D. Van Nostrand, 1936) 22; see above, Chapter VIII. 
6. Crosby, Percy L., Three Cheers for the Red,~, ~ Red (McLean, 
Virginia, Freedom Press, 1936) 467, 
7. 8olles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• American Merc-
yt[, Vol. 39, No. 153, September, 1936, 12. 
8. Bolles, Blair, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 83. 
9· Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Saturday Even-
jng Post, Vol. 209, No. 5. August 1, 1936, 9• 
10. Bolles, Blair, 'The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 86. 
position. Not only was he seriously and ardently promoting his rise to 
power; his machinations also had a lighter side -- for him. He thoroughly 
enjoyed his powers and his efforts to increase them. He was having a 
fine time doing exactly what he always wanted to do; he went to his work 
with greater gusto than any other professor associated with President 
Roosevelt,11 A journalist arch-foe of Tugwell commented, 'What a thrill 
he ~1i7 must be having now.• The New Deal was the fulfilment of 
his dreams. After years of studying and writing, and imagining a world 
organized and managed according to his theories, Tugwell now found his 
ideas adopted by the President, accepted by the nation, and he, himself, 
in a position to play a key role in their execution. "What a transforms-
tion for this young man from his cloistered college circle to the center 
of power in the world1• 12 •What a grand time he is having these days:•13 
The charges that Tugwell was a totalitarian and a potential die-
tater ran from the intensely serious to the satirical. A judge from 
Louisville, in a speech to the American Liberty League in Washington, 
pounded the desk so hard that he put out an electric light as he accused 
the President, Tugwell, and others -- in that order -- of planning an 
aristocracy at Washington with •ever,r right of the citizen subject to 
the will of those who sit in the seats of the mighty.• 14 In contrast, 
11. •Tugwell: He Blazed a New Path in 'Dismal Science,•• Newsweek, Vol, 
1, No. 8, April 8, 1933, 16. 
12. Kent, Frank R., Without G~o~es (New York, William Morrow, 1934) 45• 
13. Kent, Frank R., Without Gloves, 230. 
14. Rogers, James H., Capitalism~ Crisis (London, H. Milford, Oxford 
University Press, 1938) 1o6. 
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some anti-administration writers hurled satirical darts whose nature 
inadvertently indicated that the United States was still a democracy 
in which writers could use nicknames for high officials: 
The Tugwell and the Frankfurter 
Had matters nicely planned; 
•We're what this country needs:• they seid. 
"It would be simply grand 
If Franklin D. put you and me 
Completely in command.• 
'If we could only work without 
These constitutional checks, 
We might make every citizen 
Obey our nods and becks, 
And be a little Frankfurter 
Or else a little Rex.• 
•But do you think,• the Tugwell asked 
"That if we had a crew 
Of seven million bureaucrats 
They'd put our theories through?•· 
"I fear,• replied the Frankfurter, 
•It would be far too few.• 
•But ju*t suppose,•, ·the TUgwell said 
"That after vast expense, 
Those thoughts we've thunk proved utter bunk 
And hadn't any sense?• 
"Why then,• the other said, 'We'd try 
Some more experimentss•l5 
. Closely related to his aspirations to leadership of a new form 
of government, according to the opposition, was Tugwell's desire to 
regiment the farmers through the AAA and the RA. When Tugwell took over 
the reins, critics predicted, there would be no possibility of dissent. 
Through the AAA Tugwell and his colleagues moved swiftly toward the reali-
15. Braley, Berton, ~Deal Ditties (New York, Greenberg, 1936) 20. 
zation of their ideals -- the regimentation of all American agricul-
ture.16 County and field agents instructed farmers how to vote at the 
polls; farmers were told to vote "Yes• on AAA proposals so that Congress 
would got deny the USDA funds •• as the agents suggested it might in 
17 
the event of a 'No• vote. The farmers were responsive to regiments• 
tion because they were prostrate; they had to accept benefit payments 
or go out of business.18 
His critics declared that Tugwell's rapid progress toward regi• 
mentation of agriculture through the AAA did not prove rapid enough to 
suit· him. In March, 1934, the Administration offered some •clarifying• 
amendments to the AA Act. These amendments, it was alleged, would give 
the Secretary of Agriculture dictatorial powers to control acreage reduc-
tion and the licensing of every person who processed or distributed an 
agricultural product. There would be a $1000 fine for violations; in 
all cases, according to anti-administration accounts, there would be no 
{urt review, the Secretary's decision being final, Roosevelt supported 
the bill because Wallace was· for it; Wallace was for it because Tugwell 
•sold" him on it.19 With the AAA changing from a voluntary to a com• 
pulsory stage, Tugwell allegedly was one of the few unalarmed persons in 
Washington. The second step was logical and inevitable; it was prel~ 
16, Desvernine, Raoul E., Democratic Despotism (New York, Dodd, Mead, 
1936) 189-90. 
17, Michael, George, Handout (New York, G. P. Putnam's, 1935) 160-63. 
18. Mitchell, James G., "The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust' 
and Its Many Manifestations,• The Annalist, Vol. 43, No. 115, June 
l, 1934. 848. 
19. Kent, Frank R., Without Gbvea, 255. 
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inary to the third, the third to the fourth. Tugwell bad •no idea of 
stopping, recovery or no recovery•; he was for •going the full distance 
••• from the start.• Compared to Tugwell, who did not delude himself 
with •emergency hooey,• the rest of the planners were •puny pikers,• 
He wanted to go the "whole planned limit,• doing a complete job with 
the American people while he had the opportunity,2° 
When the Supreme Court declared the AA Act unconstitutional, 
Tugwell's ambitions were not thwarted, The Department of Agriculture 
produced out of its wells of magnificent political and social fancy 
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. In debate on the 
measure several Senators offered different reasons for the act: soil 
conservation, production control, and increasing farm purchasing power 
through raising prices to maintain farm parity on the 1910-1914 base. 
Beneath the diverse purposes proposed was the Secretary of Agriculture's 
unreviewable power to reapportion the national income among economic 
classes according to his own statistics. The Department of Agriculture 
was a government in itself, with its own social and economic policies 
and its own machine for cresting opinion.21 
The Soil Conservation Act merely clothed the AAA in a new dress. 
The AAA ·and Tugwell's Resettlement Administration, through which the 
•Great Transplanter• could buy up land and move people about with celerity 
20. Kent, Frank R,, Without Gloves, 218-19. 
21. Garrett, Garet, •National Hill Notes,• Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 
208, No. 46, May 16, 1936, 12-13. 
911. 
and impunity as he chose.22 together regtmented the lives of seven 
million farm families.23 The situation now represented fulfilment of 
Tugwell's aim as indicated in 1928 in his frequently cited sentence in 
his chapter on Russian agriculture: "In short, agriculture can be• 
come the kind of activity soil scientists, farm-management specialists. 
and economists have dreamed of -- if only the peasant can be made to 
do his part.•·24 His critics estimated that Tugwell, by the end of 
1935, controlled the farmers. He could be expected to extend his 
authority to other segments of the population on his way to dictator• 
ship. 
Rebuttal 
There is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that Tug-
well, unlike the power-seeking professor of press accounts, personally 
preferred not to go to Washington.1 There is also evidence that Tugwell 
found government service far from sheer pleasure after he arrived in 
the capital; he did not consider his appointment an opportunity to exer• 
cise dictatorial powers, elevating himself to the headship of the govern-
ment. 1im Farley, who conferred with Tugwell many times, found Tugwell 
apparently unhappy in public life.2 Tugwell himself, in reviewing a 
22. 
23. 
24. 
l. 
2. 
Kent, Frank R., Without Grease: Political Behavior 1934-36 (New York, 
William Morrow, 1936) 298. 
Bolles, Blair, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 84. 
Tugwell, R. G., "Russian Agriculture,• in Soviet Russia in~ Second 
Degade, edited by Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn, and Rexford G. Tugwell 
(New York, 1ohn Dey, 1928) 64. 
See above, Chapter VIII. 
Farley, 1ames A., Behind 1h§ B&llots (New York, Harcourt, 1938) 219. 
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book on government planning, observed in 1948, •His book came out of a 
Washington experience which evidently was not a happy one -- as whose, 
for that matter, ever is?•3 
Tugwell originally thought he would stay in Washington only 
until the Department of Agriculture saw its major measures through Con• 
gress. On March 17, 1933, he wrote to the President: 
I believe our bill may be something of a charter for an oppres-
sed people, Now if we can do as much for consumers with a new 
Food and Drugs act I can return happily to academic lifel4 
Tugwell was to be disappointed in his desire to extricate himself from 
the administrative web in which he became enmeshed. His personal cor-
respondence and his communications to Columbia regarding leaves of 
absence revealed that he continually believed he was about to leave 
Washington in the near future, In requesting a leave of absence from 
Columbia for the fall semester of 1933, he stated that he was not sure 
when his work in Washington would be finished.5 In December, 1933, he 
wrote to the proprietors of his New York apartment that he hesitated to 
remove his furniture because he did not know when he would return to 
Columbia,6 By late 1933 Tugwell was no longer certain that his departure 
from Washington was imminent. He asked that his leave of absence be 
Tugwell, R, G., "The Utility of the Future in the Present,• Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 8, No, 1, Winter, 1948, 56. 
Roosevelt Papers. 
Letter, Tugwell to H. E, Hawkes, Dean, Columbia College, Tugwell 
Papers. 
Letter, December 22, 1933, Tugwell to Lester and Lester, Real Estate, 
Tugwell Papers, 
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extended to include the spring semester; "further into the future than 
that I cannot see very clearly,•? 
The years passed; Tugwell remained in Washington. In early 1936 
Columbia granted him his third leave of absence.8 It was difficult for 
Tugwell to leave Washington until he finished projects which he had 
undertaken, especially -- after the spring of 1935 -- the operations of 
the Resettlement Administration, He would not leave against the Presi-
dent's desires; Roosevelt expressed his attitude in his reply of Febru-
ary, 1936, to an inquiry about Tugwell by Nicholas M. Butler, President 
of Columbia: 
•For several weeks I have been meaning to write to you 
in regard to Professor Tugwell, I appreciate your letting 
the Government use his services during the past two and a 
half years, However, he is continuing to prove very valuable 
and it would be extremely difficult for me to replace htm 
this summer or autumn. 
Bee&use of our Constitution (in which I still believe) no 
one can tell who will be responsible for the Resettlement 
Administration after January 20, 1937. To lose Tugwell 
before that time, ho~ver, would really seriously affect 
government work •••• • 
In an earlier letter to Butler Tugwell indicated that his return to 
Columbia depended on the President's decision: 
As I have told you before, it is my desire to return to the 
University. My hesitation involves no lack of loyalty; 
merely a feeling that the situation has become more complex 
than can be resolved by a simple decision flowing from my 
own wish in the matter.l0 
7. Letter, December 27, 1933, Tugwell to John J, Coss, Summer Session, 
Tugwell Papers. 
8. The ~York Times, February 25, 1936, 22:1. 
9. Letter, F. D. Roosevelt to N. M. Butler, February 10, 1936, Roosevelt 
Papers. 
10. Letter, Tugwell to Butler, January, 1936, Roosevelt Papers. 
Tugwell was not having a •grand time• in Washington. He was not 
promoting regimentation for the sake of regimentation, thereby setting 
the stage for his own rise to power, In his view the AAA was an emerg-
11 
eney device. In the 1920s Tugwell pointed to land-use practices, 
especially the retirement of submarginal lands, as the way to a perma-
nent solution of the agricultural problem,12 In the 1930s, in his arti-
cles and speeches, he held to his views of the 1920s. He frequently 
referred to the temporary nature of the AAA as an "immediate, emergency• 
policy;13 he rejected the direct restriction of the use of land as a 
permanent program.14 
Despite, or because of, its emergency nature (one of its severest 
critics deemed it necessary15) the AAA did not represent regimentation; 
the farmers overwhelmingly called for a crop-control scheme. The Kerr-
Smith Tobacco Act originated with the tobacco growers, the Bankhead Act 
of 1934 with the cotton producers. Senator Bailey of North Carolina, who 
11. See Above, Chapter III, Section, •Tugwell's Long-Run Thinking.• 
12, Tugwell, R. G., •Farm Relief and Permanent Agriculture,• ~ 
Annals £( the American Academoc of Political ~ Social Science, 
Vol, 142, No, 231, March, 1929. 
13. Tugwell, R, G,, Address, Columbia Broadcasting System, July 31, 
1934; USDA Press Release, 2, 
14, Tugwell, R, G,, Address, "The Place of Government in a National 
Land Program,• Joint Meeting, American Economic Association, 
American Statistical Association, and Farm Economic Association, 
Philadelphia, December 29, 1933; ~Press Release, 7• 
15. Mitchell, James G., "The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain 
Trust• and Its Many Manifestations,• The Annalist, Vol. 43, No, 
115, June 1, 1934, 848. 
said that the Bankhead Cotton Control Bill meant socialism and dictator-
ship, one year later sponsored the Potato Act, which originated with the 
commercial potato producers.16 Senator Borah, who was hostile to the 
AAA until then, in 1935 requested aid for his Idaho potato growers. 17 
The farm organizations themselves, disgusted with the performance 
of the lame-duck Congress on the farm issue, sought to keep the admin-
istration of the bill beyond direct Congressional control by giving the 
Secretary of Agriculture unprecedented powers.l8 Yet, the effective 
execution of the reduction programs ultimately depended on initiative 
at the bottom, not on direction from the top. Tugwell maintained that 
the AAA simply made its machinery available to cooperators; the life• 
blood of the program was supplied by the County Production Control Associ• 
ations.19 In less than six weeks after the perfection of the 1933 plan 
nearly 2 0 000,000 cotton farmers cooperated in reducing their crop by 
la,ooo.ooo acrea.20 The cotton planters' cooperation in the opinion of 
Tugwell's friend Stuart Chase, that the results of the democratic process 
-- in which the farmers themselves first voted for controls and then 
administered the AA Act through 2500 local boards -- justified the method.21 
16. Lindley, Ernest K., HalfwaY~ Roosevelt (New York, Viking, 1937) 
123-24. 
17. Lindley, Ernest K., Halfway with Roosevelt, 25-26, 
18. Lord. Russell. The Wallaees .Qf ~ (Boston, Houghton Mifflin. 1947) 
311-12. 
19. Mitchell, James G,, "The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust' 
and Its Many Manifestations,• 848. 
20. Tugwell, R, G., Address, Clemson College, South Carolina, August 15. 
1934; Y§QA Press Release, 6. 
21. Chase, Stuart, Democracy under Pressure (New York, Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1945) 89, 92. 
Tugwell's suggestion of the potentialities of Russian agriculture 
"if only the peasant can be made to do his part• did not result in the 
Sovietizing of American agriculture. Tugwell frequently asserted that 
the effective implementation of a farm program depended on the support 
of American farmers. The government could only publicize the problem; 
farmer response depended on felt needs, education, and a desire to coop• 
erate; these in turn would cause government to respond by sponsoring a 
mechanism for cooperation. Tugwell foresaw that popular response would 
not be forthcoming in Russia if the Soviet attempted compulsory collec-
tivization. He pointed out one way to assure that the peasant would not 
do his part: 
The proletariate may now have the power, may even have 
the will to use it; they fail miserably in its exercise 
when they atteillpt to discipline the peasantry or blend 
them into Marxian compounda,22 
Compulsion would not work in Russian agriculture; it certainly would not 
work in the United States. 
Facts did not support the charge that the USDA effectively sought 
to set itself above the Constitution and the courts, The courts continu-
ally reviewed the administration of the AA Act. In one well-known case 
Chief Justice Hughes of the Supreme Court blasted the USDA for making a 
decision without a c6mplete hearing. Hughes stated that the court should 
give due weight to administrative findings; it was not, however, to be 
22. Tugwell, R. G., •Russian Agriculture,• in Soviet Russia in~ Second 
Pecade, edited by Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn, and R. G, Tugwell (New 
York, John Day, 1928) 56, 
blinded by Congress from seeing an invasion of constitutional rights 
through clearly erronaous findings (Morgan vs. u.s., 298 US 468),23 
The description of the power of the USDA as self-perpetuatin~ proved 
inaccurate when the Supreme Court declared the AA Act itself unconsti• 
tutional. 
Regardless of the details of the AA Act, the fact remained that 
Tugwell alone could not possibly have been responsible for its creation. 
As for its administration, he actually had far less to do directly with 
its policies than the press asserted -- indeed, virtually nothing after 
late 1934• In October, 1934, the press announced that Chester Davis had 
replaced Tugwell as the formulator of AAA policies.24 Tugwell responded 
that he never made AAA policies,25 Undoubtedly Tugwell participated in 
AAA matters: he was the Secretary's representative when Wallace was 
absent; he worked on informal assignments regarding specific matters such 
as sugar policies; he was a consultant on major economic policies.26 If 
he did not assume an active role in the AAA, he did throw the weight of 
his influence against codes allowing processors to fix prices without 
opening their books to the government.27 These contributions did not mean 
that he set policy, As 1934 passed, Tugwell had less and less to do with 
23, Pusey, Merlo J., Charles Evans Hughes, 2 vols, (New York, Macmillan, 
1951) 707-08. 
24. The New~ Timas, October 27, 1934, 17:1. 
25. The~ York Times, November 17, 1934, 2:4. 
26. MacMahon, Arthur w. and Millett, John D,, Federal Administrators (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1939) 211. . 
27, Finney, Ruth, Scripps-Howard staff writer, Washington, April 12, 1936, 
newspaper clipping, Tugwell Papers, 
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AAA policies and procedure -- partly because of his distaste for AAA 
ideology and his far greater interest in resettlement, partly because 
wider assignments from the White House or Wallace kept him traveling --
to Puerto Rico on sugar matters and to Rome as American representative 
to the International Institute of Agriculture.28 As 1935 approached, 
the young urban liberals in AAA urged Tugwell to get back in there and 
fight; by this time he had virtually agreed to weld the RA together and 
had no time for other activity. He confined most of his advice to the 
AAA to speeches.29 In early 1935 Wallace told the press that Tugwell 
had had nothing to do with the AAA for eight months.3° It was 1935 that 
saw the real revolt against regimentation.31 
Charges that the RA vas a device for regimentation of the rural 
population asserted that Tugwell bought up land and moved people about 
as he saw fit. In fact, no one had to sell his land if he did not wish 
to do so.32 The government could not compel people to move.33 Tugwell 
was aware in 1933 that an effective resettlement program necessitated 
the •utmost care for all the human values immediately concerned •• 34 The 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32· 
33· 
34· 
Lord, Russell, The Wallaces 9f. ~. 402. 
Lord, Russell, The Wallaces of Iowa, 403. 
Ward, Baul W., •Wallace the Great Hesitator,• Nation, Vol. 140, No. 
3644. May 8, 1935. 536. 
Lindley, Ernest K., Halfway with Roosevelt, 124. 
Abrams, Charles, Revolution .1Jl Land (New York, Harper, 1939) 225. 
Benedict, Murray R., Farm Policies of~ United_States, 1790•1950 
(New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1953) 326. 
Tugwell, R. G,, •National Significance of Recent Trends in Farm 
Population,• Social Forces, Vol. 14, No. l, October, 1935, 4. 
human aspects of resettlement proved difficult and baffling. Families 
long established in a given area were reluctant to move and difficult to 
resettle; the newer settlers who were usually ready to move were often 
poor farmers, also difficult to resettle and quick to consider the gov-
ernment responsible for their success in a new location or to blame the 
government for failure due to their own shortcomings.35 
After he became Resettlement Administrator, Tugwell discussed the 
human side of the task of resettlement in some detail.36 Besides the 
farmers' desire for better land and part-time outside work, the RA had 
to consider land use, the demand for farm products, and the cost in newly 
settled areas of providing local government and facilities such as schools, 
roads, telephones, and postal services. Where extensive areas were 
involved, the RA had to consider new opportunities not only for farmers, 
but for business and professional people.37 
The assertion that the enactment of the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1148), technically an amendment 
of the Soil Erosion Act of April 27, 1935 (Public Bill 46, 74th Cong.), 
was a revival of the AAA in another guise, and consequently a continuation 
of unconstitutional regimentation, did not relate to Tugwell in any event. 
Concerning this Act Tugwell wrote • ••• this was some one else's job, done 
mostly after I left the Department. I can claim to have shared in it 
Benedict, Murray R., Farm Policies of the United States, 326. 
Tugwell, R, G., Address, "The Place of Government in a National Land 
Program,• 13-14, 16-17. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, "The Place of Government in a National Land 
Program,• 13-14, 16-17. 
920, 
only in the vague way that preliminary discussion precedes program,•38 
Evidence relating to Tugwell's views and activities as an official 
in the USDA, and eventual developments, as seen twenty years later, inval-
idate the accusation that he sought, and possibly could have attained, 
personal leadership of a regimented people, His views on economic coordi-
nation, which the administration did not follow, did not represent regi-
mentation to him. He wrote that 
As Cornelia Parker once said, 'I don't care who designs 
the drain pipes of my house so long as I can choose my 
own hat.• ••• a classic distinction •••• There is room 
yet for vast extensions of government activity before 
regimentation will appear, It may even be than an exten-
sion of governmental activity is necessary to prevent the 
great industries from making robots of us all •••• 39 
Tugwell's reference to the predatory end regimenting potentialities of 
great combinations suggested his forceful argument that the New Deal was 
fighting regimentation. He stated that 
What the Old Order described as •rugged individualism• 
meant the regimentation of the many for the benefit of 
the few,40 
He asked the question: 
38. 
39· 
40. 
41. 
••• millions out of work were supposed to resign themselves 
to industrial 'bad luck,• and to hope meekly for the best, 
and to live on whatever charity offered them •••• what is it 
but economic regimentation of the most tragic sort?41 
Tugwell, R, G., The Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 26, 
Tugwell, R. G,, •Trial and Error,• in~ Battle for Democracy (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1935) 38. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, •Relief and Reconstruction,• National Con-
ference of Social Workers, Kansas City, Missouri, May 21, 1934, in 
The Battle for Democracy, 319. 
Tugwell, Address, •Relief and Reconstruction,• 307, 
921. 
•Regimentation• was an abstraction meaning different things to 
different people at different times. Its associations and emotional 
42 
color constantly changed. Undoubtedly many people who viewed govern-
ment activity from a standpoint different from Tugwell's frame of refer• 
ence were sincere in their objections to New Deal •regimentation.• At 
the same time, Tugwell was sincere in his belief that successful action 
programs depended on local understanding, support, and cooperation aria• 
ing from education and discussion; drastic compulsory action by the 
central government could •merely take the responsibility for the general 
scope, character, and financing of the plan, leaving most of the local 
decisions to local authorities,.43 He both acknowledged and applauded 
the legal and constitutional checks on powers delegated to executives: 
Any atta.pt at the a8use of such authority by an arbitrary 
or capricious exercise of it will not succeed because the 
courts in the long run refuse to sustain any requirement 
too far divergent from the ordinary community standards of 
good conduct and fair practice. These in the end always 
determine the maximum level of law enforcement •••• 44 
The occurrence of sincere intellectual disagreement with Tugwell 
regarding regimentation did not justify accusing him of an inclination 
towards regimentation stemming either from a general philosophy inten-
tionally totalitarian (some critics asserted that his ideas were dicta-
42. Chase, Stuart, Government in Business (New York, Macmillan, 1935) 
261. 
43• Tugwell, R. G,, Address, •The Place of Government in a National Land 
Program, • 17. 
44. Tugwell, R, G,, •The Copeland Bill and the Food Industries,• 2!2-
~ Trade News, October 24, 1933; USDA Press Release, 9· 
torial whether he knew it or not, a view which could be accompanied by 
intellectual sincerity) or from an unbridled desire for personal place 
and power. While a man is not always the best judge of his own motiva-
tion, Tugwell's remarks in this regard -- including those he made well 
before he contemplated government service -- corroborated the opinion of 
others who worked with him. 
In 1930 Tugwell wrote that individuals who received a mandate 
through elections to make decisions should do so as social servants.45 
In the view of a pro•New Deal author Tugwell practiced what he preached, 
being careful to consider himself a public servant rather than a great 
46 
steward. Jim Farley recalled, on the basis of direct contact, that 
Tugwell never took advantage of his closeness to the President, stayed 
in his own back yard, and kept his hands off politics -- •an example 
47 that could have been followed with profit by some of his successors.• 
Tugwell's Research Assistant testified to the effect that his superior 
was not concerned with personal advancement or power in Washington; JOhn 
Franklin Carter wrote that Tugwell was ready to resign from his job when• 
ever he became an embarrassment to the administration.48 
Other New Dealers soon became tired, disillusioned, and jealous 
of one another.49 Tugwell emerged from conferences, in which he invari• 
45• Tugwell, R. G., •Human Nature and Social Econosey,• Part II, Journal 
of PhilosophY, Vol. 27, No. 18, August 28, 1930, 488. 
46. Looker, Farle, ~American Wav: Franklin Roosevelt in Action (New 
York, John Day, 1933) 71. 
47. Farley, James A., Behind~ Ballots, 219-20. 
48. Carter, J, Franklin (Unofficial Observer), The New Dealers (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1934) 91. 
49. Tugwell, R. G,, ~ Stricken land, 681. 
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ably proved to be a tenacious fighter, apparently unruffled as men 
around him dropped from fatigue or nervous systems frazzled to the 
50 
breaking point. Tugwell seemed never to lose the calm aloofness of 
51 
an observer. Apparently he was not affected by the fate of his pro-
posals in so far as they involved his personal status. 
Tugwell was usually outwardly calm. This appearance did not 
reflect an absence of inner drive and motivation. He considered what 
he did important to society and 12 himself, but not for himself. He 
felt obligated to do what he could to help society solve its problems; 
he sought as a reward i~~er satisfaction rather than outward acclaim. 
In 1927 Tugwell wrote a little-known essay on his literary hero, Thomas 
Hardy, which, Russell Lord stated, revealed as much of Tugwell as of 
Hardy, Some excerpts are revealing: 
so. 
51. 
It rains too hard; it freezes too soon; the pests come 
when the crops look best. There is a sense of all this 
in Hardy. The kernel of life is soon consumed and there 
is nothing much to show. 
A certain deep loneliness resides in man which has awakened 
pity many times. It may be largely out of pity that poets 
have turned again and again to comforting those who find, 
at intervals, the victories a little dull, or feeble, or 
impertinent. Never mind, they say, there will be flower 
and fruit and childhood always. Your thought, your hands, 
even the dissolution of your body is part of a cycle •••• 
And whatever you do, even if you only are, you have a con-
tribution to make without which the race would be, by a 
significant measure, much the poorer. 
Hardy had not this kind of pity, Fate had the power to 
Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Magazine. 
Volume 105, No. 1, November, 1933, 264. 
Lindley, Ernest K., •War on the Brains Trust,• 264. 
anger him. It was pure anger, however; there was no 
whine in it; and no particular softness for the weak-
ening of others, There are bleak winds that blow from 
eternity. But for all his large defeatist principles, 
he lived as though he were important, as though it 
always mattered what he did.52 
Fate had the power to anger Tugwell. He believed that man must defy 
determinism; each man must do what he can -- not for personal gain and 
not out of pity, but because the race possesses the intelligence to 
set things right. 
In 1934, in an address to some college students, Tugwell made 
additional comments on motivation. These remarks were similar to those 
he made privately in 1927. He rejected the possibility of suffering in 
this world, the avoidance of punishment in the next, or the desire to 
survive in the race's memory and records as desirable incentives for 
making a contribution to the advancement of civilization,53 
No, there is no legitimate threat I know of. But there 
is the tremendous challenge of opportunity which, once 
it has been seen by man, has never yet failed to stir the 
blood. There is something deep in us which responds to 
the growing challenge of the tyranny of things and calls 
out efforts which no other reward could possibly evoke. 
The incentive, I 
is exactly this. 
other, believing 
suppose, which has changed the world most 
And I have no desire to appeal to any 
any other to be superfluous.54 
Each man, in the time of his departure, would be his own judge: 
52. 
To have lived - in the definition you will sometime formu-
late for yourselves - you must have participated livingly 
in the decisions of your time which matter, You must have 
Tugwell, R, G., •Meditation in a Stinsford Churchyard," unpub~ished, 
1927; cited in Lord, Russell, The Wallaces of Iowa, 351. 
Tugwell, R. G,, Address, •on Life as a Long-Time Enterprise,• Dart-
mouth College, April 26, 1934; .!l§.!lA Press Release,., 9-10. 
Tugwell, h, G,, Address, "On Life as a Long-Time ~terprise,• 10, 
done even more than that - you must have set your race for-
ward in same positive way by a contribution which only you 
could possibly have made. 
••• in your judgment, when you are_old and living largely 
on a diet of recollection, these Lavoidance of suffering _ 
now and in the hereafter and survival in the racial memo~ 
will not seem sufficient •••• you will have become mellow, 
benevolent, and unafraid, rather than active, selfregardful, 
and cautious. You will say that you have not done what you 
should have done; that the world is not better for your hav-
ing been in it; that in living for selfish certainties and 
an assured supply of things, you sacrificed the chance that 
the race to which you belong might once for all come into 
the promise which was set in its mind from its first appear-
ance on this earth. You will hate yourselves and die unre-
gretted and full of remonstrance.55 
Tugwell's reference to the •promise• implanted in the racial men• 
tality indicated his high aspirations, The compelli~g motives throughout 
his life, according to Sumner Welles, were his sympathy for the under-
privileged and his passionate desire to serve their interest~6 Another 
comment on this same motivation was, •He loves the people to beat hell 
,57 
•••• This last implied that Tugwell combined with his high aspirations 
an emotional approach to their attainment; Jim Farley found Tugwell reason-
able, honest, sincerely interested in improving economic conditions, and 
sensible and never arbitrary in his approach to particular situations,58 
Tugwell's aspirations were high. However, in seeking solutions to real, 
difficult problems on the long road to better conditions, his expectations 
were conditioned by the fact that his feet were on the ground. 
55. Tugwell, R. G., Address, 'On Life as a Long-Time Enterprise,• 10, 
56. Welles, Sumner, review of The Stricken Land, Saturday Review of Litera-
~. Vol. 29, No. 52, December 28, 1946, 9. 
57, •Rex in Puerto Rico,• Time Magazine, Vol. 39, No. 5, February 2, 1942. 
19. 
58. Farley, James A., Behind~ Ballots. 219. 
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Tugwell declared that the New Deal had its roots in American his• 
tory because its basic aim was to extend the impulse of neighborliness --
from the village to regions Which technology had made wider, "Gambling 
with human lives was to be closed to speculation,•59 He was devoted to 
6o the public interest and opposed to special interests of any kind, He 
expected nothing for himself in return for his efforts in his neighbors' 
behalf, He received no financial feathering for his nest.61 He sought 
no credit for fighting for the general interest as he saw it. For example, 
he felt that the domination of the USDA by the major farm organizations 
through agricultural-college graduates was harmful to the national inter-
est; he believed that smaller farmers should benefit by the administra-
tion'a program: •I took the other line, I say it without pride because 
I had no supvort among the professional fraternity anyway.• 62 Tugwell 
would not cling to any office if he believed his presence was a handicap 
to the promotion of the public interest: • ,,, realizing that my ineffect-
iveness in Washington would be a progressive weakness Puerto Rico Lwhere 
he was Governor, 1941-42/ could ill-afford, I resolved not to delay my 
going beyond summer.•63 
There is also evidence that Tugwell did not mouth idealistic aspira-
tiona merely for public consumption, Long after he left Washington he 
59. Newspaper clipping, Tugwell Papers. 
60, Rodgers, Cleveland, Robert Moses (New York, Henry Holt, 1952) 129. 
61. Letter, Tugwell Papers; Tugwell declined membership in a social club 
in Washington, offering as his reason his inability to pay the initi-
ation fee. 
62. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 54. 
63, Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, xxi. 
wrote to the President, requesting that at least one campaign speech 
include a statement of what America wanted in the world; he listed items 
involving peace, plenty, and freedom, It was to be above politics: 
•It seems to me that the election will be won easily; 
but I know that what lies in your heart now is not that. 
It is where we shall be when the great showdown comes 
•••• you might rally unexpected forces to us, so that 
our might will have a great moralally when it is next 
needed.•64 
Tugwell's retrospective observations on his career in government 
are not what one would expect from a man who had suffered frustration 
of his personal ambitions for power and pelf. He recalled his thoughts 
as he left Puerto Rico for the University of Chicago& 
I might be forgiven, I thought, if I regarded ~ work 
in Pueito Ric~, as in New York with the Planning Commis-
sion Ll939·4~/, and in Washington with the RA, as ori• 
ented against destruction, It had never succeeded. It 
bad always been overwhelmed by those who represented a 
temporarily successful laissez-faire. But it had been 
t:ue g~ough. And, Chicago, I hoped was to be its exten• 
SlOn. ) 
Regarding his impact, in the light of his relations to Roosevelt, he 
wrote: 
He had taken something from me, something fran others; as 
time passed, and our original Albany group had been en-
larged time after time, and usually with business people 
••• he had found their ideas mo~ suitab~e, and he heard 
by proxy, from the old J"ustice LBrandei§./ who knew what he 
wanted, Holistic ideas were ditched, for the most part. 66 
But that was his responsibility, I had done what I could •••• 
I had always given him what I had to give and had not askgd 
anything except - and this I did not ask - to be service, 7 
64, Letter, Tugwell to Roosevelt, September 16, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, 
65, Tugwell, R. G,, The Stricken Land, xxxi. 
66, Tugwell, R. G,, •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D, Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 21-22. 
67, Tugwell, R. G,, The Stricken~. 681. 
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Perhaps the most appropriate summary of the rebuttal to charges 
that Tugwell sought to become a dictator is to be found, paradoxically 
enough, in a drama about the prototype of modern autocrats: "Ambition 
should be made of sterner stuff.• (Julius Caesar, Act III, Scene 2.) 
The Arrogant Tugwell 
Only he knew what was best for the nation. 
Tugwell's critics charged that he was arrogance personified and 
consequently provoked much,of the opposition against him. They referred 
to his curt, contemptuous manner as evidence of the dormitory aesthete's 
scorn for homely ideas, plain people, and politicians. His arrogance 
arose from a consciousness of intellectual superiority and a romantic 
imagination. He exhibited deliberate finesse in his tactlessness. His 
avocation was being unpleasant to Congressmen, business men, politicians, 
and petitioning citizens. He flaunted his idealistic scorn for human 
l 
imperfections before anyone who doubted his romantic nostrums, 
The Chicago Tribune described Tugwell as living in a •perpetual 
state of astonishment ••• at his own intellect and his own beauty.• 2 An 
anti-Tugwell magazine writer asserted that Tugwell usually knew which 
toe was the gouty one and stamped on it; he displayed the historic arro-
gance and superciliousness of the court favorite, being temperamentally 
unable to cooperate with anyone below the rank of President of the United 
1. Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• American Mercury, 
Vol. 39, No. 153, September, 1936, 77-78. 
2. Dilling, Elizabeth, The Roosevelt Red Record and Its Background 
(Chicago, The Author, 1936) 351. 
States. This journalist compared Tugwell's role to that of Colonel 
House under President Wilson; he pointed out that House, unlike Tugwell 0 
averted the jealousy which a court favorite usually attracts, never mak-
ing enemies unnecessarily, by remaining silent and circumspect. A busi-
ness man joined the journalists, deploring Tugwell's smug confidence 
and his assurance in his own theories.3 John T. Flynn, who abandoned 
the New Deal with a vengeance, charged that Tugwell, after having looked 
at the world in his college years and having found it strictly third• 
class, perfected himself in the fine art of being contemptuous; in Wash• 
ington he displayed bad menners; the pet targets of his contumely were 
Congressmen and Senators.4 A critic on the left echoed the remarks on 
Tugwell's haughtiness; Tugwell was essentially an academician, aloof and 
cold almost to the point of snobbishness,5 
Reports of specific incidents, not all of which were definitely 
verified, tended to substantiate the general assertion that Tugwell found 
it difficult to get down to the intellectual level of men with whom he 
had to deal, especially Congressmen and Senators, thereby presenting his 
enemies with an abundance of ammunition for criticism. It was said that 
an editor asked Tugwell to explain certain features of the AA Act. Tug-
well asked the editor whether he had read the bill. The editor said that 
he had read the bill three times but was still perplexed. Tugwell replied. 
Phillips, Cabal, 'The New Dealers - Where Are They Now?•, The New 
X91:k Times Magazine. September 29, 1946, 52· 
Flynn, John T., The Roosevelt Mtl.!l. (New York, Devin•Adair, 1948) 149• 
Ward, Baul w., •wallace the Great Hesitator,• Nation, Vol. 140, No. 
3644. May 8, 1935. 53· 
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6 
"Then what more can I say?• An eye•vitness reported that in a press con-
ference on March 7, 1933, in the Department of Agriculture, Tugwell, in 
his best classroom manner, informed the reporters that everything vas 
simple and all would be straightened out by the end of the summer. Tug• 
well left without answering any questions; that was the end of the inter• 
viev.7 
Stories about Tugwell's lack of tact gain credence when one con• 
eiders the observations of New Dealers and commentators who were generally 
favorably inclined towards the New Deal. Henry Wallace said of Tugwell, 
"The trouble with Rex as a public man is that he exhibits disdein,•8 Sum-
ner Welles of the State Department, who thought highly of Tugwell, con-
ceded that the latter was 'intellectually arrogant, perhaps, and frequently 
tactless with those whose purposes he combatted, or whose views he held 
in contempt.•9 Russell Lord, who worked with Tugwell in Agriculture end 
admired him, admitted that it was true, as an eminent Senator had remarked 
somewhat wistfully, that Tugwell broke the first rule of politics in 
exhibiting disdain.1° Congressman Byron Harlan of Ohio, who wished to 
protect the RA against adverse criticism, complained to the White House 
that he tried for four days to get an appointment with Tugwell; Harlan said 
6. 
7. 
8. 
10. 
Mitchell, James G., "The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust' 
and Its Many Manifestations,• The Agnalist, Vol, 43, No. 115, June 
1, 1934. 848. 
Michael, George, Handout (New York, G. P. Putnam's, 1935) 128-29. 
Lord, Russell, The Wallaces of l2!m (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
346. 
Welles, Sumner, review of The Stricken Land, Saturday Review of Lit-
erature, Vol. ~9. No, 52, December 28, 1946, 9. 
Lord, Russell, •Governor Rex of Puerto Rico,• Common Sense, Vol, 11, 
No. 7, July, 1942, 224. 
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11 he might just as well laave tried to get an appointment with the Mikado, 
Harlan's reference to the Mikado was similar to the assertion 
Which Puerto Ricans made later, When Tugwell was Governor of their island, 
that he was "harder to see than the Pope,• 12 Oswald Garrison Villard, a 
journalist Who was sympathetic towards Tugwell's efforts, found that the 
Puerto Ricans' complaint was to a great extent justified; Villard con• 
eluded that some of Tugwell's troubles were his own fault; he could be 
charming and engaging, his sincerity was obvious, his administrative 
ability beyond question, but sometiMes the schoolmaster or a lack of taste 
and dignity was evident; he needlessly antagonized people,13 Another 
journalist Who favored Tugwell's vieva in political econo~ reported that, 
While both had earned the Ph.D. degree, Raymond Moley's secretaries spoke 
of •Mr.• Moley, and Tugwell's spoke of •Dr.• Tugwell,14 A pro-New Deal 
historian has referred to Tugwell as a 'handsome, hard-fighting, somewhat 
arrogant professor, with substantial confidence in his own capacity to 
1 1 t 1 . 1 t. ,15 so ve amos any comp ex soc1a ques 10n ••·• 
Undoubtedly the press, in its effort to discredit Tugwell because 
of his sponsorship of a Pure Food and Drugs Bill, overplayed some of the 
11. 
12. 
13o 
14. 
15. 
Letter, Harlan to M. H, Mcintyre, August, 1935, Roosevelt Papers, 
"Rex in Puerto Rico,• Time Magazine, Vol, 39, No. 5, February 2, 
1942. 19. 
Villard, Oswald G., "'l'hat Man Tugwell,• .:rM Christian Century, Vol. 
61, No, 14, April 5, 1944, 430. 
Lindley, Ernest K,, "War on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Magazine, 
Vol, 94, No. 5, November, 1933, 263, 
Schlesinger, A.M., Jr., "The First Hundred Days of the New Deal,• 
in 'l'he Aspirin hi!§., 1919-1941, ed. by Isabel Leighton (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1949) 287, 
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incidents which it cited as examples of his arrogance end tactlessness. 
Many politicians were also prone to encourage exaggeration since they. 
along with veteran political writers. looked askance at the unelected 
academicians and technicians whom Roosevelt brought to Washington. 
Frank Kent. of the Baltimore Sun and an ardent foe of Tugwell 0 
explained why the new species of New Deal political animal was unbearable 
to the orthodox species. The unelected New Dealers operated beyond 
strictly technical lines in action programs and active policy-making. 
Consequently. old political rules and images did not cover their acti• 
vities; they were bound to provoke Congressional resentment. Kent re• 
ported that the politicians warned the newcomers during their first few 
weeks in Washington that they had better settle down. minding their poli• 
tical manners refraining from the exhibition of any impetuosity to hard-
ened observers. Vice-President Garner srunded the wrning at a party 
which Democratic leaders gave at the Sulgrave Club to enable the new men 
to meet with the veterans of the capital. The Vice-President said it was 
s new experience to him to hand the top cards to •boys who had never 
worked s precinct;• the politicians would go slang with the President if 
that is what he wanted for the time being.l6 
Because of the broad powers which Congress delegated to the Execu-
tive in the emergency of 1933. it probably was inevitable that politi-
cians should be quick to interpret some actions of non-political adminis• 
16. Kant. Frank R •• in the Baltimore sun. July 21. 1933; cited in Lord. 
Russell. The Wallaces 2f. l2J5 (Boston. Houghton Mifflin. 1947) 
352-53· 
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trators as demonstrations of tactlessness. Congressmen passed the cam-
plaints on to their acquaintances of long-standing in the Washington 
press. The charge that Tugwell was tactless often did not reflect overM 
sensitivity on the part of the accusers. Some incidents involving the 
Assistant Secretary were distorted; one such anecdote concerned Frank 
Kent. The story in the press told how Alice Longworth in vi ted Tugwell 
to a luncheon, offering to introduce him to her friend and guest of honor, 
Frank Kent. Tugwell asked, •Kent? Kent? Who is Mr. Kent, anyway?• 
From that time, the press version continued, Kent sought revenge through 
his column.17 Actually, Kent had been excoriating Tugwell in his col-
umns for some time; Tugwell asked his question as a joke •• which brought 
18 
the house down. 
On the occasion of Tugwell's departure for Europe in September, 
1934, to attend a meeting of the International Institute of Agriculture 
in Rome, he locked himself in his stateroom, leaving Assistant to the 
Secretary Paul Appleby outside to explain that the Under Secretary was 
not snooty but had a lot of last-minute work to do, Reporters resented 
Tugwell's shutting them out; they attributed his behavior to arrogance 
and tactlessness. President Roosevelt, at ~de Park, explained to the 
press that process•servers, looking for Tugwell in connection with a 
suit filed ageinst the Department of Agriculture, accounted for the furtive 
departure.19 A similar misunderstanding arose when representatives of the 
17. ~Magazine, Vol, 23, No, 26, June 25, 1934, 11. 
18. Interview with writer. 
19. ~Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 13, September 24, 1934, 55· 
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drug industry met in Washington to give their views on the Pure Food and 
Drugs Bill. They were affronted when TUgwell, after opening the meeting, 
departed. Tugwell intended no affront since he assumed his assistants 
would record the views of the drug people for consideration by the draf-
ters of the bill; he intended to call in legal experts to draw up the 
measure
20 
-- an intention to which he adhered. In some instances accuse-
tiona of tactlessness arose from misunderstanding. Occasionally critics 
resorted to caviling in order to call Tugwell a snob. 
The proponents of acreage control found that they had taken a 
bear by the tail; they had to travel fast and far, with the necessity of 
shaping far-reaching plans as they traveled. Tugwell commented, 'One 
move compels another, as in a game of chess.• This statement aroused de-
rision. Russell Lord considered Tugwell's description of the situation 
accurate; Lord felt that the derision reflected a hypercritical attitude: 
"It would have sounded homelier, more country-like, if he had said 
21 
'checkers.' • 
The fact that Tugwell's co-workers generally found him a pleasant 
man to work with indicated that his arrogance was confined to a certain 
level. Tugwell went unheeded during the 1920s when, citing flaws in the 
economy, he predicted ultimate collapse. He was convinced that capital-
ism required some major operations for its own salvation.22 He had little 
20. Lamb, Ruth, American Chamber of Horrors (New York, Farrar and Rine• 
hart, 1936) 285. 
21. Lord, Russell and Lord, Kate, eds., Forever the Land (New York, 
Harper, 1950) 51; this citation is from a note by Russell Lord. 
22, •Tugwell: New Deal's Leading 'Red' Gets Job in Wall Street,• News-
week, Vol. 8, No. 22, November 28, 1936, 16. 
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patience with representatives of the forces who, in his view, having been 
responsible for the depression, sought only to salvage what they could 
in their own interest. It was their turn to step aside and let someone 
else seek solutions. Moreover, not even his harshest revilers ever 
accused Tugwell, who paradoxically enough was charged with being "obscure• 
in his public speeches, of not being frank.23 He said what was on his 
mind in private encounters with holders of views which he rejected 
because they had produced a depression. 
Tugwell placed a high value on the possession of friends; he 
wrote that Veblen acted a part until he was unable to discover his own 
nature and died without real friends, regretting that lack.24 Russell 
Lord described Tugwell as a man who did not usually unbend in public, 
but who was friendly and considerate to co-workers.25 Elsewhere, Lord 
wrote, •He hates a heel and a hack; he cannot slap backs or kiss babies; 
but he is a companionable and gallant man with whom to work.• 26 A letter 
from the Manager of the Columbia University Press also attested to the 
informality which characterized Tugwell's relations with friends and 
co-workers: •I expressed surprise at the above handle LThe Honorabl£7, 
but ~ secretary tells me that it is correct.• 27 
In the matter of intellectual arrogance, Tugwell's attitudes were 
23. •Tugwell's Dream,• Newsweek, Vol. 28, No. 1, August 11, 1946, 28. 
24. Tugwell, R. G., •Veblen and 'Business Enterprise•,• ~Republic, 
Vol. 98, No. 1269, March 29, 1939, 218-19. 
25, Lord, Russell, The Wallaces .Qf. Iowa, 348. 
26. Lord, Russell, "Governor Rex of Puerto Rico,• 224. 
27. Letter, Charles G, Proffitt to Tugwell, November 27, 1933, Tugwell 
Papers. 
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also on two levels. On one level, he presented to his opponents an air 
of omniscience; on the level of ultimate intellectual honesty he did 
not consider himself omniscient in his hard thinking about society's vast, 
complex problems. The implication underlying charges that Tugwell was 
intellectually arrogant was that he believed only he knew what was best 
for society. This implication did not find substantiation in co-workers' 
statements that Tugwell was a reasonable man for and with whom to work. 
In many matters Tugwell, at Roosevelt's request, selected men who were 
considered more expert than himself on specific subjects for consulta-
tion with the President.28 Tugwell's comments on the President's pre-
paration for his tasks reveal intellectual humility in the face of ns-
tional problems: 
28. 
29. 
••• after having a relatively rich experience. he still 
had all the essential education for the Presidency ahead 
of him. Nothing that a man has gone through, only what 
he has specifically learned, is much good to him in the 
White House, really, although it seems more popular to 
testify that the reverse is true •••• humility in the as• 
sumption of great responsibility is certainly the essential 
beginning. The dangerous man is he who is intellectually 
arrogant and consequently neglects his studies,29 
,,, solutions. Ldid no1/ appear to have the satisfactory 
simplicity of common sense. The whole process was quite 
like that which ·every true scientist faces at some time 
or other when he finally reaches the boundaries of what 
is known. To push out further he may have to invent a 
new mathematics or, at the very least, call up all his 
reserves of learning, before his mind can take hold of 
the instrument which will pry back the next stone across 
his path. Mr. Roosevelt had very little to go on. That 
is the truth. But he had the great advantage of knowing 
Interview with writer; for example, Tugwell brought men in for con-
sultation with the President on money matters, concerning which their 
views were quite different from Tugwell's, 
Tugwell, R, G., "The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol, 1, No, 2, June, 1948, 139. 
it in advance rather than belatedly discovering it in 
the midst of responsibility.30 
937· 
In his retrospective writings Tugwell exhibited an objectivity 
regarding himself, rare among active or former public figures. In The 
Stricken Land he presented •without self-glorification and without apo• 
logy" the record of his accomplishments and failures in Puerto Rico.31 
Tugwell made no pretentious to infallibility; for exa~ple, he hoped that 
more sweeping changes in the banking system would result from the emer-
gency of 1932-JJ, but, "I am ready to concede that I may have been wrong.•32 
He also viewed his activities as a publicist as possibly having been an 
ineffective expenditure of energy• 
I had been a governmental adviser in theory as well as 
practice. But I had a legacy of Progressivism of the 
o~d sort •••• I had talked as well as devised •••• Abe 
LFortas, of Inteiior at the time of the conversation 
Tugwell recountJ!f felt the talking - although it re-
lieved my feelings -- had counted for no real good, He 
might be right.33 
Tugwell may have been more objective about himself in retrospect 
than he was during New Deal days -- he was then •an inexperienced and 
pretty cocky young fellow;•34 on the other hand, a man does not suddenly 
acquire the ability for relatively objective self-appraisal. The impres-
sion Tugwell made on his opponents appears to have been far different from 
the impression he made on himself. The impression he made on his co-
workers was also quite the opposite of that he made on the objects of his 
30, Tugwell, R, G,, "The Preparation of a President,• 139-40. 
31. Welles, ~er, review of The Stricken Land, 9· 
32. Tugwell, R, G., "The Preparation of a President,• 147. 
33· Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 349· 
34· Interview with writer. 
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disdain. Tugwell did not take himself as seriously as his detractors 
thought he did. 
The conflicts between Tugwell and politicians inspired the novel-
ist Sherwood Anderson to offer a psychological analysis. Anderson sug-
gested that politicians who sought attention (the desire for love, under-
standing, and respect) became perverted in something in them; in some 
men, like Tugwell, this desire produced an •outwardly cool, apparently 
too cocksure, reserved" impression.35 Regardless of the validity of 
Anderson's analysis, Tugwell's public relations taught the lesson that 
both politicians and professors in government have to strive with open 
minds if they are to overcome obstacles to their effective negotiation 
and cooperation. It is possible that Tugwell's anticipation of opposi-
tion accounted for a "don't give a damn• attitude. Such anticipation 
would have been no excuse for his occasional displays of tactlessness. 
There was no excuse for politicians jumping on Tugwell no matter what he 
did. There was blame on both sides. 
The Vote-Buying Tugwell 
He knew how to win followers. 
During the bitterly fought campaign of 1936, George Peek was re• 
ported to have discovered during his unhappy sojourn in the AAA that the 
sole purpose of the administration's agricultural program was to gain 
1 
control of the farm vote. Others privately made similar charges speci-
~. 
1. 
Magazine clipping, Tugwell Papers. 
Barry, Richard, Theme Song-~ (Indianapolis, Bobbs~errill, 1936) 
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fically against Tugwell in his capacity as Resettlement Administrator. 
Two Democratic editors of !E! Jourpal of Portland, Oregon, inquired 
of the President whether rumors that all subordinate appointments in the 
RA had to pass political approval were true; they were Democrats, but 
they objected to such practices as hearsay attributed to the RA.2 Roose-
velt replied that the Extension Service nominated the farm end home econ-
omics advisers of the RA; applicants for non-technical positions took 
examinations similar to Civil Service tests; technical appointees were 
chosen on merit from lists provided by educational institutions and the 
other usual sources used by business and industry. In all cases the RA 
gave preference to eligibles on relief rolls.3 
Tugwell's statements, in reply to Congressional inquiries -- often 
requests in behalf of constituents for employment -- of personnel policies 
attested the accuracy of Roosevelt's reply (which was undoubtedly prepared 
by the RA) to the two Oregon editors. Tugwell wrote to Congressman Sum-
ners of Texas that the RA insisted on the hiring of auditors in that state 
on merit.4 Similarly, Tugwell informed Senator Gore, through the White 
House, that the appointment of a non-local regional attorney in the Okla-
hama~exas area was a rare exception to the RA practice of hiring local 
attorneys; the exception was necessitated by the second requirement of 
government experience.5 
2. 
5· 
Letter. B. F. Irvine and M. N. Dana, The Journal, Portland, Oregon, to 
Roosevelt, July 12, 1935, Roosevelt Papers. 
Letter, Roosevelt to B. F. Irvine and M. N. Dana, no date, Roosevelt Papers. 
Letter, draft of reply, Tugwell to M. H. Mcintyre, September 16, 1935, 
Roosevelt Papers. 
Letter, Roosevelt to Senator T. P. Gore, September 24, 1935, Roosevelt 
Papers. 
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Tugwell was aware of the political facts of life; nevertheless his 
personnel policies placed performance above politics, Once, he reportedly 
enraged New Dealers by denouncing Jim Farley's alleged suggestion that the 
Library of Congress fire a large number of its staff, replacing them with 
6 loyal Democrats, (Obviously Tugwell's academic background enabled him, 
in the particular instance of the Congressional Library, to see the damage 
involved in depleting the cumulative knowledge of the staff of a research 
center.) Ernest K. Lindley noted that there was never any public charge 
that Tugwell was amenable to political influence in the selection of his 
administrative and field staffs.7 Tugwell revealed an attitude which dis-
couraged public accusations in a lengthy and interesting letter to a 
Maine Congressman. Tugwell listed the efforts he made to satisfy the leg-
islator from Down East regarding RA appointments in Maine. There were 
some dismissals and some retentions, after careful investigation in every 
case. Tugwell concluded the letter by pointing out that certain considers-
tiona outweighed Congressional pressure, informing the Congressman that 
I should like to impress upon you ~ desire to be as 
helpful to you as is consistently possible under the 
circumstances with which we are faced, I assume from 
your record in Congress that we have the same general 
objectives and that the most important consideration, 
both from a hgman and political standpoint, is to do 
our job well. 
6, Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Saturday Evening 
Post, Vol, 209, No. 5, August l, 1936, 74. 
7. Lindley, Ernest K., Halfway~ Roosevelt (New York, Viking, 1937) 210. 
8, Letter, Tugwell to Congressman Edward C, Moran, Jr., Maine, December 23, 
1935, Roosevelt Papers. 
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The assertion that there were no administrative errors and no 
corruption in the RA would be as untenable as in the case of any govern-
ment agency employing thousands of people. In connection with a suit in 
which the residents of a New Jersey township sought to enjoin the RA 
from undertaking a suburban-housing project at Bound Brook, opponents of 
the government proposal charged that the contemplated withdrawal of the 
suit, at one stage of the lengthy litigation, followed a promise to one 
of the agents of the township that he would receive a government job for 
seventy-five dollars a week upon changing h.is mind. 9 The truth of the 
charge involving a job offer was neither proved nor disproved. 
On April 10, 1936, Senator Robert D, Carey of Wyoming charged that 
the RA sent 1400 checks to farmers in his state who did not seek them.10 
Carey learned of distribution of the unrequested checks when some farmers 
took them in December, 1935, to the Converse County Bank, in which the 
Senator had an interest, at Douglas, Wyoming. Carey wrote to Tugwell of 
this •shameful• incident. The official explanation of the RA that it had 
sent out the checks "in preparation for recommendation for relief prior 
to investigation~11 does not appear satisfactory, However, the disbursal 
of the checks may just as well have been a gross administrative error as 
a vote-buying scheme. 
Tugwell could not personally supervise the conduct of all personnel 
9. Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• 73• 
10. Moore, Russell, Roosevelt Riddles (Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, 
1936), a. 
11. Johnston, Alva, "Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• 74• 
in his far-flung agency. Americans do not ordinarily condemn a public 
official for the occasional infiltration into his administration of a 
corrupt employee -- end some become corrupt after they obtain employ-
ment. It is expected that a government executive will dismiss corrupt 
employees whenever he learns of their activities. Tugwell quickly dis-
charged RA personnel when he discovered that they had been guilty of 
malpractices;12 he prosecuted corrupt contractors.13 Occasionally 
opponents of the New Deal hurled the charge of playing politics with 
appropriations in a satirical vein: 
General Hughie: What's the matter chief? 
Franklin: (sipping again.) I'm not just sure yet. There's 
something about this soup. (Takes another sip,) 
Rexford: Isn't it all right, Boss? 
Franklin: It doesn't seem just right. You make it? 
Rexford: Yes, boss. I put everything in it. It's supposed to 
be perfect. 
Franklin: Yes, I can taste the AAA, the CCC, NRA, PWA, CWA, CAB, 
TVA, SAB, FCT, FERA .... (Suddenly,) I know what it 
is. It needs a whole lot more appropriations, 
Rexford: There's appropriations in it, Boss, 
Franklin: Maybe, but it's not enough. 
Rexford: It's all we had, Boss. There isn't a turnip with a 
drop left in it. 
12. The New York~. October 10, 1936, 4:4; October 16, 1936, 14:7. 
13. The New X2I!1; Times, March 22, 1936, 39•5· 
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Franklin: The stamp collectors' vote's in the bag. What 
I'm worried about is the othera.14 
This satirical charge, incidentally, had in common with serious accuse• 
tiona the failure to mention the RA. Insinuations that relief funds 
went to politicians instead of the unemployed were aimed mostly at the 
WPA,l5 
Tugwell was quick to defend Harry Hopkins' administration of the 
WPA, as well as Ickes' Dl8nagement of the PWA. He commented that 
Progress in this program will not be made without op-
position of various sorts. Much of it has already ap-
peared. Some is obviously political, coming from those 
who say, for instance, that the new appropriation bill 
is merely a huge campaign fund which will be used to 
buy votes. So long as we have democratic government 
and political parties, that would be said about any 
Federal administration which undertook to meet the re• 
sponsibilities of the present crisis. Certainly the 
direction given to pest expenditures by Mr. Hopkins 
and Mr. Ickes cannot be fairly criticized in this re• 
spect. Both have been actuated by motives which are 
beyond question. Indeed they have not been questioned. 
The partisanship displayed has all been on the other 
side. The complaints come from those who would like 
to see the care of the poor6and disadvantaged bent toward different purposes,l 
Tugwell believed that huge relief expenditures were necessary. He 
maintained that political influence would blight the quality of person-
nel and subordinate stable policies to political advantage, thereby 
14. Wolf, Howard, Greener Pastures: !!:. New .!2!!.!!1 Fable (Caldwell, Idaho, 
Caxton, 1936) 13, 71. 
15. Lindley, Ernest K., Halfway with Roosevelt, 21. 
16. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "A Third Econ~,· Rochester Teachers' 
Association, Rochester, N. Y., April 9, 1935; Q§QA Press Release, 15. 
\ 
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becoming a principal obstacle to the effective execution of a program 
of social recovery by organizations which needed competency, courage, 
continuity, and confidence.17 
Tugwell has stated in retrospect that corruption of any kind, 
including the vote-buying variety, can have serious consequences. The 
•mean end unnecessary incidents of domestic dishonesty• which tormented 
the Truman administration in 1950 had their roots in the structure of 
support which Roosevelt erected under his domestic and foreign policies 
-- especially the latter. The price of minor turpitude in and about the 
White House and in the executive agencies in the early 1950s was higher 
than these deviations indicated. Fixers and influence-peddlers in the 
presidential entourage were evidence of an "irresponsible carelessness 
concerning the dignity of a great office.• 18 
The minor irresponsibilities of presidential attaches and small 
corruptions, Tugwell continued, were not as important in themselves as 
they were in weakening the presidential office itself at a time when 
leadership was necessary to national survival! the "minor stigmata were 
evidence of major failure.• Finally, constitutional principles became 
involved• 
A president speaking from an impregnable moral position 
as the chosen leader of his people would not, for in-
stance, have placed his office in jeopardy to legislative 
aggression and then have allowed his military chiefs to 
17, Tugwell, R. G., Address, •Relief and Reconstruction,• National Con-
ference of Social Workers, Kansas City, Missouri, May 21, 1934; in 
The Battle for Democracy, 310. 
18. Tugwell, R. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 322. 
take over the argument pro and con concerning national 
policy - not military strategy, but high political de-
cision. The controversy between MacArthur and the 
other generals ••• under Congressional auspices ••• 
ought never to have happened in American life. It was 
in fact a national disaster,l9 
Tugwell warned that there was no telling how far the ultimate conse-
quences of corruption would reach. 
Tugwell was aware that political considerations continuously af-
fected any administration and required compromise. Vote-buying is the 
opposite of compromise. The vote-buyer says, in effect, •I will not 
compromise; I shall buy the votes necessary in order to get the measure 
I want.• Tugwell saw one level of compromise -- the reconciliation of 
a novel and complex, if useful, measure such as the Voluntary Domestic 
Allotment Plan, for example, with higher national needs -- as a strategic 
operation above the level of politics and corruption,20 
The limits of compromise were often defined by the emergency of 
the early New Deal period; in many instances the administration had to 
stand on principle, disregarding possible political loss, There was some 
compromise in anticipation of opposition -- while crisis action had to 
be decisive, it also had to be acceptable. However, the necessity of 
allaying rising panic did not permit any anticipation of opposition which 
would result in delay and distortion of essential measures.21 
The consideration of national problems in the emergency inevitably 
19. Tugwell, R, G,, •The Compromising Roosevelt,• 323. 
20. Tugwell, R, G,, •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
Western Political Ouarterlv, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 140, 
21. Tugwell, R, G,, "The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 146, 
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led to basic studies above political considerations. In this regard, 
Tugwell wrote: 
He LRoosevel!f often got down in the scholar's dirt 
with the rest of us and worked, worked hard at the 
specific task of knowing what government at Washing-
ton had to be and to do in the circumstances which 
were looming up. This work was by no means always 
relevant to campaigning,22 
Tugwell placed a number of national problems, calling for national solu-
tiona, above considerations such as party politics, regional aggrandize-
ment, or power and place for any man. 23 It was with reference to censer-
vation activities, in particular, that Tugwell rejected vote-buying and 
corruption of any kind. Establishing a firm foundation for continuous 
conservation would be 
the work of at least a generation and cannot be approached 
by slap-dash methods or emotional ballyhoo •••• This means 
that·, in the deepest sense, this entire program of resettle-
ment and rehabilitation must ••• not be guided by political 
expediency,24 
To save theand and the people who depend on it is an aspir• 
ation in which all of us ••• can join. It transcends party, 
creed, and class,25 
There is no justification for ruling out politics from the admin-
istration of the New Deal on the basis of Tugwell's attitudes. At the 
same time, Tugwell, who often received abuse for his impractical •academic• 
background, does not appear by training and inclination to have been 
22. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 139• 
23. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "Your Future and Your Nation,• University 
of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, June 10, 1935; !!§I1A Press 
Release, 2. 
24. Tugwell, R. G,, Address, Tompkins County Development Meeting, Ithaca, 
New York, August 7, 1935, B. 
25, Tugwell, R. G,, Address, •conservation Redefined,• Fiftieth Anniver-
sary of the Founding of New York's Forest Reserve, Albany, N. Y., Mey 
15, 1935; ~ Press Release, 10. 
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ready to disregard the process of compromise, which he understood to be 
involved in the politics of any democracy, in order to purchase votes. 
The Abstruse Tugwell 
He concealed his aims in double-talk. 
Some critics of Tugwell accused him of intellectual dishonesty 
in the form of clever concealment of his un-American aims in his inten• 
tionally obscure speeches and articles. He did not use the language of 
Jefferson, Lincoln, Congress, the street, or the farm; in employing the 
language which highly learned people used in talking to one another, 
Tugwell wes "like the giant squid, ••• which beclouds itself in its own 
ink.• 1 
An anti-New Deal, and especially anti•Tugwell, writer conceded 
that the former professor, unlike most of his colleagues, had a first• 
rate mind; Tugwell wrote well, although in a severely cold style with a 
painfully cultivated formality.2 Another critic stated that Tugwell's 
literary efforts were characterized by the •hollow baccalaureate• style, 
with a •rustle of academic skirts• in almost every sentence.3 
Tugwell's writings sometimes tended toward an esoteric academic 
style. There was justification in certain instances for the attitude of 
some observers that they did not necessarily object to Tugwell's pro-
posals; they simply wanted a clear explanation so that they might then 
l. 
2. 
3· 
Magazine clipping, Tugwell Papers. 
Flynn, John T,, The Roosevelt H.'d.!l (New York, Devin-Adair, 1948) 149 • 
Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Saturday Evening 
Post, Vol. 209, No. 5, August l, 1936, 74. 
voice knowledgeable approval or disapproval. Same of the unfavorable 
analyses of Tugwell's words were caviling and belabored, especially 
those involving books and articles which he obviously wrote as an aca-
demician. For example, the title page of The Industrial Discipline. 
published in May. 1933, read "by Rexford G. Tugwell - Professor of 
Economics - Columbia University.• Anyone with a passing knowledge of 
booksales promotion could have seen the advantage in advertising the 
volume as "by the adviser to the President and Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture.• Tugwell did not choose to sacrifice his academic identity 
for financial gain; he did want people to confuse his academic approach 
to economic problems with immediate measures of the administration,4 
Certainly, Tugwell's academic writings were subject to public 
scrutiny. Pundits and politicians were well aware that it was not 
always reasonable to apply the same analytical methods in scanning 
Tugwell's academic writings as in examining statements he made after 
becoming a public official. Tugwell's views were available in non-aca-
demic media in the homeliest, plainest terms, especially in a series of 
remarkable syndicated columns,5 Caviling critics often chose to cite 
4. Telegram, Tugwell to Charles Proffitt, Manager, Columbia University 
Press, March 10, 1933, •Urge care in any publicity to use no name 
but my own and no connection except Columbia University;• Tugwell 
Papers. 
5. Tugwell, R. G,, •senator Progressive,• •senator Progressive Again,• 
"The Senator and Beauregard Boone.• in The Battle f2! DemocracY; Rus-
sell Lord reported an incident which showed both the camaradie Tugwell 
enjoyed with his co-workers and his ability to speak plainly, When 
the lady readers of a Hearst paper in Washington chose Tugwell as the 
most handsome New Dealer, his associates tried to pull his leg at 
lunch the next day. •He responded with words which showed that while 
in the strictest sense of the term he may be no (continued on next page) 
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passages from books Tugwell wrote while he was a member of the faculty 
at Columbia. Reference exclusively to his academic works was in itself 
an act of distortion when it led to charges of abstruseness. As a pro-
feasor, Tugwell did not necessarily seek communication with the public 
in general. As a public official, he expressed his views in speeches 
and articles in a etyle'adapted to a·wide audience. 
The nature of academic treatises is usually such that the extrac-
tion of single passages amount to their removal from a lengthy, compli-
cated intellectual scheme; the result is often distortion of meaning. 
For example, when Tugwell called for an •end of business• in a speech 
before the academicians of the American Economic Association, he defined 
business, in the very next sentence, as the seeking of profits in an 
unregulated aeon~. Critics maintained that the •end of business,• in 
Tugwell's thinking, meant the end of private ownershipf they neglected 
to cite the next sentence Which gave Tugwell's definition of "business.•6 
In the Senate debate in June, 1934, on Tugwell's promotion to Under 
Secretary of Agriculture, Senator Robinson of Indiana interpreted Tugwell's 
expressed belief of 1931 that •business will be required to disappear• 
as the public ownership of doctrinaire socialism. Senator Logan replied 
that, in view of Tugwell's definition of business, the •end of business,• 
in context. simply meant the end of laissez-faire.7 There was nothing 
5. (continued from previous page) farmer. he at ·least grew up ip, e small 
country.toWn with comfortable access to the livery stable.• The Wal-
laces of Iowa (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 348. 
6. See Above, Chapter III, Section, "Implementation of Planning.• 
7. Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 78, Part II, 11434• 
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in Tugwell's works which called for the abolition of private ownership. 
The nature of Tugwell's academic writings required, for fair 
analysis, a careful examination of the body of his professorial pro• 
nouncements. It would have been unreasonable to discredit observers 
for not finding all of Tugwell's academic writings plain and simple. 
However, many pundits, in their treatment of single passages, showed that 
they devoted little time to examining the professor's works. Certain 
phrases which Tugwell employed could be understood clearly only on the 
, basis of a general comprehension of his views. ·For example, Tugwell's 
"democratic discipline• became, in the opinion of critics, enforced 
uniformity, when Tugwell actually referred in broad ecological terms to 
the self-discipline which man had to achieve in order successfully to 
meet new environmental challenges. 
A striking example of a brief stat~ment, the proper understanding 
of which required a thorou£h, detailed grounding in Tugwell's economic 
views, was this sentence culled from a text-book: "When industry is 
government and government is industry, the dual conflict deepest in our 
modern institutions will be abated." At first glance, this passage seems 
·to justify its being labeled an •overneat• summary of Tugwell's view• 
point as a proponent of the doctrinaire attitude of the extreme Left.8 
Placed in the context of Tugwell's Veblenian views, the statement meant: 
when governmental powers such as price-fixing (government) are exercised 
8, Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• American~­
~· Vol. 39, No. 153, September, 1936, 82. 
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in response to considerations involved in the production of goods (indu-
stry) rather than in accordance with the desires of speculative financial 
management (business), the V~Dlenian conflict between producers of goods 
and producers of profits would disappear. One could not reasonably ex• 
pect a casual reading to reveal the special import of the statement in 
question; on the other hand, journalists and publicists were aware of 
the care which interpretation of academic writings required. They seem 
rarely to have taken the time to examine Tugwell's works adequately. 
Jim Farley declared that nearly all of the critics who called Tugwell's 
books Communistic had never read them.9 
Tugwell's non-academic writings were not entirely without diffi• 
cult passages. However, some of the unfavorable comments were strained, 
belabored efforts to find obscurity where there really was none. One 
author asserted that George Soule and Stuart Chase suffered from foggi-
ness in their ideas, not their writing; as for Tugwell, the "fog is in 
h . ,10 liDo This author stated that Tugwell's writing, "The sources of our 
values are made .sterile by a lack of philosophy,• showed how little the 
professor knew about human beings. If a lack of philosophy was our trouble, 
it affected only a small percentage of the population, Did Tugwell dis-
cover any strong desire among the plumbers when they were earning ten 
dollars a day to read Plato and Josiah Royce?11 This comment does not 
9. Farley, James A., Behind the Ballots (New York, Harcourt, 1938) 219, 
10. Neilson, Francis, Control from~ Top (New York, G, P. Putnam's, 
1933) 73· 
11, Neilson, Francis, Control ~ ~ Top, 19-20, 
merit refutation. 
The author who translated Tugwell's "democratic discipline• into 
Democratic Depotism harped on this sentence in one of Tugwell's speeches: 
"For we have established a record now which may well substitute itself 
for the 'plan' and the minority dictatorship which others use.• 12 Des-
vernine thought that this was truly an •amazing• statement. Dr. Tugwell 
informed his Progressive colleagues that the "Plan,• with a capital •p• 
which they sought, was not necessary because of the New Deal. The New 
Deal record was not only a •Plan;• it was also a substitute for the 
•minority dictatorship which others use,• Obviously Tu>,-well meant by 
•others• the Soviets because the adjective "Progressive,• as Tugwell 
used it, had a "distinct Marxian flavor,• 13 Tugwell's position, as 
stated in this speech, was anti-¥Erxist. He told his Progressive 
friends that a democracy could achieve a healthy, equitable economic 
situation without a socialistic "plan• or a minority dictatorship. Des-
vernine assumed that •substitution• meant the replacement of one undemo-
cratic process with another similar, if concealed, process. For his own 
purpose he gave his own meaning to •substitute• -- not one found in the 
dictionary0 Desvernine•s comment was far more confusing than the state-
ment he criticized. 
On occasion the failure of people to consider the context of certain 
12. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Committee, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935; Resettlement Administration Press Re• 
lease, 7• 
13. Desvernine, Raoul E., Democratic Despotism (New York, Dodd, Mead, 
1936) 106-07. 
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phrases which Tugwell employed led to his embarrassment. He delivered 
a speech in Washington entitled "Wine, Women, and the New Deal• to the 
Women's National Democratic Club.14 In this address Tugwell pointed 
out that any seeming overseriousness on the part of the New Dealers was 
really directed towards the restoration of the American people to a 
happy situation characterized by wine and moderation in contrast to the 
liquor-lubricated excesses of the reckless, uncertain happiness of the 
1920s, He discussed the potentialities of domestic production of wine, 
appealing to women particularly to promote the use of wine and generally 
to take the lead in fostering cultural values which would "lay the founda-
tion for a deep and enduring social attitude of mutual forbearance and 
friendly toleration• so essential if the American people were •to enter 
upon the more abundant life which is rightfully theirs.• 15 
In response to Tugwell's speech the White House received some 
strong protests, A telegram from Dr, W, S, Smith of Masury, Ohio, read: 
"Fifty-five ministers of Methodist Episcopal Church at Youngstown District 
Conference assure you Lthe Presiden!/ of our prayers and humbly inquire 
whether Tugwell's Trinity of Wine, Women, and Song accurately interprets 
16 your New Deal.• Tugwell informed the White House that he received the 
same telegram; he replied by sending the clergymen a copy of the speech 
so that they might become better qualified to judge its import.17 
14. Tugwell, R, G., Address,•Wine, Women and the New Deal," Women's Demo-
cratic Club, Washington, D. c., February 5, 1934; in The Battle !2r 
DemOCfBCV, 178-86, 
15. Tugwell, R, G,, Address, "Wine, Women, and the New Deal,• 186. 
16, Roosevelt Papers. 
17. Letter, M. H. Mcintyre to Tugwell, April 30, 1934; Letter, Tugwell 
to M. H. Mcintyre, May 1, 1934; Roosevelt Papers. 
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Senator Byrd and Tugwell became involved in an acrimonious dis-
pute, over some amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, revolving 
around the interpretation of the word •clarifying.• Tugwell asserted 
that the description of the amendments as •clarifying• did not represent 
an attempt to minimize their importance; they were "designed to make it 
unmistakably clear that, in spite of ambiguities in the Act, what the 
Secretary of Agriculture has been doing, he has a clear right to do.• 
He cited numerous court decisions upholding the Secretary's issuance of 
licenses which fixed prices, established quotas, and provided for the 
examination of the books of the producers and distributors of certain 
products. Tugwell noted that Byrd offered no comment when, a month pre-
viously, Chester Davis and Wallace made statements similar to those of 
the Assistant Secretary. When Tugwell spoke out for the amendments, 
Byrd contended that the necessity of clarification had to mean that the 
18 Secretary of Agriculture had been performing illegal acts. 
On the Senate Floor during the debate on Tugwell's promotion 
Senators Robinson (Arkansas), Bankhead, and Cutting defended Tugwell 
against the charges, bssed on Byrd's contentions, of Senators Robinson 
(Indiana) and Fess that Tugwell was intellectually dishonest.19 The 
attribution of a desire to usurp power to officials in the Department of 
Agriculture who were offering amendments which clearly defined their 
18. Unpublished statement, •The Amendments to the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, 73 Congress, 2 Session, s. 3326,• Tugwell Papers. 
19. Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 78, Part 11, 
11453-55. 
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their authority was aparadox which undoubtedly irked Tugwell. Such 
Senatorial tactics may have explained, although they did not jusfity, 
his occasional obscurity in response to questions from Senators. A 
Senator once felt obliged to ask Tugwell at a hearing what he meant in 
an article by, 'Chance has substituted itself for the anthropomorphic 
20 interpretation of history as a causal sequence.• After Tugwell's 
reply that the •anthropomorphic interpretation of events was very plain,• 
21 the Senators understood no more than they had before,• Tugwell's 
answer assumed a familiarity with Veblen's discussion in The Theory of 
the Leisure Class of the devout observances that make up modern capi-
talism. Despite Tugwell's understandable annoyance at the tactics of 
some senatorial interrogators, the response was uncalled for. 
Tugwell was vulnerable to a certain extent to complaints that his 
academic style of writing was not always easy to follow. The difficulty 
was in part unabcidable, arising from the nature of the subject matter 
with which he dealt as a student of economics. Academic treatment of 
economic concepts was often necessarily long and involved. As a profes-
sor, Tugwell did not aim his works at an audience of typical laymen. 
His views were also available in a plain style, of which he was 
quite capable when he wrote for widespread circulation. Critics often 
concentrated on his academic writings in en unreasonable manner; their 
comments frequently included distortions that unintentionally revealed 
20, Time Magazine, Vol. 23, No. 26, June 25, 1934, 11. 
21. Dorfman, Joseph, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York, Viking, 
1935) 517. 
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skimming -- rather than thorough study. Distortions of reasonably 
plain statements betrayed deliberate misrepresentation. The charge that 
Tugwell employed a "chameleon• literary style, red at one moment and red, 
white, and blue the next, the •Yours for the Revolution, Constitution I 
love you• style,22 was without justification. His writings were certainly 
not completely free of obscure passages; some of his work could have 
stood revision. Yet, the belabored quality of critics' comments indicated 
that his occasional obscurity was greatly exaggerated. 
22. Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, The President's Idea Man,• 74• 
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xrv. The Ha~ess Tugwell 
He was really too ineffective to be a serious threat. 
The Impractical, Dreaming Tugwell 
Charges 
Men who represented special interests, gauging the world by the 
stockmarket or the monetary profits and losses of their businesses, 
struggled to hold their positions in a time of change; it is understand-
able that they should have looked with hostility on academic people 
possessing a broad social point of view,1 Critics of the professors in 
government had a ready-uede line of attack, for, as Tugwell pointed out: 
••• there was a journalist picture of such academi-
cians. No one had taken the trouble to reexamine it 
for several generations. The fresh-water college 
Greek professor was the model - as much a stock char-
acter as the stage Englishman. But also journalists, 
being employees of business men, had one standard 
plea which they were tempted to put forward when situ-
ations got out of hand. 'What we need,• they said, 
·"is a business man for President,• •a practical man 
for Mayor,• or for whatever office was in question, 
There was a short period when editorial columns were 
remarkably free of this old cant; that was when busi• 
ness was thoroughly discredited; yet it would begin 
again with amazing effrontery in 1933• Who but busi• 
ness men had created the mess we were in? Others, it 
would seem in the circumstances, might now be allowed 
a hearing.2 
In short, Tugwell's career as a college professor automatically 
placed him in the category of theoretical idealists who were utterly 
incapable of formulating effective policies for the improvement of prac-
1. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Magazine, 
Vol. 94, No. 5, November, 1933, 286. 
2. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 4. 
tical affairs. Poetry which he composed nearly twenty years before3 and 
his identification of the objective of American society as an •econo~ 
of abundance•4 showed that he was a "drea~·5 •pure theorist• 6 and •social 
spiritualist•7 --despite evidence that any popular stereotype of the 
academician hardly fitted Tugwell.8 His speeches and conduct conveyed 
an impression •not so much of youthful spontaneity, as a rather preco• 
cious juvenility.•9 He had had no experience in large affairs;10 having 
had little contact with laborers and other men who devoted their time 
to seeking material riches, he was not aware that another pound a week 
meant to a London porter •two more pints, and bet a bob instead of six-
11 pence.• (On the second page following this quotation of the porter 
the author wrote "Dr. Tugwell is under no sociological delusion as to 
the social milenium.•) It was unfortunate that Tugwell left Columbia 
for government service because fate had cast him for the role of the 
young professor found on every campus "impressing sophomores with things 
that neither Marx nor Winchell knew until now.• 12 
3• See above, Chapter I. 
4. See above, Chapter III, Section, •The Econo~ of ll:!Umdance.• 
5. •Territories: Rumbles in Puerto Rico,• Time Magazine, Vol. 39, 
No. 24, June 15, 1942, 12. 
6. "The Brain Trust,• Business~. March 22, 1933, 16. 
7. Knox, Frank,~ Planned It That Way (New York, Longmans, Green, 1938) 
78. 
8. See above, Chapter !!,,Section, •Tugwell's General Dissatisfaction.• 
9. Mitchell, James G., "The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust• 
and Its Many Manifestations,• The Annalist, Vol. 43, No. 115, June 1, 
1934. 847· 
10. Young, James c., Roosevelt Revealed (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 
1936) 149. 
11. Neilson, Francis, Control from the Top (New York, G.P. Putnam's, 1933) 
20-21. 
12. Ward, Paul w., •The End of Tugwell,• Nation, Vol. 143, No. 22, Novem-
ber 28, 1936, 623. 
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Those who described Tugwell as an impractical idealist repre-
sented major sectors of public opinion, Business-oriented la~ers 
hurled the epithet of "dreamer.• A prominent figure in the legal pro-
fession in New York referred to Tugwell's bureaucratic mentality, which 
failed because of a •complete lack of historical and realistic sense• 
to apprehend that democracy and bureaucracy were mutually exclusive 
concepts; a bureaucratic mentality also accounted for Tugwell's identi-
fying himself with the larger good. The young professor's divorcement 
from reality resulted in his inability to appreciate the implications 
of his own writings 
tation could not be 
and speeches; he failed to realize that experimen-
13 
separated from theory. The New York barrister 
did not make it clear how experimentation, although related to theory, 
was often inseparable from practical ends -- as in the engineering 
division of many manufacturing concerns, 
The business world, of course, produced its share of critics of 
Tugwell, though few business men elaborated on their brief, general com-
ments to any length. The Chairman of the Board of the American Rolling 
Mill Company did set his observations down in some detail in a trade 
journal. He stated that he was concerned that a man in so important a 
position as Tugwell's exhibited an utter lack of sympathy with, and 
understanding of, the actual problems involved in the conduct of business; 
13. Mitchell, James, G,, "The Precocious Juvenility of the 'Brain Trust' 
and Its Many Manifestations,• 848. 
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Tugwell inadvertently and openly made many misleading and incorrect 
statements about industry. Tbis manufacturer warned that intellectual 
development and book knowledge without experience were a dangerous com-
bination when applied to practical things. He did not question Tug-
well's sincerity or loyalty, only the soundness of his plans and poli-
cies. While there was no reason to question the sincerity of this 
critic, some of his specific comments were difficult to follow and of 
doubtful validity. He referred to Tugwell's observation that industrial 
experimentation had made men's lives insecure, requiring society to pay 
too high a price for free experimentation in industry; he refuted Tug-
well's assertion by pointing out the value of experimentation in industry 
in a technological frame of reference.14 Actually, Tugwell referred 
to speculative interindustry allocation of resources (without regard to 
technological advance based on technological experimentation). 
Anti-Tugwell statements in the press were lengthy and numerous. 
Their general tenor was indicated in the writings of Frank Kent and Blair 
Bolles, two of Tugwell's most persistent and caustic journalistic critics. 
Bolles bemoaned the dismissal of men of affairs as principal counsellors 
to the government and the choice, in their place, of "writers• such as 
•Tugwell,15 whose thought stemmed primarily from compassion and from a 
14. Verity, George M., •Appraises Prof. Tugwell; Finds Lack of Appreci-
ation Problems of Business,• Part I, The Iron Age, Vol. 134, No. 1, 
July 5, 1934, 34-35. 42B. 
15. Bolles, Blair, •Prose and Politics: Writers in the New Deal,• 
Saturday Review of Literature, Vol. 21, No. 23, March 30, 1940, 17. 
desire to have all men happy and well-fed, seeing in the Professor a 
"frustrated Utopian• who found in business the demon barring the road 
16 to heaven. 
Kent's collected columns were a catalogue of anti-Tugwellisms, 
flavored with the satirical wit of the slightly veiled or tongue-in-
cheek barb. It was ridiculous, wrote Kent, to criticize Tugwell as an 
authority on agriculture because he was not a "dirt farmer;• his home 
was "in the clouds.•·17 Kent saved his most expansive missiles for his 
comments on Tugwell's view of the potential prospects of the future. 
There may have been men of more balanced judgment and greater practical 
experience in public affairs than Professor Tugwell; there were none 
who could see prettier pictures. When it came to long-range vision, 
Tugwell was •at the top of the class •••• Through the empurpled haze 
his keen eyes peer down long, lovely vistas at the end of which lie 
flowery beds of ease on which everybody leads a happy life •••• It is 
not fair, however, to expect the Professor to reveal all his plans ••• 
and the final promise he holds out ••• is so beautiful that one should 
not harrow him about details. 'Then,' he quotes, 'shall they sit, each 
man under his own vine and fig tree and none shall be afraid -- a land 
in order, wisely used, with the hills 
will certainly improve the appearance 
green and the streams blue.• This 
of the Missouri River.• 18 Admini-
16. Bolles, Blair, •Prose and Politics: Writers in the New Deal,• 4• 
17. Kent, Frank R., Without Gloves (New York, William Morrow, 1934) 288. 
18. Kent, Frank R., Without Gloves, 147-50. 
strative difficulties did not dampen Tugwell's optimistic spirit; he 
was undaunted by such dangers, his serene confidence that his planned 
Paradise was close at hand remaining •unshaken and unshakable.• 19 Occa-
sionally Kent "retracted" his criticism; after all, •only the sinister• 
would suggest that Tugwell's limited experience, cloistered life, and 
previous lack of success disqualified him from safely guiding lJO.OOO,OOO 
Americans and solving all the problems which had perplexed generations 
20 
of statesmen. 
There was a natural, if not inevitable, tendency for politicians 
21 to disapprove of Tugwell; They, too, attributed impracticality, among 
other qualities to the ex-academician. Some party veterans resented 
Tugwell's having an important voice in the administration despite the 
fact that he lacked public approval through the ballot box and any party 
t d . 22 s an 1.ng. One author called attention to friction in an administra-
tion which was a combination of practical politicians like Jim Farley 
and, in contrast, ecstatic academic theorists like Tugwell.23 Senator 
Burton K. Wheeler expressed a feeling which typified the attitude of 
many politicians when he stated that he was friendly to the AA Act, but 
resented its being promoted by a few professors who sat around the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and •never saw a bushel of wheat in their lives.• 24 
Perhaps this general observation by Richard Crossman, teacher, public 
19. Kent, Frank R., Without Gloves, 172. 
20. Kent, Frank R., Without Gloves, 227. 
21. See Above, Chapter XIII, Section, "The Arrogant Tugwell.• 
22. Young, James C., Roosevelt Revealed, 149. 
23. Young, James c., Roosevelt Revealed, 114. 
24. Young, James C., Roosevelt Revealed, 41. 
servant, editor, and Member of Parliament, throws some light on the dif-
ficulties inherent in Tugwell's situation regarding his relations with 
politicians: 
The intellectual in politics is always •unbalanced," in 
the estimation of his colleagues. He peers round the 
next corner while they keep their eyes on the road, and 
he risks his faith on unrealized ideas, instead of con-
fining it prudently to humdrum loyalties. H~ is "in 
advance,• and, in this sense, an extremist.2) 
Regardless of whether Crossman's view applied in detail to Tugwell's 
position in Washington, it is essentially true that any attempt by Tug-
well to promote the general interest for the long-run virtually had to 
provoke the opposition of special interests, political as well as econo-
mic, with short-run viewpoints. 
Occasionally comments characterizing Tugwell as an impractical 
idealist dealt specifically with his qualifications, or lack of them, 
for holding a high position in the Department of Agriculture. A scur-
rilous account summarized Tugwell's studies of agricultural problems by 
stating that he once read a book on the subject and wrote a thesis of 
such •shallow profundity• that it duly impressed that •sterling dirt farmer 
from the fish markets of New York, Al Smith.•26 Another opinion credited 
Tugwell with little knowledge of agriculture, but a great deal about cru-
25. Crossman, Richard, ed., The God That Failed (New York, Bantam Books, 
1952) Introduction, J. 
26. Bealle, Morris, Washington Squirrel ~ (Washington, The Author, 
1934) Jl; this book is among those in the collection of scurrilous 
literature in the Roosevelt Papers which includes a pamphlet The 
Screw Deal; Smith never read Tugwell's memorandum of 1928; Tugwell, 
Interview with writer. 
sades.27 Within the Department, George Peek informed Tugwell that he 
(Tugwell) knew •nothing of the intricacies of the business of different 
industries• which were to operate under marketing agreements.28 After 
he left the administration, Hugh Johnson, whose writings indicate re• 
spect for Tugwell's contribution to the ironing out of differences among 
the authors of the NIR Act, voiced this unqualified opinion: "Rex Tug-
well knows as much about agriculture as Haile Selassie knows about 
Oshkosh, Wisconsin.• 29 
Rebuttal 
It was unreasonable to call all college professors the •Ivory 
Tower• type; there was ample evidence that, working among academicians, 
Tugwell was by no means removed from reality.1 As a professor he dis-
approved of dOctrinaire theorists2 in the same terms which he employed 
after he became an adviser to Roosevelt. In 1928 Tugwell made~ this 
general observation: 
The great safety of categorical abstraction is that it 
can not be touched by knowledge; but this is also its 
ultimate source of danger. For we are always discover-
ing things and when definitions can no longer be tor-
tured into including these phenomena, they fall into 
disuse.3 
27. High, Stanley, Roosevelt -and Then? (New York, Harper and Brothers, 
1937) 160. 
28. Peek, George N. with Samuel Crowther, Why Quit Our Own (New York, 
D. Van Nostrand, 1936) 84. 
29. Time Magazine, Vol. 26, No. 20, November 11, 1935, 11. 
1. See above, Chapter II, Section, "Tugwell's Generel Dissatisfaction.• 
2. See above, Chapter II, Section, "Reasons for Institutional Lag.• 
3• Tugwell, R. G., "Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part II, Journal 
of Philosophy, Volume 17, No. 18, August 28, 1930, 480. 
Tugwell's comments in the years 1928-1930 on specific events 
illustrated his anti-doctrinaire attitude. He lauded a dissenting 
judicial opinion as an example of the pragmatic view of human necessity 
which distinguished our best legal scholarship.4 He deplored what 
appeared to be a revival of "doctrinaire ruthlessness• in Russia --
after it had begun to seem that the regime was becoming less Commu-
nistic than pragmatic. 5 
In connection with the presidential campaign of 1928, Tugwell 
compared Woodrow Wilson, who created a rationale to prepare the way 
for action, to Alfred E. Smith, who took action first. Wilson's lib-
eral idealism was unable to meet situations flexibly by finding solu-
tions with direct apprehension and freedom from reference to a general 
philosophy. Consequently, Wilson's liberal principles were •wrecked on 
6 
the reefs of necessity.• Under Hoover conservative priileiples·rared. 
no better. Tugwell was not, however, a doctrinaire anti-doctrinaire. 
Both approaches, Wilson's and Smith's, he wrote had their strengths and 
weaknesses. He simply thought the "direct approach was best right now.•? 
4• Tugwell, R. G., "That Living Constitution,• New Republic, Vol, 55, 
No. 707, June 20, 1928, 121. 
5· Tugwell, R. G,, •communist Theory vs. Russian Fsct,• New Republic, 
No. 54, No. 702, May 16, 1928, 367, 
6. Dulles, F. R., "The Retreat into Isolationism,• in The World of 
History, ed. by c. Canby and N. Gross (New York, New American 
Library, A Mentor Book, 1954) 216: " ... he almost completely 
subordinated any concept of national interest to the dictates of 
duty,• that is, Wilson urged membership on moral grounds rather 
than for self-interest. 
7. Tugwell, R. G., "Platforms and Candidates,• New Republic, Vol. 55, 
No. 704, May 30, 1928, 44• 
Tugwell's adverse view of the doctrinaire, as expressed after he 
left Columbia, was consistent with his pre-New Deal pronouncements. In 
fact, his comments on categorical reasoning a decade after he expressed 
the views cited in the quotation next above, and after his government 
service, showed that through the years he was consistently anti•doctri-
naira. His opinion in 1939 was that 
Reality has a way of escaping from categories. It is 
apt to protrude.in awkward shapes from the most cheri-
shed concepts and to spread embarrassingly across the 
the most elaborate categories.8 
During the New Deal period Tugwell cited •our healthy dislike of the 
doctrinaire• as a fundamental aspect of American history.9 He asserted 
that all the beating of breasts by the radical and reactionary extremes 
was •carried on in a vacuum outside of reality. The alternatives offered 
are impossible of achievement. But achievement, of course, is not the 
purpose.• 10 
After his New Deal experience, Tugwell continued to deplore undue 
deference to theoretical departures in public affairs. In 1937 he wrote 
that individualism and cooperation were not theoretical virtues; they 
arose from the needs of situations.ll In 1941 he objected in one of his 
articles to doctrinaire adherence to Darwinism. People erroneously 
8. Tugwell, R. G., "The Superpolitical," Journal of Social Philosophy, 
Vol. 5, October, 1939-July, 1940, 110. 
9. Tugwell, R. G,, "The Progressive Tradition,• Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 
155, No. 4, April, 1935, 419. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., "Address,• "A Third Economy,• Rochester Teachers' 
Association, Rochester, New York, April 22, 1935; Y§QA Press Re• 
lease, 3· 
11. Tugwell, R. G., •cooperation and Resettlement,• Current History, 
Vol. 45, No.5, February 2, 1937, 75. 
associated natural selection with progress, whereas Darwin's thesis 
really was not a meliorative principle at work in human affairs. Stu-
dents overlooked both the accidental nature of elimination12 and the 
possibility that devolution might be the result of natural selection, 
(In other words, natural selection was not operative, and, even if it 
were, it would not necessarily be beneficial to the race.) In accord-
ance with his undoctrinaire, anti-deterministic rejection of Marxism, 
economic classicism, and Darwinism, Tugwell concluded that progress did 
not just happen; it was consciously created,13 In a book review in 
1948 Tugwell expressed his approval of practicality with this comment: 
"Sir Oliver Franks is no convinced advocate of any 
ism •••• When he speaks of what Britains must do, he 
speaks from the heart and from ex~rience but not 
from any theoretical commitment.• 4 
In his specialty, economics, Tugwell long complained of the fail-
ure of economists to adopt an experimental approach, relating their stu• 
dies to reality,l5 He found the study of economics in colleges and uni• 
varsities, on the whole, a curious situation in which the opportunity 
for academic activity kept alive ideas which might readily have died in 
the going world -- "for one could teach anything to passive students 
12. For example, in wars the best element of the population suffers the 
most casualties -- an accidental or artificial interference with 
natural selection, 
13. Tugwell, R. G., •The Directive,• Journal of Social Philosophy AnS 
Jurisprudence, Vol. 7, No. 1, October, 1941, 23, 
14. Tugwell, R, G. and Banfield, E. c., "The Utility of the Future in 
the Present,• Public Administration Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter, 
1948. 59· 
15. See above, Chapter II, Section, "Tugwell's General Dissatisfaction.• 
provided he talked sensibly about worldly affairs,• 16 Academic econo-
mists attempted futilely to exclude human nature from their studies.17 
They failed to see facts as social facts; •one thing at a time' was not 
good enough because no one knew the important things to choose, and 
18 
other things never remained equal. Conventional economics became 
like a religion; it had little to do with how men behaved on weekdays, 
only on economic Sundays.19 Consequently, 
The teaching of economics in school and college went 
on, as it always had, completely ignoring the study of 
production, and continuing to concentrate largely on 
the conceptual statements of a theory inherited from 
the contributors to an old tradition.20 
Tugwell considered academic economics static rather than dynamic; 
it was not applicable to reality. Things never were as they had been 
before; only the experimental method could keep up with ever-new reality.21 
Tugwell's specialty was the study of social invention in economic life, 
the •creative intelligence - how things were made and ideas shaped, how 
22 
novelty was possible and where it came from.• The creation of ever-
needed new social institutions required the experimental approach, •with 
all its safeguards against long-run error and its dedication to reality.• 23 
16. Tugwell, R. G., •Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part I, 452, 
17. Tugwell, R. G., •Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part II, 478•79• 
18. Tugwell, R. G., •Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part I, 454. 
19. Tugwell, R, G., •Veblen and 'Business Enterprise•,• ~Republic, 
Vol. 98, No. 1269, March 29, 1939, 215. 
20. Tugwell, R. G., Industrr's Coming of Age (New York, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1927) vi. 
21. Tugwell, R. G,, •Human Nature and Social Economy,• Part I, 349• 
22. Tugwell, R, G., •The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Ouarterly, Vol. l, No. 2, June, 1948, 137-38. 
23. Tugwell, R. G., •The Fourth Power,• Planning and Civic Comment, 
Part II, April-June, 1939, 17. 
Economics, as formally taught, vas not adequate for the task of social 
invention because it was not an experimental science; it could not be-
come so until it enlarged the area within which it carried on its char• 
acteristic activities. Tugwell credited fact-gatherers and measurers 
with performing important functions; their work, however, fell short of 
the real need -- the problem approach. The measurers generalized on 
the basis of inadequate data, rendering their simple formulae suspect. 
Economists had to consider men as they actually behaved in their vari• 
ous dilemmas unless they were to risk possible misinterpretation and 
misreading of the evidence.24 
While stressing the need for the adoption by economists of the 
experimental approach, Tugwell did not assert that it would easily leed 
to final, correct answers; it was not infallible. He warned that the 
experimenter could not treat the undefined as defined -- but he must 
never stop trying to define it.25 Nothing in itself was acceptable or 
final, but only tentative; a fact entering into an experiment had to be 
redefined as forces changed either it or the acceptability of the re• 
sults of the experiment.26 Tugwell was aware of the measurers' objec• 
tion that it was impossible to experiment with social forces. In reply, 
the measurers' •critic would say that experiments are continually in 
progress. The world is a laboratory.• 27 Tugwell did not accept the al-
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
Tugwell, 
Tugwell, 
Tugwell, 
Tugwell, 
R. 
R. 
R. 
R. 
G., •Human Nature 
G., •Human Nature 
G. • • Human Nature 
a •• • Human Nature 
and Social Economy,• Part II, 481-82. 
and Social Economy,• Part II, 486. 
and Social Economy,' Part I, 449• 
and Social Economy,• Part n. 477. 
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leged fact that "human nature never changes• as narrowly defining the 
limits of achievement through experimentation; this kind of argument 
was •superseded by a tendency to stress the rich human flexibility 
which is so obvious to experimenters.•28 This last comment indicates 
the influence on Tugwell's thinking of Simon Nelson Patten; Patten 
believed that the problem facing social inventors was not one of chang-
ing human nature, but rather one of creating an institutional environ• 
ment which would stimulate the expression of the more desirable aspects 
of the many-faceted human make-up. 
When Tugwell turned his attention from academicians in general, 
and economists in particular, to government in the going world, he 
found unrealism also rampant there, personified in Herbert Hoover, The 
ineffectiveness of the President's policies as economic conditions pro• 
gressively worsened moved Tugwell to wade through Hoover's published 
statements in order to infer a fundamental theme or intellectual trait. 
The pamphlet which Tugwell produced29 concentrated on Hoover's unrealism, 
his adherence to a faith, and his rejection of all factual evidence to 
the contrary. 
The tenor of Tugwell's expression undoubtedly revealed the rancor 
and impatience of one who considered the situation analogous to a refusal 
to call in firemen when the house was burning down. However, there was 
28. Tugwell, R. G., •Earthbound: The Problem of Planning and Survi~l,' 
Antioch Review, Winter, 1949•50, 479-80. 
29. Tugwell, R. G., Mt• Hoover's Economic Policy (New York, John Day, 
1932). 
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intellectual content in his disapproval of Hoover's basic thought pro• 
ceases; the President's economies were 
••• theological in form and origin, ••• a consistent, 
well-rounded body of principles. They become confused 
only from contact with unholy reality. For a clergyman 
or a college professor this is not so tmportant •••• 
But a President of the Federal Union in the 1930s is 
not so lucky. Hobgoblin reality reaches for him from 
behind every bush.30 
It required, in Tugwell's esttmstion, an acute and clever apologist to 
save such a doctrinal system from ridicule. Yet, Hoover, who was •un-
gifted in dialectic and blunt and stiff in expression,• undertook, with-
out apology or even reluctance, this difficult task which might have 
discouraged even his cleverest eontemporary.3l 
Tugwell charged that Hoover's attempted enforcement of outworn 
dogma through public policy had precipitated crises.32 Tugwell cited 
statements by Hoover pertaining to specific economic problems as examples 
of the President's unrealism stemming from doctrinaire concepts. Hoover 
lauded the nation-wide cooperation of business in the 1930 crisis as 
having lessened hardship by serving as a practical system of unemployment 
insurance; Tugwell inquired how this "feeble gesture of denial" could 
come from the· same mind which conceived praiSes of family solidarity and 
solicitude for children -- only because Hoover hoped so much that it was 
true that he came to believe it.33 In June, 1931, Hoover proclaimed that 
30. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economi£ Polic:i, 18. 
31. Tugwell, R. G.' Mr. Hoov!i!r's Economic PoliC:io 19. 
32. Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economi£ PoliC:io 19. 
33· Tugwell, R. G. • HI:· Hoover's Economic PoliQ:io 22. 
972. 
he had •steadily urged the maintenance of wages and salaries• in order 
to sustain purchasing power and promote social good will; everyone else 
then knew, Tugwell commented, that wage-cutting had become a major 
policy of business.34 Hoover's confidence stemmed from an ideal concept 
of business, rather than its particular performances,35 Meanwhile, 
Hoover urged the expansion of research which, Tugwell asserted, could 
only take place within the limits of a dogma,36 Tugwell concluded that 
the progress of national catastrophe strengthened Hoover's faith, •now 
magnificent in its repudiation of fact.•37 
Having rejected the popular concept of Hoover as a practical man, 
the engineer in government, Tugwell got his chance to participate in 
public administration. Did he carry his rejection of unrealism from 
the Columbia campus into action in Washington? The nature of his acti-
vities quickly indicated to him that a classroom approach had no place 
in government. Tugwell knew that there was quite a difference between 
being a college professor and a public official some time before it was 
at all certain that he would go to Washington. He found the atmosphere 
in the Roosevelt camp in early 1932 •academic,• the seminar air of free 
exchange, by comparison with what came after the Democratic Convention, 
After Chicago the •purpose narrowed. We became not inquirers, but 
38 
architects then.• If there was a distinct change after early July, 
34· Tugwell, R, G., Mr. Hoover'§ Economic Polic~, 23. 
35· Tugwell, R, G., ~Hoover'§ Economic Polic~, 26-27. 
36. Tugwell, R. G,, Mr. Hoover'§ Economic Polic~, 26. 
37· Tugwell, R. G., Mr. Hoover's Economic Polic~, 22. 
~. Tugwell, R, G., •The Preparation of a President,• 143· 
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1932, with many new influences and pressures moving in upon Roosevelt. 
•this was even more true after the election.• 39 
In 1934 Tugwell made this comment, which indicated that he had 
left the classroom behind: 
This is not_an issue Lemployment for youth entering the 
labor fore~ which can be deferred until some theorist 
can work out a neat solution. It is terribly urgent. 0 
In the following year he suggested to some college students who were 
about to leave the classroom that it was not too early for their parti• 
cipation in public affairs in a •more than academic way.•41 
Despite his concern with currently pressing problems, Tugwell con-
tinued to devote what time he could spare to consideration of economic 
problems on a basic level aside from politics and immediacy.42 He did 
not detach himself summarily or completely from his academic background. 
His effort to be a man of affairs and a scholar at the same time 0 or in 
his spare time, did lead him into difficulties in public relations. 
Critics maintained that a professor in government should do re• 
search and scientific work 0 turning over his ideas to an entirely differ• 
ent type of man -- the man engaged in the practical application of devel-
oped theories.43 Other critics conceded that it was acceptable for Tugwell 
39· 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43· 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 146. 
Tugwell, R. G., Address, •Relief and Reconstruction,• National Con• 
ference of Social Workers, Kansas City, Missouri, May 21, 1934; in 
The Battle~ Democracy, 317. 
Tugwell. R. c., Address, •Your Future and Your Nation,• University 
of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, June 10, 1935; .Y§!lA Preas 
Release, 16. 
See Below, Chapter XIII, Section, "The Vote-Buying Tugwell.• 
Verity, George M., •Appraisal of Prof. Tugwell; Finds Lack of Appreci• 
ation Problems of Business,• Part II, Ih!l. Iron !Eli• Vol. 134, No. 4, 
July 26. 1934, 33·34• 
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to adopt an academic approach at times, so long as he simply stated on 
a given occasion whether he was speaking as a scholar or as an admini-
strator; yet any attempt by Tugwell to make this distinction met with 
ridicule.44 In the view of the press public officials virtually never 
spoke as individuals but as spokesmen for the administration.45 
Tugwell was apparently well aware of the difference between aca-
demic and administrative activities -- an awareness not easily achieved.46 
He indicated that he knew Thomas More's Utopia was for consideration by 
students, not administrators: 
Faith that objectives can be useful to racial purposes 
persists and is not discouraged by achievements which 
turn out to be less than Utopian.47 
He showed that he had not forgotten, by 1935, what he had written in 1926 
a condemnation of the typical idealist who had to have all or nothing, 
who neither understood •a willingness to compromise, nor an unwilling• 
ness to affiliate.• Why, he inquired could not one approve of same parts 
of capitalism, for example, and not of others? We could •withhold nothing 
of energy or loyalty• simply because our ideals had been violated.48 
44• See above, Chapter X, .Section, •Promotion.• 
45. See above, Chapter III, Section, •Tugwell's Long-Run Thinking;• Kent, 
Frank R.,Without Grease: Political Behavior 1934-36 (New York, Wil• 
liam Morrow, 1936) 276. 
46. Brinton, Crane, The Shaping of ~ Modern Mind (New York, New Ameri-
can Library, A Mentor Book, 1953) 104, writes regarding Machiavelli, 
• ••• be leaned over backward in his effort to be no academic intel• 
lectual but a man of the world •••• His very reputation for wicked-
ness ••• in itself is proof of his failure. Scientific knowledge does 
not contain the corrosive acid of Machiavelli's wit.• 
47• Tugwell, R, G., "The Progressive Tradition,• 410. 
48. Tugwell, R. G., •Chameleon Words,• New Republic, Vol. 48, No. 612, 
August 25, 1926, 16, 18. 
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Tugwell did not confine his non-Utopian views to generalities' 
he also applied them to specific developments during the New Deal peri• 
od.49 With reference to the Pure Food and Drugs Bill, he wrote: 
Solon told the Athenians to make, not the best laws 
that could be written, but the best that could be 
enforced. Whatever the wording of a law or the de-
sires of the lawmaker, the community's standards of 
good conduct or fair practice inevitably determine 
the maximum level of law endorcement.50 
He thought that the subsistence homestead settlements, as a whole, would 
serve merely as •small eddies of retreat for exceptional persons.•5l He 
told an interested group that the efforts of government consumers• 
agencies, despite some lesser achievements, had not been justified by 
results so far; he even thought that the whole experiment might prove 
to be unrealistic and futile.52 
As Tugwell and others grappled with real problems, one sector of 
the opposition objected to the novelty and sweep of what the administra-
tion considered limited actions; another sector demanded millennium-pro-
ducing policies such as those pronounced by HUey Long, about whom Tugwell 
observed: 
•His slogan, 'Every man a king,• was an appeal, dema-
gogic it is true, and impossible in a practical sense, 
49. Tugwell, R. G., Address, •consumers and the New Deal,• Consumers• 
League of Ohio, Cleveland, May 11, 1934; in ~Battle for Demo-
cracy, 285-86. 
50. Tugwell, R, G., "The Great American Fraud," The American Scholar, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter, 1934, 95· 
51. Tugwell, R. G,, Address, "The Place of Government in a National 
Land Program,• Joint Meeting of the American Economic Association, 
American Statistical Association, and Farm Economic Association, 
Philadelphia, December 29, 1933; USDA Press Release, 14. 
52. Tugwell, R. G., Address, •consumers and the New Deal," 285-86. 
just as others later on would be - the Townsend and 
Bigelow schemes and California's •Ham and Eggs• •••• 53 
976. 
Tugwell saw no possibility for quick, final solutions for national 
problems such as a professor could outline on a blackboarct.54 He noted 
in 1928 that the diseases overcoming both laissez-feire and state con-
trol were being met with •nostrum hunting.•55 Before he went to Wash• 
ington, he learned that the incoming administration would attract many 
panacea-purveying adherents. In August, 1932, Moley turned over to 
Tugwell a memorandum sent in by a pro-Roosevelt partisan, Tugwell re-
ferred to this memorandum in a letter to Basil O'Connor as 
just one of those things which come to economists at 
times like these literally by the hundreds. Everyone 
has some little formula which he thinks will solve 
the world's difficulties •••• ••• We are, I hope, go-
ing to outline a more fundamental policy wh6ch will 
make such suggestions as this unnecessary,5 
After he had been in Washington some time, Tugwell was more aware 
than ever that quick, easy solutions were not available to the govern-
ment. With reference to the maladjustment of population to resources, 
he advised that an effective realignment would require "time, enormous 
effort, and all the intelligence of which Americans are capable.•57 
53· Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol, 64, No. l, October, 1953, 19. 
54. See above, Chapter IX, Section, "Tugwell's Aversion to Crackpot 
Do-Good ism. • 
55. Tugwell, R. G,, "Governor or President?•, New Republic, Vol. 54, No. 
702, May 16, 381. 
56. August 9, 1932, Tugwell Papers. 
57. Tugwell, R. G., "National Significance of Recent Trends in Farm Popu-
lation,• Social Forces, Vol, 14, No. l, October, 1935, 7. 
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Regarding distressed rural populations, he warned people to be •wary 
of ••• casual proposals to fix things up during the next ccnvenient 
weekend •• 58 Despite Tugwell's expression of these views, the opposi• 
tion press associated him with the young, eager bureaucrats who lent 
Washington a campus atmosphere in the early New Deal period,59 Since 
Tugwell's letter to O'Connor was not for distribution to the public, 
one can accept his public statements on evolutionary progress as valid 
evidence that he knew he was no longer at Columbia. 
Tugwell pointed out in studying complex social soils that there 
was no indicators available comparable to sage and greasewood, which 
indicated the soils that would respond profitably to irrigation, In 
the absence of such guides, we had to rely still, despite the develop-
ing arts of forecast, on the 'oldest method of contrivance- trial and 
60 
error,• Approaches could only be tentative: 
In entering ••• an untrod path it is unwise to lay down 
too specifically the structure of new things; it is always 
better merely to register a change of heart and mind and 
then begin to work out p~tiently and carefully the require-
ments of the conversion,bl 
Tugwell saw a danger in early commitment to measures with long-run im• 
plications. Some of the activities which seemed prosperousat first might 
62 turn out not to be; from failures a great deal could be learned, 
58, Tugwell, R. G., "National Significance of Recent Trends in Farm 
Population,• 4• 
59· See above. Chapter IX, Section, •Tugwell's Aversion to Crackpot 
Do-Goodism.• 
60. Tugwell, R, G., •Trial and Error;• in The Battle for Democracy, 34• 
61. Tugwell, R. G., "America Takes Hold of Its Destiny,• Today, April 
28, 1934. 260. 
62, Tugwell, R, G., •cooperation and Resettlement,• 71, 
978. 
He considered the administration's experimental approach its most impor-
tant characteristic; it was in the American tradition -- "at least there 
was a time when Yankee ingenuity was a byword of praise.• Adherence to 
the American tradition would produce •no antiseptic Utopia and no soci-
alistic paradise, but a changing system in wl:ich free American human 
beings can live their changing lives.• 63 
Tugwell's conments on specific problems reflected his general 
advocacy of the trial-and-error method. He made such comments in the 
late 1920s. His writings of 1928 disclosed dissatisfaction with doctri-
naire formulation of policy without continual readjustment in the light 
of new data and changed conditions. Re considered tariffs based on the 
comparative-costs theory the result of a theoretical generalization 
resting on insufficient data; no one knew what the actual costs in vari-
ous nations were.64 Tugwell noted that examination of a particular 
operation within a general framework demonstrated that policy was an 
evolving factor; administrative policy, in banking in this instance, 
could make •all the difference in the world.• 65 
In 1929 Tugwell wrote with regard to the farm problem: 
The new agriculture will not develop to fit any fixed and 
rigid delineation such as may be suggested ggre, but will 
create its own forms and social conditions. 
63. Tugwell, R. G., "America Takes Hold of Its Destiny,• 266-67. 
64. Tugwell, R. G., "What Is a Scientific Tariff?", New Republic, Vol. 
55, No. 706, June 13, 1928, 92. 
65. Tugwell, R. G,, "Bankers' Banks,• New Republic, Vol. 57, No. 732, 
December 12, 1928, 95· 
66. Tugwell, R. G., •Farm Relief and a Permanent Agriculture,• The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Vol. 142, No. 231, March, 1929, 276, 
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His New Deal speeches and writings revealed that he consistently ad-
hered to an undoctrinaire, trial-and-error approach to agricultural 
problems. Speaking in 1933 about the land program, he stated that he 
expected no perfect answer on the first attempt; the administration 
would have to do the best it could with tentative plans until the 
future direct io!l of eccnomic growth was more certain. 67 In 1936 he 
replied to the advocates of simple retirement of marginal lands that 
their scheme had no immediate practical value; there had to beeconomic 
opportunities for the occupants of the land to be retired; in some 
cases the right farming and grazing techniques would improve the situ-
ation; in any event, •we should have a rude awakening if we attempted 
68 to do it by a tour de force.• 
In 1937, shortly after he left Washington, Tugwell wrote that 
the land program stemmed from a common need rather than from a common 
ideal, therefore resting on a sounder foundation69 -- not the view of 
an uncompromising idealist. As late as 1949 Tugwell asserted that policy 
makers had to look upon agriculture as a producing and conserving occu-
pation, not a way of life.7° He consistently maintained for a quarter 
of a century the realistic attitude concerning the agricultural problem 
67. Tugwell, R. G., Address, "The Place of Government in a National 
Land Program,• 6. 
68. Tugwell, R. G., "Changing Acres,• Current History, Vol. 44, No. 6, 
September, 1936, 63; •Down to Earth,• Current History, Vol. 44, No. 
4, July, 1936, 33· 
69. Tugwell, R. G., •cooperation and Resettlement,• 71. 
70, Tugwell, R. G., "A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• Journal 
gt Farm Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, February, 1949, 45. 
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which he displayed in 1934; in that year he referred to the difficul-
ties involved in managing agricultural production so it would not out-
distance demand, wr.ile increasing demand through a redistribution of 
purchasing power 
••• a colossal job requiring a finesse of judgement and a 
technique of administration which we are only beginning 
to master. Mistakes will be made.71 
Undoubtedly Tugwell was encouraged to express his experimental 
attitude by the response it evoked in Roosevelt. The inclination to 
experiment when no precedent or solution was at hand was an important 
aspect of Roosevelt's make-up,72 Roosevelt's view that society and 
economics were in a constant flux which called for experimentation im-
pressed Tugwell, who had been teaching that for years,73 A columnist 
close to the Roosevelt camp since Albany days attributed the first sen-
tence of The Industrial Discipline, "The fluidity of change in society 
has always been the despair of theorists,• to Roosevelt's influence on 
Tugwell,74 The same journalist, Ernest K. Lindley, largely wrote the 
speech, which Roosevelt delivered at Oglethorpe University in May, 1932, 
containing the future President's best known reference to the need for 
experimentation (• ••• unless I mistake its temper, the country demands, 
bold, persistent experimentation •••• •). However, Roosevelt did not 
71. 
72. 
73· 
74. 
Tugwell, R, G,, Address, •consumers and the New Deal," 279, 
Tugwell, R, G., "The Experimental Roosevelt,• Political Quarterly, 
July, 1950. 
Bolles, Blair, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• American Mer-
~· Vol. 39, No. 159, September, 1936, 82. 
Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's ¥agazine, 
Vol, 94, No. 5, November, 1933, 259. 
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carry out experiments with the boldness indicated in his pre-nomination 
statement. Tugwell has written in retorspect that Roosevelt never 
again achieved the courage and inspiration of the Oglethorpe University 
address; he executed his experiments within limits which Tugwell con-
sidered confining.75 
Tugwell's official position gave him the opportunity to engage 
in the first-hand observation which he considered an essential part of 
the experimental approach. He asserted that the administration had to 
consult continually the people, whose interests it was charged with the 
duty of promoting, concerning their ambitions; the government could do 
nothing which smacked of the •armchair, of the bureaucrat or of the 
76 
student's lamp.• Tugwell managed to get out into the field from time 
to time in order to observe policy at the level of application. In the 
spring of 1933 he visited the South to learn about cotton control in 
t . 77 ac 1on. Later that year, August 17 - September 20, he made a trip 
through the western states, visiting installations and personnel of the 
Department of Agriculture. He contacted people in irrigation and con-
servation work and employees of the Bureau of Public Roads and the Forest 
Service.78 In 1936 Tugwell made a 2000-mile trip as a member of the 
President's special Drought Commission in order to obtain information on 
75. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roose• 
velt,• 14, 22, and here and there; see below, Chapter XV, Section, 
•The 'Progressive' Nature of the New Deal." 
76. Tugwell, R, G., Address, Tompkins County Development Meeting, Ithaca, 
New York, August 7, 1935; .!l§l2A Press Release, 7. 
77. Tugwell, R, G., Address, Clemson College, South Carolina, August 15, 
1934; .!l§l2A Press Release, 1. 
78. Scrapbook and Log, Tugwell Papers. 
which to base relief measures for the stricken areas,79 
Any program, experimental or otherwise, faced modification in 
the face of a formidable reality ever present in public affairs -- poli-
tical considerations. Making no pretensions to expertness in political 
matters, Tugwell, nevertheless, was well aware of their significance, 
He knew that general definition of a policy and the hammering together 
of an actual, politically acceptable program were two different tasks. 
In 1928 he commented, in connection with the banking community's mis-
givings in Wilson's time about demands for sweeping modification of 
their activities, that the Federal Reserve Act proved 'Radical talk 
writes no legislation,•80 Political considerations were, of course, 
readily apparent in high appointments and patronage. Regarding the lat-
ter Tugwell wrote: 
It is possible to believe that if patronage based on 
political considerations should be outlawed by exten-
sions of the merit system, the American Presidency 
might be deprived of a very neces~ary weapon, one vi-
tal to the conduct of the office. 1 
Concerning appointments, Tugwell referred to the manipulations behind 
one particular selection as •not a pretty story ... still it was under-
standable,• because every day, in a democracy, people received for poli-
tical services rewards in the form of jobs which they could not begin 
to perform satisfactorily.82 
Tugwell's private conversations and communications attested that 
80. Tugwell, R, G,, •Bankers• Banks," 95. 
81. Tugwell, R, G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 340, 
82, Tugwell, R, G., The Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 39· 
his public statements and writings did not represent an effort to pass 
himself off as a realist when he actually was not, He told President 
Truman that his administration as an extension of the Roosevelt regime 
•could be true only in a limited and temporary sense;• Tugwell had seen 
enough of White House affairs to know that •policies had to be reshaped 
almost continually,•'83 Perhaps the most revelatory evidence of Tugwell's 
awareness of political and practical realities was a letter he received 
from an agricultural economist in the USDA who apologized for his expres-
sian of dissatisfaction with the progress of the land program: 
I realize that my discontent with our rate of progress 
was due to my not seeing the whole field of campaign 
as broadly as you saw it, and not realizing the obsta-
cles in full that you were maneuvering to overcome, 
In any case, I'm glad you called attention to my care-
lessness and its possible consequences, It is only 
because you had taken me with you to the heights to see 
the vision ahead that I felt cast down when I found us 
still in the low foothills. But I appreciate, of course, 
that we have to grow into IIIBny of these things, and 
that public opinion and political support cannot be 
forced ,,84 
One would expect that Tugwell's realism evoked some favorable com-
ments; of those there were many, although they seldom appeared in the 
press. James Farley described Tugwell es •sensible in his approach to 
particular situations and never arbitrary.• 85 His Research Assistant 
wrote that Tugwell was neither a socialist, anarchist, nor Utopian; he 
faced not the conservatives, but the facts: permanent plenty amid gen-
83. Tugwell, R, G,, The Stricken land, xvii. 
84. Letter, no date, Tugwell Papers. 
85. Farley, James A,, Behind~ Ballots (New York, Harcourt, 1938) 219. 
eral poverty, mass production and increasing machine efficiency, and 
human self-love,86 Some Congressmen supported Tugwell with laudatory 
comments. Congressman Foulkes praised Tugwell as the scientific type, 
not obstinately tied down to old customs and institutions or flatly 
committed to any cut•and-dried philosophy of what form an ideal govern-
ment actually would take.87 Congressman Hildebrandt stated that there 
were few men in the nation b~tter equipped to take charge of the land 
program. 88 Professor John D. Black of Harvard placed Tugwell among the 
men responsible for a •major part of the thinking about effective lines 
of action •••• • in agriculture.89 Ernest Lindley wrote that the •Tug-
wellian menace• did not consist of his theories, but of his practical 
judgment and realism; he was •probably as free of dogma as any official 
in the Administration, and far less doctrinaire than many of his critics.•90 
The authors who considered Tugwell as boldly and as brightly 
active as any of the business men and politicians who opposed him may 
have exaggerated when they wrote that "the professor helped to lay for 
all time the old tradition of the foggy-eyed scholar lost within cloist• 
86. Carter, J. Franklin (Unofficial Observer), The New Dealers (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1934) 86. 
87. Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 78, Part 10, June 
11, 1934. 11088·89. 
88. Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 79, Part 4. March 
27. 1935. 4535· 
89. Ggus, John M. end Wolcott, Leon c., Public Administration and the 
United States Department £r Agriculture (Chicago, Published for the 
Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research 
Council by Public Administration Service, 1940) 66. 
90. Lindley, Ernest K., Halfway with Roosevelt (New York, Viking, 1937) 
43· 
ered walls.•·91 Exaggeration in the opposite direction was more common, 
A writer for a business journal, in what he described as an attempt to 
get the real picture which lay underneath press epithets, noted that 
he was •unable to find a single critic who has passed on the facts 
before passing on his opinions to others• about the impracticality or 
92 
academic futility of Moley, Barle, and Tugwell. The facts indicated 
that his critics would have had little reason to harp on Tugwell's 
removal from reality if he had actually been a dreamer. 
Tugwell the Poor Administrator 
Charges 
The opposition press contended that since Tugwell was primarily 
an idea man, he proved to be a fumbler as a man of action after his ale-
vation to an administrative post at the head of the Resettlement Admini-
stration.1 One commentator compared Tugwell unfavorably with Colonel 
House, who saw that a •world-remodeling tete-a-tete man• ought to avoid 
administrative jobs in order that he might have power without responsi-
bility; any worth which Tugwell's ideas contained was offset by his self-
defeating'administrstive efforts.2 George Peek recalled that matters of 
administration never worried Tugwell; he was so inexperienced in them 
91. Gillis, A. and Ketchum, R., Our America (Boston, Little, Brown, 1936) 
367. 
92. McCall, c. H., "That Columbia Crow." Credit and Financial Management, 
Vol. 35, No. 6, June, 1933, 16. 
1. Ward, Paul w., "The End of Tugwell,• Nation, Vol. 143, No. 22, Novem-
ber 28, 1936 • 
2. Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Saturday Evening 
~. Vol. 209, No. 5, August 1, 1936, 8-9· 
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that he could not comprehend the wide gap between writing something and 
doing something.3 A journalist noted that Tugwell likedto write; his 
attachment to written memoranda -- administrative orders, information, 
countermands, corrections, and advice by the bale -- slowed progress to 
a snail's pace.4 
Specific criticism of Tugwell as an executive concentrated on 
the administrative expenses of the RA. Business Week, which in March. 
1936, credited the RA with having done •an amazing amount of work.• 
noted that the agency had obligated itself for $98,500,000 of the 
.$230,419,354 available, $19.727,305, or twenty cents on every obligated 
dollar, had gone for administrative expenses, including salaries for 
13.045 employees throughout the country.5 
White House correspondence showed that the administration was 
aware of RA expenditures which provided the basis for rumors and open 
criticism. D. w. Bell, the Acting Director of the Budget, wrote to the 
President suggesting that the average salary cost of $3000 per employee 
had to be reduced; the same figure for the Veterans Administration was 
$1600,6 In January, 1936, Bell sent an anonymous memo on waste and 
extravagance in RA operations, describing it as •substantially in accord 
with some of the rumors about town;• Bell suggested the possibility of a 
complete inquiry by the Bureau of the Budget.7 The President sometimes 
3· Peek, George N. and SalllUel Crowther, Why 9.Jil.:!< Our Own (New York. D. 
Van Nostrand, 1936) 82. 
4. Bolles, Blair. •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters.• American Mercury, 
Vol. 39. No. 153, September. 1936, 85. 
5. "What's Tugwell Doing?"'• Business Week, March 21, 1936, 30. 
6. Letter, D. w. Bell to Roosevelt, August 8, 1935. Roosevelt Papers. 
7. Memorandum, D. w. Bell to Roosevelt, January 8, 1936, Roosevelt Papers. 
directed remarks on administrative confusion in the RA which came to 
the White House to Tugwell's attention;8 he complained, that regarding 
the high unit costs of Resettlement farm projects, •I do not think we 
9 have a leg to stand on,• Bell suggested that Admiral Peoples investi-
gate the subsistence homestead and suburban resettlement projects of 
the RA, as he had the construction projects of PWA and WPA, in order to 
ascertain the ·percentage or labor taken from relief rolls, the cost of 
construction compared with similar work of other government agencies 
and private enterprise, the probability of the Federal government's 
being reimbursed, and the desirability of completing specific going pro-
10 jects to full size. 
Harold Ickes recorded in his diary on November 28, 1935, that 
Tugwell, whom Ickes considered a man of •real vision and ability,• never 
should have taken the position of Resettlement Administrator. Ickes did 
not think that Tugwell was a competent executive; word came to him 
(Ickes) from various sources that Tugwell's organization was a "shambles,• 
Louis Brownlow, a Democrat and a man of social vision, as well as an 
expert on administration, had recently spoken without prejudice in con-
firming adverse reports about the RA,11 If administrative difficulties 
in the RA did not justify the verdict that Tugwell was a "better poet than 
12 
administrator,• they certainly indicated, in earning the disapproval 
B. Memorandum, s. Early to Tugwell, February 2, 1936, Roosevelt Papers. 
9. Memorandum, White House, no date, Roosevelt Papers. 
10. D. W. Bell to Roosevelt, August 15, 1936, Roosevelt Papers. 
11, Ickes, Harold L., ~Secret Diarv of Harold 1· Ickes: Part One,~ 
First One Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New York, Somon and Schuster, 
1953) 473· 
12, Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 85, 
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of Ickes and Brownlow, that the agency had yet to achieve organizational 
soundness. 
Rebuttal 
Obviously the RA required some time for the shaking-down of its 
organizational structure and the establishment of efficient administra-
tive lines. It does not seem entirely reasonable to judge a man as an 
administrator or a statesman, or his accomplishments, against an abso-
lute set of criteria without reference to the tasks which he faced, In 
his work as Resettlement Administrator Tugwell encountered difficult 
problems on two levels: (l) the RA undertook vast, diverse operations; 
(2) before the agency could carry on its work effectively it had to 
absorb, evaluate, and integrate a conglomeration of activities, of vari-· 
ous degrees of feasibility and in various stages of development, inheri-
ted from other agencies. 
In comparison with the achievements of TVA,.for example, the task 
of the Resettlement Administration appeared formidable. In trying to 
reestablish the resource base of the Tennessee Valley, TVA exhibited 
unity, integration, and excellent administration, built around the great 
dams. The RA made the same attempt in scattered, blighted areas from 
coast to coast. The reasons for its diversity, lack of integration, and 
unsettled administration were apparent. The RA fell heir to an unusual 
group of subsistence homestead projects, state rural rehabilitation cor-
porations, and "plain starvation" areas involving all kinds of people in 
every condition and situated in almost every state -- the cumulative 
wreckage of decades of neglect of resources. Its difficult, complicated, 
and very necessary task was to try to find a livelihood again for the 
• 
people of the Dust Bowl and the cut-over areas, victims of swamp drain-
age and erosion, inhabitants of exhausted mining villages, and the 
•gray, beaten• army on submarginal lands, Stuart Chase urged critics 
of Tugwell's boondoggling administration to remember that Americans, in 
their mad rush to subdue a continent, had stra~ded and broken these 
millions of people. It was neither wild extravagance nor radicalism to 
1 give them a hand and try to put them on their feet. 
One of Tugwell's detractors called the position of Resettlement 
Administrator the toughest job of administration in Washington,2 On the 
floor of the House, Maury Maverick of Texas advised his colleagues to 
consider the worthwhile accomplishments of the RA, whose work was more 
important than Tugwell; the agency had to go on with or without him 
because of the seriousness of the complex problems it faced,3 Undoubt-
edly, Tugwell's reputed influence as a Presidential advisor brought the 
RA under unusually close scrutiny; critics dramatized many administra-
tive difficulties that were incidental to combining formerly scattered 
agencies, and inherent in an operation requiring c~operation with federal 
agencies and with local agencies throughout the nation.4 
1. Chase, Stuart, Rich Land,..E2!2!: 1!w.Q. (New York, wbittlesey House, 1936) 
311-12. 
2. Johnston, Alva:, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• Seturday Evening 
Post, Vol. 209, No. 5, August 1, 1936, 9. 
3· Congressio~al Record, 74 Congress, 2 Session, March 19, 1936, 4069-70. 
4. Gaus, John M. and Wolcott, Leon C., Public (continued on next page) 
990· 
Tugwell collected into the RA various early New Deal relief 
make-shifts -- •everybody else's headaches,• as he expressed it; he 
tried to build a unified working organization and staff.5 The subsist-
ence-homestead projects often required complete reorganization and reori-
6 
entation. Some had never been occupied,? while the continuation of 
8 
others was urgently requested, In every case engineers of the Sub-
urban Resettlement Division had to investigate in order to determine 
whether the RA should accept and develop a given project.9 
Some instances of administrative and financial difficulties in 
subsistence-homestead projects were particularly messy. Some of the 
190 ready-built houses at Reedsville, West Virginia, did not fit their 
foundation; others had to be rebuilt.10 Presidential Secretary Louis 
Howe waa negotiating a contract for electricity for Arthurdale, West 
Virginia, in November, 1933.11 After Tugwell had become Resettlement 
5· 
6. 
8. 
(continued from previous page) Administration and the United States 
Department Q[ Agriculture (Chicago, Published for the Committee on 
Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council by 
Public Administration Service, 1940) 241-42. 
Lord, Russell, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
429. 
Editorial, "Tugwell to the Wolves?•, Nation, Vol. 85, No. 1099, Decem-
ber 25, 1935, 6. 
Kent, Frank R., Without Grease: Political Behavior 1934-36 (New York, 
William Morrow, 1936) 296-97. 
Letter, Congressman R. "·Wilson to Roosevelt, no date; attached to 
memorandum, M. H. Mcintyre to Tugwell, August 31, 1935, Roosevelt 
Paners. 
9· Letter, Tugwell toM. H. Mcintyre, August 31, 1935, Roosevelt Papers. 
10. Moore, Russell, Roosevelt Riddles (Garden City, N.Y •• Doubleday, 
Doran, 1936) 7-8. 
11. Telegram, Louis Howe to Col. Greer, Preston Light and Power Company, 
Reedsville, ·,,lest Virginia, November 27, 1933; Roosevelt Papers. 
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Administrator nearly two years later, the President requested the "lat-
est news about cheaper electricity for Arthurdale,•l2 The White House 
received protests that the cost of the subsistence homesteads placed 
them beyond the purchasing power of the low-income people for whom 
. 13 they ;rere 1ntended. Tugwell, testifying before a Subconnni ttee of 
the Senate Committee on Appropriations, described nine projects as 
f . "lf"l 14 " 1nanc1a a1 ures.• 
Tugwell was primarily interested in the retirement of submargi• 
nal lands and rehabilitation loans; he did not want to take over the 
work of the Subsistence Homesteads Corporation of the Department of the 
Interior. 15 Interior set up projects in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
and Tennessee for stranded miners and mill-workers, who were to farm 
three-fifths-of-an-acre plots and work pert-time in industry; Tu,~ell 
believed the projects rested on the invalid theory that industry would 
16 
move to the workers; he was simply making tr.e best of a bad job, Tug-
well's statement that he accepted the subsistence homesteads at the 
President's insistence17 corroberated Russell Lord's assertion that 
Roosevelt told Tugwell to gather together a conglomeration of relief acti-
1?, Memorandum, Roosevelt to Tugwell, May 19, 1935, Roosevelt Papers, 
13, Letter, C. D. Beebe, Kalamazoo, Michigan, to Roosevelt, October 16, 
1936, Roosevelt Papers. 
14. The Nm! York Times, May 28, 1936, 11:3. 
15. Interview .J!i1h writer. 
16. Tugwell, R, G., •cooperation and Resettlement,• Current History, Vol. 
45, No. 5, February 2, 1937, 74; Stuart Chase wrote thBt Interior had 
not worked out carefully the factor of a permanent exchange base so 
that residents could pay their cash bills, Rich Land, Poor Land, 312. 
17. Interview with writer. 
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vities.18 Apparently Tugwell had no opportunity for selection; he had 
to take the whole list into the RA. 
Some of the state projects were ill-conceived and ill-planned.19 
Their transfer to the RA entailed many administrative difficulties, 
enhanced by the pressure of time. For exsmple, the RA called on State 
Reemployment Offices for assistance in procuring qualified personnel; 
complaints were received concerning some of the practices of the latter 
20 
agencies. Tugwell explained, through the While House, that any dis-
criminations in the announcements of State Reemployment Offices were 
not intended, would be eliminated, and were due to the fact that the RA 
had to hire auditors, in this instance, in a hurry upon taking over the 
State Rural Rehabilitation Corporations,21 
The RA, in assimilating various activities, found it difficult 
to avoid duplicating the efforts of other agencies. Controversies arose 
over areas of jurisdiction. A case in point was the Land Program of the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration which the RA inherited. Tugwell 
informed the President that the National Park Service continued to admin-
ister the forty-six recreational areas involved in the FERA Land Program, 
while the RA paid the annual administrative costs of $500,000. It had 
18. Lord, Russell, ~ Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
429. 
19. Meriam, Lewis, Relief and Social Security ('!lashing, Brookin[s Insti-
tution, 1946) 286, 
20. Letter, Congressman, A. W. Summers, Texas, to Roosevelt, August 28, 
1935, Roosevelt Papers, 
21. Letter, M. H. Mcintyre to H. W. Summers, September 20, 1935, Roose-
.Y!lli Ps pers, 
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notified the Park Service of its intention to take over administration, 
expressing a willingness to retain Park Service personnel necessary to 
rounding out the plans of that agency. Tugwell was letting the Presi• 
dent know of the intentions of the RA "in case there should be some 
kind of protest from Secretary Ickes. Should such a protest be made, 
22 I suggest that he and I be aut~orized to talk the matter over,• 
While there were undeniable administrative shortcomings in the 
RA, many exaggerated charges were based on a story appearing in the 
New York Times on November 17, 1935, which stated that Tugwell employed 
12,089 people in order to create 5,012 relief jobs. This article was 
widely copied throughout the country; the correction which the ~ 
itself published never caught up with the original version. On Novem-
ber 20 the Times published Tugwell's protest in which he stressed the 
omission in the article of November 17 of information on RA Rural Reha-
bilitation activities, which then cared for 354,000 families or 1,500,000 
persons (an eventual total of 2,500,000 was expected) and provided no 
unemployment relief -- in fact, took people off relief through loans 
which would be repaid. 
The administration's reaction indicated the impact of the article. 
Jim Farley advised Presidential Assistant Marvin Mcintyre to look into 
the matter if the story were ture.23 Tugwell wrote to the President 
that the "whole affair is calculated to make me more than ever sure that 
22. Letter, Tugwell to Roosevelt, June 24, 1936, Roosevelt Papers. 
23. Letter, James Farley toM, H. Mcintyre, November 19, 1935, Roose-
velt Papers. 
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our enemies do not mean to give us a fair shake, but mean to use any 
. 24 
tactics which will serve their purpose,• He also sent to the \llhite 
House a memo on the news coverage of the Times story, and an analysis 
of editorial comment which, in most cases, used the misleading figures 
in the original article, Over one hundred papers had not printed the 
correetion.25 Roosevelt was •outraged by that rotten New York Times 
26 Story ••• a ease of deliberate misrepresentation •••• • 
The misleading charge, consisting in a comparison between the 
RA 1s administrative costs (for administrative personnel) and the number 
of its employees on relief jobs, completely ignored the fact that the 
biggest part of its program was not providing jobs; the agency put hun-
dreds of thousands of farmers on a self-sustaining basis and retired 
submarginal land, The charge was made soon after Tugwell dismissed 
about 10.000 employees who were transferred from the State Rural Rehabi-
litation Corporations and other agencies,27 He had combined forty-four 
organizations in various states into eleven regional groups, arranging 
to carry a case load of 525.000 with about 6,000 employees, as compared 
to a field force of 14,000 to handle 300.000 cases as of July 1, 1935, 
the date of transfer, Tugwell had also reduced the number of employees 
in the Land Programs of the FERA and AAA, which had been transferred to 
28 
the RA, from 3.ooo to 2.ooc. 
24. Letter, Tugwell to Roosevelt, November 26, 1935, Roosevelt Papers. 
25. Letter, Rugwell to Roosevelt, November 26, 1935, Roosevelt Papers. 
26, Letter, Roosevelt to Tugwell, November 25, 1935, Roosevelt Papers. 
27. Lindley, Ernest K,, Halfway with Roosevelt (New York. Viking, 1937) 210, 
28, Letter, Roosevelt to B. F, Irvine and M. N. Dana, ~Journal, Portland, 
Oregon, no date, in reply to letter of July 25, 1935, Roosevelt Papers. 
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In the matter of selecting clients for the subsistence-homestead 
projects, the RA ran intb a difficult social-financial situation in which 
it seemed that its actions were subject to adverse criticism no matter 
which way it turned. In general, many of the RA clients were submarginal 
themselves from age, ignorance, and ill-health; it was difficult to help 
them to a fresh start,29 The RA tried to remove many of these economic-
ally displaced people from the relief rolls into garden farming, which 
would enable them at least to feed themselves.3° For a time outright 
relief was essential to all of the RA clients, who were not unemployed 
in the sense that their need for relief would end with a job. They had 
work to do; they needed education, direction, and facilities -- the 
latter through relief grants at the outset; they required assistance in 
planning, loans for equipment, seed, and fertilizer, debt adjustment, 
and relocation on better lands.J1 The urgency of relief work character-
ized the efforts of the RA to rehabilitate nearly half a million poverty-
stricken farm families.32 
The subsistence-homestead projects exhibited financial and experi-
mental aspects which differentiated them from rehabilitation through 
loans. The administration's viewpoint was that the projects were not 
launched primarily as real-estate investments; they represented an attempt 
30• 
31. 
J2. 
Mitchell, Broadus, Depression Decade, Vol, IX of the Economic History 
of the United States (New York, Rinehart, 1947) 210. 
Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• 9. 
Meriam, Lewis, Relief~ Social Security, 297. 
Tugwell, R, G., Letter to the Editor, Nation, Vol. 142, No. 3689, 
March 18, 1936, 362, 
to combat unemployment and economic stagnation in a constructive way, 
adding to the value of rural communities as did many types of public 
works constructed with funds the government did not expect fully to 
recover. Accordingly, the administration did not judge success or fail-
ure solely by financial results. On the other hand, an outstanding 
student of relief problems maintained, the projects did not qualify as 
ordinary public works since the government laid out capital for a 
specially selected group; therefore, costs were relevant. At the same 
time, he considered selection •conceivably justifiable" in conducting 
an experiment.• 33 
If the projects were to prove successful experiments in relieving 
situations of fundamental economic displacement, and if the government 
was to reduce its expenditures in this operation as time passed, possibly 
eventually realizing a return on its investment, it had to select clients 
who indicated that they could succeed as subsistence farmers and part-
time industrial workers. The selectees cculd be neither so successful 
that they did not qualify for relief, nor so unseccussful that it appeared 
that they could not make a go of it. Aa the RA attempted to consider all 
the pertinent interrelated financial, relief, and experimental factors, 
critics accused Tugwell of racial discrimination34 and social snobbishness.35 
33· Mariam, Lewis, Relief ~ Social Security, 312-13, 
34• Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• 9• 
35• Young, James C., Roosevelt Revealed (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 
1936) 269-70; ~York Herald Tribune, November 8, 1935· 
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One commentator summarized the selection policy of excluding families 
financially able to take care of themselves, While selecting those with 
sufficient ability to justify a reasonable expectation that they would 
pay back the government, by stating that the successful candidate had 
to demonstrate that he was "below per, but not defective. If you can 
establish beyond peradventure that you are not quite all there, you can 
36 
obtain ••• a Tugwell estate •••• • Occasionally, Tugwell publicly an-
swered these accusations in detail, admitting that there might be some 
silly descriptions in the thousands of case records of the Family Selec-
tion Section.37 It seems reasonable to conclude that in consideration 
of the inherently complex nature of the problem of selection, no policy 
would have escaped criticism. 
Observations commending Tugwell as an executive were not hard to 
find, Sumner Welles referred to him as an able and far-si~hted admini-
strator,38 Two publications which did not hesitate to criticize Tugwell 
conceded that he had buckled down to his job and appeared to have done 
it fairly well;39 he had shown himself, by and large, a cautious admini-
strator,40 A participant in, snd keen observer of, developments in 
Puerto Rico, asserted that Tugwell's chief contribution there was not as 
~. 
37· 
38. 
~. 
40. 
Johnston, Alva, •Tugwell, the President's Idea Man,• 9· 
Tugwell, R, G,, Letter to the Editor, Nation, Vol. 141, No. 3677, 
December 25, 1935, 742. 
Welles, Sumner, review of The Stricken Land, Saturday Review 2t 
Literature, Vol. 29, No, 5~December 28, 1946, 9· 
"What's Tugwell Doing?,' Business Week, March 21, 1936, 29. 
•Rex in Puerto Rico,• Time Magazine, Vol. 39, No. 5, February 2, 
~~.~. 
a formulator of plans (the planning was largely done before his arrival) 
but as a political scientist who showed the islanders how to set up an 
organization and get things done,41 
In the Department of Agriculture itself Tugwell was primarily 
responsible for the brilliant selections of Hugh H. Bennett as head of 
the Soil Conservation Service42 and F. A. Silcox as head of the Forest 
Service,43 Russell Lord, whose employment in the offices of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture and of the AA Administrator44 placed him in a posi• 
tion to judge, wrote in retrospect that, as a graduate of an agricul-
tural college, he was not at first sympathetic to Tugwell's point of 
view. Lord also noted that the RA was a scene of confusion at the start. 
In the end Lord concluded that Tugwell made a substantial contribution 
to the USDA through the impact of his general approach to agricultural 
problems and through his reorganization and administration of the old-
line bureaus. And in time the RA became a strong organization,45 
46 Needs for emergency relief made pressing demands on the RA, re-
quiring the employment on its projects at great expense of relatively 
41. Hanson, Earl P., Transformation: ~Story of lll!odern Puerto Rico 
(New York, Simon and Schuster, 1955) Chapter entitled, 'Tugwell.• 
42. Brink, Wellington, Big ~: Father of Soil Conservation (New York, 
Macmillan, 1951) 83-84. 
43• Tugwell, R, G., 'Forester's Heart,• ~Republic, Vol, 102, No. 
1318, March 4, 1940. 
44. Lord, Russell and Lord, Kate, eds., Forever the Land (New York, 
Harper, 1950), 8; this citation is from a note by Russell Lord. 
45• Lord, Russell, •Governor Rex of Puerto Rico,• Common ~. Vol. 
11, No. 7, July, 1942, 224; Lord, Russell,~ Wallaces 2f Iowa, 
459-60. 
46. Tugwell, R, G,, 'Changing Acres,• Current History, Vol. 44, No. 6, 
September, 1936, 59· 
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inefficient and substandard relief labor,47 and confining approaches to 
the long-run problems of land-use48 and farm tenancy49 to experimental 
and demonstration activities. Tugwell provided an interesting descrip-
tion of his difficulties in the RA when he urged the President, in 
framing a new relief bill and in all legislation, to set up no new 
administrative organizations during the election year of 1936 because 
MY experience- and Harry's ~pkins'i-
is that it takes almost a year to perfect 
a country-wide administrative organiza-
tion and that while it is being done there 
is. political turmoil over the jobs, criti-
cisms of procedure from the field, jealousy 
on the part of old organizations which fancy 
their prerogatives are threatened, and other 
sources of irritation •••• 50 
From the creation of the RA on April 30, 1935 to the time when Tugwell 
began to groom Will Alexander as his successor in the fall of 1936 was 
slightly more than a year and a half. The time factor and Tugwell's 
apparent administrative ability in other activities such as his service 
in Puerto Rico would seem to attest that the RA was a special, compli• 
cated case in the administrative history of the New Deal. 
47. Meriam, Lewis, Relief and Social Security, 286. 
48. Tugwell, R. G., "Changing Acres,• 63. 
49. The New York Times, November 21, 1936, 10:2; November 23, 1936, 
2:7. 
50. Letter, Tugwell to Roosevelt, December 21, 1936, Roosevelt Papers. 
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Conclusion 
XV. Tu«nll's !a}lllct on the New Deal 
Introductions Intellectual and 
Administrative Contributiona 
1ooo. 
The first tvo sections of this ChaJter, •Short Runs Educative 
Function.• and •Long Runs The 'Prosressive• Nature of the Nev Deal.• 
relate. At first glance it my appear (1) that Tugwell's intellectual 
impact on Roosevelt vas educative rather than decisive because the 
Nev Daal was Prosresaive, and (2) that the New Deal was ProsressiYe 
because Tugwell's function was educative, others somehow getting the 
inside track to the Presidential ear -- the two sequences interactiq: 
to give the Nev Deal its basic character. It vill be seen that the 
first sequence vas the overridi~ one. 
Short Runt lW.ucative Function 
Introduction 
1001. 
'l'he treatment below of the two subjects, •Educative Function•· 
and "'The 'Progressive• Nature of the New Deal• indicates that a recipn• 
cal relationship between them was onl7 apparent. At first glance it may 
appear (1) that the New Deal was Progressive because Tugwell's influence 
as an educator of Roosevelt was liaited, other people somehow gettinc 
the inside track tG tke Squire's lllind, and (2) that Tul;well's influence 
as an educator of Roosevelt vas liaitei because the New Deal was Progres• 
siva, the two sequences enbancinc one another to give the New Deal its 
basic character. ID perspective, the second sequence .-rges as the 
independently decisive one. Beosevelt's basic philosoph7 of political 
aeon~ limited Tugwell's impact and accounted for the favorable response 
at Hyde Park and the White House to the alternative to conjuncture which 
•practical" men like Baruch and iieolocical Progressives like Brandeis 
presented to the Democratic candidate ana President. 
Tucwell's Influence on Roosevelt 
Tucwell's Apparent Influence • Overestimations 
Virtually all of the published o•servations which attributed to 
Tugwell a decisive influence in the determination of general New Deal 
policies flowed fraa the pens of his severest critics. Invariably, these 
statements were superficial ~neralizations based on appearances rather 
than on a knowledge of the inner structure and relationships of the Mmin-
istration. A comparatively few commentators, some of them foes, asserted 
1002. 
that ~111a influence was either limited or indecisive. 
In their references to specific programs and events, authors and 
joul'IISlists exag;ersted Tugwell'• iDfluence in two principal vays: tkey 
credited him with doing things he 4id not 401 they placed on him full 
responaibility for measures in the fo~lation of which he was an equal 
among seTeral or many, with the President IIIBking final decisions. c-
manta on Tugwell's public statements usually accepted his words as expresw 
sing the exact Tiewa of the President. Documentary eTidence discloses 
that, despite the White House practice of clearing highwleTel adminiatra-
tors' articles and speeclles, 'l'lagwell's activities as a publicist occa-
1 
sionally got htB into hot water with a disapproving President. 
Tae net effect of authors• an4 jeurnalists' estimates of Tucwall's 
role in the New Deal was to COilTey the impr8llsion tllat what was apparent 
influence was actual, that what was contributory was decisive. A stu• 
dent of the New Deal, using contemporary published statements on which 
to base his eTaluation of Tugwell'• influence, voul4 produce an OTeresti• 
mation. ObTiously, during the New Deal, enough people 4id not consider 
a Tote for RoeseTelt a vote for Tugwell te bring about Democratic defeat 
at the polls. Many people d.id, however, accept the portrayal in the 
1. White House files show that Roosevelt often checked dicests of Tuc• 
well's speeches and articles, Mearands, Early te Tugwell, undated, 
indicating the President's approval of a speech to a social workers' 
conference, May, 1934. and an article in Fortune, October, 1936, 
Roogevelt Papera. Tliere was roaa for diTergence froa White House 
TieWII within this system of review, and checks could not always 111e 
ada. 
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press of Tugwell ss the key SJ~:eeutive in the nation's capital, A. COlli• 
men opinion was typified in this letter to the editor of The New York 
The newspaper report that Professor Tugwell has been lent 
to the United states W, Col~ia University for another 
year C8llle as a shock to me, I had bean under the impres-
sion that the United States A&i been lent to Columbia Uni• 
varsity for experiments by Prefessor Tugwell,2 
In 1~43 Oswald G. Villard wrote that many reactionaries in Con• 
grass recarded TU!Yell as the real author of the New Deal, holdiuc ht. 
responsible for all aeasures which R .. sevelt took in the interests of 
the common .. n.3 La«islators vho believe4 in the 1940s that Tugwell 
was the father ef the New Deal clUB£ to the char~e which the oppesition 
presse4 in the 1~30s, especially durin& the eampai«n of 1936, Tu«vell's 
lest year in the govern.ent. 
Frank Kent indicatei in late 1~35 the line whica the opposition 
woul4 take ia the comia« election year. He stated that Tugwell, vho 
came to the capital as Assistant Secretary ef Auiculture, •officially,• 
becan as and remained a first-rank Presiaential edviser.4 In 1936 tae 
opposition stepped up the attack. In the flood of e&mJ&ign literature, 
Tuawell's critics of lOR« standin« ieclared, over and over, that he vas 
the No. 1 or, at least, the No. 2 aan in Washington. 
2. %U liD .1m Times, March 22, 19,36, IV, 9:5. 
3· Villard, Oswald G., 'Tu«vell, Puerto Rico, and Washia«ton,• Caristian 
Century, Vol. 60, No. 4, J"anuery 27, 1943, 107, 
4. Kent, Frank R., Without Grease: Political Beh!vior 1934•36 (New Yerk, 
William Morrow, 19,36) 231. 
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Blair Belles c0111111ented that • , •• soon Rexf'ori in the ~:oven-
ment 1es by leY of' becOIIlins tile GoTeruaent ;• Tusvell1 s picture of' an 
industrial society cryin& f'or control .. de Roosevelt his votary.5 
James c. Younc called Tugwell the •a of' the hour, a d011inat1nc f'igure 
6 in the administration.~ Peter Crosby asserted that Tucwell did Roose-
velt's thinkinc f'or llia,7 Alva Joanston held Tucwell mainly responsible 
f'or the Albaiaistration•s prograa; Johnston believed that the f'avorable 
verdict, •Well, any1e;y, Roosevelt lias been trying to do SOIIIethiq,• was 
•based larcely on Tucwell-inspirea measures of' the New Dea1.•8 Af'ter 
the election, Walker S, Buel of' the Clevelapd Plaip Dealer predicted 
tllat Tu&well would be the •ace of' the braintrusters• in Roosevelt's 
aeconi AdBdnistration as he was in the f'irst; Buel believed that "TU&• 
well's star blazes as 8ri&htly as ever.•9 
TUa;wwll resigned about tae same time Duel's col~ appeared, 
Buel iid not see Tua;well 1s status in perspective. The prof'essor's inf'lu• 
enoe en the President af'ter they met in 1932 was essentially educative; 
its limitation. were apparent as early as Roosevelt's f'irst presideatial 
5, Belles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of' the Regi-nters,• JaeriC!Jl Mercury, 
Vol, 39• Me, 153, Sept .. ber, 1936, 83, 
6. Younc, James c., Roosevelt Revealed (Jiew York, Farrar and Rinellart, 
1936) 419. 
7. Cres"lly, Percy L., Three Cheers for !a! !!!J!, Hell, and Reel (McLean, 
Freedoa Press, 1936) 458· 
8, Jolanston, Alva, •Tua;well, the President's Idea Man,• Saturday lt!!J!-
iY Pest, Vol. 209, No, 5, Aupat 1, 1936, 9· 
9. ~lasses Men,• ~ Mscazine, Vol. 26, No. 22, Novemier 30, 193e, 
12. 
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caapa1.p.10 After March 4, 1933, there was no Brein Trust in Washinc¥ 
ton.11 Part of the policy for the crisis Df March, 1933, Tuawell ro~ 
called., citinc Ml.lloy's !took, was • ••• tlao suppression of .Wolpla Berle 
an4 11;1self as AUiiniatratien aaaociatea,•12 What influence Tugwell uti 
at the White House was ieclininc steadily lty 193513 ~¥ a year before 
his critics criea mere leualy than ever that he was the meet powerful 
New Dealer. 
A few eltservera d14 not consider Tuawell the author of the Nev 
Deal. c-ntiq on his resipatien, The Nation notei that lle was not 
• ••• in a position within the adadnistration to get much accomplishei.~l4 
In 1938 Frank Knox 4eclarei that •all the sa~called conspirators•· were 
subor4inates to the deairea, aias, and purposes of one man; only tho 
Presiiont vas to blame for the New Deal.15 Knowingly or otherwise, 
Knox vas essentially correct. 
Reporters of the Washincton scene sometimes inaccurately, ltut 
with honeat intentions, associate& Tu&voll with policy-makinc llecisions. 
Tucwsll appeared at some hi&A~level conferences as an observer. His 
contriBution to other conferences somett.es consisted in sucgestins .. n 
10. See below, Section, •The 'Progressive' Nature of the New Deal.• 
11. See above, Chapter VIII, 
12. Tu&voll, R. G., •'l'lle Preparation of a President.• Westera Pelitical 
o"•rterlr, Vol. 1, No. 2., 1une, 1948, 145• 
13. See above, Chapter X, Sections, •The Two New Deals,• •Tae Undiatri~ 
butri l'rofita '!.'ax,• "'l''eaipation,• 
14• :Uitorial, ~ Nation, Vol. 143, No, 22, November 28, 1936, 616. 
15. Knox, Frank, ~ PlalllU!i .D. Iii!. !AI. (New York, LGngmans, Green, 
1938) viii. 
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in the universities whose ideas misht interest the President.l6 His 
lleinc •·in and around• •n:r discuseiQJUI in which he was not a partici-
pant complicated the reporters' task.17 
Several observers, includin~ the usually authoritative Ernest 
K. Li,n4ley, assiped to Tugwll the preparation of a plan for sta'Diliz• 
in& the dollar.18 Tu!well'a only connection with monetary matters was 
to brine certain prafessora, such as James Hervey Rogers of Yale, to 
the White Houae.19 His views on currency aajustments differed from the 
policies which the Mainistration ailoptn.20 He recelle4, •r ll!lS ex• 
eluded from actual deciaion~kin& in financial matters, as policy ll!lS 
adopteui in early New Deal days.•21 (Hie ideas on fiscal as well as cur-
rency policies were not sought.) 
A Washington corresponaent reported that Tugwell helped draft the 
Mainistration•s power pro~raa.22 Tugwell explained his connection with 
policy-JEkin& in the power f'ieU. 'l'lae President invited Tug-ll te sit 
16. See above, Cllapter IX, Section, "Errand Boy ... 
17. Interviey .ll!llA write£1 ~11, of' course, haa -DY pri'Vlllte conver-
sations with the PresUent, aeeiac him about once a week on USDA 
matters; undoubtedly Tuswell brought up subjects other than a~ri• 
culture; Roosevelt's listeniD« aid not necessarily involve agree• 
ment, as some journals taplied, as in Tille Map.zine, Vol. 23, No. 
26, June 25, 1934, 11. 
18. Lindley, Ernest K,, •war on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Magazine, 
Vd, 94, No. 5, November, 1933, 26/u Flynn, John T., The Roosevelt 
!ltlA (New York, New York, Devin•AU.ir, 1948) 6. 
19. Interview with writer. 
20. See above, Chapter IX, Section, "MGnetary Views.• 
21. Tugwell, R. G., •Tke Camproaiainc Roosevelt,• Western Political 
QU.rterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953. 334· 
22. Finney, Ruth, Scripps-Howard staff writer, newspaper clippiq, April 
12, 1936, Tugwell Pnert. 
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in as an observer at a conference with the Federal Power Cemmissioners 
at Warra Sprincs; after the conference Roosevelt, with Tugwell seated 
beside hilll, answered reporters' question, ending each remark with tlle 
query, •Isn't that right, Rex?•; Bex•a affil'lll8.tive replies were his 
contribution to the for.Qlation of power policies.23 Tugwell's pres• 
ence at a conference in New York City in January, 1933, between the 
President and Interstate Ca.aerce Camaissioners JOseph B. Eastman and 
Charles D. Mahaffie, resulted in the iaplication, for which there ~s 
no factual basis, that he had s~thing to do with the determination of 
policies on railroada.24 
In its issue of JUDe 19, 1933, ~ listed Tugwell as a delegate 
to the International Econamic Conference. He did not go to London. It 
is true that Tugwell participated in the preparations for the Confer• 
ence, acting primarily as Moley's assistant.25 An example of exaggera~ 
tiona in the press of Tugwell's influence. through hazy reporting of 
specific events, occurred durinc the campaign of 1936. Blair Bolles 
wrote that Tugwell's ideas had DOt changed "during the period in which 
political discretion has been resu.ed for tactical reasons.•26 Bolles 
seemingly illlplied that Tugwell was a political tactician. At best, the 
report was cenfuaina; an4 incomplete. It vas JUles A.. Farley and the 
23. Interview with writer. 
24. J'uesa, Claude M., JOseM ll• liiutmn (New York, Colwabia University 
Press, 1952) 192. 
25. See above, Chapter VII. Section, "The London Economic Conference.• 
26. Bolles, Blair, •The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 86. 
1008. 
President who decided to silence Tugwell; the latter desired to apeak 
out in the campaign.27 The &ist of Bolles• report, the prediction that 
Tugwell would continue to regiment the nation in the next four years 
provell wron&• 
Tugwell Jarticipated in the discussion or formulation of several 
major pieces of le&islatioa. His critics translated participation into 
full responsibility -- an authoritative final check on various proposals. 
Blatrr·Bolles asserted that the NIRA bill did not &O to Con~~;ress until 
Tugwell 'had JJIIIde his critical e!JIIIndations of the text.• 28 The NIR Act 
really represented a reconciliation of several schools of thought. Tug-
well was one member of one achool.29 
According to Richard larry, the AA Act had to lll!et with Tugwell's 
final approval.3° As in the case of the NIB Act, Tugwell was neither 
the originator of the basic idea of the AA Act nor the sole drafter of 
the bill. A writer for a business journal stated that there was •noth-
ill& farther fl'Oil the truth' than the claim that Tugwell wrote the AA 
Act alaost alone1 at least fifteen men were in constant touca with tae 
President on the bill.31 Bolles and others made the specific alle .. tion 
that Tugwell fathered the processi~~&-tax clause of the AA Act.32 The 
27. See above, Chapter XI. 
28. Bolles, Blair, 'The Sweetheart of the Regt.enters,• 86. 
29. See above, Chapter X, Section, •The AAA ••••' 
30. lilarry, Richard, Th'M .§!AI -~ ( In.Uanapolis, Bllbbs-Merrill, 1936) 
82. 
3lo 
32· 
McCall, c. H., •That Coluabia Crew,• Credit and Financial Management, 
Vol. 35, No. 6, June, 1933. 17. 
Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 83; Block, M., 
ed., Current Biography, .!2.11! (New York, H. w. Wilson, 1941) 875• 
100'). 
processing-tax was the idea of lev,rers, especially certain lecal a4Tis• 
era in the Chaaber of Cammerce.33 
Tugwell's interest in conservation and the actiYities of the 
Resettlement A4ainiatration were the bases for exa&gerations of ais 
authority. »ollea noted that ~11 suggested the CiYilian Conserva-
tion Corps.34 Roesevelt had seaething like the CCC in mind when he was 
Governor of New York.35 A. Bu I2r5 '!'1m, correspondent rell!lrked that 
Tugwell receiTM " ••. virtual carte blanche to initiate a series of 
novel social programs to improve the standard of rural living.•36 The 
RA.'a subsistence hoaesteads, to ~ich the Times msn referre4 were not 
novel witll that agency, haYing been inherited frOlll the Department of the 
Interior. Arq r;ranting by the President of a • carte blanche" was done 
with a &enuine interest ia, ani extensive knowledge of, rural proble ... 37 
Tugwell was able to implement his ideas only when they found Presiden-
tial favor. 
It has been noted that the principal reason for the efforts of 
the press to discredit Tucw-11 was the food and drugs bill of 1933 0 cal-
led the ·~11 Bill.•38 Tuc¥811 did not write this legislation; ae 
sponsored it under the un~blicizei aegis of the President.39 
33· 
34· 
.35· 
.36. 
37· 
.38. 
39· 
See above, Chapter XII, Section, •The Constitution.• 
Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• 83. 
See abOTe, Chapter X, Section, "Tucwell ami Natural Resources."' 
Phillips, Cabal, "The New Dealers • Where A.re They Now?,• New York 
'l'i•s Magazine, SepteJIIber 29, 1946, 52. 
See above, Chapter X, Section, "'l'u&wall and the P'armer.•-
See above, Chapter XI. 
See abe~ve, Chapter X, Section, •The Pure Food and Drugs Bill.• 
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The press compounded its erronews creation of a pawerful Tu&• 
well by treating his statements as if they e&Bnated froa the White House. 
Reporters calle4 Forrest Davis' interview with Tugwell in late January, 
19.33, a conversatian which Tugwell thought was off the record., an author-
itative, prophetic outline of the incoaing administration's boonde~ling 
policies.40 When the interview appesrei on front pages across the nation, 
Tugwell was an exceedingly embarrassed young man. He recalled how ae 
••• incautiously confided to Mr. Forrest Davis of Scripps-
Howarcl, and to 71V confusion and caacrin it was plastered 
over front paces everywhere. It was not 71V first lesson in 
the irresponsibilities ia public life; but it vas the most 
embarrassing one. I was still merely an academic Roosevelt 
attache without writ or title. Ray Moley went to Wana 
Springs and "fixed• it with our principal. But to this day 
I blush when I think of 7SV naivety and brashness.41 
Private persons, followin8 the lead of the press, considered Tug• 
well's words in another private conversation, with Ja111es H. Rand., Jr., 
in late February, 19.33 1 •positive assurance• and •authoritative inside 
information• regarding Roosevelt's plsns.42 The aaandonment of the gold 
standard which Tugwell predicted to Rand did take place -- as a res,..se 
to superieflstionary pressures. Both ovel'lihelming deflation and the 
administration's reaction to it were factors over which Tugwell had no 
control.43 
40. 
41. 
42. 
4J. 
See above, Chapter X, Section, •Tugwell and the Two New Deals.~ 
Note , Tugwell Paper•. 
Sulliwn, Lawrence, Prelude 12 Panic: The Story of the Bank HolidaY 
(Washington, Statesman Press, 1936) 99; See above, Chapter VI, for 
Rand's activities. 
See above, Chapter VI. 
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The appearance of The Industrial Discipline in the spring of 
1933 provided, Tugwell's critics maintained, an aid to the understand-
ing of New Deal legislation, since Tugwell was, they alleged, respons-
ible for the origin and direction of the stream of diversified bills 
pouring through Congress. "This is 111erely another example,• a Credit 
AD4 Financial Man&l'ment author concluded, •of the puerile reasoning 
applied to anything and everything ••• Tugwell 
••• 
may do,•44 
On October 24, 1934, Tugwell expressed his long-run views on 
international traae in a speech in Rome. Tugwell spoke, in accordance 
with Cordell Hull's preference, as an individual. The press, as 
Roosevelt predicted, assumed that the address contained the President's 
views. Docwnentary evidence discloses that the White House would have 
been happy if Tugwell had not spoken.45 
On October 28, 1935, Tuiwell made a political speech to the 
Democratic State Central Committee in Los Angeles. Newspapers head• 
lined his brief discussion of fiscal matters. A campaign diatribe of 
1936 referred to the California address as • ••• the most startling 
speech made thus far by anyone having a responsible official position 
and enjoying such great presidential favor ••••• 46 Documentary evidence 
refutes the assertion that Tugwell spoke for the President. In a long 
letter to Roosevelt he stated that he was •terribly disturbed" that his 
44• McCall, c. H., •That Columbia Crowd,• 17. 
45. See above, Chapter III, Section, "Tugwell's Long-Run Thinking.• 
46. Desvernine, Raoul, Democratic Despotism (New York, Dodd, Mesa, 
1936) 101. 
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fiscal references embarrassed the President. Tugwell went on to explain: 
I still don't understand why it should have happened in 
view of what I actually said, its context, etc. Of 
course, the news reports must have perverted its meaning. 
What I actually said was only an incidental part of a 
speech in which I made the strongest plea I could fer 
progressive unity under your leadership • 
• • • 
Dealing with the fiscal part in very few words, I 111ade no 
predictions and used no official figures. I said that ~ 
own calculations showed most of the present fearsome talk 
to be allsurd ••• takiD& ltbat anyone know • • •• This was 
so incidental in ~ speeca that I vas taken by surprise 
that it should be lifted out. 
Anyway, I am embarrassed beyond telling that it should have 
been thought any kind of a prediction or official estt.ate. 
I guess the mistake was to use any figures • 
••• 
I have a great number of thin~ to report. I hope you 
don't think llecause of this mistake that I'm untrustworthy. 
Good intentions are no excuse I know. llut anyway I claim 
them. 
Tugwell covered the letter with a note to Margaret Le Hand: 
Dear Missy. 
Will you give the enclosed to the President •••• I'a 
scared to come home in view of what the newspapers have 
done to - agaiD. lilut really everything is not so bad. 
Thanks. 
Re:x47 
47. Letter, November 1, 1935, from Grana Canyon National Park, RooaeM 
velt Papers. 
Press treatment of Tugwell's words, in view of the reel situation, 
justified Louis Hacker's conclusion that conserTative critics gave the 
"'sometimes unguarded antl often airily delinred• statements of New Deal 
theoreticians much greater sigaificance thaa was intended; Hacker refer-
red specifically to HUgh 1chnsoa and Tugwell.48 Tugwell himself wrote 
to the President, in ~at, 1937• 
Titers was a time, now happily past, when everything I said 
was t.mediately attri~ted te you. That cramped DW style 
1110re tilan you now; and it causet you, I am sure, e lot 
-re embarras8118nt than you let on.49 
Apparently neither Tusvell nor Roosevelt took exaggerations in 
the press of Tusvell's influence seriously; that is, their ideas on tileir 
relative positions ditl not chan~. Roosevelt did not consider Tusv-11 a 
threat to Presidential authority. Tugwell looket1 upen himself as a 
aerTant. His words of apelOCY antl explanatioD were not those of the 
power hehind the President which the press described to the public. 
Tugwell's Actual lDfluence 
The President and the Professors 
Assertions that Tugwell was a powerful figure in the Aiministra• 
tion often attri~te4 his alle~ei influence to his intellectual 4amina• 
tiOD of the President. FraRMarch, 1932, until March, 1933, Tugwell's 
function in the Roosevelt circle was, it is true, primarily an intellec-
tual one. He presented his own views, as well as general data, on 
48. Hacker, Louis, A Short Histor:y .2f. ill& New 1l!A!. (New York, F. s. 
Crofts, 1936) 108. 
49· Letter, August 26, 1937, Rooaevelt Efpers. 
national problems, especially those in agriculture, to the De~cratic 
nQJilinee and President-elect. .Af'ter March 4, 1933, Tugwell was mere an 
aiministrator than an 'idea man.• Declarations that his thinkin& dete~ 
ined Roosevelt's both before and after the inanguration assumed, of 
course, that the 81Uire of &rae Park lacked sufficient intellectual back• 
ground and substance to enable hta independently to accept or reject 
the ideas which his professor-advisers presented to him. 
Frank Kent, tn July, 1933, stated that Tugwell was responsible 
for the administration's major aeaaures -- a program of which Roosevelt 
'had no idea• on March 4, 19331 Tugwell's Article, 'Tae Ideas behind the 
New Deal, .. in :!:M ~ York T'•• Mtpzipe ef July 16, 1933• revealed him, 
in Kent's opinion, as the real leader of the :Brain Trust1 'l'u€well saw 
his dr- realized as the Presiiient adopted his ideas.1 In his column 
ef March 27, 1935, Kent noted. that Keyaes, Lal"ellette, Norris, and Tuc-
2 
well •changed' the President into a spender. The reference to three 
men besides Tu«V&ll diluted the intellectual influence with which Kent 
credited the professor in 1933• 
of the Brain Tcwsters• ideas. In 1934 Lawrence asserted that the Brain 
Trust controlled the making of lavs,3 In 1936 Lawrence found Tugwell, 
1. Kent, Frank R., Without Gloves (New York, William Morrow, 1934) 44-
45• 
2, Kent, Frank R., Without Grease (Hew York, William Morrow, 1936) 121. 
3· Lawrence, David, Beyond the ~ Deal (New York, Whittlesey House, 
1934) 205. 
•the true author of moat of the New Deal principles of the last three 
years,• more daainant than eTer.4 
The meat puelicized camment on TYsvell 1s position was Dr. Williaa 
Wirt 1s char&• in 1934 taat RooseTelt, the Kersnsky of the Nev Deal, 
would eTentually CiTe way to Tucvell, the Lenin of the new American raTO• 
lution.5 Wirt reported the reply of some New Dealers when he inquired 
shy the President could not see throulh the reTolutionariea' scheme: 
•we are on the inaide, we can control the avenues of influence. We can 
.. ke the President belieTe that ae ia reachin& decisions for hiEself.•6 
Wirt c81lclulied that, •Mr. Roesenlt thinka only what these men tell Ilia 
and accepts their deciaions without queation,•7 
Alva Joanston of~ Sat!UjaY ETening Post ranked. Tugwell end Ctl. 
House as the two refol'llers of the last twenty-five years who had great 
influence at the White House. Beta, posaeasiDg ne political following, 
relied on capturin& the tmecination of the President througa hypnotic 
persuasiveness in tete-a•tetes. Tucw-ll 1s influence, Johnston eoaerved, 
was •prtound," accountinc for tae chaDr;es in RoeseTelt since 1932,8 
other critica of Tucwell carried the tale of his intellectual da.-
4• Celuan in the 1!J! I!!U .§!!A, May 11, 19)6, cited ey Senator J. G. Tovn• 
send, Jr., Del., in Copcretsion•l Btcorli, 74 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 
80, Part 9. JUDe 16, 1936. 9530•31. 
5. See aeoTe, Chapters XI and XII. 
6. Younr;, James c., Rooaenlt RaTosle!l ( Nev York, Farrer and Rinehart, 
1936) 147. 
7. Villard, oa-ld. G., • Issues and Men: The Coamunistic Brain Trust,• 
2kA N&tigp, Vol. 138, No, 3587, April 4, 1934, 377• 
8, Jelmston, Alva, •Tu&vell, the Presiclent 1s Iclos Man,• SaturclaY Eyuioc 
Post, Vol. 209, No. 5, August l, 1936, 8, 
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ination during Roosevelt's first term into the 1940s. Blair Bolles 
listed the intellectual writers who defined New Deal doaocracy -- spend-
iq, expertise, and centralization; accorcl.in& to iolles, Frankfurter, 
Wallace, Jer011111 FraDk, Hei'IIIIUl Oli)lumt, ThUl'Diln Arnold, ana Tugwell were 
the 
••• philosophers who proaptei Franklin Roosevelt to cliab 
a political peak in Darien and drove him to exploration tar 
into the new world they aao¥8d aia.9 
Tile trust-waters, ArnoU, Frankfurter, and Oliphant, and Tucwell could 
not bave described this new world in siailar ter.a. 
In 1944 Joaeplt. i. El7, a conservative Massachusetts DeiiiGcrat, 
recalled that Raeaevelt did not fellow the platform which •the creat 
De1110cratic Part7 of 1932" presentecl te ilia. He followed the plans ef 
Wallace, Tu«vall, and Ickes. El7 referred to Tugwell as •·a youns -n of 
ideas, politicallT unknown until ••• he began to plan the sort of prograa 
which the De1110cratic P*rty should adopt ••••' Tugwell and •a few others• 
10 framed the lesislation which stamped tile New Deal for what it really was. 
Saae of the commentators who attributed t.portant intellectual 
influence on the President to the •rata Trust, and to Tugwell in particu-
lar, were not, as were Kent, Lawrence, Johnston, end Bolles, unyieldins 
critics of the New Deal. c. H. McCall, who protested aaainst inaccurate 
9. 'Bolles, Blair, •Prose and Political Writers in the New Deal,• 
§atu£4ay Reyiew, Vol. 21. No. 23, March 3, 1940, 3• 
10. JO.y, 1oseph •·• The .Derigap Dreg (Boston, B. HUlllphries, 1944) 
172-177. 
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seneralizations about the Brain Truat 0 maintainei that Moley, Berle, 
ani Tugwell exertei •a definite influence in the sha~ing of economic 
~olicies •••• ••11 The French historie iernarcl Fay noted., in 1935, tlaat 
Tugwell was in less close contact vita the Presicl.ent than Moley but 
exerted a more forceful influence; tor six years, Fay commented, Tus• 
wall haci. been announcing and predicting in his books what was later to 
become, with si~Qificant practical mo4ifications, RooseTelt's creed.12 
Francis P. Miller stateci. that the Brain Trust exercised the policy• 
•king function which the political ~rtiea bad ne1lected.13 Miller's 
ebserTStion suggests that, perhaps like the Church's absorption of 
ciTil functions in the political Tacu~ after the fall of the Raman 
Empire, the ExecutiTe Branch's daainstion ot policy-making in 1933 
resulted from legislatiTe and party default rather than usurpation by 
the Brain Trust. 
Some of Tugwell's friends were among the obserTers who credit&& 
him with &i~Qificant White House influence. In August, 1932, Henry Wal• 
lace wrote George Peek that Tugwell kai the inside track at HYde Park 
on econoaic mattera.14 Haroli Ickes caaplaineci. in his diary, under tke 
date of Marek 25, 1933, that Tug¥811 was closer than tke ca8inet to tke 
ll. 
12. 
J.4. 
McCall, C. H., "That Celwabia Crow,• Credit and Financial Ma:nae;e-
BRQi, Vol. 35, No. 6, June, 1933, 16. 
Fay, Bernarll, ReoseTelt and His Allerica (Boston, Little, llrewn, 
1933) 252. 
Miller, Francis P., The Blessings 9f. Liberty (Chapel Hill, Uninr-
sity or North Carolina Press, 1936) 83. 
Sullhan, Lawrence, Prelude 1.!! Panic: The Story of the Bank Holi• 
m (Washington, Statesman Press, 1936) 22, 
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White House.l5 In May, 1936, Ickes recorded a conversation he hai with 
Charles E. Merriam, a member of the National Resources Beard; Merriaa 
c011111ented that un like Moley, ~11, and Frankfurter l!lad kept away 
from the President older and more experienced men like Harold Moultoa 
of the Brookins• Institution and Professor Dodds of Princeton, who 
earlier were disposed to support Roosevelt but were now critical af tl!le 
Administration; Ickes noted that it was only his own efforts which put 
Merriam and Wesley c. Mitchell on the National Resources Executive 
16 Comaittee. 
In the 1940s at least two auirers of Tugwell placed hila in a 
very influential position as of 1933· In 1946 Sumner Walles called him 
•one of the two or three individuals most responsible for the shapina 
17 
of the original New Deal.~ In 1947 Russell Lord wrote, concerning The 
Ipdustrial Piscipline: 
••• the -ook clearly predicts. with occasional fatalistic 
premenitions of futility, such self-policing of industry 
and agriculture, in turn policed by the Government, as has 
since been tried in the Unite4 States.l8 
SGae of the caaaentators who stressed Tugwell's influence in the 
White House contradicted themselves by also making statements which depre• 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Ickes. Harold L., Iru!, Secret Diaa .!f. Harold 1.• Ickes; htl_ Qmt, IaA 
First Thwsp!l .J:l!D., 1'133-1236 (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1953) 
9· 
Ickes, Harold L., ~ §ecrat Pial'Y RL Harold I.• Ickes; ht1W• 610. 
Walles, Sulllner, review of :!l\!, Stricken Land, in Setur4ay Review, Vol. 
29, No. 52, December 28, 1946, 9· 
Lord, Russell, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
318. 
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ciated the tapact or TUgwell's thought on the Presidential mini. In 
January, 1935, Frank Kent, who rrequently rererred te TUgwell as a pGv-
errul figure, explained •chanses• in Roesevelt's ideas and policies as 
being due to the influence or several progressive Republicans in the 
Seute and in tile Callinet, Keynes, ani Tugwll; he ascribei the chanps 
to •the combination of all these ele111ents rather than to cme.• 19 In 
May, 1935, Kent rejected as err the target wholesale attacks on the 
Administration by the opponents of the NRA; the New Dealers and Eraia 
Trusters •were all subordinates;• the apposition could not place respaDB-
1\Iility for 4ecisions anCl lllistakes •upon any a:roup or aClviaer.• 20 
Bernard Fay, Blair Bolles, an4 Harold Ickes entangled themselves 
in contraiictions silllilar to Kent'•• Fay, who 4eclareCl that TUgwell's 
8ooks announced RoGSevelt 1s program during the six years before 1933, 
emphasized Maley's screening function; Meley "'filterect• TUgwell's ideas 
ani, with other Brain Trusters, 'llalenced, controlled, and compensateCl'' 
Tugwell's iafluence.21 Bolles observei that Tugwell was ss •charmed' 
by Roosevelt's experimental approach as tile latter was impressei by Tus• 
well's economic ideas.22 Ickes, in 1936, noted in his diary: 
I am be&inning te~~ hear that las jjeosevelii is too sure or 
himself ••• and less ani less willing to seek or take advice 
rroa competent men. TGI a lltaiaishing extent does he conrer 
19. Keat, Frank R., Without Grease, 54•55· 
20. Kent, Frank R., Without Greaae, 142. 
21. Fay, Bel'IIS.rd, Rotsevelt .l!li Hia •yriea, 252•53• 
22. Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Regimenters,• !Dericap M!r-
~· Vol. 39, No. 153, September, 1936. 
witll 118n of sullataace and standins. He's surreundiDS 
llillself with 118n like Moraentltau, Hopkins, and Tqwell, 
plus a lot of lesser li&llta.23 
1020. 
Ickes• statement implied that RooseYelt, in his feeling of self•confi• 
deaee, kept •yes men•' a'llout hilll, 
Por eYer, assertion that Tu&vell sinsle-handealy wrote the AAA ana 
the NRA there was a state .. at te the contrary. Re~r41ac other specific 
•asures, some obseners deniecl '1'\a&well'a iafluence or procila~cl ltis 
defeat. John T, Plyna concludecl that the NRA •represented aliiKlst entirely•' 
the influeace of \11& \lusiness MDI pn>fessors had a "'microscopic• ahara 
24 in ita paternity. AB authority on J.erican a~ricultural policy con• 
clucled that the AAA was not the work of radicals, impractical idealists, 
or cellese professors; hsrU•IIitten practitioners, many politically con• 
aerYatiYe, had cleYeloped the concept af parity and the principle of acre• 
ase reatriction ~ 1928.25 
A lliesrapltical sketch of TU«vell, pulllished in 1941, noted that he 
opposecl internaticmalilllll as a foreisn pol\cy, ar~ed for very rapii ex• 
penditure of pu\llic worlcs apprepristiona, and foupt for consumer protec• 
tioa in the NRA. ·- and was •iefeated on all sceres.• 26 Joseph Alsep and 
Rebert Kintner referrei to Hull's defeat of Moley, Peek, and T~well on tile 
Ickes, Harol4 L., The Secret Diarx .2t Harold 1• Ickes; Part .Qu. 46. 
Plyna, John T., •Whese Cll.ild Ia tll.e NRA?,• Harper's Magaziu, Sept...,. 
ller, 1934, 394 1 cited in Pal"llltlee, Maurice, Farewell 1£ Ponrtr (New 
Yerk, John Wiley, 1935) 28n. 
Pita, Gilbert c., Geerce J!• Peek an4 the !!!lll for Farm Parity (Ner-
IIISll, University Gf Oklslloma Press, 1954) 222, 
Block, M., eli., Current BiH1'!,phr, !2il (New York, H. w. Wilson, 1941) 
875· 
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questien of international•traae policy.27 Charles A. Beari descrihe4 a 
conversation, about the President-elect's acceptance of the Stt.son Doc-
trine for the Far East, between Roesevalt and Moley an4 Tugwell, • ••• 
wham he lla4 not consulted altout hia c~t111ent prior to his actien.• 28 
The President-elect rejected the two Brain Trusters' iieas on Far Easter. 
A nuaher of estimates of Tucwall'a ceneral status did not square 
with Frank Kent's and Blair Bolles' ~sciviugs that a Roosevelt Tictory 
in 1936 vouli find ~11 more powerful than ever. Robart Sherwoo4 
stated, in a Pulitzer-prize•vinniaa ltiearaphy, that after the 1934 alec• 
tiona, aJIIOil& Presidential advisers, Harry Hopkins' star was •now definit• 
ely in the ascendant.• 29 In survaya~·at the New Deal era, Frederick 
Allen and Henry M. Robinson, in a~at identical words, ebserved that Dy 
1931> Tu&well no loaaar atooti near •the throne.•3° 
Editorial comment in periodocals as different as Business Week and 
the Nay RePUblic repudiate4 allesations that Roosevelt's professorial 
advisers contrelled his thinkinc. Ju!ineaa !t!£ aaserted that the Presi• 
dent's •c1asaro0111 callinet• c-nied his •ear but not his decisions;"' 
27 • 
28. 
Alsop, J. and KintDer, R., trrican White Paper• The StorY of AI!!!!D.-
.all Dhl!!!!!!ICY AU .!U, Seconj jorl!l l!J: (New Yark, S~n and Schuster, 
1940) 875· 
lleari, Charles A., Alllerictn Foreip Policy in the Maki!UI:, 1932•1'140 
(Mev Haven, Yale university Preas, 1946) 142. 
Shervooi, Ro'l>ert E., Roosevelt anQ Hopkins (New York, Harper, 1948) 
64-'5· 
Allen, Fre4erick L., Since Yesterday (New York, Harper, 1940) 241; 
Ro'l>inaon, Henry M., Fantastic Interil! (New York, Harcourt, 1943) 278. 
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acaieraiciaus cUi uot iomiDate JilooseTelt; they prorldeol hia with •racts 
ani Droai conclusions which he accepts or rejecta.•31 The New RepuDlic 
saw no eTidence that tb.e President eYer took the prot'eesors' advice --
•either collectively, since their was no collective PrQgraa, or inaiviiu• 
ally;• the de~ee to which RooaeTelt•s policies departed froa Tucwell's 
ideas was •patent to every ODssrYer not Dlinied by Tory hi&h bloed pres• 
sure.•32 Karla Leekar. a pro-Rooaeyelt author. declared that Roosevelt 
did not relinquish c0111plata control of any area of soveruaent to suDordi• 
nates; ia tae area of agriculture Wallaee, Tu&well, Peek. and Ezekiel were 
• constantly at his desk at his request •• ..33 
Ill the lilht of the Taryins estimates of professorial influence in 
the Vl:lite House D:y toea. frienda. and c0111peratively neutral observers. the 
comments of the two .oat t.portant professors themselves on their iutel-
lectual relatiouship vita the Presiient .. rit consideratiou. Moley maie 
a brief refereuce to RooaeTelt's manner ot 1118ntal activity. iudicatins 
that the professors• fUilction was an e4ucative one -- RooseTelt aaae the 
final decisions. Moley explaiaei how the Preaiieat. showia8 •astoniahin&• 
energ and Titality and aa 'lu&ziq"' illterest in thinss. skippei and 
DOUDeeol throu&h seeminsly intricate subjects. Re sot IIIElst of his info~-
tion fl'OIII. talkill8 to people. stor1Jl8 awy the •net"' of eacl!t conTeraatioa. 
•The Jlraiu Trust,"' Buaiaess Week, March 22, 1933. 16. 
Editorial, "Tugwell to the WelTes?,• New Republic. Vol. 85, No. 10,9, 
Dec~er 25, 1935, 186. 
Leoker, Earle, The Alleris:aa !!z: Franklin RooseTelt 1a Actien (New 
York, John Day, 1933) 297. 
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Roosevelt's approach to many su8jects at various levels throu~ the 
Socratic method seemecl • ••• to give Tu.cwell some worries because he 
wants people to show familiarity with pretty elementary ideas.• Maley 
considered Roosevelt's nonwdo,.atiam a virtue in 1932 and 1933; Hoover, 
full of information and dosmaa, was •taprisoned" by his knovledge.34 
Maley's account of his reaction to Roosevelt's apparent adoptiaa 
in January, 1933, of Stimson's views on the Far East indicated that he 
and Tugwell understood frcm the outset who had the last vori in the 
Roosevelt circle. Before takin& up the question of Far Eastern policy 
with the President-elect, Maley wondered whether a psssible reason for 
Roosevelt's stand was a desire to prove to Maley that the next President 
was • ••• dependent on no one kind of advice, or no adviser at all •••• ?• 
Moley, • ••• God knew, required no such proof .35 •••• 
Durin& Tugwell's government career he did not comment on the 
intellectual aspects of the relationship between the President and his 
professor advisers. He usually devote4 his in-service articles and 
speeches to current problelllB. In 19.35, in an article, Tugwell did refer, 
in a ne~tive way, to the question of ultimate responsibility for the 
Roesevelt Adlllinistration"s 111easurea, declaring that the New Deal was not 
an •aca4emic brainstora;• "••• no group of pallid professors ensctei ita 
Ein features.•36 Arter Tugwell's returned to the academic world in 1946 
34• Maley, Raymond, After Seven Years (New York, Harper, 1939) ll. 
35· Mltley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 95· 
36. Tugwell, R. G,, •'!'he Pror;ressive Trailition,• The Atlantic Monthly, 
Vo~. 155, No. 4, April, 1935, 409• 
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he wrote at length aaout the function of the professors who played a 
part in the Calllpaip and later enjoyed access to the White House. 
Tugwell's recollections in 1953 of the campaign of 1932 indicated 
tmat the results of the efforts of the professors -· Moley, Berle, and Tu&-
well -· largely appeared, in a D&aic sense, in Roosevelt's phraseoloiY• 
The Democratic candidate often su..arized information with which the pro• 
fesaora provided him in phrases whicll they suggested. When •Mr. Roose• 
velt sometimes spoke with the voice ot a learninc we made available 0 "'37 
he employed the professors' work and words for detailed illustration of 
general views which he held before lle Mt the IIISn from Collllllbia. Tug• 
well disclat.ll any transfol'llinc Ulpact on Roe~sevelt's basic ideas. He 
took •no pride'' in the candidate's ue of his data and vocabulary; 'The 
creation was not ours. We were •rely the lllicildlemen of modernilllll ••••• 38 
In aJlY event, Tugwell concluded, Roosevelt's victory in 1932 was not the 
result of the Democratic candidate's intellectual appeal.39 
Frea the becinning Tugwell was aware that Roosevelt made final 
decisions on policy in the invisible recesses of his own mind, according 
to his own criteria. The candidate and President, who ws not, in Tug-
well's opinion, up to his cousin Theodore in the use of words, did emple,y 
a number of speech-writers with li tersry talent; "This is not to say that 
37· Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 4· 
38. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthocl.oxy of ••• Roosevelt,• 4• 
39• Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of ••• Roosevelt,• 20. 
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the policies they LRoosevelt's speecheAf expressed were anyone else's, 
for they were not ••••• 4° 
In an interestin~ psychological observation, Tugwell traced Roose-
velt's refusal to delegate responsiDility for final decisions to others, 
from whom he eagerly sought information and opinions, back to the Presi-
dent's boyhood, While Roosevelt's children apparently suffered from 
the domination of en over-protective grandmother, Franklin did not let 
his mother Sarah get him under aer taumbs 
••• it is all too clear Lfrom his personal letterAJ that he 
never showed her his mind, or save her a chance to do more than 
infer -- as others had to -- what vent on inside him, In her 
various efforts at management she moved a good deal in the 
dark. ••• If Franklin escaped Dy adroit withdrawal, neither 
his wife nor his children did •••• The future President was 
his own man.4l 
The strata~em to which Roosevelt resorted as a boy -- writing sup-
erficial letters to his mother -- in order to retain his intellectual 
independence, seeiiiS to have caused him to behave at times in a manner 
which same of his subordinstes considered utterly devious, Tugwell under• 
stood the President's deceptive way of obtaining information witheut shar-
ing decision-saking responsibilities with his informants. He recalled 
that for a year he carried in his Driefcase charts on governmental reor-
gsnization, Roosevelt spoke to him about the subject many t~s. The 
President 
40, ~11, R. G., •The Two Great Roosevelts,• Western Political 9.l!AJ:-
~. Vol. 5, No. 1, March, 1952, 87. 
41. ~ll, R, G,, •The Two Great Roosevelts,• 93· 
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••• was usiq me, as he usecl others, for round-table pur-
poses. He liked to do that, openiq out the most important 
subjects casually and saying fiDBlly that he wished you 
would work en it sa.e mere. It didn't mean what a new reci• 
pient of his confidence ws apt to think it did. He was 
only working somethiDg out in his mind; he was not trusting 
his vis-a.Yis with respoasibility.42 
In conferences with atministrators Tugwell usually took care to 
indicate that in conversations With the Presiclent he hacl not obtained 
tlae final wrd on a @;hen •tter. Wlaea the top 1118n in TVA sou@ht Till;-
well's ideas on the basic objectives and functions of their a@;ency, 
the Assiatant Secretary of Aariculture probably expressed 
s- thoughts of his OWl!., ancl if he did it is to be hopea 
that he labeled them carefully as such, because in such 
cases as these no one at all was 'lloved to know what vas 
goinc on in the Preaiclent'a .tne.,43 
One of Tugwell's articles, •Tae Preparation of a President,• 
(Western Political Ouarterlv, Vol111118 l, NUIIIber 2, June, 1948) brou@ht 
to@;ether me~ of his thoughts oa the professors• eclucative function. He 
wrote at le~h on the process by which Roosevelt, especially from March 
to November, 1932, obtainecl fraa his academic advisers the information 
and ideas which he aesired and needea. 
Tu@;vell recalled that Roosevelt cleterlllined the course of his ova 
education, The candidate did not channel his aitl.es 1 efforts alon& pe.rti• 
euler lines so mach as he let thea raable while he chose items which fit• 
tecl his intellectual purposes, At Hyde Park and Al-.ny suborclinates were 
often bewildered because they dicl not knew where the specific gaps which 
42. Tugwell, R. G., The Stric!ten ~ (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 3· 
43. Tugwell, R, G., and J!anfielll, E. c., •Grass Boots Democracy • ~lt. 
or Reality?,• Public Adainistration Review, Winter, 1950, 47• 
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they filled ley within a broad scheme: 
Our candidate was quick enouca; ha did not have to be hit 
with a brick; the gentlest exposure to facts touched eff 
reactions whicll aigbt turn eut to be disproportionate. But 
that depended on the patten he was working out -- wich was 
what aade life miserable tor those of us who had patterns of 
our own, He knew what ours were. He should have known; we 
bad not yet ceased to De pedagogues •••• We told him too 
11111ch, when it amused him to give us that kind. of opportunity, 
all rowuled out and triDaed down. He bad to sift a gocd 
deal, I can see nov, to cet what he wanted. He never told 
us anything -- anything mucll, that is, which would have 
guided us, He didn't know llov to do that. He said a good 
deal; iut all his words were for his own use. He was think• 
1ng out loud, But the tyill@: up, the systematizill@:o went on 
somewhere below -- or abeve -- the levels on which be moved 
vi th us; and there alae the &C!=9Daodat ions were worked out 
which tUI'lail him to the paople,44 . 
•Graclually,• Tu«vell notei, •we learned ••• the trick of moving 
with his mind and supplying its neeis.•45 Adjustment to Roosevelt's 
thought pattel'D8 involved playing down theoretical concepts. Generaliz-
in& occurrea on an occasional, incidental basis: 
••• we had to learn whet it .. aat to desystematize, We 
could threw out pieces ot theory; and perhaps they would 
fiftd a place in his sch-. We could suggest relet ions; 
an& perhaps the inventiveness of the suggestion would at• 
tract his notice. But the tapestry of the policy he was 
weaving was guided by an artists's conception which was 
not made known to us. Perhaps 1 t never could ie. But vas 
it aecesssry?46 
Roeaevelt dii not obtain what he was seeking only through aelec• 
tion from conversations which roameil without restraint over the range of 
44• Tugwell, R. G,, •The Preparation ot a President,• Western Political 
9uarterlx, Vol. 1, No. ~. June, 1948, 132. 
45. Tugwell, R, G,, •The Preparation ot a Preai4ent ,• 135· 
46, Tugwell, fl. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 135· 
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natienal problems, 'l'l!.e absence ef guidance was often more apparent 
than real. He frequently provi4e4 a direction for his assistants; 
roaminc then took place within predete~ned bounds, so that • ... 
memoranda and ... speeches were aet accidental; their contents were 
planned and often asked for.•47 When the professors failed te bring 
RGeaevelt llhst l!.e wante4, • ••• .be had to llline for it in us antl send 
ua out to get filled again.•48 Responae to Roosevelt's requests re• 
sulted in feverish activity, Tugwall, Moley, and the Gthers spent 
• ... the IIIQSt gruelling 1110nths of our lives havin& part of that candi• 
date's education dug aut of our entrails •• 49 At the same time, the 
professors' labors, undertaken at Boesevelt 1 s suggestion Gr urging, 
provoked a compensating reaction& 
I aa quite certaia that we supplied him with stt.u1atien 
to work morely by revealing a vealtl!. of materials, but I 
feel toe that we IIBY have helJSd to lift him into the 
strict iatelleetual reala of the Presidency by forecasting 
with hia, one by one, an4 quite precisely, the instruments 
he would need to peeaeas.50 
Intellectual interaction between the Presi4ent and tl!.e professors 
did net mean that Reosevelt permitted his advisers to participate ia 
making final decisions. Tucwell's references to ulttaate responsibility 
for policy indicate4 that Reosevelt reserve4 to himself the preaounee• 
... nt of the last word. His retention of final authority pertly at-a 
47. Tucwell, R. G., •'!'he Preparation of a President,• 138. 
48. Tacvell, R. G., •TAe Preparation of a President,• 132. 
49. Tua;well 1 R. G,, 'The Preparation of a Presiilent,• 131. 
50. Tua;well, R, G., •TAe Preparation of a President,• 141. 
froa his optimiaa: 
••• our candidate was a big man in wham the tides of vigor 
ran full; and with this full-ruaniag vigor there was a 
healthy optimism which cannot be exaggerated, Difficulties 
were never to him a117thiq -re than challenges ; they sel4• 
eve11. affected his PIU"POSas except in matters of tilaiq, And 
if we were of no use -· aor was anyone else -- ia this, he 
felt no lac~. Napeleoa oace re .. rked that two generals were 
worse thaa eae JOOr one, Tkere was ns question in anyone's 
raiad of shariq Mr. Roosevelt 'a generalship, thoup Ray 
Maley's later theory would seea to iavolve saae reseataeat 
Decause of chaqe in that respect, Ray's was a superior status 
and the rest of us shared soae, but not all, of the delecations 
aede to ltia; still I am sure that it was aerely deleptie>n, 
just as, for educational purpeaes, it was really joint explora-
tion only on eccasion,51 
Tu&vell concluded that the predeadnance of one aeneral was the 
best sst-up at staff healiquarters froa the point of view of natioDSl 
welfare in a tiae of crisis. He t.plied that Roosevelt was the best 
general available in 1933: 
It was not in panic, or &DTthia& like it, but nevertheless 
in intellectual need that he turned to us, And if what he 
got was mere his own creation tasn ours, that was bound to 
be true in the circuastaaces; and aoy otAer result Liue te 
division of authority or anether general/ would aave had 
consequences far worse taaa those which are by now recorded 
ia histol'Y',52 
lor Ilia part ia the ed.lication of a President, Tugwell was by ae 
aeans apologetic: 
He could have taken VO£se counsel; in fact, ~ did before 
the tiae CSIIII!! to act Lf~ the •Progressives~. We never 
confirmed his most naive views; we sharpened his intellsc• 
51. Tligwe11, R, G,, •The Preparation of a President ,• 142. 
_52, Tllgwe11, R. G,, •The Preparation of a President ,• 142, 
tual rather tban his emotienal processes; with us he ll.ai no 
ambitions and ao pretensions to diacount,53 
Tugwell's disaTowal of ambition on the part of the professors to doadnate 
their chief fitteoi in .,vi11Ja all ef Us c-nt on Roosevelt's intellac-
tual activity, The au.erous assertions in the press that •Roosevelt is 
a sood .AIIericaa, but ll.e is the Tietia of those crackpot professors around 
laiJa,• do not square with Tugwell's 'inside' testimony, 
'l'ugwll and Roosevelt -· Persanal .Relet iou 
Russell Lori, in ~Ita --l}acas of 12¥!, stated that Roosevelt an4 
Tugwell •·likeoi each other fro. the first,• ~gwell, •ariinarily a cool 
custoaer, ••• 8ecame ensegingly b07ish ••• in his respect and affectien 
for the Squire,• Their Tiewa quickly interacte4, each offering the other 
TSluaile intellectual equi,.,nt. Roosanlt, who lsr,;ely accepte4 '1'118well 1s 
diagnoais of economic oievelopmenta ia tll.e 1920's, iapressed the professor, 
Lori reported, with his assertion that life vas more flui4 than many 
1 theoretical analysts of society recognized. 
The development ef a friendly relationship between Tugwell ani 
Roosevelt was neither as staple nor as ineTitalille as Lori iapliad. Two 
mea can share service in a cause, and vieva on means of prEliiiOt iag tllat 
cause, without bei~ frienUy. 1oe ~inker and 1oll.nny Evers, '--rtalizetl 
in Franklin 'P, Ailams' •Tinker to EYers to Cllance, • served. a co111110n cause, 
the Chicago Cuis' pennant questa; they bad many similar itleas on tll.e 
53· 
1. 
Tugwell, R. G., "'!'he 'Preparation of a 'President, • 142. 
Lora, Russell, ~ Wallas;es !1l..l!!a (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947) 
318, 
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techniques of winning baseball @:lliiiB&; they also refrained from speaking 
te one another during some of the years of their greatest success. Here 
the allusion must end. Unlike either Tiaker or Evers, Roosevelt enjoyed 
a status superior to that of all those vbe worlce4 witlt. him. Tu@:well 
explained how Roosevelt's position, unique in his camp, complicated his 
personal relations with his advisers: 
A President -· or a man who may become President -- is 
much more difficult to understand than other asn because 
almost ne one approaches hta except on a selfish mission. 
••• ••• and this DBk:es the development of a satisfactory 
personal relationship impossible. The aura of consequence 
was upon Mr. Roosevelt when I first IIISt aim. And I, no 
leas than others, reprded Ilia more as a possible instru• 
ment chosen by fate to stay the bleeding of ~ country's 
wounds than as a DBn vho Ddpt ltecome 117 friend. Only 
later did I discover in J~Yself anether feelinc •• that 
affection vhicll. is come by so hard in such a case. And 
it vas only then that I beCSDB invelved in a struggle for 
unaerstanding. But that was net so much later. At least 
it 'lllllS well before we knew that the Presiclency lay down a 
straight road clearly revealed.2 
11y the tt.e Roosevelt took: office, Tugwell could assume that his 
affection was not unrequited -- he hall acquired a White House nick:nalll8 0 
•the 11olshevik:.•3 Although Tugwell did not visit the Executive Mauion 
as etten as Moley, he did receive frequent calls from the President to 
discuss major legislation.4 Conversations between Tugwell and Roesevelt 
usually went lteyond specific measures. Roosevelt enj~ed hearing lt.is 
z. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Preparation ot a President,• Western Political 
al"rterlx, Vol. l, Ne. 2, June, 1948, 137. 
Liniley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust ,• Scri'Dner's Magazine, 
Vol. 94, No. 5, Noveaber, 1933, 262. 
Carter, J. r. (Unofficial O'Dserver), Til§. New Dealers (New York, Simon 
an4 Schuster, 1934) 88. 
adviser's vieva on such matters as land conservation, the rehabilitation 
of strancl.ed populations, and the illprovement of agricultural cGnditions.5 
Tucvell knew that the general area of conservation was one of Roosevelt's 
favGrite subjects. 
~ change in the frequency ana aature of contacts between ~well 
encl. the President, the inevitable result of 'l'ugwell' a whipping-boy rGle 
and his administrative activities, t .. k place as time passed. ~ter 
Tugwell sponsored food and drugs lecislation in 1une, 1933, he became a 
prima target of anti•AAministration attacks in the press. From the au.-
aar of l'J34 tltrougll the elections of that year, he vas overseas. Tltere 
is no eviaence to support the assertion in the press that RGosevelt, 
upon discovering that Tugwell had a aecative prepaganda value, gave his 
"'face ••• a veil of political inviantility• in 1934.6 Undoubtedly the 
President and his political advisers, if they did not insist, preferred 
that 'l'ugwell ra.sin silent.7 
Tugwell's survival of the •purse• ef the AAA in February, 1935, 
indicated that tae attitude of the President, as chief of the De.acratic 
Party, towards Tugwell's participation ill the csmpaign of 1934 did. not 
impair the close relationship between the President, as Chief Executive, 
ancl. his trusted adlllinistrator. !!a referred to 'l'ugwell 'a elevation to 
a place 0111 a uw operating council of the AJ.J., while kis friends in that 
5. Farley, James A., Behind the Ballots (New York, Harcourt, 1938) 219. 
6. liB Mapzine, Vol. 25, No.7, February 18, 1935, 14. 
7• See above, Chapter XI. 
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aaenCT received their walkin& papers, as a renewed expression of sate .. 
froa the AdministratiOD.8 Tu&well's critics, especially Blair Bolles, 
bemeaned his retention of his head despite the decapitation of many of 
his friends and other New Dealers; Bolles attributed ~well's survival 
to his •outward obeisance• to the Conatitution -- "While he winks at 
Marx, the Profeasor ia over ready to kiss the foot of Madison.~9 
Predictions, based on the chances in AAA personnel of February, 
1935. that Tugvell 1a influence would increase, proved incorrect. By 
early spring, wnen he became Resettlement Adainistrator, his influence 
at the White Houae ws on the w.u. He reealled.s 
~ unpopularity with the reactionaries in Congress aad 
until now LiPril, 1935? aa.a aore or leas counterbalanced 
lty 7q influence iD the executive branch. But that was 
cone now, or rapidly aoinc.lO 
Tugwell's Dew adainistrative post, to whica he alaost exclusively 
devoted his tt.e and ener&Y, accounted, in itself, for a decrease in 
his contacts with the White House on .. tters outside of his direct pur-
view. Criticiaa of ~11 by the press and criticiaa by him of the 
President also contributed to his decline, which the rise in the inner 
Presidential circle of Corcoran and Cohen underlined. 
A deterioration of Tuawell's persoael relations with the President 
did not accompany the decline in his status in the Aeministration. Reports 
B. !iB. Magazine, February 18, 1935, 14• 
9. Bolles, Blair, "The Sweetheart of the Re&illlenters,• American Mercurz, 
Vol. 39, No, 153, September, 1936, 83-84. 
10. Tucwell, R, G., The Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) XTiii. 
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in the press that Tuswell simp:!¥ "fell froa Roosevelt favor• and that. 
"Disfavor, as it must to all favorites, came to blunt Rex Tugwell,• 
left room, through the oadssion of qualifications, for the conclusion 
that Roosevelt took umbrage at Tu&well personally,11 
Durin« the period of Tugwell's declining influence, the Presi• 
dent's conduct towards him did not reflect any personal animosity, On 
Septeaber 28, 1935, Tugwell wired Roosevelt concerning the President's 
allocation letter of September 25, which apparently allotted funds for 
lend-use and development projects, planned for two and one half years 
by the RA, to other agencies. Tugwell considered the President's 
action •a repudiation of the devoted efforts of a staff ot 2500• and "'a 
Uievous disappointment to me,• In a telegram of October 1 Roosevelt 
replied that there .nat have been some misunierstanding of his letter; 
there was no intention to give resettlement work to other agencies,12 
Cordiality characterized social as well as administrative relations 
between the President and his declining subordinate. In May, 1936, on:~¥ 
a few months before f«rleJ'''tieteDined that Tugwell would not participate 
in the Presidential campaign, the professor was Roosevelt's guest on a 
weekend cruise.13 This good will between the two men, and its continu-
ance after Tugwell left Washington, belied observations which conveyed 
11. •Territories: Luis and Rex,• Time Magazine, Vol, 38, No. 7, August 
18, 1941, 15; •Planner,• .!iM 'M!!gzine, Vol, 46, No. 27, December 
31. 1945. 46. 
12, Roosevelt Papers. 
13. l:!l§. .lWf York Ti!!!eS, May 16, 1&7. 
the impression that Roosevelt had no personal re~rd for him. 
A militant liberal commeated that Tugwell remained in Washington 
at Roosevelt's request, after he was convinced that the President no 
longer took him seriously, re~rding him as an •amusing piece of baggap• 
the Aiministration could afford to carry in order to "keep the attention 
of liberals engsged.• 14 It was true that Roosevelt, as a politician, 
treated Tugwell harshly enough, 8ut there is no evidence that the Presi• 
dent considered Tucwell a political iastrument for rallying liberal su..-
port.15 The professional politicians rated Tugwell a liability. It was 
not in Roesevelt 1 s nature, as the Naaber One ~emocrat, to risk political 
loss as the price ef his personal amasement. Although the President did 
not sugsest that Tugwell resign, the facts of political life dii n.t 
square with the assertion taat for pelitical purposes he resorted to 
blandishments in order to keep Tugwell in the capital. Nor was it in 
Roosevelt's nature, as a conservationist, to regard as •amusing• the 
work of the RA, which continued after Tugwell's departure. 
Neither resentment at personal abuse nor a feeling that the Admin-
istration considered his work unimportant accounted for Tugwell's resigna-
16 tion. He did resent the request that he remain silent in the fall of 
1936. Perhaps it was tlt'lle, as one author asserted, that Roosevelt •used 
14. Ward, Paul w., •The End of Tugwell,• The Nation, Vol. 143, No. 22, 
November 28, 1936, 623. 
15. See above, Chapter X, Section, •Tugwell's Prestige with Progressives.• 
16. See above, Chapter X, Section, "Resignation.• 
him so long as he found him an asset, then let him go.• 17 Yet, Tugwell 
explained his experiences in political, not personal, terms. The sur-
vival of the New Deal outweighed the political or administrative life of 
any one of its adherenta.18 
Tugwell was on friendly terms with the President when he left the 
government. Their friendly relations continued until Roosevelt's death, 
the ex-Brain Truster enjoying access to the White House until the end. 
As early as February, 1937, a little more than a month after Tugwell's 
resignation became effective, he wired the White House for assistance 
ia obtaining air transportation out of the Barbadoes to New York, where 
his daughter lay ill; the prampt reply notified Tugwell that Pan American 
lll!ls trying to locate a plane, and that the news from the hospital was 
reassuring,l9 
In August, 1937, Roosevelt and Tugwell corresponded on both a 
serious and a h\llllOrous level. On August 26 the President asked Tugwell 
to put out a •trial balloon• ia the next few months on the court-peeking 
scheme.20 On the same day Tugwell, then an employee of Charles Taussig's 
American Molasses Company, sent the President a broadside on the land 
program of President Carlienas of Mexico; Tugwell wrote: 
Will you look at this! I shall have to go to Mexico if I 
17. Ward, Paul w., •wallace the Great Hesitator,• The Nation, Vol. 140, 
No. 3644, May 8, 1935, 129. 
18. See above, Chapter XI. 
19. February 10, 1937, Roosevelt Papers. 
20. August 26, 1937, Roosevelt Papers. 
am eYer tlil see the aims of the Resettlement Administra-
tion carried out. And do you see what Cardenas does tlil 
the ~ig farmers like you •••• ? 
Roosevelt replied from Hyde Park on August 29: 
Dear Senllr Tugwllo: 
What a pity that the Yankees cannot improve the proces-
ses of their civilization Dy eaulating our Mexican cul-
ture. As a jefe politico, I am hoping that you will be 
sent as Mexican ambassador to Wasaington when the tille 
comes. 
Give ~ regards to Don Carlos Taussigo and I visa for you 
both much sucre.2l 
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At the end of 19'57 CCliiDUilication beheen Tugwell and the Presi-
dent returned to serious matters. In the middle of December Tugwell 
notified the White House tbat he had suggested to Professor w. E. 2ink• 
ley ef Ohio Northern University that he send an inascribed copy of his 
book, !I!IIJl Powra R!. .llul Preaidept, te RooseYelt.22 At the end of the 
month Tugwell Yisited the White House,23 He again conferred with the 
President in the middle of 7anuary, 1938.24 These conversations consia-
ered problems which ar~~se from the recession of the autumn of 1937• 
In the fall of 1938 Tugwell, then Chairmen of the New York City 
Planning Commission, publicly expressed his support of a third term for 
Roosenlt,25 In September, 1939, Current History referred to Tugwell as 
21. RooseYelt ?lpers. 
22. To Missy Le Hand, December 15, 1937, Roosevelt Papers. 
23. Newsweek, Vol, ll, No. 2, 7anuary 10, 1938, 7; The New York TiDies, 
December 29, 1937, 8:2. 
24. The New York~. January 15, 19J8, 1:5. 
25. •For a Third Term for President,• New York Herald Tribune Forwa, 
October 25, 1938, Report gf. the Eighth ADnual Forum, 1938. 
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the leader of the thirdMterm movellll!nt.2' In May, 1940, Tugwell contri• 
buted an article to The ~ew Repu~lic, •MUst We Draft Roosevelt,• in which 
he recounted a recent conversation with the President. Tugwell haa not 
asket Roosevelt his intentions; he haa told the President he was aware 
••• that in spite of his repatation as an innovator, his 
alleciance to the traditions of his office was very deep 
and that the violation of well-established custom was 
unpleasant • ••. jje shoul.Q decide on the basis of public 
interest and set us at_far forward as possible up to the 
last possi8le moment.~ 
In a letter which Tugwell wrote to the President on September 16, 
1940, he iadicated his confidence that Roosevelt would win a third tera, 
his expectation that the United States would not stay out of the war iadeM 
finitely, and his faith in Roosevelt's leadership. He requested an elec• 
tion speech 
••• devoted to stating what we're after in this world, 
,/;incA! nothing so wcks up a p.ng as enthusiasm for what 
it is doinc lCreated whe~ SQiebody defines a~&in and 
apin, in concrete and appealinc ways, what we are dOillfl 
and why it is worth work and sacrifice • 
••• 
No one can do this as you can. It seems to me that the 
election will be won easily; but I know well enough llhat 
lies on your heart now is not that, It is were we shall 
be when the areat showdown c0111es. I do think a crest 
speeclt f~ you ••• sight rally unexpected forces to us, 
so that our ai&ht will Jaave a great 1110ral ally when it is 
aext aeedea.28 
26. Citei in Stein, Charles w., 11a Thiriooll'erm Tradition (New York, Col-
bia University Press, 1933) 47. 
27. Tugwell, R. G., •Must We Draft Roosevelt?,•· New Republic, Vol. 102, 
No. 1326, May 13, 1940, 631, 
28, From Key West, Florida, under letterhead of the New York City PlaDDillfl 
C..ission, RQO&evelt Paura. 
Shortly after the election Tu&vell wrote to the President: 
Now thet the unpleasantness is happily oyer perhaps you 
will want to talk with me apia about the Forest Service,29 
As it turnea out, Tu&wll rejoined the Administration in the fall of 
1941 as Governor of Puerto Rice, ia which position he remained until 
1946, enjoying the President's support and confidence until that fateful 
day at Warm Springs, April 12, 1945. 
'l'he the111es of service ana leyalty ran through Tu«vell's relation-
ship with Roesevelt. His concept of service was primarily an intellec• 
tual one -- the representation of a poiat of view, invalidating, in his 
case, his owa aefinition of political loyalty. Seeking no personal 
gain, Tu&vell served without rsceiviq thanks and despite the frequent 
rejection of his aavice. Yet, his behavior did not substantiate his 
assertion that political orsanizations paradoxically engenllerea in men 
ef principle selfless personal loyalties, so that they did not judge the 
purposes ani social effects of measures but adopted a philosophy of 
sU.ple faith in a leader, enabling hta to gather, throu~ organizing 
genius, power anti preatige)° For all his loyalty, Tu&vell was often 
critical, in private meetings, of Roosevelt's proposals. His critical 
attituae, waich contribute& to a aecline in his status in the Administra-
tion, reflecteti intellectual leyalties even stronger than his loyalty to 
and tiesire to serve the President. 
29, Letter, NGT-ber 7, 1940, Roosevelt Papers. 
30, Tu&well, R. G., •The Superpelitical,• Journal of Social PhilosopiY, 
October, 1939-J'uly, 1940, 98. 
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On aeTeral occasions Tug¥811, desiring to get out of the goTera-
ment, stayed on at the President's request. In February, 1935, he see .. d, 
to Ickes, deter.dned to get out ef Agriculture and go back to Col~ia, 
·~t he does not want to let the President down.•31 At tt.es when Tug-
well felt that his senicea as a whippinr; boy worked to the Adlllinistra• 
tion•s disadTBntar;e, he offered to resi~, only to be overruled by Roose-
nlt,32 
Tucwell showed his loyalty to the President publicly as well as 
priTately. In .Tune, 1933, he stated to a getherinr; of lawyersc 
It is rather c..aoa to hear praise and criticisa ia one 
breath these days. The prograa is deplored because of 
its departure trom traditioa; the ahaper aad adaiaistra• 
tor of the program is praised because he embodies all 
these traits we like to thiak ot as Aaerican. But taia 
is an antithesis which cannet be allowei. If praise ia 
due for what he does, praise is also due tor the pror;raa 
wll.ica per.dts the doinr;. The lb:eeutiTe is inseparable 
troa this procraa ••• 
Laudiq Roeeevelt for his coeperative illpulse, his inte&rity, his lauaGr, 
his adainistratiTe talent, his huacer tor knowledge, and his experiaental 
attituie, 'l'll&well declared that he atoed for tile President .!!!! tl!te New 
Deal.33 
31. 
32· 
33· 
Ia Auaust, 1934, Tucwall, publicly refsrrinc to RooseTelt in per-
Ickes, Harold L., Da. Secret Piau §!. Harold 1,. Ickes; .fAtl .Qu, %h!!. 
First 'fh9W!an!l .!!!:!n, 19 33•1936 (New York, "'imon and Schuster, 19 53) 
303. 
Wari, !'anl W,, "The Encl. of Tugwll,• b23o 
Tucwell, R. G., •Desip tor Goveraaent,• Udress, Ei~th Annual Meet• 
inc et the Feieration of Bar Associations of Western New Yerk, .lnae 
24, 1933, in~ Battle for D!aocracx, 15-16, 
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aonal teras, cave his reasons for aerYiDC in the Administration: 
It is no accident that ·~ frienas• should be his charac• 
teristic ana invgluntsr,r aecinniag when &e talks over the 
radio. Aad it is because of this, and because what one 
does for a friend must at least be conceived in kindliness 
and be csrriei out with an ener«r such as can ca.e from no 
other source, that I have been so &lad to sink ow personal 
preferences in his prograa, and to do all that I could to 
help in carr,rinc it out.34 
ID October, 1935, in a purely political speech, Tugwll again paid tri• 
buts to Roosevelt's qualities: 
Our best strategy is to surge forwara with the workers and 
the farmers of this nation, cemaittod to general achieve• 
menta, but trusting the cenius of our leader for the dispo-
sition of our forces and the tt.dng of our attacks. I do 
not nee& to remind you of his conius for this task, nor of 
ais devotion to the cause of overthrowing industrial auto. 
cracy and the creation of the 4emocratic deacipline. If you 
do not believe in these qualities of his by nov, I despair 
of convincing you. I only hope to lll&ke more clear to you 
the need of coudn& together under his leadership and for 
declini:a& to aerYe our enellies 1 purposes by dispersion in 
pursuit of lesser !Gals than the great ones which lie so 
clearly before ua.35 
Tu&vell put asiie his long-run academic views ( •sank his personal 
preferences•) once the AdBdnistrstion bad formulated a policy, but during 
J6 the process of fol'llllllation he was no •yes llfiln.•· He apparently took 
Roosevelt as he ¥as, expecting nothing for hiaaelf and occasionally 
ar~ing sharply with the Presiient. Tu&well's loyalty did not produce 
anything like a belief in Roosevelt's infallibility: 
34• Tu&vell, R. G., "Address: Niaprs County Pieneer Association, Olcott 
Beach, New York, August 8, 1934, USDA Press Release, 3•4• 
35· Tu&well, R. G., Address, Demecrstic State Central CODiittae, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935, Resettlement Administration Press Helea1e, 
7· 
36. Tu&well, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 143• 
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••• at this tt.s I could not understand his apparent sympathy 
with the underJriYileged aad his frequent excursions inte 
policies which vera certainly assinst their interest and favor-
able to their exploiters.37 
It appears that Tugwell sometimes .as too harsh in his criticisa: 
We wre the journe:J'IIIIIn, las the Mater craftsllllln. Soms of 
us at tt.es forgot our pleoes. But he did not let that 
affect his final results, and he was gentle -- too gentle 
to rspr~na.38 
In the end Tugwell's attitude hastened his departure: 
His was net the only way to haTe proceeded; it was only 
his way. Perhaps it was not the ~est. That is what I baa 
always theught and that is ~ I had not ~een keJt at his 
sUe.39 
Tucwell wanted acknowledc-ent in the form of understanding rather 
than appreciation, He deplored, Ickes reported, Roosevelt's lack of •any 
notion• of what the PWl had acca.plished and the difficulties it had 
overcoae.4° He ~elieved the President should have information on govern• 
ment operations. He did not leok fer SXJressions of gratitude• 
••• none of us had ever heard a word of commendation or, 
for that RBtter, of reproef fraa Mr. Roosevelt. I did not 
think afterward, when I knew hila better, that this was 
strantel and certainly it dii not occur to me at the time 
.IJ'JW •••• 41 
If Tugwell did not expect thanks when his words or his work proved useful, 
aeither did he consider the rejeotion of his recouaendations a personal 
31· Tugvell, R. G,, •Tae Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No, 1, October, 1'153. l'J, 
Tugvell, R, G., •The Preparation of a President,• 135. 
Tupell, R, G., 'l'ke Stric][ep. lap.tl, 680, 
Ickes, Harold L., In Secret Diarv §!. Harold I,. Icke111 htt .QM, 352 • 
Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of ••• Roesevelt,•' 21. 
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affronts 
••• it ••• I offered advice, and it was not taken, I did 
not jude~ J!VSelf au;rined, although I might not lilce the 
policy,42 
In the end the seelllin«l:r ia)lersonal ailministrative relationshi:p 
acquired a deep personal quality which vas not readily apparent. Roose• 
velt did not allow personal re88rd to affect his decisions, and, as Presi-
dent, he dill not have occasion, especially as Tugwell's whipping-boy role 
developed, to express personal feeliags. Tugwell did not expect indica-
tiona of personal reprll, bein« aware of the limitations politics placed 
on Roosevelt's private relations to public fi~res. He undoubtellly 
sensei the Presi4ent's appreciation of ais loyalty and service, particu-
lsrly when, after five years out of the goverDEnt, he returned to serve 
as Governor of Puerto Rico froa 1941 te 1946. 
For Tugwell's part, his description of a visit to the White House 
after he became Governor of Puerto Rico, and his statements after Roese-
velt's death, indicated that a strong personal attachment mingled with 
his intellectual concept of duty, During a wartime conversation Tugwell, 
despite Roosevelt's claim to coea health, found the President looking 
bad. It ws •fripteninc to c0111:pare the President to the same -n ten 
years before.~ When Roosevelt told a story and roared with laughter 
which reminded Tugwell of the lsuptei' that once roared to the top of the 
HJde Park houe, •There was such a constriction in JIV throat that I could 
42• TugW8ll, R, G., •The Preparation of a Presicient,• 142. 
hanUy go on. •·4.3 
Tugwell did not consider Roosevelt's Progressive program ada• 
quate to the needs of American society. He concluded, however, in 195.3, 
that Roosevelt had done the best he could, in view of the instruments 
available and the limitations preaent, to remain true to his objective 
of promoting social justice -- •At any rate I should be at peace with 
hta.•44 Tugwell made a comment in 1947 which showed that personal feelings 
overrocie intellectual •:peace• in the final determination of his attitude: 
It was not because he was a great man, nor because he was 
always right, that I loved Ilia. I perhaps more than others 
had always been critical of his methods anci even his re• 
sults and apt to wei&A with skepticisa the unrolling of his 
policy, Like other men, looked at critically, he was not 
infallible 1 and to me had had not even been kind or under• 
standing • , , • What good was there in probing the anat~ 
of loyalty? I had never been able to before; and I aad no 
creater luck now,45 
The loyalty which Roesevelt inspired in his subordinates helped to ex-
plain why they did not find the Truaan adainistration to their liking, 
heine • ••• robbed by his LRoosevelt•i/ death of a sort of spiritual 
anchor to their Government jobs ••••• 4' 
In 1956 Tugwell, not easily given to demonstrativeness, referred 
to Roesevelt in moving personal tel'lloll. Writing about .!zy'de Park and Wana 
Springs reminded hila of many incident., such as the times when the Presi-
4.3· 
44· 
45· 
46. 
Tugwell, R, G., The Stricken !&!!i• 654-Sb· 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of ••• Roosevelt ,• 21. 
Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken 11JlA, 681, 
Phillips, Cabal, •The New Dealers • Where A:re They Now?,• New York 
TiP'S M&gazine, September 29, 1946, 5.3· 
dent 
••• talked with newspaper men and embarrassed me by turn-
ing to me for confirmation of something he said -- the 
President Of the United States! 
Yes, you can teal him there. You will probably choke with 
amotion. Then you will know that you feel htm.47 
Conclusion 
RoesaYelt and the New Deal 
The consideration aboYe of the relationships between Rooseyalt 
and his adYisers suggests as appropriate at this point a comment on a 
problem which the President's ralatiYe status in the New Deal creates 
tor historians wbo study twentieth-century America. RooseYelt was the 
solar star in the New Deal galaxy; his adYisers ware satellites. In 
one sense, we can learn more about the nature and function of lesser 
figures than we can about the President. Fortunately, the keeping and 
publication of a number of personal records enables cross-checking, out 
Of which a reasonably accurate picture of subordinate officials amerces. 
Regarding RooseYalt, as Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has pointed 
out, an accurate re-creation of the position of the President in his 
OYsrall, priority-setting function does not emerge from the writings of 
lesser adBdnistrators, to each of whom, at one time or another, the 
President had to say, •No.• 1 Unfortunately Rooseyelt did little writing 
47• Tugwell, R. G,, •F. D. R.: LiYing Memorials,• The Nation, Vol. 182, 
No. 14, April 7, 1956, 276, 
1. Annual Meeting, American Historical Association, New York City, 1954· 
of the sort that gives the historian direct insight into the real nature 
of the presidential office. 
A study of a subordinate's bapact on the New Deal inevitably 
becomes a study of his relationship to Roosevelt. This relationship does 
not necessarily determine a subordinate's contribution to American life. 
In Tugwell's case, it is possible that the publicity given his statements, 
aespite the disapproval and distortion it usually contained, emphasized 
concepts, such as the significance to a healthy economy of purchasing 
power, which the New Deal sought to implement in one way, but whica 
American society at some future date conceivably could, if conditions 
necessitated new policies, seek to implement in another way -- possibly 
Tugwell's way. 2 
Roosevelt: •His Own Man•l 
Roosevelt's Decisions 
Tugwell indicated in a brief general statement the extent to which 
Roosevelt accepted and the extent to which he rejected the ideas of his 
advisers who held to the philosophy of •concentration and control:" 
I had given him the explanation he needed of the crisis 
of 1928·32; and naturally, since he had accepted the 
explanation, I had expected him to accept the logical 
resolution. The cure lay in the cause. But that was not 
his way, whatever .ay have been his intention.2 
2. See above, Chapter X, Section, •Publicist.• 
1. Tugwell's phrase, •The Two Great Boosevelts,• Western Political Quar• 
terlY, Vol. 5, No. l, March, 1952, 93. 
2. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 681-82. 
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Perhaps the general thesis, illustrated above in a consideration of 
Tugwell's influence, that Roosevelt's reactions to his advisers' proposals 
depended upon his own criteria becomes clear through a classification 
under different kinds of reactions of specific measures with which Tugwell 
was connected as an administrator, author, or representative of a point 
of view. 
Measures Which Roosevelt Approved 
Measures to Which Roosevelt Responded 
Measures Which Roosevelt Rejected 
10~. 
Consel'Tation 
Resettlement Admini-
Favorecl 
lJ 
stration x 
Soil Erosion (later 
CollaerYation) Service x 
Civilian Conservation 
Corps x 
Nationalism x 
Intergovernmental Debts x 
Gold standard x 
London Economic Confer-
ence 
Far Eestern policy 
Financial 
Money 
Banking 
Price controls 
Responded ReJected 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Roosevelt respond,ed, RJU_ offered .JuU.l•hearted support 
Food and Drugs regulation a bill no strong pu\1-
lic support 
Federal incorporation 
'l'he consumer; • reduce the 
spread• betwen prices 
farmers receive and 
prices consumers psy, 
and a •concert of in• 
terest• between farmers 
and consumers 
a good idea 
sections in 
AAA and NRA 
no bill 
AAA the hi& 
farmers' agency-
Peek for higher 
prices, period; 
sections wak 
Roosevelt responded, .lm1 .1M 
Undistributed Profits Tax 
renonse .!U.s! not ~ .1M desired !!m 
NRA 
The small farmer 
Roosevelt responded, 
desired 
l'llrchasing power 
Fiscal policy 
Public works 
Work relief 
Keynesian economics 
Roosevelt responded, 
Foreign trade 
Anti-antitrust 
a law drastically 
a law 
a law 
debt adjust• 
llll!lnt ; the RA 
modified 
big business• 
asency 
big famers' 
agency 
AAA the hie; 
farmers' 
but .!!2i to the degree 
agency 
and/or with the rapidity 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
but subsequentlY adopted contrasting policies 
Moley and Hull 
'l'ugwll 
NRA Thurman 
Arnold I 
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Roosevelt's response to the conditions and demands of the tt.es appears 
to heve been a compromise between his anti-determinist, experimental 
inclinations and his orthoda.E bent. 
A historian of American Progressivism noted that an 
••• hiatorioal tradition has srowu up since 1933 that 
Franklin D. Roosevelt knew little about economics and 
consequently meat of the si&nificant New Deal reforms 
vera inspired by his e4viaera.l 
Tucvell'a experience as an adviser to the President suggests substantial 
lllDilification of the assertion that the iapa11t on New Deal measures of 
RGOaevelt, who ilid not heve extensive fOI'IIIIll traininl!; in eGoaomiGs, vas 
inversely proportional to the iapact of his advisers, who dido 
The fact thet Tugwell vas •close to the White House• does not, in 
itself, prove that Roosevelt aCIGepted his e4viee. The fa11t that The 
Ipdustrial Discipline pre4iGted, according to Russell Lora,2 the Greation 
of the NRA and the AAA does not demonstrate that Roosevelt approves 
those agencies at Tugwell's ••heat. Both the irulustrial and agricul• 
tural progl'BIIIS had a history of vide support. Tugwell participated in 
their formulation at the final stage, as a maober, in each instance, of 
1. Mowry, Georl!;a E., review of The Economic Thoupbt of Franklin ll• Roose-
.Dll and !b§ Oridna S!I. the .blf llu! by Daniel R. Fusfeld (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1956) in •merican Historical Review, July, 
19.56, 1051; the writer exalllined Professor Fusfeld 1s work ia th.e form 
of a doctoral dissertation at ~de Perk. 
2. Lora, Russell, 1Ja Wall aces !!f. J2B (Boston, Houpton Mifflin, 1947) 
318. 
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a ~oup of authors. 
On tae other hand, the fact taat Roosevelt .. de the final deci• 
sions on .aasures proposed does not necessarily indicate that he ultiaately 
deterudnea the nature of the Hew Deal. The choices between alternatives 
could have been based on sli~t knowled&e, in which event the educative 
function of Roeaevelt's advisers would have been decisive. 
Roosevelt's fill81 decisio-. taken topther, show not only that:'ae 
rejected Tu«well'a basic iastitutional point of view, but also that the 
nature of the alternatives to which ae turned exhibited a consistency 
reflecting consideraBle knowled&e of economics and a set economic phil-
osop_,. The state.ant that Reosevelt's choices rested on more than a 
passing fULiliarity with econa.ic attars does not, however, invalidate 
Oliver Wendell He~s' fa.uus obser.ation, •A second-class intellect. 
»ut a first-class temperament.~3 Roosevelt did not have to be a profea-
atonal eeona.ist in order to ~sp the intended directiom and tapaet of 
his advisers' proposals. 
Roa~aevelt had pod aeadGic training in economics; he continued to 
read and study in tae field after ~duation.4 Before he became Governor 
and :President, be displayed. a fUiiliarity with economic concepts which 
were to beco.e illportant during tile Hew Deal -- deficit spendin~, re~ional 
plaaaing, the •yardstick'' approach to controllin~ private profits, and a 
•concert of interests• among ecenomic ~pa.5 Roosevelt's Governorsaip 
3. Burns, J"IIJIIIIS M., Roosevelt • !AI Lioa and the Fox (New York, Harcourt, 
Brace, 1956) 157. 
4• J'usfelci, Do R,, ru li!cenoaic T4onght of • .. Roe~sevelt, passim. 
5• J'usfeld, D. B., ru Ecencw1c 'l'honght of ••• Roosevelt, paasia. 
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foreshaaowed a significant portion of the New Deal, He aivocatad social 
security, extensive governaent relief, public power projects, and 
labor's right to organize and bargain collectively,6 
Roosevelt's private excursions into acaaemic economics and his 
contact, as a public aiainiatrator, with practical problems equipped hta 
with a philosophy of political econ~ before he met the Brain Trusters. 
He salectei or rejected his advisers en the basis of their affinity tir, 
or aversion to, his philosophy. 'l'ucwll, who passed the test, would not 
say that Roosevelt •a adult experiences •equipped" him with a philosephy. 
He would say that Roosevelt's public career as Wilson's Assistant Secre-
tary of the Na'fY and asGoveraor of llew York, as well as his privata 
activitiaa ia the 1~20 1s, •reinforced• a philosophy originating in a 
secure enviranaent ani status which Roasavelt knew from chilaaooi, 
There is so.a inclination to seize on the struggle for recov-
ery froa infantile paralyais as a traaafo:.ing episede, and 
to credit those around hira vita a basic change as he fought 
lNick to •stery of hillself. This is very likely, again, -ch 
toe superficial, Eleanor Roosevelt and Louis Hove were de-
votei praons; and Eleanor, perhaps, oueht riptly to be 
sainted. It •s compensation indeea to have thea lly hta 
throueh the ;rears of strua;le. llut the inner convictions 
which aaae Franklin Roosevelt the instrument of his nation's 
return to health were his OVD. They were so sturdy and f'ull 
fu, so ardentl;r allll with sucll artf'ulDess fought for, that 
6, Outstallllin« stwlies of Roasevelt 1a Governorship are Fusfald, D. R •• 
The EcoDoaic Thoupt !!. ... Rooaaveltlc::liiUOil'oo~"hi'liari, Franklip 1!• 
Roosevelt .1! Governor Jl!. !f!l! ~(New York, Coluabia Univerait;r 
Preas, 1~55) 1 Freidel, Frank, lranklin 1!• Roosevelt: The Trip•l!. 
(Boston, Little, Brown, 1~56), Tolu.e III of the definitive biog-
raphy. 
they can only llan 'been the extension of his own nature, 
at last came to full ripeness throuch suffering, contsa-
plation, and conTiction, ~t not create4 by those experi• 
enoes,7 
A stu4ent of the medical profiles of tile Presidents of the United 
States oorreboratei ~ll1s opinion, stating that lon& periods of ill-
ness • ••• are tiMs of trial 'IIIlich soften the weak and t•per the 
atrona.•8 Hooaenlt 1 s strencth - fro. a secure vorl& of "beneTelent 
authority• - a "beautiful fra.ea• Ilia political career w.s an attempt 
to realize •lleylloo& ideala nurtured at H;yl.e Park, Groton and Harvari.•·9 
At Harvari H.aseTelt concentrate& on the social sciences; he took 
a dozen ccuraea in history ana aeTersl each in goTerDIIent ana ecm0111ics, 
incluilin& currency le,sislation, economics of transportation, of 'bankiDCo 
10 
ana of corporations. Perhaps it was to his nation's adTantace that 
RoeseTelt receiTei no more than •a solid grounding in classical ecenaaics.• 
He later said, "I took ecenoaica courses in college for four years, and 
eTerythin& I ws taught was wr•DC•"ll 
BeeseTelt discOTered the fallacies in classical econo.tcs after 
poatiuation ana 'before he 111et tile Brain Trusters, His ideas on the cauaes 
of the depression 4id not fall vitbia tbe realm of classical econoaicsa 
their rouch siailarity to 'l'u&well'a accounted for the latter's aimiasion 
7• Tucwell, R. G., •'l'ae Protagonists: BoeseTelt ana HeeTer,• Antiecll 
ReTiev, Winter, 1953•54• 432•33• 
8. Mark, Rudolph, M. D., "'A MaGical Protile oi' George Washincton, • in 
!M. eriAAn Herita«;e Reader (New York, Dell, 19.56) 29• 
9. Burns, J"amea M., RoeseTelt • The lli!! and the Fox, 5, 9, 21. 
10. Burna, J"ames M .. RooseTelt: ~Lion and the Fax, 18. 
11. Burns, J"ames M., Rooeevelt• 'l'lle Lion and lli Fox, 18, 20. 
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to the advisory staff at Hyde Park. Ernest K. Lindley, fsm.ihO.r with 
Roosevelt's practices from Alllany days, explained in an article in 
Scribner's Mapziae that 
••• Mr. Roosevelt has al~ys elltained the advice of a great 
sany types of individuals. Tbeuck some were slow to believe 
it, ll.e had developeli his fundamental attitude toward the 
American experialnt long llofora he Mt the first samber of 
sroup that CalM to De knewn aa tile llrains trust. And he is 
iMmovably addicted to sakinc hie ewn decisions. 
Doctor Tugwell's perception of one ot tho main causes of the 
depression in the failure of the capitalistic system to dis-
tribute the surplua piled up lly the astonishing growth of 
industrial efficiency in the nineteen-tventiea harmonized 
••• with Mr. Roosevelt's own ollservations.l2 
Ill & Booaevelt RtJGlgtien 1 J'int FUse Lindley refuted tile 
popular impression that college professor• provided Roosevelt with a 
political philosophy. He also repudiated the assertion taat Roosevelt 
•rely aliopted a political philosophy and a prograa which would make the 
depression his •springboard to the Presidency,• Roosevelt, as his 
spesches and career showed, had developed his political philosophy lone 
llefore the depression began. The Governor, Lindley concluded, 
••• did not recruit his professorial advisers to provide 
Ilia with a point of view1 he drew them to hill because 
their point of view ~s akin to his own,l3 
Raymond Maley •agrees with Lindley• that Roosevelt had, long before the 
depression, a point of view which tll.e professors "llsd to matca.•14 J. 
12.. Lindley, Ernest K., •War on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Mapziu, 
Vol. 94, No. 5. Noveaber, 1933• 258. 
13. Lindley, Ernest K., The Roosenlt Reyolution, Firat Phase (New York, 
Vikiac. 1933) 7• · 
14. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years (New York, Harper, 1939) 13. 
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:Jranklin Carter, who worked for 'l'ucwell, stated that Roosevelt saw tll.e 
causes of the depression as hu.an and psycholo~ical rather than natural 
or pb7sical before Moley ever brou@ht Tugwell to H;yde Park,l5 
It the professors did not have a philosophy to provide, they had 
work to do. They ha4 to learn th•c•in tnn4s of Roosevelt's thou@ht 
and the kind of information he wanted in order that he mi@ht enlar~ 
and coordinate his knowledce ot economica.16 They had to help apply 
Roosevelt's philosophy to the specific oonditions of 1932 and 1933.17 
In givin~ direction and force to Roosevelt's interpretations, the pro-
tessors worked hard; Liniley reterrei to Tucvel,l as 
••• the philosopher, the sociolo&ist, and the prophet of 
the Reosevelt Revolution, as well as one ot its boldest 
practitioners. He had provided the movement with auch of 
its rationale (to use one ot his favorite words) ,16 
The appearance of this reference to ~ll by Lindley in tile article in 
which he noted that the principal qualification for admission to the 
Brain Trust vas conformity to Roosevelt's views indicates that TugWell's 
activities fell under tae headin~ ot refinement and U.pleaentation of 
his chief's philosophy. 
Dixon Wecter observei that the 
••• New Deal vas not an explicit program drafted under 
Roosevelt's direction in 1932, but a general attitude toward 
15. Carter, ;r. 7. (Unofficial Observer) The !!lf Dealers (New York, Simon 
and Schuster, 1934) 67. 
16. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brai~,is Trust,• 259. 
17. Lindley, Ernest K., !II!. Roosevelt Revolution, First Phase, 7. 
lB. Lindley, Ernest K., •war on the Brains Trust,• 263. 
governaent for the people later shaped by the urgency of 
circuastance,l9 
In the crisis, Tugwell helped work out programs which he could support as 
emergency measures, and Roosevelt approved the schemes of the Hundred 
Days. Roosevelt rejected Tugwell'• long-run proposals for institutional 
change. He accepted Tugwell's enalysia of the causes of tlae depression; 
Jae did not accept Tugwell's reca..endations for a cure, which did not 
~lend with a philoaopay ef political econ~ whose roots took nouris~nt 
ill the Progressive soil of Theoclore Roosevslt •a Square Deal and Woo4row 
Wilson's New Freedoa. 
The Progreasivea won -· because Roosevelt determined that they 
should. Tugwell recorded their victorya 
He ha4 taken s011ething t'rca •• sOIIething frca ethers; as 
time passed, and our Albany group ha4 been enlarged tiae 
after ttae, aDd usually with .artho4ox, business-ainded 
people -· like General 1ehason -· he had found their ideas 
-re sui tatlle, aDd lae Jaeari, by proxy fr0111. the old 1ust ice 
who knew what he wanted. Holistic ideas were ditched, for 
the aost part. lilut that -s his responsibility. I had 
done what I could .. and ~ new I had had ~ revenge,20 
Tugwell's •revenp• ws intellectual. He placed full responsibility on 
Roosevelt for the failure of the New Deal to achieve full recovery, Roose• 
velt made the final decisions accordin& to the dictates of his own thought. 
No professor, indeed no man, participated in the final stage of policy 
19. Wecter, Dixon, The !JI& of the Great DePression, ].<)29•1941 (New York, 
MaCIIIillan, 1948) 59. 
20, Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethic§, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 21-22. 
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decisions -- with one possible exception. Tugwell believed that there 
was one man in the nation who could aave affected Roosevelt's decision• 
making in its last stage -· the "old Justice.•21 Yet, Mr. Brandeis held 
no views which conflicted with the Proe;ressive orthodcxxy of Franklin D. 
RooseTelt. 
Long Runso Tae •ProgressiTe" 
Nature of the Hew Deal 
Introaction 
The anti-antitrust institutional Tiews of Tugwell clashed, on a 
theoretical leTel, with the trust-lluating Tiews of Mr. Justice Brandeis. 
Bernard M. Barnch symbolized, on a practical economic leTel, the victors 
in this conflict. The Progressives were a"Dle to defeat the •planners• 
because Franklin D. Roosevelt, aetiae; on his basic incliDations, let 
them. Consequently, the New Deal was essentially Progressive ·- an 
attempt to restore the econOBV to llealth by "lllaking the capitalists lie• 
haTe,• not an effort to alter the institutional framework of the capital-
istic system. By 1936 or 1938 tile New Deal "died" insofar as additional 
legislation was concerned. The Prosressives' Tictory did not, however, 
annihilate their opponents. A dual intellectual nature continued to 
characterize the New Deal, RooseTelt being unable to comait himself whole• 
heartedly to either the philosophy of •concentration and control• or te 
trnst•busting. After the recession of 1937, the President, according to 
Tugwell, finally saw the need for conjUDctural institutions, but by 1938 
21. Interview .l!ll!l writer. 
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tae expansion at the Axis gaTe foreicn affairs first priority, compellinc 
d..estic compromises which prevented the creation of instruments of con-
juncture. 
'l'he Conflict 
The Protaaonists 
Tugwell' Conjuncture 
As an institutional econcaiat, ~ll stressed the concept of 
conjuncture -- coordination of the aeon~ at the top level through cen-
tral allocation of resources, facilitated by federal incorporation.1 
Conjuncture, as Tugwell described it, ob'f'iousl:y would end laissez•faire. 
It would also end collusive ":Pri'f'ate planniq,• substitutinc non-collus-
ive public cooperation for clandestine price.fixins. Tugwell did not, 
however, contemplate government ownership of the means of production. 
Tugwell considered conjunctural institutions both legal and nec-
essary. Regardins legality, he emphasize& the historic basis in English 
CCDIIIOil law for a public interest in private enterprise. Conjunctural 
institutions would restore to public control •governmental• functions 
which business aad usurped in the nineteenth century. As for necessit:y, 
Tugwell basad his anti-antitrust position on the invincibility of the 
growth in optt.wa size of production facilities. Rather tban advocatinc 
breaking up inevitably buge production units, he cautioned that the:y 
llllSt not be able to work against the public interest. Conjuncture would 
1. See above. Chapter III, for the material summarized here. 
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end the Ye~lenian conflict, whose effects were anti-public, between the 
financiers and the engineers, enabling wider distribution of goode in an 
expanding •econom,y of a~ilance.• 
Tugwell considered the Prosressives' intention to •make the capi• 
talists behave• through antitrust lecislation and legal bans on immoral 
economic conduct inadequate for meeting the probleas which modern Taylor• 
ized industry created. The Progressives, he maintained, adhered to the 
disproven theory of the Smithian total. They believed that if the gov-
ernment broke up industrial combinations and enforced honest, the sum 
of individual efforts would equal the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber. They clung to the •one betrBTing weakness• of the American people, 
their making •an unrealistic fetish of canpetition.•2 
Concerning business etbics, Tuswell did not believe that tbe 
Protestant ethic had failed because .. n had not lived up to it. Unlike 
the Progressives, he looked at ethical questions on an tmperaonsl level. 
Men behaved immorally in business, he reasoned, because ~rality often 
3 
~ecame a condition of survival in the going e~onaaic systea, which compel• 
led men to adopt a speculative, short-run view. The system, institutions, 
not men, could change. Prosressive refoms did not get at the sources of 
human economic behavior. 
Granting, which he did not, for purposes of discussion, that the 
2. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken 1!M (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 441. 
3· See above, Chapter IX, Section, • ••• Attitude towards Business.• 
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the Progressives could Jllllke capitalists behave, Tugwell still would 
have insisted that the aeon~ which they envisioned was inapplicable 
to modern industry. Progresshiam ws • inadequate for enlarging national 
income,..4 Regulation, through Progressive reforms, of an atomized 
aeon~. was an attempt to hold back the hands of time: 
••• no sooner hed the efforts of large-scale production 
became obvious than there arose from the more reaction-
ary backwaters a demand for suppression, a demand which 
finally culminated, in the Federal field, in the anti-
trust acts, statutes whica have come to typify the re-
actionary-reform movement of the American progressives 
•••• 5 . 
The Progressive New Deal did not create conjunctural institu-
tions • ••• so that its elements of reciprocity could become permanent 
and its inflationary supports be dropped.•· As soon as it achieved a 
tolerable situation, the cry arose, •Back to freedom.• On and on went 
the unbalanced budget and subsidization of needy parts of the econ~. 
Withdrawals in 1936 of subsidies end relief expenditures, in an •unarti• 
6 
culsted1 econo~. brought a recession in 1937• 
The New Deal had not really done 11111ch. Its Progressivism did not 
deal with economic fundamentals: 
It is true that the Wilsonian reforms would finally, with 
much recrimination, be put through; the bull moose at lest 
would feed on the lilies of accomplishment. But that 
these were not important in the genuinely vital sense would 
4• Tugwell, R. G., "'After the New Deal: 'We Have Bought Ourselves Time 
to Think,'~ New Republic, Vol. 99. No. 1286, July 26, 1939. 323. 
5. Tugwell, R. G •• •The Directive,• Journal of Social PhilosophY and 
JUrisprudence, Vol. 7. No. 1, October, 1941. 27. 
6. Tugwell, R. G., 1 1.. Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,•· Journal 
111 EArll Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, February, 1939. 136-37. 
gradually be learned as the chronic frictions of 
economic life inevitably became again the center of 
attention. Depression, driven Qff repeatedly, would 
be still wa?ting, a gaunt wolf on the threshold of 
the future. 
Elrandeia: At0111isa 
lo61. 
The leading opponent, in both articulateness and influence, of 
Tugwell's anti-antitrust position was Mr. Justice Brandeis, a Progres-
sive trust•buster or atomist. Tugwell believed that if there ,.s one 
man in the nation whose opinion the President would consider at the 
final stage of decision-making level, that -n was Brandeis1 - an 
indication that the Justice possessed far greater influence than was 
generally known. Tugwell was aware fr0111 the beginning that he would 
encounter opposition from Brandeis and his followers, who, believing 
that bigness was badness, disapproved ot government planning and indus• 
trial integration. The NRA was a curse to Brandeis, who strove mightily, 
and successfully, to keep Roosevelt an old-fashioned Progressive. 
I.Qoking back over Branileis' career, Tugwell concluded that the 
Justice turned out to be •one of the !few Deal's astonishing paradoxes1~~" 
••• Mr. Justice Brandeis was one of the earliest dis• 
coverers of ~lor. He had suggested that Taylorisa 
might save the railrGS.d&o But as an interesting illu-
stratioa of the illlpregnability Qf orthodoxy, he had seen 
no connection between this and the inevitability of 
large-scale operations. He had gone right on using all 
7. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
QUarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 139. 
1. See above, this chapter, Section, •Roosevelt's Thought.• 
2 his influence for atoadzation. 
In the crisis of 1933, Brandeis, who had been a Brain Truster for Wilson, 
found another President responsive to his views in the person of another 
follower of Wilson. Here was the opportunity to enact regulatory acts, 
such as the Holding Companies Act and the Securities and Exchange Act, 
and to effect econ0111ic reform through the taxing power - all that was 
necessary, Brandeis believed, for restoring the econo~ to soundness. 
Tugwell implied that Brandeis turned to the taxing power because 
the antitrust acta had failed& 
It was wall known to President Roosevelt and his associ-
ates that Mr. JUStice Brandeis believed the taxing power 
to lte the road to betterment. '!'his, of course, was be-
cause 1ustice Brandeis believed that nothing more was 
needed to llreak the hold of concentrated wealth. '!'be 
power to tax was the power to-ke diainutive. The anti• 
trust laws were a forty..year old failure; they restM. 
insecurely on the CGmmeroe clause,3 
Tugwell considered Brandeis' single-instrument approach to economic proll• 
lema over•simplified and ineffective. It reflected a lack of familiarity 
with the intricacies of the going aeon~. Books such as w. z. Ripley's 
Ma!D Street :!!!.• Wall Street and Brancleia' other People's Money, which 
stressed the taxing power, showed that 1110ney, credit, capital, and cur-
rency were always "'aclmillistrative utters on which liberals were not quite 
clear;• consequently, 
2. Tucwell. R. G., "'!'be New Deals '!'he Rise of Business,• Part I, Western 
Pelitical Ch!!rterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1UD.a, 1952, 27n. 
3· Tugwell, R. G,, •'!'be New Deal: '!'be Decline of Government ,• Western 
Political QuarterlY, Vol. 4, No. 3• September, 1951, 481, 
'!'be f'illanciers were certain. to be rouply dealt with by 
the f'irst prol!ressive administration to cc:111111 alonl!• :Su.t 
no systematic chaD!!• was in the cards, nothing like gov-
ernment recapture of the f'iaencial function.4 
Moley, like Tugwell an allvocate of •concentration and control," 
pointell out the wide I!BP betwen the conjunctural instruments wich he 
and Tugwell advocated and the PrOI!r&ssive reforms which 2randeis ea-
poused. The NRA and AAA, Moley explained, vera intendell as collective, 
cooperative efforts by producers to gsin ayst ... tic control of produc-
tion. Essentially, both meaaures 
• • • apraD.I! froa a philesophy wilich encCIIlpaasell realllll 
unknown to those New Dealers wo drew initial inspira-
tion froa BraD.Ileis, and who VIIUlcl. have limitell Roeae-
velt to the reaedy of aiQae and the curtailment of 
•special privileges.•5 
The liRA, Tugwell asserted, was, like the AAA, the result of six 
(, 
mcnths of acquiescence in executive lea4ership. In 1935 Mr. Justice 
Carllozo, in an assertion of the •ald.-fashioned liberalisa which restell 
on legislative superiority,• issued a repr~D.Il for "cl.eleptien run 
riot ,• underliniD.I! what had happened. in 1933· 7 The NRA had, by 1935, auf-
fared the perTersion vhich befalls public Sl!encies when private interests 
take over their administration. The AAA retained its emergency features 
after 1935, but ita beneficiaries parTerted its basic coordinatinl! and 
4. Tugwell, R, G., "The New Deal• The Decline of Government,• 481-8:a. 
5. Moley, Ra,.ond, After Seven Years (New York, Harper, 1939) 3&9. 
6. Tugwell, R. G., :J:!a Stricgp ~(New York, Doubleday, 1947) 5'3· 
7• Tugwell, R. G., The Stricgn 1&B (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 5'3· 
D&lancing inteat.8 The publicity which the NRA and the AAA received 
tended to distort the picture in the public's mind of the impact of the 
two agencies and the relative influence of the contending schoola of 
theught in the .New Deal. Roesevelt turned away fr0111 the Brain 'l'Wuat 
because an altal'Jiativa, regulatory acta, w.s •available and ardently 
arpad for lay those he auire4 aD4 revered;• Mr. Frankfurter, •aurre-
gate for Justice Brandeis,• in his visits t• Albany ancl Hyde Park, 
••• argued, day in and clay ._t, for this approach to busi-
ness regulation. It w.s ne wy of •making liUle ones out 
of big ones,• It .as alae true that General Johnson liked 
it, terlaapa because he beliend taat while it was high-
sounlliq; it was alae innecuous. And Leuis Hove favored it 
because his guiding aat.Daity w.s a bitter auapicien concern-
ing the innstment bankers. It -ld not lte true te say 
that Adelf and I wra oppesed to ref01"118 of investment bank-
ing. We theupt refol'JIII wre necessary toe. lllut we did not 
believe the abuses they weald cerrect had auch to do wit• 
our situation. This is why the Celuabus pronounc-nt,,LReose-
velt's Progressive speech ia Ohio on August 20, 19~ sae .. d 
anticlillllctic. It ws ia the tradition of rural radicalisa, 
of LsJ'ollatte pro&ressivisa; it w.s what Theedore Reesevalt 
luui argued for. It was what Brandeis llelievecl.4l 
8. 'fu&wll, R. G., •A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• Jourpal !lt. 
lAm EcenO!IIica, Vol. 31, .No. 1, Fellruary, 1939, pe.asia. 
9· Tugwll, Ro G., •The Prcpoeaaive OrthHay of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
EthiCfo Vol. 64, .No. l, Octeber, 1953, 16; in 1956, the one hundredth 
anniversary of Brandeis' birth, several volu.es and a number 111f articles 
about Ilia judicial career appearacla KDnefsky, Sallluel J., The LeiUlCY of 
H9lys .AM Branjtia (New York, Macaillan, 1956); Freund, Paul A., •Louis 
D. Brandeis,• in Dunhaa, A. and Kurkland, P. 11., eds., !'!!:• Justice 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Preas, 1956); Pollack, E. H., ad., Ial 
Brandeis Reeder (.New York, Oceana Publications, 1956), which includes 
excerpts from a number of articles, books, and addresses about the 
JJIStice; Mason, Alpheus T,, Brandeis& ! Free Man's Life (.New York, Vik-
iq;, 1946) was reissue4; Dunhul, A., review of Mason, ilpheus T., !!A£-
lu Fisk!~ Pillar of the !.Ax (.New York, Viking, 1956) in Saturiq 
Reyiey, VII!. 39, No. 50, December 15, 1956, concluded that, "In the 
camp of Hol.Bes and Brandeis and later of Cardozo, for all their alleged 
liberalism, he ~one? found in general a like respect for the stability 
of Constitutional interpretation -- systematic and creative untelding 
of the law.•· 
The Winner: Barucll. 
In order to deteraine the winner of a match, one must ~e able 
correctly to identify the contestants, An attempt to ascertain the line-
ups of the collectivist and trust-busting teams of the .early New Deal 
tram popular and press accounts is like trying to identify the ball car-
rier in a football game played in a sea of mud which has obliterated 
the players' num~ers. Misidentifications reflected a failure to under-
stand the nature of the schools for which the contendia« BrOups stood, 
.ln editorial in the Wasl!.in,rlon Herald of May 8, 1934, entered in 
the Record by Senator Metcalf (Rep., R, I.), typified catch-all cOIIIIISnts 
on the President's advisers which luape4 them together without takin« 
cognizance of their various, claahilll: viewpoints. In noting that the 
American people were •sick of the brain trust,• the Herald associated 
'I'ugvell with ThOIIIla Corcoran, Counsel for the RFC, Benjamin Cohen, counsel 
for the Public Works Housi~ Authority, and Felix Frankfurter,1 Profes-
sor Frankfurter and his two protegees were Tugwell's implacable Progrea-
sive enemies, 
Frank Kent's columns were confused on the alignment of collecti• 
vista and trust•busters. In one col\IIID he iaplied that Frankfurter and 
Brandeis supported the NRA -· mad not Hugh s. Johnson, in person, fre• 
quently consulted with Justice Brandeis about the N. R. A.,..2 An 
1, Copgreuional Record, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 78, Part 8, 82o7-68, 
2, Kent, Frank R., Without Grease (New York, William Morrow, 1936) 159; 
Johnson, of course, favored coordination of business through the NRA, 
but he thought 1118re in teras of pins for business than Pl'OIIIOtion of 
the ~neral welfare. 
lob6. 
understal!lding of Branlieis' views would have made it clear to Kent that 
the Justice opposed the Brain Trust. Whatever Brandeis told Jebnson about 
the NRA undoubtedly constituted an attempt to counteract the collectivist 
direction of that agency. 
Reporters and publicists througbout the nation repeated the con-
fused coaaents of unliiscerning Washington correspondents. A piece of 
cam~aR literature of 1936 included this verset 
Three's a Crewd 
(With Apologies to the Shaae of Eugene Field) 
Frankfurter, Tupell, and Jill 
- these three 
Are busily occupied 
Runnin« the New Deal Machinery 
(And runniac it hish and vide). 
For Felix figures out brand New Deals, 
And Rexford labors with vim, 
And Farley sm80thly greases the wheels --
(A natural task for him). 
The new econ01Q' 1S kept in tria 
1ly Felix, Rexford, and Jim.3 
There were SOllie writings on the New Deal which correctly identi-
fied the adherents of the opposing factions among Presidential advisers. 
Max Lerner associated Branlieis with western populiBDl and atomism,4 Two 
professors, in editing a source book on problems in American political 
econOIQ', entitled one section, 'The Lillited Expectations of Progressives,• 
under which heading they treated Samael Gompers anli Louis D. Brandeis,5 
3· Braley, Berton, New~ Ditties (New York, Greenberg, 1936) 50. 
4• Lerner, Max, Ii .il Later lm You Think (New York, Viking, 1939) 156•57• 
5. Manning, ThOIIL'ls G, and Potter, IlaTid M., Government ~ the American 
EcAAO!!!f, 1870•Present; Select Probl'N ill Historical Interpretation 
(New York, Henry Holt, 1950) 20oo21. 
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Meley clearly stated the position of Mr. Brandeis' surrogate, FeliX 
Frank:turter: 
Frank:turter thoroughly disapproved of the N. R. A., since 
his prescription for economic ills vas the antitrust act 
•••• He disliked Rex Tugw8ll •••• For the whole philes• 
ophy of plannins Frankfurter .. intained intense opposition,6 
On the surface, Brandeis au Frankfurter practiced the conventional 
amenities in their relations with Tugwell, The Justice sent a message of 
consrstulations to Tugwll on his appoint11111.nt as Assistant Secretary ot 
Agriculture. 7 On December 12, 1933, J'rank:turter requested a copy of s. 
1944 (the Foo4 and Drug& Bill) from Tugw8ll, adding 1 
And arn 1t you having a swell tt-? Even from this ellll 
that's clear. Jut have you professors, abetted by a lot 
ot young, misguided lawyers, no pity? Why do you disturb 
your elders, if not your betters, so mnch?8 
It was Frank:turter, of course, who sent many of the •youns, ais• 
guided lawers,•' including Corcoran and Cohen, to Washington. Yet his 
note could possibly have been ambiguous. At first glance it appears to 
be a tongue•in-cheek jibe at the conse~tive die-hards who deplored the 
New Deal. But, did the disturbed •elders•' include Frankfurter hilllself? 
One can 11111.ke too much of a note penned in levity. In any event, Frank• 
furter vas no sponsor of Tugwell, Indeed, another letter from Frank:turter, 
6. Moley, Raymontl, s;z Ma,sters .S!f. Politics (New York, Funk and Wagnalls, 
1949) 1571 it is interesting to note that the accurate comments cited 
here appeared in the writings of 111en connected, at least pertly, with 
the academic world; they did not reach as large an audience as the 
newspaper columnists. 
7. Tywell Papers. 
8, Tugwell Papers. 
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reaching Tugwell by way of the White House, confirmed the Harvard pro-
feasor's Progressive philosophy. He suggested that same one in the 
Administration collect utterances against T. R., Hughes, and Wilson 
when they were trying to put througb their legislation.9 
Clarification of the campesition of the opposing sides promotes 
understanding of Tugwell's comments on the winner of the conflict. It 
was his judcment that the •planners• lost, and the Progressives won. 
He noted that references to the •Brain Trust• tended to obscure the 
victory of the anti-planners in the •education• of President Roosevelt --
a triumph which rendered the use of the tera •Brain Trust• ironic. It 
was obvious, Tugwell observed, that Roosevelt got a ••• good deal of 
that conjunctural education we had perhaps stilllulated him to feel the 
need of from other people who were not much noticed.• He listed Profes-
sora Warren and Frankfurter, Lewis DO\Ifllas, business men, and war horses 
of politics such as Swager Shirley, Homer Culllllings, Key Pitt11111nn, and 
James Byrnes, 
••• all of wham had decided views on the questions at 
issue, however sound or otherwise they mi~ht be accord• 
ing to our criteria. .And I can see now Ll9/S that this 
matter of soundness must have run heavily against us 
then, just as it did later • 
••• 
Ultimately, what those of us said who took this view 
lthat "fiXing up• the situation once, without going into 
control of incame, prices, and investment, would be effec-
9. Memorandum from FDR, May 28, 1934, Tugwell Papers. 
tive for only a short t~ would be proved sound 
enough. But I, at least, am ready to believe that 
for saae reason our lessons were bad. ones. Certainly 
when we had to compete vith General Johnson and Pro-
fessor Warren we were found wanting.lO 
Tugwell was aware of the Progressives' victory as early as August 
20, 1932. On that date Roosevelt made a speech which Tugwell, in review-
ing the campaiga, placed in this context: 
April 7s The •Forgotten Man• speech, in which Moley had a large 
hand; it involved a holistic commitment. 
April 18s A speech in St. Paul; it emphasized a •concert of 
interests,• a concept which Tugwell stressed. 
May 22: A speech at Olglethorpe University; written largely by 
Ernest K. Lindley, it emphasized social planning and 
experimentation. 
July 22: The Acceptance Speech; it stated Roosevelt's theory of 
the depression, an analysis similar to Tugwell's, point-
ing to experimental social planning rather than reform 
as the r-dy. 
August 20: The Coluallus speech; Roosevelt attacked Hoover not for 
bad planning, but for doing eny planning at all; he 
took the antitrust position, listing Progressive re-
forms; Tugwell had argued against this speech in vain; 
once or twice 1110re in the campaign Roosevelt 'IIIBde a 
bow" to the philosophy of social management. 
Sept. 14: The Topeka speech on the farm problem; it foreshadowed 
the AAA in a way general enough to hold promise for 
mid-Western farmers without offending conservative East-
ern democrats. 
Sept. 23: The Ssn Francisco Commonwealth Club speech, in which 
Roosevelt mentioned industrial self-planning and good 
and bad trusts; it represented an attempt by Berle to 
reconcile the Oglethorpe and Columbus speeches.ll 
10. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 145. 
11. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 10-18. 
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To Tugwell the Columbus speech meant the triumph of the Progres• 
sives and business interests who held that reassurance to business, 
through conservative financial policies, lowered government expenses, 
and reduced taxes, would end the depression: 
And it has to be recorded that immediate Presidential 
action was more consistent with this view than with our 
own.l2 
Especially in the matters of fiscal and monetary policies did it soon 
become apparent to Tugwell that Roosevelt's education was taking 
••• two turns toward what -s easy and meretricious and 
away from the severe plan which Adolph and I felt he 
must in all honesty follow. These turns toward orthodox 
views set his feet upon a path he was to tread for a 
long time.l3 
The President had decided, with regard to the use of government credit 
as a balancing mechanism, to follow the •practicality• of the business 
leaders as against the •radicalism• of TUgwell and others.14 And it was 
the •spokesman of finance and industry• who taught Roosevelt how to 
handle the banking crisis.15 
'Who were the •spokesmen of fiusnce and industry?"' Frankfurter 
and Brandeis were, after all, a professor of law and a judge, respectively. 
Their interest in the econ~ was ideological, not financial or managerial. 
Who stood to gain directly from the fact that Roosevelt, the NRA and AAA 
12. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• 143· 
13. TUgwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• 144• 
14. Tugwell, R. G., •The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 334-35· 
15. Tugwell, R, G., "The Preparation of a President ,• 147. 
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notwithstanding, •· ••• still clung to the Brandeis-Frankfurter view 
•••• ••?16 Who had little fear of a Progressivism which did not affect 
business on an institutional level and did not prevent the promotion of 
the •business confidence• thesis? 
Tugwell offered same testimony which serves as a response to 
these questions: 
For General .Tohnson was in our midst, and he proceeded 
from quite different base and cams out at quite a dif-
ferent end than Adolph Berle and ~self • 
••• 
Ours Ltheir vie~ implied a harsh, relentless discipline. 
General Johnson's implied a harshness only to those who 
were widely considered to have it coming to them. For 
nobody liked Y&terans except the veterans themselves, and 
nobody at all liked government employees, even others such 
as themselTes. If what had to happen was mostly directed 
at these two classes, the remedy was relatively easy. 
But if, as I, at least, felt, a heavy hand had to be laid 
on the very citadel of faith -- business -- and that it 
had rigorously to be directed and disciplined, that ws a 
hard solution to accept. 
We gathered these days to discuss not a memorandum, but a 
speech to be made by a candidate ••• who was obviously 
leading. The caTalryman in our midst made a good deal of 
difference. He was, on the whole, hostile to us and we 
to him. I appreciated his color and his real genius for 
invective. But I suspected his associations with every 
fibre of ~ being. I distrusted his principal, Mr. Bern-
ard Baruch, and I resented his coming among us after what 
we believed to be service with the stop-Roosevelt mo..-ement 
all spring,l? 
Bernard M. Baruch had been the 118ntor of f,ohnson and George N. 
16. Tugwell, R. G. and Banfield, E. c., •Grass Roots Democracy -Myth or 
Reality?,• Public Administration Review, Winter, 1950, 50. 
17. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 143• 
~ek since their service on the War Iadustries Board in World War I. 
Johnson became the first Administrator of the NRA. Peek ¥aS the firat 
Administrator of the AAA. The knowledge that Johnson and Peek 'WOUld 
become the heads of two of the most important agencies of the early New 
Deal reassured Congressmen wary of legislation allegedly authored by 
Roosevelt's •radical• advisers. It is also apparent that Roosevelt under-
took a political maneuver in order to pacify a potential source of power• 
ful opposition within the Democratic party. A friend of Peek believed 
that the latter would have been Secretary of Agriculture but for his 
friendship wita Baruch.18 Roosevelt was suspicious of Alfred E. Smith's 
staunch supporter. 
The treatment of history in terms of personalities can produce 
distortion as well as vividness. Yet, perhaps there is less distortion 
than there seems to be at first glance in designating, at least in s 
sy.bolic sense, as the victor over the •planners,• a man whose influence 
on the New Deal is generally miSUD4eratoed and underestimated -- Bernard 
19 M. Baruch. 
The Judge: Roosevelt 
Roosevelt being the judge of the contest, Tugwell ws not surprised 
lB. Fite, Gilbert c., George H• Peek .!AI! the Fisht for !!ill! Parity 
(Norman, University of OklahCllllll Press, 1954) 248. 
19. Tugwell, interview with writer, believeGl that the full story of 
Baruch's influence has not been told. 
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at the outcome. He liBS also a-re of forces, aside from the nature of 
the man in the White House, which would liait the pace and scope of the 
Administration's program. He knew the history of reform and Progres-
sivism in America demonstrated that a non-doctrinaire people, whose 
attitudes were far from explicable wholly in economic terms, would sup• 
port only so much reform in a generation -- largely in crises and only 
1 
so much even then. His own preference for evolutionary development 
and his aversion to impulsive moves tempered his youthful enthusiasm 
for action under the first Progressive President to hold office duriag 
a depression. 
Tugwell understood that politics in a democracy is a process ot 
compromise. Holding back from necessary measures was often not a mat-
ter of choice.2 A President, in order to accomplish anything, had to 
appease Congress.3 He had to consider the acceptability of a measure 
to the Supreme Court.4 He had to entrust administration of his policies 
to subordinates, who, receiving clear instructions only as to ends, were 
prone to make deals with key legislators, accepting •practical" or •ortho-
dox" solutions as to means ana postponing the quest for long•range goals.5 
1. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Tradition,• At1antic Monthly, Vol. 
155, No. 4, April, 1935. 
2. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President ,• Western Political 
Ouarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 146. 
3· Tugwell, R. G., •The New Desl1 The Decline of Gover~~~~~ent,• Part I, 
Western Political Ouarterl!, Vol. 4, No. 2, June, 1951, 311. 
4• Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal& The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 486. 
5· T~~«nll, R. G., •The CamprOIIIisiag Roesenlt,• Western Political Quar-
terly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 320•22. 
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Many of Tucwell 1s EDdernist colleacues were iapstient with taese 
•needa of the heaa of govera.eat.•6 Hs conceded that it was difficult 
to accept a pro~ that was 1 ' ••• just catching up with La Follette 
three decades later •••• ~ -- evea when one understood the reasons for 
the lag] lleiq an intellectual, wita an aversion to eJRC)tional cleoogoodisa, 
Tugwell dicl not share his colleagaes' tapatience.8 Nor did he agree vita 
the tolerant and patient who saii taat education was the only safe recourse 
for overclaiq the Mrriers in aea•s ainda to institutional adjustment. 
Notiq that the effects of ei1acation depended upon its aims. he -phasizei 
"'habituation,• pointiq out that the New Deal. having created some insti-
tutions in vhich people ca~y vent about their business in a new way, 
had .ade a beginning in this area.9 
ID retrospect, Tugwell wrotea 
It vas naive to assuae either that experiment would be 
tolerated or that it wouli be carried out. with any 
familiar techniques, on the ff'le llbich was inTolved 
in genuinely national pleas, 
FraJ1lt Kent • accoriing to ene of Ilia col111UU1 1 would have rejected the asser-
tion that Tugwell was not surprised at. was even resigned to. the limits• 
tiona of the New Deal. Kent wrote, •The e•rcency stuff just lillie Ilia 
6, Tugwell, R. G,, "After the New Deal: 1Ye Have Bought Ourselves Tiae 
to Think,'"' Nay Republic, Vel, 99, No. 1286, July 26, 1939, 320-22. 
7. Tu.K¥811, R. G., • After the Hew Deal a 'We Have Bought Ourael vas Tiae 
to Think,• 325. 
8. See abOTe, Chapter IX, Section, •Aversion to Crackpot Do-Goodiaa,•· 
9· Tugwell, R. G •• "After the New Deals •we Have Bought Ourselves Tiae 
to Think,' • 325· 
10. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 142. 
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LTUcvel1/ smile;"' ke had no intention of stoppinc whether New Deal 
pert.ents succeedei or failed, receTery or no recoTer,v.11 Soon after 
the appearance of Kent's coluaa, Ickes recorded in his diary under the 
date of Fe\lruary 2, 19.35: 
Tucvell is of the opinion that this Administration has 
done all that it can De expected te do in the vay of 
social alinnce. He thiake too tat tile President is 12 slippimc ana that the laic interests han hia stoppea. 
Tugwell, too, in a sensa, c-pro.ised. Seein&• without surprise, 
that illplementation of his lOD&•l'llD Tiews would not De forthcomin&, lae 
worked with the Prosressins, seekins ln a practical way to acccaplisll 
what he could for the American people in the situation in which he 
found ktmselt.13 The principal lt.dtins force in that situation, ·fram 
his point of Tiew, and the force which accounted more than any other for 
the failure of the ProcressiYe character of the New Deal to surprise hia, 
was the nature of the "'Skipper,• who, in a real sense, was truly repre• 
sentatiTe of the Alllericsn people, "' ••• refusing to risk endangerinc 
the integration of his followers in trying to improve their position.•l4 
What intellectual equipment, specifically in the field of econcaics, 
did Roosevelt bring to the White House? What environmental-intellectual 
11. Kent, Frank R., Without GlOYes (New York, X'il:liaa Morrow, 1934) 2l.7. 
12. Ickes, Harol4 L., nt, Seqret Dierv ~Harold .I.• Ic!tes; liU:1 .Qu., l!u. 
Firat Thrn•"!!d llu§., l93H93& (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1953) 
. 302. 
13. See above, Chapter IX, Section, "Tucwell's Prestige with Progressives."' 
14• Burns, JIIIIISs M., RooseTelt: !!1!.1!2!l and!!!! Fox (New York, Harcourt, 
Brace, 1956) 487n; see below, Section, •The Dichot~ of the New 
Deal,• for Tugwell's siailar Tiews. 
attacbDents and preferences in political aeon~ modified his application 
to practical problems of that knowledge ot economics Which he did possess? 
Critics• responses to these questions run the gamut from claims that 
Roosevelt's knowledse and practice aade him the right man, in the right 
place, at the right tille, for the survival or the American syst-, to 
expressions of regret that his shortcOIIIiqs, mental and sentimental, 
resulted in a program that was inaciequate to the task ot assuriq con-
tinuous econoadc stability and srovta. 
Critics• verdicts become understandable only in terms of their 
hopes or expectations. Criticism revolved around Roosevelt's familiarity, 
or lack ot familiarity, with economics at three levelss 
· 1. His understanding ot classical economics. 
2. Hie awareaess that classical theory failed to provide an 
accurate description of the aeon~. 
3• His lack of understanding of recent economic thought, 
particularly the Keynesian and institutional-holistic 
schools, which allegedly offered ways ot meeting the 
problems of a modern aeon~. 
These three levels were not, in fact, compsraentalized. Roosevelt's 
awareness ot the ina\)curacy of classical econOIIIics caused him to under-
take innovations which led staunch conservatives to conclucie anci charge 
that he knew little, if anything, about the economics which had prevaileci 
in his country since its foundiq. At the same time, Roosevelt '• attach• 
ment to traditions was one factor which limited both his understandiq of, 
and his commitment to, new economic policies. 
'llllS 
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The aharce that Roosevelt knew virtually nothing a8out economics 
not true.15 His recognition that classical economics was outmoded 
was a 8oon to the nstion in the opinion of many o8servers, including 
Moley and Tugwell. Tugwell asserted that •Roosevelt's schooling had 
taught hia mostly thince ••• that were not .,16 so. Tugwell also indicated 
that after graduation Roosevelt discovered the fallacies in the theories 
he had studied in colleges 
The postwar era was a q11apire, and it did end in a 
debacle for which those same LBpecial, speculativil 
interests ware solely and iaescapa8ly responsible. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt knew it then.l7 
Tugwell considered it to the nation's advantage that it ha4 a President 
in 1933 who did not 8elieve in invalid doctrines: 
The disorder in economic affairs, being complex, was 
hard to analyze. President Roesevelt, as he faced inaug-
uration, had no fixed theories about it, and so was bet• 
tar ott than the economists •••• 18 
Roosevelt's freedoa of blind COIIIIIitment to the past, together vitlt 
his political sensitivity, enable& him to 
••• realize a feat to which few who ware skilled in 
politics could rise -• that he not only could, but must, 
11eet problems bolily, an4 he -at do things that had 
never been done before.l9 
15. See above, this chapter, Section, •Roosevelt 1s Thought .•· 
16. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 
Western Political Qparterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, June, 1952, 279. 
17. Tugwell, R. G., •The C0111proaising Roosevelt,• 329. 
18. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,•· Part II, 
480. 
19. Hamilton, Walton, •When the lanka Closed,• in Aaron, Daniel, ad., 
Alllerica 1n Crisis (New York, Knopf, 1952) 281. 
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Roosevelt's resort to novelty infuriated die-hards; its limitations dis-
appointed advocates of fundamental change. He had rejected the past, but 
not completely. He had accepted the future, but, partly due to the ele-
lllents of the past which persisted in his thought, far froa completely. 
It vas Roesevelt's approach to the future which produced a dual• 
natured New Deal.20 It was his failure to reinforce his recognition of 
the need for something new with understanding of, and cODDitment to, 
basic new departures which disappointed among others, Tu!well and James 
MacGregor Burns, author of the first pelitical biography of Roosevelt.21 
They considered Roosevelt's knowlediS of economics inadequate on the 
P'Oilnds that a Presiclent, in 1933, needed to know more than ( l) classi• 
cal econOBlics and ( 2) that classical econOlllics vas wrong. 
Burns deplored Roosevelt's failure to exploit the potentialities 
of Keynesian econOlllics. Tugwell be-ned the President's limited know• 
ledge of holistic ideess 
It vas this more exact sense ot complexity, of tenuous• 
ness, of continuous trying tor llalence, that I think we 
IIS.Y l!lave helped hiJII. to t;et, together w1 th a sense of the 
possibilities of genuinely social action as against sup-
port for various individual interests • 
••• 
What I have been trying to say is that Mr. Roosevelt, with 
his fly-paper J&ind, had an enol'IIIOils fund of that informa-
tion which comes in handy ~where in public life, but that 
he vas almost grossly lacking in knowledge of the theory, 
20, See belov, this chapter, Section, •The Dichotom;y of the New Deal,•· 
21. Burns, James M., Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, •Roosevelt as an 
Economist,• 328-36. 
and at least liadted practice, in this other Lholistis/ 
field.22 
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Roosevelt's incomplete rejection of the past and his incomplete 
acceptance of the future left hU. in an essentially half-way, suspended 
state. He had a philosopby.23 He did not, despite a flood of crisis 
measures in 1933, have a fundamental program. The core of his philosophy 
of political econ~ was a readiness to use the power of government to 
redress the balance of the econaaic world. That readiness, Moley as• 
serted, did not constitute a national program.24 Moley s\DIJISrized 
Roosevelt's basic views: a belief that the government should achieve 
subordination of private interests to collective interests; a conviction 
that cooperation should replace the .ad scramble of selfish individual• 
ism; a profound feeling for the underdog; a real sense of the critical 
unbalances of economic life; a keen awareness that political democracy 
aould not exist side by side with economic plutocracy. These thinss, 
Moley concluded, represented a • ••• state of mind and heart thoroughly 
familiar in the United States;• but the desire to carry a democratic 
program forward was not enough to bring to the presidency.25 
Tugwell, too, recalled Roosevelt's arrival at the White House 
without a program. While the President's lack of attachment to fixed 
theories about the disorder of the econ~ was preferable to the rela• 
22. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• 141. 
23. See above, this chapter, Section, "The President and the Professor.• 
24. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Xears (New York, Harper, 1939) 13. 
25. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 13·14· 
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tively inflexible approach of a Hoover, rejection of orthodox ideas did 
not mean that Roosevelt had formulatad a new approach: 
,,, he had not really thought about it ,,, and, at the 
start, had hardly the beginnings of a program in mind -· 
with the exception, of course, of several orthodox re-
forms, He thought that with these, and with people fed 
and clotged who were hungry and cold, the emergency would 
be met,2 
As inauguration approached, disturbing, complicating factors entered 
Roosevelt's mind -- the idea of planning, the concept of balancing pro-
duction and prices, the notion that money was significant to the world's 
ills, the possibility of promoting economic justice through the taxing 
power --
With these ideas for equipment he would wrestle honestly 
and with a sense of imminent responsibility through the 
months of his aovitiate,27 
That Roosevelt assumed the nation's highest office without a fund• 
amental program in mind might appear attributable to the failure of Tug-
well, and others, who had been working with the candidate since March, 
19.32, as educators. Conceding s~ shortcomings in method and motivation 
on the part of the Brain Trusters, Tugwell concluded that they had, in 
the end, accomplished about all that they could in any case: 
Our calculations had had little result, perhaps; we thought 
so then, in despair. Yet there were many indirect conse• 
quences ef those evenings. If we had thought more of him 
26, Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal! The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
480. 
27, Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal! The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
480. 
and less of ourselves, and of our clever schemes, 
Adolph and I, ve might have been much more useful. 
But much as I should regret that early selfishness 
of purpose, it was tempered by the certainty that not 
Bllch more could have been done anyway. Mr. Roosevelt 
was getting what he thought he wanted. None of us 
could foresee that the deepening crisis would preci• 
pitate action quite so swiftly as in the end it did. 
It all centered,ct course, upon the depression and what 
to do about it. And the kaleidoscope of ar~nts 
moved ceaselessly all spring •• and, for that matter, 
all SUDDer. But the pieces began to make a picture late 
in the campaign. It vas a picture I did not like; and 
I failed if uw purpose was to influence policy. I had 
uw vindication as a social scientist later on, but that 
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was no consolation for a lost year of opportunities pas-
sed over. Mr. Roosevelt's mind was struggling all those 
months, evidently, to crystallize same program which would 
be more than the reestablishment of old institutions and 
their reform. We did not supply it for him; and he could 
not put it together from what he had available or from 
what anyone else should supply. This was the one needful 
thing; and he could not dig it out of us. If he came to 
the fourth of March, 1933, with what was generally regarded 
sa the Nation's worst crisis to meet and had to fall back 
on •the reestablishment of confidence,• on building up 
trust again in old institutions, that was our failure and 
his together. That it had a succescd'estime for the moment 
was seized on for too much justification. It is still true 
that Americans would have followed hbn anywhere on that day, 
and that he had no place to take them.28 
Having rejected the past, why was Roosevelt unable to commit h~ 
self to the future? He did not lack advisers who presented new views to 
him. He did not lack purpose -· his aims were not confused in general, 
only in particular; he meant to better the lot of common men.29 He did 
not lack desire -- he considered the solution of the domestic crisis his 
28. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 138•39· 
29. Tugwell, R. G., ru Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 22. 
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supreme historical test.3° He did not lack opportunity -~ in 1933 
• ••• the public's tolerance of innontion Lwe.§} far greater than even 
he realized.•Jl 
Politics, a knowledge of which enabled Roosevelt to innovate, also 
undoubtedly confined his cOJIIDitment to the future. His campaign speeches 
in 1932 illustrated the political principle that simplicity widens 
appeal. He abandoned sophistication for common sense and customary state-
ments of policy. Tugwell believed that simplicity was less practical 
than sophistication; the strategic elements of public policy were not 
easily understood lllfltters of c011111on sense. Roosevelt could afford to 
take some political chances in the interest of real leadership, Tugwell 
asserted in 1932, because his election was certatn.32 
On occasion the Democratic candidate referred to bold experiments-
tion with social devices. Tugwell concluded that such references often 
represented instances 
••• of verbal acceptance which either did not penetrate 
to the springs of Mr. Roosevelt's belief or was modified 
as it emerged into action end was compromised to suit an 
estilllflte of the political situation.33 
Tugwell's question, •could not a political campaign be educative in the 
true sense?,• furnished its own answer -- a political leader had first to 
30• 
31. 
32· 
33· 
Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 681. 
Hamilton, Walton, •When the Banks Closed,• 281. 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive OrthodoxY of Franklin D. Roosevelt ,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 1-2. 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of ••• Roosevelt,• 18. 
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assure election,34 Roosevelt responded to the party chiefs who coun-
seled caution, because they had concluded that nothing need be said to 
insure election; the less said, the less there might be to account for 
later.35 
Politics, or Roosevelt's political artistry, related to his 
intellectual inability to reject the past. 'His sensitiveness to poli-
tical values,• in the opinion of Professor Walton Hamilton of Yale, 
•stood in the way of the detachment essential to thinking problems of 
public policy through •• 36 Roosevelt's halfway position between the past 
and the future also stemmed from an essentially intellectual shortcoming. 
His deficiency vas not one of I. q. It was not an informational one, at 
least with respect to knowledge of the content and fallacies of classical 
economics. Even with regard to new alternatives, Roosevelt could have 
hurdled intellectual obstacles if he had been able, initially, to commit 
himself to basically new policies. ( J'undamentally new departures wre 
not involved in the conflict which arose from his Progressive reforms 
and his liadted acceptance, in an emergency, of relief and experiments• 
tion, and business• rejection, upon its partial recovery, of his crisis 
program.) 
Professor .Burns, in·· a provocative analysis, suggested the source 
of Roosevelt's unwillingness or inability to respond to the implications 
of the collapse of the old systelll. Expressing regret at Roosevelt's 
failure, especially in 1938, to exploit the potentialities of Eeynesian 
'l'ugwll, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of 
Tugwll, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of 
Hamilton, Walton, "When the Banks Closed.• 
... 
••• 
Roosevelt,• 18. 
Roosevelt,• 14. 
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economics, Burns concluded that the President simply could not commit 
himself to a system -- any system.37 In borrowing the phrase "fly-peper 
mind• to describe Roosevelt's lack of a special kind of intellectual 
discipline, Burns indiested that his conclusion was similar to the one 
at which Tugwell had previously arrivea.38 Tugwell concluded that 
Roosevelt had a ·~enuine indifference to systems of all sorts• on the 
basis of the latter's reaction to the philosophy of •concentration and 
Control• -- a philosophy which Burns, except for his inclusion in a 
list of opposing New Deal schools of the words •trust•busters and collec• 
tivists,• did not treat as an alternative available to the President in 
1938. 
Tugwell noted that Roosevelt, in considering holistic thought, 
was •unable ••• to visualize its practical embodiment in acceptable insti-
tutions.•.39 Undoubtedly, Roosevelt could have visualized integratine; 
institutions in operation if he had really tried. Yet he could not try. 
In the final analysis, his Jmowled~e of new approaches proved limited 
because he did not learn what he did not want to learn. He could not, 
for reasons other than any deficiency in intellectual capacity, devote 
his energy to the acquisition of knowle4~e, the application of which would 
mean the adoption of a systea• He •instinctively wanted a new interprets• 
tion,• but 
Burns, James M., Roosevelt: The l.12D and 1M 1:$ 0 •Roosevelt as an 
Economist,• 328-36. 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of 
Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of 
... 
••• 
Roosevelt,• 19. 
Rooseve 1 t • • 18 • 
The contriving traits of his mind took hold of sug-
gestions for better organization; in his thoughtful 
moments he understood the momentum of collectivism; 
but he pulled back from the sacrifices LOr private 
privilege and speculative hoRI? implied in acceptance.4° 
It is conjectural vbether, in an ultt.ate sense, Roosevelt's 
•main trouble was intellectual,•41 Perhaps the psychologist and the 
sociologist could discover deeper and wider reasons for wbat Burns 
called his •staccato• intellectual habits. In any event, Roosevelt's 
reaction to systems tied in with his adherence to his Progressive heri-
tags, Progressivism, with its refora and atomism, was, after all, legis-
lated good behavior in an enforced •no-system.• 
Tugwell, in a series of articles in The Western Political ~­
terly, outlined the environmental (or heriditary?) and political origins 
of Roosevelt's Progressivisa,42 Tugwell referred to the squire of ijyde 
Park in terms which bring to mind phrases such as •noblesse oblige• and 
•Tory democracy:• 
Human relations in the new Aaerica had lost their dignity 
and their mutuality • 
••• 
40, Tugwell, R, G,, •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Roosevelt,• 18. 
41. Burns, James M., Roosevelt: The !:!!a and~ Fox, 334· 
42. Burns, J"SIIles M., Roosevelt: The Lion and. the Fox, "A Note on the 
Study of Political Leadership,• 481-87, within a discussion of the 
relationship between a leader and his general environment, s~r­
izes recent scholarship dealing with inherited traits as against 
characteristics acquired in a particular environment, distinguishina 
between inherited traits and "heritage;• In considering the ques-
tion, •Who makes history, the lllln or the times?,• Machiavelli, in 
Chapter 25 of The Prince, concluded. that it was about fifty-fifty, 
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Mr. Roosevelt was apparently as far removed from all this 
unpleasant realization as any son of an old merchant family 
could well be. If any man llight be expected to treat his 
income as a matter of esta•lished ri~ht, it would be one 
whose assurance rested on a fallily prosperity which ante-
dated the English invasion of lllew York. He llight wll be 
expected to show surprise and resentment at the questioning 
of old arrangements. Stran&ely en111ugh, there survived in 
his heart an antique sense of responsibility. This had 
nothing to do with recognition of the changed nature of re-
lationships any more than did the far.ers' or workers' re-
sentment. It involved a certain mild indignation at the 
antics of the newer rich, a Dutch sense of need for the 
restoration of Order and an English feeling for fair play 
-- what his distant cousin, an earlier President, had cal-
led •the square deal.•43 
Further analysis discloses that this passage virtually summarized Tugwell's 
comment on the sources and nature of Roosevelt's Progressivism. 
Elsewhere, Tugwll noted Roosevelt's surprising failure to resent 
•the questioning of old arrangements• in other terms -- Roosevelt's 
8lll8zement at the crash of 1929 was "'Leas ••• , perhaps, than might have 
been thought poasibleo1 '44 The obserYBtion that Roosevelt's reaction to 
economic collapse "had nothing to do with the changed nature of relation-
ships• was another way of saying, 1 Jnd yet he too had not been immune to 
our national m,yths,•45 or, •But he ••. had a weakness for what was fSIIIiliar 
and trusted ••••• 46 In the end Roosevelt's affinity for the familiar 
deterained that the New Deal woult not be • ••• 'radical' in the usual 
43• Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 281. 
44• Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, September, 1952, 503. 
45. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 503. 
46. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• 142. 
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sense of the word.~47 
"'Indignation at the antics of the newer rich" and •an English 
feeling for fair play• involved, tn Jart, the religious basis for 
Roosevelt's Progressivism-- a basis which Tugwell emphasized in sev-
eral of his articles.48 Roosevelt believed in the capitalistic, busi• 
ness system and the Protestant ethic. He attributed the recent debacle 
to mismanag81118nt of corporate surplus, in economic terms, and to bad 
behavior, in ethical-religious ter.s. His 
••• underlying faith in business would really be measured 
by the capacity he would retain for outrage at each in-
stance of bad behavior. When such a man no longer becomes 
angry, I have often thought, then is the time to look for 
something spectacular. Until that time he is onl{ a 
reformer and will do nothing basically dangerous. 9 
Roosevelt's "indignation at the antics of the newer rich" also reveals& 
the influence on his attitudes of "his distant cousin, an earlier Presi-
dent,• vho desired that men of means behave in such a manner as to • • •• 
prevent any just discontent becoming a factor in the socialistic move• 
ment •••• 
.,so 
Tugwell dealt at soiDB length with the impact of Theodore's career 
on Franklin, pointing out similarities and differences between the Repub-
47• Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
483. 
48. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
486; •The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• Antioch Review, Win-
ter, 1953-54, 434• 
49. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 152•53· 
50. Tugwell, R. G., •The Two Great Roesevelts,• Western Political ~­
terly, Vol. 5, No. l, March, 1952, l89n. 
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lican Roosevelt of Oyster Bay and the Democratic Roosevelt of HYde Park. 
He observed Roosevelt's •sense of continuity from T. R.• in connection 
with the Food and Drugs bill,5l The cCJnservation movement, too, found an 
instrument in the administration of the cousin of that Roosevelt who at 
the turn of the century had publicized the people's lost resourees.52 
Progressive reforms such as the creation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the enactment of the Holding Company Act would have 
pleased Theodore, who 
••• thought of himself as saving the capitalist system 
by making the capitalists behave; Franklin, it must be 
judged, thought of himself in much the same way.53 
There were also significant differences between the two Roosevelts. 
Teddy's letters down to 1912 indicated 
••• how far he was from being a natural progressive, and 
they prepare the way for the suspicion that his espousal 
of the progressive movement was largely for his own pur-
poses.54 
As a •good government• man, Teddy passed the key progressive test in tae 
early years of the century. Yet, the compromise in his relations with 
Senator Platt and other politicos showed that •Perhaps he was merely per-
sonally incorruptible.• Franklin, on the other hand, •was an out-and•out 
progressive.• His first political battle in 1911 against the election 
as Senator of •Blue-eyed Billy• Sheehan, contributor to the Democratic 
51. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• 134· 
52· Tugwell, R. G.' •The New Deal: The Decline of Government , • Pert I, 
309· 
53· Tugwell, R. G., •The Two Great Roesevelts ,• 89. 
54· Tugwell, R. G., •The Two Great Roosevelts,• 88. 
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campaign but counsel for sinister utility interests, showed "his fix in 
the progressive matrix,• Though a party man, young Roosevelt 
Somewhere and somehow, ••• had acquired a set of attitudes 
and faiths which were already operative and which would 
remain so throughout his career.55 
Roosevelt's early allegiance to progressivism would be aTailable 
for leadership in the 1930's in tha attempt to overcome industrial 
depression, widen the distribution of income, and experiment with busi• 
ness controls -· all of which Theodore would have treated with •the 
contempt he especially reserved for reforms, 'reformers,• and •social• 
ist• aberations,• and with Theodore •socialism•· was a wide concept cov• 
ering even the movement for public ownership of utilities,56 It is 
conceivable that Teddy, probably having finally drawn, in 1912, a con-
elusion about the future of American politics similar to that at which 
Franklin had arrived in his first campaign, might have made the Repub-
licans the Progressive perty.57 As it turned out, Wilson, who also 
believed that a • . .. ground swell could be ridden to success -- and 
the long ground swell was toward progressivism,• created the setting for 
Franklin in the Democratic party.58 
In 1932, Tugwell learned in conversation with the President-to-be, 
Roosevelt believed that from then on the majority party in the United 
55· Tugwell, 
56. Tugwell, 
R. 
R. 
57. Tugwell, R. 
58. Tugwell, R, 
G.' 
G, • 
G., 
G., 
•The Two Great Roosevelts,• 88. 
"The Two Graat Roosevelts,• 89. 
•The Two Great Roosevelts,• 90. 
"The Two Great Rooaevelts,• 91. 
States would have to be a progressive one. Before the election Roose-
velt said to Tugwell. •we look forward to eight years of power. At 
the end of that time there may not be a Democratic party -- but there will 
be a Progressive one.•59 In the three decades between the governorships 
of the two Roosevelts, Progressivisa, of course, had changed. It was 
far from socialistic, but • ••• it was no longer abhorrent to speak of 
public ownership ••• of utilities, and the redistribution of income 
through the graduated income tax,•6° Roosevelt's prediction, if inac-
curate with respect to reorganization of the parties, was valid in the 
sense that by 1952 majorities of both parties accepted many Progressive 
measures. 
It was this Progressivisa, the progressivism of Alfred E. Smith, 
of Tom Johnson of Cleveland. of Brand Whitlock of Toledo. of Henry 
Hunt of Cincinnati. of La Follette and other Westerners. of the muck-
rakers, and of a stronger labor movement -- all promoting education in 
public grievance -- which Roosevelt inherited,61 Despite the NRA and 
the AAA, Roosevelt did not abandon his heritage,62 His recovery program 
operated within much the same limitations as Hoover 1s,63 The President. 
••• having no rancor. no revolutionary impulses, would 
allow discretion to control his impulses. Since psnic 
was on the land and business men had been trusted once, 
the quickest way to confidence again would be their re-
59· Tugwell. R, G., •The Two Great Roosevelts,• 90. 
60, Tugwell. R, G., •The Two Great Roosevelts.• 89. 
61. Tugwell. R. G., "The Two Greet Roosevelts,• 89. 
62, Tugwell. R. G, and Banfield, E. c., •Grass Roots Democracy -Myth 
or Reality?.• Public Administration Review, Winter, 1950, 50. 
63. See above, Chapter VI. Section. • ••• The Democrats' Depression.• 
habilitation.64 
••• he could see no way to get the nation back on its 
feet ••• except by restoring business to •prosperity.• 
This was what • recovery• meant. Yet there had to be 
some admixture of •reform• in recovery. This was the 
product of the "dear good people's' scruples. It did 
not go far, no further than would make the system 
operate tolerably,65 
He, like others, would spend a lot of time ••• pl4nting 
protective shrubbery on the slopes of a volcano,66 
The lle111i.lts 
The "Progressive• Nature of the New Deal 
1091. 
In 1935 Walter Lippmann stated that the emergency did not dictate 
Roosevelt's reforms. They were the 'logical consequences of the corpor-
ate form of industry.• They derived 'directly and inevitably" from the 
fundamental assumption that we haTe a national econom;y and from the 
principle that publicly subscribed corporations are publicly accountable, 
The new reforms, affecting enterprises such as trucking and gas, and 
regulating private finance and the capital market, simply extended to 
additional areas the underlying assumptions applied to railroads and 
central banking in the preceding era of reform. Even the seemingly novel 
or radical •recovery• program had a background of fifty years of advocacy, 
and occasional practice, of the concept of governmental responsibility 
64. Tugwell, R. G.,c ~The New Deal: 
302. 
65, Tugwell, R, G., "The New Deal: 
66. Tugwell, R. G,, "The New Deal: 
The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
The Rise of Business,• Part I, 329· 
The Rise of Business,• Part II, 503, 
for the state of the econ~.1 
Tugwell agreed with Lippmann that the New Deal had a historical 
background. Roosevelt did not invent the New Deal; he • ••• understood 
and took advantage of the progressive drift.~ Tugwell emphasized the 
emergency somewhat more than Lippmann. If the crisis did not dictate 
the nature of Roosevelt's reforms, it provided the reason and the 
opportunity for their enactment - an opportunity of which Hoover, Tug-
well argued, disagreeing with Lippmann, did not take advantage. Indeed, 
Tugwell concluded, Roosevelt, too, stopped far short of the point to 
which the American people were at first ready to follow him. And once 
the worst of the crisis was over, Americans quickly lost their reform-
ing mood. 
Tugwell wrote at length on the fuaction of crises and the oppor-
tunities they provided in the history Of United States. He was familiar 
with the pragmatic attitudes of the American people which led to their 
solving problems as they came to them. They came to them largely in 
crises, when 
••• fright overtakes privilege and reduces resistance 
to change; opportunity for creative ideas open out when 
something different is desperately enough needed. 
Only war seemed sufficient for inducing purposeful national organization. 
1. Lippmann, Walter, The New Imperative (New York, Macmillan, 1935) 
28-35. 
2. Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Tradition,• Atlantic Monthly, Vol, 
155, No. 4, April, 1935, 409• 
It was such a ~ ••• transcending objective that doctrine is willingly 
sacrificed in its service.• Tugwell was not a war-monger, but he 
believed that war showed • ••• the qualifications an objective must 
have in order to induce the sacrifice of prejudice and self-regard." 
He hoped for the emergence of a peaceful, •moral equivalent of war,•3 
Tugwell believed that our economic objectives were readily de-
finable: 
••• how to achieve more goods and more satisfaction 
in their making from new processes and keep the lib-
erties of a lower scale of living L;whicb7 can only 
be achieved by a concerted national scheme in which 
conflict disappears and creative impulses are fused. 
Short of this •conflict of competition in good works," we have to wait 
until • ••• pressures build up and force unwilling accommodation Lin-
stitutional reconstructioD/ to new technical situations.• Uneven 
progress through tours de force was • ••• wrought out in hatred end 
accepted with bitter resignation.•4 
Looking back on the crisis of 1929-33, in particular, Tugwell 
drew two main conclusions: (l) Roosevelt took far from full advantage 
of the situation; (2) the crisis mood of the people was short-lived. 
All that 1929 produced, he commented, 
4· 
5-
••• was the dusting off of same atomic reforms that 
had been lying around for fifty years -- unused or 
safely mismanaged by hostile administrations.5 
Tugwell, R. G., •After the New Deal: •w-e Have Bought Ourselves Tt.e 
to Think,'" New Republic, Vol. 99, No. 1286, July 26, 1939, 324. 
Tugwell, R. G., •After the New Deal,• 324• 
Tugwell, R. G., •After the New Deal,• 324. 
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All the shouting was over the measures which resulted i'rom six months 
oi' executive supremacy: 6 
Only by the accident oi' vast patronage in emergency 
agencies would President Roosevelt have, for a few 
months, the lever to move things oi'i' center and to 
come into some control oi' business.? 
The people were eager to return to their dream oi' • ••• easy, irrespons-
ible and uncomplicated living ••••• ,a In 1939 Tugwell saw no likeli• 
hood oi' improvement in the dominant policy-makers• attitude toward 
•modernity and its pragmatic way short oi' another crisis like 1917 or 
1929."'9 
Roosevelt's reactions to the crisis roughly paralled those oi' 
the American people. He, too, wanted to return to an uncomplicated 
world whose simplicity the rei'orms which his Progressive heritage die• 
tated would be sui'i'icient to maintain. Tugwell described the core oi' 
Roosevelt's Progressivism: 
Exemption from custaa and convention undoubtedly had 
contributed to the unprecedented speed oi' change. Busi-
ness was rapacious in a Christian world; it was spend• 
thrift in an economical world; it spread and expanded on 
an enQDmQus scale in a world which believed in small 
enterprise; it stifled competition almost at will in a 
world which believed in free trade; it set up arbitrary 
empires, governed by absolute dictators, in a world 
which thought itself democratic. Because it had been 
rapacious, spendthrii't, larj!;e-scale, monopolistic, and 
absolute, it thrived in the body politic like a cancer 
6. Tugwell, R. G,, The Stricken~ (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 563. 
7. Tugwell, R. G., •The Nev Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 312. 
a. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 441. 
9. Tugwell, R. G., •Af'ter the Nev Deal,• 324• 
among the normal cells of a living body -- and, like 
the cancer, it made its host ill. The New Deal was to 
be an attempt to reestablish the old virtues and to dis-
cipline the upstart cells. The disaster would be laid 
to departures from the eld paths of rectitude. Certainly, 
as he pondered these matters in Albany, that had been 
Governor Roesevelt's view. with Louis Howe a strong rein• 
forcing agent. Much public support could be counted on; 
for a politician to be a!Binst big business was a good 
deal like a preacher being against sin. There was plenty 
of sin -· and plenty of big business -- to be against.lO 
In the crisis Roosevelt saw the enactment of his cherished 
reforms. With his flair for innevation, he also sponsored some experi• 
mentation with social devices. But even during the crisis he turned 
to the •business confidence• approach.11 He followed •practical• busi• 
ness advice on fiscal and banking policiea.l2 His program beyond Pro-
gressive reforms really reflected a forgoing of his •country-squire 
concepts• during the emergency; when he felt thst the crisis was over, 
he reverted in 1936, to balancin« the budget.13 He did not have the 
••• temperament ••• of the real reformer. So he met issue 
after issue, as it arose, with an expediency. There was 
no attempt to reshape the econo~ to serve human needs 
through giving full reign to the dynamic impulses of busi• 
ness enterprise. Instead, the insistence was upon the 
measures necessary to make the old aeon~ a &eing concern 
10. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5. No. 2, June, 1952, 279• 
ll. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Govel'DIIISnt,• Part 
r. 302. 
12. Tugwell, R. G., •The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political 
quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 334•35; 'The Preparation of 
a President,• Western Political gn•rterly, Vol. 1, No.2, June, 
1948, ua. 
13. Milton, George F., ~Use !If. Presidential Power (Boston, Little, 
Brown, 1944) 276. 
again.14 
It ~s logical that non-Progressives constituted a minority of 
a Progressive President's advisers. Tugwell has described the modern• 
. ' 
ists 1 defeat: 
The stock and commodity exchanges had to be made less 
like •casinos•; holding companies must be killed; the 
international banksrs 1111ch be restricted; and bankint; 
must be separated from investment, About all these 
reforms no Progressive dissent ~s expected, They were 
lont; overdue, There were people, however, who might 
think that the program -- even linked to the most levis~ 
use of the spending power -- ~s not enough. Indeed, many 
would almost certainly feel th.is way. But agreement would 
not go far. Some would want to break up enterprise and 
return to competition; some would want to inaugurate a 
system of planning, cooperation, control, social management. 
These latter were to fight a losing battle, In an evolu• 
tionary sense, they would be right. Sometime, somehow, 
public policy would be shaped in the direction they would 
have had it take at once; but it would not happen quickly 
or easily. Orthodoxy would have too firm a hold on Pro-
gressive beliefs; control could be too conveniently likened 
to • CODIIIIIUiism,• which would long be a bugbear anywy; De.r• 
winism, with its doctrine of struggle and of the survival 
of the fittest would still seem applicable to economic af• 
fairs, Very few would really believe in cooperation or in 
planning, and least of all the Progressives •. Like generals, 
who are said always to prepare for wars on the pattern of 
the last one, the Progressives were beginning a New Deal 
outfitted with the strategies of the New Freedom and nothing 
else,l5 
References to Roosevelt's advisers can distort one's view of the 
origins of the nature of his program, A majority of his advisers was 
14. Hamilton, Walton, •When the Banks Closed,• in Aaron, Daniel, ed., 
America .!A Crisis (New York, Knopf, 1952) 281, 
15. Tugwell, R, G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol, 4, No. 3, September, 1951, 480, 
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Progressive because he was Progressive. Like many American leaders, 
he declared, his objective to be the betterment of American life, 
Unlike many American leaders, he came into office when a ruined social 
and economic structure made action both necessary and possible. But, 
••• he could not bring himself to the doing of what was 
necessary to its ithe crisis!? resolution. This was partly 
because he never understood with the hard, clear perception 
of a Wilson, for instance, what the situation was and what 
all its related elements were. So that he was always 
wasting precious political reservas on irrelevancies ••• 
antique reforms of antique a~ses, instead of keeping to 
the main course and shaping all his decisions to it. He was 
a progressive of the nineteenth century in economic matters. 
And it was in economics that our troubles lay. For their 
solution his progressivism, his new deal, was pathetically 
insufficient, which is why in 1944 he wanted to be forgot.l6 
One school of thinkers, including Tugwell, cited Roosevelt's 
handling of the banking collapse as a striking example of his Progres-
sivism at work in a crisis. In bailing out the banks and getting credit 
to flow again, Roosevelt enjoyed immediate success. •Such failure as 
there was,• wrote Professor Walton Hamilton, an institutionalist, •came 
in a long-time view.• 17 The public would have supported the creation 
of a truly national institution of credit, •· ••• but the opportunity 
was not at once seized, and presently it was gone.•l8 Hamilton asserted 
that the crisis program 
••• was not -- in no sense could it be -- radical. 
was no drive to the roots of the matter, no probing 
cover the ultimete sources of the troubles •••• 19 
16. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken~. 681. 
17. Hamilton, Walton, "When the Banks Closed,' 282. 
18. Hamilton, Walton, •When the Banks Closed,• 282. 
19. Hamilton, Walton, "When the Banks Closed,' 281. 
There 
to dis-
Hamilton's views on the banking measures of 1933 and the New 
Deal in general were similar to those Of Tugwell, who observed, "The 
strange thing about it fthe New DeaJ] was the weakness of the medi• 
cine prescribed for the sickness which beset us,.,20 Americans and 
their President were not ready to build a new national house; they 
made extensive and unsightly patches in the walls and roof,. without 
strengthening the foundation, because patching was • ••• all the New 
Dealers knew how to do or all their enemies would let them do • .21 
It is interesting to note that Tugwell's published opinions on 
the Progressivism of the New Deal exhibited consistency from their 
first appearance in 1939 through 1953, when he wrote a series of 
article for The Western Political 9.uarterly, and later.22 In late 
1953 he elaborated, in an article in The Antioch Review, on his basic 
estimate of the New Deal. He asserted that, in retrospect and per• 
spective, the. fight between the Democrats and Republicans took place, 
and continued to take place, between relatively narrow limits.23 
President Eisenhower's praise of Alfred E. Smith and Herbert Hoover's 
tribute to Woodrow Wilson in the 1950's supported Tugwell's analysis. 
A final note about the ~uantitative aspect of the New Deal 
appears appropriate, in view of the fact that a difference in degree 
20. Tugwell, R. G,, •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, September, 1952, 496. 
21. Tugwell, R, G,, The Stricken~. 22. 
22. Tugwell, R. G,, •After the New Deal ••••" appeared in 1939· 
23. Tugwell, R. G,, "The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• Antioch 
Reviey, Winter, 1953•54• 
can be a difference in kind. Statistics refute the argument that big 
govel'IIIMnt meant a gigantic welfare system. In 1950 five cents of 
each federal tax dollar went towards public assistance for widows, 
orphans, the aged and the blind; education; rehabilitation of the 
handicapped; eradication of slums; health improvement; national parks, 
museums, and libraries; and the school-lunch program. The total ex• 
penditure for these purposes was less than one per cent of national 
income in fiscal 1950. Public funds, at all levels of government, 
devoted to health, education, and assistance to the needy amounted 
to two-thirds of expenditures on liquor and tobacco,24 
Tugwell's institutional thought did not pertain to the wel• 
fare state• It emphasized a releasing of the dynamicism of private 
enterprise in a way which would reduce welfare problems to a minimum. 
It rejected the Progressives' formula for achieving vitality and sta• 
bility of private enterprise. Progressives confused •private• enter-
prise with •free• enterprise; they regarded business liberty as a 
•final objective• of all policy,25 Yet, even the inadequacy of Roose• 
velt's programs did not necessitate a welfare state.26 Welfare sta• 
tistics did not refute Tugwell's judsment that the New Deal was Progres-
siva. 
Childs, Marquis w. and Cater, Douglass, Ethics in.!!. Busines~ §221• 
~ (New York, New American Library, A Mentor Book, 1954) 2 -27. 
Tugwell, R. G,, 'After the New Deal •••••" 323. 
•Welfare state• often brings to mind Great Britain, whose economic 
problems are not analogous to ours. 
1100. 
The •Death• of the New Deal 
The New Deal, the Progressive off•spring of crisis, had a 
short life. It was limited in time as well as in penetration towards 
the roots of our economic troubles. Estimstea of the dates of its 
contraction of fatal illness and of its "death• vary. •Death,• of 
course, refers to the cessation of legislation. It does not mean 
that what was done has not had a continuing impact on American life. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of June 25, 1938, marks a terminal 
point within which the estimates of virtually all students of the New 
Deal fall. Obviously, the observer who considers intention or spirit 
the key criterion of health places the onset of useless senility 
some time before 1938, looking upon the date of "death• as an insigni-
ficant technicality. 
Beginning in 1939, Tugwell often asserted in his articles that 
the New Deal 'W!lS limited in its impact and in time. He stressed the 
increasing resistance to governmental action as the nation emerged from 
crisis. The resisters forced compromise after compromise on the Presi-
dent, finally stopping the New Deel dead in its tracks. Roosevelt, to 
••• a degree just less than vas true of Wilson, ••• was 
to be frustrated. It would come in a different way be· 
cause of his different character. He would give away in 
compromise most of his earlier gains, rather than lose 
them in one great defeat. But they would nevertheless 
be lost. By 1942 there was very little left of the New 
Deal. Soon he would repudiate it altogether.! 
1. Tugwell, R. G., :Dl£_ Stricken Land (New York, Doubleday, 1947) 442• 
llOl. 
•Sabotage,• in addition to compromise, contributed to the demise of 
the New Deal. It was so successful that 
••• very little of it Lthe New Dea.!/ had survived at 
all -- and that little the reformist rather than tae 
reconstructive part.2 
The loss of the •reconstructive part• referred to Roosevelt's aband-
onment in 1935, under Supreme Court displeasure, of a concept he 
never again espoused, "' ••• an acceptance by the government of the 
responsibility for conjuncture.•3 (The Court •s "displeasure• was its 
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the NRA and the AAA.) 
Tugwell wrote in other terms than •saboteurs• and •resisters.• 
He emphasized the influence of "business,• which forgot its "fake 
repentance• as soon as it got over its fright of the emergency.4 Busi-
ness poured its renewed strength into 
••• its lobbies, its control of mass communication media, 
and its resistance to change of any sort. This resistance 
perverted NRA; it hindered labor legislation, higher taxes, 
unemployment relief, and social security.5 
Allied with business, in a partnership which illustrated the adage that 
•c0111110n enemies make strange bedfellows,• were the Progressives. Roose-
:··' 
velt largely abandoned his program of economic reorganization because 
2. Tugwell. R. G., WMust We Draft Roosevelt?,• New Republic, Vol. 102, 
No. 1328, May 13, 1940, 632. 
3· Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• Antioch 
Review, Winter, 1953-54, 437• 
4• Tugwell. R, G., "The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol, 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 139, 151. 
5. Tugwell, R. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political~­
terly, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1953, 329. 
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••• a curious coalition of speculators and old-fashioned 
prog~essives was more powerful than the forces of modern-
ism. 
Congress also came under Tugwell's scrutinity in his survey of 
the opponents of the New Deal. As recovery proceeded, Roosevelt 
could not gain acceptance for new instruments by Congressmen who 
would • ••• no longer cleave to his will.•7 During the war Congress 
killed off New Deal agencies one by one by perverting the legislative 
process into a struggle among private interests for advantage; •Gov-
ernment,• Tugwell protested, •ought to be more than that.•8 Being 
incapable of making a policy which • • •• rose above this level or 
which to any degree embodied the people's aspirations,• Congress pre-
vented executive action.9 
• • •• 
Finally, Tugwell referred to •the people,• who, upon recovery, 
would no longer be greatful for renewed faith in themselves.• 10 
0'The people,• of course, fell into a number of categories, of which 
Tugwell mentioned two in particular -- one economic and one regional-
political. In a sense the New Deal helped to bring about its own 
decline; the middle-income group widened with recovery and took on a 
conservative color.ll As for the Southern Democrats, most of them 
6. Tugwell, R. G.' •Must We Draft Roosevelt?,• 630. 
7· Tugwell, R. G.' "The Preparation of a President,• 139· 
8. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 436. 
9· Tugwell, R. G.' The Stricken Land, 436. 
10. Tugwell, R. G.' •The Preparation of a President,• 139· 
.11. Tugwell, R. G.' "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 325. 
"bitterly hated• the policies o~ the New Dea1.12 In fact, Tugwell de-
clared, • ••• the basic disloyalty in Washington, which overshadowed 
all others, was the disaf~ection of the reactionary South;• and by 1942 
the reactionaries were dominant.13 
The Southern Democrats participated in a vital transaction wh~h 
showed the close relationship between domestic and foreign affairs. Tug-
well explained the "deal• which resulted ~rom Roosevelt's determination 
by 1936 that stopping the Nazi-Fascist threat was by far the top-pri• 
ority current goal, justi~ying almost any necessary compromise. The 
New Deal, 
••• with some gains registered, ••• was brought to a 
~ull stop as the price of adequate preparation for 
approaching world conflict. The epitaph was provided 
when •Dr. Win-the-War• was acknowledged to have taken 
over from "Dr. New Deal• /;t a Presidential press con-
~erence in 19~7 • 
••• 
For in spite o~ sedulous cultivation of political means 
and their skillful use by a masterly team, power slipped 
from the President's hands at crucial times and compro-
mises of substance had continually to be made. The New 
Deal had finally to be abandoned in a grand ~inesse to 
gain consent to strengthening the military in prepara-
tion for wr. The political method ws not enough; in 
the end domestic reform had to be traded ~or national 
security.l4 
The Southerners said to Roosevelt, •We'll support your anti•Axis foreign 
policy if you'll cut out that New Deal stuff with its 'bold new experi• 
12. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• 139. 
13. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 541-42. 
14• Tugwell, R. G., •The Compromising Roosevelt,• 329, 340. 
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Tugwell's comments on the "death" of the New Deal included refer-
ences to the following years: 1935, 1936, 1942, 1944. His references to 
•a few months of executive supremacy• carried the dste of contraction of 
fatal illness back to late 1933• From the standpoint of his institutional 
views, 1935, when the definite •abandonment of conjuncture• occurred, 
was the most significant year. 
Samuel Lubell, the noted political analyst, attached great 
importance to 1935, "The Year of Decision,• in which the American people 
decided, in essence, to go on to the new and •reshape• America rather 
than go back to the old.15 Perhaps there is some justification for quar• 
reling with Lubell, as the Monophysites quarreled with the Nestorians, 
over the use of prepositions. Did Americans decide to go on •to• the new 
or •with" the new? The desire to retain gains did not necessarily imply 
a continuing zeal for reform. It appears that many people, perhaps a 
majority of those who contributed to Roosevelt's smashing victory at the 
polls in 1936, voted against a return to unchallenged business dominance 
rather than for additional ventures in experimentation, 
Turning from a consideration of the people's attitude to that of 
their political choice, one can see that the President, by 1936, was 
• • •• willing to stand on what has been done.•l6 The historian George 
15. Lubell, Sauruel, The Future of American Politics (New York, Doubleday, 
An Anchor Book, 1956) 47. 
16. Bolles, Blair, •Prose and Politics: Writers in the New Deal,• Satur-
daY Review, Vol. 21, No. 23, March 30, 1940, 17. 
Fort Milton considered it s significant fact that, after the first term, 
the President effected • ••• practically no basic change in our social 
and economic institutions.• Milton considered suggestions that changes 
in Roosevelt's advisory personnel accounted for the •atrophy of the 
experimental urge,• and rejected them. •Far more important as a factor,• 
Milton concluded, •was the President himself,• 17 
It appears that Roosevelt reverted to his Progressive heritage 
in 1936, It is possible, though largely indeterminable, that he harbored 
a desire to expand the New Deal which, in the inner recesses of his 
mind, he decided to suppress in anticipation of strong opposition. His 
deep concern with developments overseas, and the limitations which his 
foreign policy, because of the Southerners' attitude, imposed on possibi-
lities for domestic legislation, clearly were operative factors. In any 
event, he did not act as if he interpreted his 1936 majority of eleven 
million as a mandate for further militant pursuit of a New Deal for the 
American people. Predictions that a Roosevelt victory in 1936, accompan-
ied by an uncooperative attitude on the part of business, would bring 
about a drastic swing to the left and the end of the Constitution, courts, 
and individual liberty proved puerile.18 Perhaps 1936 provided confirma-
tion of a Presidential attitude which was apparent to Tugwell in 1935• 
17. Milton, George F., The Use of Presidential Power (Boston, Little, 
Brown, 1944) 275. 
18. Kent, Frank R., Without Grease (New York, William Morrow, 1936) 398; 
Elliott, William Y., The~ for Constitutional Reform (New York, 
Whittlesey, 1935) 44. 
Tugwell's concern, and regret, that the New Deal we.s Progres• 
sive and short-lived did not mean that he considered ~t a total failure 
or that he believed it "died• in a total sense. If it did not implement 
his institutional ideas, it was preferable to the Hoover alternative. 
Roosevelt at least •saved• the iomestic situation.19 The New Deal had 
bought 20 • ••• not only time but a multitude of blessings •••• • 
Certainly there would be no return to the •good old days• of the 1920's. 
The post-1937 Supreme Court generally accepted the power of government 
to regulate economic matters when there was a reasonable basis for the 
legislative belief that welfare was promoted. In 1939 Tugwell stated: 
No one, perhaps, or, at any rate, very few by now, 
would deny that there is a public interest in business. 
The New Deal must have wiped out the last indefilable 
area. It becomes then a matter of degree rather than 
kind: public enough to be regulated ne~tively but not 
enough to be directed positively, perhaps. But what a 
far remove even this is froa 1928121 
The "Dichot~· of the New Deal 
The dual nature of the New Deal was more readily apparent in 
the realm of intellectual than in legislative history. It was more under-
standable in terms of what vas not done than in terms of what was done. 
It reflected the intellectual state not only of the President, but also 
19. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 681. 
20. Tugwell, R. G., "After the New Deal: 1We Have Bought Ourselves 
Time to Think,'"' New Republic, Vol. 99, No. 1286, July 26, 1939, 
325. 
21. Tugwell, R. G., "The Fourth Power,• Planning and Civic COllllllent, 
April-June, 1939, Part II, 13n. 
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of the nation as a whole. 
It is possible profitably to relate legislative matters, 
especially the NRA and the AAA, to intellectual developments. Creation 
of the NRA and the AAA did not mean that Roosevelt had totally abandoned 
his Progressive heritage. The abandonment of the NRA and the AAA did 
not mean that he had completely reverted to his Progressive heritage. 
This intellectual state, which resulted from only a partial rejection of 
the past and only a partial acceptance of the future, accounted for both 
contradictions and indecisiveness in the New Deal, 
Moley described the intellectual dilemma of the New Deal in 
economic terms, • ••• Roosevelt's refusal to make a choice between the 
Bhilosophy of Concentration and Control and the Philosophy of Enforced 
Atomization.• He noted a shift from an emphasis on Concentration and 
Control in the early New Deal to a wavering between the two approaches 
after the invalidation of the NRA in 1935· This wavering was the • ••• 
basic fault in the congeries of the administration's economic policies •••• •1 
Tugwell, too, described Roosevelt's hesitation between two poli-
cies, which resulted from his being caught between two worlds. In 1932, 
in Albany and ayde Park, Roosevelt wondered: 
Where had that world gone which he had hoped merely to 
lllllke better in familiar ways? He had not meant to do 
more than see through some cherished reforms, and beyond 
that to use the powers of his prospective office to en-
1. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years (New York, Harper, 1939) 372-73• 
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hance the prestige of his country.2 
Tugwell traced the dichot~ of the New Deal at least back to September 
23, 1932, when Roosevelt tried to reconcile collectivism with Progres-
sivism in his Commonwealth Club campaign speech in San Francisco.3 
Like Moley, Tugwell saw dichot~ continuing beyond 1935, as Roosevelt 
sought in vain to discover a positive control of prices without violat-
ing the antitrust ideology, • ••• yet he dared let go of neither ••• 
indefinitely into the future •••• .4 The desire to reconcile opposites 
proved to be an • ••• impossible challenge, ••• the source of costly 
confusion.•5 
Roosevelt's bewilderment, Tugwell asserted, was characteristic of 
Progressives in general. They were torn between attachment to their tra-
ditional attitudes and the demands of a new technological era• 
The contemporary adherents of that reformist strain in 
American life which came out so clearly in the Progres-
sive political program are normally opposed to planning 
and especially to direction. The reformers do not want 
a more efficient industry with all its implications 
nearly so much as they want free scope for individualism. 
Having this aim they fear governmental repression even 
more -- much more, it somet~s seems -· than compulsions 
frcm private sources. This is doubtless more a matter of 
emphasis than of outright preference of one system for 
another; and it is easily accounted for on historical 
2. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal1 The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, June, 1951, 312. 
3• Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 17. 
4. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
308. 
5· Tugwell, R. G. I "The New Deals The Decline of Government ,• Part r. 
308. 
grounds; but the conflict involved in the contrast• 
ing attitudes has prevented the New Deal, for 
instance, from formulating and carrying out a progrelll. 
It is fundamentally a fear of regimentation which ali-
enates progressives from a program of planning. There 
is another, an inner, conflict which is destroying the 
old progressivism. This is the increasing incredibil-
ity with which its program is viewed by realists among 
the rising generation, Retreat to an atomized industry 
in order to gain a theoretical freedom seems to them 
more and more unlikely as technical changes cumulate.6 
Tugwell also saw puzzlement and hesitation in the attitudes of 
farmers, who wanted to eat thier cake and have it too, As farmers, they 
wanted markets for all they could produce. As voters, they would not 
accept the drastic modifications of the econo~ which the creation of 
their kind of market required. They wanted assistance in •palatable~ 
form or •· ••• in ways of which they need not be made conscious • , •• • 
When they produced surpluses, whether they were consumed, dumped abroad, 
or into the sea, •· ••• they preferred not to haYe to choose.• The farm-
ers' inconsistency put planning officials in a dilemma which caused Henry 
Wallace to write his protesting pamphlet, America .Mu§1 Choose.7 
The perplexity of the President, Progressives, and farmers reflec-
ted the confusion of the people in general. They looked on the depression 
and the resulting program as a temporary deviation from familiar wsys, 
Tugwell and Moley, of course, based their recommendations on the assumption 
6. Tugwell, R. G., •The Fourth Power,• Planning and Civic Comment, April-
June, 1939, Pert II, 13. 
7• Tugwell, R, G,, •A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• Journal 
of Farm Economics, Vol, 31, No, 1, February, 1949, 34, 34n. 
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that the nation was not • ••• suffering a hangover from a single specu-
lative orgy in 1932, but that it had chronic dyspepsia of its economic 
system,• 8 To Tugwell, a return to familiar ways would be a return to 
boom and bust, to an economy in Which a "' ••• few points of rigidity 
in the price structure, a few monopolies, had set the whole system pivot• 
ill8 upon them in wild gyrations.•,<J Roosevelt, too, did not want to go 
back to violent cyclical fluctuations. At the same time, he tended to 
hold back from holistic ideas, revertill8 to an older way of thought. In 
retrospect Tugwell concluded that 
• • • our candidate was more typical of the American mind 
than we were then able to appreciate, ••• It was in this 
sense that Mr. Roosevelt was typical; he edged away from 
difficult reality. The nation was advancing into a future 
Which was no more than half understood, Which, psychologic-
cally, was resented, and yet Which produced things and ser-
vices which people could no longer do without. A stage in 
intellectual history had been reached at which the New 
Deal would linger for years, unwilling to name the sacri• 
ficas of private privilege and speculative hope necessary 
to a world in which security is achieved by management 
rather than by nature's largesse or by good luck. This 
lingerill8 between two worlds would be reflected throughout 
American life and more especially in government policy; it 
would be evident in the cautious and half-hearted approaches 
we should make to any guarantees of security as well as to 
overhead management of industry,lO 
Tugwell's comment indicated how Roosevelt, in a meaningful way, 
really represented the people. They did not want to choose between abandon-
8. Moley, Raymond, After Seven Years, 369. 
9· Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, September, 1952, 495. 
10. Tugwell, R. G., •The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt •"' 
2-3· 
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ing big business to go back to • ••• an earlier form of organization 
which could survive without discipline •••• ,• and attempting • ••• the 
great·,advanture of national planning.• Neither did their President.11 
The Progressive nature of the New Deal was a matter of relative 
emphasis. In the matter of legislation, the prevalence of Progres-
sivism determined the nature of most of what was done. Intellectually, 
the prevalence of Progressivism did not eliminate holistic thought. 
Hesitation between the two determined that a lot of things were not 
done. Roosevelt was somewhat aware of the impact on modern life of 
collectivistic forces, 
But we had ridden so high, so wide, and so handsomely, 
down the broad highway of the 'twenties that we could 
not believe that what lay ahead was anything but a detour. 
Soon, we thought, we would bs on the highway again. The 
years of the depression would largely be wasted in the 
search for that highway.l2 
1938: Too Late to Reverse the Decision 
Roosevelt was far from ignorant in economics. He knew about as 
much as anybody else, or, to put it less positively, about as much as 
he needed to know, about classical or Progressive economics.1 His dis-
trust of systematic economic theories, 1ames M. Burns commented, 
••• freed him from slavery to ideas that would have been 
11. Tugwell, R. G. • •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part II, 
495· 
12. Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise Of Business,• Part II, 
495· 
1. See above, this chapter, Section, •Roosevelt's Thought .• • 
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risky in the 1930's,_ But ~ the same time, that distrust 
helped cut him off Lin 19~ from the one economist and 
the one economic idea that might have provided a spectacu• 
lar solution to Roosevelt's chief economic, political, and 
constitutional difficulties.2 
Burns referred to Keynesian economics, for which Tugwell would have 
substituted "direction,• or •conjuncture.•3 
Tugwell's chronology of Roosevelt's attitudes towards economic 
policies differed from Burnsl In 1933, it is true, the President knew 
very little about holistic thought, but in the next few years he 
acquired knowledge of collectivist ideas. It was then, before 1938, 
that his distrust of systems •cut him off" from attempting to create 
conjunctural institutions. By 1938, after the shock of the recession 
of 1937, he was ready to try new policies. 1938, for reasons other than 
Presidential ignorance or hesitation, was too late. 
Tugwell recalled how Roosevelt • ••• grew slowly into an appre• 
hension of the deep contrast in these two positions•4 •• the collecti• 
viet and the Progressive, both of which he had espoused in his 1932 
campaign speeches. Not only did the President learn, Tugwell observed, 
but he also 
••• provided himself ••• with our line of defense if it 
should be needed; he was at onePtime equipped with a 
revised Federal Reserve which could influence the volume 
2. Burns, James M., Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York, Harcourt, 
Brace, 1956) 329-30. 
3· See above, Chapter III. 
4• Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. l, October, 1953, 3· 
of credit and, to a certain extent, prices; with an 
NRA which could effect a control in industry over 
production and prices; with an AAA to manage farm sur-
pluses and prices; with an RFC to stimulate business 
through direct loans; with relief and public works 
funds for expanding consumption; and with flexible 
power over tariffs ••• and wide monetary powers.5 
Roosevelt used these instruments and powers in a halfway manner. "The 
trouble with deficit spending,• Burns asserted, •was that halfway appli-
cation did not work.•·6 Tugwell would have said the same about conjunc• 
tural devices. Mesn~ile, Roosevelt's education went on: 
Reemployment by General Johnson's blue eagle methods 
would help some and public expenditures -- when they 
finally should get started -- would help more, but 
nothing, finally, in later years would serve to con-
ceal the need for fundamental change. Like a child 
in a progressive school, Mr. Roosevelt learned by doing •••• 7 
The climactic lesson in Roosevelt's schooling was the recession 
of 1937, which followed the President's reversion to budget-balancing. 
"The recession of 1937,• Tugwell wrote, •was to be a hard lesson for 
the Rooseveltians .• 8 Writing in 1952, Matthew Josephson implied that 
the recession was a hard lesson for •Even so ardent a Rooseveltian as 
Professor Rexford Tugwell •••••. 9 John T. Flynn condemmed Roosevelt 1s 
favorable response to Tugwell's suggestion, after the recession of 1937, 
that the Administration increase both spending and planning.10 
5. Tugwell, R. G., •The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 145. 
6. Burns, James M., Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 335· 
7. Tugwell, R, G., "The Preparation~a President,• !46~· 
8, Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol, 4, No. 2, June, 1951, 283. 
9· Josephson, Matthew, Sidney Hillman (Garden City,·Doubleday, 1952) 449. 
10. Flynn, John T., ~Roosevelt Htlll (New York, Devin Adair, 1948) 120, 
148-61, 182. 2o6-07. 
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Josephson and Flynn, proceeding from widely separated points on 
the political spectrum, revealed their lack of familiarity with Tug-
well's institutional thought. The failure of the program of 1933-1937 
to effect a cure of the nation's economic illness could not have dis-
illusioned Tugwell. As Flynn himself put it, Tugwell • • •• had never 
thought much of that Second New Deal which ••• came tumbling down.• 11 
Flynn, on further investigation, would have learned that Tugwell could 
not have recommended both deficit spending and planning as permanent 
policies to the President, whom he visited in December, 1937, and Janu• 
12 
ary, 1938. Tugwell approved deficit spending as an emergency measure; 
in the long run it would create serious economic and social stresses.13 
Permanent cure ley in the area of institutional reconstruction. 
Finally, in February, 1938, Boosevelt gave • ••• indisputable 
signs of recovery from Progressive orthodoxy.• 14 At a press conference, 
the President, with figures and charts, expounded to the White House 
newsmen, while referring to the charas •with almost professional famili• 
arity,• the theory of •balanced prices.•·15 From that time on it was 
clear that Roosevelt • ••• at least understood the need for social 
11. Flynn, John T., The Roosevelt~. 158. 
12. Newsweek, Vol. 11, No. 2, January 10, 1938, 7; ~ New York Times, 
December 29, 1937, 8:2; January 15, 1938, 1:15. 
13. See above, Chapter III, Section, "Tugwell's Long-Run Thinking.• 
14. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, June, 1952, 282. 
15. Tugwell, R. G., •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 282n; 
~New~ Times, February 19, 1938; the charts appeared in Busi-
~ ~. February 26, 1938, 6. 
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management rather than social reform.• 16 
Roosevelt never attained the objective of national balance 
through public control at the price-deciding points in our economic 
system: 
Ultimately he would turn to the uae of devices for 
control which by that time remained with him. But IOC>st 
of them by then would have disappeared. Congress would 
DO longer consent to expanding expenditures; NRA and AAA 
would be dead by the hand of the Court -- and so, when 
not only Mr. Roosevelt, but the requisite number of 
others should know what to do, it would be too late to 
do it.l7 
The principal delaying development was the fact that •The war would 
intervene ••• but the way would have been cleared for later action.• 18 
The President was aware that failure was concealed by inflation as war 
approached. He 
... knew that after the WBr new devices would be needed. 
He began to think about the program of 1932; but then he 
died. His successor did not have to meet the problem 
because preparations for war began almost at once and 
inflation supervened,l9 
Conclusions 
Tugwell's Evaluation of Roosevelt 
In all of Tugwell's books and articles, there are only a few 
comments which deal with means and ends, that is, which make ultimate 
16. Tugwell, R. G.' •The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 282. 
17. Tugwell, R. G.' "The Preparation of a President,• 146. 
lB. Tugwell, R. G.' "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Part I, 282. 
19. Tugwell, R. G., •The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• Antioch 
Review, Winter, 1953-54. 438·39· 
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evaluations of Roosevelt as a man and as a statesman. However, they 
fit with sufficient clarity into a frame of reference afforded by the 
body of his writings to make it possible to analyze with reasonable 
certainty and comprehensiveness Tugwell's estimate of the President he 
served. 
Tugwell believed that Roosevelt achieved his short-run objectives 
of turning back the wolf of poverty from our doors and keeping the Axis 
horde fran our shores. From the standpoint of his institutional ideas, 
Tugwell concluded that Roosevelt failed either to effect changes which 
would assure long-run economic stability or, at least, to educate the 
American people into a readiness to accept such changes in the forsee-
able future. Yet, considering the limitations on the achievements of 
statesmen in this world, Tugwell judged that Roosevelt 1 s short-run 
accomplishments entitled him to a place near the top of a very brief 
list of America's greatest Presidents. 
Roosevelt's bringing his weight down •constantly just a little on 
the side of humanity --a little left of eenter •••• served to save the 
domestic situation.•1 In arresting the depression, he showed himself a 
"'leader with the genius to avert a revolution.• 2 With some experience 
in emergency action, he became •genuinely expert at crisis management.•3 
1. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken.I&!!9,.(NewYork, Doubleday, 1947) 681. 
2. Tugwell, R. G., Address, Democratic State Central Comnittee, Los 
Angeles, October 28, 1935, USDA Press Release, 2. 
3· Tugwell, R. G., A Planner's View of Agriculture's Future,• Journal 
~Farm Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1, February, 1949, 38. 
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In other words, he became expert in choosing effective means to his end, 
Roosevelt, in an introductory note to his Public Papers and Addres-
ses, wrote, •consistently I have soqght to help our people gain a larger 
social justice.• He used unpretty means to achieve his end: 
It L;tudy by historians at EYde Bar~ has begun to dis-
pel some RWths which could be of no service to a great 
man's memory -- such, for instance, as that of a kind of 
infallibility, which same of his uncritical followers 
would perpetuate if they could. What is emerging from 
this just-beginning analysis is the portrait of a man 
who maneuvered endlessly for political preferment, 
learned his trade in professional fashion, rose to the 
greatest office in America, and then had to struggle 
just as endlessly, with the means he had and understood, 
to gain for his people the ends he saw as imperative to 
their future. The struggle was a political one; it was 
neither clean nor pretty, His opponents were unscrupulous, 
powerful, and determined. He had to gain his people's 
victories against odds, often, and always against potenti-
ally powerful opposition, They -- the people -- judged 
that he succeeded. The methods he used they were not aware 
of; mostly they were not interested. He hsd no support for 
niceness and scrupulosity; if he adhered to such standards 
it was because another course offended something inside him-
self, not because he feared any disapproval. He had those 
scruples. They came from his parents, from his school, his 
church. But all his experience taught him that they had 
to be compromised in politics. Fire had to fought with fire,4 
Roosevelt was the complete politician. Politics wss as 
natural to him as breathing, and he used its techniques for 
the accomplishment of the purposes he judged to be important 
with a finesse and pertinacity which are seldom seen. Roose-
velt has to be accepted as a politician before he can be 
understood as anything else-- conservationist, reformer, 
humanitarian, statesman, or world strategist. To each of 
4• Tugwell, R. G., •The Compromising Roosevelt,• Western Political Quar• 
terly, Vol, 6, No, 2, June, 1953, 431. 
these he brought his politics and accomplished with 
political means what could be achieTed •••• He was a 
leader, not a dictator; a manipulator, not a conspirator; 
a persuader, not an authoritarian. Such a man is neces-
sarily deTious and given to compromise. And these are 
sometimes held against him by purists. ••• If you are 
interested to convince your sons and daughters that the 
subject of this book was one of those paragons of civic 
Tirtue who accomplished his works by goodness and by 
scrupulous fairness, who loved eTeryone and was loved 
in return, this is not the book to put in their hands. 
Roosevelt was a tough customer in a fight, There are 
many things he should have done that be did not do, And 
the things he did cannot always be explained as scrupu-
lous,5 
1118. 
While "'the political criteria were always present,• it was •not 
the means that determined his purposes -· to give Americans security in 
life, to free the world from totalitarianism.~ Certainly, Roosevelt 
did not employ unscrupulous means because be liked to: 
It is possible to say that President Roosevelt used 
doubtful, even sinister, means to achieve his results, 
just as it is possible to assert that he was never inju-
dicious about what he was doing, For such departures, 
it can be seen or inferred by the serious student, he 
had well•weighed reasons. If there were bad consequences 
it was because he had deliberately chosen what he believed 
to be a lesser evil.7 
He was, •in the whole fibre of his being,• democratic and Christian, 
6. 
1· 
••• not in the surface sense, not as one who repeats 
empty formulas, but in the sense of one who was that 
way, simply and disinterestedly, He would therefore 
seek those powers and those permissions which, as 
Tugwell, R, G., review of Roosevelt: The Lion .ru!Q. the ~. by James 
M, Burns, in Chicago Sun-Times, August 12, 1956, II, 4• 
Tugwell, R. G., review of Roosevelt: The Lion~ the ~. II, 4• 
Tugwell, R, G., •The Compromising Roosevelt,• 323, 
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President, a Christian and a democrat would need,8 
Roosevelt did not wear his religion on his sleeve, but it was there ·-
,,. a deep religious faith Which most commentators 
assumed to be no more than the nominal affiliation any 
politician would maintain. Then too the Episocopal church 
to which he belonged did not ask of its members an osten• 
tatious piety. The Roosevelt religion was consistent 
with gaiety and intellectual freedom; but it was neverthe-
less deeply held. And if it required nothing else as a 
norm of conduct it insisted on good works. It was thus a 
reinforcement, or perhaps the source, of the noblesse so 
characteristic of the President throughout his life. How 
this could transform itself into a concern for human wel-
fare which overrode any principle of government or any 
conception of business is not di.fficult to see. Nothing 
else was so important. Institutions were instrumental, 
and among them both government and business.9 
Similarly, his humaneness did not early appear clearly on the surface: 
Then there is -- or perhaps there began, even before, at 
Groton -- the slow, almost unconscious development, out of 
the warmth he felt toward his family and friends, a wider 
regard for the welfare of others which would one day blos-
som first as an interest in conservation and then as a con-
cern for his less fortunate fellow citizens. This want on 
below a particularly deceptive surface and in spite of (or 
perhaps, in reaction, because of) many surrounding influ-
ences. The temptation was to use the family fortune and 
the assured social position as many of his contemporaries 
did. There were those who had known him as a young man who 
could never understand how he could be different from what 
they supposed him to be. The appearance was that of a 
gilded youth without a thought in his head beyond dress. 
sports. social affairs and easy friendship. 
By a strong instinct too he was led to show no more of his 
inner nature to his mother than to others. This was undoub-
8. Tugwell 1 R. G, 1 'The New Deal: The Decline of Government.• Part II, 
Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, September, 1951. 486. 
9. Tugwell, R. G., 'The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,• Antioch 
Review, Winter, 1953-54. 434• 
tedly because he knew very well how opposed she would 
have been to the conclusions maturing in his mind. At 
any rate, neither she, to whom he seemed so close, nor 
others with whom he had intimate contacts, had any notion 
of what was going on, And the student of his life has, 
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in fact, to infer far more than he would like about the 
spread of the roots which must have gone on over many years 
without betraying the kind of three his character and pol• 
icy were to be. His philosophy begins to be plain in his 
Albany years, by 1910; but it can be seen in full maturity 
only later -- after his trial in the ordeal of sickness 
and physical disaster,lO 
Roosevelt's escape from his mother 
••• may be partly responsible, I think, for his curious 
but very marked elusiveness. This puzzled his associates, 
often tormented them, and somett.es •• as in the case of 
Farley, Jones and Ickes -- made them furious. Sometimes 
it also left them feeling that they were dealing with a 
very deep and complex character. This is the outstanding 
note in Frances Perkins' The Roosevelt 1 Knew; and Robert 
E. Sherwood, in a kind of despair, spoke of him as •an 
artful dodger.• Others who were simply seekers from one 
or another kind of interest, rather than ambitious to be 
friendly or understanding, were merely baffled. Wendell 
Willkie was one of these. So was Huey Long. There were 
many who thought they had his consent to policies about 
which he was doubtful or felt to be premature, and who 
found themselves out on a very long limb from which they 
had to climb down as best they could,ll 
Finally, Roosevelt's religion bolstered his Progressive approach to poli-
tical econ~ -- making the capitalists behave: 
Mr. Roosevelt's education would go on in this practical 
rather than fundamental manner. He would be driven from 
point to point tactically until his opposition would ap• 
pear universal. It would not really be that, however, 
because there would still be no fundamental disturbance 
of code, no diminution of faith in individual regeneration 
as a cure for social ills. Mr. Moley would part company 
10. Tugwell, R. G., "The Protagonists,• 433· 
11. Tugwell, R. G., "The Two Great Roosevelts,• Western Political Quar-
terly, Vol. 5, No. 1, March, 1952, 93· 
with him on a curious issue -- essentially non-recogni-
tion of the plainest facts. He would have required of 
the President an appeasement which he should have known 
was impossible, for it involved assent to wickedness. 
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Ray would come to the point of regarding demands for 
plain ethical behavior as somehow threatening and unusual. 
On this the implacability of Mr. Roosevelt would continue 
to be bolstered by religion, by training, by everything 
moral in an otherwise unstable world. I would come to 
the point, in~ obserTation of attacks on the President, 
and evasions of responsibility and control on the part of 
business men, of wondering whether his code could stand 
the shattering impact. But it •lways would. 
The unremitting drive from business on the forts of Mr. 
Roosevelt's courage would usually present itself to the 
world in the guise of a quest for •·confidence .• ••• This 
kind of pressure would prove ineffective because it would 
oppose itself to something in him which would remain be-
yond his or anyone else's control. 
His sense of right and wrong was fully developed. His 
morals were from the first impregnable. This would be 
concealed by a surface amiability or by political flexi-
bility,l2 
Roosevelt would not •be good," firing his impractical •radicals• 
and fronting for speculators, because morality was not an educable trait. 
In this he chose to be the educator, trying to generate in men of busi-
ness a sense of sin. They gave verbal support to his code, but they 
violated it wilfully and arragrantly. Roosevelt exposed them. That is 
why they hated him. Their •rage would know no bounds.• •Thus an essenti-
ally .tolerant, kindly, and forgiving man would be converted into the 
scourge of business.• 13 
12. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, June, 1948, 151-52. 
13. Tugwell, R. G., "The Preparation of a President,• 152. 
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RooseTelt possessed certain qualities which enabled him to use 
unscrupulous Jllellns without losiD« st«ht of his ori~inal goals. Beneath 
his political cleTerneas and personal chara, there was a •conTiction of 
appointment an~ a dedication to aerTice• which •by a strong instinct~ 
he concealed.14 He had a touehnesa which did not show itself so much 
in the •~~~eana usn to pin ends, as in the determination to gain the 
ends by same means -- eTen unexpected anes.•15 ~ans did not diTert hba 
from ends pertly because he had aa •a~st inh~n· ability to compert• 
mentalize his mind -- on Dec.aber 8, 1941, he asked Tugwell for a report 
lb 
om Puerto Rico. 
Another important teaaon tor RoeseTelt'a ability to keep his sights 
on ends vas his confidence that he could achieTe them. He had no secret 
personal troubles. He vas •carryiac oa within a proTed tradition.• ETen 
when issues arose for which he could not tina a policy, he was confident 
that solutions would •turn up.• He felt •at one with history, an agent 
of benicn pro~ess.• Mistakes were not worries; his averace would be 
sood, and mistakes, too, mignt haTe their uses. He was, T~well conclude&, 
•a aan with fewer doubts than anyone I have eYer known.• 17 
ADd Roosevelt dia aot lese ai&ht of his goal. His definition of 
his aim as oue of helping •our people, to gain a larger social justice• 
14. Tucvell, R. G., "The Protagonists,• 434• 
15. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 347. 
16. Gunther, John, RoeaeTelt 1a Retrospect (New York, Harper, 1950) 115. 
17. T~well, R. G., 'lll.e Strick:en I.!H• tx. 
was not an evasion: 
He was trained in the law. The planning which with me 
seemed to involve disciplines and controls so difficult 
that their attainment ought to be our main effort was, 
with him, one instrument by which, through the "func-
tioning of the representative form of democratic gov-
ernment in its modern sense,• we should arrive at that 
"larger social justice.• I would think looking back, 
long after I had left his administration, closing the 
big book and holding it in ~ hands as I went back over 
those Spring and Summer days of 1932, that he had been 
true enough to that definition for any man.l8 
When he died he had been through perhaps the most sub-
lime ordeal of contemporary humanity. If he could 
speak to those who remain behind him, he would be the 
last to gloss over the ordeals he underwent, to belit-
tle the baseness of the struggles he often had to carry 
on, or to claim that his ends were not more noble than 
his means. He would say that perhaps he had been mistak-
en, but that with what he had at the time, he had done 
his best.l9 
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Tugwell considered Roosevelt's best adequate for the emergency. 
Roosevelt had, •everywhere and always,• an impulse to improve his sur-
roundings, and there was improvement in every part of the nation.20 But 
he failed to take measures which the institutional economist believed 
were necessary for the long-run. Roosevelt did not fail in this area 
because he was unaware of the nation's need to look before it leaped: 
••• Roosevelt was more capable Lthan Wilson/ of understand-
ing men's incapacity for facing the unpleasant consequences 
of their neglect. He knew, too, that our form of government 
made it easy for the sovereign people to create policy 
blindly and then to resent the consequences. A large part 
16. Tugwell, R. G., "The Progressive Orthodoxy of Franklin D. Roosevelt,• 
Ethics, Vol. 64, No. 1, October, 1953, 21. 
19. Tugwell, R. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 431. 
20. Tugwell, R. G., •F. D. R.: Living Memorials,• Nation, Vol. 182, No. 
14, April 7. 1956, 274, 275. 
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of his presidential life was given to saving his fellow 
citizens from their carelessness and their follies, He 
never tired, or if he did, he did not let it be known. 
Occasionally his impatience with the less sincere of his 
enemies showed, perhaps, in an irritable press conference, 
and then he was scolded severely by the publishers' syco-
phants,21 
Perhaps Roosevelt failed because, as Tugwell said, he was a laWM 
yer, looking upon disciplines and controls as one instrument of govern• 
ment, not basic accommodations of invincible technological forces. Per-
haps he failed because he was indifferent to •systems.• Perhaps he 
failed because he underestimated, especially in 1933, his ability to 
effect fundamental institutional changes, judging that the American 
people were not ready yet to accept them -- even at his suggestion, with 
all the weight it initially carr4ed. Apparently, he decided that he had 
to reconcile •newly achieved understandings with the progressive-reac• 
tionary political philosophies• of the legislators and bureaucrats from 
whom he had to wring concessions, satisfying himself that measures con-
sistent with a last-generation view of the world were at least an advance 
over two generations before.22 
Short of action, Roosevelt might have educated the American people 
in the need for long-run changes. He, himself, thought that he had cre-
ated a climate for gradual reform.23 Tugwell judged that he had not. The 
21. Tugwell, R, G0, The Stricken Iand, 442• 
22. Tugwell, R. G., "After the New Deal: 'We Have Bought Ourselves Time 
to Think,• New Republic, Vol, 99, No, 1286, July 26, 1939, 325. 
23. Tugwell, R, G., "After the New Deal,• 323, 
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American people were eager, after the war, to go back to their old ways. 24 
If Roosevelt failed, 
••• he failed, ••• as an educator, as one who sought to 
bring us nearer to the acceptance of reality in national 
policy, who meant to turn ua away from the past and towards 
the future~5 It ia not fair to measure his success in any other way. 
Perhaps Roosevelt failed because he did not wish to risk offend• 
ing same of his political 
mate sense -- as James M. 
supporters, and so was not a leader in an ulti• 
26 Burns said. A deeper reason for his failure 
seemed to appear in Tugwell's analysis --Roosevelt failed to change 
the people because he was truly repr.sentative, because he was too much 
like them: 
The man born in the elegant house ••• symbolized the Ameri-
can dream just as well as he would if he had come from the 
traditional log cabin. A man may be a democrat from whatever 
environment he comes.27 
He could be blind to reality as were farmers and workers be-
cause his own education had been quite as defective. He 
could be the leader os such a folk in a crusade for hope-
lessly oversimplified reforms and for direct attack on the 
symptoms of evils, the success of which would be more disas• 
trous than the evils themselves. With all his privileged 
education -- Groton, Harvard, Columbia -- does it seem 
strange to say that President Roosevelt was as unseeing as 
any farmer or city workingman? The farmers and workers had 
had either no schooling or one which was irrelevant to the 
complicated decision of latter-day democracy; President 
Roosevelt's schooling had taught him mostly things -- to 
24. Tugwell, R. G,, "A Planner's view of Agriculture's Future,• 39· 
25. Tugwell, R. G., "After the Nev Deal,• 325· 
26. Bums, James M., Roosevelt: The 1i2Jl. and the Fox (New York, Harcourt, 
Brace, 1956). 
27. Tugwell, R. G., •F. D. R.: Living Memorials,• 274• 
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leave out of account what was of little use to a states-
man -- which were not so, Farmers, workers and the Presi-
dent were thus equally prepared for a New Deal. ••• Joy-
fully the people would recognize their champion, He and 
they would find disillusion together. The New Deal would 
never find fulfillment, and would gradually be merged 
into new, more realistic, aspiretions.28 
President Roosevelt, as symbol, agent, and vessel of our 
contradictions, our hopes, our external cynicism and our 
internal reaching for fellowship, would be understandable. 
He was like the rest of us and was not to be understood in 
any other way. His New Deal would not have turned out to 
be like us or in tune with the times if he had been differ• 
ent. The New Deal would be confused because we were confused; 
it would cater to greed, while it stretched out a generous 
hand; it would be orthodox in economics, and still show a 
glimmer of understanding of economic evolution; it would be 
niggardly and, at the same time, spendthrift -- and it would 
be all of these because that is what we were like, and ~at 
the man was like whom we had chosen to lead us .29 
No important study of Roosevelt has covered the war years. (Pro-
feasor Frenk Friedel may carry the story into 1945.) Tugwell made a few 
comments on the President's wartime performance which serve the purpose 
of this study when they are compared to estimates of peacetime accomplish-
ments. 
Tugwell questioned some of Roosevelt's war policies. In the 
field of •political warfare,• •unconditional surrender• and the dropping 
of liberalism were •doubtful,• The latter was probably not a military 
necessity and involved a commitment to the upper classes of occupied 
Europe which prevented the employment of the revolutionary forces of lib-
28, Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Rise of Business,• Pert I, Western 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, June, 1952, 281, 
29, Tugwell, R. G., "The New Deal: The Decline of Government, • Pert II, 
485. 
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eralism. The creator of the New Deal in the United states created an 
Old Deal for the rest of the world. leaving us on the wrong side 0 unable 
to understand revolutionary forces.3° 
On the whole, Tugwell considered the President's performance in 
the war, despite its shortcomings, praiseworthy: 
His tour de force of giving business charge of war prepara-
tion was sn act of genius. Knowing what he did -- for he 
had no illusions about the aims of methods of business •••• ••• 
It can ba seen now that he took as long a gamble as any states-
man in history, but that it was the best choice. The vindica-
tion is that he won. He understood how thick was the fat on 
our collective ribs and how little it mattered how much was 
wasted or taken in profit provided time was telescoped and the 
lead of the methodical German bureaucracy overcome.3l 
There cannot ••• have been many greater strategists on the 
grand scale than he. In all the great sweep of his conception 
I could think of only one or two elements which I had been 
unable to believe right and useful ••• But aside from these, 
what a magnificent war it had beenl That we came through as 
we did must now and always, I think, be attributed almost 
wholly to the genius and the determination of Roosevelt.32 
In refusing to let a prosperous, skeptical, pacifistic people rest in 
careless sloth while disaster impended, and in conducting the war, Roose-
velt, Tugwell concluded, exhibited his greatest statesmanship-- •as 
never in domestic affairs.•33 
# 
Roosevelt failed to assure long-run economic stability. Short 
of that, he failed as an educator. His peacetime statesmanship did not 
30. Tugwell, R. G., Til.!!. Stricken Land, 444-45· 
31. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 61. 
32. Tugwell, R. G., The Stricken Land, 681. 
33· Tugwell, R. G., The Strickep I.and, 69. 
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measure up to his wartime leadership. Yet, what he accomplished 
domestically, limited as it was, was impressive, giving him a high rank• 
ing. 
How can one rank a statesman? It is possible to say that a woods• 
man who chops down a soft tree with a sharp axe has achieved a less dif-
ficult deed than a woodsman who chops down in the same time a hard tree 
of the same size with a dull axe. If we are to judge a statesman by 
what he accomplishes in the light of what he has to wrk with and what 
he has to face, how can we quantify such matters? Which was the greater 
achievement, Bismarck's unification of Germany or Cavour's unification 
of Italy?. 
Tugwell committed himself on the risky matter of e final ranking. 
He listed briefly the achievements on which he based his estimate: 
His wide experience, his deeply felt responsibility for 
imperative objectives, may have weighted too heavily on 
his mind; or his own power to command response and get 
his way without the particular compromises he made may 
have been underestimated. But the choices he made can be 
looked at now with more sympathy because it is so clear, 
as it was in the case of Lincoln's support of Grant, that 
what President Roosevelt believed to be the paramount 
American necessity was achieved. The depression he inher-
ited was overcome; that of 1937 was aborted; and the Nazi-
Fascist conspiracy to dominate the world by force was. 
defeated. These were the greet objectives of his policy.34 
Tugwell offered renkings both on en all-time and a contemporary 
basis. Looking back over America 1 s history, he 
34• Tugwell, R. G., "The Compromising Roosevelt,• 323. 
35 
•••• 
••• DeTer thoU«At taat ae waa as r;reat a man as Wilsoa, 
for instance, ana I am aura that ae dia not taink so 
either. •ut ae haa letter instinct• than Wilson •••• 
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He aaa been a stateaman •••• ; ae baa been one of our 
-st conauute :politicians toe, so nat lao could "Drinr; 
his politics to the aerTiee of Ilia statesmanship. Not 
all leaders in Aaericaa crises haa pasaeasea ais inatinc-
tiTe finesse in tile deals aaa tile .. aeuTera of the pro-
fession, not eTan those who aaa usa& palitics aatermdn-
ealy. Washincton, lefferaon, ana Wilson had tria& in 
their Tarioua WBT•• ana eaca haa playa& interests off 
a .. inst eaca otller, holdin& to the principle that there 
is aa essential intacrity of patriotiaa in all Americana: 
Terias, Wlli .. , .K!ao11'olfothiapra, Repu"Dlicana, Deaacrsts; 
radicals, coaaerTatiTas, ..aerataa; prfl&ressiTOa, reac-
tionaries, lillarala, All wra Americana. But none, 
except Liacala, haa played palitics vita suck success. 
Ana Lincaln haa tile crest "Dlaak ataia oa his recera of 
llaTiDC preaiaea OTer a ciTil war. It was not of his 
.. kina. But he aii not acc .. plish the tapassible ana 
keep it fraa aappeaiaa. 
He haa "Dean a atateaaan, one of aur tares ar four createat 
Aaonr; his conteaporaries -- Hitler, ~asolini, Churchill, 
Stalin -- BaaaaTelt was •tae creat ... of our tt..;• •None coula 
utch hta.•36 
'fucwll waa aD autaar of le&islation; he belpea to write tile 
llliil Act ana tao AA Act. He was an errand boy who llraupt acaaeaiciana,, 
er their ideas, to tae Preaiaent; an iaea .. n; ana a pu"Dlicist. He waa 
35. Tucwll, R. G., Tile Stricken ~. 681. 
36. Tu&well, R, G., rniew of Raaanalt: ru Lion anci the Ig, II, 4• 
lle we an aoinistrator in the USDA. arui the JIA. 
Authors ana journalists SYerestiaated Tu«vell's influence in two 
princiJ&l wys: tmey creiiteol Ilia with doiD& thinss lte iii not ae --
auclt as deterainin& monetary ,.licy; they place& on hill full respensiai-
li ty for measures in the fol'lllllation ef wlaicll he was an eqll&l alliCin& 
seYeral or aany -• as in the cases of tile NIR Act ana tile AA Act. These 
over~atiaatiens stemmed fraa the underlyin& assumption that TU&well's 
intellectual influence on BoeseYelt was aecisiYe. In fact, Tu«well 
presents& thou&Jats to Roosevelt ani supplied hill vitll information, vhica 
the latter usei or disrepriei as lle sav fit. As an idea Jlan Tu&vell 
pertol'!2i an educatiYe function. !!soaeYelt ws •ais ow •n,• •kine 
the final decisions in accordance vitll his Proaressive ideas in politi• 
cal ecen08,Y. 
RoeseYelt adopted certain attitudes and ideas, and the Aaainistra-
tion took s0111e 1118asures, which vera ia accord with Tusvell's thinkiq. 
It is impossible to measure the professor's iaJSct on suck aatters: 
RoeaeYelt•s experimentalism arui Ilia anti--determinism; his rejection of 
HooTer's •Eiaropesn•· interpretation of the depressiQn 1 Ia is acceptance of 
the domestic interpretation, with its empbaeis on the mieuse of corporate 
surplue; his initial nationalism vith respect to intersove~ntal debts, 
the London Economic Conference, the sold standard, and toreisn traie; 
Ilia •aiYeraitied attack• en the depression whicll proYided aid from tke 
aottoa to the top of the econ(I8,Y, attemptin& to bolster coneu.er pur-
cllesin& power threu&Ja tke use of the power to epend ( vhicll enaaled tile 
Aaaiaistration to encase in deficit financinc of vork relief and public 
llJl. 
works ia order to provide direct aii in the fora of wa«e ani relief J«Y-
ll8nta), the power to tax (which., ia tending to effect a redistrilroution 
of income, ~rovidei indirect aid), and the ~wer to re«Ulate currency 
(which. enalroled the Administration to proTide aid in the fora of •refla• 
tion•), end attempting to create, tlarou«b the undertakin« of public 
works, a aarket for heaT,Y equipment -· tlaerelay «ivin« llusiness, in 
aclUtion to RI'C leans, cust-1'11; hie aupport, half-heartecl thou«Atit 
seems to haTe been, ef direct proteotioa of the consuaer ia the NftA and 
tile AAA and throu«h pro,osecl foo4 aaci clrup le«islation; his partial 
initial response to tile uti-antitrust er •concentration anoi cantrol'' 
J1ailosoph7, ostensilJly euooiied in 1;1ae Nl!A; and lais taxing of unaistri• 
lauted profits. 
Reosevelt took ne action on acme of Tu«well 1s ideas, especially 
those involved in the instituti ... l econoaist's concept of •conjuncture,• 
which lae proposed to achieTe tlaroup central allocation of reswrcea, 
facilitated lay a federal incorporation lav, and price controls, and 
which. woulcl constitute a baaia for an exJ«ndinc •econ011y ef alllmdance,•' 
Repriina; these 11atters, it is possible to say tlaat ~well aade virtu• 
ally no tapact, the Nev Deal being essentially •ProgressiTe" -- an atteapt 
to •aake the capitalists laeaave• rather than a fundamental alteration of 
the institutional framework of the econQJ~y. In the area of forei«n 
policy RooseTelt rejected Tu«vell 1s ideas on relations with Japan. 
The •Progressive• aature at the Nev Deal reflected the iieole&ical 
victory of Brandeis' atoaisa oTer Tu«V&ll's conjuncture. As judge or 
referee of tlte contest, RooaeTelt, en erthedox Pro&resaiTe, 4eterainel 
the outcome, Which directly aenefited the •practical• aen syabolized ay 
Bernard M. Beruch. Intellectually, the New Deal, torn between trust• 
austin@: ani •concentration end control,• continued to exhibit a dual 
nature. A4ministratively, this iaieciaion bad, of course, a ne&atiTe 
iapact, bein& explicable larcely in teras of vkat was net done, 
In one exceptional case, the field ef fiacal policy, aoney, ani 
aaDkiD&, initial rejection of TUcwell 1a ideaa was followed, to smme 
extent, ay their suaaeqvent iaplementation in the 'Second' New Deal, 
TUf:WSll 1s iapact in this instance was indirect but, in a way, aeasur• 
a,ale -· that ia, lle was lar&ely responsible for Marriner s. Eccles• 
comiD& te Washinf;ton, 'IIbera the Utall banker proaoted the use of covern• 
ment creiit as a means of recover,, aad fostered coordination and central-
ization, tb.rou~~t the Federal ResorTa Systea, in tile administration of 
policies concernin& mQney, aankin&o and priTate credit. 
TUcwell lled a lane-run iapact in two ways whicll were not suacept• 
ibla of measurement. As an iiea man, he encoura&ed the study of assic 
probleu abaTe the level of politica ani emercency policy. As a publi• 
cist, he not only supportei current measures, but lle also expressei, ar 
referred to, his lone:•run institutional views. While they were often 
distorted by both his critics and Ilia overzealous supporters, it is rea-
sonaale to assuae that the publicity attendin& their author led a nwaaar 
of serioua- and fairwminded men to look into thea. 
Finally, TU&Wll sened in direct administration th:b.oulb tlte oli-
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line Dureaus of the USDA, reor88nizin~ some of them and attemptift« to 
increase the powers or oae of them, the Food and nru, A4ministration; 
throu&A two new a,encias in the USDl, the AAA and the SCS; and throuc& 
a new independent asency, the !IA 0 whicll, upon his recoDDendation, was 
eYentually taken into the USDA. 
Tu&well's spensorship, at Presidential direction, of a food and 
d~s bill larply accounts~ for his becoad~ the whippin~: boy for tile 
Adlainistration. A concertei, ruthless caapaip to defeat the bill lty 
discre~itin' hia with tile ~rican people took place. His attackers dis• 
tortei his ideas, academic and aiainistratiYe, in tapu~:ain« his personal 
motives, his adainistrative altility, and kis loyalty. Their activities 
incidentally raised the question of tke attitudes of politicians, press, 
and public towaris professors in t;OYel'lllllent in particular, and, in ~:en• 
eral, tllwaris intellectuals in ~rica. It ia ar,;ualtle tkat Tugwell's 
efforts llastened the passase of fo~ and ~ru,;s le~:islation waich finally 
eccurre~ in 1938. It is oertaia that the propapnda campai~:~~ of tla• 
!till's oppeaents ruined his public reputation. 
Priatrily throul:h llis friends, especially JerOllle Frank, Tu,;wll 
pl'OIIlOted his views on AAA policies. He ~efeated Geor~:e N. Peek in 1933 
on the question of eaphasizin« production controls rather than marketint; 
a«reements and subsidization of exports. In 1935 his friends lost their 
jobs, beins ~ismissed by Chester c. DaYia, who was far more brosdminiei 
than Peek, ana ~11 lost hope that tlae AAA would implement his broai 
Yiew or the a~:ricultural proltlea. He stressea the relationship of a~:ri-
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culture to the rest of the aeon~, iasistin~ that the AAA make en effort 
to •reduce the spread' between prices farmers received and prices consum-
ers paid in order to prevent an increase in industrial prices which would 
return the farmer to his f~r diaadvanta~eous econaaic position. 
Tugwell was also interested in the distribution of increasin& 
fara income amons the farmera themaelves, deploring the •capture• of the 
AAA by the hi& staple farmers. In the Rl, which he practically invented 
himself, he had an opportunity to proYida ahert•run assistance to small 
farmers and to carry aut wbat amouated to a d-.onstration of lo~·run 
possibilities in the land•retir ... nt or conservation approach to the 
acricultural prohlea. 
Tuswell judsed that Roesevelt's pelicies •saved the domestic situ-
ation• in the crisis. Bains essentially ot a stop-~p or emersency 
nature, they did not sat at the roots of our economic problems. It was 
not until 1938 that Roosevelt, whose intellectual habits baa until then 
prevented his commitment to BUT •system,• finally saw that social aanace• 
ment rather then reform was necessary. It was too late, because of the 
need tor an anti•Axis forai&D policy and the domestic compra.dses which 
that need dictated, to act on Roosevelt's belated cooclusions about the 
aeon~. In the sense that no nev lesislation vas forthcomi~·after 
1938, the Nev Deal "died' in that year. Tugwell would place tae date of 
contraction of fatal illness in 1935, when Roosevelt, after the Supraae 
Court's invalidation of the AAA and the NJA, definitely abandoned con• 
junctura. 
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By early 1938, Tu«vell had baea out of the ~overaaent for a year. 
He haa resigned in late 1936 prt.arily because, as an institutienal eco-
nomist, he really was not at hoae in the New Deal. He had •sunk his per-
sonal preferences• in erder to do the best he could to improve the wel-
fare of the American people. 
Tu&vell's attitude towards his service reflected his judgment of 
Roosevelt. While he did not think Roesevelt's policies were the best 
policies, he thought Roosevelt was the best man available to lead the 
fight a~inst the depression. By no -aDS, Tu~ll asserted, was Roose• 
velt responsible for halti~ incipient recovery, as Hoover's fictional 
char~e would have it. Tugwell was satisfied that Roesevelt had done the 
best he could, accordi~ to his lisbts, and sometimes with resort to 
unpretty means, to achieve his eD.d of improvin~ the lot of collllllQn men. 
On a personal level, Tugwell, despite his unkind treatment, essentially 
for political reasons, at the hands of Roesevolt. had groat affection. 
apparently not unrequited for the "Skipper,• whose position strictly lim-
ited expressions of personal recard on both sides. 
Tugwell's contribution to Roosevelt's quest, partially motivated by 
personal loyalty, was largely intellectual in its ori~in. The background 
of the economics professor froa Wilson, New York, which differed from that 
of the numerous yo~ urban lav,rers amo~ his colleagues, indicates that 
he waa net aneemotional do-goeder. He believed that men's ability to do 
thi~s right was a sufficient challenge and motivation in itself. Never• 
theless, his contribution was. in its impact, humanitarian. 
General 
A study of Tu!!vell 1s career, l9J2-J6, appears to be of value tor 
several reasons. Hia institutional economics is of interest in itself• 
and because of the possibility thst it may be practically iaportant at 
same future date when men of affairs will, as they often do now, act, 
largely unknowine;ly, according to tlae teachinl!s of some professor loq 
since dead. His career prGYides a point ef entrance to, and his thought 
a kind of yardstick by which to measure, the New Deal. His wkippinc-~oy 
role raises the ~estion of the intellectual's place in our society, 
which sucgeats, in tura, the problem of utilizing ell of our resources 
in facin1 the fundamental question of chance. 
I 
It is impossible to uaaure 'l'u8well 1s impact on certain corporate 
practices as they haTe ieveloped since the depression, but it is inter• 
estiD~ that they tend to eltainate abuses which he cited in his analysis, 
froa an institutionalist's stanipoint, of the causes of the de~cle. 
In 1eneral, there had been a gowth amoq corporations of social con• 
sciouaness -- described in the writin~& of AAolph A. Berle, Jr., DaTii 
I. Lilienthal, ani others. Specifically, there haTe been cha01es in 
the bases for investment decisions, there beinl increasi88ly careful 
1 
and thorough planning of the future development of enterprises • 
.Alain, it is impossible to -•sure 'l'u8well 1s impact on 80T8I'DIII8nt 
policies that tend to offset illeTelo~tB WiCh he deplored in the 
l9201s. The 1overuent is lleeply concerned wita IIIBintaininl conSUIIISr 
purchaaiD~ power, to which Tugwell f!&Ve a crucial function in the seen~. 
There has been a ~wth of influences, such as unemployment compensation, 
which tend to check declines in persoaal income -- built•ia •stabilizers.• 
1. Schlicter, Sumner, ~noted in Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 
1955. 12. 
2 The Federal Reserve Board keeps a close watch on installment credit --
which, Tu&well vamed, can D&c011111 a false prop -• and on inflation ia 
general -- which lie called •noxioua.• Tile last three decades haYe seen 
the iolstering of purchesing power through another ievelopaent Which 
Tugwell favored - a redistribution of incollle, effected, in prt, ~ 
progressive taxation, and characterized by an increase in the portion 
of national inca.. going to the growing middle•iDcoae grOUJ&• 
Ia 1956, Dr. l'ta;vacmd :r. Se.ulaier, Chairman of the President•• 
Couscil of Econaaic Advisers, stated, •we take the view taat the Fed• 
eral Goversment had a heavy responsibility to moderate econaaic flue• 
tuationa.•3 An important instrument of the goverament in its role as 
econoadc watchdog, the centralized controls of the Federal Reserve 
Board, initiated lay Tugwell's recor.endee, Marriner s. Eccles, are 
not a subject of party controversy. We do not have tlt.e centralized 
allocatiOD of resources whiclt. Tugwell advocated, but Professor Galllraitlt. 
pointe out, the effect of exiatinc cestralized controls has lleen ta 
creat, without direct interventioll iD business decisions, an economic 
"'clt.ate• which will lead business to •ke the •right"' aeciaions.4 
Finally, if, despite precautions, depreasian threatens, there exists 
the assurance that, regeriless of whiclt. political party is in power, 
2. Lci>ftua, :T011eplt. A., •Buying Spree Stokeli by Installment Credit,• 
Tile I!.!!~ !il!u.o Decelllber 23, 1956, IV, l2s5. 
3· IU. .!!lu I2l:k Ties, NoYelllber 25, 1956, I, 70s3• 
4• Galbraith, :r. K., •merican CapUaliPs Tie Cepcept of Counteryail-
.iD& Power (Boston, Houghtos Mifflin, 1952) Chapter XII, "The Role 
of Centralize& Decision.• 
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• ••• whatever action may be required to prevent anything reaeabling 
the dellacle of the Nineteen Thirties will be taken.•5 
II 
Tu&vell's aerTice aa a New Dealer was of interest and importance 
in itself. Ernest K. Lindley stated that no list of •tae six or ei~at 
moat iapertant architects and builders• of tae early New Deal would be 
complete if it did not include Tucvell.6 A study of T~well'a career. 
1932-36. also dispels some ~~~Ttaa. prevalent ia seme quarters. altout 
Roosevelt and the New Deal -- esJecially Hoover's version of the causes 
and course of tae depression. the judcJ!ent that the New Deal was redi-
cal. and the contention that it was •accidental.• 
tion: 
A college text typifies a trena ia .. ki~ the following obserTa-
Taouga tae ~rican achieve .. nt of the 1930's was 
perhaps leas a .. tter of intelli&ence and systematic 
planni~ than of goad fortUDe 1 or at least of unco• 
111rdinated experirllentatioa. it was aevertla,elesa a 
~reat achieve .. nt 07 
Tae New Deal. it is true. involvn a &reat d.eal of •uncoordinatea ex• 
perimenting1 1 aut it also rested on the vi~rous exercise of intelligence 
ay mea like Roosevelt ana Tu~well -- anti-deteradnists who were vary of 
d.epen&ence on ·~eod. fortune.• c-nti~ on :James M. Burns' p€>litical 
5. Spigelmen. J"oseplt H •• • It We Were Faced with a Depression.• New. 
~ T1pn Mop·line. August 5. 1956. 56. 
6. Lindle:r. Ernest x •• •War on the Brains Trust,• Scribner's Mapzipt 1 
Vol. 94, No. 51 November, 1933. 266. 
7. Kaappen, Marshall, loa Intrcd,uction .12 Wri"'D Fpreicn Policy (New 
York. Harper. 1956) 112. 
••• ke fails to conYey -· what I taink he aust know·-
that a bright tareai of intention ran throu~ the con-
fusions and contradictions of tae early New Daal.a 
nat tae Hew Deal, confused as it w.a, bad enoup intellipntly detera-
ined taruat to CiYe it a general direction and make the label •accidental" 
inaccurate becames apparent wnen one considers tke possible policies 
if another aan had becoae President in 1933• 
Tae liberal achieyements of the early New Deal ••• 
vera not merely the by•preduct of a favorable poli-
tical c:l~te, a particular r-work of national 
iac-, er the nwaber of people unemplayed. To be 
sure, the crisis af the araat depression aade it 
easier and apparently less risky for political lead-
ers to act Yiproualy. But if Newton Do Baker or 
&Yen Alfred E. Saith had baoome President in 1933, the 
scape of action would undoubtedly haYs been quite dif-
ferent. The crest and euurill& procrama or the New 
Deal wre forced and •quantified" by couraceous lib· 
ersls, tar ahead of •public apiaion• •••• 9 
The aasuaption that •the scops ot action• would haYs been differ• 
ant under another President su~eesta a queation about RooseYelt -- How 
could he be both conserYatiYe and liberal, in the literal .. anin«a sf 
the tara~~? -• to lltlich a study at Tv.cwll's thoucbt and career appeara 
ta proyiae an answer. JTaa the atandpeint of Tugwell's institutional 
ideaa, RoeaeYelt ws an ertho4ox Procraasi ve, and the Hew Deal will co 
8, Tucwell 0 Ro G., r&Yiew of RooaeYelt: The Lion and the I'm:, "Dy 
1 .... M. Burna (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1956) in 8hicaco ~­
Ti!!'• Aucust 12, 1956, II, 4• 
9. Keyserlin&• Leon H •• •The Future of Liberaliaa -· II: ••Liberal• 
GonrnMnt Is Net Enoup,'" 'l'he l!t'D!rter, Vol. 14. No. 11, Ma7 ,l, 
1956. 18. 
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down, fifty or a a~ndred years fraa now, in nearly all account, as a 
conserTative attempt to patch ~• tae capitalist systea in order to 
keep it coiq;. It was in tae patchin& up tllat Reosevelt shovea a flair 
for inneTation ana iaproTisation. It was in tile patc.hin~: up, not as an 
instit~ti-l econoaist, that Tucvell aeryed and exercised whatever 
illfluence ae llicht kaTe llaa. For example, Roosevelt dill not spend eneucla 
fast eneup to suit the professor, lnat ae aicht laan spent less -re 
slow!y tllan he aia aad it net llaea fer tae aavice of Tucvell ana others. 
In •DT event, •tae scope of action• dia not involve the Eina of insti• 
tutional aeparturea ~ica Tuf:wel1 reeownendea. 
In view of Tu&vell 's eTa1uatien ef tae New Deal, Professor .li8f• 
stadter seeaa to overemphasize Roosevelt's flair for innoTation ana 
iaprDYisation. transferrin& ~at was essentially a aatter of instru.en• 
tstion, to tae leTel of pkilosoplu< of covel"llll8nt, and recordiq; a 
chance in 8ota. In his own ter.a, aowever, Hefetadter is consistent, 
since ae treats the New Deal in tlla lickt of philosopaic Tal~••• 
notinc a shift in Proarassivi .. , as it attainea pewer durin& a depree• 
sion for the first tiM, fi'OII aa emplt.asb on •.orality• te an eapluasis 
10 
ea •praaaatia.•' He warns, iaplicit1y, that -ana caa become eaas. 
III 
All a praaaatiet, an anti-4eteminist, an experimenter, an inno• 
10. Hefetadter, Riclaard, Da .e.&a gL Ref91'1ls .lJ:!JI ilryap .1! F. D. R. 
(New Yerk, Knopf, 1'955) Copter YII, •:rraa Proarasehiaa to tae 
New Deal.• 
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Yater, ani an iaprOYiser -- none of which roles indicatei his ~sic 
Dllture ana f'Wlctien -· llooseTelt gave acadeaic isna a hear inc, reeerT• 
ins to hilllself the prerogative of -kins fiiUll decisions. As one of 
tae most taportant iatellectuals -. not all academicians are intellec-
tuals -- to have access to the Presidential ear, TU!;wll suffered 
unfair treatment at the &anoia of the press and, consequently. severe 
dallllp to his pulllic reputation, The attack asainst Iilia sussesta the 
question of the place of intellectuals in our aociety ani ita relation-
ship to the ieeper queation of effectins chanse under a ieaocratic 
fora of pve1"111118nt. 
The twentieth century has ~·• characterized in a numaer of 
ways: the Ace of Anxiety, the Ace of Pulllicity, the Aspirin A&•· the 
A&• of Conformity, the Anti•Intelleotual A&e.11 The latter two relate. 
In connection with conforaity w hear such terms as •Wlaite Collar,• 
•corporatieD Man,• and •outer-diractei• and •other-directei... The in• 
tellectual who performs hie true functions of supplyins objective data 
and senins as a •free•wheeliDg aocial critic, as the iissector of 
superstitions, the aDalyst of ~ths, the surpon of follies,• will Datur• 
11. Krenenllerr;er, Louis, CQ!IIHnv Magan: A Cultural Ipguil'Y iAU 
*Mt'iCf.p .I...Ull (llew York, New Aaerican Library, A Mentor llook, 
1955) 11•12, discusses the difficulties in contemporary classi• 
fication of an age; llriDton, Crane, The ShapiPf!j of the Modern 
Mini (New York, New Allerican Library, A Mentor Book, 1953) 
eatitles Chapter VII, •The Twentieth Century• The Anti•Iatel• 
lectual Attack.• 
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12 T 
ally irritate tae confor.det. Ilia irritation can take a hostile 
form of expression which weakena our society in an a~ vaen weakneaa 
can be fatal. 
Americans are not a doctrinaire people. TRey solve their proi• 
lema as they c- to them. In 1933 they unlalovi~ly aitained a leader 
wao. vaile. like thea. he waa not doctrinaire, was to be responaive at 
the ri~t tt.e to the need for inn ... tion -• within certain limi$atiama. 
Hia shortcominp in the area of lo~·ranp thinki~ met with disapproval 
iy some intellectuals -- includins Tu!vell. On tae other hand, • ••• 
hew can one maw that 1looc•ranse' plana woulil have 'Dean 1110re succeeaful 
than wut was tried'!"'13 
Uncertainty allout the posaillle affects of unailopted propoaala 
doea not, af course. 111ean that lons•ra~e thinkins is superfluous in eur 
aociety. In fact, in the Age of the Cold War. it may well be extremely 
da~eroua for tile AMrican people to refrain froa considerins preble-
until tlley cOllie directly upen tllea. Tke iapact en international affaira 
of a six aontha' tlifferential 'between opposing nations in tllle tleveloJ-
aent or. say, a type of guided aiaaile is only a telescopei 0 draaatic 
illustration of tile 'institutional lac• whick Tu«well related to sur• 
vinl. There is an urpnt Dad. to look akead: 
12. Frankel, Charles, •Definitien of tile True ~eaa,• The New York 
Ti•ea M&gazine, October 21, 1956, 58. 
13. Johnson, Walter, review of Rooaevplt: The Lien and tllle !s• lly 
.Tames M. 5urns, ill~ Jm¥ .I2I:k Ti•a Book Reviey, August 12, 
1956. l. 
Solutions proposed for present ac:tion, 1111.st, of course, 
lie fra.ed within the limit of what is politically pos-
sible in Aaerica. 
:aut it ia always the additional task ef liberals to lay 
out facts, analyze situatious, state conditions, ana 
propose ideas that will llriq tony's iapossible into 
tomorrow's field of political feasibility,l4 
Intellec:tuals of all stripes, certainly conservatives as well 
as liD&rals, can discuss proposals for future action -· the conserTS• 
tives, of course, citing iaplic:ationa, in a 8iven proposal, for the 
preservation or 4estruc:tion of vhat they consilier valuallle in our 
herita~. In this way, intellec:tuals meve beyond their role of c:ritic 
and dia8Dostic:ian to their eupreae poeitive function, whick is •to 
keep before the public eye the possillilities of life which the conven• 
tional •n, the hurriu •n, or tile boliticai/ -n are likely to for-
get or i8Dore.•·15 r-4iate action on intellectuals' proposale is not 
as iaportant as their bein8 ~nted a hearing -- which depends on the 
attitude of our society towards intellee~uals. 
Tugwell's experience seems to shed some light on the problea of 
tile intellectual's place in our society, with special reference to 
the employment of professors in soveruaent. His conduct loth fostered 
and retarded improvement in the public relatiens of acaliemicians in 
WashiQ&ton. On the constructive side, he served with all his energy 
14• Berle, Adolph A., J'r., "The Future of ~riean Liberalisa -- II: 
'Tile Problems Overlap,••· 15. 
15. Frankel, Charles, •Definition of the True E&ghead," 60. 
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and ability. He understood, sa a professor entering ~!;OTernment EtSt, 
that while the world suffers ED)' illa, there are no magic fol'llll1las 
tor OTernight solutions. He ''sank his personal preferences• in order 
to work within the l~itationa imposed by administrative and political 
possibilities. This attitude, despite its cendemnation by emotional 
do-cooders, militant leftists, and doctrinaires, vas ce.aendable. It 
sl!.owell that professors can be doers sa well as thinkers. Tugwell also 
helped tl!.e cause of professorial public service by concentratiftl!: on 
problems in an intellectual and non-political way -- that is, as Jim 
Farley attested, he kept eut ot party matters. 
While ~ll was not S)'lllpathetic towards the emotional urge to 
moTe with j!;reat, rapid striaes into the future, he was impatient with 
those who clUB~!: with undlle tenacity tiD the past. This impatience, on 
the necative siae, led to unnecessary and profitless cockiness and tact-
lessness in social situations. Perhaps his occasional lack of tact 
also proceeded froa a problem which .. DY intellectuals aave. There is 
the intellectual who loTes •Man• but does not haTe much time tor •men.• 
This contrast emerges fraa the aature ot his function. His consiclera-
tion of ways of impreTin& the life of 'Man' may inTolve him in illtellec-
tual actiTity on such a hith leTel that he loses the ability to ccmmuni• 
cate with less intellectual •.an.• It aa effective radical keeps his 
pants pressed, an effective intellectual will retain the ability to 
c~icate, in person, with all kinds of men -- truck driTera ancl sail-
ors as well as presidents of universities and Presidents of the United 
States. 
The most unfortunate episOde ot Tugwell's career in Waskincton 
did not result from his personal conduct, iut rather from an administra-
tive miscalculation, He should not have been involved in the lecislative 
process with res .. ct to the obviously controversial food and dru&& bill. 
This view is not based on the iindsitht Vhici permits us to see tist 
the press discredit•d him due to his connection with this particular 
iill. The ceneralization that men who aave experience and position in 
politics and lecislative circles saould assume the task of putting a 
iill throup Concress appears sount. 
Nothinc, however, Vhica Tugwell tlt.oupt, said, or cUd justified 
the vicious nature ot the press' attack on lt.im. An analysis of the 
attack shows that .any columnists seea te turn in a column whether or 
not they have •-thine vorthvile to say or a news story to tell. Many 
of them were inaccurate aDd. inconsistent, shovi!~f; that they had not 
ione their hc:aevork. others, of course, isd to write what their publisk-
ers waated them to write. J.llll what columnists write, wether or not it 
is true, is insofar sa peeple believe it, a historical force. 
J.s a people whick staDia for the principle of freedaa of the 
press as Jefferson proaounced it, we cannot interfere with that freeiaa. 
aut intellectuals can hit back at ae.-ers of the press who pursue ruth• 
less distortion. The wea:pon of the intellectual is exposure. Universi• 
ties should produce and pualicize studies ot rsmear• campaicns and 
cases of sustained iad reportinc. 
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Certainly Tu«well deserved .ore just treatment by the press ani 
a more open-.dnded reoeptioa by the public. He was an unambitious, 
lG78l American. His intellect 'is one of the most profound and proli• 
fie that has operated in this country ia the last quarter•centll1'1•" 16 
He was conserYative in a real sense, aivocatin« adaption of our insti-
tutions to new technolo8ical facts, He did not believe in a lar~er 
role for federal ~overnment for its own sake -- • ••• disturbances in 
interstate relationships should dete~ine the sphere of action of the 
feieral government,•l7 He was far mere conservative than a number of 
officials whe pnerally eajeyei the repitaUon of "Dein~ aafe and souu •-
for example, Cordell Hull and Ilia fre.-traie followers, whose 
••• pelicy, its proponents adait, would undou"Dtedly 
cause considerallle teiiiPorary har&ahip, It lli~t 
inieei throw many industries into llankruptcy and 8 force a reors-nization of the capital structure.1 
Tugwell's •planned capitalisa• entailea no such disruption. What he 
wanted for the nation and for the worla was this: 
Total disarmaaent. 
A kind of aoney which keeps production up and aets the 
aoods to people. 
Secarity a88inst the risks of age, illness, disaster, 
and unemployment. 
The chance to train ourselves and after that the grateful 
iiscipline of work. 
16. Phillips, Cabell, review of ! Chronicle .2!: J"eopardy, 1945-55 ( Chi• 
cago, University of Chicaco Press, 1955) b7 R. G. Tu«well, in The 
New York Times Book Review, Aucust 1.4, 1955, 3• 
17. Tu&well, R. G •• •Gevernor or ~sident?,• New Repulllic, Vel. 54, 
No, 702, May 16, 1928, 381. 
18, 'Wallace, Schuyler c., The }f§J! Jl!Al.i!l. Action (New York, Herper, 
1934) 70. 
Freedca of thousht and of speech. 
A union of peoples throuch trade, common access to 
education and opinion, and free trsTal,l9 
Tu«well's personal loss due to misrepresentation was less U.por-
tant in itself than it was as an example of the effect of a kind of 
behaTior which can result in a serious loss to the nation, Certainly 
his ioleas were worth listening to, Viewa which he expressed over three 
decades a~o prOToke iiscussion today •• consider this statement, which 
sounds like an excerpt fr0111 Tugwell's article of 1929, "'From Relief and 
a Pel'lllllnent Af;riculture, • in 'l'll.e IIIey York Times of January 13, 1957, on 
conserTation, and its relation to acricultural economics: 
)lbch lll!lr&inal land that is now fa1'1118d must be taken 
out of cultiTation altogether if a dust bowl even 
~rester than that of the thirties is to be prevented, 
conservationists contend. The Department of ~icul­
ture has said that 14,000,000 acres unsuitable for 
croppi~ are lDein~ plowed. Likewise, -ny ranches 
are over~razed,20 
Or consider this o-sarTation in 1957 on Russia: 
The missin~ i~redient accordin~ to this analysis is 
a conscious national policy of keepin~ prices rele• 
tively stable while wa&es rise, thus putting insistent 
pressure on employers to modernize their production 
118chinery.~ ;c:, 
19. Letter to Roosevelt, September 16, 1940, ur~ing the President to 
•ke a speech on ~rican eias, Rooaevelt Papers. 
20. Jenaon, Donald, •specter of 30 1a at Drought Talk,• a report on the 
opening of a USDA-sponsored conference of agricultural experte 
froa fifteen etates at Wichita, Kansas; 2 million acres were dust 
end 29 million were ready to "blow' in the sptinc, comparell to nine 
million which •blew• in 1938, the last big dust-bowl year of the 
thirtiea, The Haw York Times, January 13, 1957, I, 68. 
21. :Raskin, A. H, COIIIIISnt on ])yyaic Factera ill Industrial Prod~activit:r, 
by SeyBUr Mellll!ln {New York, John Wiley, 1957) in The New York Ti-s, 
January 20, 1957, I. 
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In 1928 Tugwell wrote an article entitled •wap Pressure and Efficiency.•' 
Labor took up Tugwell's ar~nt that sains in technological ef-
ficiency should be accompanied by wge increases. In March, 19.55, Wal-
ter Reuther seids 
Yon know, we go tile urpining table and manapment 
asks• "'Don't you ever pt tired of asking fer IIGre 
and more and more?• The answer is, as long as sci• 
snce and technology through tile creation of abundance 
makes more not only ecenOBdcally just, ~t makes more 
and more economically neceasary -• the answer is yes, 
we are going in year after year ani asking for more 
and more and more •••• 22 
On the other hani, wage demands in excess of increases in productivity 
per man hour sharpen tile tilreat of inflation.23 
Concerning inflation, Profeaser Galbraith wrote. in Fe~ruary, 
1957. a provocative and peaaimiatic article on the wace•price spiral, 
which he attribute& to demands &y strong unions for wage iacreasea 
abeve incresaes in productivity. Gelaraith asserted that monetary ani 
fiscal restraint• stringent eneugil to break the spiral would cause 
havoc in the 110re competitive sectors ef the econOI!,Y ana create un-
pl.,.ent. Tile alternative of direct wee and price controls, Galaraitil 
noted, is pelitically uaacceptable. Be concluded that we cannot have 
full empla,rment without persistent inflation.24 
If it is possible that what is politically unacceptable coul4. 
l!evaweek. May 30. 1955. 67. 
Loftus. Joseph A., •u. s, Outpu.t Geias Fwn4 Decreaaell.• The Hew 
I!U T1•s. November 23. 1956. 56. 
Galbraith. 1. K,, •Are Living Costa out of Control?.• The Atlantic, 
February. 1957 • 
uso. 
in lteceaiDg politically acceptable, benefit the nation, this possibility 
should be publicized -· as Tugwell did in the case of wace ana price 
controls --and considered. Controls, ef course, raise basic questions 
in a free society. Professor Hofatadter cautiens, in effect, that an 
oYeremphasis of •expertise• and •·Jtnpatisa• can ltaYe serious iaplica• 
tiona for basic lilteral nluea.25 On the other ltando a toe-narrow defi• 
nition of liberaliaa can fail to reco«nize that there ~st be a soun& 
ecenoadc base if we are to Itaya aD7 lilterty, that America ltas diaplayed 
a flexiltility whiclt aeeta the d..ands of equalitarianiaa while preserY-
ins large areas ef liierty.26 Liberals aaat continue te sltow flexibility 
as to meana if they are to be effectin. Tiley often tend to sutter from 
acute nostalcia, approaching present-day probleaa in terms of the aiffi• 
cultiea we faced in tlte 19301a.27 Tucwell'a vritinca indicate that lte 
doea not fall inte this category.28 
Tae flexibility in American deYelepaent indicates that modern 
American capitalisa is •net ae a\))1. a •ayatem• as a cOJIWination ot folk• 
ways, hUIIBn !IBture, and horae aenae.•29 What the intellectual consider& 
25. Hefstaater, Richard, The !a of Reform, Chapter VII. 
26. Goldlllan, Eric F •• re'f'iew of 'l'b.e Decline 9f A!llerican Lib!raliaa (Hew 
York, Lonpans, Green, 1935) iy Arthur A. Ekirch, 1r •• in S.tur&ly 
ReYiey, Vol. 38, No. 51, Deceaber 17, 1955. 18. 
27. McWilliaae, Carey, •Tapa for the 1930's,• The Nation, Vol. 182, No. 
14, April 7, 1956, 269; SchleaiDger, Arthur M •• 1r •• 'Tite Future of 
Liberalisa: 'The Cltallenge of Aiundance .. '"' 'l'b.e Reporter, Vol. 14, 
Ne. 9. May 3, 195', 9· 
28. Tucwell. R. G., •A Planner's View of Acriculturt•a Future.• 1ourpal 
of Farm EconoaiCf, Vel. 31, No. 1, February. 1939. sb.ova an ability 
to loek at tlte peliciea of the 1930's in perspective. 
29. Editorial. The New I!!Ui T1•ra. April 1, 1957, 2lpl, 
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horae sense .. Y not strike the pa~liceat least for some tt.e. in taa 
same way. But he should be ~ivan a aearin~. for avery type of citizen 
can .. ke a contriiution to the atrencth and iaprovement of American 
life, The 1950's kava seen. in reaction to ~latant anti-intellectualism. 
so- attempts on a aeai•pepular laval. to explain to the )JIIIblic the 
natura and fUDction of tke intallactaal.3° ioth political parties nov 
cultivate the el&heads,31 However. craat chaD8eS in tae public•• atti• 
tudes towaris intellectuals must taka place if we. as Professor Curti 
says we mat • are coiBf!; to recocnize as socially useful and. iapertant 
all eur skills and. talents and capitalize them for the common cooa.32 
We need. not do the intellachal'1 s biddi~. but we should face 
facta. And it is often the intellectual who cives thea to us. It is 
te the nation's discraait and loss when it abuses a man like Hexford. 
Guy Tupell. It is hoped that tais stuiy. simply by tellinc waat he 
really thoucht and said. and dii. will contribute to a dt.inishinc of 
tke antacaaisa between intellectuals anll the rest of tae people. of what 
Professor Curti calls •the conflict ~etween thou&&t and notion.• 
31. 
32. 
•Tae ~Mil: Who He Ia; waa He Thinks He Is.• lllegveek. Octolfar 
6. 1956; •America and the Iatallactaal: The Reconciliation.• ~. 
1une 11. 1956 -- both •cover• articles. 
Baker. Russell. •G. o. P. to Appeal to Intellectuals.• lli New Yark 
IiaU. Aucust 3. 1956. 1:3. 7:6. 7. 
Curti. Merle • •rrican Parajox 1 ~ CGinflict .21: Theught and. ,lotion 
(Rev BrUDaviek. Rut~era University Press. 1956) 102. 
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Allstract 
Rexfor4 Guy Tuswell, Professor of Economics at Columbia, joine4 
the Roosevelt circle in March, 1932· He was Assistant Secretary of 
~riculture, 1933•34• Under Secretary, 1934-36, and Resettlement Admini-
strator, 1935-36. He helpe4 to write the National Industrial Recovery 
Act and the A~icultural Adjustment Act. He was an idea man; a pu'Dli-
cist; end an errand boy, llrinciag academicians, or their ideas, to 
Roosevelt. He was a member of several inter4epartmental boards. 
Overestimations of Tugwell's influence rested on the assumption 
that his intellectual iapact on Rooaevelt was decisive. Roosevelt ~ed 
or disre~rded Tugwell's ideas as he saw fit. Some policies were in 
accord with Tugwell's thinking; it is impossible to measure the profes• 
sor•s imJSct on such .attars. Roosevelt took no action on some of Tug• 
well's ideas, especially those involved in the institutional economist's 
concept of •conjuncture.• In one exceptional case, the field of fiscal 
policy, money, and banking, initial rejection of Tugwell's ideas was fol-
lowed, to some extent, 'Dy their tmplelllllntation - in the "Second" New 
Deal. Tugwell's impact in this instance was indirect - he was larsel;r 
responsible for Marriner s. Eccles' coming to Washin~on. 
Tugwell administered the old•line bureaus of Agriculture, reor• 
~&nizing them and attempting to increase the powers of one of them --
the Food and Drug Administration, a new agenc;r in ~riculture --the 
Soil Conservation Service, and a new independent a~&ncy --the Resettle• 
ment Administration. His sponsorship at Presidential direction, sf a 
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food and druss bill larsely acceuntei tor his becoains tke Adainistra-
tion's whippins boy. His attackers conducted a concerted, rutkless, and 
successful caapaiSII to defeat the 11i11 by diacreditiD« hi.lll witk tke 
public. They distorted his ideas, academic and administrative. Tkey 
iapuped his IIIDtins, adainiatrative allilUy, and loyalty. 
Tusvell defeated Georse Peek, Asricultural Adjustment Adainistra-
tor, in 1933 on the question of emp&asizia, production controls ratker 
taan asrketing agreements and subsidization of exports. By 1935 he lost 
hope taat the AAA would implement Ilia broad view of the fana probl_, 
which stressed the relationship of agriculture to the rest of the econ~. 
Tugwell was interested ia tke distribution of iacame among fa~ 
era theaselves, deplorin' the •capture• of the AAA by bis staple taraera. 
Through the Resettlaaeat Adainistration, whick he practically inventei 
ht.aelt, ke provided short•l'Wl assistance to ... 11 faraers, He also 
conducted what amouatea to a demenstration of lons•run possibilities in 
the conservation approack to the agricultural problea. 
Tugwell jud~d that Roosevelt's policies •saved the domestic situ• 
atiea.• They did not get at the roots of our economic difficulties. 
Tke New Deal, despite the AAA and the lOlA, whick vas •perverted" by its 
llusineas-adnded acl.ainistrators, was essentially •Progressive• •• an 
atteapt te 'Bake capitalists behave.• Adainistratively, Roosevelt defi• 
nitely a~ndoned •conjuncture• in 1935. Intellectually, the New Deal 
raaeiaed tora betweea truat•busting ana •concentration and control.• 
In 1938 Boesevelt finally saw that social asnacemeat rataer taaa 
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reform was necessary. The President's reco~ition of new policy re-
quirements, because of the neei for an anti•Axis policy and the da.estic 
compromises whick tkat aeed dictatei, was too late. 
Tu~ll resi~ed in leta 1936 prt.arily because, as an institu• 
tioDal econamiat, ae was not at ha.e ia the New Deal. To serve in the 
emergency aa &ad •sunk personal preferences.• Ha did not think Boose• 
velt's policies vera the best policies, but he considered Boosavelt tae 
bast .an available to lead the fi~t a~&inst depression, He believed 
that Roosevelt did his best, so.att.es usiD! devious means, to attain his 
end of taproviD! the lot of c...on mea. ~ll's service, partially 
motivated by personal l..,alty, was larcely intellectual in its origin. 
His backcrORad indicated thet he was not an emotional do-cooder. Never-
theless, his contribution was, in ita impact, humanitarian. 
